

Jim Patton Wash DC
apt. Decatur 1080

James G. Patton
mgs

Memorandum on "Citizens' Committee"

Office Atlantic 9647
in Wash D.C. from 17th to 24th /50

March 27, 1950

Dear Professor Einstein:

At the last meeting of the Emergency Committee, it was decided that the Emergency Committee shall initiate the setting up of an organization to study what type of an over-all Russian and American settlement would provide a framework in which international control of atomic energy could satisfactorily operate. In the following are summarized the considerations which I had presented to the Emergency Committee concerning the plan of setting up a "Citizens' Committee" that would conduct an inquiry into the considerations of a satisfactory over-all political settlement:

Prior to the meeting, between October, 1949, and March, 1950, I had discussed the possibility of setting up such a "Citizens' Committee" with the following persons:

his
Thomson
(Lindsay Rosenwald?)

- Chester Barnard, New York
- Stringfellow Barr, New York
- Laird Bell, Chicago
- Pierce Butler, St. Paul, Minnesota
- Henry B. Cabot, Boston
- Grenville Clark, Dublin, New Hampshire
- Gardner Cowles, New York
- Miss Adelaide Enright, St. Paul, Minnesota
- Marshall Field, Chicago
- Thomas L. Finletter, New York
- Lloyd Garrison, New York
- Palmer Hoyt, Denver
- R. M. Hutchins, Chicago
- Fowler McCormick, Chicago
- Archibald Mac Leish, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Josiah Marvel, Wilmington, Delaware
- Gideon Seymour, Minneapolis, Minnesota
- James Warburg, New York
- Gilbert White, Haverford, Pennsylvania

Los Angeles
Dave Noyes
John
Vice Pres. Penell

Jim
La Cron
an. Sec. of Agriculture
Barkeley
his wife is Sec
of Com. of

Robert
Proddle
Proddle

Henry June 15 to Oct 1 50
in original (?)
Jim up

Most of those whom I saw in New York, I saw in the company of Marshall McDuffie, who was much interested in this project and who I hope will maintain his interest in it. Before the war, McDuffie was with John Foster Dulles' law firm. During the war, he was head of the Board of Economic Warfare in the

Jim

Middle East for about two years; subsequently with the State Department in charge of Lend Lease settlement; and after that, in charge of the UNRRA control commission in the Ukraine. At present, he is with Merck and Company of New York, and his assignment gives him enough free time to be able to render a public service when the need arises. I have known him now for about five years and had often asked him for guidance on issues which involved the public interest.

All those whom I saw in Minneapolis and St. Paul, I saw in company of Mr. and Mrs. Harris Wofford of Scarsdale, New York, and St. Paul, Minnesota, whom I have known over a period of years and who were very helpful on this occasion; they might make important contributions to this enterprize if they remain interested in it.

Only the names of those are listed above with whom I had a full personal discussion of the issue; the names of those with whom I did not fully discuss the matter or who were contacted by correspondence, are not included in the list.

All those with whom I have spoken showed a friendly interest in the project, the degree of interest varying from person to person. In some cases I was not able to gain a definite impression as to what the final reaction of the man might be if he gave the matter further thought. In one case, I found very strong interest but at the same time also strong concern about the difficulties and obstacles standing in the way of the proposed enterprize.

I believe that the final reaction of most of those whose names are mentioned above will depend on what kind of sponsorship will be forthcoming and on just how in detail we shall decide to proceed. The difficulties and obvious pitfalls of the enterprize were, of course, stressed by both Marshall McDuffie and me in all of our conversations.

The project as it shapes up in my mind at present as the result of all these conversations would be as follows:

- 1) The "Citizens' Committee" consists of a Commission and a Board.
 - a) The Commission is composed of about 15 men who will serve full time

fer about six months. For a period of two or three months, the Commission may study jointly the issues involved, hear witnesses, and otherwise gather the required evidence. Then the Commission might find it advisable to form out of its members two teams of perhaps five persons each. These teams would be assigned the task of representing the real interest of America and the real interests of Russia, respectively, and they would engage in discussions or "negotiations" with each other in order to see whether it is possible for them to reach an agreement on all outstanding issues involved, including the issue of putting an end to the present arms race.

b) The transcript of these negotiations and the final agreement, if one is reached, will go to a Board of no less than 15 or no more than 50 American citizens of national standing, hereafter referred to as the "Board" which will transmit it, together with its own findings and recommendations, to the American people.

The function of the Board is to decide whether the agreement worked out ought to be acceptable to the American people, assuming that it were acceptable to Russia. The Board will naturally not be in a position to say whether such an agreement ought to be acceptable to Russia.

Since the function of the Board is to testify as to the validity of the conclusions reached by the "American Team," the members of the Board (or at least the members of an Executive Committee of the Board which might comprize about 15 Board members) will have to follow the work of the Commission sufficiently closely to be able to form a considered opinion as to the validity of its conclusions. The members of the Board (or at least the members of its Executive Committee) might have to meet with the Commission perhaps for two full days every month in order to keep in touch with the progress of study, to familiarize themselves with the difficulties that stand in the way of a satisfactory agreement, and in order to fully understand why certain particular solutions were rejected and other particular solutions were adopted .

2) Because lawyers, by virtue of their profession, are accustomed to take on the case of a client--for a fee--it is natural to turn to lawyers when looking for men suitable to serve on the Russian team. It would be desirable to enlist the service of some of the leading corporation lawyers for this purpose, but this does not mean that all members of the Commission need to be lawyers.

Finding a satisfactory Russian team appears to be an easier task than finding a satisfactory American team, because the only requirement for a man on the Russian team is that he be "good," while on the American team, he must not only be "good," but also must enjoy the full confidence of the Board and a certain measure of public confidence. This is so because when it comes to details, the Board will have to rely to a large extent on the say-so of the American team when formulating its own opinion on the merits of the proposed settlement.

The transcript of the negotiations will show what the difficulties are which stand in the path of a satisfactory agreement, and it might show that the Commission was able to work out an agreement which in their opinion would safeguard the vital interests of America and Russia without infringing upon the vital interests of the other nations involved.

If the Commission succeeds in outlining such an agreement, and if their draft finds wide-spread acclaim in America at the time when it is made public, then it is conceivable that some spokesman of the Russian government and some spokesman of the American government might publicly recognize that draft as a suitable basis of discussion for governmental negotiations.

But even disregarding this possibility, there is much that could be learned from the transcript of the Commission's negotiations. On atomic energy control, for instance, the American government put forward in 1946 the Baruch Plan which the Russians rejected. The transcript of the negotiations might show that the "Russian team," composed of American citizens charged with representing Russian interests, also finds the Baruch Plan unacceptable. This in itself does not teach us anything much, but the reasoned argument of our "Russian team," stating why the Baruch Plan

is not acceptable to them, will probably show us what real interests were involved when the Russians rejected the Baruch Plan and thus possibly disclose the real reasons for Russian opposition to the Plan.

When the Russians opposed the Baruch Plan, they did not tell us their real reasons for doing so, and what they told us of their reasons, they said in a language which is not intelligible to the American people. Our "Russian team", on the other hand, will not only tell us why they find the Baruch Plan unacceptable from the point of view of their "client," but they will tell us their reasons in a language which we can understand.

The negotiations in the Commission are, of course, in no way a substitute for real negotiations, but on the other hand, they have from a point of view of intellectual clarification, certain rather important advantages over real negotiations. In the real negotiations, carried out by governmental representatives, the display of imagination and resourcefulness is greatly inhibited; such negotiations have to move with great caution since it is not easy to retract a point once it has been conceded. The negotiations in our "Commission" are not subject to such limitations; here it is possible for a "team" tentatively to concede a number of points and as the over-all picture emerges, either to retain or to reject what has been tentatively accepted. This makes for flexibility and speed in the "negotiations."

For America, faced with a difficult problem of reaching an over-all settlement with Russia, it might be of value to have the real negotiations preceded by such an intellectual clarification as might be attained through the devise here proposed.

5) The work of the Commission, in order to be effective, must be widely known, studied, and discussed. In order to achieve this, it is advisable at the very outset to make arrangements that will give the press a stake in the enterprise. If the progress of the negotiations is followed by the press, step by step when material about them is released, if we can be sure that columnists, radio commentators

and editorial writers study these transcripts, then we may assume that the staff of the State Department too will pay attention to them. And if we could at least achieve that the public discussion of the Russian-American conflict will be henceforth carried on more in terms of the real conflicting interests which are involved and less in the irrational terms in which it has largely been conducted in these last four years, then we would already have achieved something of importance.

4) One of the controversial points that arose in the conversations dealing with the problems of the "Citizens' Committee," was the question what the terms of reference of the Commission should be. Clearly the terms of reference of the Commission should enable them to deal with any issue that is relevant to the creation of a stable peace. On the other hand, most of those with whom I spoke agreed that the issue of transforming the United Nations into a world government or otherwise setting up a world government would go beyond the scope of the work of the Commission, as presently envisaged.

5) An important issue on which there was divergence of opinion is the terms of reference of the Russian team. Shall the men on the Russian team say what they themselves would find acceptable if they had the task of safeguarding Russia's vital interests or should the Russian team say what they think the Russians might find acceptable?

In favor of this latter point, it was argued that the Russians were not guided by rational considerations; that they were guided by irrational desires, peculiar theories about what is going on in the world and that they are suffering from all sorts of misconceptions. The opinion was expressed that the work of the Commission would be meaningless unless the Russian team, in place of saying what they would accept, did study the Russians and then said what they thought the Russians would accept.

To me it seems that we ought to reject this approach. Naturally neither the government of the United States nor the Russian government will in fact follow an entirely rational course. As far as either of these two governments are concerned,

what they can do and what they cannot do will be influenced by the political system within which each one has to operate. Both the American and the Russian team must naturally be cognizant of this factor and even without any conscious effort to do so, they will, of course, take into account the political systems in which the contracting parties will of necessity have to operate.

But while the men on the "Russian team" can say with some degree of assurance what they themselves (using their own judgement and their own appreciation of the issues involved) would accept in the interest of their "client," they cannot with any degree of certainty say what the Russians might find acceptable. Any attempt on the part of the "Russian team" to do so would involve not only the Russians' misconceptions, but also their own misconceptions of the Russian misconceptions. I personally do not think that an attempt to "play the Russian" would be of much value and it certainly could not claim any objective validity.

I believe that this point is so important that it ought to be clarified in the statute setting up the "Citizens' Committee," and that it certainly ought to be clarified before anyone is solicited to serve on the Board or on the Commission or anyone is asked to contribute funds to the "Citizens' Committee."

The difficulty of predicting what the Russian government might do in any given set of circumstances ought perhaps to be compared with the difficulty our meteorologists had a generation ago in predicting the weather. Meteorology was at that time in such a state of imperfection that the simple prediction of fair weather tomorrow if the weather was fair today, or rain for tomorrow if it rained today, could favorably compete with the prediction of the meteorologist. Thus following the thumb rule that "The weather never changes" was about the best prediction that one could make.

Similarly, the thumb rule that the Russian government will act as we ourselves would act if placed in similar circumstances and entrusted with their responsibility will today give as good forecasts (and do it much less painfully) than the contro-

versial forecasts one could obtain by a discussion of Russian psychology.

Naturally, neither of these thumb rules will give the correct answer always. The weather does sometimes change and the Russian government does sometimes act differently from how we would act in similar circumstances. Yet if one accepts the point of view that we have primarily to deal here with the conflict between two nations and their respective allies, and that even this perhaps oversimplified problem will require much ingenuity and resourcefulness for its solution, then one will be inclined to think that its solution would provide us at least with a framework for actual negotiations between the Russian and American governments.

6) The United States and Russia are not the only major countries whose vital interests have to be taken into account in an over-all settlement. While it is probably not practical to have more than two teams negotiating with each other, members of the Commission who are not assigned to any team may be assigned the task of representing the interests of one or another of the countries involved and acting as spokesmen for those interests. These spokesmen would sit in on the negotiations of the two teams and currently make it clear to the two teams where they would infringe upon the interests of those other countries. The countries in Western Europe will certainly be very strongly affected by any over-all settlement that might be reached, but the effect of the agreement on other countries will have to be considered also.

Since the number of men serving on the Commission who are not assigned either to the Russian or the American team will not be large (perhaps no more than five) their assignment to represent other nations will have to be kept rather flexible.

7) The Commission must have at its disposal an adequate staff to assist in its work, and must have facilities to obtain the assistance of experts on a part-time basis.

8) It was emphasized by various persons that it would be important to clear with the State Department or with the White House this enterprise at the outset or

at a somewhat later stage. Some thought that the enterprise could obtain Truman's blessing, perhaps in the form of a letter in which he would ask that a transcript of the negotiations be submitted to him. Others thought that this would be difficult to get without the blessing of the State Department and that rather than asking for the blessing of the State Department, we ought to merely "clear" the matter with the State Department. All these comments were made before Acheson's press conference of February 8, and I do not know how these comments would be modified in the light of that press conference.

9) Funds for the "Citizens' Committee" may be raised through private donations elicited by personal contacts, through contributions of foundations, and through public fund-raising. The last of these methods has the advantage of giving the public a stake in this enterprise and ought therefore to be used at least as one of the methods by which funds are raised. Fund-raising should be aimed at no less than half a million dollars and no more than one million dollars.

10) It was proposed that the Emergency Committee create a Committee of Arrangements which will have the responsibility of initiating the setting up of the "Citizens' Committee." The Committee of Arrangements could help the "Citizens' Committee" to assemble a suitable Commission, but the appointment of the Commission is the responsibility of the Board of the "Citizens' Committee" and not of the Committee of Arrangements. Once the "Citizens' Committee" is set up with its Board complete and the Commission appointed, the Committee of Arrangements will have no further functions.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Cal. Joseph I. Greene
1115 17th St. N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.
Metropolitan 3136
my business with
Tan Bullentine

Palmer Hoyt
Newborn
Kraus
1950
[Bullentine]
[Palmer Hoyt]
[Times business]
[Editor]

Charles A. Graham
off Synes Bldg.
Madison 5101
Name 2345 Rault Str
Lakewood
2233 W
Lakewood
Cal

Dean Edmund C. King Cal Union
Laro School

Byron White Lawyer, Denver
(Law on law of theories) → real football

Eric Davis
att. - Denver
Henry Swan Jr
(Doctor) *

Ben Cherrington, Denver
Fundation

Dean Paul Roberts. Univ. of Denver

St. Julius Episcopal Church Denver.

George Forster

Walter Patton
and Hoyt

Allan Shipp
Lawrence
son of Senator

Robert Henry
Rep

Ms. Mabel Law Cal Gooding (Theories)

Dean C. King / E. Ray Campbell (semi invalid)
Pres. Denver Post
Norold Silver (Mrs. Silver
more subterfuge)

May 15, 1950

The enclosed ditto contains copies of communications

from Carter, Ledyard and Milburn to Harrison Brown
from David Noyes to James Patton
from Josiah Marvel, Jr. to Leo Szilard
from Leo Szilard to Grenville Clark
from Grenville Clark to Leo Szilard
from Walter Orr Roberts (Director of the High Altitude
Observatory of Harvard University and University of Colorado)
to Leo Szilard
from Henry B. Cabot, Boston, to Leo Szilard
from Karl Compton, Chairman of the Corporation MIT
to Henry B. Cabot
from Albert Pratt (Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, Boston)
to Henry B. Cabot
from J.E. Killian, Jr., President MIT, to Henry B. Cabot
from Phillip Ketchum (Herrick, Smith, Donald, Farley, and
Ketchum, Boston) to Henry B. Cabot
from Stringfellow Barr to Leo Szilard

CONFIDENTIAL; Please do not transmit to
anyone without first checking with
Leo Szilard, Harrison Brown or Joseph Mayer.

May 14, 1950

Copies of documents giving reaction to the plan
of the Emergency Committee of the Atomic Scientists
for setting up a citizens inquiry into the conditions of peace.

Carter, Ledyard and Milburn
Counsellors at Law
2 Wall Street, New York 5, N.Y.

March 16, 1950

Dr. Harrison S. Brown
Emergency Committee of Atomic
Scientists, Incorporated
956 East Fifty-eighth Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Dr. Brown:

Since talking to you and Dr. Szilard on Monday, I have discussed your proposals with my partner Jesse Fillman, who is a specialist in the tax law. He confirms the advice which I gave you on Monday.

Inasmuch as I promised Dr. Szilard some confirmation along these lines, and do not know his address, I would appreciate your passing the word along to him.

Sincerely yours,

Edward F. Clark, Jr.

P.S. Fillman has some interesting ideas on how to get an advance exemption ruling.

The following is a telegram from Dave Noyes.

1950 Apr 20 PM 1153

Hon. James Patten
954 Bonnie Brae Blvd Dvr
Los Angeles Calif 20

Have just returned from an extended stay in the East. The proposal submitted to you by the distinguished professor is new in concept and provides an interesting approach to the problem. It also however poses many collateral difficulties. I shall be going east again shortly and will be eager to arrange a meeting. With warm regards.

Dave

From: Josiah Marvel, Jr.
Continental American Building
Wilmington, Delaware

March 28, 1950

To: Professor Leo Szilard
1155 East 57th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

My dear Professor Szilard:

I was very glad to receive your letter of March 23rd outlining to me the steps which have been taken regarding the establishment of a "Citizens' Committee for Studying the Requirements of an Overall Settlement."

As I indicated during our conversation in Princeton, I am still most interested in the proposals and purposes of this contemplated study, and I look forward to hearing from you what progress is being made.

Sincerely yours,

Josiah Marvel, Jr.

From: Leo Szilard
1155 East 57th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

April 25, 1950

To: Mr. Grenville Clark
31 Nassau Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Clark:

Since our very pleasant luncheon in New York, the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists has decided to initiate the setting up of an organization for the purposes which we discussed in New York. The Emergency Committee has appointed Professors Joe Mayer, Harrison Brown, and myself to act for her in this matter as the "Committee of Arrangements".

We are proposing that an organization to be called "Council of Inquiry into the Conditions of Peace" be set up entirely independent of the Emergency Committee and be organized on a tax-exempt basis. This "Council" might operate along the lines discussed in Memorandum dated March 27 which is enclosed. An appendix to this memorandum, containing a further discussion of the terms of reference of the "Commission" of the "Council", is in preparation.

We are asking Mr. Hutchins to act as chairman of the Board of the "Council", and Mr. Clarence Pickett to act as its vice-chairman. Mr. Hutchins has accepted, and we hope that Mr. Pickett will accept also. We recommended to Mr. Hutchins to choose the initial members of the Board of the Council from among the following list of names: Laird Bell, Henry B. Cabot, Grenville Clark, Marshall Field, Reuben G. Gustavson (University of Nebraska), Fowler McCormick, R. L. Stearns (University of Colorado), and James G. Patton. Mr. Hutchins leaves for Europe on May 2, and by that time we hope

Mr. Grenville Clark -- continued

to have the initial board members lined up so we can proceed to incorporate the Council. Carter, Ledyard, and Milburn, who have been acting for the Emergency Committee, will be asked to act for the Council also and to try to obtain an advance ruling from the Treasury concerning tax exemption. No public announcement of formation of the Council is planned until we have secured a fund of perhaps \$200,000. for the Council.

It is our understanding that Mr. Hutchins will try to reach you before he leaves for Europe and ask you to serve as a member of the Board. We hope very much that you will accept. We realize, of course, that you cannot take on any duties that are very strenuous. Membership on the Board might involve your spending two days a month with the "Commission" of the Council which is the full-time organ of the Council; but if this should prove too strenuous for several Board members, it might be possible to form an Executive Committee of the Board and thereby to ease the burden of the Board members. An Executive Committee might have to be formed in any case if the Board should be enlarged much beyond 15 members.

Lately I have spent a week in Colorado and found such enthusiastic response to our "plan" that I feel quite heartened by it. This experience strengthens me in the belief that the Council will have to draw much of its strength from the Middle West and the West. I am also inclined to think that the formation of regional committees in Minnesota, in Colorado, and perhaps in Oregon might be very useful. These regional committees could be affiliated with the Council and would have the task to keep the people of the "region" informed of the activities of the Council.

With respect to the composition of these regional committees and also the Board of the Council, I believe we ought to make an attempt to enlist outstanding men who, in the past, have kept aloof from public affairs but who now, at last, are really concerned and are willing to take their share of the burden.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

cc: Joe Mayer
Harrison Brown

From: Grenville Clark
Dublin, New Hampshire

May 2, 1950

To: Professor Leo Szilard
Institute of Radiology and Biophysics
University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Mr. Szilard:

With regard to your letter of April 25, I am, as I told you in New York last winter, very interested in having carried out a careful study by non-official persons of what can be done to achieve an over-all East-West settlement, and to make progress towards world order. So I am glad to see that you are proposing to go ahead.

Professor Leo Szilard -- continued

As to my own participation, I am complimented to be asked to go on the Board of the proposed Council and, as I also have confidence in Mr. Hutchins, I'd be glad to accept if I saw my way to it. But I regret to say that I cannot. I could not give it the necessary attention because I have all my time and energy tied up for quite a while ahead. I want to try to finish in the next year a piece of work I have in progress with Louis B. Sohn in the shape of "Detailed Proposals for Revision of the U.N. Charter". It is a long and difficult job and, with my other commitments, will take all my working time.

I realize what you say about having an Executive Committee and that not all the Board members would necessarily be expected to come to meetings, etc. But if I were on the Board, I would want to keep in close touch and, in the circumstances, could not do that.

I venture some comments on your letter and your memo. of March 27.

First, and most important from my standpoint, I certainly hope that the idea on p. 6 of your memo. that the "issue of transforming the U.N. into a world government or otherwise setting up a world government" would "go beyond the scope of the work of the Commission, as presently envisaged" will not be adopted. I think this would vitiate the whole project right at the start. This is because I don't think that there can be an East-West settlement or "stable peace" without general and universal disarmament (in all arms and by all nations); and I think it obvious that such disarmament can't be obtained unless a world government limited to the sphere of war prevention is established.

In the sentence on p. 6 preceding the intimation that the question of a world government (any world government apparently) would be excluded, you say that the "terms of reference of the Commission should enable them to deal with any issue that is relevant to the creation of a stable peace." Since I think that the creation of a world government is not only relevant to but a pre-condition of a stable peace, I think the two sentences are contradictory. When I read them together, I couldn't help thinking of the old rhyme: "Mother, may I go in to swim? Yes, my darling daughter. Hang your clothes on a hickory limb, and don't go near the water."

Seriously, I hope no limitation of this or any sort would be put on the Commission's thinking.

Second, I wonder whether the enterprise needs so much elaboration. What is really required is some hard thinking by a few competent independent people who are not over-burdened like the officials, by day-to-day duties and not inhibited by tradition and politics, like most of the State Department. There is ample material; in fact, it is easy to bog down in it. Also, if the Commission is large, they might well bog down in interminable discussions and have too many divergent views. I should think about five good men on full time for six months (with a few assistants) could do better than 15. And I think a Board or Executive Committee or Advisory Committee of 6-10 would be enough to keep in touch, criticize and advise.

When it comes to putting out the Commission's Report and having it widely discussed, that is another matter; and there I can see a function for a large Citizens' Committee and regional committees.

If it were pruned down in this way, \$200,000. should do the whole thing.

Professor Leo Szilard — continued

Third, I like the idea of two teams. But they needn't necessarily all be Commission members. Two teams of three or four each could be recruited for two-three months after the Commission had defined the issues somewhat, - partly composed of Commission members and partly of others.

Fourth, I don't like any idea of trying to get a governmental blessing for the enterprise. Citizens have a right to study a subject and submit their conclusions to the people and the Government without anyone's blessing. They had better do just that here. I don't know what "clearing" the enterprise with the State Department or White House means. It may seem to imply asking approval. That approval might be withheld and what then? You have either to drop the project or go ahead against the Government's opposition. Or if approval were granted, would it strengthen the enterprise or weaken it by giving the impression that it was a sort of agency of the State Department? In getting up the Selective Service Act in 1940, the Citizens Committee of which I was Chairman, didn't ask the blessing or approval of the War Department or President. We just went ahead, drew our Bill and got it introduced. In this way, we avoided the complications of possible disapproval on the one hand or having it an Administration measure on the other. It was much better that way.

This isn't a case of negotiating with a foreign government, where the Logan Act might apply. It is simply doing what all citizens have a right to do without any permission from anyone.

This isn't to say that any secret should be made of the enterprise or that the State Department and President shouldn't be informed. They both should be, just as we informed the War Department and President Roosevelt of the move for a Selective Service Act. All that needs is two letters politely informing them of the project and its purpose. This should be done, I think, only after the enterprise is actually organized and ready to function; and the letters should be carefully framed to avoid any implication that any permission or approval is requested.

The enterprise will succeed or fail by virtue of the wise and constructive character of the Report or the opposite and the success or lack of success in getting it publicly discussed. It is quite unnecessary and I think unwise to try to "clear" it with anyone in the Government.

Some of these comments may seem unsympathetic. But that is not my intention. I have long thought that our Government people are incapable (for a variety of reasons) of producing the ideas essential to achieving disarmament and a "stable peace" and that these ideas must come from non-official sources. Believing this, I have been trying myself as a sort of one-man "Commission" to produce a set of ideas and I shall get out a document within six weeks which is what I would recommend if I were a member of a group such as you envisage. It will be in the form of "A Statement for a Sub-committee of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate". I think I'll have the temerity to call it a "Plan for Peace", since it will purport to be a program of ideas and procedure to achieve an over-all settlement.

So I'm very sympathetic to such a study and would, indeed, like to see several such, provided they all were by experienced and competent persons. And if the Commission isn't excluded or discouraged from canvassing or recommending limited world government (which, as I say, would, in my opinion, render the enterprise futile or worse), I'd be just as much interested in its work, even though I couldn't be active in it.

Professor Leo Szilard -- Continued

I'm sending a copy of this to Bob Hutchins, whom I like and admire.

Sincerely yours,

Grenville Clark

From: High Altitude Observatory of
Harvard University and University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado

24 April 1950

to: Dr. Leo Szilard
Institute of Radiobiology and Biophysics
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Dr. Szilard:

I have just returned from a long discussion with President Stearns about the committee for Colorado to be associated with the national activities. We also discussed at some length the plan as a whole.

Stearns felt that the choice of Henry, Swan, White, and Hoyt was excellent. Regarding Hoyt he said that he felt that the choice of Hoyt to the committee would assure the minimization of the importance of the group by the Scripps-Howard (competing) newspaper. And it might be possible in some way to get the support of both papers if neither editor or if both editors were on the committee. However, he thought that as a calculated risk the choice of Hoyt alone would be O.K.

So far as Patton is concerned, he felt that Patton was one of the most able members of the committee, would contribute a lot of energy and activity, but that with a large segment of the agricultural population of the state and the area the committee would have a left wing appearance. The reason for this is that Henry, Swan, and White would be relatively little known to the farmers, whereas Patton would be extremely well known.

Stearns thought, however, that Patton should definitely be on the committee, but perhaps balanced by a man active in farm circles of slightly more conservative stripe, but still with great public interest. Stearns suggested two men, father and son, who might well qualify. The father is Harry W. Parr of Greeley, Colorado. The man is an alumnus of the University, and is widely known among farmers in the area for his activities in important farm issues. I regret to say that I failed to find out whether he is associated with the National Grange or some other of the farm groups. I believe that Stearns' implication was that the man is associated with one of the more conservative farm organizations.

The son, William Parr, like his father, is extremely well known in farm circles, and has been very prominent in public affairs, also like his father. Stearns seemed to think that either of the two men would be equally good.

Dr. Leo Szilard -- Continued

As for myself, I know nothing about either of the men, and so am not able to make any independent evaluation.

.....

Very sincerely yours,

Walter Orr Roberts

From: Henry B. Cabot
140 Federal Street
Boston 10, Massachusetts

May 10th, 1950

To: Professor Leo Szilard
1155 East 57th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Mr. Szilard:

I sent your memorandum about a settlement with Russia to the following persons: Mr. Albert Pratt, a partner of Paine Webber Jackson and Curtis, an investment firm; Mr. Lloyd Brace, President of the First National Bank of Boston; Mr. Phillips Ketchum, one of our leading lawyers; Judge Raymond Wilkins, a justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts; Mr. Thomas Mahony, another leading lawyer; Mr. James R. Killian, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Mr. Erwin Canham, publisher of the Christian Science Monitor; Mr. Harold Hodgkinson, General Manager of Filene's, one of our largest stores; and Mr. Karl Compton, Chairman of the Board of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I have written replies from all except Messrs. Brace, Wilkins, Mahony and Canham. Mr. Canham is away in Europe and I haven't heard from him. Mr. Brace told me that he felt that the situation in the world was so serious that any step which might even have a very small chance of improving our relations with Russia should be taken and that he felt that a study such as you suggest was one of them. Mr. Mahony's reactions were very similar to those of Mr. Grenville Clark but, in addition, he felt that your memorandum put too great restrictions on the general point of view of the Russian team. Judge Wilkins was the only person who was unfavorable to the idea. He felt that it would be a good education for those participating in the project but for nobody else. I am enclosing the reports of all the other gentlemen.

My own feeling remains that a general study of the relations between the West and Russia would be beneficial. However, I agree with Mr. Clark that to leave out of consideration world federation is to leave out an essential part of any possible settlement and, as your memorandum stands today, I would not be prepared to go along with it for that reason. I have some other but lesser criticisms. I also judge from the reactions of these gentlemen that the question of raising money will not be easy.

.....

Yours sincerely,

Henry B. Cabot

From: Karl Compton
 Chairman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

May 1, 1950

To: Mr. Henry B. Cabot
 140 Federal Street
 Boston 10, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Cabot:

I have read the memorandum by Professor Szilard which you sent with your letter of April 25, and I am returning it to you with the following comments.

The suggestion is an interesting one, but I find it very difficult to come to any conviction as to whether it would likely work out successfully or not. On the one hand there is obviously a very important point in bringing about public understanding and public consideration of these questions, and there is also the fact that an independent committee of very able citizens might be able to make the suggestion which would break the present impasse. What may be needed might be a new idea or it might be some face-saving mechanism.

If this plan is carried out it would seem to me that a logical extension of its basic idea would be to provide two Russian teams, and not one. The first of these teams might approach the problem from the point of view of Russian self-interest along the lines suggested in Szilard's memorandum. We must admit the possibility, however, that the Russian government will not act, even as a first approximation, the way we would, and that it may have objectives definitely in view which are not susceptible of argument on the assumption of a desire for world peace and a free society. It might therefore be advisable to have a second Russian team which would go to the worst extreme possible, and assume that all the Russian objectives were of the type which we most dislike and most fear.

I have some qualms about the suggestion at the bottom of page five to the effect that the press should be brought into these discussions at the very outset. I would be afraid that this might result in an avalanche of political or prejudiced outpourings which would handicap the project at the start. I would think that a better procedure would be to carry through the study on a rather confidential basis until it has reached the stage of at least some tentative conclusions and some definitive formulation of arguments. Then might be the time to bring in the press for their reaction and for securing the reaction of the public through them.

Finally, there is another obvious difficulty. In order to bring in people who are best informed it would probably be necessary to call in people who have also been associated as members or advisers of the State Department on these issues, - to say nothing of men who have been associated with the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. On the other hand, it would be extremely difficult for any of these men to operate objectively, if at all, because it would be impossible for them to dissociate themselves with the arguments concerning these same questions in which they may have been involved in their governmental duties. Perhaps I feel rather keenly about this because I have had to write myself out of a number of interesting situations, since leaving the Research and Development Board, simply because I could not divorce myself from the discussions of these questions which I had heard in the War Council and other agencies.

Mr. Henry B. Cabot -- Continued

As you may see, therefore, I am very much on the fence as to whether this is a good project or not, and by good I mean a project which can reasonably be expected to produce results commensurate with the cost in time and money. I do think that Szilard has made a very straightforward and skilful presentation of the plan.

Very sincerely yours,

Karl Compton
Chairman

The following is a copy of a letter from Albert Pratt of Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, 24 Federal Street, Boston 10, Massachusetts

Mr. Henry B. Cabot
140 Federal Street
Boston 10, Massachusetts

April 25, 1950

Dear Harry:

I have read with interest Professor Szilard's memorandum. I think he is overly optimistic of the possible results of his plan. I doubt that such a recommendation of a private commission can ever be accepted by both the American and Russian governments as a basis for negotiations. However, I do believe that his idea has merit as a method of devising possible solutions, provided that the highest calibre brains are employed to work out a new approach entirely unhampered by preconceived ideas.

In this connection I think there is some danger in unduly restricting the "terms of reference" as suggested in Professor Szilard's paragraph four.

I also have some doubt as to his conclusions in paragraph five as to the point of view which the Russian team should adopt. It seems to me that this team must try as best it can to take into the act the Marxian method of thinking of the Russians. Otherwise the procedure will be entirely unrealistic and of no value.

I also doubt the practicality of the press coverage proposed in paragraph three. I don't think that it is the kind of "news" that will be used and there is some doubt in my mind as to whether premature publicity might not destroy the value of anything which the commission is able to work out.

I am returning to you the memorandum as you requested.

Sincerely,

Albie

From: J. R. Killian, Jr.
President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

May 3, 1950

to: Mr. Henry B. Cabot
140 Federal Street
Boston 10, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Cabot:

It was good of you to send me a copy of Professor Szilard's letter to Professor Einstein. I return the copy as you requested.

I feel very strongly that we need more public discussion of the whole atomic energy problem, and particularly we need to face up to the question of the advisability of a further effort to reach an agreement with Russia. For this reason I am generally in favor of systematic efforts to study the problem. You may be interested in the marked passage in a speech of mine made on the west coast some weeks ago in which I discussed this problem.

I was awfully disappointed that I could not get to the meeting at your house recently.

Yours sincerely,

J. R. Killian, Jr.
President

From: Herrick, Smith, Donald, Farley and Ketchum
1 Federal Street
Boston 10, Massachusetts

April 27, 1950

To: Henry B. Cabot, Esquire
140 Federal Street
Boston, Massachusetts

Dear Harry:

I received yours of April 24th with the enclosed memorandum of Leo Szilard which I have read with great interest. It raises two questions.

1. Would the Commission which he plans produce a valuable advance in thinking about a possible agreement between Russia and the U.S.A. within which there could be International control of Atomic Energy?

2. Would the money, namely, from \$500,000. to \$1,000,000. for the work of the Commission and the Board be obtainable?

Dealing with the second question first, I think it would be extremely difficult to raise the money unless a few large donors were prepared at the outset to give most of it.

Herrick, Smith, Donald, Farley and Ketchum -- continued

As to whether the Commission would produce a worthwhile idea, I feel unable to have a sound opinion. The chances I should think would not be as favorable as 50-50. Inevitably such a Commission works in a somewhat academic atmosphere and the ability of those representing Russia to really understand the Russian point of view would be subject to considerable doubt. A great deal would depend upon the genius of the members of the Commission working on the two teams. How could one assume a probability that they would be up to the job? I find myself in a haze. I return herewith the memorandum.

Yours sincerely,

Phillip Ketchum

From: Stringfellow Barr, President
Foundation for World Government
Fifty-eight Park Avenue
New York 16, New York

May 5, 1950

to: Mr. Leo Szilard
1155 East 57th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Mr. Szilard:

May I confirm in writing what I told you orally at the Waldorf Saturday, namely, that at a meeting of our trustees on April 28 your application of April 24 was carefully considered. In view of their own present plans and policies they felt unable to go further than a token grant of \$10,000. which I hope may be of some help.

Will you tell me how payment should be made. Is the Emergency Committee willing to accept money from the Foundation? You may recall their public statement that they were not. On the other hand, our trustees would want to make the grant to some tax exempt body.

Cordially yours,

Stringfellow Barr

at a somewhat later stage. Some thought that the enterprise could obtain Truman's blessing, perhaps in the form of a letter in which he would ask that a transcript of the negotiations be submitted to him. Others thought that this would be difficult to get without the blessing of the State Department and that rather than asking for the blessing of the State Department, we ought to merely "clear" the matter with the State Department. All these comments were made before Acheson's press conference of February 8, and I do not know how these comments would be modified in the light of that press conference.

9) Funds for the "Citizens' Committee" may be raised through private donations elicited by personal contacts, through contributions of foundations, and through public fund-raising. The last of these methods has the advantage of giving the public a stake in this enterprise and ought therefore to be used at least as one of the methods by which funds are raised. Fund-raising should be aimed at no less than half a million dollars and no more than one million dollars.

10) It was proposed that the Emergency Committee create a Committee of Arrangements which will have the responsibility of initiating the setting up of the "Citizens' Committee." The Committee of Arrangements could help the "Citizens Committee" to assemble a suitable Commission, but the appointment of the Commission is the responsibility of the Board of the "Citizens' Committee" and not of the Committee of Arrangements. Once the "Citizens' Committee" is set up with its Board complete and the Commission appointed, the Committee of Arrangements will have no further functions.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Wolfram Beel
Rosenfeld

Alfred Laons
(Philip Morris)

Mrs. Harold Lewis
or Mrs. Asch

X Grenville
Lewis and Bell
Harold Prochler
Harold Winder

Ine Eckhouse

Alto Spornel

Harold Winder
Gen. Inv. Investors
and Apprehensions

Arthur Rubin
and Hutchinsons

Oline Bridge
N.Y.

for Harold Winder

Grafton

John Corson; Wash Post
(Luis W. H.)

Justinson }
Stems }

Trudor Empemar (CED)

~~Seymour~~

Hutchins

~~Edmund Day } (formerly Cornell)~~
O.K. Hutchins

~~W.H. M. Davis } H neutral~~

Brown O.K. Hutchins

Huteliars Schedule

Mo 17th leaves evening
[press conf. 3 pm]

24 to 27th in Chicago

1 to 2 end of May
in N.Y.

June 5 back in
N.Y. C. —

Council of Inquiry into the conditions of peace

Suggestions for Board

~~Initial Board~~

A) Initial Board

Pickett

Cabot

Granville Clarke

Marshall Field

~~Thomas Finletter~~

Gardner ~~Gardiner~~ Cowles

Hutchins

Laird Bell

Fowler McCormick

B) Further suggestions

Leah Lapham (Mayor of San Francisco)

Milo Perkins

Walter Reuther

Stearns (University of Colorado)

Nelson Rockefeller (David?)

Homer T. Bone all (Wash. Ind.)

James Patton

H. L. McNaughton (Portland)

Richard K. Mellon (Pittsburgh)

John ~~Edw~~ Cowles

Percival Brundage (Price, Waterhouse & Co.)

Collier (Standard Oil of California)

Palmer and Bruce *for Board*
managing adv. agency

Amos Mitchell
Chas. W. ...

William ...
Arthur ...
Walter ...

Power for ...
Amos ...
John ...

John ...

De ...

James ...

Harold ...

Paul C. Smith

Handwritten notes and signatures

Handwritten notes and signatures

Suggestions for Board

Antitrust Board

A) Initial Board

Pickett

Cabot

Dr. Charles Clarke

Marshall Field

Thomas Lindecker

Arthur Maxwiler Cowles

Hutchins

Laird Bell

Walter Macfarlane

Harold G. Ladd

Mayor of San Francisco

Milo Perkins

Walter Fisher

Stearns (University of Colorado)

Nelson Rockefeller

Horace T. Bone

James Patton

H. A. McLaughlin (Portland)

Richard K. Mellon (Pittsburgh)

John R. Cowles

Perival Brundage (Price, Waterhouse & Co.)

Collier (Standard Oil of California)

General Board of Directors

Robert M. La Follette
Proctor of the People
Supper
Attorney
General Board of Directors

in L. A.

Walter Fisher
Arthur Maxwiler Cowles
Marshall Field
Dr. Charles Clarke
Cabot
Pickett

People
Arthur Maxwiler Cowles
Walter Fisher
Harold G. Ladd
Mayor of San Francisco
Milo Perkins
Stearns (University of Colorado)
Nelson Rockefeller
Horace T. Bone
James Patton
H. A. McLaughlin (Portland)
Richard K. Mellon (Pittsburgh)
John R. Cowles
Perival Brundage (Price, Waterhouse & Co.)
Collier (Standard Oil of California)

Walter Fisher
Arthur Maxwiler Cowles
Marshall Field
Dr. Charles Clarke
Cabot
Pickett

Robert M. La Follette
Proctor of the People
Supper
Attorney
General Board of Directors

Panel of Advisors

J. R. Oppenheimer ✓

Chester Barnard ✓

Walter Lipmann ✓

Sumner Welles *

Hanson Baldwin

I. I. Rabi

~~Charles Thomas~~

~~James Warburg~~

~~Arthur Hays Sulzberger~~

Carl Freeman

F. G. Korman

W. W. Rostock, Burtaleg

Jonathan Gray mta arch. alexander for Board

~~Arthur Hays Sulzberger~~

March 15, 1950

Suggestions for Conference

Walter Reuther
Walter Lipmann
Sumner Welles
James Roosevelt
Clark Clifford
Dickey
Nelson Rockefeller
Marshall McDuffie
Mrs. Roosevelt
Jerome Frank
Hans Bethe
Robert Oppenheimer
Stearns
John ~~Colles~~ Cowles
Chester ~~Barnett~~ Barnard
Henry B. Cabot
Josiah Marvel
Chester Bowles
Adlai Stevenson
Marshall Field
Fowler McCormick
James Patton
James Warburg
Soapy Williams

for Board
McKuffie says Bill Griffin
(athletic) director
at home

For Commission Jerome Frank Suggests

- Irving Brandt (St. Louis Post Dispatch) *yes says Patton*
 - Judge Curtis Bok (Philadelphia) *← yes says Patton*
 - Randolph Paul *← yes says Patton*
 - Wm. H. Davis *for Board says Patton*
 - Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (Harvard)
 - Henry Steel Commager (Columbia University), does not know him
 - Sinclair Lewis
 - Norman Cousins
 - Fred Rodell (Yale)
 - Alan Gregg
 - Ed Murrow
 - Dean Christian Gauss (Princeton) *Part Appleby yes says Patton*
 - Amney Flame; Gerhard Lorell; Max Radin; Ed Morgan*
- For Board Jerome Frank Suggests
- Russell Leffingell (Morgan)
 - Homer T. Bone (West Coast)

Murray (Opp) for Council

*Patton says changes
Wellesley
at East
about*

Other suggestions for Commission

- | | | |
|---------------------|------------|---|
| Thomas Finletter | | Stearns (Univ. of Colorado) |
| Lloyd Garrison | } Murray | Murray Lincoln (Amer. Farm Bureau) |
| Marshall McDuffie | | Mark Etheridge |
| Vera Dean | | Nelson Rockefeller |
| John Dickey | | |
| Colonel Faymonville | <i>for</i> | <i>George Schuster
Pres of Teachers College</i> |

Patton suggests *Arnold Taylor*
Pres. Federal Reserve

Raymond (Frank)
Patton says
M. M. Fowler
J. Van Galbraith
seems to at home
primarily Fortunes
Monroe Appointments / am of Wesley Chapter?
(says)

Oppenheimer suggests for Board:

John Sherman Cooper (55 Rep Louisville)

Granville Clarke

John Lord O'Brien (WPB)

Dickey

Jack Vinar

Philip Jessup

Paffan date

at Plaza at 2 pm
on Apr 3 rd ~~Wed~~
(Wed)

Alvin Jansson
for Fund raising

Dr. and Mrs. Max Ascoli
23 Gramercy Park S.
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Charles Engelhard
30 Church Street
New York 7, New York

Mr. and Mrs. Marshall Field
250 Park Avenue
New York 17, N.Y.

Mr. D. S. Gottesman
Central National Corporation
22 E. 40th Street
New York, N.Y.

Mrs. William S. Ladd
25 East 83rd Street
New York 28, N.Y.
~~XX~~

Mr. S. Ralph Lazarus
Benrus Watch Company
~~XXXXXXXX~~ 200 Hudson St.
New York 13, N.Y.

Mr. Raymond Rubicam
444 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Halle Schaffner
5 East 57th Street
New York 22, N.Y.

Mr. Harry Scheman
~~XXX~~ 385 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Mr. M. Lincoln Schuster
1230 Sixth Avenue
New York, New York

Gi
X
Allan Wardwell Jr.
(Anson)
Spencer N. J.
[Jack Rosenman
L.]
Henry Kaiser
via Sam Rosenman

*Waldemar Giff
(John Garette)
York Pa*

Paul Mehta Jr.

Fels (Pa)

*Asenshol Jr.
Morris*

*(Leim Hall
Brooklyn)*

Jus Busch

*Paul Baumgard
(N.Y.C.)*

Jack Kaplan Jr.

*(Arthur Johnson Jr.)
David Lewis (Pa)*

*Arde Pulava (Pa)
Henry Magenthan (Pa)*

*Maurice Wertheimer (Pa)
W.M.C.A. Nathan Strauss
Coast*

*f.o.
f.*

Dickhoff
my
hon. Powell

Mr. Cyril Bath
The Cyril Bath Company
East 70th Street and Machinery Ave.
Cleveland 8, Ohio

Mr. Jacob Blaustein
American Trading and Production Corp.
American Building
Baltimore, Md.

Mr. William L. Clayton
Anderson, Clayton and Co.
Box 2538
Houston, Texas

Mr. and Mrs. William F. Cochran
411 North Charles Street
Baltimore, Md.

Mr. H. D. Collier
Standard Oil Company of California
Standard Oil Building
San Francisco 20, Calif.

Mrs. Edward C. Congdon
3300 London Road
Duluth, Minn.

Mr. Theodore M. Edison
Llewellyn Park
West Orange, N.J.

Mr. Harrison S. Hires
Berwyn, Pa.

Mr. Fred Lazarus, Jr.
Federated Department Stores, Inc.
707 Race Street
Cincinnati 2, Ohio

Mr. Fowler McCormick
International Harvester Co.
180 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois

Miss Esther Morgan McCullough
35 Brookby Road
Scarsdale, N.Y.

Mr. and Mrs. George D. Pratt, Jr.
Schaghticoke Farm
Bridgewater, Conn. **JEE**

Mr. and Mrs. Edward L. Ryerson
38 South Dearborn
Chicago 10, Ill.

Mr. and Mrs. Albert M. Sheldon
1808 Knox Avenue S.
Minneapolis 5, Minn. (F. A. Bean Fndn.
838 Knight Bldg. MPLS)

Mr. Edgar B. Stern
Edgar Stern Family Fund
2110 American Bank Bldg.
New Orleans, La.

Mr. Percy S. Straus, Jr.
Mellie Esperson Building
Houston 2, Texas

Mr. William Volker
P. O. Box 168
Kansas City 8, Mo.

Miss Kurlbaum
Berkeley

Rosalind
money?

GUESTS AT BULLETIN DINNER, FEBRUARY 13, 1950

Mr. Charles R. Adelson
34 Wensley Drive
Great Neck, Long Island

Dr. and Mrs. Max Ascoli
23 Gramery Park
New York, New York

Mrs. David Berman
26 Ogden Road
Scarsdale, New York

Mr. Robert P. Brundage
169 Christopher St.
Montclair, N.J.

Mr. John W. Carlisle
West Shore Road
Oyster Bay, New York

Mr. Theodore M. Edison
Llewellyn Park
West Orange, N.J.

Mr. Richard V. Gilbert
3308 35th St., N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Mr. and Mrs. Dan Golenpaul
444 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

Mr. H. W. Huber
~~Redbank~~ Redbank, N.J.

Mr. David Karr
488 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

~~Miss Clara Mayer~~ Dr. Edward J. Kempf
Wading River, N.Y.

Miss Claire J. Landau
~~Hotel Cameron~~
41 W. 86th Street
New York 24, N.Y.

Miss Clara Mayer
New School for Social Research
66 W. 12th St.
New York, N.Y.

~~S~~
Mr. Lewis/Rosenstiel
Sherry-Netherland Hotel
Fifth Ave. at 59th St.
New York, New York

Mr. Robert K F. Rothschild
4640 Delafield Avenue
New York 63, New York

Mr. George Rublee
242 E. 49th St.
New York 17, N.Y.

Dr. Alexander Sachs
1200 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.
& Mrs.

Mr./Stanley Resor
420 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York

Mr. Maurice Stone
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Robert K. Straus
10 Gracie Square
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Jack D. Tarcher
630 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Roy E. Tomlinson
National Biscuit Co.
449 W. 14th St.
New York, N.Y.

Mr. W. H. Weintraub
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Beth Webster [Bethuel)
15 Broad Street
New York 5, New York

Mr Swan Jr.

Inst. of Inst. Beth. at Yale

Harold Odium (son Thomas)
(Atlas Co) candidate Vulture

at Harvard Law School [Agnew White]
young man from Yale (46) Harold Berman

March 27, 1950

Dear Professor Einstein:

At the last meeting of the Emergency Committee, it was decided that the Emergency Committee shall initiate the setting up of an organization to study what type of an over-all Russian and American settlement would provide a framework in which international control of atomic energy could satisfactorily operate. In the following are summarized the considerations which I had presented to the Emergency Committee concerning the plan of setting up a "Citizens' Committee" that would conduct an inquiry into the considerations of a satisfactory over-all political settlement:

Prior to the meeting, between October, 1949, and March, 1950, I had discussed the possibility of setting up such a "Citizens' Committee" with the following persons:

Chester Bernard, New York
Stringfellow Barr, New York
Laird Bell, Chicago
Pierce Butler, St. Paul, Minnesota
Henry B. Cabot, Boston
Grenville Clark, Dublin, New Hampshire
Gardner Cowles, New York
Miss Adelaide Enright, St. Paul, Minnesota
Marshall Field, Chicago
Thomas L. Finletter, New York
Lloyd Garrison, New York
Palmer Hoyt, Denver
R. M. Hutchins, Chicago
Fowler McCormick, Chicago
Archibald Mac Leish, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Josiah Marvel, Wilmington, Delaware
Gideon Seymour, Minneapolis, Minnesota
James Warburg, New York
Gilbert White, Haverford, Pennsylvania

Most of those whom I saw in New York, I saw in the company of Marshall McDuffie, who was much interested in this project and who I hope will maintain his interest in it. Before the war, McDuffie was with John Foster Dulles' law firm. During the war, he was head of the Board of Economic Warfare in the Middle East for about two years; subsequently with the State Department in charge of Lend Lease settlement; and after that, in charge of the UNRRA control commission in the Ukraine. At present, he is with Merck and Company of New York, and his assignment gives him enough free time

to be able to render a public service when the need arises. I have known him now for about five years and had often asked him for guidance on issues which involved the public interest.

All those whom I saw in Minneapolis and St. Paul, I saw in company of Mr. and Mrs. Harris Wofford of Scarsdale, New York, and St. Paul, Minnesota, whom I have known over a period of years and who were very helpful on this occasion; they might make important contributions to this enterprise if they remain interested in it.

Only the names of those are listed above with whom I had a full personal discussion of the issue; the names of those with whom I did not fully discuss the matter or who were contacted by correspondence, are not included in the list.

All those with whom I have spoken showed a friendly interest in the project, the degree of interest varying from person to person. In some cases I was not able to gain a definite impression as to what the final reaction of the man might be if he gave the matter further thought. In one case, I found very strong interest but at the same time also strong concern about the difficulties and obstacles standing in the way of the proposed enterprise.

I believe that the final reaction of most of those whose names are mentioned above will depend on what kind of sponsorship will be forthcoming and on just how in detail we shall decide to proceed. The difficulties and obvious pitfalls of the enterprise were, of course, stressed by both Marshall McDuffie and me in all of our conversations.

The project as it shapes up in my mind at present as the result of all these conversations would be as follows:

1) The "Citizens' Committee" consists of a Commission and a Board.

a) The Commission is composed of about 15 men who will serve full time for about six months. For a period of two or three months, the Commission may study jointly the issues involved, hear witnesses, and otherwise gather the required evidence. Then the Commission might find it advisable to form out of its

members two teams of perhaps five persons each. These teams would be assigned the task of representing the real interest of America and the real interests of Russia, respectively, and they would engage in discussions or "negotiations" with each other in order to see whether it is possible for them to reach an agreement on all outstanding issues involved, including the issue of putting an end to the present arms race.

b) The transcript of these negotiations and the final agreement, if one is reached, will go to a Board of no less than 15 or no more than 50 American citizens of national standing, hereafter referred to as the "Board" which will transmit it, together with its own findings and recommendations, to the American people.

The function of the Board is to decide whether the agreement worked out ought to be acceptable to the American people, assuming that it were acceptable to Russia. The Board will naturally not be in a position to say whether such an agreement ought to be acceptable to Russia.

Since the function of the Board is to testify as to the validity of the conclusions reached by the "American Team," the members of the Board (or at least the members of an Executive Committee of the Board which might comprize about 15 Board Members) will have to follow the work of the Commission sufficiently closely to be able to form a considered opinion as to the validity of its conclusions. The members of the Board (or at least the members of its Executive Committee) might have to meet with the Commission perhaps for two full days every month in order to keep in touch with the progress of study, to familiarize themselves with the difficulties that stand in the way of a satisfactory agreement, and in order to fully understand why certain particular solutions were rejected and other particular solutions were adopted.

2) Because lawyers, by virtue of their profession, are accustomed to take on the case of a client--for a fee--it is natural to turn to lawyers when looking

for men suitable to serve on the Russian team. It would be desirable to enlist the service of some of the leading corporation lawyers for this purpose, but this does not mean that all members of the Commission need to be lawyers

Finding a satisfactory Russian team appears to be an easier task than finding a satisfactory American team, because the only requirement for a man on the Russian team is that he be "good," while on the American team, he must not only be "good," but also must enjoy the full confidence of the Board and a certain measure of public confidence. This is so because when it comes to details, the Board will have to rely to a large extent on the say-so of the American team when formulating its own opinion on the merits of the proposed settlement

The transcript of the negotiations will show what the difficulties are which stand in the path of a satisfactory agreement, and it might show that the Commission was able to work out an agreement which in their opinion would safeguard the vital interests of America and Russia without infringing upon the vital interests of the other nations involved.

If the Commission succeeds in outlining such an agreement, and if their draft finds wide-spread acclaim in America at the time when it is made public, then it is conceivable that some spokesman of the Russian government and some spokesman of the American government might publicly recognize that draft as a suitable basis of discussion for governmental negotiations.

But even disregarding this possibility, there is much that could be learned from the transcript of the Commission's negotiations. On atomic energy control, for instance, the American government put forward in 1946 the Baruch Plan which the Russians rejected. The transcript of the negotiations might show that the "Russian Team," composed of American citizens charged with representing Russian interests, also finds the Baruch Plan unacceptable. This in itself does not teach us anything much, but the reasoned argument of our "Russian Team," stating why the Baruch Plan

is not acceptable to them, will probably show us what real interests were involved when the Russians rejected the Baruch Plan and thus possibly disclose the real reasons for Russian opposition to the Plan.

When the Russians opposed the Baruch Plan, they did not tell us their real reasons for doing so, and what they told us of their reasons, they said in a language which is not intelligible to the American people. Our "Russian team," on the other hand, will not only tell us why they find the Baruch Plan unacceptable from the point of view of their "client," but they will tell us their reasons in a language which we can understand.

The negotiations in the Commission are, of course, in no way a substitute for real negotiations, but on the other hand, they have from a point of view of intellectual clarification, certain rather important advantages over real negotiations. In the real negotiations, carried out by governmental representatives, the display of imagination and resourcefulness is greatly inhibited; such negotiations have to move with great caution since it is not easy to retract a point once it has been conceded. The negotiations in our "Commission" are not subject to such limitations; here it is possible for a "team" tentatively to concede a number of points and as the over-all picture emerges, either to retain or to reject what has been tentatively accepted. This makes for flexibility and speed in the "negotiations."

For America, faced with a difficult problem of reaching an over-all settlement with Russia, it might be of value to have the real negotiations preceded by such an intellectual clarification as might be attained through the device here proposed.

3) The work of the Commission, in order to be effective, must be widely known, studied, and discussed. In order to achieve this, it is advisable at the very outset to make arrangements that will give the press a stake in the enterprise. If the progress of the negotiations is followed by the press, step by step when material about them is released, if we can be sure that columnists, radio commentators and editorial writers

study these transcripts, then we may assume that the staff of the State Department too will pay attention to them. And if we could at least achieve that the public discussion of the Russian-American conflict will be henceforth carried on more in terms of the real conflicting interests which are involved and less in the irrational terms in which it has largely been conducted in these last four years, then we would already have achieved something of importance.

4) One of the controversial points that arose in the conversations dealing with the problems of the "Citizens' Committee," was the question what the terms of reference of the Commission should be. Clearly the terms of reference of the Commission should enable them to deal with any issue that is relevant to the creation of a stable peace. On the other hand, most of those with whom I spoke agreed that the issue of transforming the United Nations into a world government or otherwise setting up a world government would go beyond the scope of the work of the Commission, as presently envisaged.

5) An important issue on which there was divergence of opinion is the terms of reference of the Russian team. Shall the men on the Russian team say what they themselves would find acceptable if they had the task of safeguarding Russia's vital interests or should the Russian team say what they think the Russians might find acceptable?

In favor of this latter point, it was argued that the Russians were not guided by rational considerations; that they were guided by irrational desires, peculiar theories about what is going on in the world and that they are suffering from all sorts of misconceptions. The opinion was expressed that the work of the Commission would be meaningless unless the Russian team, in place of saying what they would accept, did study the Russians and they said what they thought the Russians would accept.

To me it seems that we ought to reject this approach. Naturally neither the government of the United States nor the Russian government will in fact follow an

entirely rational course. As far as either of these two governments are concerned, what they can do and what they cannot do will be influenced by the political system within which each one has to operate. Both the American and the Russian team must naturally be cognizant of this factor and even without any conscious effort to do so, they will, of course, take into account the political systems in which the contracting parties will of necessity have to operate.

But while the men on the "Russian team" can say with some degree of assurance what they themselves (using their own judgement and their own appreciation of the issues involved) would accept in the interest of their "client," they cannot with any degree of certainty say what the Russians might find acceptable. Any attempt on the part of the "Russian team" to do so would involve not only the Russians' misconceptions, but also their own misconceptions of the Russian misconceptions. I personally do not think that an attempt to "play the Russian" would be of much value and it certainly could not claim any objective validity.

I believe that this point is so important that it ought to be clarified in the statute setting up the "Citizens' Committee," and that it certainly ought to be clarified before anyone is solicited to serve on the Board or on the Commission or anyone is asked to contribute funds to the "Citizens' Committee."

The difficulty of predicting what the Russian government might do in any given set of circumstances ought perhaps to be compared with the difficulty our meteorologists had a generation ago in predicting the weather. Meteorology was at that time in such a state of imperfection that the simple prediction of fair weather tomorrow if the weather was fair today, or rain for tomorrow if it rained today, could favorably compete with the prediction of the meteorologist. Thus following the thumb rule that "The weather never changes" was about the best prediction that one could make.

Similarly, the thumb rule that the Russian government will act as we ourselves would act if placed in similar circumstances and entrusted with their responsibility will today give as good forecasts (and do it much less painfully) than the controversial forecasts one could obtain by a discussion of Russian psychology.

Naturally, neither of these thumb rules will give the correct answer always. The weather does sometimes change and the Russian government does sometimes act differently from how we would act in similar circumstances. Yet if one accepts the point of view that we have primarily to deal here with the conflict between two nations and their respective allies, and that even this perhaps oversimplified problem will require much ingenuity and resourcefulness for its solution, then one will be inclined to think that its solution would provide us at least with a framework for actual negotiations between the Russian and American governments.

6) The United States and Russia are not the only major countries whose vital interests have to be taken into account in an over-all settlement. While it is probably not practical to have more than two teams negotiating with each other, members of the Commission who are not assigned to any team may be assigned the task of representing the interests of one or another of the countries involved and acting as spokesmen for those interests. These spokesmen would sit in on the negotiations of the two teams and currently make it clear to the two teams where they would infringe upon the interests of those other countries. The countries in Western Europe will certainly be very strongly affected by any over-all settlement that might be reached, but the effect of the agreement on other countries will have to be considered also.

Since the number of men serving on the Commission who are not assigned either to the Russian or the American team will not be large (perhaps no more than five) their assignment to represent other nations will have to be kept rather flexible.

7) The Commission must have at its disposal an adequate staff to assist in its work, and must have facilities to obtain the assistance of experts on a part-time basis.

8) It was emphasized by various persons that it would be important to clear with the State Department or with the White House this enterprise at the outset or at a somewhat later stage. Some thought that the enterprise could obtain Truman's blessing, perhaps in the form of a letter in which he would ask that a transcript of the negotiations be submitted to him. Others thought that this would be difficult to get without the blessing of the State Department and that rather than asking for the blessing of the State Department, we ought to merely "clear" the matter with the State Department. All these comments were made before Acheson's press conference of February 8, and I do not know these comments would be modified in the light of that press conference.

9) Funds for the "Citizens' Committee" may be raised through private donations elicited by personal contacts, through contributions of foundations, and through public fund-raising. The last of these methods has the advantage of giving the public a stake in this enterprise and ought therefore to be used at least as one of the methods by which funds are raised. Fund-raising should be aimed at no less than half a million dollars and no more than one million dollars.

10) It was proposed that the Emergency Committee create a Committee of Arrangements which will have the responsibility of initiating the setting up of the "Citizens' Committee." The Committee of Arrangements could help the "Citizens' Committee" to assemble a suitable Commission, but the appointment of the Commission is the responsibility of the Board of the "Citizens' Committee" and not of the Committee of Arrangements. Once the "Citizens' Committee" is set up with its Board complete and the Commission appointed, the Committee of Arrangements will have no further functions.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

May 15, 1950

The enclosed ditto contains copies of communications

from Carter, Ledyard and Milburn to Harrison Brown
from David Noyes to James Patton
from Josiah Marvel, Jr. to Leo Szilard
from Leo Szilard to Grenville Clark
from Grenville Clark to Leo Szilard
from Walter Orr Roberts (Director of the High Altitude
Observatory of Harvard University and University of Colorado)
to Leo Szilard
from Henry B. Cabot, Boston, to Leo Szilard
from Karl Compton, Chairman of the Corporation MIT
to Henry B. Cabot
from Albert Pratt (Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, Boston)
to Henry B. Cabot
from J. Killian, Jr., President MIT, to Henry B. Cabot
from Phillip Ketchum (Herrick, Smith, Donald, Farley, and
Ketchum, Boston) to Henry B. Cabot
from Stringfellow Barr to Leo Szilard

CONFIDENTIAL: Please do not transmit to anyone without first checking with Leo Szilard, Harrison Brown or Joseph Mayer.

May 14, 1950

Copies of documents giving reaction to the plan of the Emergency Committee of the Atomic Scientists for setting up a citizens inquiry into the conditions of peace.

Carter, Ledyard and Milburn
Counsellors at Law
2 Wall Street, New York 5, N.Y.

March 16, 1950

Dr. Harrison S. Brown
Emergency Committee of Atomic
Scientists, Incorporated
956 East Fifty-eighth Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Dr. Brown:

Since talking to you and Dr. Szilard on Monday, I have discussed your proposals with my partner Jesse Fillman, who is a specialist in the tax law. He confirms the advice which I gave you on Monday.

Inasmuch as I promised Dr. Szilard some confirmation along these lines, and do not know his address, I would appreciate your passing the word along to him.

Sincerely yours,

Edward F. Clark, Jr.

P.S. Fillman has some interesting ideas on how to get an advance exemption ruling.

The following is a telegram from Dave Noyes.

1950 Apr 20 PM 1153

Hon. James Patten
954 Bonnie Brae Blvd Dvr
Los Angeles Calif 20

Have just returned from an extended stay in the East. The proposal submitted to you by the distinguished professor is new in concept and provides an interesting approach to the problem. It also however poses many collateral difficulties. I shall be going east again shortly and will be eager to arrange a meeting. With warm regards,

Dave

From: Josiah Marvel, Jr.
Continental American Building
Wilmington, Delaware

March 28, 1950

To: Professor Leo Szilard
1155 East 57th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

My dear Professor Szilard:

I was very glad to receive your letter of March 23rd outlining to me the steps which have been taken regarding the establishment of a "Citizens' Committee for Studying the Requirements of an Overall Settlement."

As I indicated during our conversation in Princeton, I am still most interested in the proposals and purposes of this contemplated study, and I look forward to hearing from you what progress is being made.

Sincerely yours,

Josiah Marvel, Jr.

From: Leo Szilard
1155 East 57th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

April 25, 1950

To: Mr. Grenville Clark
31 Nassau Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Clark:

Since our very pleasant luncheon in New York, the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists has decided to initiate the setting up of an organization for the purposes which we discussed in New York. The Emergency Committee has appointed Professors Joe Mayer, Harrison Brown, and myself to act for her in this matter as the "Committee of Arrangements".

We are proposing that an organization to be called "Council of Inquiry into the Conditions of Peace" be set up entirely independent of the Emergency Committee and be organized on a tax-exempt basis. This "Council" might operate along the lines discussed in Memorandum dated March 27 which is enclosed. An appendix to this memorandum, containing a further discussion of the terms of reference of the "Commission" of the "Council," is in preparation.

We are asking Mr. Hutchins to act as chairman of the Board of the "Council", and Mr. Clarence Pickett to act as its vice-chairman. Mr. Hutchins has accepted, and we hope that Mr. Pickett will accept also. We recommended to Mr. Hutchins to choose the initial members of the Board of the Council from among the following list of names, Laird Ball, Henry B. Cabot, Grenville Clark, Marshall Field, Reuben G. Gustavson (University of Nebraska), Fowler McCormick, R. L. Stearns (University of Colorado), and James G. Patton. Mr. Hutchins leaves for Europe on May 2, and by that time we hope

Mr. Grenville Clark -- continued

3.

to have the initial board members lined up so we can proceed to incorporate the Council. Carter, Ledyard, and Milburn, who have been acting for the Emergency Committee, will be asked to act for the Council also and to try to obtain an advance ruling from the Treasury concerning tax exemption. No public announcement of formation of the Council is planned until we have secured a fund of perhaps \$200,000. for the Council.

It is our understanding that Mr. Hutchins will try to reach you before he leaves for Europe and ask you to serve as a member of the Board. We hope very much that you will accept. We realize, of course, that you cannot take on any duties that are very strenuous. Membership on the Board might involve your spending two days a month with the "Commission" of the Council which is the full-time organ of the Council; but if this should prove too strenuous for several Board members, it might be possible to form an Executive Committee of the Board and thereby to ease the burden of the Board members. An Executive Committee might have to be formed in any case if the Board should be enlarged much beyond 15 members.

Lately I have spent a week in Colorado and found such enthusiastic response to our "plan" that I feel quite heartened by it. This experience strengthens me in the belief that the Council will have to draw much of its strength from the Middle West and the West. I am also inclined to think that the formation of regional committees in Minnesota, in Colorado, and perhaps in Oregon might be very useful. These regional committees could be affiliated with the Council and would have the task to keep the people of the "region" informed of the activities of the Council.

With respect to the composition of these regional committees and also the Board of the Council, I believe we ought to make an attempt to enlist outstanding men who, in the past, have kept aloof from public affairs but who now, at last, are really concerned and are willing to take their share of the burden.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

cc: Joe Mayer
Harrison Brown

From: Grenville Clark
Dublin, New Hampshire

May 2, 1950

To: Professor Leo Szilard
Institute of Radiology and Biophysics
University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Mr. Szilard:

With regard to your letter of April 25, I am, as I told you in New York last winter, very interested in having carried out a careful study by non-official persons of what can be done to achieve an over-all East-West settlement, and to make progress towards world order. So I am glad to see that you are proposing to go ahead.

As to my own participation, I am complimented to be asked to go on the Board of the proposed Council and, as I also have confidence in Mr. Hutchins, I'd be glad to accept if I saw my way to it. But I regret to say that I cannot. I could not give it the necessary attention because I have all my time and energy tied up for quite a while ahead. I want to try to finish in the next year a piece of work I have in progress with Louis B. Sohn in the shape of "Detailed Proposals for Revision of the U.N. Charter". It is a long and difficult job and, with my other commitments, will take all my working time.

I realize what you say about having an Executive Committee and that not all the Board members would necessarily be expected to come to meetings, etc. But if I were on the Board, I would want to keep in close touch and, in the circumstances, could not do that.

I venture some comments on your letter and your memo. of March 27.

First, and most important from my standpoint, I certainly hope that the idea on p. 6 of your memo, that the "issue of transforming the U.N. into a world government or otherwise setting up a world government" would "go beyond the scope of the work of the Commission, as presently envisaged" will not be adopted. I think this would vitiate the whole project right at the start. This is because I don't think that there can be an East-West settlement or "stable peace" without general and universal disarmament (in all arms and by all nations); and I think it obvious that such disarmament can't be obtained unless a world government limited to the sphere of war prevention is established.

In the sentence on p. 6 preceding the intimation that the question of a world government (any world government apparently) would be excluded, you say that the "terms of reference of the Commission should enable them to deal with any issue that is relevant to the creation of a stable peace." Since I think that the creation of a world government is not only relevant to but a pre-condition of a stable peace, I think the two sentences are contradictory. When I read them together, I couldn't help thinking of the old rhyme: "Mother, may I go in to swim" Yes, my darling daughter. Hang your clothes on a hickory limb, and don't go near the water."

Seriously, I hope no limitation of this or any sort would be put on the Commission's thinking.

Second, I wonder whether the enterprise needs so much elaboration. What is really required is some hard thinking by a few competent independent people who are not over-burdened like the officials, by day-to-day duties and not inhibited by tradition and politics, like most of the State Department. There is ample material; in fact, it is easy to bog down in it. Also, if the Commission is large, they might well bog down in interminable discussions and have too many divergent views. I should think about five good men on full time for six months (with a few assistants) could do better than 15. And I think a Board or Executive Committee or Advisory Committee of 6-10 would be enough to keep in touch, criticize and advise.

When it comes to putting out the Commission's Report and having it widely discussed, that is another matter; and there I can see a function for a large Citizens' Committee and regional committees.

If it were pruned down in this way, \$200,000. should do the whole thing.

Third, I like the idea of two teams. But they needn't necessarily all be Commission members. Two teams of three or four each could be recruited for two-three months after the Commission had defined the issues somewhat, - partly composed of Commission members and partly of others.

Fourth, I don't like any idea of trying to get a governmental blessing for the enterprise. Citizens have a right to study a subject and submit their conclusions to the people and the Government without anyone's blessing. They had better do just that here. I don't know what "clearing" the enterprise with the State Department or White House means. It may seem to imply asking approval. That approval might be withheld and what then? You have either to drop the project or go ahead against the Government's opposition. Or if approval were granted, would it strengthen the enterprise or weaken it by giving the impression that it was a sort of agency of the State Department? In getting up the Selective Service Act in 1940, the Citizens Committee of which I was Chairman, didn't ask the blessing or approval of the War Department or President. We just went ahead, drew our Bill and got it introduced. In this way, we avoided the complications of possible disapproval on the one hand or having it an Administration measure on the other. It was much better that way.

This isn't a case of negotiating with a foreign government, where the Logan Act might apply. It is simply doing what all citizens have a right to do without any permission from anyone.

This isn't to say that any secret should be made of the enterprise or that the State Department and President shouldn't be informed. They both should be, just as we informed the War Department and President Roosevelt of the move for a Selective Service Act. All that needs is two letters politely informing them of the project and its purpose. This should be done, I think, only after the enterprise is actually organized and ready to function; and the letters should be carefully framed to avoid any implication that any permission or approval is requested.

The enterprise will succeed or fail by virtue of the wise and constructive character of the Report or the opposite and the success or lack of success in getting it publicly discussed. It is quite unnecessary and I think unwise to try to "clear" it with anyone in the Government.

Some of these comments may seem unsympathetic. But that is not my intention. I have long thought that our Government people are incapable (for a variety of reasons) of producing the ideas essential to achieving disarmament and a "stable peace" and that these ideas must come from non-official sources. Believing this, I have been trying myself as a sort of one-man "Commission" to produce a set of ideas and I shall get out a document within six weeks which is what I would recommend if I were a member of a group such as you envisage. It will be in the form of "A Statement for a Sub-committee of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate". I think I'll have the temerity to call it a "Plan for Peace", since it will purport to be a program of ideas and procedure to achieve an over-all settlement.

So, I'm very sympathetic to such a study and would, indeed, like to see several such, provided they all were by experienced and competent persons. And if the Commission isn't excluded or discouraged from canvassing or recommending limited world government (which, as I say, would, in my opinion, render the enterprise futile or worse), I'd be just as much interested in its work, even though I couldn't be active in it.

I'm sending a copy of this to Bob Hutchins, whom I like and admire.

Sincerely yours,

Grenville Clark

From: High Altitude Observatory of
Harvard University and University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado

24 April 1950

To: Dr. Leo Szilard
Institute of Radiobiology and Biophysics
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Dr. Szilard:

I have just returned from a long discussion with President Stearns about the committee for Colorado to be associated with the national activities. We also discussed at some length the plan as a whole.

Stearns felt that the choice of Henry, Swan, White, and Hoyt was excellent. Regarding Hoyt he said that he felt that the choice of Hoyt to the committee would assure the minimization of the importance of the group by the Scripps-Howard (competing) newspaper. And it might be possible in some way to get the support of both papers if neither editor or if both editors were on the committee. However, he thought that as a calculated risk the choice of Hoyt alone would be O.K.

So far as Patton is concerned, he felt that Patton was one of the most able members of the committee, would contribute a lot of energy and activity, but that with a large segment of the agricultural population of the state and the area the committee would have a left wing appearance. The reason for this is that Henry, Swan, and White would be relatively little known to the farmers, whereas Patton would be extremely well known.

Stearns thought, however, that Patton should definitely be on the committee, but perhaps balanced by a man active in farm circles of slightly more conservative stripe, but still with great public interest. Stearns suggested two men, father and son, who might well qualify. The father is Harry W. Farr of Greeley, Colorado. The man is an alumnus of the University, and is widely known among farmers in the area for his activities in important farm issues. I regret to say that I failed to find out whether he is associated with the National Grange or some other of the farm groups. I believe that Stearns' implication was that the man is associated with one of the more conservative farm organizations.

The son, William Farr, like his father, is extremely well known in farm circles, and has been very prominent in public affairs, also like his father. Stearns seemed to think that either of the two men would be equally good.

As for myself, I know nothing about either of the men, and so am not able to make any independent evaluation.

.....

Very sincerely yours,

Walter Orr Roberts

From: Henry B. Cabot
140 Federal Street
Boston 10, Massachusetts

May 10th, 1950

To: Professor Leo Szilard
1155 East 57th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Dr. Szilard:

I sent your memorandum about a settlement with Russia to the following persons: Mr. Albert Pratt, a partner of Paine Webber Jackson and Curtis, an investment firm; Mr. Lloyd Brace, President of the First National Bank of Boston; Mr. Phillips Ketchum, one of our leading lawyers; Judge Raymond Wilkins, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts; Mr. Thomas Mahony, another leading lawyer; Mr. James R. Killian, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Mr. Erwin Canham, publisher of the Christian Science Monitor; Mr. Harold Hodgkinson, General Manager of Filene's, one of our largest stores; and Mr. Karl Compton, Chairman of the Board of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I have written replies from all except Messrs. Brace, Wilkins, Mahony and Canham. Mr. Canham is away in Europe and I haven't heard from him. Mr. Brace told me that he felt that the situation in the world was so serious that any step which might even have a very small chance of improving our relations with Russia should be taken and that he felt that a study such as you suggest was one of them. Mr. Mahony's reactions were very similar to those of Mr. Grenville Clark but, in addition, he felt that your memorandum put too great restrictions on the general point of view of the Russian team. Judge Wilkins was the only person who was unfavorable to the idea. He felt that it would be a good education for those participating in the project but for nobody else. I am enclosing the reports of all the other gentlemen.

My own feeling remains that a general study of the relations between the West and Russia would be beneficial. However, I agree with Mr. Clark that to leave out of consideration world federation is to leave out an essential part of any possible settlement and, as your memorandum stands today, I would not be prepared to go along with it for that reason. I have some other but lesser criticisms. I also judge from the reactions of these gentlemen that the question of raising money will not be easy.

.....

Yours Sincerely,

Henry B. Cabot

From: Karl Compton
Chairman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

8.

May 1, 1950

To: Mr. Henry B. Cabot
140 Federal Street
Boston 10, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Cabot:

I have read the memorandum by Professor Szilard which you sent with your letter of April 25, and I am returning it to you with the following comments.

The suggestion is an interesting one, but I find it very difficult to come to any conviction as to whether it would likely work out successfully or not. On the one hand there is obviously a very important point in bringing about public understanding and public consideration of these questions, and there is also the fact that an independent committee of very able citizens might be able to make the suggestion which would break the present impasse. What may be needed might be a new idea or it might be some face-saving mechanism.

If this plan is carried out it would seem to me that a logical extension of its basic idea would be to provide two Russian teams, and not one. The first of these teams might approach the problem from the point of view of Russian self-interest along the lines suggested in Szilard's memorandum. We must admit the possibility, however, that the Russian government will not act, even as a first approximation, the way we would, and that it may have objectives definitely in view which are not susceptible or argument on the assumption of a desire for world peace and a free society. It might therefore be advisable to have a second Russian team which would go to the worst extreme possible, and assume that all the Russian objectives were of the type which we most dislike and most fear.

I have some qualms about the suggestion at the bottom of page five to the effect that the press should be brought into these discussions at the very outset. I would be afraid that this might result in an avalanche of political or prejudiced outpourings which would handicap the project at the start. I would think that a better procedure would be to carry through the study on a rather confidential basis until it has reached the stage of at least some tentative conclusions and some definitive formulation of arguments. Then might be the time to bring in the press for their reaction and for securing the reaction of the public through them.

Finally, there is another obvious difficulty. In order to bring in people who are best informed it would probably be necessary to call in people who have also been associated as members or advisers of the State Department on these issues, - to say nothing of men who have been associated with the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. On the other hand, it would be extremely difficult for any of these men to operate objectively, if at all, because it would be impossible for them to dissociate themselves with the arguments concerning these same questions in which they may have been involved in their governmental duties. Perhaps I feel rather keenly about this because I have had to write myself out of a number of interesting situations, since leaving the Research and Development Board, simply because I could not divorce myself from the discussions of these questions which I had heard in the War Council and other agencies.

Mr. Henry B. Cabot -- Continued

9.

As you may see, therefore, I am very much on the fence as to whether this is a good project or not, and by good I mean a project which can reasonably be expected to produce results commensurate with the cost in time and money. I do think that Szilard has made a very straightforward and skilful presentation of the plan.

Very sincerely yours,

Karl Compton
Chairman

The following is a copy of a letter from Albert Pratt of Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, 24 Federal Street, Boston 10, Massachusetts.

Mr. Henry B. Cabot
140 Federal Street
Boston 10, Massachusetts

April 25, 1950

Dear Harry:

I have read with interest Professor Szilard's memorandum. I think he is overly optimistic of the possible results of his plan. I doubt that such a recommendation of a private commission can ever be accepted by both the American and Russian governments as a basis of negotiations. However, I do believe that his idea has merit as a method of devising possible solutions, provided that the highest calibre brains are employed to work out a new approach entirely unhampered by preconceived ideas.

In this connection I think there is some danger in unduly restricting the "terms of reference" as suggested in Professor Szilard's paragraph four.

I also have some doubt as to his conclusions in paragraph five as to the point of view which the Russian team should adopt. It seems to me that this team must try as best it can to take into the act the Marxian method of thinking of the Russians. Otherwise the procedure will be entirely unrealistic and of no value.

I also doubt the practicality of the press coverage proposed in paragraph three. I don't think that it is the kind of "news" that will be used and there is some doubt in my mind as to whether premature publicity might not destroy the value of anything which the commission is able to work out.

I am returning to you the memorandum as you requested.

Sincerely,

Albie

From: J. R. Killian, Jr.
President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

10.

To: Mr. Henry B. Cabot
140 Federal Street
Boston 10, Massachusetts

May 8, 1950

Dear Mr. Cabot:

It was good of you to send me a copy of Professor Szilard's letter to Professor Einstein. I return the copy as you requested.

I feel very strongly that we need more public discussion of the whole atomic energy problem, and aparticularly we need to face up to the question of the advisability of a further effort to reach an agreement with Russia. For this reason I am generally in favor of systematic efforts to study the problem. You may be interested in the marked passage in a speech of mine made on the west coast some weeks ago in which I discussed this problem.

I was awfully disappointed that I could not get to the meeting at your house recently.

Yours sincerely,

J. R. Killian, Jr.
President

From: Herrick, Smith, Donald, Farley and Ketcham
1 Federal Street
Boston 10, Massachusetts

April 27, 1950

To: Henry B. Cabot, Esquire
140 Federal Street
Boston, Massachusetts

I received yours of April 24th with the enclosed memorandum of Leo Szilard which I have read with great interest. It raises two questions.

1. Would the Commission which he plans produce a valuable advance in thinking about a possible agreement between Russia and the U.S.A. within which there could be International control of Atomic Energy?

2. Would the money, namely, from \$550,000. to \$1,000,000. for the work of the Commission and the Board be obtainable?

Dealing with the second question first, I think it would be extremely difficult to raise the money unless a few large donors were prepared at the outset to give most of it.

As to whether the Commission would produce a worthwhile idea, I feel unable to have a sound opinion. The chances I should think would not be as favorable as 50-50. Inevitably such a Commission works in a somewhat academic atmosphere and the ability of those representing Russia to really understand the Russian point of view would be subject to considerable doubt. A great deal would depend upon the genius of the members of the Commission working on the two teams. How could one assume a probability that they would be up to the job? I find myself in a haze. I return herewith the memorandum.

Yours sincerely,

Phillip Ketchum

From: Stringfellow Barr, President
Foundation for World Government
Fifty-eight Park Avenue
New York 16, New York

May 5, 1950

To: Mr. Leo Szilard
1155 East 57th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Mr. Szilard:

May I confirm in writing what I told you orally at the Waldorf Saturday, namely, that at a meeting of our trustees on April 28 your application of April 24 was carefully considered. In view of their own present plans and policies they felt unable to go further than a token grant of \$10,000. which I hope may be of some help.

Will you tell me how payment should be made. Is the Emergency Committee willing to accept money from the Foundation? You may recall their public statement that they were not. On the other hand, our trustees would want to make the grant to some tax exempt body.

Cordially yours,

Stringfellow Barr