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Data from: Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building

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Data from: Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building

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Date Issued
  • 2016
Creation Date
  • 2012
Cite This Work

Driscoll, Jesse (2016): Data from: Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building. UC San Diego Library Digital Collections. http://doi.org/10.6075/J0KS6PHX

Description

PAPER ABSTRACT: After highly fragmented civil wars, order is often secured through the selective co-optation of rebel field commanders and atomized insurgents. This paper presents a formal model of civil war settlement as a coalition formation game between various regime and rebel factions. This approach emphasizes the ability of installed civilian rulers to lure warlords into the state based on promises of future wealth, then use divide-and-rule tactics to pit different warlord factions against one another. Quantitative and qualitative data from Tajikistan, including an original data set of warlord incorporation and regime purges during wartime reconstruction, are used to evaluate the model.

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1 digital object.

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Related Publications

Driscoll, Jesse. 2012. Commitment problems or bidding wars? Rebel fragmentation as peace-building. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 1, 118-149. doi: 10.1177/0022002711429696

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