

An Oral History of

# HERBERT YORK and STANLEY CHODOROW

On September 3, 1998

1   **CHODOROW:**   This is a conversation with Herb York, primarily about the foundations of  
2   medical school, but we will start with another question that came up, recently, in the  
3   conversation with John Singer. What John said was that, once you became—which must've  
4   been by the time you arrived—a general campus, and had to build in the whole range of fields,  
5   that there was a committee of Brahmins, as he put it, put together that was mostly people from  
6   outside the nature of philosophy. And he knew that there was somebody from UCLA whose  
7   name he couldn't recall, and that they were the ones who were suggesting people to be brought  
8   through for literature and history and philosophy, and so on. And we had not yet—had never  
9   picked up on the existence of that committee, and wanted to ask you about it.

10   **YORK:**   Well, I think it was actually more of a floating crap game than a formal committee. I  
11   remember asking Clark Kerr where to get advice, and he came up with a bunch of names. And  
12   many of these people were names actually suggested by Clark, or even by Harry Wellman. And,  
13   but we—my memory is that we never met—that group never met as a committee, which is why I  
14   say it was more of a floating crap game. But there were a number of people whom we were  
15   regular in touch with, and it included—and I may have even mentioned this last time, and I'm  
16   still blocking on a name—a guy who was the first head of Institute for Advanced Study in the  
17   Social Sciences, up there at Stanford—he was one. And sometimes they came here and  
18   sometimes I went to visit them.

19   And my main memory about it is dealing with them myself, but I'm probably—I'm sure it must be  
20   true, that Singer and some of the others met with them, or especially when one or more of them  
21   visited here. Among other people at UCLA, we talked with Lynn Hoit. I'm not sure—I don't  
22   remember another name. The same thing applies to Medical School, but quite separately. That  
23   is that there, there was actually a committee. But with regard to the general campus, it was a  
24   case of a subgroup of people that we had, you know, more than just—there were probably a lot  
25   of people we talked to just once. And, you know, the name of the guy at Stanford is right just  
26   behind the cloud—he was a longtime friend of ours.

27   And, so there was such a group of people, but I don't think of it as a committee in the case of  
28   the general campus. In the case of the Medical School, we actually had a committee of—it was

29 a group of people who were very helpful, although all of those early people came out of some  
30 other—you know, the methods by which we found people were otherwise. In the case of the first  
31 philosophers, I believe it was my very long lifelong friend, Joe Platt, who was president of  
32 Harvey Mudd, who either told—the other Popkin—Richard, to call me, or told me to call him, I  
33 forget what it was. But Joe Platt somehow knew that Popkin was at loose ends and looking at  
34 something, and—but Joe Platt was not one of these Brahmins; he happened to be a friend who  
35 I was in touch with.

36 The others were not people I had previously known; Ralph was the first name of the *[unclear]*.  
37 The others were not people that I knew personally, but had, you know, had met only in this  
38 connection. Joe was somebody I knew all along. And, you know, Harold Urey bumped into—I  
39 guess we talked about this, last time—Harold Urey bumped into Seymour Harris, who told him  
40 that he was being fired by reason of age, was outraged about it, at Harvard. And there were  
41 other people like that—and I've forgotten where a lot of them were. In the case of, you know, the  
42 non-humanities, in the case of the mathematicians, there, it was Brueckner just digging, digging,  
43 digging, and very persistently.

44 And we went through several names and we thought we had, and I mentioned this last time,  
45 too. So, we did consult our campus; there wasn't so much—I don't recall that we ever got all  
46 these people together at one time, although it's possible that we did get most of them together  
47 once, or something like that. But there was a small pool of people who we, you know, had been  
48 put *[unclear]*.

49 **THIRD SPEAKER:** *[unclear]* Professor Singer was there, it was a very formal *[inaudible]* their  
50 choices on this campus *[inaudible]* whatnot. And who also *[inaudible]* to the position that UCSD  
51 was a new campus *[inaudible]* attract many stars.

52 **YORK:** That was uniquely the position of Seymour Harris. I don't remember anyone else—  
53 that may have been a part of other people's views.

54 **THIRD SPEAKER:** This story or this anecdote was used to illustrate the hiring of Roy Pierce  
55 again, because what professor Seymour said is that after somebody, the chair of the  
56 department at the University of Washington campus presentation, Professor Singer by himself  
57 or *[crosstalk]*, discussing this with Jim Arnold and others, saying how bad these selections were.  
58 And Arnold challenged them to go out and do it themselves. And they did it and they got Roy  
59 Pierce to come.

60 **YORK:** Well, that could be, that could be. You know, my recollection of the people that  
61 Singer thought were bad was, you know, *[unclear]*. So, he thought most people, I mean, he  
62 didn't like most people. They didn't fit his idea of what a humanist or a social scientist ought to  
63 be. And he had a very particular idea. Now, the Pierce case, you know, something like that  
64 certainly could've happened, I think that's a realistic conversation, you're talking about it, and—  
65 and so something like that could've happened, but—and it is also true that, the people we did  
66 get didn't come through this process. I mean, in other words, the recommendations we got, as  
67 far as I know, virtually none of them did work out. I don't know where the idea of Barraclough  
68 came from.

69 **CHODOROW:** Yeah, I asked John if he knew, and he did not *[crosstalk]* no idea. You know,  
70 Barraclough had a career in which he moved fairly often. When I told my mentor, Brian Tierney,  
71 that Barraclough, who was a very famous medieval historian although he'd moved into world  
72 history *[unclear]*, was at UCSD, he said, "Oh, well, not for long." Because that was his  
73 reputation. And in fact, by the time I got here, he had left, after three or maybe four years—I  
74 think it was three years. And gone to Brandeis and eventually back to Oxford as one of the  
75 chairs. But how he was discovered, I don't know.

76 And in some respects, he was a really inspired choice, because he was so well-known. But his  
77 strategy—of course, he's dead, now, and you can't ask him but—his strategy of appointing  
78 senior faculty, most of them coming in as associate professors, from small liberal arts colleges,  
79 was a very interesting. When I got to the campus in 1968, the seven or eight senior people in  
80 the department were, every single one of them, from a liberal arts college. From Knox College  
81 to Cornell College in Iowa, from *[unclear]* Saint John's College, just one after the other, they  
82 were all from—so that their upbringing, so to speak—their academic upbringing was quite  
83 different from *[crosstalk]*.

84 **YORK:** Was Gabe first? *[Crosstalk]* and I wonder if we got Gabe through John Galbraith.

85 **CHODOROW:** May have but I don't know that.

86 **YORK:** And then, see, once there were social scientists here, then they were coming up with  
87 all sorts of ideas. And there were a number of interesting ideas in political—political science is  
88 the one that took us the longest.

89 **CHODOROW:** That's right, and I was already involved in that, because when I got here, it  
90 hadn't been done [*crosstalk*] we kept working at it for a couple years [*inaudible*] and Sandy, too.

91 **YORK:** Yeah, there were some ideas that I think would've worked out, but which were  
92 rejected. They were the kind of thing as exactly the same situation as Braidwood, somebody  
93 particularly Singer didn't think this scholar was mathematical enough. Or, you know, again, it's  
94 not quite the right word, but, I mean, scientific enough is the idea. And then there was one that  
95 was promoted and unfortunately didn't come—I think it was just the chaos at the end—and I  
96 can't—maybe you can remember—it was a short name—it's a guy—

97 **CHODOROW:** Ted Gur?

98 **YORK:** No, no, this is a fellow at Princeton, who's—you know, he's an elite radical—I can't  
99 think of his name. But we wanted a chairman, and he didn't want to be chairman. He's  
100 somebody that knew Mark was promoted, in fact, several people promoted him—but it's a short  
101 name. I actually visited him at Princeton, and there are lots of chaotic offices in this world,  
102 including my own, but I had never seen one anything like his. There was, you know, a desk  
103 more or less half this size, a typical size, and literally piled this deep with paper.

104 I don't know how he could've ever found anything. [*Laughter*] He probably did remember where  
105 certain things were, but—he was very good—he was brilliant and, you know, great with words.  
106 But as a chairman, he would've been terrible, and I think he would've been [*glitch interferes with*  
107 *audio*].

108 **CHODOROW:** So, let's turn to the Medical School—

109 **YORK:** Well, the first thing that happened as far as—well, you know, there are really two—  
110 there are several threads coming together, here. One important thread I'll mention, then I'll back  
111 away from it, is the fact that Bonner and Singer and Hamburger [Robert], maybe one or two  
112 others, had all come from Yale, where they were positive about the fact that the Yale Medical  
113 School was no good. I mean, they were just extremely negative about the Yale Medical School.  
114 And this is part of an odd, you know, momentary coalition, Roy Pierce and the ones from Ohio  
115 State were upset about the medical school there, but for an entirely different reason. And that is  
116 that the adjunct professors, which are common in medical schools, had a vote in the senate.

117 And as far as Roy was concerned, that was a disaster. I mean, you know, they were all arch-  
118 conservatives—Roy has this picture of himself as being a liberal, which has a certain amount of  
119 truth to it, but—

120 **CHODOROW:** Classical [*crosstalk*].

121 **YORK:** Yeah, but I don't think [*glitch interferes with audio*]. Well, he has a certain—he knows  
122 the vocabulary. And, but at any rate, that was one of the things that he was very upset about,  
123 and he didn't want that to happen again here. And then, of course, there was a—so, there were  
124 these two groups who had very fixed ideas about medical schools [*laughs*], for quite different  
125 reasons. And I'll get back to the Bonner-Singer fixation in a minute. And then there was the  
126 global question which was everywhere, I mean, not just here, but it was throughout through the  
127 whole academia at the time. And that is the difference between fulltime and part-time faculty,  
128 which is basically a kind of a—it's still an unresolved question.

129 That is to say, it's not fully resolved. And then, so then, we'll set those aside and we'll get back  
130 to. There was an interval of about five months between when I was appointed chancellor and  
131 when I actually showed up. And in that interval, I made one or perhaps two visits, and I was in  
132 touch with Clark Kerr, and several people came to visit me—Joe Mayer is the one I remember  
133 best, but there were others, too. And somewhere in there, I met with Roger, maybe here, and  
134 began to meet some of the others. But mainly, it was a very remote relationship between me  
135 and the campus, from when I was appointed, which may have been the February meeting of the  
136 board, or the March meeting, of 1961 to when I actually showed up, which was the 4th of July.

137 And during that time, one of the conversations I had with Clark Kerr, he raised two questions.  
138 He said, "What should the name of the campus be?" and how he put the question I'm not sure,  
139 but the alternatives were University of California La Joya, University of California San Diego.  
140 And the other one was, "Should we have a medical school?" Now, I'm not sure how much  
141 freedom of choice I really had with respect to either of those questions—I wasn't sure then, I'm  
142 not sure now. A certain amount, you know, but not a hell of a lot. I mean, it seems, to me, fairly  
143 obvious that Kerr knew the answers to both of those questions, [*laughs*] just wanted to make  
144 sure I was onboard. But, you know, I might've been able—you know, I can't say that it was an  
145 entirely empty question.

146 If I'd had good reasons on either one, or he was able to present a good reason, then maybe it  
147 would've been different. But mainly, it was already set up. And with regard to the name, I said,

148 you know, I was already aware that the people of San Diego had voted us nearly all of this land  
149 up here. And I have a general anti-elite attitude towards everything except *[laughs]* higher  
150 education, where I fully believe, you know, in an elite school like we are. But otherwise, I don't—  
151 I'm generally negative about elites, and that included the people of La Joya, you know, I wasn't  
152 really sure about them at all. So, the idea of naming it after San Diego instead of La Joya just fit  
153 perfectly well, I didn't have any doubts about it.

154 The other one I just didn't know, I'd never thought about that, you know, and I didn't—I don't  
155 remember any particular views forming then, except, the very general idea that, yeah, that  
156 would be, you know, that provides a lot of opportunity for [unclear]. Same view I held when the  
157 question later came about a law school, that would be a good thing, because it's another  
158 interesting area to sort of have and mix in with everything else. So, I liked the idea of a medical  
159 school, not for any very profound reasons, but just because I thought, you know, that's a good  
160 way to get things even broader. So, at any rate, I said yes, and began working with people on  
161 that question, very soon after coming here.

162 And working especially with Bonner and Singer on the one hand, and then other people here,  
163 too, but especially them. And then with Kerr and other people. And it soon became evident that  
164 the Bonner-Singer view of what a medical school ought to be was pretty singular. It was, you  
165 know, and let me exaggerate just to make the point, it focused heavily on research. But not just  
166 any kind of research, I mean, because they were—most of the biologists here, not just Singer  
167 and some of the others in Scripps, were, at that time, you know, sort of anti-taxonomy. I mean,  
168 these people would go out and name all the birds, and, I mean, that's not intellectual, I mean,  
169 you know, and—

170 And so, the kind of research they're talking about is essentially what we would now call  
171 molecular biology or molecular genetics. And that's what the medical school ought to be doing,  
172 and, you know, that's what they don't do at Yale, and—you know, these things are sort of mixed  
173 up in my head. But, I mean, it was this great antipathy with Yale, combined with this notion that  
174 what we want to do, if we're going to have a medical school, is it's going to be a research  
175 institution, especially with regard to molecular biology. And, but it was evident that what Clark  
176 Kerr and everybody else had in mind was a medical school of quality, that would do research  
177 and educate physicians to, you know, be concerned directly and indirectly with the health of the  
178 people of California. And so, there was really a fair difference.

179 Now, the—and I think—I don't remember talking clearly, but we must've talked about it. But  
180 anyway, not very long after, Kerr—and I think it must've been Kerr, and he must've cleared it  
181 with me, but, I mean, it was his initiative—appointed [Robert] Tschirgi to chair the committee.  
182 So, now we have a real committee.

183 **CHODOROW:** Where was he, at the time?

184 **YORK:** I think he was at UCLA. And there were several other members who were from those  
185 other medical schools. We must've had some local people on it, as well, but the main trend was  
186 actually determined, now, by these other people who were from real medical schools. And as I  
187 told you with respect to the campus as a whole, my own philosophy always was that equality  
188 first, and then novelty is okay if it doesn't interfere with quality. And that was very much my idea  
189 with respect to the medical school: we want a great medical school, but the novelty is not by  
190 itself a virtue. But we did start out with a certain amount of novelty, but not the novelty that the  
191 campus biologists had in mind.

192 And, so we proceeded, in a number of the things you have to do, just the mechanics of it. I  
193 mean, I went down to the county hospital and talked with Dr. Sadel, who was the head of the  
194 hospital and was the county officer for, somehow or other—well, it was the usual county hospital  
195 where the indigents went, right there in Hillcrest where it still is. And we started recruiting, and  
196 we started planning somewhat more generally. And the recruiting went poorly, the same way as  
197 it went for some of the—you know, we had the same problems we had with mathematics and  
198 political science. And that is, we had trouble getting something that we wanted.

199 And here, I don't remember a lot of disagreement about the persons, but there were several  
200 people whom we went right over the edge with, and then they dropped out at the last minute.  
201 One of them—and I don't remember this name, it must be in the records somewhere—was a  
202 fellow who had been dean at the University of Oklahoma. And he actually accepted, and then  
203 within days called up and said, "No, I've thought it over and I don't want to do it." It's probably  
204 just as well, but I think it—it probably would've worked. But he was not at all in the image of—  
205 you know, he was—he was maybe too far from the Bonner image. But we had been having  
206 enough trouble so that we felt the need to get started.

207 **CHODOROW:** One of the things that John said was that, for a quite a long period, Bonner  
208 was bringing people in as potential dean candidates, and couldn't anybody to buy his plan. So  
209 that just, it just wasn't interesting [*crosstalk*] these people who he would normally turn to.

210 **YORK:** Well, yeah, I think that's probably true. I don't know that it was—he probably did, but  
211 the people I'm talking about, I don't think he even came through that channel. I mean, it's  
212 probably true that—I'm not even sure that I knew, at the time, what you just told me, but maybe I  
213 did. But the people I'm talking about came—different channel. Now, then we got somebody on  
214 the hook who did become dean at Stanford, I mean, in other words, when we went after him, he  
215 turned—he was a cripple from polio. Does that ring a bell? And he was interested, and we spent  
216 a lot of time negotiating, and then he turned us down.

217 And then about a year or two later, he went—he showed up as dean at Stanford Medical  
218 School. And I only remember those two as really going deeply into it. I mean, I'm sure there  
219 were a lot of others whom we, you know, had a small minuet with, but only those two whom we  
220 went very far with. At one point, the university offered him the job, the first one, and in the  
221 second case, essentially, I had offered him the job, but he wouldn't take it. I'm not sure we got to  
222 even that point with anyone else, but we kept going. And finally, we got in touch with Joe  
223 Stokes, and how we heard about Joe Stokes, I'm not sure.

224 But Joe Stokes did fit the image of sort of a modern medical school, in other words, of being  
225 somebody whose views were different. But I can't remember *[laughs]* different in what way. And,  
226 you know, different in the sense of being less stuffy, you know, almost a personal characteristic  
227 rather than intellectual *[glitch interferes with audio]*. And so, we did start to recruit him. But while  
228 we were recruiting him is when the interim period came between when I had announced I was  
229 resigning to when John Galbraith replaced me. And Joe said he wouldn't—he was interested,  
230 but he wouldn't take the job unless he knew who the chancellor was going to be.

231 And so, the appointment of John Galbraith and the appointment of Joe Stokes took place almost  
232 simultaneously. Because Joe was willing to work with John, and—it may not have been the  
233 same Regents meeting, it may have been a Regents meeting later. Again, it's a place where  
234 there's a hard record one could check. And so that worked out. Now, Joe did turn out, perhaps,  
235 to be too relaxed. I mean, he did get started, he did recruit good people, they were people who  
236 were known as great medical school faculty. Who, you know, I think of as not being the image of  
237 what Singer and Bonner wanted, but nevertheless, being intellectually fine people anyhow, and  
238 acceptable but only reluctantly. I don't know, I—what can you tell me about *[laughs]* what John  
239 might've said about the first appointments?

240 **CHODOROW:** *[Crosstalk]*, yeah, John actually said that—well, he obviously has very little  
241 respect for Joe Stokes. Somehow, Joe recruited people who really *[crosstalk]*.

242 **YORK:** Yeah, but they were not the microbiologists that they were talking about.

243 **CHODOROW:** Right.

244 **YORK:** See, to exaggerate to make the point, my view of what Bonner and Singer were  
245 talking about was a school that would raise doctors who would, if somebody was bleeding,  
246 they'd say, "What is that red stuff? What is wrong with that person?" *[Laughter]* And what I've  
247 never been able to figure out—and I've never tried to talk with him to explore it—is the fact that  
248 Hamburger, Bob Hamburger, you know, was with them on this issue. And yet, he himself is a  
249 perfect example of a real, of a wonderful physician from the curing the sick people point of view.  
250 So, somehow or another, I've never understood that contradiction, because—

251 **CHODOROW:** It's hard to say what role he played, he was there—

252 **YORK:** Well, he helped with recruiting, you know? I don't think he did play a major—he's not  
253 somebody whom I remember as being a major figure in either administration or recruiting, but  
254 he was great by example, and he also—and I'm sure he contributed. So, Bob was one of the—  
255 Bob Hamburger—is -urger—just Hamburg—is it with an "er"?

256 **CHODOROW:** *[Crosstalk]* Yeah

257 **YORK:** He's a wonderful *[crosstalk]*.

258 **CHODOROW:** I know this very vividly because, when we first met him, my older son was  
259 about five or six, and heard that name and started to cackle *[crosstalk]* a five- or six-year-old  
260 does, right?

261 **YORK:** Right, *[crosstalk]* somebody being named "Weiner" *[crosstalk]*. *[Laughter]*

262 **CHODOROW:** Yeah, right.

263 **YORK:** So anyway, we went the quality orthodox way, and Tschirgi—I'm coming back to  
264 Tschirgi—he chaired this group and kept us, you know, on this line, which it was the line I  
265 favored. When I say kept us on it, he wasn't doing anything I didn't want done. And helped with

266 the first recruiting, then we got other people. Then Tschirgi himself, you know, never did play a  
267 major role in the school, except that early point, and I—

268 **CHODOROW:** He did become a faculty member.

269 **YORK:** Yes, I have to tell you, I never knew what it was that John Galbraith and Bob Tschirgi  
270 had going between them. Because Bob didn't do much, here. You know, most of the time he  
271 was here, he sometimes had titles like vice-chancellor for something, but—

272 **CHODOROW:** He was the vice-chancellor of planning *[crosstalk]*.

273 **YORK:** Yeah, but he never seemed, to me, to have a central role in any of those things,  
274 except in the case of the medical school. When he was chairman of this committee, he did, in  
275 fact, play an important role.

276 **CHODOROW:** *[Glitch interferes with audio]*

277 **YORK:** No, no.

278 **CHODOROW:** Wasn't *[glitch interferes with audio]* school *[glitch interferes with audio]*?

279 **YORK:** It could be, but I don't remember, yeah, all that's probably true, mm-hmm, all that's  
280 probably true.

281 **CHODOROW:** *[unclear]* enjoyed the fact that Tschirgi's name was his profession *[crosstalk]*.

282 **YORK:** What does Tschirgi mean?

283 **CHODOROW:** Surgery.

284 **YORK:** Oh, does it? Ah, like, it's a Spanish word, "cirugia" meaning "surgery."

285 **CHODOROW:** *[Crosstalk]*

286 **YORK:** So, in what language is "Tschirgi"?

287 **CHODOROW:** It's Italian. But in his case, I always thought he was from the area of Italy way  
288 over by Slovenia *[crosstalk]*.

289 **YORK:** Yeah, we all would've preferred, early on, a medical—more activity on the campus,  
290 as relevant to what was going on in Hillcrest. And we eventually did, you know, we built the  
291 basic science building, right away. But it took a long time before we got to Perlman and  
292 Thornton and the veterans administration. I was chancellor when we negotiated the veteran's  
293 administration. That was somewhat controversial, because the question is, you know, "Is that  
294 the kind of thing we want to get involved with or not?" but the medical faculty probably did. Then  
295 I was also—

296 **CHODOROW:** They need patients.

297 **YORK:** Yeah. I was also involved when Cliff [Clifford Grobstein] was dean, and he was  
298 difficult to deal with, but for an entirely different set of reasons. I mean, Cliff could suddenly get  
299 off on a small point and just *[laughs] [glitch interferes with audio]* forever, which is what, you  
300 know—I'm sure the people—the people in Biology often threw up their hands at Cliff when he  
301 was chairman. It's the very same thing, he really was difficult, from sort of the way he  
302 approached questions, you could just *[laughs] [unclear]* and you—very hard to get by that. So, I  
303 don't know the facts, but I think when he ended his tour as dean, you know, they were relieved  
304 to get somebody else, but I don't know much about the *[glitch interferes with audio]*. But it was  
305 during his time that we were working out with—we did have a terribly complicated problem. It  
306 was this question of fulltime, part-time, and, you know, how much can you earn, and the—it's  
307 honestly complicated, and it still is.

308 **CHODOROW:** When did you come up with the xyz—what we always knew as the xyz  
309 funding for faculty who made a base salary, and then they made a percentage of?

310 **YORK:** I don't recall, at all. I think it happened over a long period of time. I don't think that it  
311 just was—it wasn't just something I was involved with *[crosstalk]*.

312 **CHODOROW:** One of the characteristics of this medical school was that, as far as I knew  
313 from the beginning, the faculty practice within the medical school *[crosstalk]*.

314 **YORK:** We tried to keep as far over towards pure fulltime as we could. And the only reason  
315 we were unsuccessful is that, simply, you couldn't pay the doctors enough. And furthermore,  
316 when you started getting the clinical faculty from outside, the question of where they had to be  
317 and how they got paid got all mixed together. And I can't remember the details anymore, but, I  
318 mean, there just were lots of social problems relating to money and pay, where the cleverer

319 faculty were inventing all kinds of arguments for how they could get paid for this or that in  
320 addition to their fulltime. And, you know, it was sort of a long-term battle between people on the  
321 one hand wanted to keep the administration as simple as possible *[laughs]*, and people kept  
322 figuring out clever new ways of justifying, you know, getting more money.

323 And, you know, getting more money in the classical sense, I mean, it was, you know, greed is  
324 part of it, but if you see everybody else getting a lot more money than you are for doing the  
325 same thing, it's not a very surprising attitude.

326 **CHODOROW:** Do you remember much about the foundations and the development of  
327 different departments in the medical school?

328 **YORK:** Not in great detail. I remember [Marshall] Orloff coming, I remember who was it in—?

329 **CHODOROW:** Braunwald?

330 **YORK:** Yeah, Braunwald, and a number of very good people, and then spreading into other  
331 areas like Helen Ranney, you know, with the community medicine. So, I don't remember  
332 anything terribly specific, except, I remember being quite satisfied with how it was going. I  
333 mean, I thought we were doing very well. I liked *[glitch interferes with audio]*—still do. *[Laughs]*

334 **CHODOROW:** How did the Bonner plan, which actually was in place *[glitch interferes with*  
335 *audio]*.

336 **YORK:** Well, what do you mean by the "Bonner plan"?

337 **CHODOROW:** I mean the fact that the basic science faculty positions of the medical school  
338 were essentially delivered into the hands of the *[crosstalk]*.

339 **YORK:** Yeah, well, that, I think—first of all, I think that worked quite well. And second, it  
340 worked well at least partly because it wasn't—we didn't follow it with total rigidity. I mean, I don't  
341 remember how we departed, but—I mean, the most severe sharp corners were somehow  
342 shaved off of that, but it did work, I mean, and I thought it worked fairly well. And the medical—  
343 the whole conjunction, you know, when they finally started teaching medical students, especially  
344 at the first two years, did try a number of novel things. Which were, essentially, I believe, all  
345 ultimately abandoned, because although they seemed clever, they weren't all that good. I mean,  
346 ultimately, they didn't really fit all that well.

347 And I myself participated personally, because, you know, what the medical school course  
348 number was I'm not quite sure. But I spent about a month in the course that dealt with radiation,  
349 talking about radiation from a physicist's perspective, but all was oriented towards what was  
350 happening, you know, in the kind of materials that people were made out of, I mean, bones and  
351 meat and things like that. And talking about x-rays, protons, and all the different kinds, all of  
352 which are ultimately of some interest, because they can be used—you know, they used—well,  
353 you still use radiation for therapy. You know, years ago, there was much greater hope for that  
354 than what ultimately turned out.

355 And there were a lot of ideas about beam therapy, that have been abandoned. And there are  
356 those which say—I myself had my prostate cancer treated with radiation. So, I actually taught  
357 one of those classes, other people did the same, and that was novel, you know, to have  
358 somebody from the physics department talking to the medical students about radiation. And  
359 they liked it, but it turned out, from the point of view of the medical school, you know, the  
360 curricular gurus, it was too much time spent on things that were relevant but, you know, not—  
361 the relevance wasn't matching, you know, the time they were using up. So those things all were  
362 eventually abandoned, so that it was not only that the biologists were, in the biology department,  
363 what you're calling the Bonner plan, but other departments were involved, as well.

364 **CHODOROW:** There were engineers, there were a couple of physicists, there were—

365 **YORK:** Yeah, that's right, we had these engineers who dealt with the blood flow, I mean,  
366 Fung and—

367 **CHODOROW:** Right, [*inaudible*] spent—my understanding was that the development of  
368 bioengineering, basically, here, was one of the earliest developments in that field.

369 **YORK:** It was certainly early. You know, how early I couldn't say, but I think fairly early—  
370 goes back quite a while, here, goes back to the '60s, I guess, I'm not quite sure. It was Fung  
371 and someone else do you remember the other name? We still see Bert Fung around—the other  
372 guy, I don't—

373 **CHODOROW:** Yeah, he was a model faculty member. He was always regarded as a model  
374 [*crosstalk*].

375 **YORK:** Yeah, [*crosstalk*].

376 **CHODOROW:** Yes, and a wonderful scholar.

377 **YORK:** But the other guy was, you know, not quite the same in the extracurricular sense, but  
378 also, the pair—seems to me the pair of them were very good. But there were two—

379 **CHODOROW:** I don't remember the name. One of the questions has to do with the medical  
380 school *[unclear]*.

381 **YORK:** It was similar to very good medical schools—that's what it is, and that's what most of  
382 us—you know, that's what I wanted, that's what Kerr wanted. It differs in some perhaps  
383 important ways from what—but that's the category that I think we're in. I mean, we are a good—  
384 we're a very good orthodox medical school, and just what *[laughs]* we should be.

385 **CHODOROW:** *[unclear]*

386 **YORK:** Well, we almost—that's very nearly what we did. I mean, except, you know, there  
387 were differences—we tried to get away—we tried, harder, to avoid—you know, we tried to be  
388 somewhat more pure and idealistic on things like fulltime versus part-time, and, you know, pay  
389 and so forth. But those administrative details aside, we did build a school like the good ones in  
390 the university already. And wittingly so, you see, I mean, there are those that think, well,  
391 somehow that got forced on us but, no, that's what we—or at least, didn't get force on me  
392 *[inaudible phrase]*.

393 **CHODOROW:** What about the issue of the hospital? Was there a plan, from the very  
394 beginning, to build a campus hospital?

395 **YORK:** Yes, but it was never funded. I mean, so, yes, it was a plan, but it was a paper plan,  
396 it was a generally—you know, it was accepted, but, you know, in that—accepted in the way that  
397 anything for which there are no funds can be said to have been accepted. In other words, Kerr  
398 and those regents who might've cared about it and the local people accepted the idea, but—and  
399 it took a long time for it to happen. But getting the basic sciences here was a first step in that  
400 direction, it gave us a foot in the door. I think we all thought of that as being a good idea.

401 **CHODOROW:** *[Crosstalk]* having the basic science building and—

402 **YORK:** Both to have it close in biology. So, I think everybody agreed that linking biology and  
403 medicine was a great idea, if you don't carry it, if you don't let the biologists run the school, it's a  
404 great idea. And it worked well; it's what you're calling the Bonner plan.

405 **CHODOROW:** Yeah, in effect, that's what *[unclear]* because he came here, as well.

406 **YORK:** Yes, I don't know whether you should say that's what it was about, though—but,  
407 yeah, it certainly was related to that idea, yeah, and that's what made it more acceptable than it  
408 might've been. It was rare to have non-MDs as deans, but I think it wasn't unknown, I think it  
409 simply was rare. And you're right, it probably was the way we kept the two mixed that made that  
410 possible.

411 **CHODOROW:** Did it make a big difference that the basic sciences and the clinical were  
412 essentially *[unclear]*

413 **YORK:** I don't know that. I mean, I never saw a serious problem with that, but maybe. There  
414 certainly were mechanical problems, but I don't know whether there was any, you know,  
415 whether it had a reflection on the academic problems. It may have, for some idea, for some  
416 period, the Hillcrest faculty, for quite a long time, were not very well integrated with the faculty  
417 out here. In any form, you know, senate or anything else. And it led to the existence of a  
418 separate senate, which probably is a good idea anyway.

419 But it was a long time before we had somebody from the medical school who was chairman of  
420 the senate, on the campus. And before they started living around La Jolla and—

421 **CHODOROW:** Do you think it makes a difference that there is this tradition, in medical  
422 schools, of long-term very comical chairs in departments in terms of relationships with the  
423 general campus departments?

424 **YORK:** Oh, it certainly influences it, yeah, it's such a different way of doing things. But I'm  
425 not aware that it creates a problem, other than that people notice it—often, are surprised by it. I  
426 mean, it's not until somebody from, you know, economics becomes an officer in the senate, and  
427 *[laughs]* they discover some of these chairmen that are these powerful *[crosstalk]*. Yeah,  
428 because it's very different from the way the rest of the campus runs, and—I have to say, in my  
429 own case, I didn't think about it until it happened. You know, I mean, there it was, and it was  
430 evident that's what everybody expected.

431 The other surprise, to me, was how little teaching the basic science people connected—see,  
432 when we finally did have basic science people who—I don't remember how this worked out  
433 administratively, but basic science people but whose appointment was primarily in the medical  
434 school. Even though they were here at La Jolla, they somehow were administratively controlled  
435 not by the chairman of biology but by someone else—how little they expected to teach. You  
436 know, I mean, that I was complete—well, why would I know? I mean, I had no experience with  
437 it, and it was one of several big surprises, that they would talk about teaching two courses, and  
438 they meant two lectures a quarter, *[laughs]* they didn't mean two courses going on at the same  
439 time. *[Laughs]*

440 **CHODOROW:** Right. that has created enormous strain between biology and chemistry  
441 departments on the one side, and the medical school basic science department *[crosstalk]*,  
442 everywhere—everywhere.

443 **YORK:** Yeah, because it looks like privilege—it looks like privilege.

444 **CHODOROW:** It is privilege.

445 **YORK:** Yeah, sure, it is, yeah, and people are very sensitive to that. You know, one of the  
446 things that I remember from the—you know, and here, of course, I'm not going to mention any  
447 names at all—is that the faculty as a whole, you know, is made up of people who really were  
448 just happy to be faculty members, and not at all aggressive about salary. And then, a somewhat  
449 smaller group, but a lot more than just one, who were terribly aggressive about salary, and who  
450 had all kinds of work—you know, in addition to the business of getting an offer somewhere and  
451 all of that, which is no surprise, in fact, that even happens without manipulation, good people get  
452 offers. But the manipulation came because there were a number of people, here, that worked in  
453 pairs.

454 I mean, one of them would always come and say the other one, you know, "I mean, we're going  
455 to lose them, and we don't want to do that," and then vice-versa. There were a number of pairs  
456 of people on the campus who were a) very aggressive about salary in the first place, and then  
457 used all kinds of maneuvers.

458 **CHODOROW:** Did you as chancellor deal with that directly*[crosstalk]*?

459 **YORK:** Yes, because when I—both times I was chancellor, we were still small enough so  
460 that I did what the vice-chancellor now does. And in fact, if I had stayed on as chancellor, I

461 would've tried to keep it that way. Because the very best way for the chancellor to know the  
462 faculty is to be involved as the guy who actually signs off on all those—

**[END OF PART ONE, BEGIN PART TWO]**

463 **CHODOROW:** Did you relate to the budget committee in a direct way, or did they did you  
464 frequently go and talk to them about cases?

465 **YORK:** No, but I did, rarely—no, normally, I did not. We dealt with it in, what I think worked  
466 out nicely, a hands-off, you know, through paper. And through Kathleen Douthitt, if you  
467 remember her.

468 **CHODOROW:** The famous Kathleen.

469 **YORK:** Yeah. Well, you know, she developed the reputation with people of somehow  
470 running that sort of thing and making the decisions, which was never any—which was never  
471 even remotely true. But she took her job seriously, was a very hardworking person, and when  
472 I—both times I was chancellor, she really worked very hard to make sure that what I wanted  
473 happened. But she let me—she didn't try and tell me what to do, except mechanically she said,  
474 "You know, you got to do something about—you got to sign this in the next two weeks,  
475 because." But she never would say, "You got to appoint Joe because, you know, *[unclear]*." But,  
476 yes, I did deal with the chairman of the budget committee, but not often, it wasn't necessary.

477 And of course, now that—even less with the ad-hoc committees. But I read all the ad-hoc  
478 committee reports, so that, you know, it wasn't secret *[crosstalk]*. Now, when that, when McElroy  
479 came in, he immediately delegated it to Saltman who insisted that it be delegated. And on other  
480 campuses—I don't know whether it was all of them or most of them—it was, in fact, done by the  
481 vice-chancellor. But during the time—the campus was still small, in those days; I knew  
482 everybody here, and that's how I knew him.

483 **CHODOROW:** One of the things that—one of the ways in which you have *[unclear]*  
484 characterized the early history of the medical school is that you started off and they're all  
485 idealistic ideas, and settled back toward the norm. Which I would say is probably true of every  
486 department on campus, so, a lot of them started off with very particular distinctive ideas, and  
487 over time, *[crosstalk]*.

488 **YORK:** Yeah. Well, and I like that, because as I said, I—quality first and novelty second. And  
489 if novelty interferes with quality, you get rid of novelty. And so, it was right to try a lot of new  
490 things, because they might've been, you know, some of them probably worked *[laughs]* and I  
491 don't remember which one. But some of them probably worked, and it was good—and we—and  
492 it's only when you're new that you get opportunities. So, it was the right thing to do, but I have  
493 no regrets about—but when they didn't work out, I didn't regret it at all. You know, except, I still  
494 like this romantic idea we had, at the very beginning, that we would actually have courses, say,  
495 in history and so on, that would be taught in Spanish, or in French, or something. And it's too  
496 bad, but, I mean, it's just too hard *[crosstalk]*.

497 **CHODOROW:** There are a few, now, that that's done, it's a small program, but we started  
498 doing that second to the last year in the department. And but it's a small program *[unclear]*. The  
499 other question I had is, it was something we picked up from some of the people we've talked to,  
500 which is the sense that the first generation was growing, and that the next generation were not  
501 so good. And so, somehow, the promise of *[unclear]* in those early days was never realized.

502 **YORK:** Well, you see, I think it was. I think that's a too narrow a view. And the reason I think  
503 it was is, when you look at our reputation, we still are the best American university founded after  
504 World War II. You know, maybe I told you this, when I would—on the rare occasions when I had  
505 occasion to mention that to Dick Atkinson, he would say, "No, we're the best, period." *[Laughs]*  
506 And which I couldn't agree with, but I—the only place I allow a little bit of waffling is, we're the  
507 best in the second half of the century or the best in the century. I mean, you can argue that  
508 we're the best since 1900, but I think it's better to say we're the best since World War II.

509 And, you know, that's not a coincidence, it just can't be. I mean, to be best and then say, "Well,  
510 we didn't do it right," is ridiculous.

511 **CHODOROW:** Well, not really.

512 **YORK:** I think so.

513 **CHODOROW:** *[Crosstalk]* still fell pretty short of our original vision. *[Crosstalk]*

514 **YORK:** No, I don't think we did fall short of our original vision. Our original vision was to be a  
515 high-quality university. Some people wanted—Roger wanted to be like Caltech, somebody else  
516 wanted to be like something else, but there were plenty of us, including me, whose hope was to

517 be a very high-quality American university. So, I'm not the least bit disappointed. And I think  
518 that—but you put this into different terms, you put it in terms of the people.

519 And the fact is that, when the academy or somebody like that starts rating people, you know, we  
520 have so many departments [unclear] there's all these different ways to count [*glitch interferes*  
521 *with audio*], you know, that's not a coincidence. I mean, it didn't just happen because somebody  
522 did things wrong; it happened because people did things right. You can't be best and not have  
523 [*glitch interferes with audio*]. It's like complaining that Rembrandt wore the wrong hat, you know,  
524 he should've worn a different hat, he would've been a better artist. [*Laughter*]

525 **CHODOROW:** But it's certainly the case, it may well be that people who think that the  
526 institution has declined from those first days, had on those first days an unrealistic view of what  
527 could, in fact, in the ordinary course of [*crosstalk*].

528 **YORK:** Well, that's probably true. And, you know, I must say, I'd have to really think it  
529 through but I'm inclined almost to agree with you, that the second [*laughs*] wave of people were  
530 not as good as the first wave. I'm trying to think of that in various departments, though, and I  
531 don't think it's true everywhere. But, you know, physics, it's not—its reputation did actually go  
532 down some of the newer people are not as good as the original ones, but it may be building  
533 back up. And to be in the top 10 or 20 is just, you know, it has it's got to be a combination of  
534 doing things right, and then certain good luck-bad luck. But, I mean, you can't be best and have  
535 it be other than the result of policy correctly carried out. [*Laughter*] Even by people who didn't  
536 like it all the time.

537 **CHODOROW:** And [*glitch interferes with audio*] on this, too, that first generation of faculty  
538 [*glitch interferes with audio*] and that they came here [*inaudible*] to sort of tear down [*inaudible*]  
539 boundaries [*crosstalk*].

540 **YORK:** Yes, mm-hmm, yes, yes.

541 **CHODOROW:** But that was successful with their generation [*crosstalk*].

542 **YORK:** Oh, no, we didn't tear down [*crosstalk*]. That's always, right from the very beginning,  
543 just talk. I mean, I've always been in favor of it, I mean, if my own personal disappointments,  
544 now that you remind me. I did want, you know, we don't have—interdisciplinary activities are not  
545 what they should be, in my personal view. And we did try to do it. But every, every, every time,  
546 including at the beginning, when you really started down that road, people in the two disciplines

547 that you're entering, each of them would say, "I hope he's got a good reputation in the other  
548 one, because he's not very good in this one."

549 And that happened from the very beginning; it's not something that developed later. Everybody  
550 says how great it would be to have interdisciplinary activity—by the way, it's everywhere, it's not  
551 just us, I mean—and it's worst at the best institutions. The conflict between depth and breadth  
552 depth wins every time, and it was that way in the '60s *[laughs]* just as much as it is today.

553 **CHODOROW:** It was that way in the 15th Century *[crosstalk]*.

554 **YORK:** I know, yeah, back when I was chancellor the very first time, there were a number of  
555 persons came up, finally, that couldn't get promoted or were just barely promoted. And they had  
556 feet in two departments, and each department says, "You know, I hope this guy's good in the  
557 other department, cause he's pretty mediocre here." Certain things, which are actually thought  
558 of as interdisciplinary but which aren't, do work such as biophysics or biochemistry. But that's  
559 not; that's a discipline. And the same with political economics, I mean, it's a discipline.

560 **CHODOROW:** The great model that's now held up for interdisciplinary possibilities it's called  
561 *[unclear]*

562 **YORK:** Yeah?

563 **CHODOROW:** And it may be that you're worried about them, too, but what they found was  
564 intradisciplinary, not interdisciplinary, is that when the linguist, the philosophers, the  
565 psychologists, basically, came together *[unclear]* came together to form cognitive science, they  
566 were creating interdisciplinary.

567 **YORK:** Yes, that's an interesting case, because, you know, the fact that the church ones are  
568 in the philosophy department is an interesting situation, because—I don't know how well you  
569 know—Pat actually went to medical school in Canada. After getting a Ph.D. in philosophy, in  
570 order to—she didn't get into Greek—in order to learn more about the mind from the wet science  
571 point of view, and went on rounds in the psychiatry, you know. So, there are certain individuals,  
572 but it's hard, again—and I may be exaggerating when I say it didn't work, but just case after  
573 case, when I was hoping it would work, and where—and the most disappointing part is that,  
574 every case I knew—and I didn't know all of them—where there was an assistant professor who  
575 tried to do, you know, the interdisciplinary, not a single one ever got tenure.

576 And when I was in IGCC, we started relating with people on other campuses—Berkeley and—  
577 not a single one of them got tenure. Well, because the political science department doesn't like  
578 policy. They like to study policy, but they—you know, in those days, you know, so they don't  
579 care how the Cold War comes out, just as long as it provides a convenient model to study.  
580 *[Laughter]* And the same in the Nuclear Arms race *[crosstalk]* don't care how it ends, we just  
581 want to—you know, is it a good vehicle to study. And the people that we related with, on other  
582 campuses, that were interested in both political science and policy, the—well, *[unclear]* single  
583 one, but, I mean, the ones that I knew about and thought were most interesting just didn't get  
584 tenure *[crosstalk]*.

585 **CHODOROW:** It's very hard in a research university to run a policy operation *[crosstalk]*.

586 **YORK:** Yeah.

587 **CHODOROW:** What people say, for example, about the Kennedy School, is that it's the  
588 lowest common denominator of Harvard, you know, it's the *[crosstalk]*.

589 **YORK:** Yeah, I've heard other people say, "We're not going to ever do that again, we're not  
590 going to make that kind of mistake again. The best institution of its kind in the world—we're not  
591 going to do that stupid thing again."

592 **CHODOROW:** Right, exactly.

593 **YORK:** But there, you know, I'm—although I'm disappointed, I have to say that I'm not  
594 convinced that the rest of the world was wrong. Because I think the academic world probably is  
595 a good place for depth, and that you find breadth outside. I mean, there are other people who  
596 are broad-minded and the world runs on that—of course, everybody's narrowminded, but I  
597 mean, one of my more—you know, I remember my heart sinking. I was at the senate meeting—  
598 you weren't here—it was back in the days of the Gulf War, and Dick Atkinson was being  
599 extremely sensitive about criticism. They were criticizing him. They wanted to have—they  
600 wanted to devote some classes to talking about the Gulf War, in places that were irrelevant.

601 And I remember a young woman, in some humanities or social sciences, standing up, she said,  
602 "Well, academics are the only people in society who think broadly." And I was, like, "What, no,  
603 she really means it *[crosstalk]*." *[Laughter]* But she certainly meant it *[glitch interferes with*  
604 *audio]*.

605 **CHODOROW:** Okay, I think we've brought this one to the end, it's very good. *[Crosstalk]*

606 **YORK:** You—yeah, that, of course, is when you weren't—you were not here, or even in  
607 touch, I guess. When did you leave?

608 **CHODOROW:** In July of '94.

609 **YORK:** So, you were here.

610 **CHODOROW:** I wasn't at that—

**[END OF PART TWO, END OF INTERVIEW]**