

do this, because you're really going to mess things up and so forth." So on that kind of analysis, I felt that we had to go ahead and do the best we could, and we did.

One of the things that determined us was the approach of the corporation. There's that one famous quotation of Starkweather's that we've used just to show what we were getting into and what we're facing. And this was one of the things that persuaded Reuther, as well, that we had to really teach this corporation a lesson if we were going to establish ourselves as a legitimate union at North American Aviation for the first time. Just winning the '52 arbitration decision wasn't really establishing the union. This is a direct quotation of Gene Starkweather, who was then vice president in charge of industrial relations at North American Aviation. He said to us across the bargaining table, "I control North American, and when I sign an agreement, I intend to control the union." Which means that once you have negotiations completed, then you've got to be under the discipline of the corporation. You're a creature of the corporation. Well, in my own idealism, even as pragmatic as I could be, I couldn't live with this kind of a concept and neither could my union colleagues.

So we made the decision. We went to a membership meeting. What we did was call a meeting, I believe on

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October 22~~nd~~ or 23~~rd~~, at the end of the contract. We called a meeting during working hours, at 8:30 in the morning, Culver City Stadium. There's a big picture of it in the Life magazine of that time showing that--We had practically everybody there. Everybody came from the plant or came directly from home, and we had a rousing strike rally and a practically unanimous vote to continue out on strike.

CONNORS: This was a story that ran in Life magazine for November 9, 1953, a one page photo essay, actually.

SCHRADE: And the same thing occurred at Fresno Local 1151 and Columbus Local 927. They had these big rallies and confirmed the strike votes which had been taken earlier in bigger meetings back in September. And so we went out, and it was called what we called "Midnight Walkout" because the strike officially started with the swing shift that night. So the meeting must have been on the 22nd. The 23rd was the end of the contract at midnight, and then it was at "Midnight Walkout". The swing shift came out en masse with very few staying. So the strike started and--

CONNORS: That got pretty good coverage, too--television and newsreel coverage.

SCHRADE: Yeah, newspaper and magazines, because a major war plant with a history of the 1941 strike, it's the first strike attempted since that time. We're still in the

Korean war, so in some way the product was essential, even though the Defense Department said they were not interested in intervening to end the strike or end the possibility of a strike. In fact, during that period the Defense Department told Livingston that they'd give ~~him~~ North American Aviation sixty days to advance their deadlines on the contracts and would have sixty days more if they needed it. They, in fact, gave North American Aviation a quarter-billion-dollar contract, which was a sizeable contract during that period, for more production. So in a way the Defense Department was intervening again in the strike in a very negative way by giving North American Aviation extensions on their delivery dates as well as giving them more in the way of contracts.

CONNORS: You said that there had been a stab at Federal Mediation.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Did somebody from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service come out and meet with you?

SCHRADE: Yeah. I don't remember the representative. It's probably in the record, but I don't remember the name.

CONNORS: You mentioned you were working closely with Bill Beckham and Ross. At the local level, who was your committee?

SCHRADE: Well, vice president of the local, Jack Hurst,

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became chair of our strike committee, and people like
Carter Paine, Elmer Lyons, Al Epstein, Don—what's his last
name? He'll never forgive me. But several others. We had
a very broad leadership group. We called our committeemen
the stewards, and we had a couple hundred as a strike
committee, and we had already set up a strike kitchen in
advance and had our picket signs ready. We had consulted
with the officers of Local 148 at Douglas Aircraft
[Company] in Long Beach, where they had a strike in 1951.
We had Spike Innis assigned to us who was an old-time guy
out of the east who was our major support guy, because he
was fully ⁱⁿ favor of the strike. We also had some help from
Harold Clements, John Allard, and so forth, but we didn't
feel that we had full commitment from Allard or from
O'Halleran or the other people in the National Aircraft
Department, Livingston, Russo, and Kircher. They gave us
lip service in terms of support for the strike, and they
went along with the strike decision at the membership
meetings out of loyalty to the organization, but we felt
that, in terms of running the strike, and winning the
strike we were not going to get major help from them; they
were not really committed to doing that. We felt really
let down by them during that period. And as the strike
continued, we also had the feeling that they were
occasionally sitting down with the company. The company

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made a major effort through phone calls, from meetings with people in the membership, visits at their home, letters, press releases, and so forth, making a major back-to-work effort, which succeeded in great part. And during that period, we were concerned that Livingston and O'Halloran and these people were sitting down with the company and sort of counting the people coming back to work and counting the days when they could end the strike and take over. We don't say they were disloyal, but they just were not as supportive as they could have been.

They were relying in great part on the company's figures on the back-to-work movement, and what we were never able to convince them of was that a great deal of the back-to-work movement was major employment of scabs, and they were using these figures of the new employees as people who were returning to work from the membership. We watched those figures as well because we were concerned about how far we could go, and we knew we had our limits, that at some point we'd have to end the strike and get back to work, whether we gained anything as a result of it or not. It was mainly our hard work that had built the local to this point and organized new members and prepar^{ed}~~ing~~ members for this experience. So we felt our commitment was greater than theirs. And as soon as the membership began dropping down--I think it finally got down to around 12,000

from about 16,000; I think our figures were 4,⁰⁰⁰ or 5,000 thousand who had ~~gone~~ back to work towards the end that we sort of had in the 11,⁰⁰⁰ or 12,000 area--that we ought to be getting really seriously considering this. We finally did. We got to the point we were getting into early December and the Christmas vacations and so forth.

It was one of the first big experiences with the new strike fund the union had, too. We had major money coming in, but it was based on need. So we had this heavy interview program going on: "Do you really need the car payment? Do you need the house payment?" Because we committed ourselves that nobody would lose a car, nobody would lose their home as a result of not making payments. We would either get these payments deferred or would pay them as a bottom line. Soon after that, the union changed this, and it became strike benefits as a matter of right rather than need, and you didn't have to go through this whole needs test, which was very, very difficult. We had major support from a lot of unions, from the CIO, from the CIO councils, from around the UAW, people did food collections, money collections. We did a radio program every day, which we paid for, a fifteen minute report. I think we were doing it at NBC [National Broadcasting Company, Inc.] in Hollywood on Vine Street at the time. Bill Crago would interview me or other people in the

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strike, Dick Cartwright who was a major player in the strike, another ~~one~~ of the really good leaders. It was before the days of hotlines, I think, and we felt that by constantly reporting and because people knew we were on every evening at that time, they could get the latest information on the strike and keep people informed. We were getting massive picket lines. We had heavy effort by the company to end picketing. They finally did win a restriction from a very reactionary judge that the picket lines would have to be spaced so that people were twenty feet apart. We had lots of gates to cover, and this wasn't effective picketing. I think this may have come out of our knowledge of the strike in 1941 where the U.S. Army troops were around the whole plant; what we did was develop a picket line which what we called the longest picket line in the world. We just had people marching twenty feet apart or so around the whole plant. We'd picket the plant rather than particular gates, which I thought was a very effective way of dealing with it. It gets a lot of attention so that people understood that picketing was still going on. And that was part of the strike.

CONNORS: Well, that was then named "Schrade's Parade" is that right?

SCHRADE: "Schrade's Parade"

CONNORS: Who gave it that name? Do you remember?

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SCHRADE: Well, it became more of a political assault on me that it was my strike, that it was the "Yalie Youngsters" strike. There was "Schrade's Parade" which was sort of demeaning what workers were doing in fighting for these major issues. And that resulted a lot from the O'Halloran-Allard-Livingston attack on us, which, in a way was a challenge before that, but became an outright attack on us after the strike.

CONNORS: What percentage of the work force did go out initially? Did you have a--?

SCHRADE: I would say 95 percent.

CONNORS: Ninety-five percent? It was that high?

SCHRADE: Easily that. Maybe more.

CONNORS: And production did stop.

SCHRADE: Did stop. And even though they rolled airplanes around, they never produced one plane during that strike, even with the new hires and people who were members of our union who went back to work. They never produced anything, because we had our people inside who were reporting on all this stuff, too, keeping us informed of what was happening. And even though they were talking about that and they had ads about delivering 50,000 airplanes over their history, they weren't delivering anything, because they couldn't. The skills were outside on strike, most of the skilled people, and they couldn't put together that

kind of team in there with the people they had, the new hires, as well as the people from our membership who were scabbing.

CONNORS: So by the time the strike was called off, you were down to, you say, about 11,000, 12,000 people?

SCHRADE: Yeah, 11⁰⁰⁰ or 12,000 members, which is substantial. It's still the largest membership we'd ever had and a good percentage.

CONNORS: And the skilled people stayed out?

SCHRADE: Pretty much, yeah, the tool and die department and the jig and fixture people and machinists, all kinds, were very good in the strike, part of the leadership of the strike. Jack Hurst, for instance, the vice president of the local, had been a committeeman in the tooling department, was a toolmaker himself--

CONNORS: He's an interesting character. Red Aston spoke some about Jack Hurst. He said that the union was pretty much his life.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: He said that when he was president later on--we can talk about that--but he would be calling meetings at all hours of the night because that was his [#] where did he come from? *shift*

SCHRADE: Oklahoma. Marlow. Yeah, he was a wonderful guy, a very good, close friend. He'd been with the O'Halleran-

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and during the ~~1953~~ strike

Allard group but didn't like what they were doing going into the [Local] ~~33~~ and joined us. And we recruited him on our slate as a vice president. He was a very, very good guy. And part of the-- You know, there was a lot of migration from Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Texas, and that was a large part of our membership. Many of them came out during the thirties during the dustbowl period to work in the farms of California, and then, during the war, came into the aircraft industry because better of pay and lots of work. And those who came out during the war, too, didn't make that transition from the California farms into the factories, so a large part of our membership was from Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Texas. Jack was a good cultural representative.

CONNORS: Were there many who had experienced the '41 strike as well as the '53? Or do you suppose that the turnover was such that--?

SCHRADE: Turnover was too large. I think we did a breakdown on that at one point. I think less than 1,000 were still there who had been through the '41 strike.

CONNORS: What about attempts to stop scabs from going in or attempts to keep guys who were out on strike from returning. Did that ever turn violent?

SCHRADE: It did in a number of ways, but it was infrequent. We had a hardline policy, because we

understood that violence was going to work against us, as it usually does, unless you are working in mines, because you've got community control and a better situation with mine workers. And we knew that we were going to lose our picket lines, that we were going to have war injunctions against us, and the propoganda against us would be tremendous with this company who was already attacking us viciously. So we had a hard line. So when there were breaks with that policy, we just moved in and took over. Maybe this is one of the things that Red Aston is talking about. If anything was breaking out at a particular picket line, Hurst would call a meeting and immediately move a ~~stank~~ ^{flank} squad in there to stop what was happening. And we had coordination with the LAPD [Los Angeles Police Department], too. There was a guy who was in charge of strike situations for the LAPD. In fact, Reuther tried to hire him as a bodyguard at one point because he was fairly friendly and cooperative, even though he was protecting property in the main. But at least we could deal with him. And he would report to us anything where they had intelligence where things were going to happen, and we would then move in and stop. So I would say there were very few people injured. I think there were four or five or six discharges as a result of people involved in those kind of situations, but we got those people back to work

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because the charges weren't too serious.

CONNORS: Did you talk to the ranks and try to smooth over the bitter feelings that would come out when guys did go back to work? I know that in one of The Propellers, after the strike was over, there was an anonymous poem--and I'd have to go back to Red's manuscript or the newspapers themselves--but it was a real touching kind of poem about "I thought you were my friend" sort of thing, "but you stabbed us in the back." It was a very bitter kind of lament about people returning.

SCHRADE: Well, there was a lot of bitterness and anger in membership returning, because hundreds of our fellow workers had really undermined the strike and reduced our ability to deal with this company, particularly on the wages and benefits that we were seeking and had a right to. But we went through a period where that became pretty intense, and the calling the people scabs and not talking to people went on for weeks and months, and we were cautioned about this by the international union. It's another thing where Livingston and his group became very aggressive on that and saying, "We've got to make friends with these people. We've got to reach out and try to rebuild the organization." And although that was good in principle, in terms of rebuilding the organization and building new solidarity, it couldn't happen overnight.

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Those feelings were just too strong.

One of the things we tried to do in a positive fashion was we developed a little gold button, a fifty-four-day button, for those of us who stayed out on strike. It was kind of a positive statement that we made the struggle. And that was criticized by Livingston and O'Halleran and these guys; "You shouldn't do that. You're agitating the scabs and people--" So again, it became more of a political attack on us in terms of helping us rebuild. So it became part of that thing.

One of the other political things that happened, which we really were angry about, was that the regional office [UAW Regional Office] had a Christmas party, and O'Halleran invited staff and local union representatives but also some corporate representatives. Well, that goes back to some other stuff that happened in the fifties in the convention about the politics, which we ought to get into, because it sort of set the stage. But he invited Starkweather and Cole and Stewart, these company representatives who really had viciously attacked us, had beat us into the ground with the strike, destroyed our ability to really fulfill our commitment on the wage equity question, the benefits questions, and so forth, and put us in a real tough position, which we recovered from over the next year. But here they were and it was characterized as here the company

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and the National Aircraft staff and O'Halleran are dancing around the Christmas tree on our graves, which wasn't exactly the way it was, but it hurt us badly that this kind of thing could occur. We felt that this wasn't really loyal to the union, even though they opposed us politically. And recently it was confirmed, because I raised this with a former management person who is retired from North American Aviation now, and I said to him, "One of the things that concerned us during that period was that Livingston was going to make some sort of a challenge, either a kind of a loyal opposition on the board or take him on as president." And he says, "We knew about that. He was going to make a real challenge against Reuther." I said, "Well, we were suspicious of that." He said, "We were more than suspicious, because we were communicating with these people during that period." So in a way we knew we were really in for it from O'Halleran, and Livingston, Kircher, Russo and Allard after the strike.

And just to go back into the '53 convention, we had put together a program of cooperation with O'Halleran back in '51, '52, with Reuther, that we would cooperate with him, we'd try to get along. Certain of our people of the regional cauc^us were put on the staff, like Maynard and Stinson, Cartwright from our local, and then, later on, Allard, [Ernie] West, and [Charles] Bioletti, who were part

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of this original Rainbow Caucus of 1949, who were all
together. So there was some sort of a coalition in the
regional office of the National Aircraft staff. And in
1953, one of the sessions I had with Reuther about the way
the Grievance Committee was going in this hearing--he
wanted a fill-in on that to see how the hearings were
going--I went in and met with him with Jack Conway one day,
and he tossed a bundle of clippings across the table at me
from Los Angeles newspapers which reported that O'Halleran,
the regional director, and Noah Tausher, the assistant
director, were in an automobile crash with the vice
president of U.S. Spring and Bumper [Company]. There was a
question of booze, whether a driver was drunk, whoever that
was--I don't remember. They were on their way back from
the Santa Anita race track, and they had been in
negotiations on a new contract with [UAW] Local 509. And
Reuther says, "How come you people out there put up with
this?" And I remember his words. He said, "If any regional
director did this in Michigan, we'd tar and feather him and
ride him out of town on a rail." And I said, "Well,
there's one good reason why we do this: because we vote for
him, because you tell us to vote for him. You endorse him
every convention. That's why." And he just sort of
blinked at that point. And then, going out of there, I
said to Jack, I said, "Jesus, I hope I said the right

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thing." He said, "You said exactly the right thing." So at the end of the convention, Walter-- We were at Atlantic City at that point. Detroit was the first meeting in his office. He called me and Dick Cartwright and Conway in and he said, "Look, that conversation we had back in Detroit about O'Halleran", he said, "I will never ask you to endorse him again", which gave us the license to really-- He wasn't going to participate directly, but he said, "Just do what you have to do." And so part of it, I'm sure, is that Livingston probably got wind of this about Reuther's position on O'Halleran and began moving Allard. And that's why Allard came to me and said, "If I do a good job for you in negotiations--"

CONNORS: That makes sense, yeah.

SCHRADE: So all of this began coming together. And then that Christmas party, and the representatives of the company and the union are together dancing around the trees. If they did or not, I don't know. But we really had hardball politics going at that point with the region against us, with Livingston against us, and so forth. I don't know where you want to end at this point, but--

CONNORS: No, let's keep going. We've got some more tape and--

SCHRADE: But going into '54, we had new elections coming up. We were still on annual officer's elections in the

local. We were under attack inside the plant from the company, our people were being pinned down, our opposition group was creating all kinds of problems for us, saying we never had a strike authorization, this was "Schrade's Parade", we didn't have the support of Reuther or Livingston, and that sort of thing. And these are guys coming directly from O'Halleran and the Allard group saying these things, saying the strike was a mistake and so forth. So we were under a real attack. And the company was going along with this because they wanted us out of office, too.

CONNORS: Just a couple of things on the mechanics of the strike. So the aircraft department people would be meeting with the company. It was a standoff. Nothing was happening, though, and that just persisted day in, day out.

SCHRADE: Yeah, we did have some mediation meetings during that period, but they were uneventful and not useful. But Livingston, Russo, and maybe Kircher, maybe Allard, would be meeting with the company separately from us.

CONNORS: So how did you understand that, at some point, you would have to call off the strike, and when you got down to, as you said, 11,000 or 12,000 people, you knew that that was the time. But was there a certain amount of agony around that?

SCHRADE: Oh, God, yes. Sleepless nights and a lot of

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agony, because we knew we were in trouble. We didn't know exactly how this was all going to come together. Actually, the settlement, in terms of traditional bargaining, wasn't too bad in terms of wages and some of the benefits and so forth. We didn't get a retirement program. We didn't move on the wage equity question at all. The company won in that. We didn't get the union shop back. But at least it was-- And the other thing that we fought hard for, at that point, is that it be a one-year agreement, not the three-year agreement, so that we would have a chance to come back. So we did get a one-year agreement out of it and an opportunity to go again.

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CONNORS: Last time we ended our discussion with just the aftermath of the strike of 1953, specifically, things like problems on the shop floor, what the attitudes of the workers were towards each other--those who had stayed out and those who went back in--the need to rebuild the union, and your suspicions as to what the internal politics of the whole thing had been. I thought we could pick it up with that now talking about how the whole thing was assessed in the UAW [United Auto Workers]. And you are showing me here your report to the membership of Local 887 on what happened in the strike. Maybe we could talk about that and how the other officers in the UAW were treating you at that point.

SCHRADE: Well, the membership that remained on strike-- There was a division between the people who stayed on the strike and those who went back to work. The company felt this, too, and were after us to resolve that. We were not in the mood to do that early on, because we were making a struggle over very important issues, and we felt that people who had gone back to work didn't really have to. We were maintaining people's homes, cars, and food supply, and the issues were so important that we felt that what they had done was wrong. There was also a large group of people hired during the strike. In fact, that was the way the

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company inflated its back-to-work figures. And a lot of these people had no experience, had done nothing during the strike; the company had never produced an airplane during the strike. So there was a kind of a three way mix: the new hires, the people who had been there for some time and gone back to work, and those who stayed on strike. So it was very difficult, disjointed, no real harmony, and the company wanted to achieve that quickly. Well, there's no way to achieve that quickly. We were called on the carpet on this by some of the international officers that we were continuing the struggle and alienating people who were already alienated, and we began modifying our militancy in terms of trying to get back in shape and to rebuild, to reorganize. And, about the only thing we did--and we were criticized again for this--we put out a little gold button commemorating the strike, a fifty-four day button. It was a very small button, but it was a symbol that people wanted to show that they'd made the fight and that we had really built ourselves in a stronger and better way. But again, that problem remained, and there was a lot of grievance activity and a lot of fighting with the company.

We were also under attack from the group that we talked about before, John [W.] Livingston, the vice president in charge of the aerospace department and our bargaining council at North American Aviation [Inc.],

[Cyril V.] O'Halleran the regional director, [John] Allard on the Livingston staff, [Noah] Tausher, who was the assistant director, [Paul] Russo, [William] Kircher, and that whole group. They had a prestrike political strategy, and that was to try to organize us into their group against [Walter P.] Reuther and his group. We had forestalled that because we were closely identified with the Reuther administration, as was Livingston, but he was trying to build his own independent power. He was protecting O'Halleran, who hadn't been part of the Reuther changeover in the forties, was hanging on, and there was a move to replace him with John Allard. John was very important in our negotiations and tried to win our support and get a commitment from me before the negotiations and the strike, and I refused to give it to him. So that strategy continued. We had people in their caucus^u and they had people in our caucus^u. There was always spying activities on each other's politics, so we knew what was going on.

So the move was to really put Allard into the regional director's position. The corporate people and the Livingston team had a fairly close working relationship with corporate officers that were in negotiations. And one of the things we really objected to was that just a couple of weeks after the strike ended, they continued that relationship in a Christmas party in the regional office

where there was a lot of drinking and claims of beating us politically. Our objections were that this was not a corporate question, this was a union question, and that that kind of collaborative effort was wrong. Recently, I saw one of the company officials who's retired and we talked about this. I said, "We were very suspicious about what was happening at that point, with Livingston being in this close relationship with the company and after us. Our suspicions were that he was after Reuther and Reuther's job." And he said, "Suspicious, hell!" He said, "That was what he was going to try to do." I also talked to Jack Conway recently. He and his wife ^{Lu Verne} had their fiftieth anniversary up in Colorado. Monica [Weil Schrade] and I were up there for that. And we didn't spend much time talking about the UAW, it was not that kind of thing. We've sort of got an agreement now that the old war stories we've told enough. But he went over that whole period, because he was in conflict with Livingston as well, because, when Reuther was shot in 1948, Jack represented Reuther in the General Motors [Corporation] and the Ford [Motor Company]-Chrysler [Corporation] negotiations. Livingston didn't want Conway around, and there were serious internal difficulties over that. That kept occurring, and when Reuther would want Conway involved, because Jack was a key guy on his staff and was very

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skilled, very intelligent, and knew the power apparatus of the union as well as the corporate systems and was a valuable ally-- At one point in the fifties in General Motors, Livingston said he would walk out of the bargaining room if Conway came in with Reuther, and Reuther backed down at that point. So there was really bad blood topside there. And we were feeling the impact of that as well in our situation because we were on the chess board of this big power game, and they wanted our local, they wanted our region, and to continue this effort against Reuther and Conway.

So in the '54 period following the strike, we knew we were going to be under attack, we knew that we had to really build, reorganize the local, keep the confidence of the membership. And I think one of the worst things that they did, they began challenging the legitimacy of the strike. Their political allies in the local said there wasn't even a strike authorization from the international union. We had to reprint the strike authorization to show it was authorized, because they were saying this was my strike, this was "Schrade's Parade" and there was no involvement. It was difficult to deny when there were two other locals on strike, we had the authorization, we had this full participation in the strike meetings, and so forth. But it was the challenge of the political

propaganda that we had to meet at that point, and we did. Fortunately, we got reasonably good results in the election that time, even though our opposition had the full financial and strategic support of the regional director, the vice president, and all his people. I'm just referring to the officer's election that the local-- Most of us won by anywhere from 5⁰⁰ or 600 votes to 1,000 out of about 4,000 voting. We felt pretty good about that because we won the whole election. So we were in a position to maintain ourselves at that point.

CONNORS: So what month would this have been? This was in June of '54? Is that right?

SCHRADE: Probably June. We had annual elections in June at that point. I don't see a date on this, either, but I would think so.

CONNORS: Yeah, it's June.

SCHRADE: Yeah, mid-June.

CONNORS: I'm looking at some broadsides of other kinds of documents from that period. The slate that went up against you was called the New Broom.

SCHRADE: Sweep clean. [laughter]

CONNORS: As the New Broom sweeps clean. But you're saying that this group was pretty much on the Livingston side--

SCHRADE: Yeah, they were endorsed by the regional office and involved in the regional political caucus. There was

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no doubt about where their support was coming from, because they were a lot of the people who'd been with the O'Halleran regional group over the years and were now with the support of Allard and Livingston, Kircher, and Russo and that group and the international union. And there was real money there to support them. We organized our own money from volunteer contributions, but we had a hell of a contest, and we won it.

CONNORS: George Terry ran against you. You mentioned before that he had been president of the local during the forties.

SCHRADE: Late forties, yeah. A person I knew pretty well, too, because in my job in the plant, he was the inspector in charge of chrome plating where we had to have a lot done for the department I was working in, and I would often see him. We often talked about the union's history and so forth. But there was a recruiting job by the regional and national union people to get a team together against us, but they failed.

CONNORS: Well, thereafter, were your relations with Terry and some of these other people okay? Or did that--?

SCHRADE: No, generally still bad, because there was continuing opposition. I've said this before, but in an annual election round, when you're running every year, you've got to constantly be into the politics. And

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everybody is, so it really meant that the split was there and continued.

CONNORS: So this was happening in June. Prior to that, there was a conference the Aircraft Department [UAW] conference in Washington, D.C. that I think was in March of '54.

SCHRADE: Uh-huh. [affirmative]

CONNORS: Did you go to that meeting? Do you recall that meeting at all?

SCHRADE: Yes. I don't recall much of what happened there.

CONNORS: I believe a report was made as to--

SCHRADE: About the strike?

CONNORS: About the strike.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Livingston's report came out at that time.

SCHRADE: Yeah. And I'm sure we challenged that. There was also the same kind of event on a regional basis up in Fresno where O'Halleran made this long report condemning the strike and our activities, and John Allard from the aerospace or the Aircraft Department staff, the Livingston staff, also did the same thing, and then I countered with my report. In terms of the political balance in the region, I think we held our own at that point, because they were in a position of attacking a very important strike, a struggle that had to take place, and I think most people

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understood this. In fact, we put it on the basis that this is a political attack on their part, valid as their politics might be, but they shouldn't be doing this to a local that's gone through this kind of a struggle. And I think we got a lot of sympathy from around the region as a result of that.

CONNORS: In your report to the membership, can you summarize some of the points that were made in this? I think that would be a good thing to enter here because Reuther did reply to it. It would be good to see something of what was said there.

SCHRADE: Well, this is a report to the membership in the form of a letter to Reuther, because, since we were under attack from people in his administration--Livingston, Allard, Russo, Kircher, and O'Halleran--we felt that he had an obligation to put his house in order and that we had done our job in the strike and wanted to rebuild the local and were willing to cooperate with everybody. In fact, I met with O'Halleran and his people on a regional basis, and with Livingston, and would say, "Look, we've been through this struggle, it's no time for you to be attacking us, particularly when the company wants our heads on the platter, too." And they would usually agree to that, but then their people in the local were constantly attacking us, and the relationship was still there. We kept our

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