

Walter Desmond

Interview conducted by

Mark Jones, PhD

July 30, 1997

SAN DIEGO TECHNOLOGY ARCHIVE



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Walter Desmond

After receiving his PhD in biochemistry from UCLA in 1979, Dr. Walter Desmond went to work for Hybritech for over twenty years, where he contributed to the development of TANDEM and ICON technologies and other important developments. He went on to work in the San Diego educational field with Lincoln High School and the Science/School-to-Career program, and as a board member with the San Diego Science Alliance.

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INTERVIEWEE: Walter Desmond

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DATE: July 30, 1997

LOCATION: San Diego, California

1 **JONES:** How did you get to UCSD? What were you doing there?

2 **DESMOND:** I was a research assistant in the Biology Department and also at Scripps
3 in Marine Biology.

4 **JONES:** Who were you working with?

5 **DESMOND:** I was working with Gordon Sato in the Biology Department and Dr.
6 Volcani at Scripps.

7 **JONES:** What kind of projects?

8 **DESMOND:** Cell biology. We were studying growth regulation in cells, particularly
9 hormone effects and other growth factor effects on cells.

10 **JONES:** How did you first hear about Hybritech?

11 **DESMOND:** I first heard about it from a friend in the local scientific community.
12 That was Gary David. He had started working for them. I can't remember specifically,
13 but I know that he called me up and said that I should take a look at this new
14 company that they were starting. So I came over and checked it out.

15 **JONES:** Do you remember how he described it, how he represented to you what was
16 going on there?

17 **DESMOND:** No, I don't. In fact, I will say that I didn't know about that specific
18 technology of monoclonal antibodies. I don't recall, but he described it as something
19 like a new company that he's involved in and I should take a look.

20 **JONES:** Where had you met Gary, at Scripps?

21 **DESMOND:** Yes, while he was at Scripps. I guess that I just had met him just in
22 scientific circles.

23 **JONES:** So you went over to Hybritech. What happened there? Who did you talk to?

24 **DESMOND:** Well, at that time, I talked to the President, Ted Greene and that's the
25 only thing I remember. I will say it was a real flyer. I wasn't really intending to do it,
26 or wasn't really looking or anything.

27 **JONES:** You were happy with what you were doing?

28 **DESMOND:** Yeah. He told me about it. I remember that I went on vacation right
29 after that so I just thought I was going to go and hear about it. I guess I thought about
30 it over vacation, and somehow, I can't remember specifically, but it was quite a move
31 at that time.

32 **JONES:** Did you think that it was a risky move to go to this little start-up?

33 **DESMOND:** Yeah, yeah. Well, not because it was a start-up. I really didn't know
34 about that. But it was considered risky just to leave academia. In biology, it's quite a
35 bit different now. At least I think it is, but at that time it was irreversible. Since then,
36 there's become a lot more interplay and interaction, and less distinction.

37 **JONES:** Did you go to Notre Dame?

38 **DESMOND:** Yeah.

39 **JONES:** I'm from South Bend.

40 **DESMOND:** Oh, you are. For goodness sakes.

41 **JONES:** Are you from California originally?

42 **DESMOND:** Yes.

43 **JONES:** From San Diego?

44 **DESMOND:** Yes.

45 **JONES:** After Notre Dame, what did you do?

46 **DESMOND:** I went to UCLA for graduate school and got my PhD in biochemistry,
47 and then came to UCSD as a postdoc.

48 **JONES:** So you were thinking about an academic career at that point? Is that why you
49 may have been a little reluctant?

50 **DESMOND:** Yeah.

51 **JONES:** People have told me that Ted Greene is very persuasive, he's good at
52 generating excitement about this stuff. Did you find that to be so?

53 **DESMOND:** Yeah, he must have been. I think he was, yeah. He was a good sales
54 person. I mean, he was very good because he had some sense of the science and could
55 represent that to business people. Then he had a sense of the business, which he
56 could then represent to people like me. So, yes.

57 **JONES:** And this was early '79, or the middle of '79?

58 **DESMOND:** Let's see. Yes. It was September 1979.

59 **JONES:** So you decided to start. What did you do when you first arrived? They had
60 started the cell biology group, right?

61 **DESMOND:** Well, we were making antibodies to some specific antigens that they
62 wanted to measure. I think the idea at that time was that they were starting to
63 expand a little bit, differentiate a little bit, into biology and chemistry departments.
64 And so they were hiring a fair number of people in biology. They had hired Joanne
65 Martinis. Then me shortly after - I guess a month or so after. The idea was to
66 essentially double in size and split the research into chemistry and biology.

67 **JONES:** How many were in the group at the time, do you recall?

68 **DESMOND:** Rachel Hernandez, she started the same day I did. This guy named Gary
69 Jones. I think there were eighteen people at that time.

70 **JONES:** Do you remember your badge number?

71 **DESMOND:** Yes, thirty-one.

72 **JONES:** What was your impression of the labs and the research compared to UCSD or
73 Scripps? Did that have anything to do with your decision?

74 **DESMOND:** No.

75 **JONES:** What really motivated you then?

76 **DESMOND:** Well, it was...I can't really say. It wasn't financial. I think one thing
77 maybe was just the challenge or the assignment of getting this organization set up,
78 and organizing, making kind of a systematic manufacturing function. Although I
79 have to say that I didn't know anything about manufacturing. I guess it was a
80 challenge, but it was also something that was very clear. I'm not saying that I went
81 out to do the unknown, so I guess that's why I went. I was probably looking for
82 something new, but not really very vigorously.

83 **JONES:** Did you believe that the technology would work?

84 **DESMOND:** Yes, well, it was sort of faith in the actual business and medical
85 application. I was more interested in the science. Another reason was just to learn
86 that. It wasn't obvious that that was going to be a new up-and-coming technology,
87 but I was aware of it. I just wasn't really aware of the exact science, so I think that that
88 was another prime reason - learning a new area. So, sure, I believed. I mean, it was
89 already in practice. I knew that.

90 **JONES:** So what kind of work were you doing? Cell fusions and experimenting with
91 different cell lines

92 **DESMOND:** At Hybritech early on?

93 **JONES:** Yeah, at Hybritech.

94 **DESMOND:** We were really using an established technique, and we had some ideas
95 about kind of refining the procedures to do. I remember very well that once you got
96 into seeing this thing, you could come up with lots of ideas about technological
97 things we could do in the lab or applications. It was a lot of fun sitting around
98 dreaming up potential applications once you had some idea about the power of these
99 things.

100 **JONES:** Can you recall some of these things that you thought of that you either
101 pursued or didn't pursue?

102 **DESMOND:** Yeah, I have to think a minute. We had lots of ideas, idea notebooks.
103 Come back to that, I'll think about it.

104 **JONES:** OK, what was the atmosphere like? How was it similar to or different than
105 working in an academic setting? Because it wasn't like real industrial research...

106 **DESMOND:** Not at all. I would say, for the most part it was a very similar
107 atmosphere. I mean, all of the people were just from academic labs. And, you know,
108 there wasn't even really any tremendous urgency of production of a product. There
109 wasn't any manufacturing timeline or anything. But I think there was a kind of
110 urgency of realizing this thing and just getting it going. It was a pretty amazing
111 situation. There was no budget, no particular timeline - well, I shouldn't say we didn't
112 have a timeline. We certainly had products that we had in mind. There were plans,
113 five and ten-year plans, things like that. Maybe I should say that we didn't really
114 sense that, you know, 'We have to have this by December, or March,' or something.'
115 But the atmosphere was very exciting. Everybody was working hard. I remember very
116 well, people routinely came in Saturdays. I remember that because we had TGIFs on
117 Friday, and it was traditional to stash a bunch of beer so you'd have some beer on
118 Saturday. Ah, the innocent old days. And I think the other thing was that we realized
119 there was a lot to do, so it was exciting in the sense that we wanted to get stuff done,
120 and also we were hiring a lot of people. You know, there were constantly new people.

121 **JONES:** Were you involved in any of that? Did you bring in people that you knew?

122 **DESMOND:** Oh yes. I was involved in all the interviews. We had kind of team
123 interviews. A hundred lunches at Torrey Pines Inn over at the golf course which is the
124 only eating establishment in the area. That was it, that's where you went to eat. And
125 we all were thinking of people that we knew around town to recruit, so that was a real
126 big effort.

127 **JONES:** So, a lot of the people did come from UCSD and Scripps?

128 **DESMOND:** Oh yeah, I think at one time a third of the people were from Scripps or
129 people from UCSD. These were various people that we had collaborated or worked
130 with in the past.

131 **JONES:** Do you remember the Friday morning technical strategy meetings that Ivor
132 Royston would take the minutes for?

133 **DESMOND:** And bring donuts.

134 **JONES:** He would bring donuts?

135 **DESMOND:** Yes.

136 **JONES:** So, you attended those? Do you remember what kind of discussions those
137 were?

138 **DESMOND:** Oh yes. They were essentially the strategic planning meetings, and that
139 was something that was really organized by Ted Greene. I mean, I don't want to give
140 the impression at all that there was no product-oriented direction. It was just that we
141 sort of left it to him. We'd show up and be asked, 'How are all these projects going?'
142 and then go through all the antibody projects. We were, I distinctly remember,
143 introduced to words like milestones.

144 **JONES:** How involved was Ivor Royston? He would come over once a week?

145 **DESMOND:** Yes, he wasn't really technically involved at that time at all.

146 **JONES:** Ted Greene, I guess he was working with Gary David a lot at the chemistry
147 end. Did he get involved with the cell biology group?

148 **DESMOND:** No, he really didn't do chemistry, either. I mean, he wasn't a scientist.

149 **JONES:** Yes, but he's on the patent. I don't know what his contribution was actually,
150 but Gary told me that it was significant...

151 **DESMOND:** Yes, as far as concept and discussing the applications and stuff like that,
152 for sure. But in the actual lab, no. He was involved in cell biology in that sense.

153 **JONES:** He knew what was going on technically?

154 **DESMOND:** Right. I remember he designed an experiment once, I remember.

155 **JONES:** Did it work?

156 **DESMOND:** Well, I'm not sure we did it. Howard Birndorf was much more involved
157 in day to day operations because he was sort of the operations manager. So he did
158 purchasing and licensing.

159 **JONES:** These guys were around, and there was a lot of interaction with the people
160 doing the management stuff?

161 **DESMOND:** Oh, yes. All the time. It was really small in number and also physically,
162 so yes, they were just around all the time.

163 **JONES:** When did you start getting the research antibodies out?

164 **DESMOND:** Hepatitis.

165 **JONES:** That was toward the end of '79?

166 **DESMOND:** December of '79.

167 **JONES:** People have told me about filling the vials and capping the vials, did you do
168 all of that? Were you involved in the whole manufacturing process?

169 **DESMOND:** Yeah, actually, I think Gary David probably did most of that.

170 **JONES:** People have also told me that things started to change when Tom Adams
171 came in. Would you second that?

172 **DESMOND:** Well, he added a little bit of industrial or business rigor to the way we
173 operated. He introduced lab notebooks. We had to think about things like patents,
174 you know, things that are really obvious from a manufacturing standpoint such as
175 standard operating procedures. We had a little bit more formal research meetings
176 where we talked about the science. Not that we didn't have those before, but it was a
177 little bit more formal. I guess just having him there made it a little different. The
178 place was getting bigger. One major difference was that, obviously, there's a sort of
179 organizational hierarchy, and it wasn't so necessary to get together with everybody
180 like it had been earlier. So we didn't see, say, Ted Greene, as much.

181 **JONES:** Do you recall when you moved out of La Jolla Cancer?

182 **DESMOND:** It was in probably '82?

183 **JONES:** That late? You were there that long?

184 **DESMOND:** Yeah, because before we moved, we expanded into trailers, so I would
185 say it was '81 or '82.

186 **JONES:** So during that period did you keep acquiring more lab space?

187 **DESMOND:** Yeah.

188 **JONES:** Did the process change when you started shifting the focus from making
189 research antibodies to diagnostic kits? Did it matter for cell biology at all?

190 **DESMOND:** Not substantially, I don't think.

191 **JONES:** So you were still basically involved in producing antibodies?

192 **DESMOND:** Yes.

193 **JONES:** It was more basic research than product development?

194 **DESMOND:** Well, no. I just think that the application of the product or the way it
195 was sold didn't make too much difference. I mean, it really wasn't basic research. It
196 was still churning out antibodies. There was a little bit of basic research as far as
197 antigens and potential product to see if we could get good antibodies. I think the
198 goals would be the same regardless of what the application was as far as cell biology
199 went. And even chemistry to a large extent. I mean, there were some practical
200 questions that we started thinking about such as manufacturing and a large-scale
201 manufacturing process.

202 **JONES:** During this period can you think of any episodes or any events that really
203 changed the atmosphere, changed the company? Was moving out from La Jolla
204 Cancer a big thing, or was it just the growth of the company.

205 **DESMOND:** I think it was mainly just growth. We clearly needed more space. It just
206 instantly had a more corporate feel, which the science people didn't necessarily
207 appreciate, but obviously was essential. The appearance, and the address, and sort of
208 the amenities, and so forth, are what you have to have. But I'm sure the main reason
209 was just to get more space.

210 **JONES:** Was going public a big event? Did that make a big impact?

211 **DESMOND:** On me, personally, no. I'll always remember that Tom Adams called me
212 in and said, 'Well, we're issuing stock and here are your stock options.' And I said,
213 'Oh, OK.'

214 **JONES:** Did you perceive any value in the stock that you held? Was that important?

215 **DESMOND:** No.

216 **JONES:** Did it become important later, when it was really worth something?

217 **DESMOND:** Sure. The original stock was a fifth of a cent, and it probably ended up
218 being, well, you probably have the calculations somewhere, I think they were twenty-
219 seven dollars, from a fifth of a cent. But I'll say that probably 90% of the people had
220 no previous experience with that. I always think about that now, because I do a lot of
221 advising of students that I work with in a biotechnology class at City College. I'm not
222 sure that anybody goes to work for Company X because they think it's really going to
223 pay off big in the long run. That was certainly the case then. But people like Ted
224 Greene, and people who had been in these things before had a different feel. Even if
225 we thought that it was going to be successful, we didn't really see it as some major
226 payoff.

227 **JONES:** When the company goes public and the officer salaries become public
228 knowledge, was there talk about that?

229 **DESMOND:** Probably, I suppose. I don't remember that. I do remember you could
230 just look it up. There were probably discussions about who was worth their pay, I
231 don't know.

232 **JONES:** But going public didn't disrupt the atmosphere?

233 **DESMOND:** Not at all, and I think that was another important thing, and it was a
234 real milestone. I mean, there's no question that we were really excited and proud of it
235 and everything. But again, that was just kind of a business function, and we were just
236 doing what we were doing anyway.

237 **JONES:** As time went on, you were in very early, so I assume that you were being
238 pushed toward management and administration rather than working in the lab? How
239 did that happen for you?

240 **DESMOND:** It was very gradual. It was mainly a function of just huge numbers of
241 people that we hired, so it was gradual. The entries in the notebook got sparser and
242 sparser and there was some point when I just gave up the notebook. But it was
243 gradual, and we were never really strapped for technical people. There were plenty of
244 technical people there who were really good. So both Joanne and I, and the other
245 scientists, we did spend a lot of time in the lab and we would do all of the various
246 technical things sometimes.

247 **JONES:** Were you happy with that kind of change?

248 **DESMOND:** Yes, I was.

249 **JONES:** You enjoyed doing that? Managing the lab, managing the research?

250 **DESMOND:** Yes.

251 **JONES:** Did you develop any kind of philosophy for doing that?

252 **DESMOND:** No.

253 **JONES:** Did others?

254 **DESMOND:** I don't think so. Again, we're talking about the science people. It was
255 pretty much seat of the pants. There was certainly no formal training in any kind of
256 management at all.

257 **JONES:** Was that true up until the time that Lilly bought the company?

258 **DESMOND:** Yes. I mean, we just got stuck right into the middle of Lilly management
259 training.

260 **JONES:** But until even up until the sale everything just sort of happened?

261 **DESMOND:** I will say there were people that came in that were experienced
262 managers. Russ Saunders, he's a good example. He was a scientist who had a lot of
263 management experience. We learned a lot from him, but it was all pretty much
264 learning by doing. It's kind of an interesting school of management because, first of
265 all, the whole situation was pretty much ideal. Really good employees, really
266 motivated, an exciting business, expansion. There were essentially no personnel or
267 management problems, so all that was a good way to learn. I think Joanne and I - I

268 remember when we went to Lilly later on and started getting the TQM stuff in '89, we
269 had done a pretty good job of learning. Nothing was particularly new. I will say, the
270 other thing is that management is common sense dealing with people. So if you have
271 people with common sense and a reasonable situation to deal with, and the crises
272 come very slowly so you can figure them out, it's a pretty good situation.

273 **JONES:** Do you remember any scientific milestones that were particularly significant
274 in the '82-'86 period?

275 **DESMOND:** Well, yes, I mean, the obvious one is the TANDEM concept which was
276 around for a long time. But in actually putting it into practice, and I discovered that it
277 was more complicated than just getting two antibodies that worked. There were
278 various other technical aspects which meant that you had to a lot more selection than
279 just grabbing two that worked. That included mostly chemistry, but also some cell
280 biology.

281 **JONES:** So, there was a lot back and forth between the different groups working
282 together?

283 **DESMOND:** Yes and I think we made a lot of effort to know what each other was
284 doing, even as the thing expanded. And then other assay technologies like the ICON
285 and other immobilization methods like that, again, those were mostly chemistry and
286 product development. But there some concerns for the cell biology department.

287 **JONES:** So you would select the right antibodies, the best antibodies to use for these
288 things?

289 **DESMOND:** Right, and ultimately we came up with the idea that the final test
290 configuration is really critical, and that you should do as much selection as you can as
291 early as possible to ensure that the antibodies are going to work in that configuration.
292 Again, another big thing that was starting at that time was instrumentation, and that
293 was not too much our concern in cell biology. We were always working on other
294 methods of production, like human antibodies and in vitro production, rather than
295 growing in mice. You know all about this technical stuff?

296 **JONES:** I know some.

297 **DESMOND:** There are two aspects that are done in animals, and they're still done in
298 animals. One is actual immunization to create the antibody producing cells in the

299 first place. The other is the production, which is done both ways, but still a lot of it is
300 done in mice. And even early on, there were lots of reasons to want to get both of
301 those processes under the more controllable in vitro situation, so I don't think these
302 are breakthroughs, but these are research and development refinements. And the
303 other one was to have human antibodies, using human lymphocytes.

304 **JONES:** Could you say a little bit more to describe the production processes? For the
305 immunizations in the vivarium, you had a lot of mice, right? How big was the
306 vivarium?

307 **DESMOND:** We had hundreds for the immunizations, because we probably had
308 twenty to thirty different analytes, or things that we wanted to make antibodies
309 against. And we were always trying to refine and improve the immunization process
310 to get better antibodies, so all immunizations were experiments. You'd have fifty or a
311 hundred animals. There are also biological variations among these animals, which are
312 supposedly identical, so you have to have some duplication to take care of that. That's
313 a process that takes six months, maybe, three months to a year or two, to get animals
314 producing antibodies. That's sort of one branch of the production of the cells that are
315 going to be the parents of the hybridomas.

316 **JONES:** And then you take those and...?

317 **DESMOND:** The generation of the hybridoma cell lines, and that's another thing that
318 takes, we'll just say six months of work, essentially all of it in culture. And eventually,
319 when you select cells that look like they're going to be product cells, you expand
320 those and grow a lot of them. They either grow in a whole lot of mice, or they grow in
321 various kinds of culture apparatus.

322 **JONES:** And initially it was done in mice, and you were developing new techniques.
323 Did you develop some originally at Hybritech, or were you sort of cognizant of what
324 going on elsewhere and trying those things?

325 **DESMOND:** For the production procedures?

326 **JONES:** Yes.

327 **DESMOND:** Mainly using technology that was around in other places. I mean, there
328 were lots of reports of people doing it in various ways, and there were companies that

329 were commercializing a number of processes. There were probably like five or ten
330 pretty different processes.

331 **JONES:** Which did you settle on?

332 **DESMOND:** Well, actually, we settled on kind of the simplest, the most
333 straightforward, which is what they call fermenter culture - big stirred pots of cells
334 that are used universally for production of microbial products, bacterial and fungus,
335 things like antibiotics and vitamins, and stuff like that. Those processes were adapted
336 to mammalian cell cultures and hybridomas specifically. We did some of that
337 adaptation, but typically it wasn't...there was a lot of that stuff going on, so we just
338 kept dragging that stuff in.

339 **JONES:** So you were more involved in setting up a pilot plant for those, and then
340 later when you get a product, it would be an operations task to scale it up, to get a
341 really big fermenter?

342 **DESMOND:** Right, in fact, in all the time I was in cell biology, I mean, I actually
343 started a little pilot in vitro antibody layout, and we had a little one going doing that.
344 Then, I moved out of that area - it was later -and it kind of expanded as we planned
345 with a production pilot, and then a production area. We finally went to Lilly where
346 they have huge production facilities.

347 **JONES:** Was cell biology always located up on Torrey Pines?

348 **DESMOND:** Yes.

349 **JONES:** Did you move it to the white building on Torrey Pines?

350 **DESMOND:** There's a story about the white building. One of the great things is that
351 building is right up on the edge of the sagebrush. In fact, it encroaches on Torrey
352 Pines State Reserve, where I'm a volunteer docent there. But anyway, when they built
353 the building, I remember, this is really common knowledge. It was gray, and one of
354 the things that Ted Greene wanted to do was to get that thing white as soon as
355 possible. I'll always remember the architect, who I actually later knew, saying that
356 they picked this gray, a specific gray, you know, sagebrush, to blend in with the
357 environment. All of a sudden it's given this sort of Taj Mahal white that sort of jumps
358 out at you from the freeway, which is probably two points of view on whether you
359 want the thing to blend in or stand out, but yeah, it was in the white building.

360 **JONES:** And it stayed there?

361 **DESMOND:** Yeah, in fact, it stayed there until last year.

362 **JONES:** And the vivarium was there too?

363 **DESMOND:** Yeah, I mean there was another vivarium over on Carroll Road, for
364 manufacturing and for production.

365 **JONES:** And that was a much bigger operation, a lot more animals?

366 **DESMOND:** Yeah.

367 **JONES:** So things sort of proceeded on course until the Lilly sale?

368 **DESMOND:** Yes.

369 **JONES:** Did you know anything about that beforehand? Were there any rumors
370 floating around?

371 **DESMOND:** No, the management, our level of management, was in on it ahead of
372 time, but not very much. It was a real business deal. It was kind of surprising.

373 **JONES:** This reminds me - someone told me a story about sometime in '79, there was
374 a point where the company had trouble making payroll. Do you remember that?

375 **DESMOND:** Yes, I do.

376 **JONES:** What was that like? Was it a tense period? Did you think that, well, maybe
377 this isn't working?

378 **DESMOND:** No, I don't think so. I do remember that. It was like we were just about
379 to run out of money. It was kind of dramatic, but there was no feeling like, 'Well,
380 we've got to go out and start working labs to keep the place going.' I'm sure the
381 feeling was that we were trying to get money in various places, and that we were
382 going to get it. I can't remember the exact circumstances, what we were waiting for,
383 what the timing was. Essentially, we'd run out of the first batch of money, but there
384 was no feeling of real panic or anything. I'm sure of that. I don't know if you've heard
385 differently, but it was kind of dramatic and it made us realize, I mean it's kind of a
386 funny situation, because there's this huge pot of money and you just burned it. I

387 mean somebody, maybe it was Tom Adams, or maybe after he came, but at some
388 point, we had to have a budget, and people said, 'Oh, a budget? You mean we have to
389 plan what we're going to spend?' It was a real different situation.

390 **JONES:** With the Lilly sale, what was your reaction to that, when you learned that
391 this was going to happen?

392 **DESMOND:** There were some people who thought, well, 'We were going to do it on
393 our own,' and this was kind of a disappointment. Obviously, the sort of party line
394 explanation was that in order to expand and do all this stuff, particularly the
395 therapeutics, people were going to need huge amounts of money. I will say that I
396 didn't think about that too much. I mean, it's actually obvious now, we just didn't - I
397 didn't - think that much about the business requirements. I guess I said, 'Well, hell.
398 We're making antibodies, why don't we just keep on making antibodies.' I guess it
399 always just sort of a business decision that you have to make. It's amazing how often
400 that happens. I mean, you're successful and then you have to expand. If you talk to
401 people, even in like restaurants, or something, 'I want to only keep this restaurant. I
402 do not want to expand,' but the pressure is on to expand. So, you have to just make
403 this conscious, sort of rebellious effort to just say no. I think obviously there, they
404 want the business to really boom, so I think for most people, it didn't matter. There
405 may have been a few people - I don't know what Gary David thought - but there were
406 a few people that were disappointed. For most people, including me, that wasn't the
407 case. I don't even think that we thought, well, there's more stability here, or whatnot.
408 There was some concern over how much interference there would be. It's kind of
409 interesting because, from a Lilly standpoint, the scientists, we found out afterwards,
410 were also concerned. They thought that we were going to interfere because we were
411 really monoclonal antibody experts, and they weren't. They were doing some
412 monoclonal work, and part of the idea was that we would, you know, complement
413 them, so there were monoclonal people saying, 'Well, what's going to happen to me?'
414 As far we were concerned, it had almost no effect, either. The research and stuff was
415 pretty autonomous, certainly autonomous in terms of day to day and month to
416 month. I think there were long-range strategic influences from Lilly, but....

417 **JONES:** Do you think that that was more true for cell biology than for some other
418 groups, maybe?

419 **DESMOND:** Yes, right. Cell biology, just by nature, is further back down the product
420 development line, so, you know, as you get closer to product, obviously there's more
421 influence and probably more concern.

422 **JONES:** And when Lilly came in, pretty quickly, at the top level of management, there
423 were a lot of changes. Those people went out and Lilly people came in...

424 **DESMOND:** Not very many Lilly people came in.

425 **JONES:** No? Ted Greene left, Tom Adams had gone long before that, but...

426 **DESMOND:** Well, it was kind of gradual. Well, I never thought of it that way, let's
427 put it that way.

428 **JONES:** It didn't make a big impact on day to day operations?

429 **DESMOND:** No.

430 **JONES:** And your impression of Lilly, when they came in -- A good company to work
431 for? Good people to work with?

432 **DESMOND:** Yeah, I mean, it was a good impression, but it wasn't that important,
433 just because there wasn't that much effect. I mean, we went back and certainly we
434 were really impressed with their relatively large operation in all ways, and it was all
435 real impressive. I don't think we thought too much about what the company was like
436 to work for, because we really didn't work for them, and they didn't really change
437 much. Personnel policies were not really changed substantially, or if they were, it was
438 kind of gradual. The bigger thing was the retirement and the stock sharing and stuff
439 like that. One of the things always emphasized was that as soon as you start making
440 money, we'll talk about it. I'll always remember that. It was always an employee
441 question when Lilly executives would come, 'When are we going to get the
442 retirement?' So that's one side, and the other side was that, as far as, I think,
443 employees were concerned, Hybritech's personnel policies were quite autonomous,
444 and they proceeded as they had.

445 **JONES:** Did you actually go back to Indianapolis and visit?

446 **DESMOND:** Yes.

447 **JONES:** Did a lot of people do that?

448 **DESMOND:** Not a lot, but they had management training, so probably a hundred
449 people went back for that. Lilly people would come out every now and then. And we
450 had some scientific interactions, little scientific meetings about specific applications
451 or specific product ideas or production ideas.

452 **JONES:** I haven't heard much about that. Did they ever develop monoclonal products
453 of their own?

454 **DESMOND:** You know, they had some that they were using for research, and it's a
455 little hazy, but essentially, we never produced or sold any of their antibodies. There
456 was one, a cancer antibody, that there had been some thought about doing. Mainly
457 the technical things that I'm thinking of are either manufacturing, overall
458 manufacturing process things. Specifically, the fermenter technology, and things like
459 processing, purification and probably pharmaceutical production sorts of things. That
460 was the main kind of technical thing. And then the other thing was more research
461 oriented, and that was the cancer research stuff.

462 **JONES:** Yeah, how did that project unfold? This is where you were working on
463 human antibodies, or humanizing the antibodies, right?

464 **DESMOND:** Well, the fundamental idea was just to make antibodies that were used,
465 essentially, in people, in vivo. The humanizing is one thing that's needed, or you have
466 to think about that in order to make it practical. As long as those projects went, we
467 didn't have real humanized antibodies that we were using. So, again, the main idea
468 was, we'll just say injectable antibodies.

469 **JONES:** There was a molecular biology group working on this though, right?

470 **DESMOND:** Oh, yes, right. And there were lots of ideas and lots of generations of a
471 number of the products, and that was certainly the long range plan. Anyhow, since
472 from 1979 on, the idea was you would make antibodies that would be used in therapy.

473 **JONES:** So, what kinds of problems did you face then, when you wanted to produce
474 antibodies that could be used in vivo? What kinds of things did you have to do to
475 develop antibodies that would work for that application? What characteristics did the
476 antibodies have to have?

477 **DESMOND:** Well, let's see. They just have to have the characteristics that
478 monoclonals just sort of inherently have, and the more specific they are, the better. I

479 mean, whatever the target is, you want them to really recognize that target. They're
480 supposed to be as sensitive as possible, so you can use as small an amount as possible.
481 Those were the two really critical things. Now, in addition to that, there are
482 requirements about their ability to survive and act in an in vivo environment.
483 Antibodies are just amazing things, you know. It really is an incredible mechanism,
484 but the major one is the host or patient response to them as foreign. I'm sure you
485 know all that stuff, so the other major characteristic is, as I say, that ideally, they
486 wouldn't look foreign, so you wouldn't have a reaction to them.

487 **JONES:** So how do you go about producing such antibodies? I mean, you're still using
488 mouse-based antibodies, right?

489 **DESMOND:** Right, well, one way is to make fragments. The antibody is a great big
490 molecule, and there's a much smaller part that's the actual active antigen-recognition
491 part. So, one approach is to chop off as much of the rest of it as possible, so that
492 there's less that's different. So, that's one major approach, making fragments that are
493 still functional, but aren't as...

494 **JONES:** So, this involves a lot of basic research, finding out what happens when you
495 do that, how does the antibody behave, and so on?

496 **DESMOND:** Right, and then, the other thing was this humanizing thing. One
497 approach is just to make human antibodies using human cells in culture, and the
498 other thing is to make mouse antibodies look like human antibodies by doing genetic
499 manipulations. A lot of that stuff is going on, too. I'm sure you've heard of that. So,
500 that was a big effort and a big ultimate requirement, for sure.

501 **JONES:** Were a lot of your efforts and resources directed towards that once the
502 diagnostic kits started going out the door?

503 **DESMOND:** Yeah, it was a big focus, but not the only one. It was clear that you were
504 going to have a lot of research and development that was going to have to go into
505 that, including what you just suggested, to answer these basic questions, will they
506 work as well? Will the same antibodies that work in this form work as well in the
507 required new form? So, there was a lot of effort going into making a first generation
508 product, which would use the more conventionally produced kind of antibodies, and
509 that's a lot of effort to do that.

510 **JONES:** And did you always have the resources to do what you had to do? To get the
511 people, the materials?

512 **DESMOND:** Certainly, I would say yes, for the most part. You could always come up
513 with ideas of how you could use more people, but it was very well-staffed.

514 **JONES:** Did you have the feeling that you could do things there that you couldn't do
515 in an academic environment, or not as easily?

516 **DESMOND:** No. I think the one thing was that, typically, there was more money and
517 more equipment and stuff. I think the way that the Hybritech atmosphere was that if
518 you had something that you really wanted to do, you could do it. It helped if it had
519 some kind of product orientation, but, as a matter of fact, most people in labs at
520 Scripps or UCSD have some kind of application in mind, right? So, it's not very
521 different, I think, and it's getting more and more similar.

522 **JONES:** Well, in all your time at Hybritech, did you maintain ties with academic
523 researchers? Did you know what was going on?

524 **DESMOND:** Yes, sort of. Later on, it was much less. I mean, we were much more
525 concentrating on specific products, specific product improvements, manufacturing
526 and processes and regulatory things, and stuff like that, that aren't so much a concern
527 of research areas. But I do remember, myself and a lot of other people would have
528 liked to have had more time to keep up better on what was going on. We made a lot
529 of efforts. We had journal clubs and stuff like that. There was no discouragement of
530 contacts. It was just a matter of time, and sort of focus.

531 **JONES:** Was there a policy for publishing, you know, if you had stuff that wouldn't be
532 classified as a trade secret?

533 **DESMOND:** Oh yes, I would say it was encouraged.

534 **JONES:** Even after Lilly?

535 **DESMOND:** Yeah, in fact, I will say that I was frustrated in not publishing. I mean I
536 had a lot of goals of finishing stuff and publishing it. Those were recognized goals by
537 the company that we didn't get done just because we were off doing other things.
538 That's the kind of thing where it would probably have been a little better to have a
539 little more collaboration with people outside, so you could let them do the

540 publishing. But no, that was encouraged. I think patents became more and more
541 encouraged, but publication wasn't a problem.

542 **END OF INTERVIEW**

Recommended Citation:

Desmond, Walter. Interview conducted by Mark Jones, July 30, 1997.
The San Diego Technology Archive (SDTA), UC San Diego Library, La Jolla, CA.



The San Diego Technology Archive (SDTA), an initiative of the UC San Diego Library, documents the history, formation, and evolution of the companies that formed the San Diego region's high-tech cluster, beginning in 1965. The SDTA captures the vision, strategic thinking, and recollections of key technology and business founders, entrepreneurs, academics, venture capitalists, early employees, and service providers, many of whom figured prominently in the development of San Diego's dynamic technology cluster. As these individuals articulate and comment on their contributions, innovations, and entrepreneurial trajectories, a rich living history emerges about the extraordinarily synergistic academic and commercial collaborations that distinguish the San Diego technology community.