

An Oral History of

MANUEL ROTENBERG and STANLEY CHODOROW

On May 4, 1999

1 **ROTENBERG:** —what you've done so far.

2 **CHODOROW:** Okay. What we have done— I'll tell you how it started and how this has
3 progressed so far. It started with Jim [James R.] Arnold calling me and saying that he and Keith
4 [A.] Brueckner were going to come in here to do an interview and to talk—they didn't say
5 "interview" so much as to "talk"—about the origins of their two departments with Brad [Bradley
6 D. Westbrook], who is the university archivist, and would I come as a historian and help form the
7 questions and keep them more or less on track. And I said, "Sure." And that session turned out
8 so interesting and illuminating that we decided—Brad and I—we would just continue to do it. So
9 now we have talked to— What we aimed at was the founders of departments.

10 **ROTENBERG:** Yes.

11 **CHODOROW:** Right. So, we've talked to Mel [Melvin] Spiro, to Joe [Joseph R.] Gusfield, to
12 Gabe [Gabriel] Jackson—

13 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, really?

14 **CHODOROW:** —who came through, as he does about once a year, to Roy [Harvey]
15 Pearce—

16 **ROTENBERG:** Oh. Was he coherent?

17 **CHODOROW:** He was mostly coherent, yes, but still fighting every battle—

18 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, yes.

19 **CHODOROW:** —from the early days on. Herb [Herbert F.] York, Mel [Melvin] Voight and
20 Andy [Andrew] Wright about the origins and early development of the library, which was very
21 interesting. Am I missing somebody?

22 **WESTBROOK:** Jon [S. Jonathan] Singer.

23 **CHODOROW:** Jon Singer, who was— And I will bring also [Robert N.] Hamburger, who was
24 also here at the very beginning—maybe even earlier, actually, than Singer because he came
25 with [David] Bonner.

26 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, he was Bonner's protege.

27 **CHODOROW:** Right. And Leonard [D.] Newmark, who was terrific. He was really terrific. We
28 have scheduled Sol [Stanford] Penner a little later this week. Probably it'll be Murray Rosenblatt
29 for—

30 **ROTENBERG:** SIO

31 **CHODOROW:** No.

32 **ROTENBERG:** For math.

33 **CHODOROW:** Math.

34 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, yeah.

35 **CHODOROW:** And Helmut Röhl, who was also—who was actually here, I think, in that first
36 year. I think the two of them were here the first year.

37 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, there are some—

38 **CHODOROW:** There are some problems—

39 **ROTENBERG:** —there. I don't know whether this should be on microphone or not.

40 **CHODOROW:** Well, we can talk about it later.

41 **ROTENBERG:** Okay.

42 **CHODOROW:** Okay. I've contacted Burt [Burton] Rodin, right? Burt's response—he's away
43 right now—was, "I was a junior faculty member"—a beginning assistant professor in effect. "You
44 had better talk to the two senior people who were here." I will follow up with him when he gets
45 back, because I think that his perspective may be a balance. And he became— You know, he
46 lived through and became a very senior person in the department—and a chair of the
47 department. So, he was eventually in a position to reflect on all that.

48 **ROTENBERG:** Ted [Theodore T.] Frankel may give you another—

49 **CHODOROW:** And Ted Frankel, right. Somebody had mentioned him. And he was here very
50 early, maybe in the second year or third year. We have not yet moved on economics: Don
51 [Donald V.T.] Bear is the oldest living economist here, and Dick [Richard] Attiyeh, who was here
52 within a year or so.

53 **ROTENBERG:** He has the junior point of view.

54 **CHODOROW:** And he also has the junior point of view. But none of— If I could get Dan
55 [Daniel] Orbach at some point I would interview Dan for economics. So, we're trying to go
56 through this. I will tell you something that's come up—

57 **ROTENBERG:** Music and art. Music and visual arts.

58 **CHODOROW:** Yes, I will— Well, John [L.] Stewart is no longer really able, and of course,
59 [Robert] Erickson is dead. But Wil [Wilbur L. Ogdon] is still going—

60 **ROTENBERG:** I think he's still—

61 **CHODOROW:** And still compos mentis. And then in the arts, some of the early people are
62 here. I know them all very well, of course, because I was their dean. I will start to bring some of
63 them in. That's going to be a tough one.

64 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, yeah. I think if you get somebody somewhat removed, like—what's his
65 name? He's back in New York now. He was—

66 **CHODOROW:** The founder. The founding— Miriam Shapiro's husband—

67 **ROTENBERG:** —Miriam Shapiro's husband.

68 **CHODOROW:** —whose— I'm also— It's not— Paul—

69 **ROTENBERG:** Yes.

70 **CHODOROW:** Paul— I want to say Brach but—

71 **ROTENBERG:** You're close. It is Brach.

72 **CHODOROW:** Oh, it is Brach. Okay.

73 **ROTENBERG:** *[inaudible]* Brach.

74 **CHODOROW:** Yes. And yes, if we can get him to either go there or on one of the trips that I
75 make to do it there or here. He was, in fact, the founding chair, and it would be interesting to
76 reflect on that.

77 **ROTENBERG:** I remember Miriam especially because she was over at my house a year ago
78 and she said, "You know, you ought to invest in art." And I said, "Who should I buy?" And she
79 said, "Me."

80 **CHODOROW:** Yes. Good advice. Good advice. And the other— In theater, obviously, Arthur
81 [Wagner] is—

82 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, yes.

83 **CHODOROW:** —still quite active and— Although he comes down fairly regularly.

84 **ROTENBERG:** He comes down once a year.

85 **CHODOROW:** Yeah, or more often. He's here fairly often and we'll talk to him—

86 **ROTENBERG:** He just came back from a nice, long cruise.

87 **CHODOROW:** But he's still— He's a person we want to talk to. And it would have been
88 interesting to talk to John Stewart because John formulated the idea along with colleagues who
89 were here in the sciences, and their unique perspective on the arts at UCSD was in fact
90 generated by that intersection between artists and the scientists.

91 **ROTENBERG:** We did a good job on that, I thought, but I thought it was miscast as a
92 provost.

93 **CHODOROW:** Perhaps. Perhaps. Now, art— Now one of the things that would be interesting
94 at some point, obviously, is to talk about the early history of some of the colleges. And they are
95 all here, right?

96 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah.

97 **CHODOROW:** And we could do that because the— But Paul Goldberg—

98 **ROTENBERG:** June Tapp is not.

99 **CHODOROW:** No, she's not, but she succeeded Paul. And John, of course, is not here but
100 Pat [Patrick J.] Ledden was involved for practically from the beginning. He was involved also in
101 Warren [College]—or what became Warren. And both I and Jim [James K.] Lyon were involved
102 in the origins of Fifth College, so we have that—

103 **ROTENBERG:** And Irwin Jacobs was involved in the origins of Third College.

104 **CHODOROW:** Is that right?

105 **ROTENBERG:** Irwin Jacobs, yeah.

106 **CHODOROW:** He was a member of the faculty when we—

107 **ROTENBERG:** But he quit in a huff because they wanted to go the Lumumba Zapata way—

108 **CHODOROW:** Was he connected then or one of the people who— One of the faculty
109 members connected to Armin Rappaport in the early days when it was going to be a history
110 college, in effect?

111 **ROTENBERG:** Might have been. Might have been. But the distain came and when he saw
112 academic standards were not going his way, right.

113 **CHODOROW:** There, of course is, part of Bill McGill's book, *The Year of the Monkey* is
114 about that transition.

115 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah.

116 **CHODOROW:** And I saw it from Armin's point of view, which was a bitter point of view. But
117 talking to Irwin might well be a very good thing to do in that respect. Now let me say something
118 about one of the things we found or that I'm beginning to observe in this. It comes from a
119 discussion I had recently about the origins of the departments and programs at [University of
120 California,] Irvine as compared to UCSD. The fundamental difference so far as I can tell at this
121 point—and it may only be an artifact of the approach that I'm taking, and that Brad is taking, in
122 terms of the way we're trying to do this history—is that UCSD was founded by department

123 chairs. Every department, the first step was appointing somebody and giving that person quite
124 free reign to develop the department—

125 **ROTENBERG:** To recruit.

126 **CHODOROW:** —recruit. Whereas at Irvine it was done by deans, school deans, which—
127 One of the things that meant was that the people who built our departments were, in fact, within
128 those disciplines. As we are finding out—it's one of the big questions we're asking—they had
129 very strong views about the nature of their disciplines: where they were going and where they
130 ought to go, so that their departments began as realizations of that vision that they had which
131 was a disciplinary vision. At Irvine, the dean might know one discipline and vaguely a couple of
132 others, but the choices as a result—the early choices—were very different.

133 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, I think that's right. And it had an effect nationally. That is, when
134 somebody said, "Okay, Penner—" Rutgers said, "Okay, Penner, start this department of
135 Engineering," then that news got around and everybody knew what the style of the department
136 was going to be like.

137 **CHODOROW:** Because he has a distinctive personality within the discipline.

138 **ROTENBERG:** That's right. Right.

139 **CHODOROW:** Well, that's very good. Now let's go back and talk about— To start with— The
140 questions we've been asking people have been rather straightforward: What was the—from the
141 point of view of the founder—what was the state of the discipline around the time of the
142 founding? What was happening in his or her area? And in this case, it's been "his" in every
143 case. And how did that person—the founder—react to it and think about those issues? What
144 was the vision—the disciplinary and intellectual vision—that person had coming in? Then how
145 did the early recruitments— What were the strategies for recruiting a department based on that
146 vision? How did the successes and failures of the early recruitments affect the vision and
147 realization of it? We generally go from the beginning, which basically is from 1960—'58 to '60,
148 depending on the department—through about 1975, by which time most of the founders had
149 given up their authority. They were members of departments that had corporate existence. And
150 you might say, the ordinary politics and development of a corporate body in the department was
151 now governing what was happening. Of course, you then also go into, as you know, a hiatus in
152 the development of the institution. You were told, "No, you're not going to be 27,500 students;

153 you're going to be maybe 14,000." And so, everything sort of went into a hold at that point and
154 then took off again in the '80s. But we're trying to deal with that first period which makes it, by
155 the way, optimistic. It's an optimistic period up to the end of it for most departments.

156 **ROTENBERG:** Well, you know that I was involved in two departments.

157 **CHODOROW:** Yes, and that's where I wanted to start. My understanding was you came in
158 physics and then moved over to what was APIS: Applied Physics and Information of Science.

159 **ROTENBERG:** No.

160 **CHODOROW:** What was it?

161 **ROTENBERG:** It was AEP: Applied Electro-physics. That was under [Henry G.] Booker. And
162 they had to abandon that because nobody knew what the hell it was. You know, even today
163 *[inaudible]*. But we can come to that. *[crosstalk]*

164 **CHODOROW:** Okay. Why don't you go back and talk about when you got here and about
165 the early years of your experience in moving through those two departments and what was
166 going on. And then we can— Then when you became graduate dean and graduate research,
167 and what your functions were and how that developed.

168 **ROTENBERG:** Well, Keith Brueckner brought me here in '61, that's when I came. And I knew
169 Keith from Los Alamos. Now, when I graduated MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] my
170 first job was at Los Alamos. Los Alamos had the tradition of—because we were so isolated—in
171 the summer all the bigwigs used to come and visit—the summer people, the summer
172 consultants. And Keith was especially interested at the time because he needed computers in a
173 very bad way. He had developed a theory in nuclear physics, called "many-body" theory that
174 was very computer-intensive. And the place where you could find lots of computing time was at
175 the National Laboratories—or Los Alamos was not yet a national laboratory, but they had
176 computers. And so, he and I and another guy by the name of "Bud" Lockett [?], who has since
177 died, would start our day at eight or nine o'clock in the evening and tend the computer—

178 **WESTBROOK:** Overnight.

179 **ROTENBERG:** —all night when nobody else was on it. And over a matter of the summer we
180 were able to generate the paper, too. And that's how I got to know Keith. Then after I left there, I

181 went to Princeton [University], and then from Princeton I went to [University of] Chicago in
182 195?—

183 **CHODOROW:** There you went as an assistant professor?

184 **ROTENBERG:** An assistant professor. I went to Chicago. And I was consulting in
185 Livermore—not in weapons, but in computers. And I bumped into Keith, who was up there for
186 some reason or other—you never discuss these things in bright light. *[Chodorow laughs]* So we
187 were— And then he said, "Oh, by the way, I'm starting a new campus" he mentioned. He says,
188 "Let me get in touch with you; you can come and give us a seminar." And sure enough, he did
189 get in touch. I came, gave the seminar and got a nice sunburn. And this was at Christmas.

190 **CHODOROW:** Right. *[laughs]*

191 **ROTENBERG:** —at Maria Meyer's pool, and then he invited me out there in 1961. And I
192 became assistant director—computer center director—

193 **CHODOROW:** And the director was called?

194 **ROTENBERG:** Clay Perry.

195 **CHODOROW:** Oh, Clay Perry.

196 **ROTENBERG:** Clay Perry was— I don't know Clay's background at all; he wasn't much of a
197 mathematician. He knew something about computers, but he was in the math department in
198 which there wasn't any. He was a professor of mathematics—assistant or associate, I've
199 forgotten his rank. So, he tended the computer—

200 **CHODOROW:** Which was not yet the Burroughs?

201 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, no, no. This was an IBM [International Business Machines] clunk
202 *[Chodorow laughs]*, which Keith managed to get—mostly for himself. He kept the thing busy, but
203 everybody else began to chip in. People weren't as familiar with computers then as they are
204 now, only now it's unthinkable that you don't have something on your desk. But then it was only
205 when the going got impossible you finally resorted to a computer. So that went along nicely for a
206 while. Then Clay—something happened to him mentally; he became paranoid. Clay became
207 paranoid, and I was the guy. I was the— As you know, paranoids focus on something: I was
208 going to take over the computer center and throw him out. That got worse and worse. Finally,

209 the vice-chancellor at the time, who was Carl Hickert, said, "Rotenberg, you had better clear out,
210 go to physics." Things got worse. Finally, the math department had been formed and [Stefan E.]
211 Warchawski, who was a very close friend of Clay's, got Clay to go to a psychiatrist. He got the
212 psychiatrist— He got pills that normalized him. Things kind of gelled for a while. I came back in
213 and helped him out, still very wary. Clay felt very good. You could see a few ups and downs, but
214 still, those pills seemed to stabilize him. He felt good enough to go to a math conference
215 somewhere in South America, I think Brazil. He landed, he knew something was wrong, got on
216 the airplane turned around and came home. He was very ill. And shortly after that he overdosed
217 and he died. Now, we don't know whether it was suicide or an accidental overdose; you never
218 can tell with those things. But that's what happened. I've forgotten— Because of the paranoia
219 and my position in that paranoia it didn't seem like it would be a good idea that I would take
220 over. So, I gave it all up, went to physics. I forgot who became the computer center director. It
221 wasn't [Kenneth L.] Bowles yet, because Bowles wasn't on the scene. It was somebody else; I
222 can't remember. But shortly after that Booker came on board, brought Bowles with him, who
223 was a student from Cornell [University]. After some time, Bowles took over and talked us into
224 getting a Burroughs, and the Burroughs were suited to some God-awful language like—it wasn't
225 Cobol, but it was some non-Fortran language. And it was—

226 **CHODOROW:** It wasn't Cobol?

227 **ROTENBERG:** It wasn't Cobol, no—that was a business language. It was Algol.

228 **CHODOROW:** Algol.

229 **ROTENBERG:** It was Algol. I actually taught students Algol, and I'll tell you a story about that
230 later. It was just the wrong thing to have done. We were the only people on earth who was
231 teaching this Algol and programming in Algol. The philosophy then was the Campus Computer
232 Center, above all; nobody was allowed to have a computer. Nobody.

233 **CHODOROW:** Right.

234 **ROTENBERG:** You had to support the central computer. I mean, we just— that just did not
235 work. We fought it. When I was dean, I had to fight it for Salk [Institute]. But after a number of
236 times at Salk when he said to his friends, "Okay, you can have a computer but nobody else.
237 Well, you can have a computer but nobody else." The whole thing fell apart.

238 **CHODOROW:** I actually remember that, because I was responsible in the early '70s—the
239 early to mid '70s—to the creation of the CAT system, which was the "computer-assisted text"
240 system with the PDP 11-70s that were purchased for that purpose. And I was aware that there
241 was a struggle between the center and the periphery, so to speak.

242 **ROTENBERG:** Right. But the pressure got too great and we just had to give it up.

243 **CHODOROW:** Right.

244 **ROTENBERG:** The story about Algol is the following: Paul and I were in a restaurant and the
245 waitress comes over. "Oh, Dr. Rotenberg, how are you?" I said, "Do I know you?" She said,
246 "Yes, I took a class from you." And then I gave her the tag line: "Well, what's a nice girl like you
247 doing in a place like this?" And she said, "You taught me Algol. It was completely useless."
248 *[mutual laughter]*

249 **CHODOROW:** All right. So, you never really came back into the computer center after those
250 first couple of years.

251 **ROTENBERG:** No.

252 **CHODOROW:** But you were a user there, right?

253 **ROTENBERG:** I was a user. I had always been a user. When I went to Chicago, I was with
254 the Institute for Computer Science—

255 **CHODOROW:** I see.

256 **ROTENBERG:** —as well as with the physics department, so I was designing computers. So
257 that was part and parcel of my professional activities. So anyway, I went back to physics. About
258 that time the fashion in physics was changing. Keith and his many-bodied system had done
259 what it was supposed to do. And it wasn't really new anymore, to do things in there. Meanwhile,
260 the stuff of the guys that Keith had brought on board: George Feher, Harry Suhl—the solid-state
261 physics guys—

262 **CHODOROW:** Right. Bernd Matthias—

263 **ROTENBERG:** —Bernd [T.] Matthias, especially, that was taking over like wildfire. I mean,
264 those guys were very smart, very successful. Everything they touched turned to gold. Walter

265 Kohn, of course, was not the least among them; he was just starting to develop *[inaudible]*
266 frame and landed him a prize in the wrong subject. *[mutual laughter]* So that was taken over
267 completely. And fortunately, but that time I was starting to switch over to things in mathematical
268 biology, but things were happening with [Paul D.] Saltman and Roy Harvey Pearce and so on,
269 and I was brought over to the dean's office. Roy was beginning to feel that he needed an
270 assistant, so Paul [A.] Libby became assistant or associate dean of something and I became the
271 associate dean of everything else. And then shortly after that there was a real breakout of
272 warfare between Paul Saltman and Roy Harvey Pearce. Pearce left and Paul Libby wanted to
273 go back to engineering. A search committee was set up and I was appointed dean.

274 **WESTBROOK:** Now when— In what year was that, '72 or '73?

275 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, something like that—maybe even a little later than '72 or '73.

276 **WESTBROOK:** When had you moved over to Booker's department? At what point did you
277 move from physics to—what was it you said—AEP?

278 **ROTENBERG:** That was just before I got into the dean's office. It was a couple of years or
279 maybe a year after Booker came. God, I wish I had this chronology better and down pat. But he
280 got me in there because even though he had set up a department of applied electro-physics—
281 which really meant atmospheric physics—he was interested in electrical phenomenon in the
282 atmosphere.

283 **CHODOROW:** There was a man here at that time who was, as I remember, a New
284 Zealander.

285 **ROTENBERG:** Yes. He came a little later.

286 **CHODOROW:** Alfred? Was that his name?

287 **ROTENBERG:** No, his name was—

288 **CHODOROW:** He ended up at the Max Planck Institute.

289 **ROTENBERG:** Yes, he was the director there.

290 **CHODOROW:** Yes, that's right.

291 **ROTENBERG:** And also, he ended up as vice-chancellor for academic affairs in the
292 university system in New Zealand.

293 **CHODOROW:** Back to—

294 **ROTENBERG:** That was an extremely handsome man, tall—women students were just
295 throwing themselves at him. I mean, he was— Oh, Acksford, Ian Acksford—

296 **CHODOROW:** Acksford.

297 **ROTENBERG:** Ian Acksford came and he was the world's authority in the aurora borealis.

298 **CHODOROW:** Right.

299 **WESTBROOK:** That's how I remember that he was interested in atmospheric physics.

300 **ROTENBERG:** That's right. But he was a plasma physicist—

301 **CHODOROW:** Really?

302 **ROTENBERG:** —and Banks, remember him?

303 **WESTBROOK:** Yes. I remember Banks.

304 **ROTENBERG:** What was his first name? He's still around. Banks— Anyway, Banks
305 blossomed under Ian's—it wasn't tutelage, but he created an atmosphere. Good students came,
306 good postdocs came, and Banks wrote a two-volume definitive work on the upper atmosphere.

307 **CHODOROW:** Now, was Barney [Barnaby] Rickett part of that as well?

308 **ROTENBERG:** No.

309 **CHODOROW:** He was interested in radio astronomy.

310 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah. He and Bill [William A.] Coles were interested in radio astronomy, and
311 this was part of Booker's scheme. Then there was another very able fellow by the name— He
312 was from Sri Lanka.

313 **CHODOROW:** Asoka?

314 **ROTENBERG:** Asoka Mendis.

315 **CHODOROW:** Who I just saw today.

316 **ROTENBERG:** Now, Asoka came—he was here on sophomore year—and Booker said,
317 "We'll take care of you" because he was really becoming well-known in the area of cometology.
318 By the time Asoka came up for appointment, the complexion of the department had changed so
319 that we were becoming more and more solid-state and computer-oriented. So, when Asoka
320 came up for appointment, there was nothing there. Now, Asoka was very disappointed of
321 course, but he hung in there. I don't know why.

322 **WESTBROOK:** There was a lot of soft money.

323 **ROTENBERG:** A lot of soft money; he was bringing in soft money. We began to notice that
324 he was away a lot, giving invited talks. He became a world figure. After a while we just said, you
325 know, let's get—we've got to get a special *[inaudible]* for him or something. But he was
326 appointed.

327 **CHODOROW:** This was about the time that CASS was founded?

328 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, yeah. And even though he's now retired officially, we still see him.

329 **CHODOROW:** So where did Jacobs fit in? Was he in this department or a different
330 department?

331 **ROTENBERG:** No, he came—Jacobs came as an associate professor. The two of us started
332 courses in programming and in computer science.

333 **CHODOROW:** He came when—in '66, '65?

334 **ROTENBERG:** No, I don't think it was that early. I think it was a little later. But he came as a
335 beginning associate professor and quit by the time he was a professor. He started Linkabit. It
336 was M/A-COM, and then became Linkabit.

337 **CHODOROW:** Linkabit.

338 **ROTENBERG:** —Linkabit and then he lost control. And he said, "To hell with you guys," and
339 took his marbles and—

340 **CHODOROW:** Created QUALCOMM.

341 **ROTENBERG:** Created QUALCOMM. And the rest, as they say, is history.

342 **CHODOROW:** Now when did the department take on the name that I knew, which was
343 APIS?

344 **ROTENBERG:** Well, they went from AEP—

345 **CHODOROW:** *[laughs]* From AEP, yes—

346 **ROTENBERG:** They went from Applied Electro-Physics—AEP—to—APIS. I think was next. I
347 think it was three or four years after AEP's founding. Then it became Computer Science—
348 Information— No, was it ICS?

349 **CHODOROW:** Oh, I remember that stage. I think that's right: ICS—

350 **ROTENBERG:** It was something like that: Information and Computer Science—something
351 like that. And then it finally became SCE. And that was very important for various departments.
352 You know, we split—

353 **CHODOROW:** Yes.

354 **ROTENBERG:** For a while: software went one way, hardware went the other way. And then
355 there was a gray area in between they didn't know what to do with and they called it "Computer
356 Engineering."

357 **CHODOROW:** In both departments.

358 **ROTENBERG:** And both departments tried to hang on with mixed success.

359 **CHODOROW:** Talk a little bit about the— The original vision then was a department which
360 would affect the physics of the atmosphere with—

361 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, right.

362 **CHODOROW:** —near earth phenomena.

363 **ROTENBERG:** At one time we had three physics departments: we had the Physics
364 department where Saul Penner was doing very theoretical stuff at the time. It was Applied
365 Physics, more on the hydrodynamic and aerodynamic area. And we were doing Applied Physics
366 in the *[inaudible]*. And that was great. But we were a physics department. And then we became
367 more and more applied in computers—

368 **CHODOROW:** Right.

369 **ROTENBERG:** —and not only computer circuitry, communications and information theory,
370 but in solid state—the actual making of these micro-devices.

371 **CHODOROW:** Who was involved with that?

372 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, I guess Bill [William S.C.] Chang was the first and began to bring in other
373 people. Bill Chang was a founding integrated circuit guy. But now we're working in quantum
374 reactive materials.

375 **CHODOROW:** Right. And this— Once you had arrived at the information science applied or
376 solid-state physics—applied solid-state physics—by the perhaps the early '70s—let's see,
377 yeah—then that lasted in effect for another ten years before—? In '83 I think, the division of
378 engineering was— You were still an Applied Science department or regarded that way.

379 **ROTENBERG:** That's right.

380 **CHODOROW:** Can you talk a little bit about that, the developments that led—especially from
381 the faculty point of view—to the creation of the division? And was that an outside thing that the
382 faculty paid very little attention to? Or was there really a feeling that they needed to be a part of
383 an Engineering department?

384 **ROTENBERG:** Well, at this point [Richard C.] Atkinson was Chancellor.

385 **CHODOROW:** He came in 1980.

386 **ROTENBERG:** That's right. Now, you'll remember that—we haven't talked about it yet—there
387 was this kind of blow-up with Saltman and McElvoy.

388 **CHODOROW:** Right.

389 **ROTENBERG:** There was the famous "palace coup", the vote of confidence, the subsequent
390 "pooh-poohing" by the [University of California] Board of Regents saying the faculty has nothing
391 to do with this. Of course, a couple of months later McElvoy was all set to step down, Atkinson
392 was doing a quick interview with the LA airport or something—there were various rumors about
393 that—and became chancellor. The first thing he did was fire Saltman. I waited for the other shoe
394 to drop; it didn't drop for a couple of years. John [W.] Miles came in as *[inaudible]*—

395 **CHODOROW:** Interim.

396 **ROTENBERG:** It was more than interim; it was for a couple of years.

397 **CHODOROW:** Well, at the beginning it was interim and then he slid because Dick didn't
398 want to make a search.

399 **ROTENBERG:** That's right.

400 **CHODOROW:** And he said, "Okay, I will do it for three years," because that made a
401 difference to John financially.

402 **ROTENBERG:** That's right, financially. I remember that going into his calculations.

403 **CHODOROW:** Right. John was very careful about that.

404 **ROTENBERG:** Right. Then there was this— And so I was sort of sitting there waiting to be
405 dinged at any time. I was very careful to report to the Vice-Chancellor, because the fight started
406 out—I don't know if you remember this, or you weren't here? —

407 **WESTBROOK:** No.

408 **ROTENBERG:** But the fight started because McElroy called me into the office one day and
409 he said, "Rotenberg, you are now Vice-Chancellor of Graduate Studies and Research and you
410 are reporting to me."

411 **CHODOROW:** Without telling Paul—

412 **ROTENBERG:** Without Saltman—

413 **CHODOROW:** —who was the Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs.

414 **ROTENBERG:** Right. And with that he lit a fuse which blew up in his face. So, I got off the
415 street as Saltman advised me to do, because these two guys were firing each other. And
416 Atkinson came in, fired Saltman, and I was the natural "other guy" to be fired but he didn't fire
417 me. So, I sort of hung there very carefully reporting to Miles. But Miles was very taciturn. When I
418 would sit down with Miles in my weekly— You were supposed to have an hour with him after the
419 Chancellor's Council. "What went on? What did I have to know?" He would always say,
420 "Nothing. Nothing went on." And he would say the same thing to the Provost: "Nothing went on."
421 So, there I was kind of operating in a vacuum. Well, one day at the [Academic] Senate
422 meeting—and it wasn't a representative senate; everybody turned up.

423 **CHODOROW:** Everybody was there. I was chair.

424 **ROTENBERG:** Up comes [Richard C.] Atkinson announcing that we're going to have a
425 School of Engineering. So, somebody said, "Rotenberg, you're going to be the Dean of
426 Engineering; how do you feel about that?" And I was just caught totally by surprise. And I made
427 some goofy answer which was, I think, inappropriate. *[mutual laughter]* But anyway, that didn't
428 endear me to Dick's heart, but I still *[inaudible]* about doing it. But after a while I got tired of the
429 job. After a while you just see everything.

430 **CHODOROW:** Twice. By the time you stepped down you'd been there almost ten years.

431 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, yeah. I'd been there for a long time. And I was getting bored and things
432 were slipping away from me. I felt I was losing my mathematical skills. I was losing my research
433 skills which you have to keep, you know. I tried— I used to take off every Friday to keep up. But
434 I could see that the level of my work declined steadily, and if I could notice it then I knew
435 something was wrong. So—

436 **CHODOROW:** I know that I remember that in those days you were doing work on
437 mathematics in biology—

438 **ROTENBERG:** That's right.

439 **CHODOROW:** —having to do with chemotherapy.

440 **ROTENBERG:** Well, yeah. I was—

441 **CHODOROW:** Some of it, anyway.

442 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, part of it was chemotherapy. Because a lot of the things you do with
443 competing populations—insects, rabbits and frogs *[inaudible]*—you can apply that to
444 chemotherapy where you have cells being eaten up by chemicals and being regenerated.

445 **CHODOROW:** And getting the timing right. That's what—

446 **ROTENBERG:** Getting the timing right, yeah. That was something that is under control,
447 which isn't under control in the natural populations.

448 **CHODOROW:** Right.

449 **ROTENBERG:** So that had a short growth. People were interested in that suddenly because
450 it seemed to be a new kind of paradigm. But other paradigms were much more successful
451 *[inaudible]*. So anyway, I got into the department and somebody said to me, "Rotenberg, we
452 need a lab course." I said, "Well, I *[inaudible]*." *[Chodorow laughs]* They said, "That doesn't
453 change the facts." Well, I used to— You know, when I was a kid, I used to build radios and
454 things like that, so I started up a lab course and it's been going ever since. It was— At that time
455 it was the first lab that our majors would take. Then when the Electrical and Computer
456 Engineering [ECE] got to be very fashionable and we had to raise the standards. We had
457 entrance requirements. You couldn't be an ECE major until you were a junior, and then you had
458 to have a three-point—. It kept going up: three-point six, three-point six-five GPA [grade point
459 average] even to get your foot in the door. And they used my course as the screening course.
460 So, they would put the guys through everything and they had taken twelve exams and all kinds
461 of things, and we would ding everybody and still there were hordes of people coming into the
462 major. But at any rate, now that things aren't quite as tight, it is a required course. It is the
463 second laboratory course—they take a very easy course before that—and it's still going on:
464 ECE 60L. *[Chodorow laughs]* People learn things that, you know, I learned in high school.
465 People learn this—which end of the oscilloscope to look at. This is a resistor. That's a
466 condenser. And you spell ohms with an "h." *[mutual laughter]* Things like that.

467 **CHODOROW:** If you do crossword puzzles you know that.

468 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, yes. That's right.

469 **CHODOROW:** Let's go back and talk a little about your tenure as the Dean, because it's
470 interesting in itself. First of all, the early years of the campus there wasn't at the beginning this

471 Division, was there? I mean, when Keith [Brueckner] was head of the campus— I think he was
472 called Dean, in fact, not Vice-Chancellor.

473 **ROTENBERG:** He was Dean. I don't think there was even a Vice-Chancellor. Yeah.
474 Remember he was head of the department. He was Dean, and he was, in effect, in control of all
475 recruiting.

476 **CHODOROW:** Right.

477 **ROTENBERG:** And there was a Dean of Graduate Studies by the name of [Norris W.]
478 Rakestraw, I believe—

479 **CHODOROW:** Oh, yes. I remember that man. He's not somebody I ever knew.

480 **ROTENBERG:** I hardly ever knew him either.

481 **CHODOROW:** Was he an SIO [Scripps Institute of Oceanography] person?

482 **ROTENBERG:** He was an SIO person and he was in charge of actual graduate admissions.
483 He did the paperwork. And the only time I saw him, he was going to go on sabbatical for a year
484 and we needed a house—because we were building a house.

485 **CHODOROW:** Right.

486 **ROTENBERG:** And so, we all got moved into his house and then two days before we were
487 supposed to move in, he cancelled his plans. And there we are, stuck out in the street
488 practically. So that was the one time we saw him. Yeah, he was a Dean. And then after
489 Rakestraw, in that position, I think, Jim Arnold, Mark McCain, Herb York—

490 **CHODOROW:** So, there wasn't— Well, yes. I knew that Herb came back and did that.

491 **ROTENBERG:** Did that job, right.

492 **CHODOROW:** And then he had a hiatus when he was Interim Chancellor—

493 **ROTENBERG:** That's right.

494 **CHODOROW:** —between [John] Galbraith and— No.

495 **ROTENBERG:** McGill—

496 **CHODOROW:** McGill and— I thought it was McGill and McElroy.

497 **ROTENBERG:** Where was Galbraith? Galbraith was—

498 **CHODOROW:** Galbraith was before McGill.

499 **ROTENBERG:** Okay. Then it was McGill and Galbraith. And then because McGill took off
500 for—

501 **CHODOROW:** And then he went back to being Dean.

502 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, right. That's right. And then Roy Harvey.

503 **WESTBROOK:** Right. So, Roy was after—? York?

504 **CHODOROW:** After York. Yeah, that's right.

505 **ROTENBERG:** Now actually this— The fact that these guys took over in kind of short
506 succession really did great things for the staff in *[inaudible]*, because they were the people who
507 *[inaudible]* into continuity and making policy and so on. When Paul Libby was Acting Dean for a
508 brief time, he hired a woman by the name of Jean [Forte].

509 **CHODOROW:** Yes.

510 **ROTENBERG:** She was a natural. She somehow embraced the concept of graduate study,
511 and fellowships, and equity, and women's rights and all of this. She had it all in one— And she's
512 still there. And if it weren't for her, I don't know where any of this would be. She really made the
513 difference in the standards of that place. I really owe a lot to her.

514 **CHODOROW:** As does Dick.

515 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah.

516 **CHODOROW:** Now, what about the research side? The graduate side is mostly
517 management of the technicalities of the graduate program and the adjudication of the
518 occasional blow-up.

519 **ROTENBERG:** Well, also the disbursement of funds to the various centers—

520 **CHODOROW:** Right.

521 **ROTENBERG:** —and the disbursement of funds— We used to actually give some—

522 **CHODOROW:** Graduate support funds, you're talking about?

523 **ROTENBERG:** That's right. When I got there, we were actually looking at every application
524 for graduate support individually.

525 **CHODOROW:** Wow.

526 **ROTENBERG:** And I said, "This is impossible. Every department doesn't— They have
527 different standards, different languages. You know what we'll do? Let's divide it all up." So, we
528 became— We— Jean Forte designed it: block grants.

529 **CHODOROW:** Right.

530 **ROTENBERG:** And we're still operating with block grants.

531 **CHODOROW:** How did the block grants get shifted—? They can't stay the same forever.

532 **ROTENBERG:** No, they have a historical—

533 **CHODOROW:** Is there a limit, for example, on change? Like ten percent or fifteen percent?

534 **ROTENBERG:** Yes, yes. It could be 15 percent. But it changes. Dean to Dean and year to
535 year, it changes. But we did have— In order to avoid catastrophes and sudden shift in academic
536 fashion—you know. Kids can change in two years. You'd leave the department hanging out
537 there with nothing. We did have a cap on the decrement of each department so their support
538 wouldn't suddenly disappear.

539 **CHODOROW:** Right. And that— Most of that support was TA [teaching assistant] support.
540 To what extent was it fellowship support?

541 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, it was fellowship support.

542 **CHODOROW:** Oh, it was?

543 **ROTENBERG:** This was the way— Yeah. This was the way we got our research support.
544 And this is now the way we get our foreign students, because the block grant makes up that
545 difference.

546 **CHODOROW:** What about TA support? That was done with the provosts. When did that
547 system start, do you know?

548 **ROTENBERG:** That started under Saltman. Saltman, as you know, was a provost. And while
549 I was always banging heads with him, as was proper, as to where resources should be going,
550 he was always very mindful of undergraduates and was always very accommodating to the
551 provosts. And it was always his decision to make sure that our undergraduates and our provosts
552 were treated properly. And I was always mad at him for that, but looking back with twenty-
553 twenty hindsight, it was the right thing to do. I mean, it was the right tension to set up. And had
554 he listened to me, of course, the undergraduates would never have done as well as they are
555 doing here. I think that the college system, as much as I hated it at the time—and as much as it
556 didn't turn out the way it was supposed to—. It was supposed to be the "grandmaster," you
557 know, being a provost, sucking up a pint, in front of the fireplace with the undergraduates
558 around him listening to—

559 **CHODOROW:** And the faculty were supposed truly to be divided amongst the colleges, and
560 each college faculty was to be more important than any departmental faculty.

561 **ROTENBERG:** That's right. It never panned out that way. And these turned out to be—. The
562 visions that the students could cope with— You know, it could have been eating halls, it could
563 have been dormitories; it turned out to be colleges. Fine. It worked out well.

564 **CHODOROW:** It gave human scale to the place.

565 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, that's right.

566 **CHODOROW:** It also did one other thing, which was I think very important. And that is that it
567 permitted a multiple approach to undergraduate education so that faculty who disagreed with
568 one another about how this ought to be carried out did not have to beat one another into
569 submission or compromise to the level of lowest common denominator—which happened in
570 many places—but could get a group of like-minded colleagues together and go ahead and
571 develop a college in that form.

572 **ROTENBERG:** We developed out of models. When you *[inaudible]* a college, you need to
573 *[inaudible]*. Kids can take each one—

574 **CHODOROW:** Right.

575 **ROTENBERG:** —or anyone. And they responded to it as, "Yes, but you'd still have to
576 administrate these things, and you may not have needed a secretary here or there." Like
577 *[inaudible]*.

578 **CHODOROW:** Yeah. Well, we did a study as you may remember—at the beginning of the
579 '80s, as I remember; maybe it was a little later than that—of the cost of the colleges. We
580 reviewed the cost of the colleges roughly at the time of the twenty-fifth anniversary—the middle
581 '80s I guess—and we used Irvine as our comparison and differently organized. And what we
582 found was that the cost was roughly the same—

583 **ROTENBERG:** Probably a little more expensive here.

584 **CHODOROW:** Slightly, but very slightly. Because you had— They had more deans and we
585 had the provosts—at that time, four. But the actual assignment of funding for administering
586 undergraduate education to both campuses was equivalent from the formulas that the state
587 system used. And we were not spending very much more money. We had the offices of the
588 provosts, which cost money to run, but in personnel it was essentially the same.

589 **ROTENBERG:** Well, that's what it will always turn out to be. At any rate, there was this
590 tension all the time between the graduate dean and the four provosts. I complained at the
591 beginning that this was unfair.

592 **CHODOROW:** Right. There were four of them and— *[laughs]*.

593 **ROTENBERG:** We had this PRC (Program Review Committee), the program that you came
594 in on, which was the—. This was a very fine committee. All the goodies were put on the table—
595 all the FTEs, all the money—and there was a public pie-cutting ceremony. Everybody knew
596 what was going on. We'd all argue, and Paul would say that this is what it's going to be, and you
597 have to handle it. But there were four of them and one of me. And after some months I said,
598 "Look, why don't they just get one of them"—that turned out to be the chairman of the Council of
599 Provosts—"to come to this meeting, and then it would be one-on-one?" And Paul *[inaudible]*.
600 The PRC, I think, was a wonderful invention. Saltman was, for that time and for that size of the

601 university, probably the ideal administrator. It was strictly run on personality. He had personal
602 contact with every chairman and that's the way he did it.

603 **CHODOROW:** Right.

604 **ROTENBERG:** For the size of the university he carried it off beautifully. But just at the time
605 when he left that office and Atkinson came in as chancellor, the university was getting just a little
606 too big. And he began to introduce this idea of deans and decentralizing. Then by the time
607 Casiero came, she decentralized power totally. So, at the council—the Vice-Chancellors'
608 Council of the Deans—the pie was broken up. FTEs and money were given out and that was
609 the end. After that she was more or less powerless.

610 **CHODOROW:** She was doing the personnel—

611 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, she was—

612 **CHODOROW:** But even the deans played more and more of a role in that as well.

613 **ROTENBERG:** Oh, yes. Yes.

614 **CHODOROW:** That was an argument that was carried, basically, by Michael Rothchild with
615 the support of the rest of the deans in the late '80s. After Hal Ticho, who kept very close control
616 of everything.

617 **ROTENBERG:** Well, I was chairman of our department for five years. I never got to see the
618 Vice Chancellor once. Every time I would call up to have a chat with her—

[END OF PART ONE; BEGIN PART TWO]

619 **CHODOROW:** Well, that has taken I think a step even further.

620 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah. Now the *[inaudible]*. Bob [Robert] Conn is a very powerful man.

621 **CHODOROW:** Right. Certainly Murph Gromer—

622 **ROTENBERG:** Murph Gromer doesn't take any guff from anybody. I think that the Dean for
623 the Arts is not quite up to that caliber. I mean, he just doesn't have it in him.

624 **CHODOROW:** Nor the Social Sciences.

625 **ROTENBERG:** Nor the Social Sciences.

626 **CHODOROW:** The Social Sciences are carried in part by their enormous enrollments—

627 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah.

628 **CHODOROW:** —which is the modern trend in almost every institution.

629 **ROTENBERG:** That's right. But I think for the size that the campus is going to be—which is
630 going to be 27,000-30,000—that's the only way to handle it.

631 **CHODOROW:** Right. Sure.

632 **ROTENBERG:** There was something I wanted to mention. This is going to be—you'll have to
633 splice this in—about the difference of the way that we started our departments. The early
634 departments had a honeymoon period of graduate students only, and that's how they got key
635 people to come here. You didn't have to do undergraduate work for two or three years.

636 **CHODOROW:** And when they did they had brought a cadre of junior faculty to assist them in
637 doing this. That's true.

638 **ROTENBERG:** And the standards of the tradition was that the standards were extremely
639 high. It's very strange; if you look at the statistics of how many assistant professors leave either
640 because they were whispered to by the chairman before it came time or because they were
641 actually told to go, it's at two percent.

642 **CHODOROW:** Yeah.

643 **ROTENBERG:** I mean, the number of assistant professors who continue on is somewhere in
644 the ninety-two percent or something like that. It's very high. And it turns out that we have a
645 reasonably high success of getting people who are "somebody" by the time they are professors.
646 Lenny [Leonard D.] Newmark, who had a terrible time recruiting bigwigs—

647 **CHODOROW:** Right, at the very beginning.

648 **ROTENBERG:** —when he was— At the very beginning. He said, "I'll grow my own." And so,
649 he got the best students of those bigwigs and they turned out to be very good, by and large.

650 **CHODOROW:** That's right, that's right. Let's talk a little bit about your role in the research
651 side. What were you expected to do?

652 **ROTENBERG:** Ah. I was expected to encourage the formation of centers, institutes and so
653 on. And indeed, I did that whenever there seemed to be a community of interest that seemed to
654 go across departmental boundaries or there seemed to be a special interest within a department
655 that seemed ripe to get money from DOD or various agencies. Then I would come and try to
656 suggest that a center be formed. And then they would say, "Well, what's the advantage of that?"
657 And then the advantage always was, "Well, you'll get your own overhead funds coming back,
658 they're already coming back, and you have better control." If they were interdisciplinary, as they
659 usually were, then these institutes would sometimes rise above departmental barrier—they don't
660 have to worry about that. You get special money for graduate support. And so, these things—
661 That was part of the argument.

662 **CHODOROW:** And you were the only distributor of whatever the money was?

663 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, that's right—for *[inaudible]* years.

664 **CHODOROW:** So, some of the overhead money that was collected at the center would
665 come to you, and then from you directly into the—

666 **ROTENBERG:** It was a very circuitous route. It was money that would go directly to the state.
667 The state would take off ten percent from the top for administration, split the rest in half, half
668 would go to the [University of California, Board of] Regents.

669 **CHODOROW:** Right.

670 **ROTENBERG:** Then the regents had sticky fingers; it came to— By then it was a distribution,
671 not in proportion to the—

672 **CHODOROW:** No. I calculated that we were getting seventeen cents on the dollar when in
673 1982-83 when I was chair of the [Academic] Senate. And it was a big issue at that time,
674 because that was the first— That was the beginning of the A-21 cycle—

675 **ROTENBERG:** Yes.

676 **CHODOROW:** —and what was that going to mean? Well, the first thing you had to do was
677 figure out what the current state of the situation was. And Dick [Richard C. Atkinson] was at war

678 with the system-wide administration of that and how much money was coming back, to the
679 extent to which we were subsidizing [University of California,] Santa Cruz, [University of
680 California,] Riverside, [University of California,] Irvine and so on.

681 **ROTENBERG:** Right. The Regents didn't do that subsidization, so there were sticky fingers
682 there. It then got to the Chancellor and that became special programs.

683 **CHODOROW:** Right.

684 **ROTENBERG:** —and I think that gave him some flexibility. That was marvelous. And then
685 the few pennies that came down to the Dean, who then divided it up. And I didn't want any
686 warfare: I simply divided it up in proportion to the—

687 **CHODOROW:** To the production.

688 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah. And sometimes I would give a little extra to somebody that started.
689 Sometimes somebody was—needed a secretary, so we gave a half-time secretary to get the
690 proposals rolling. And then that's how some of them got started. Some of them were very
691 successful, some were not. But even after I stopped being dean, I found myself being on the
692 board of directors in various places, just to get them started since I knew the ropes.

693 **CHODOROW:** These are the Chancellor's advisory committees for ORUs—?

694 **ROTENBERG:** Yes.

695 **CHODOROW:** Well, that's good. Can you think of anything else you think we should—?

696 **ROTENBERG:** Well, there was this business of speaking of— You reminded me of it when I
697 said something about Dick Atkinson being at war with the Chancellor for our fair share of the
698 overhead dollar. Paul Saltman was in that war with—who was it? It was David [S.] Saxon. And it
699 was quite public. I remember David Saxon came and addressed our senate, and Paul Saltman
700 stood up and said, "Why are we not getting our fair share of the dollar? Why do we work so hard
701 just so that Santa Cruz can *[inaudible]*?" There was open warfare there. Then when— I don't
702 think that stood him well.

703 **CHODOROW:** No, I would think not.

704 **ROTENBERG:** When it came time to pick a new Chancellor—and he was a candidate, of
705 course—people were saying, "Do we want somebody who's a Chancellor who's at war with
706 David Saxon?"

707 **CHODOROW:** Right.

708 **ROTENBERG:** The war with McElroy was very complicated; I don't know whether you were
709 aware of the two strains that were—

710 **CHODOROW:** Well, I was Chair of Privilege and Tenure and had been involved in a case—a
711 complaint made against McElroy by a chair of a department in the medical school—where the
712 committee, after roughly a hundred hours of hearings, reported to the president—since the
713 chancellor was involved—that the chancellor had misbehaved. The result in the end was that
714 the chair was reappointed; it was over the reappointment of that chair.

715 And then I was— Since I was about probably the youngest of the chairs of committees, when
716 the meeting occurred in Mandeville [Hall?] to discuss the vote of no confidence, I was asked to
717 be sergeant-at-arms *[laughs]* and had to try to monitor that meeting, which was packed as you'll
718 remember and had people in it who shouldn't have been in it. I could identify them, but I couldn't
719 climb down the rung and grab them by the collar and get them out of there. That was not really
720 my role, but I did note them and watch to see whether they voted or not.

721 **ROTENBERG:** Well, you know there were two strains that were— I don't think they were
722 recognized by the general academic public. There was the strain, the pro-Saltman strain. And
723 then there was the anti-McElroy strain: the people in that school who thought he had
724 misbehaved with regard to the senate. Of course, he thought very little of the senate.

725 **CHODOROW:** And the Chair of the Senate was Russ [Russell F.] Doolittle[?], who was a
726 very strong proponent of senate authority.

727 **ROTENBERG:** And then there were the people who thought that Paul was getting a bad
728 deal.

729 **CHODOROW:** Now, didn't that dispute—that is, the strain between the Chancellor and the
730 Vice-Chancellor—go back well before that final argument?

731 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah. But then when the opportunity arose both of these opposing groups
732 joined in getting rid of McElroy. There was some miscalculation in that I think Paul thought that
733 this whole thing was on his beat. I think there was some miscalculation there. Whereas there
734 was a large faction of *[inaudible]* who didn't agree with Paul, who just didn't *[inaudible]*.

735 **CHODOROW:** Right.

736 **WESTBROOK:** So, he was a bit *[inaudible]* he was going to move up, *[inaudible]*?

737 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, yeah. *[inaudible]* was a very likable guy; people loved him.

738 **CHODOROW:** He was well-known in the community.

739 **ROTENBERG:** Very well-known in the community. He was a great showman, and it was
740 just—

741 **WESTBROOK:** Who appointed the *[inaudible]*?

742 **CHODOROW:** McElroy.

743 **ROTENBERG:** McElroy, yeah. He had just been Provost of Revelle [College], right?

744 **CHODOROW:** And he had been since, I think, 1966.

745 **ROTENBERG:** He did a very good job there. But then he made a mistake, he appointed June
746 Tapp as provost.

747 **WESTBROOK:** I'm sorry, what?

748 **CHODOROW:** He appointed his successor as Provost of Revelle College, he appointed
749 June Tapp—

750 **ROTENBERG:** She was a very egocentric person.

751 **CHODOROW:** —who was a big problem. She managed to drive me—a very dedicated
752 Revelle faculty member—away from the college. I didn't quit the college, but I stopped
753 participating in the activities of the college because I could not work with her at all.

754 **ROTENBERG:** Right. There was one meeting the four provosts and I had with [Paul D.]
755 Saltman—it was very tense. I've forgotten why, but after the meeting—I do believe it was
756 *[inaudible]*—one of the Provosts came over and he said, "Look, *[inaudible]*, I don't want to be
757 seen talking to you, but watch out for your parking space." And a couple of days later June Tapp
758 was asking Saltman—and he said, "Get out of here"—to get rid of my parking space, which was
759 next to the Vice-Chancellor, because it gave the Graduate Dean more of a psychological edge
760 than the Provost because the provosts tended to have their parking spaces *[inaudible]*.

761 **CHODOROW:** She was a psychologist, though most of us would have said that she was a
762 "pop" psychologist.

763 **WESTBROOK:** So how was her appointment a miscalculation on his part, then?

764 **ROTENBERG:** Well, she had a reputation. She was on various boards in the National
765 Congress of Psychologists, and apparently, she did a good job. She was an old high-school
766 buddy of Paul's.

767 **CHODOROW:** That's right. They had gone to high school together.

768 **ROTENBERG:** Do you know him?

769 **CHODOROW:** Uh-huh *[affirmative]*.

770 **ROTENBERG:** —and Paul thought a lot of her. And as a matter of fact, at first splash, we all
771 thought a lot of her. And so, he made the appointment and it turned out that she was just going
772 to *[inaudible]*.

773 **CHODOROW:** I'll give you an example—

774 **WESTBROOK:** I guess I'm trying to connect this to the fallout with McElroy, though. So, it's
775 out of this—

776 **ROTENBERG:** No, I think it's disconnected.

777 **CHODOROW:** No.

778 **WESTBROOK:** Not quite in that way, okay.

779 **CHODOROW:** There was no— It didn't have anything to do with that. What it did was
780 alienate a lot of faculty. And when you make an appointment like that, even your friends think—
781 have just learned that you're capable of making a serious mistake of judgment.

782 **ROTENBERG:** And it looked like nepotism *[inaudible]*—

783 **CHODOROW:** That's right.

784 **ROTENBERG:** —because of these childhood associations.

785 **WESTBROOK:** So, being absent from that history or the time of that history, what was the
786 fallout between Saltman and McElroy about? Where did that originate?

787 **ROTENBERG:** That originated— Well, that went back to when McElroy got here and
788 appointed Saltman, but he brought with him as his close associate. I guess he was Associate
789 Vice-Chancellor?

790 **CHODOROW:** He may have been Associate Chancellor or Assistant Chancellor—Assistant
791 Chancellor, probably Head of *[inaudible]*.

792 **ROTENBERG:** I don't know. It was not a—

793 **CHODOROW:** It was a kind of amanuenses.

794 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah. He had a lot of power and he was a non-academic.

795 **CHODOROW:** He came from the—

796 **ROTENBERG:** National Science Foundation.

797 **CHODOROW:** National Science Foundation.

798 **ROTENBERG:** And he had all the power. And he and McElroy would decide over drinks—.
799 McElroy was a great boozier, and so was Francisco *[?]*—at somebody's house, his house or
800 McElroy's—and this is the way it's going to be. And then at the next Chancellor's Council that's
801 the way it was, and it would drive poor Paul up the wall.

802 **CHODOROW:** And Paul was a defender of the academic prerogative. And what was
803 happening was at the business side, because 'Cisco was essentially the Vice-Chancellor for

804 Administration or for whatever they called it at that time—was that the business side was
805 "wagging the dog." And as far as Paul was concerned, the "dog" was the academic program
806 and the academic personnel—the faculty.

807 **ROTENBERG:** And then, I think, McElroy saw that the faculty were really in love with Paul.
808 They really liked him a lot and he wanted to clip his wings. And then that's when I got dragged
809 into it and he just announced to me that I was reporting to him.

810 **CHODOROW:** That was in 1978-'79, right? Or was it '79-'80? It must have been '78 or '79.

811 **ROTENBERG:** And it was a spoken love. A spoken love. And Paul looked at me with a great
812 deal of suspicion, and I was entirely innocent of the thing. The more I protested, of course, the
813 worse it got. And so, he gathered his lieutenants around him and *[inaudible]* war.

814 **CHODOROW:** And had very strong support. And I think what Manny says about the two, in
815 effect, parties—. There was a party that really was Paul's supporters and friends, and there was
816 a party much less distinct of people who were fed up with McElroy. And one of the problems—
817 McElroy was, in fact, drinking a lot.

818 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah.

819 **CHODOROW:** He was doing things like saying untruths to people. He was—. We were
820 starting to build buildings, and we were building buildings and he was giving away more than
821 100% of buildings—promising to this group and to that group that they would have space in the
822 building when there was just not enough space—and letting somebody else sort that out. There
823 were a lot of those kinds of activities going on that bothered people. So, there was a group that
824 really was—had become anti-McElroy. As I remember, however, there was a great deal of—
825 especially among the senior faculty—hesitation to take the step of no-confidence.

826 **ROTENBERG:** Well, it was unprecedented.

827 **CHODOROW:** It was unprecedented. It was clearly going to be disruptive.

828 **ROTENBERG:** The Chancellor— The [University of California] Board of Regents didn't know
829 what to do with him. They said, "Well, it's none of your faculty's business. The Chancellor is our
830 appointment."

831 **WESTBROOK:** How disruptive was it, in retrospect?

832 **ROTENBERG:** Well, it wasn't disruptive as far as classroom activities were concerned or
833 research. It took a lot of nervous energy talking to a lot of people.

834 **WESTBROOK:** Sure.

835 **ROTENBERG:** Just like I said, there were a lot of sleepless nights. I didn't know what was
836 going to happen from one day to the next. Administratively it was very disruptive by the time we
837 got down to the departmental level.

838 **CHODOROW:** It is possible—and I'm not sure whether I would make this assessment on
839 further study—that the amount of energy, emotional and physical energy, put into this may well
840 have burnt out a lot of senior faculty who had given a very great deal to the institution, had been
841 real citizens of the institution for a long time. And what had it gotten them? It got them into this
842 mess where they had to spend a lot of time, much more time at this than they ever wanted to.
843 And after that, through the '80s, they backed off. It was harder to get through certain
844 committees—you know, "What am I getting myself in for here?"—because of that precedent of
845 how much it involved.

846 **ROTENBERG:** And also, when [Richard C.] Atkinson came forward, the whole tenor of the
847 administration changed. It was less *[inaudible]*.

848 **CHODOROW:** And as you said, there's another factor that was part of this, and that was
849 when we were beginning to grow again we had arrived at a point where the old system—which
850 had been held together in part by the powerful personality of Paul and his energy, which was
851 amazing—

852 **WESTBROOK:** We've had this characterization of the early days of these very energetic men
853 with great personalities coming and trying to tear down *[inaudible]* orders— *[inaudible]* talked a
854 lot about that.

855 **CHODOROW:** Right.

856 **ROTENBERG:** So, I'm wondering, is this transition that's happening with McElroy such a
857 dissimilar departure from that?

858 **CHODOROW:** Well, I think you would find—and you may remember this, Manny—there was
859 in this period of the late '70s a battle between departments and colleges. Not merely about what

860 you were involved in but also over curriculum. Because originally, for example, there was
861 supposed to be a chemistry course for Revelle and a chemistry course for [John] Muir [College]
862 and a chemistry course for Third [College] and so on. And the chemistry department finally said,
863 "Wait a second, chemistry is chemistry is chemistry. We're just not going to do that." And the
864 Provosts felt that it was very important that there be these distinctive courses. And the end
865 product of that was that the departments won except in the humanities, and humanities
866 courses—or humanities/social science courses—remained distinctive. But at the end of that
867 period, the only distinctive courses that were college-oriented and identified with the college
868 were with our humanities: the Third College course, and courses that had been created one way
869 or another for Muir, and then *[inaudible]* for the Fourth College to keep, *[inaudible]*, and all the
870 others with their associated writing programs. All the other courses were departmental courses
871 taken by college students in accord with the college's general education requirements.

872 **ROTENBERG:** Yeah, that's right.

873 **CHODOROW:** And that battle went on as well. And that was a very important battle,
874 because by the end of— That's why in the '80s the question[s] arose: Should we still have the
875 colleges? What good are the colleges and how expensive are they? And we did that study.

876 **ROTENBERG:** I think one of the other things that made the colleges stick was that Saltman
877 was one of the favorites of the local newspaper. He would always give them stories. He was a
878 good interview. The reporters loved him. He would always play up the colleges, and then the
879 newspapers began to talk about "UCSD: famous for its colleges." It was just impossible to go
880 back. It was out of the bottle.

881 **CHODOROW:** That's right. The role Paul played was critically important, and we ought to
882 talk to him.

883 **ROTENBERG:** You'd better go *[inaudible]*.

884 **CHODOROW:** Yeah. Sir, thank you very much.

885 **ROTENBERG:** I had fun, yes.

886 **CHODOROW:** Thank you.

887 **ROTENBERG:** I've been *[inaudible]* that I remembered so much.

[END OF PART TWO; END OF INTERVIEW]