

CONNORS: How about strikes during this period? I see we have a newspaper here, which is of the L.A. Herald Examiner for Thursday, September 7, 1967, and it's covering the Ford [Motor Company] strike, Ford, Pico Rivera [California]. How long did that strike last?

SCHRADE: I'm not quite sure. [laughter] That's a long time ago.

CONNORS: Was it a long, drawn-out thing?

SCHRADE: Not too, I don't think. Several weeks. But it held. During '67, we were up against a recession, I believe it was called in those days. What happened was the industry was trying to push us back on cost of living allowances and also on benefits for people already retired, because the UAW had this policy of constantly trying to improve the benefits of people who had already retired, because with inflation and other problems, it was necessary to keep those benefits up to snuff. Actually, what happened during that strike, we made the first two concessions in the history of the industry, and there was a never-never letter signed saying we would never, never negotiate for benefits for people already retired again. And we put caps on the cost of living allowance at that point, an eight-cent max for two years of the contract, each of two years. So that was a major step backward for us. And I think the recession-- I also blame Lyndon

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Johnson for that. One of the reasons I opposed him in that period, besides his escalating the war in Vietnam, is that he came out against the cost of living allowances during that period as inflationary. Actually, they're not inflationary except because they're dealing with inflation of the past, and the cure for inflation was not getting rid of our cost of living allowances. But anyway, he also took a position that price increases in the automobile industry were okay; he didn't move against those. So we ran into that problem in the '67 negotiations. It was one of my points of contention with Reuther when he tried to get me out of the antiwar movement, that Lyndon Johnson was doing wrong in Vietnam, but he was also doing wrong in terms of the economics of auto workers. So the strike at Ford with Ford as the target finally was settled after making those two concessions throughout the industry.

The big strike, though, lasted for several weeks in 1970 against GM [General Motors Corporation]. Part of it was to reverse those concessions, to get those two things back. Woodcock was ^ethan president. He had replaced Reuther, who was killed in a plane crash in May of '70, and so, in the fall negotiations, he was being challenged at that point as the president: ^{±±} what was he going to do about all this? So he was very militant early on calling for an old-fashioned strike against GM. This was the first

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strike, serious strike against GM for many, many years. So he was being measured both by members of the union and by the corporation. And it became a long, hard, difficult strike.

Despite the fact he called for an old-fashioned strike, we finally settled pretty much based on what Irving Bluestone said in the board meeting was what we could have gotten if we had tried to settle the thing at the strike deadline. We also got back the never-never letter; that was cancelled, on people's benefits who were already retired, and we got back cost of living allowances. So those two gains were there, but, according to Bluestone's analysis, and he was on top of the situation in the GM negotiations, he felt we could have gotten this without the strike. Now, when he said that at a board meeting--and this was off the record, legitimately off the record in this case because it was agreed to--Woodcock screamed at him. He said, "Even if it's true, don't say it!" I had some problems with the negotiations and Woodcock's performance, too, because he seemed always too respectful of the power of GM and the top executives. When the final deal was made on the strike, it was Woodcock going alone, as he said, "up to the fourteenth floor" of the GM building to meet with the top guy where it was agreed that things had to be worked out and they would settle the strike. And

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that kind of solo negotiations Reuther never would have done.

I always objected to Woodcock's doing things that way. And it was a problem I had when I went on the staff. I think I mentioned this before that, in two rounds of negotiations of new plants of North American Aviation in Neosho, Missouri, and the new Martin Marietta [Corporation] plant in Orlando, Florida, I was given a script to follow: "these are the offers the company is going to make, these are our demands, these are the second offer, third offer, and so forth, and this is what you settle at." In other words, there were prenegotiations between Woodcock and the top management, or Woodcock's top administrative assistants. And here, that same kind of thing was beginning to occur in the big three, and to me that was the wrong way to negotiate. First of all, in terms of union democracy, the committee ought to be involved. The local union members of the committee ought to be involved in these kind of things, and there ought to be none of these off-the-record meetings that went on.

The other objection I had-- Because I was involved in the national negotiations merely on the policy level, meeting in the board meetings and so forth in Detroit. But back here, I was involved in local negotiations, because we always had local contracts going. When I would call, for

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instance, from the Fremont [California] ^{local} to say,
"Look, these are the hardcore issues,"-- It was called
"rapping on the pipe upstairs." For instance, we would
signal our people in Detroit, "These are the hardcore
issues here at Fremont or at South Gate [California] or at
Van Nuys [California] plants of GM," and then they would go
to national management people and say, "This is what we'll
settle in Fremont." Well, that procedure was okay because
oftentimes there would be a national pattern on these
things which we could get into the local situations here.
But my problem was that we were calling the strike
headquarters ^{of} the UAW during this long strike against GM,
and that strike headquarters was on the fifth floor of the
General Motors building, and all my calls and their calls
back were going through the switchboard at GM. And, you
know, to me, GM can never be trusted based upon its long
record, and here we are, Woodcock's dealing a private
meeting with the top guy in the corporation to settle the
strike, and our whole strike operation, negotiation, is on
the fifth floor of the General Motors building. At least
it should have been on neutral territory.

These are the kind of things that began to really
gripe me about the Woodcock leadership. And the fact that
we didn't really win much in this, what Woodcock termed was
going to be an old-fashioned strike. ~~Low major progress~~

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going on, but we didn't make major process. We got a settlement which was kind of the traditional one without a strike, we did get those concessions cancelled out, and that was great, but we also were in a lot of financial difficulty. We mortgaged our buildings and our Black Lake [Minnesota] education center to the Teamsters union because we were in a relationship, at that point, through the Alliance for Labor Action. And we actually got General Motors to pay health benefits when it said it was going to cancel health benefits, because they were paying the premium. Of course, by contract, that should have continued to be paid, but GM was using that to leverage us in the bargaining. And when I quoted somebody about we took loans from the Teamsters union and from General Motors, Woodcock screamed at me in the board meeting saying, "It wasn't a goddamn loan! You shouldn't talk that way." Well, in effect, it was. So we were, in a way, beholden to GM on that level, too.

To me, it was not the Reuther style of militant bargaining and very careful recognition of the rights of the national committee of local union representatives and the membership. It was more autocratic than Reuther was, who was considered an autocrat, anyway, but at least he was very conscious of the need for maintaining the trust and confidence of the rank-and-file in the national committee,

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and I could not see Woodcock doing this. He was a whole different style which I objected to and still do.

CONNORS: Well, to take this up a little closer to this time, was that Woodcock practice pretty much institutionalized then within UAW? When [Douglas] Fraser came in, was there a change?

SCHRADE: Yes, there was also that with Fraser. There was one particular situation which I think is scandalous, and that is that was in the early eighties, when there was a real crisis in the automobile industry after the gas oil crisis and the major intervention of Japanese automobiles into the U.S. market, General Motors began asking to reopen the contract to make concessions on wages and benefits and work rules. The International Executive Board met on this in, I believe it was late '80 or '81; it happened over either '80-'81 or '81-'82. The board met in an off-the-record session and agreed to sit down with GM and talk about reopening the contract. There was only one vote against that, and that was from vice president Robert White of the Canadian region, a major part of the union. He voted against it. And that kind of bargaining and those concessions that finally occurred, Chrysler [Corporation], GM, Ford, Chrysler first led to the succession of the Canadian section of the union, which was probably our most militant, progressive section of the whole organization.

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But anyway, leading from that board meeting, there was an attempt to get the General Motors national council to go along with the recommender. There was a major conflict over that.

What finally happened was that it became exposed that Fraser and probably others in the top leadership had been meeting with GM to begin arranging the whole strategy to getting the union over in a position of making concessions. And when this was exposed in the newspapers, Fraser was charged with having secret negotiations with GM, and his response to the local unions was, "Well, it was a deliberately confidential meeting." That kind of euphemism for secret negotiations was-- He lost me on that one.

But anyway, there was a really tough struggle on this with very close votes on the concessions by the membership as well as the councils, but Fraser had his way and the concessions were made. Now, in terms of the economics of the industry, again, I disagree. They were wrong to do this, particularly since we didn't get very much for those concessions. So if the deal had been appropriate, then we lost in terms of translating those concessions into worker's rights questions, future benefits, investments in the corporation, and so forth, and those things were not done.

I think it was particularly scandalous in the case of

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Chrysler, where we gave away about a billion and a half dollars of Chrysler workers' money in terms of benefits, besides work rules. And the banks also got into that and took preferred stock. When I questioned the person in charge of the bailout of Chrysler a couple of years later, I said, "Well, what would have happened if we had negotiated like the bankers did for stock at that point?" And he told me the Chrysler workers would have wound up owning about three-quarters of the Chrysler corporation based upon the concessions and translating that-- But there was nothing like that.

CONNORS: Who was it that was in charge of the bailout?

SCHRADE: Brian somebody. He's also currently involved in the transfer of ownership of the United Airlines over to the workers there.

CONNORS: Now, was he a UAW--? Was he brought in?

SCHRADE: He was selected, I believe, by the [James E.] Carter administration, the UAW, and Chrysler. I don't know if there's a three-way on there or two-way of some sort, but he was selected as the person to arrange the bailout.

CONNORS: When you say the economics of all that was wrong, do you mean that while the auto industry wasn't as bad off or was making a comeback so that--?

SCHRADE: Yeah, there was certainly an opportunity to make the comeback, particularly if they'd done something early

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on about quality and design, which is where the Japanese and Germans were defeating us. The old concepts of the automobile industry, like Henry Ford used to say, Henry Ford II, "many cars, many profits", meant that they left that big opening there for the Japanese and Germans to move into. Even today, with all the attempts to get quality production, they're not meeting the same standards as the Japanese or the Germans, and consumers understand that. So this industry has been milking the public and milking auto workers for a long time and not really doing a good management job and engineering job on the automobiles.

And the UAW, I think, has been lax in pressing on those questions as well as getting a greater voice in these decisions in the corporation. I think we've got what's called a quality work life, more employee involvement, but that's generally in dealing with the day-to-day, hour-by-hour work on the assembly line. The major managerial decisions are still not in the purview of unions. Those people who say we've got democracy in the automobile industry are totally wrong and have a very contemptuous attitude towards democracy and the members of the union to think this satisfied any kind of democratic process or structure in the industry.

CONNORS: Well, how does team concept enter into this? This might be more of a latter-day-- Well, it was an idea

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that came up in the eighties, wasn't it? The early eighties?

SCHRADE: Yeah, in the seventies. There's always been this. Even in the twenties and thirties there's been talk of industrial democracy and how to formulate that in terms of structure and process and who has the power. But the current-day team process or jointness seems to be just another managerial gimmick to get workers to do more work for the same pay. What really happens is that the management, by bringing in workers into these cooperative kind of arrangements, gets all of the good ideas and the skills that workers have in terms of knowing how to do these things better than the management does. We're selling our skills and experience at a very small price. It's obvious that management has screwed up and been very greedy for a long period of time, and that's really what's created this crisis. And in order for the crisis to finally be solved, workers have to have much more say-so in how these decisions are made, from investments right on through design and engineering and the whole structure. Without that, you're not going to get a good system. So my general position is, yes, there's been major headway made in terms of employee involvement but at too high a price and at too little gain for the workers in terms of industrial democracy.

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CONNORS: How does what you're talking about compare to what the German unions have, for instance? I don't know what it's called. Codetermination, I think.

SCHRADE: Codetermination.

CONNORS: I've seen that idea criticized as being, "Okay, so you've got one worker representative on the executive"-- you know-- What do you call the board?

SCHRADE: The board of directors.

CONNORS: "The board of directors of the factory, big deal. That's just one person, one vote, and doesn't necessarily have any weight." Is that--?

SCHRADE: Well, I understand that it's a little different arrangement, that there's greater representation through the party system as well as through the unions in Germany. And there is more say at a top level than here, and it's been working for a long time. And German workers are obviously better off in terms of wages and benefits and job security. The whole economy there, as well as the managerial system and union-worker involvement, puts German auto workers in a much better position than American auto workers. I don't know that much about the codetermination system, but from what I've read about it, there's obviously more involvement at a higher level and all levels within the corporation in Germany. We're not even approaching that.

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CONNORS: The current leadership of the UAW, Owen Bieber's administration, his stand on this seems to be pretty negative. They've promoted team concept and revamping of work rules and that kind of thing, but it doesn't seem to be that what he's doing is answering what you're--

SCHRADE: No, I don't think he really thinks about these things this way. He's a staff member who became a regional director, an officer of the union, and we're now dealing with a situation where the civil servants have taken over, which means a very conservative approach with very little initiative in terms of new ideas and so forth that we had during the Reuther days. Reuther was a fighter, an organizer, and came up through militant struggle and a very difficult time of it. His concepts through that period were translated into programs and education in the union leading to a lot of progress in the organization. And there's some criticism of what he finally was doing, but at least his concept of what a union ought to be is far different from the Bieber concept.

Bieber talks negatively about team concept and jointness, but it's always at a UAW convention where he's trying to put down the opposition to team concept and jointness. And what happens is that a convention is the most insecure time for the officers of the union. That's when the unions open to democratic decision making of local

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union delegates who are elected by their own membership. Actually, it's ~~become~~ a very safe period, but there's always--and I knew this working for Reuther as administrative assistant and being on the board for ten years--this is a period when you make promises, you make commitments in order to get reelected. Oftentimes it's for a good cause. I'm not talking about corrupt people at this point in doing that. But that's an area of insecurity for even the best of the officers of the union. So what happens is, when this criticism begins mounting within the membership and within the delegation elected by the membership of the convention, then you find Bieber, as he has at the two last conventions, saying, "Well, we're not really whetted to the team concept. There have been criticisms," and so forth, "and we're going to deal with that, or we'll get rid of it." Well, that's bullshit. All he's doing is trying to get through that convention so he'll be right back in bed with General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler on these, what I consider, objectionable concepts of team and jointness. He'll be right back in bed with them the next week dealing with them on their terms in the main.

I think it's a very dangerous thing in terms of--I've just been going over a lot of this stuff with Jerry Tucker of the New Directions movement--in terms of how do we deal

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with some of these questions in terms of democratic process and structure? And one of the things that has happened that I think is most abhorrent in the jointness thing and this cooperative effort with the corporations is that there's a whole new cadre of union members working within the system who are now part of the managerial system, and they are paid by the corporation and generally appointed by both the union and the corporation. They have to be acceptable to the corporation. They now serve as a political arm of the administration of the union, and since they don't want their jobs eliminated by the people who oppose the team concept of jointness, hundreds of these people are now within the corporation who are out campaigning against any oppositionist to this kind of policy. So the union leadership now has an unfair advantage in terms of the politics of the union. How do you deal with that kind of thing? So we not only have civil-servant mentality on top of the union but also kind of a civil-servant mentality within the in-shop representation system. They're not fighting the management on grievances on behalf of workers; they're trying to reduce the problems and trying to get a cooperative kind of thing going. So the corporate agenda becomes the most important thing. I think it's a really dangerous situation we're in.

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CONNORS: You said that Bieber had been a regional director.

SCHRADE: He's been a local union officer at some point in the Grand Rapids area of northern Michigan, and I think he was on Kenny Robinson's staff, who was a really good director for the area--not too good on the Vietnam war, but generally a very good union guy. I think he was the assistant director there. I don't know if he succeeded Robinson when Robinson died, but I think that's the way that-- Anyway, he became regional director on the board, and then he became a vice president. Then he beat Ray Majerus out of the presidency.

CONNORS: So that was my question. Who was he against? Or was he against anybody when he ascended to the presidency?

SCHRADE: Yeah, Ray Majerus was the secretary treasurer, which is generally the number two in terms of power on the top of the union. Bieber was a candidate, and I think there may have been one or two others, but it came down to Bieber versus Majerus. Now, Majerus was disliked for a number of reasons--his personality and so forth, so there was a real split on the board on this thing. It came down to a fifteen-eleven-- Let's see, how was that? It came down to a very close vote, in fact, maybe even a tie. What happened was that on the second vote, two members shifted from Majerus over to Bieber so Bieber got it. And Fraser

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was the man behind the throne on this one, because his successor was being decided by the board, or at least for board endorsement. I remember, as I understand it, Jerry Whipple, the regional director here who succeeded me, was under threat because of a financial deal between him and the union attorney here and was finally forced out of office over that. But he was still in office at that point. And the guy in the Wisconsin region-- And Doug was able to get them to agree to shift over to Bieber on the second ballot. As I understand it, he was really threatening Whipple at that point. I don't know how he got the other guy, Ralph-- The names are slipping. The regional director of Wisconsin. But anyway, that occurred and was put to bed, because once the board agrees on a slate, that's it, and they go into the convention that way.

CONNORS: Do you think Majerus would have been any different in dealing with this?

SCHRADE: Well, certain integrity questions came up afterwards. In fact, he was under investigation by the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] on some health plan deals. I don't know if he was guilty of that or not. But then he also died soon after that. He came up out of the Kohler [Company] strike, had been a leader of the company union there, and then shifted over to the UAW. A fairly militant guy.

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But I think he got very power hungry and money hungry, because the local out here criticized him because when he was out here supposedly as head of Aerospace Department, on the staff, he always liked to have his meetings and spent an awful lot of time in Palm Springs just enjoying this area and not sticking to business. And we had some disagreements over some politics as well during that period.

But again, that's part of the problem of democracy in the union. We've got a one party system that has total control of the apparatus and the money and all the resources of the union, and whatever the board decides is going to happen in the convention. The convention has never reversed the board on anything, except, during the Reuther days, there were some fairly good opposition movements going. But it's all very staged and worked out in advance at the highest level.

CONNORS: Well, I wanted to talk about a few other things. But, in that we are on this subject of New Directions and what's happened in the UAW, I'm trying to decide whether we should finish up talking about Jerry Tucker and the others involved in that, yourself, how you got it going and all that. Let me jump back in time and finish up a couple of other items and then--

SCHRADE: Did we talk about my defeat in 1972?

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CONNORS: Yes, we did.

SCHRADE: We did, okay.

CONNORS: We did. We talked about that.

SCHRADE: All right, that's done, because that ties in with some of the points of contention that I was having with Woodcock.

CONNORS: But you did mention off tape--and we might bring it up here--is that in the convention of '72, he accused you of being a representative of Wall Street. Is that what he said?

SCHRADE: Yeah, an agent of Wall Street.

CONNORS: An agent of Wall Street. How did he mean that?

SCHRADE: Well, he was upset because Norman Perlstein, who is now the managing editor of the Wall Street Journal and was then a reporter, who was very friendly to the UAW, he wrote an article about my political problems with Woodcock going into the '72 convention and sort of tied me in with the whole Reuther social unionism concept and the shift in the union under Woodcock to less than that. So Woodcock was very upset about that, and that's where he tied me in with being an agent of Wall Street.

CONNORS: But did he say this in convention?

SCHRADE: Yeah, yeah. I think we ought to stop. [tape recorder off]

CONNORS: We just examined the proceedings of the

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convention in order to get the exact wording here. Why don't we just read that.

SCHRADE: Yeah. As a result of that Wall Street Journal article, Woodcock referred to that in the convention where he was responding to Anne LeFebvre, who had criticized him for being the architect of my defeat as regional director in that convention, and he said that he disliked being dragged through the capitalist press, referring to the Wall Street Journal article. What he didn't also say is that he was a columnist for the Wall Street Journal occasionally. So his tie with the capitalist press which we were being criticized about was really not a big issue.

CONNORS: Who was Anne LeFebvre?

SCHRADE: Anne was an international trustee, one of three, the first women who we had proposed as a candidate in the prior convention, and the leader of the women's ^{rights} committee in McDonnell Douglas Local 148, of our women's rights committee in the region. She got up and really blasted Woodcock and [Kenneth] Bannon and [Pat] Greathouse for being responsible for my defeat as regional director, and she said some very kind words about me and my service in the union. Then she declared that she would not run and serve with them. So she declined to run again as a international trustee because of all this. So that's the time when Woodcock got up and blasted her and blasted me.

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Here I'd been defeated the day before, I was standing in the back of the hall talking to some friends, the whole convention was going on, and I said, "What the hell is he trying to do?" I said, "I'm already done." That's when I got up and responded to him. That's all in the record of the convention.

CONNORS: So you responded at that point?

SCHRADE: Yeah, because I didn't know what to do at that point, because he kept this blast going, and it was uncalled for, certainly unfair. So I walked up through the convention and up to the platform, and the convention started just quieting right down because they saw this confrontation thing. But I didn't know what the hell to do at that point. Finally, I got up to confront Woodcock, and people grabbed me and said, "Don't do it Paul! Don't do it!" I said, "I don't know what I'm going to do. ✓"

CONNORS: Hold on.

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CONNORS: So what did you say?

SCHRADE: Well, I attacked Woodcock saying I was sorry the convention had to be exposed to this kind of diatribe and that to label me as part of the-- Oh, he also tried to connect me not only with the capitalist press but the right to work movement in California, which has been a very difficult fight we were going through. And I said something like "the worst kind of McCarthyism I've ever heard in this union." Well, I didn't want to keep attacking Woodcock, so I talked a little bit about my life in the union, that it was the best thing that ever happened to me, and that I really felt that I had a chance to do things that I wanted to do until this point, and that I would go out and try to build the union stronger and better and declared that I was going back to work in the shop, although I had a right to go back on the staff of the union. So I got a good response from the convention on that. But before I got a chance to speak, Woodcock denied me the floor to respond to him. This has always been a tradition of the UAW. If any personal attack took place, a person had a right to respond. So as my friends on the board were holding me back, thinking I was going to slug Woodcock, which I should have done, Mazey went over and

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argued with Woodcock saying that I had a right to respond. But that argument took quite a bit of time. Finally, some friends of mine from the big local in Ohio, a very militant group there that had been doing some new things in strike action-- What's the name of that local?

CONNORS: Where is that? In Norwood?

SCHRADE: No, middle of Ohio ^{in Loudstown} It was a big GM plant. They had made national media because they were carrying on strike activity against GM in a different way, and it showed that younger workers who had never worked in industry before had ideas about strategy and tactics that were effective.

So one officer ^{Ryan Price} of that ¹¹¹² local got up on the floor and said, "Schrade has a right to respond to this." So I was given a right to speak at that point and then did what I had to do. So it was a very difficult time because I was now being denied the right to office in the union by a political deal of a few officers. I found out later that actually the votes used against me ^{from} Local 509 were illegal votes. The delegates had not been democratically elected in accordance with the UAW constitution. I didn't know that, and I should have known that, ~~that~~ ^{that} they were elected in the joint council, which is a total violation of the constitution. This was discovered by Pete Beltran, who ran for regional director the next term, the next

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convention. He found out the same thing and he protested it. But he didn't win the protest as he should have. Those delegates should not have been allowed to be seated. But the International Executive Board, to preserve it's position and not the constitution, decided that it would not happen again, this kind of thing.

CONNORS: So Pete Beltran, he's from the Van Nuys--

SCHRADE: Yeah, GM Van Nuys Local 645.

CONNORS: And, of course, he's been one of the main figures in opposing the team concept and all that kind of stuff.

SCHRADE: Yeah, the team concept. And brutalized in the politics of the union by the regional director, the national officers, and GM, generally working in concert. And that's one of the things that happens in the politics of the union, that when you have this large cadre of people working for the corporation to keep things under control, the politics change, and the union and the company are more likely to be working together in the politics of the union, which is totally against what we used to have. I think the additional problem that we're going to get into as we go down the line is what the politics of the union, in terms of state politics and national politics, is going to be if we have this cooperative relationship with the corporations. Are we going to also adopt the political agenda of the corporations? Because that's always possible

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when you begin working together this way, not recognizing there are some basic conflicts that can't be resolved and can't be solved through cooperation.

CONNORS: You've mentioned Pat Greathouse several times as being Leonard's choice for Leonard's successor, perhaps. Did I get that right?

SCHRADE: Yes. He announced that, and it was published in the New York Times. That was when? Early seventies.

CONNORS: Yeah, when Fraser came in.

SCHRADE: Before Fraser, yeah.

CONNORS: Yeah. Well, he was director of organization for the UAW at this time?

SCHRADE: Yes, and also vice president in charge of--

CONNORS: Was it Forge and Foundry [Department]?

SCHRADE: Agricultural Implements [Department] and some other smaller departments. But those were the two main ones.

CONNORS: I think he was part of Forge and Foundry.

SCHRADE: Yeah, yeah.

CONNORS: But he went back a long time with the union, right?

SCHRADE: Oh, yeah.

CONNORS: He was one of the early members.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Where did he come from? Do you recall?

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SCHRADE: Chicago area.

CONNORS: Chicago.

SCHRADE: Yeah, he was regional director there. In fact, ^{when} he was elected ^{vice president} when Jack Conway made a move to go back to his region from the Reuther staff and run. But that was opposed by Woodcock and some other people. I think [they were] frightened of Jack's skill and experience. And Reuther backed away from Conway, too, mainly to preserve that kind of leadership cadre on the board, the conservatives and the main who didn't want a guy like Conway as a regional director, then a vice president, maybe a president, because any vice president is always looking at the regional directors who might become vice president, therefore competitors for the top positions. That game goes on all the time. And Conway was really hurt by that and up to that point thought that Leonard was a personal friend and ally, but Leonard didn't prove out to be that. That was 1955. It all happened during the merger convention. That was smoldering in the barroom, that issue of whether Conway ought to be director or not.

CONNORS: Oh, yeah.

SCHRADE: And ^{Robert G. ...} ~~Greathouse~~ became the director and I think a fairly conservative person on the board and a friend of Mayor [Richard] Daley's. So we had difficulties during the '68 [Democratic] convention when we ^{were} condemning the

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*Against The Democrats
our Split*
police action there, and also ~~that~~ on the Vietnam war, which
was something of a test for all of us.

But contending to replace Woodcock for the presidency at that time were also [Irving] Bluestone, Bannon, and Greathouse, the three of them. And it was finally announced that there was an agreement that Fraser be the candidate. Bluestone probably wanted it, but I think he was more likely the ^{stalking} ~~stocking~~ horse for Fraser to try to outmaneuver Greathouse so that the Fraser-Bluestone votes would finally be combined, to take out Greathouse. So Fraser became the candidate. Again, another decision made in Solidarity House within the board with no democratic participation except in a final endorsement by the convention without opposition.

CONNORS: Well, Doug brought the UAW back into the AFL-CIO, too, in '84 or '85 or somewhere around there. How did you see that? Did you see that as being just another--?

SCHRADE: Well, we left for good reason in '68, and I supported that. I didn't see any real change under the [Lane] Kirkland leadership in terms of a lot of the international relationships that we had with the ^{Third World} labor movements, and the AFL ^{CIO} association with multinational corporations and the CIA, and--

CONNORS: You're talking about things like AIFLD, which is the American Institution of Free Labor Development.

William Wimpisinger, president of the International Association of Machinists union protected Fraser's action. He had been negotiating a merger with the UAW which he wanted to complete ~~and~~ then together they could negotiate with the AFL-CIO on re-affiliation.

The return of the Teamsters (still under corrupt officers) to the AFL-CIO was another result of the yielding without negotiations.

SCHRADE: Yeah, that had not changed. And again, there was no effort to say, "okay, we'll come back if so and so and so and so occurs." It was just sort of Doug, the yielder again, like he yielded at Chrysler, like he yielded the presidency to Woodcock in 1970 when he had it. Doug was just too nice a guy and not a hard bargainer. Going back into the AFL-CIO made some sense, but what were the arrangements at that point? Was it just a move to go back in and be party to the same kind of corrupt relationship in other countries? It appeared to me not worth it at that point without having some understanding about that and some understanding organizing the unorganized, where there was not much being done by the AFL-CIO.

Here again, I challenged before the Public Review Board the method in going back to the AFL-CIO, because it had been a convention decision to take us out, there had been convention discussion of it, and what happened was that Fraser went to regional conferences and sold the idea. I think the region around Flint [Michigan] was really opposed to it. So what happens in this kind of situation, you sell it in those areas and build up votes to a point where you can really take out the opposition without the opposition having a chance to influence the other regions. It's Federalist Paper Number Eight by [James] Madison, where you isolate the opposition in these

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