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// The Russian note listed twelve American cities by name. Russia stated that if American troops crossed over into Iraq she would single out one of these twelve cities, give that city four weeks of warning to permit its orderly evacuation, as well as to allow time to make arrangements for the feeding and housing of refugees, and thereafter the city would be demolished with one single long-range rocket.

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// To this Russia replied in a second note - a note of unprecedented length - that if America were to demolish two cities in Russia for each city that Russia might have demolished in America, and if Russia were to demolish two cities in America for each city that America might have demolished in Russia, then the destruction of even one city would trigger a chain of events which would, step by step, lead to the destruction of all American as well as all Russian cities. Since clearly America could not possibly want this result, she should not make such a threat of "two for one" and expect it to be believed. Russia, on her part, would tolerate America's demolishing one Russian city, in return for Russia's having demolished one American city. But for each additional city that America might demolish, Russia would demolish one and just one additional city in America.

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principle of "one for one," even if he desired to do so, without seriously risking the defeat of his party at the next elections.

// The Government thereupon asked Gallup to conduct a poll on an emergency basis. Residents of the thirty largest cities were asked whether if Rochester, New York, one of the twelve cities names, were demolished, America ought to retaliate by demolishing just one Russian city, or whether she ought to retaliate by demolishing a number of Russian cities. To the surprise of the Government, 85 per cent of those who had an opinion favored the demolishing of just one Russian city. In retrospect, this response does not appear to be so very surprising; the people polled knew very well that if America were to demolish two Russian cities in retaliation for Rochester, Russia would demolish one additional American city - and this additional city might be their own.

// Some of the members of the National Security Council declined to take this poll at its face value and said that the people would react differently if Rochester were actually demolished. The rather involved psychological argument they cited in support of their view was never put to a test, however, for America did not intervene in Iraq.

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the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington. After an initial period of uncertainty, this lobby succeeded, with steadily increasing editorial support across the nation, in forcing a re-examination of the whole Middle Eastern issue. Doubts were raised as to whether Western Europe was really in danger of losing its supply of Middle Eastern oil, since there was no other market for it. It was said that while the price of oil from the Middle East could be raised, it could not be raised very much, since it could be replaced by oil from the Sahara. As the result of a re-examination of the whole issue, America decided to withdraw her troops from Lebanon and Jordan.

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" Russia did derive great economic benefits from her decision to forgo war. In short order, she abolished her Air Force and her entire Navy, including her fleet of submarines; she also reduced her Army and retained only a comparatively small number of highly mobile units equipped with machine guns and light tanks. Russia continued to maintain, of course, a large number of long-range rockets mounted on trucks or on railroad cars, which were constantly moved around along her highways and railroad tracks.

" As the result of the economies thus achieved, Russia was able to invest 25 per cent of her national income in capital goods serving her consumer-goods industry, and her standard of living was increasing at the rate of 8 per cent per annum. Her per capita consumption of meats and fats rapidly approached that of America; as a result, deaths from coronary attacks rose very markedly and were approaching the American figures.

" Propagandawise the Russians stressed the moral issue involved and made the most of it. All over the world Communists and Russian sympathizers proclaimed that wars, which initially merely meant the killing of soldiers, but in the end came to mean the wholesale killing of civilians - men, women and children - as well as soldiers, were now a thing of the past, thanks to Russia's decision to forgo, abrogate and abolish war. They said, over and over again, that Russia was the only truly Christian nation, since she alone, among the Great Powers, was upholding the Sixth Commandment.*

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which appeared in the February issue of the 'Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' in 1960. It is not known whether Szilard's article elicited any response other than a notice in 'Newsweek', in America, and in 'Krokodil', in Russia. 'Newsweek' condensed this article beyond recognition and managed to convey the impression that Szilard proposed that Russia and America ought to demolish each other's cities in exchange - to no sensible purpose. Taking its information from 'Newsweek', 'Krokodil' suggested in its issue of April 20, 1960, that 'Newsweek' carry an ad for Szilard offering to exchange his Room 812 in the Medical Division of Memorial Hospital in New York for a bed in Ward 6 in the Psychiatric Division of the same hospital. Some of his American colleagues do remember that Szilard made a prediction concerning the strategy which the Russians would adopt if there were no general disarmament, but they remember only that he predicted something rather crazy, without recalling what it was that he predicted. After his death, Szilard appears to have received some recognition, however, from his Russian colleagues, who named a small crater after him - on the back side of the moon.

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