

there, Mike [Michael] Peavey representing Tommy [Thomas L.] Pitts--nobody from the national AFL-CIO at that point. But Mike was one of the better people inside the AFL-CIO and was really interested in doing this, even though Pitts wasn't, ^{He} who was the secretary-treasurer of the California Labor Federation [AFL-CIO]. So we marched, met with Mayor and Reuther, in his own persuasive style, tried to say farm worker unionization is inevitable and you ought to begin adjusting to this.

So the mayor agreed to come to a meeting that night, to another rally at the union hall, to speak there and express his interest--but not support--in peace in the community. Then we got a feeler from the growers. They wanted to meet with Reuther that night. So after the meeting at the union hall, we went out to a grower's home, this huge place, and there was a dinner party going on in one section, and several of the key growers--I don't remember any names at this point. Key growers from out there were trying to say to Reuther, "You can't do this to us. We've got all kind of problems and so forth here." Very wealthy people talking about problems with their workers and not understanding that people had a right to a decent livelihood and decent lives.

CONNORS: Well, would it have been DiGiorgio [Corporation], do you think?

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SCHRADE: Possibly, I don't know.

CONNORS: Because they were also, well, they became a focus group.

SCHRADE: Yeah, this has been written about, so you might find something in the books about it. But I don't remember who-- We had a very exciting, heavy day.

What happened though, too, which also persuaded us to move to get other national people in there, was that there was a letdown then of abuse by the sheriff's department in the Kern and Tulare counties against pickets where they were being jailed for merely picketing along the roads on public property. So, because of national attention now, the city officials as well as the growers began to back away from a lot of the violence that was going on against the farm workers union organizing efforts. So just about four or five months later we got Robert [F.] Kennedy to come in with ^{the Senate on Migratory Labor} ~~a subcommittee and a Senate labor committee~~ to do an investigation, housing and jobs and conditions in California. And that again helped fend off the violence against the union organizing efforts. So that became part of our strategy, to constantly feed people into Delano. It finally got to the national press that there were real problems in California, because they became exposed to the housing and the jobs and the treatment by the growers and also by the sheriffs. So it was a good part of helping

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that movement get started.

CONNORS: When did the merger take place between the two farm working groups?

SCHRADE: Good question.

CONNORS: We can find that, but I guess I would like to-- Was it after the march to Sacramento?

SCHRADE: Yeah, probably '67 or so, around there, because there was a lot of pulling things together. In '65 there was a DiGiorgio election, which was a real crucial test of whether the Farm Workers could really organize or not, because the [International Brotherhood of] Teamsters had signed a sweetheart backdoor agreement with DiGiorgio. And ^{Gov} Pat [Edmund G.] Brown [Sr.] came forward and got an agreement that there would be a new election. There'd be an election, and if the Teamsters won, fine; then they could negotiate the contract. Otherwise, the farm worker's union would be able to do that. We won the election. That was a major effort. The UAW put a lot of money and people into that campaign, as did a lot of other unions and groups, a lot of religious groups involved in that effort, as well. So we had a really smashing victory. And I think that probably helped bring this whole thing together. And the AFL-CIO, through Kircher, was involved at that point. As director of the National Organizing Department, he got involved. So pulling all these resources together was

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really helpful in winning that election.

CONNORS: ^S No Kircher would have gotten involved more in that '66, '67 period, then.

SCHRADE: Yeah, right.

CONNORS: How did you respond to his coming on the scene? Was there any sort of tension from the old days? Or had that been put aside?

SCHRADE: Yeah, because it was very difficult to trust the AFL-CIO, because they were sort of very timid and disinterested about farm worker organizing, and it was only when it began to really perk and begin moving along with the help of the UAW and then some other unions--

Packinghouse workers union [United Packinghouse, Food, and Allied Workers], Amalgamated Clothing workers and so forth--that they began to see, "Well, we'd better get into the leadership of this thing." So Bill Kircher understood the politics of union organizing and that Meany should not allow Reuther to just take over and become the main support for the farm workers' organizing effort. And he was very competitive with Reuther anyway, Kircher was, because he had been disappointed in not winning a ^{UAW} regional director's position in 1949. Jack Conway, who was very helpful in the farm workers organizing with us, ~~and he~~ and Bill had contended over that, and ~~Jack~~ ^{he} felt ^{that Jack} ~~he~~ was mainly responsible ^{for} ~~for~~ losing that race. So there was a lot of

behind the scenes

A competition between the Kircher-Russo group, but Kircher and Conway in that struggle. So we decided to be creative with the competition and constantly challenge the AFL-CIO to ~~do more~~ ^{do more}. We'd put up some money; they'd put up some money. We would provide help in the organizing; they would do it. So it was a constant upgrading of the support which was-- And Chavez was aware of this. He became the natural leader of the farm workers' movement. Larry Itliong was very helpful, too, in bringing the Filipino group into the effort, but he didn't have the kind of charisma or the mass base that Chavez had, so Chavez became the real leader and a very effective one.

CONNORS: You mentioned that the packinghouse workers were involved. What was the capacity of their involvement?

SCHRADE: Well, they had contracts for many, many years in the packing sheds, and a very strong militant union posture. Bud Simonson was the director. Who's the guy who was the head of the organization? Ralph Helstein. He was also a very good Democratic leftist and was fully in favor of our doing this. In fact, Bud and I became really very strong allies in politics in the farm workers movement and also the antiwar movement during the struggle in Vietnam.

CONNORS: Well, let's talk a bit about the march from Delano to Sacramento. Were you involved in that?

SCHRADE: Yeah, we helped organize it. We were there at

the beginning, but because of my bureaucratic responsibilities, I wasn't able to spend the time to march that number of days to Sacramento. But we were a part of the support system, saw them off, and then we joined the march when it got to Sacramento and were at the demonstration at the state capitol.

CONNORS: And what was the upshot of all of that?

SCHRADE: Well, we were trying to bring pressure on the legislature and on Pat Brown to do something about legislation on behalf of the farm workers' organizing effort. There was no state law covering union organizing, and that was one of our goals. We must have had ten, twelve thousand people in Sacramento. It was over a holiday, I think. ~~Maybe~~ Memorial Day in May of '66. That was the year of the election, too. We felt we had some sort of leverage on Pat Brown to really give leadership to this. And the state AFL-CIO were not very interested in supporting legislation, because I was at the governor's house for breakfast with a group of union people from the AFL-CIO, and I was the only one that really spoke out on behalf of farm worker legislation. We talked priorities in the legislature with Pat Brown, and Tommy Pitts would not. So we, in a way, were isolated because of that, despite the fact there was this tremendous movement that was going on in the state at that point.

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CONNORS: What would have been Pitts's agenda? More in the area of workman's comp?

SCHRADE: Worker's comp and unemployment comp, building trades issues and so forth.

CONNORS: Hot cargo.

SCHRADE: Yeah, yeah. Traditional trade-union, political, legislative programs, which is obviously important, too, but here we had an opportunity to really ^{help} ~~(X)~~ out the farm workers movement.

CONNORS: But this is the difference of social unionism and business unionism you were setting before.

SCHRADE: Yeah, and even--

CONNORS: I know. I mean, I'm aware of that kind of dichotomy, but I think that social unionism through things like the farm workers became much more widespread as an understanding of what unionism should be--

SCHRADE: Should be, yeah.

CONNORS: --and should do.

SCHRADE: And this was a way to reach out to the liberal community that would normally support the labor movement, but not on those kind of traditional goals. It wouldn't oppose us, but there wouldn't be that strong feeling for it. But with the way the farm workers movement was organizing in rural areas as well as the urban areas and bringing a lot of the liberals in the community--middle-

class, upper middle-class people--into that movement, that here was a chance for the AFL-CIO to really develop that relationship and become stronger politically, which it has to be and had to be. And that's one of the things that's wrong today. There isn't that kind of strong alliance with these other groups.

CONNORS: Where was Jack [John F.] Henning at this point? Was he in state government? Or was he--?

SCHRADE: Let's see, he was--what?--the ambassador to New Zealand, right? Under Kennedy. Then didn't he go to the Labor Department after that? Yeah. So it was Tommy Pitts's period as secretary-treasurer, a very conservative guy in terms of these issues. He wouldn't oppose you, but he wouldn't be out there with you, either.

CONNORS: Would he have labeled this sort of interest as too radical, too left wing? Or just that it's not what unions ought to do?

SCHRADE: No, I think he's more of the traditional business trade unionist. He wouldn't really oppose you, but he's not going to do very much *helps to us.*

CONNORS: The twentieth convention of the UAW was held here in Los Angeles.

SCHRADE: Yeah, '66 again.

CONNORS: Or was it Long Beach? It was in this area in '66, and you were the chairman of that, I think.

SCHRADE: Well, I opened up the convention as ^{the} resident regional director. The UAW had never met in California before. Now it always meets here. We had a big lobbying campaign in the '64 convention: ^{##} balloons and placards and tourist material to the delegates. We got a resolution passed then to come to California. So the farm workers appeared there, and Reuther was fully involved at this point. Pat Brown was a guest at the convention, too. My mother []] and father []] were there, because they were living out here at the time. It was kind of a joyous period because the farm workers movement was really developing through ^{over} the whole union, because the boycott was being supported around the country, and so people throughout the UAW, not just those of us in California working directly with the farm workers, were deeply involved emotionally and strategically.

So we arranged this demonstration. Reuther always kept putting things off. He was always dealing with the problems of the moment. I asked him, I said, "Here are some notes about Chavez. Why don't you check these out ^{when} and you introduce him." He said, "No, this is your show; you introduce him." So at that point, we had arranged for some farm workers to come up and sing "De Colores" and "Solidarity Forever" to the convention, and Reuther saw these people coming up and he said, "I thought you were

going to introduce--" I said, "We're going to do something quite different." So they started singing, and then the farm workers moved in, maybe four or five hundred of them with farm worker flags coming through the convention, and, Jesus, people just went wild. It was a highly emotional way to do this, expressing our support.

CONNORS: Oh, God, yeah. ^{##} I can imagine.

SCHRADE: It was just great. And May Reuther marched in with them, too, and they came up on the platform with their flags, and I put Chavez on. It was great. It was really one of those great moments.

CONNORS: In your intro-- Either it was your intro or your report on what was happening at Delano, you introduced the attendees there to the idea of huelga, that whole idea of shouting the slogan "Viva la Huelga!" ^{##} That must have been a very powerfully moving moment.

Was Dolores Huerta involved at this point?

SCHRADE: Oh, yeah. She always was right from the beginning, one of the great leaders of the movement and still is.

CONNORS: What's her background like?

SCHRADE: Again, a farm worker family, and I think she also came out of the CSO movement with Chavez. Yeah. They were great allies all the way through and still maintain it, despite a lot of the difficulties they've gone through in

the last ten, fifteen years.

CONNORS: You mentioned a moment ago about the Teamsters, and that always comes up as the thing that just gauls people who are following this. At the time, I think it was such a black mark on the Teamsters.

SCHRADE: Well, the Teamsters, because they were connected with heavy equipment and truck drivers and so forth, did have an interest in the agricultural industry in California, even to the point of loaning money to some of the growers ^{like Bud Antle} up around Salinas for big equipment. And being more conservative, they just didn't want to get involved in organizing cheap labor. It was not their thing. But they were able to bridge into a place like DiGiorgio and sign off contracts, cheap contracts, just to keep the farm workers union from developing.

CONNORS: Well, was that a deliberate effort, then? Somebody said, "Let's not let this happen, so you go in there and take care of that."

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: But why?

SCHRADE: Well, to protect their own situation, to defend their membership in the industry, the heavy equipment, truck drivers. They didn't want industrial unions moving into the fields and into the industry to the point, though that-- They had a very decent guy who's still quite

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politically conservative, Einar Mohn, who was vice president out here. And at one point in a rally we had in Bakersfield with farm workers, I suggested that one way to deal with this was to set up a mutual assistance ^{raid} no-rate agreement in the industry: ^{longshore} Packinghouse, Distillery Workers [Distillery, Rectifying, Wine, and Allied Workers' International Union of America], Teamsters, and the new Farm Workers union. And the only place that was reported-- well, some Teamster representative may have heard it at the meeting--was the People's World, the communist newspaper in California. And so Einar Mohn called me the next day and said, "Look, are you serious about that, that kind of arrangement? I said, "Sure, and I think Chavez would be, too." But ⁺ Simonson with the Packinghouse Workers, I cleared it with him before I even said it. So early on we had a meeting with Mohn and heads of the union, and we did work out a written, mutual-assistance, no-rate agreement, which then put the Teamsters in a position, "Well, here we've got the agreement with the backing of the UAW and the Packinghouse Workers union. You can't trust Chavez, but we might be able to trust these other people." So that got worked out, and it lasted for a long time.

Teamster President

I think the thing that broke it finally was Frank Fitzsimmons was here in Los Angeles and made a speech to the American Farm Bureau and came out for right-to-work

legislation in such a way that it would prevent the Farm Workers from organizing. It was a terrible, terrible statement. And then there were certain people in the Teamsters who decided that-- I don't know if Mohn had resigned or retired or something. But guys like Bill Grammy-- I think he was head of organizing or something for the Teamsters, and they began raiding and fighting back. So I think that finally broke it.

CONNORS: So that agreement was enforced for a number of years?

SCHRADE: Probably two or three years, yeah, in the late sixties, maybe into the early seventies. I don't know. But then I disappeared, was defeated in '72, so a lot of these things just weren't done. There wasn't the same interest ^{by} my successor.

CONNORS: Well, did you keep contact with Chavez and the farm workers people that you had become close to in the ensuing years?

SCHRADE: After I was defeated?

CONNORS: Well, even after the strike was finished. The farm workers have still had to struggle for every step they take, there's no doubt about that. And there have been all kinds of things said about internal dissention in the way the things run, but--

SCHRADE: No, I was mainly there during the good days when

Conrad
full name?
William

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organizing was going on, the boycotts and the strikes, the
march from Coachella [California] to ^{Calxico} El Centro [California]
in '69, I think. But then I was under attack from about
'69, through the '70 convention, and into the '72
convention by the UAW for spending too much time with the
farm workers, and ^{our} the social unionism ~~approach~~, ~~our~~
~~state~~ efforts.

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CONNORS: Could you tell me about the march you just mentioned from Coachella to El Centro.

SCHRADE: Around the Indio area there was the Imperial Valley. See, there were strikes going on at that point. Let's see-- We did a memorial to Robert Kennedy down there one night at the strike headquarters of the camp. We were also going to the camps in the morning to try to talk to workers in their dining halls, which were very primitive.

Let's see, ~~the~~ '69-- There ^{were} ~~was~~ efforts-- There was one grower, ^{is Lionel Steinberg}
^a liberal Democrat, whose name ~~I don't remember-- he'll be~~
~~angry but that's okay--~~ ^{in US} we met with the labor department ^{with him.}
over the Fourth of July weekend to try to negotiate. I was with Dolores [Huerta]. Cesar usually didn't get involved in these negotiations because he didn't like that part of the work, but Dolores was very effective at the bargaining table, as were some of the other officers in the union. But the whole thing was developing around Coachella. Finally, Chavez decided that, because of that, he had to do something very public, and marches were always a very important way to get the issues out and to get media attention. So the march from Coachella was organized.

I remember we were able to get Reverend Ralph Abernathy out from the SCLC [Southern Christian Leadership

Conference]--[Martin Luther] King [Jr.] was already dead--
and organize a press conference for him at the airport
before we took him to Coachella. He accused America of
being genocidal in terms of farm workers and blacks. One
guy in the media ^{made} a very ^{abusive} violent attack on him for
making such statements and so forth. So Abernathy was
really hard-line at that point and was an important
addition to the march. We took him down and he marched for
that day.

We also tried to get Ted [Edward F.] Kennedy
involved. ~~His people didn't want him, and~~ his staff didn't
want him involved, thought there were security problems and
he shouldn't be doing the same thing Bobby was doing, you
know, this kind of nonsense. David ^{Burke} ~~what's his name?~~ He
wound up with the Dreyfus Fund, now at CBS [Columbia
Broadcasting System]. Big deal. ~~What the hell is his last
name? Not enough clues there for you.~~ Anyway, he was the
key staff person. I finally decided to go over his head
and call Ted directly and got him in his office one day and
said, "Look, as far as the security problem that Dave is
talking about, you've got to deal with that, and we'll do
everything we can to provide security here, but that's the
most difficult question, and you have to decide that." So
I said, "But Chavez never asked Bob unless he really needed
him, and Bob always responded, and all I'm saying to you is

that Chavez really needs you for the rally in Calexico [California] on Sunday." And so Ted said, "Let me talk it over with Dave and I'll get back to you." I never heard from him.

So I marched that day, Jerry [Edmund G.] Brown [Jr.], who was then secretary of state, came ~~out~~^{down}, and Abernathy. I can remember it was a very hot, dry day, and my feet were totally blistered. I found out from Chavez's nurse that you should wear heavy rubber soles because it's not the walking that does this, it's the hot pavement. It will often be twenty degrees hotter than the ^{air} temperature. So I just sort of struggled back to the motel where we were staying in El Centro. And Gloria Steinem was doing media stuff for Chavez at that point. I remember walking into her room, and she had all these messages out on her bed. She said, "I wasn't here, but somebody took a message from somebody that sounded like Ted Kennedy calling in." And I said, "Oh, it must be that goddamn John Tunney," who was not a real supporter, just coattailing on Ted, usually. So I went to bed. And early in the morning, Ted's guy Dave called me on the phone and said, "We're in Los Angeles and were coming down." I said, "Well, that's a surprise." He said, "Yeah, you won, you son of a bitch." [laughter] So we then had to quickly make arrangements for Ted to get in there. They were coming down on a commercial flight. So

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we made arrangements, talked to the El Centro sheriffs^{^ f} to provide protection, and the farm workers union always did. They had a lot of guys available to protect anybody. Chavez always thought that we could do a better job than the law enforcement, anyway. So Ted came in and, sure enough, in flies John Tunney in a private plane at the airport and starts coattailing Ted again. Are you interested in all these anecdotes?

CONNORS: Yeah, absolutely, absolutely.

SCHRADE: It was a wonderful day. So Ted and John Tunney and Mieke [Sprengers Tunney], John's wife, and a guy from Tunney's staff got in the car, and Jim [James] Drake drove us down to the motel. And during that time Ted said to me, "How are we going to settle these things? How are we going to get the growers around to really begin to negotiate on these contracts and so forth? I said, "Well, there are a few growers who are sort of liberal Democrats who are interested, but they're not going to do very much, because they're not going to really challenge the whole system out here: ^{the} the banks and the oil companies and the growers that run this industry." And I said, "By the way, Ted, why don't you talk to John Tunney about this, because the growers are all his friends these days." And John got embarrassed and Ted gave me a dirty look. So John started mumbling about how he might be able to do something, but

obviously he didn't have any answer.

CONNORS: Was Tunney's constituency really from that--?

SCHRADE: No, this bastard--

CONNORS: Where was his region?

SCHRADE: The Imperial County and San Bernardino County.

When he first ran for congress, it was a combination of the farm workers union and our union and the packinghouse workers providing very heavy commitment on people getting into the district, our money, and we got this guy elected. But then he became friendly with the social people in that county, with the growers. He was good on most liberal issues, but on this one, he was the kind of guy who would say, "Well, I'll support farm workers being put under the NLRA", which is not what the farm workers union wanted; it ~~was~~ *would have been* disastrous for them. But that was his way, his ploy. But at the same time, he was friendly with Ted. They were roommates at college and buddies and so forth. Anyway, John was there.

Then we met Chavez in the motel--he was staying at the same place--and when we went over to see him--~~we~~ [#] didn't want to go outside because of security arrangements, so the only way to get over to the other side of the motel where Chavez was staying was to walk through the kitchen. And I just about died at that point. It was the old memory of Robert going through the kitchen. You know, there's

obviously no danger at that point, but it was just a sickening feeling. Well, anyway, we got to Chavez. So Tunney and Ted and I began talking about that evening and where Ted would be on the program, because we had a big rally at the town square in Calexico. So John said to Cesar, "I'd like to be on the program." And Chavez said to him, "Look, John, we know your position. You're not really with us. You're not supporting state legislation. You're supporting us under the NLRA, and that's not good. And besides, you're not supporting the boycott the way Ted and the whole Kennedy family is, so we can't put you on the program. We don't want to be embarrassed because there's going to be a reaction to you're appearing there, and we don't want you embarrassed." And so John says, "Well, maybe I'll just come down and wander around ^{at} the rally and just see people." And Ted said, "You can't do that. You're the resident member of Congress here, and that's not ^{upholding} ~~fitting~~ the dignity of your office. Be on the program or ^{attend.} do not. You've heard Cesar's arguments about this. "They're valid." So that fended John off for that point.

So during lunch, Ted started needling him, teasing him unmercifully about his position, and John just couldn't get over to the point of where he would be supportive ^{of the farm workers} and so forth. John finally got angry because he was being really humiliated by Ted at that point. There were four or five

of us at this lunch thing. I was just sitting back watching these guys go at each other. John finally got angry and said, "Ted, you can't say that I haven't stood up on every issue in the Congress." And his staff guy said, "Which ones?" And here Ted's yanking the rug out and this other guy is doing the same thing, and John just got really angry and--

But then, that afternoon, Gloria Steinem and Lula Woodcock, who had separated from Leonard [F. Woodcock] at that point--she was living in La Jolla--she came over for the rally, and we went in her car. And just as we were leaving the parking lot, up trots John Tunney. "I want to join you at the rally." I said, "You're not going down there, are you? He said, "Yeah." I said, "You're not going to be on the program. You heard what Cesar said and what Ted said." "Yeah, but I want to go." So he got in the back seat with Gloria, and I remember her remark to him when he got in the back seat with her. "John", she said, "You've got the accent and you've got the teeth, but you're really no Kennedy." She just deballed him in the back seat of the car. So we went down to the rally in silence.

He then went to Jim Drake and got himself on the program. And here there are about 5,000 or 6,000 farm workers and supporters in the town square in the early evening, and I remember we were on a flat bed truck with a

^{of}
mic and everything, sitting there, color guards ~~and~~ the ^{of}
farm workers union behind us. So John gets on the ^{of} mic
early on and he says, "I want you to know I respect your
leader, Cesar Chavez" and so forth. And a chant started:
"Support the boycott! Support the boycott! Support the
boycott." So John just sort of gets stopped, and he leaves
the ^{of} mic and comes by Ted and me and Cesar. So Ted began
shouting at him at that point with cupped hands around his
mouth, "John, support the boycott! Support he boycott!"
[laughter] John disappeared at that point, as he should
have in the first place. It was a very embarrassing time
for him, but he deserved it. Such a fake.

Anyway, Ted said to me at that point, "What's a
Spanish word for peaceful, serene?" I said, "Look, Ted,
I'm not up on the language." So he asked one of the farm
worker color guard behind us. And I said, "What did you
want to know that for?" And he said, "Well, when I get up
to speak" he said, "the sun's going down, and this place
has been very peaceful." And he said, "Then the television
lights are going on and they're going to destroy that peace
and serenity." And I said, "Oh, Jesus Christ, here we are
in this goddamn ^{border} town and he's a perfect target there on the
back of this truck." It was one of those things that just
happens; you get so fearful ^{for these} of the guys. And finally he
got through and through it, and we just got him off there

and into a sheriff's car, and they had a police escort out to the plane. And when that door closed on the plane, I was really pleased, because it was, again, a very risky, courageous thing to do on Ted's part. And the arguments that this guy Dave had used about security and not doing the things Bobby had done, Ted really did. And it was a good thing that he did, because I think it helped Ted politically as well as personally to know that these are the kinds of actions that he ought to take.

CONNORS: Other politicians came out and spent time with the farm workers in various capacities, various visits. I know Walter [F.] Mondale came out for a while.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Do you have any association with him? Any meetings?

SCHRADE: No, that would probably be more part of the AFL-CIO getting him out. I wasn't that close to Mondale.

CONNORS: Did [Hubert H.] Humphrey ever--?

SCHRADE: No, no. ~~I'm sure he was supportive.~~ ^{He refused support.}

know that he went there or made the visit or did any of the rallies or demonstrations. I'm pretty sure he did not, because one of the things that turned me on to Robert Kennedy during that period was that he was meeting with civil rights leaders as well as rank and file minorities, going to communities and really counseling and trying to

find out what was going on. He was going beyond the transition from being not so interested in the civil rights thing to really becoming a part of the efforts in Mississippi and Alabama when he was attorney general. But I don't think he fully felt what was going on in the South or in minority communities around the North and the West, Midwest, but he knew that he had to understand this. So after his brother got killed, he got out and did these things, as well as going to third world countries and getting an understanding of what people's problems were about and how to deal with them. So he was the first liberal Democrat that I had ever seen go to a union hall like the Filipino hall strike headquarters of the farm workers and come out for the boycott, come out for the strike, and then go out to the picket line in front of the DiGiorgio ranch. Liberal Democrats don't do this sort of thing. They sort of give lip service to NLRA and to unions and so forth and try to get endorsements and support the traditional program. So Robert Kennedy, in a way, was getting into the movement.

I didn't see Hubert doing that or Mondale doing that, and certainly Eugene McCarthy did not do that. And he might have beat Robert Kennedy in California in 1968 in the primary if he'd done something like that. I know his handlers tried to get him to do this, but he was more

interested in meeting with poets and talking baseball, and he really didn't want to relate to people this way. He's more the intellectual and philosopher than the politician who was interested in dealing with rank-and-file Americans. So this turned me off ^{on} to people like Humphrey or McCarthy, that they just weren't ready to really dig in and help.

CONNORS: McCarthy never approached the UAW for support?

SCHRADE: He probably did, and he had some state support in different areas, I'm sure. But he was a fairly conservative senator, and I just don't think we had that much truck with him at all. The brilliant and the best thing he did was coming out against the [Vietnam] War early and confronting [Lyndon B.] Johnson. I think he deserves a great deal of credit for that. But that doesn't mean that he's presidential material and that he's going to be good on all these other issues. I did support him in the convention after Bob got killed, even though the Kennedy delegation didn't really know where it was going early on. But we finally organized ourselves into the McCarthy camp to support the antiwar resolution against the Humphrey-Johnson forces.

CONNORS: Because Hubert wouldn't have taken up on that?

SCHRADE: No. A very difficult problem. Reuther was working with the Humphrey group and I was working with the

Kennedy-McCarthy-McGovern group who were negotiating on a platform position against the war. Reuther thought he had Humphrey sold, and I thought, what I'm getting from our people who are negotiating with Humphrey's people is that there was a real confrontation on that during the ^{negotiations} convention. I was right and Walter was wrong. Humphrey would not come through. His relationship with Johnson just ^{at} wouldn't allow him to do it, to really challenge Johnson on ^{the} it.

CONNORS: While we're on that subject, Meany said that Humphrey, in that election, had come from so far behind with so little that the assessment afterwards was that, with just with a little bit more effort, Humphrey could have been elected. Do you see that?

SCHRADE: Yes, yes. Yeah, there were a number of us in the antiwar movement who came out in support of Hubert. I wrote a thing in the New Republic at the time, reasons why we ought to be supporting him. And I think it was just two weeks before the election when he made a speech ^{in Salt Lake City} where he indicated his own independent stronger position against the war, a slight break with Johnson, and he started bouncing up in the ^{Dolls} polls because people then said, "Well, maybe there is some hope in this guy, that he will do something different from Johnson." And a lot of people were pressing him to do that in the campaign. So yes, I think that if

Hubert, at the convention, had shown some sort of break with Johnson on war policy, he could have made it. So, even though there was support from the Kennedy-McCarthy-McGovern group in the party and antiwar activists, it wasn't enough. He's responsible for losing that election by not recognizing that the Johnson policy was a murderous one, and wrong. It's just too bad, because we got [Richard M.] Nixon and four more years of war and corruption in government.

CONNORS: To finish off on the farm workers discussion, I'd like to sort of bring it up to more recent history. Cesar Chavez went on a hunger strike, I guess it was last year.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Within recent months. And, granted, you were not involved in the same capacity, but what was your response to all of that?

SCHRADE: It was in '88.

CONNORS: 'Eighty-eight, yeah. Come to think of it, I guess it would have something to do with what you're interested in now through the ACLU with the worker's rights activity that you're involved in, because that was his--

CONNORS: Well, through the ups and downs of the farm workers movement-- I wasn't a real participant after '72, because Chavez was warned by the leadership of the UAW that if he had anything to do with me, they would cut him