

At this point you might well ask just what it is that such a lobby as I have just described, assuming that it is indeed feasible to set up such a lobby, ~~XXXXXX~~ would present for us ~~XXXXXX~~ at this time. Is it possible to designate at this time political obligations on which many may agree. Are there indeed any unilateral actions that the United States could undertake for the purpose of backing away from the nuclear war toward which we are moving. I have set forth my views on this subject in a document which I could make available to those who want to see it, but I can sketch out a short subject of these views for you in a ~~XXXXXX~~ few minutes. We have up to now used a threat of dropping the bomb on Russia to deter Russia from actions which we regard as undesirable. In particular certain spokesmen of our Government are threatening these days to drop the bomb on Russia if Russia should interfere with free access to West Berlin. There are people inside of the Government who believe that we could waive a first strike against Russian bases who think that in case of a conflict ~~XX~~ ^{over} Berlin we could make a first strike against Russian rocket bases and air bases and cripple Russia's capability of striking back to the point where we would either suffer no losses ~~XX~~ or at most lose a few of our cities. Other people inside the Administration doubt the validity of such an appraisal. The first issue which we must decide in our minds is whether we wish to base our policy of maintaining and developing and subsequently maintaining such a striking ability. In my own ~~XX~~ views, such a policy would

mean a unlimited arm's race in which over a certain period of time we might have such a striking ability. Subsequently we might lose it and still later we might reacquire the . I personally do not believe that it is possible to achieve a reasonable measure of security if we turn back on this road and I believe that the organization ought to oppose the adoption of such a policy. If we renounce this policy, we would then presumably maintain a limited strategic striking force as an assurance against the possible that the Russians might wage a first strike. If our limited strategic fighting forces are properly organized, then they will represent an invulnerable second strike. They would then fulfill the function of being an assurance of our cities being attacked with atomic bombs, but they would not represent a deterrent. We could no longer use them as an instrument in a foreign policy in order to deter the Russians for, say, cutting off free access to Berlin, for the threat of dropping the bomb on Russia if we do not have the first striking ability, is tantamount to murder and suicide and such a strike is not believable in a conflict in which national and ideological interests may be at stake where our existence as a nation is not at stake. I believe that knowing full well that we give up the bomb as a deterrent our policy should be aimed to retain the bomb merely as an assurance and that we should have to renounce and that we are not to the development of instability in order to back away from an all-out atomic war. I believe we should take a number of unilateral steps which are as follows:

Ever since 1946 it has been apparent the bomb has posed a problem to the world for which there is no ~~XXXXXX~~ and can be solved only by abolishing war. So far the Governments of the great powers have not been able to cope with this problem and their policies have followed the line of least resistance which leads to the unlimited atomic arms race. It is my personal view that it is not possible to make America secure by trying to keep ahead in such an arms race.

The very _____ of her attempts to bring the arms race under control by negotiating an agreement providing for suitable arms control. So far all such attempts have broken down and ~~XXX~~ were followed by the continuation of the arms race with renewed vigor. Towards the end of the Eisenhower Administration it was generally expected that the Administration would adopt a new approach to this problem and that a fresh attempt would be made to bring those under control.

From this point on I think the best thing I can do is to think out loud and simply to tell you how my thoughts on this subject developed^{over} the cause of the current year.

1. We ought to pledge ourselves not to attack any city with bombs, either atomic bombs or any other kind of bombs, unless our own cities are attacked with bombs. In doing so we would renounce using our strategic forces as a deterrent and we would retain them merely as an assurance.

2.

4

In discussing with Sulzberger the possibility of such a unilateral pledge renouncing the first use of the bomb, Khrushchev stressed that if there were a war in Europe, even if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which would be about to lose the war might find it impossible to abide by its pledge and might resort to the use of the bomb. To my mind that the pledge renouncing the first of the bomb may be regarded as a believable pledge only if the general principle is recognized and accepted by all nations involved, that there must be no attempt to push a war to victory.

Since it is high time that we began to back away from atomic war, as much as this is possible in the prevailing circumstances, I believe that the Organization ought to take a stand in favor of the atomic powers each pledging unilaterally that even in the case of a war in which they might use atomic bombs against troops in combat, they would never explode any atomic bomb except in a defensive operation, that is, within their own territory -- on their own side of the pre-war boundary. It would be even better if the pledge also renounced the use of atomic bombs within a 30-mile zone on their own side of the pre-war boundary.

Such a pledge would be no less clear and unequivocal than the simple pledge of "no first use" and it would be very much easier to keep; therefore, it would be a more believable pledge. This pledge would impose certain restrictions on the military conduct of a limited war, but it would be well worth paying this price.

I believe that the Organization ought to advocate as a first step unilateral pledges on the part of each atomic power that it would not be the first to explode atomic bombs except on its own side, well within the pre-war boundary.

3. On General Disarmament. The only way to solve the problem which is posed by the bomb, is to abolish war, and there is a school of thought which holds that war may be abolished through general disarmament.

It is conceivable that if America were to adopt the right approach to the Soviet Union on this issue she would meet with favorable response and that substantial progress could then be made not only toward far-reaching disarmament but also toward arriving at a political settlement. At present Americans are however reluctant to accept the idea of general disarmament. One of the reasons for this reluctance is that it is at present not discernible how the peace may be secured in a generally disarmed world.

I believe that no substantial progress can be made toward ~~XXXX~~ disarmament until America and Russia reach a meeting of the minds on this particular issue and the Organization ought to take positive steps to bring about informal discussions between Russians and Americans (perhaps at a private level at first and on a governmental level later on) on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a generally disarmed world. When a certain amount of clarification has been achieved on this issue, it may then be possible to say whether general disarmament would have a chance of being accomplished in the predictable future.

Once it becomes clear that there would be satisfactory, and generally acceptable means available for securing the peace in a disarmed world, America may come to regard disarmament as a highly desirable goal. The door would be open to serious negotiations on the issue of disarmament and such negotiations could then also open the door to a

a political settlement, which does not at present appear to be within reach.

The Russians are very much aware of the great benefits they would derive from general disarmament and the Soviet Union might be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it.

It stands to reason that this should be so. The Soviet Union spends on defense a much larger fraction of her industrial output than America does. Eliminating the cost of armaments would enable the Soviet Union not only to put an end to the housing shortage in her cities and to solve many other domestic economic problems but also to extend her influence by giving economic aid to other nations on an unprecedented scale.

Ever since America has ringed Russia with bomber bases in the post-war period, the average Russian has been keenly aware of the dangers of the arms race, much more keenly, I should say, than is the average American. There is less fear in Russia of economic dislocations that might be caused by moving too fast towards disarmament than there is in America. And above all, the whole concept of general disarmament fits in very well with the set of values generally prevailing in the Soviet Union.

At the same time the leadership of the Soviet Union is, of course, aware of the fact that America is not anywhere near to being prepared to accept the idea of general disarmament. This to my mind explains why in spite of being strongly motivated toward general disarmament the Soviet Union displays in its negotiations on this issue much the same attitude as the American Government; so far as negotiations on

general disarmament are concerned, both governments have been so far mainly guided by the public relations aspect rather than by the substantive aspect of it.

The Soviet Union's attitude in this regard might change over night, however, if it became apparent that America was becoming generally interested in abolishing war through general disarmament.

America is at present committed to protect against Russia certain territories which are located in the geographical proximity of Russia. Since, in the case of general disarmament America would not be able to live up to any such commitment, general disarmament would be politically acceptable to America only if it is made possible to her to liquidate her present commitments -- without loss of prestige and without seriously endangering the interest of the other nations involved.

Chairman Khrushchev, I know, is very much aware of this. Therefore, I am convinced that if it came to serious negotiations on the issue of general disarmament and if it became manifestly necessary to reach a political settlement in order to permit America to liquidate her military commitments, then, under its present leadership the Soviet Union would go a long way towards seeking an accommodation. Accordingly, we might be missing an opportunity which may not recur if we do not speedily examine what our attitudes towards the issue of general disarmament ought to be.

The so-called Berlin crisis centers around the commitments which we have to West Berlin. Exhortations that this crisis ought to be dissolved through negotiations are rather meaningless unless it can be

clearly stated what it is that we could offer to the Russians that they want and what it is that they could offer us in return that we want. If today we were in a position ~~XX~~ to offer the Russians a far-reaching disarmament which would permit them to achieve a substantial saving in arms costs within the framework of a political settlement that would render Europe politically stable that would have a strong incentive to reaching accommodation on the Berlin issue.

○ Sometimes I have the feeling that I have lived through all of this before and in a sense I have. I was 16 years old when the first World War broke out and I lived at that time in Budapest, Hungary. From reading the newspapers in Hungary it would have appeared that whatever the Austrian Empire and Germany did was right and whatever England, France, Russia, or America did was wrong. A good case could be made out for this general thesis, in every single instance. The newspapers were able to show that the war was forced upon the Austrian Empire and Germany by the treachery of England, that Germany had no choice, and was fully justified in instituting the unrestricted submarine warfare, etc., etc. I was in no position to prove the newspapers wrong in any given single instance, but somehow it seemed to be a priori unlikely that the two nations located in the center of Europe should be invariably right and practically all the other nations should be invariably wrong. History would be hardly likely to operate in such peculiar fashion. Realizing this, I began to scrutinize carefully both the facts and arguments presented by the newspapers, and it didn't take long until I began to hold views which were diametrically opposed to the views held by most of my schoolmates. Some of my schoolmates regarded me as something of an orator because I had less difficulty with _____ than they had and I remember that one of them asked me quite early in the war which side I thought would win the war. I said to him that I didn't know who would win the war but that I knew who ought to lose the war. I thought it was the Austrian and Hungarian Empire and Germany who ought to lose the war and that Russia

ought to lose the war also. Since Austria and Germany fought the war on one side and Russia on the other side, it was not quite clear how this could happen. ^{not} But the fact is that it did happen. I am/telling you this in order to show how bright I am. Nobody can claim at 60 to be as bright as he was at 16. In most cases it is not the intelligence that deteriorates but rather the character. There may be exceptions, but I am not among them. I am telling you this story only in order to illustrate what I mean when I say that among people there is a minority capable of seeing current events in a historical perspective.

How large are majorities in America today I do not know. The majority is not capable of current events in its historical perspective because when the loyalty to their own nation comes into conflict with the loyalty of their own truth their loyalty to the nation prevails. The yardstick which they apply to the actions of the Russians is quite different from the yardstick they apply to the actions of their own nation. There is nothing wrong with their reasoning. What is affected by their loyalty is not their reasonings but their perceptions.

After the war when I lived in Berlin, a friend of mine, Michael Polanyi, asked me one day what I thought ought to be the rules of human conduct which regulate the behavior of an individual in society. "Clearly," he said, "you cannot ask a man to be generous to other people if other people are mean to him, for if he were to follow such a rule, he might starve to death." "But," said Polanyi, "perhaps the rule ought to be 'Be 1% more generous to people than people are

to you.' " This should be sufficient if everyone were to follow this rule, human society would be transformed into a liveable place. For a moment I thought this over and said, "This will not work at all. Obviously, people don't apply the same yardstick to their own actions as the yardstick which they apply to other people's actions. And if two people behave much the same way toward each other, each may very well believe that he was a certain percent more generous to the other than the other was to him. Your rule must allow for this fact. But perhaps if you lay down as a rule of conduct 'Be 31% more generous to others than they are to you', such a rule, with luck, might work."

Neither America nor the Soviet Union are following such a rule of conduct. Moreover, the bias greatly exceeds such a percent. The majority of Americans apply a yardstick to their own actions which is very different from the yardstick which they apply to Russia's actions. Even those among them who by an act of self-discipline get the facts correct and who do not permit their memory to be affected by their loyalties manage to retain their bias simply by regarding the bad things that America has done as an exception to the rule whereas the bad things that Russia has done they regard ^{as} the confirmation of the rule. These people watch with fascination just as does everybody else the tragedy which is now being played on the stage of the world, but they laugh at the wrong time, they applaud at the wrong time and, above all, they boo at the wrong time.

Having now watched over a period of six months at close range in Washington how we as a nation respond to Russia's actions and how the Russians respond to our response, I have now very little doubt that if this pattern continues we shall not be able to get through the next ten years without an all-out war. The Berlin crisis may very well be settled by some uneasy compromise, but there is a never-ending possibility for future crises, some of them centering on a conflict of interest, in addition of a conflict of prestige, in a more serious fashion than does the Berlin crisis. You don't have to stay in Washington for months in order to arrive at a pessimistic prognosis. All you have to do is to read the New York Times. But if you stay in Washington, you gain some insight into the manner in which some governmental issues come about and you get a feel of what kind of considerations enter into such decisions and you are ~~xxxx~~ led to conclude that even though many people in the Administration might have the correct insight we still have no chance to prevail in the absence of the right kind of pressure coming from the grass roots. A few weeks ago I was in the Boston area attending a _____ at the Brandeis University and I voiced freely on the _____ what I thought

On several occasions I was asked, "Suppose you are right. What can we do?" I had to admit that this was a legitimate question and that I had no answer. Up to then it seemed to me that there is no good answer to this question, but when I returned to Washington I felt that I ought to make one more try to see if there is an answer. The first thing that

5 and 10% of the votes, it would be probably the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington. Could such a lobby be established? And if it could, is there anything in particular that I could do? I could, of course, go to some of my colleagues and impress upon them that since we are in no small part responsible for the trouble the world is in, we have a special responsibility to see if there isn't something we could do to alter the present course of events. I could invite between 7 and 12 of my colleagues to form a board and to assume the responsibility for the setting up of a lobbying organization by appointing officers who would serve on a full-time basis and who would render the Organization. This Organization could assume the responsibility of gathering a group of distinguished scholars who have more knowledge in the political field than we scientists are supposed to have and who ~~IX~~ would, on the one hand, advise the board on the policies to be followed by the lobby, and, on the other hand, would make themselves available for discussing the current political issues with such key members of Congress and the Administration as may be induced to listen to them. This Organization could go before the country and invite those who ~~XXXXX~~ wish to pool their resources in order to make a concerted effort to change the present course of events to give the Organization the proxy of the votes. What I mean here is that every ~~IX~~ voter shall be invited to join the Organization as an associate member. Associate members would be currently informed by the trustees of the Organization of the general political cause which the Organization currently pursues. And at such time as a voter remains a member of the Organization he shall be pledged to vote according to the advice

which he receives from the Organization. This holds not only for federal elections for the Congress and the Presidency but also for the primaries. The associate members retain the right of resigning at any time from the Organization and when they do so they shall have no further obligation to vote by the advice of the Organization. The Organization will be strictly neutral on issues of domestic ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ policy on the ground that none of the domestic political issues come anywhere near the importance to the issue of avoiding an all-out war.

Further, as long as a voter remains an associate member of the Organization he is pledged to spend 2% of his income in excess of \$4,000 for political contributions. ~~XX~~ Of this amount only a small fraction would go to the Organization to defray the expenses of the lobbying activities and the profit would be spent by the voter as a campaign contribution on the advice of the Organization.

At this point I try to visualize what would happen if I approach some of my distinguished colleagues with a suggestion that they form a board and assume the responsibility for setting up a lobby. Those of them who are political and knowledgeable would probably agree with me that if the Organization obtained the proxy of 5 ~~XX~~ 10% of the votes it might to the job. Then how could I convince them -- and incidentally convince myself -- that some such percentage of the votes could be secured. It is clearly impossible to guess this ~~XX~~ without improvising something like a feasibility study. How would one go about that? Well I thought to myself I could take the best university, and pick the most knowledgeable group within that ~~XX~~ university and talk over this whole matter with the students who turn up at my

lecture and see what they think of it. If there is a minority of about 10%, a little more or a little less, it does not matter, who agree ~~KK~~ with ~~XXXX~~ my analysis who think that such a lobby could do the trick and who would be personally willing not only to join such an organization as associate members but also enlist about 10 associate members in their home community, uncles, cousins, or even parents, this would indicate that perhaps something could be done and in which case I would get busy and see if I could form a board and if the board could obtain the cooperation of the kind of political advisers which it would need.

So now you know why I am here and if after cross-examining me anyone feels that what I am proposing here is a good idea and he personally would want to help, there are a few writing blocks here on which he could write his name, address and telephone number. In addition, I would make myself available tomorrow morning from 10:30 to 1 o'clock and tomorrow afternoon from 2:30 to 5:00 o'clock to discuss with those who are interested where one would go from here on. ~~KK~~ After the end of the discussion period I would ask for an indication of how many people, if any, would want to come in the ~~XXXXXX~~ morning and how many people, if any, would want to come in the afternoon and answer ~~KKK~~ by a showing of hand. If nobody ~~XXXXX~~ wants to come in the morning I plan to make some other plans and if nobody plans to come in the afternoon, I plan to fly back to Washington. Ladies and gentlemen, I have done my best. Now it is up to you do do your worst. It is time for the cross-examination to begin,-- the witness is ready.

I have so far omitted to discuss here the most important question. Suppose it were possible to set up a lobby. Could a reasonable man agree on the political objectives on which such a lobby should pursue? It is easy enough to agree that the problem posed by the bomb must be solved by abolishing war. It is probably also possible to agree that what we must do at this point is to take a number of steps for the purpose of backing away from an all-out atomic war to which we are uncomfortably close. All this is not sufficient, however it is necessary to spell out in detail a number of political objectives for which such a lobby might press in order to see whether ~~XXXX~~ its political action could gain widespread and sustained support. I have prepared a document which answers this question in detail but I don't propose to read it to you. Instead, I propose that you try to find out the answer to this all-important question by subjecting me to a cross-examination.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have done my best. Now it is up to you to do your worst. I have had my say and it is time for the cross-examination to begin.

Thank you.