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- A-K Check enclosed for Green For Senate Committee.**
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William J. Green

Council Supported Candidate
Democrat-Pennsylvania

William Green at age 37 has served six consecutive terms in the House of Representatives. He is now running for the seat from which Republican Minority Leader Hugh Scott is retiring.

Green was first elected to the House in 1964 to fill the seat left vacant by his father's death. He soon found himself at odds with Philadelphia's Democratic machine. In 1968 he backed Robert Kennedy while the Democratic City Committee endorsed Hubert Humphrey. In 1971, the split became final when Green filed in the mayor's race against the hard-line Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo, the hand picked candidate of the Democratic chieftains. The Congressman waged a vigorous and hard fought campaign, but lost the Democratic primary.

In retribution for running against the machine, his House district was decimated, and he was forced to run for reelection in 1972 against an eleven term machine-backed incumbent. Green carried the district with 58% of the vote. The win proved decisive, and in the next primary he was unopposed. These battles with the Philadelphia machine marked a turning point in Bill Green's career.

With impressive seniority on the Ways and Means Committee despite his young age he might have quietly bided his time and inherited the powerful chairmanship from his elders. In 1974 he challenged then Chairman Wilbur D. Mills (D-Ark) on the perennial issue of the oil depletion allowance. When he lost his fight in committee, he took it to the Democratic Caucus, the first member of the House to invoke successfully a new rule whereby a majority in the Caucus was able to force a floor vote. Mills

"Our foreign policy can't be pursued in secret with our leaders anticipating our acquiescence in the name of patriotism."

stalled the measure until too late to act upon it, but in 1975 Green once more brought the issue to the Caucus and this time despite the opposition of Speaker Carl Albert (D-Okla) and the new Ways and Means Chairman Al Ullman (D-Ore) the issue was brought to the floor.

On February 27, 1975, the House voted 248-163 to repeal the oil depletion allowance, the first time in fifty years that the powerful oil lobby had been unable to prevent a straight up-or-down vote on the House floor.

In a personal letter Common Cause Chairman John Gardner wrote "you deserve the major credit for the historic first vote on repeal of the Oil Depletion Allowance." *The Wall Street Journal* acknowledged that "this 37 year old Congressman . . . has turned into an assertive legislative leader . . . More than his votes, allies appreciate his toughness and tenacity."

On issues of immediate concern to the Council, Bill Green's record is outstanding. He was the first Pennsylvania congressman to oppose the Vietnam War. For three years, in 1971-3, he joined a minority of his colleagues in voting against the military appropriation authorization bill in protest at the inflated level of funding set by Appropriation's hard-line Sub-committee on Defense. In 1975 he voted to delete funds for binary nerve gas production, to require disclosure of CIA funding and to prohibit flight testing of maneuverable reentry vehicles. He voted against the B-1 bomber and funds in excess of President Ford's request for the F-111 fighter.

It would be a mistake to place a simple label on this record, for Bill Green is an independent

thinker. He was an outspoken opponent of the War Powers Act, despite "my consistent record in opposition to . . . unilateral Presidential action" as he noted in floor debate. "This bill . . . would put a 60 to 90 day congressional 'stamp of approval' on such questionable Presidential military actions as the 1970 Cambodia invasion. I believe that such unilateral Presidential action should not be so lightly authorized"

"If the Congress cannot define the President's constitutional war power, and it cannot; and if it is unwise to grant congressional warmaking power to the President, and it is, then what can Congress do? First, it can defeat Gulf of Tonkin resolutions. Second, it can muster the courage to cut all funding for military action taken by the President with which it disagrees. Third, it can impeach a President who usurps congressional warmaking power."

In the Democratic Senate primary Bill Green faces two minor candidates: Bucks County real estate developer Frank E. Elliott and liberal State Senator Jeannette Riebman, Chairman of the Education Committee in the state legislature. Without previous political experience Elliott will run a well-financed campaign directed against Washington and the federal bureaucracy. With little public recognition, minimal funding and no appreciable organization beyond her central Pennsylvania senate district, State Senator Riebman faces the nearly insoluble problem of generating substantial support in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, the major source of Democratic votes in the state.

The leading contender in the Republican Senate primary is U.S. Rep. John Heinz III, an heir to the soup fortune. He is opposed by former Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen

Spector and the former editor of the Philadelphia Bulletin, George Packard, a candidate of interest to the Council only if, against heavy odds, he were to win the nomination.

One unknown factor in the Republican primary is the spectre of the oil industry's corrupting role in politics in the state where the first U.S. discovery of oil occurred in 1859. In recent months the state and national press have carried story after story of payments to Senator Hugh Scott by Claude Wild, Jr., the recently indicted former lobbyist of Gulf Oil. In regular installments, of \$5000 in the spring, and \$5000 in the fall, Senator Scott was so favored for many years. Less well known outside Pennsylvania is that Rep. Heinz received a contribution of \$6000 from Gulf during his House race in 1972. Heinz's opponents in the primary are making the Gulf contribution a major issue.

What effect the oil contributions will have on Pennsylvania's primary and general election results is uncertain. We are reminded, however, of Bill Green's remarks during the House debate on repeal of the oil depletion allowance:

"What we are talking about is not just energy but power, the power of the oil lobby. The basic issue that this House will decide today is where the power in this country belongs and whether it belongs to the people who work and the people who pay their taxes, or whether it belongs to the special few."

Bill Green has made this major issue in his campaign.

"A United States Senator is a powerful person. And the basic issue in this election is whether that power works for you or for the special interests."



Council for a Livable World

March 23, 1976

Dear Council Supporter,

U. S. Representative William Green (D-Pa) is running for the seat to be vacated by the Senate's minority leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa). You may recognize from recent news reports that Senator Scott has been the annual recipient for many years of \$10,000 from the Gulf Oil Corporation. This relationship raises serious questions about his ability to act as an independent legislator in matters relating to corporate taxation and the energy problem. Now Senator Scott has given his public endorsement to U.S. Representative John Heinz, III, also the recipient of Gulf money in the form of a \$6,000 campaign contribution in 1972. Heinz is considered the leading contender for the Republican nomination.

By contrast, Bill Green shepherded to passage the amendment which finally repealed the oil depletion allowance.

Detailed information on Bill Green and the Pennsylvania Senate race is contained in the enclosed profile which we urge you to read and to retain for future reference.

In this time of widespread corporate and political corruption we cannot over-emphasize the importance of finding people of integrity to run for the Senate and of supporting their campaigns generously. Our concern, of course, is that Senators not be inhibited by campaign obligations which conflict with the exercise of their best judgments on behalf of their constituents and the country.

This is doubly true, as we warned in our letter of 18 November 1975, because of the alarming proliferation of corporate political action committees. Recently Common Cause collected the data on special interest fundraising from the files of the Federal Election Commission. They discovered that 242 new political action committees registered for the first time last year. Of these committees 176 represent corporate and other business interests -- Lockheed Aircraft, Standard Oil, Pan American Airways, Litton Industries, to name but four.

(over)

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Most of these new committees are only now beginning to raise funds in earnest, but along with previously existing committees, whose fundraising for 1976 has long since been underway, all special interest committees together have raised \$16.4 million in 1975. This sum marks a sharp increase of 40% over the comparable period only two years ago. Since the presidential primaries under the new campaign law are partly financed by public funding and the general election for the presidency completely so, the bulk of the monies amassed by special interests will be devoted to the 1976 congressional campaigns.

In our view these figures go a long way toward explaining government corruption, the favoritism practiced by federal regulatory agencies, the criminality of corporations and the failure of the federal government to prosecute corporate crime.

Council supporters may well wonder if there is any role left for them to play in the jungle of federal campaign financing, but it has been our experience in every election that by concentrating limited resources in the right places and at the right time the Council can indeed play a decisive role in the election of outstanding Senators.

Despite the onslaught of campaign funds from corporate-military interests the Council has been able, since it first supported George McGovern in 1962, to help elect thirty Senators committed to ending the nuclear arms race.

The appearance of such fine Senate candidates as Paul Sarbanes in Maryland and now Bill Green in Pennsylvania is reason for hope and for our heightened support.

Bill Green is expected to face a difficult contest in the general election. He has only recently announced his candidacy, and early support will be crucial for the success of his campaign. Please make your contribution today as follows: A - K Green for Senate Committee, L - Z Council for a Livable World.

Sincerely,

William Doering

William Doering
President

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036, Phone: 265-3800, ac 202, Cable: DELPHINI WASHINGTON, D.C.

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April 20, 1964

Memorandum to all Directors

Re: Genevieve Blatt

Senator Joe Clark called me today and requested that the Council give some money to Mrs. Blatt for her primary fight against Judge Musmanno. Musmanno is a rather wild right wing Democrat who has let loose a blast at Fulbright concerning his latest "myth" speech. Senator Clark seems to feel that Mrs. Blatt has a good chance to win in the primary if she can get some money for last minute television and poll watchers. Apparently they have run out of money.

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The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, week ending 17 April, has this to say on the Pennsylvania primary outlook:

"The impressive list of Democrats backing Musmanno includes former Gov. David Lawrence, former Philadelphia Mayor Richardson Dilworth and Pittsburgh Mayor Joseph M. Barr. Barr April 7 accused Clark of using tactics similar to those of the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy after Clark, in an apparent effort to arouse Musmanno to public campaigning and make him display his windy speaking skills to public view, brought up questions about Musmanno's place of birth and the name he used in World War I. The Clark charges aroused the Pennsylvania ethnic press to warm defense of Musmanno but served its purpose in prompting Musmanno to an angry retort.

"Pennsylvania observers say that Musmanno's overwhelming organizational support makes him a strong favorite to win the primary but that the Democratic squabble - plus Musmanno's reported deficiencies as a campaigner - may assure Scott's reelection."

This will be the first item on the agenda for Friday night's conference inasmuch as if we are to help Mrs. Blatt, it must be done quickly.

H. Ashton Crosby
Executive Director

HAC:bmo'r

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



WASHINGTON BULLETIN

March-April 1964

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036

BOARD OF DIRECTORS: *Co-Chairmen*, WILLIAM DOERING, LEO SZILARD; *Officers*: BERNARD T. FELD, *President*; ALLAN FORBES, JR., *Vice-President*; DANIEL M. SINGER, *Secretary-Treasurer*;
DIRECTORS: RUTH ADAMS, MAURICE S. FOX, JEROME FRANK, MARGARET BRENNAN GIBSON, MATTHEW MESELSON, JAMES G. PATTON, ARTHUR PENN, CHARLES PRATT, JR.

The following article and the two enclosed are forwarded for your information as part of the Council's program of reproducing or preparing papers of significance in the field of arms control.

The Council has been working on the Multilateral Force (MLF) and Viet Nam problems. A Council study on the MLF will be issued shortly, a draft version of which has been circulated within the Senate, State and Defense Departments.

The next newsletter will contain Council recommendations on candidates for election and/or re-election to the Senate and House.

The Council and Dr. Szilard have been under attack from a correspondent named Holmes Alexander who writes for the McNaught Syndicate. An article appearing in various newspapers 10 March was hostile in tone and content. It was initially feared that such an attack might cause our candidates some embarrassment but from all indications the response has been minimal. Mr. Alexander has written a series of 12 essays on the Federalist papers which were carried by American Opinion in 1958-59. American Opinion is published by Robert Welch, Inc., Belmont, Massachusetts.

THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

An analysis prepared for the National Research Council on Peace Strategy

January 1964

When, on September 26th, 1961, the late President Kennedy signed Public Law 87-297 creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the event was greeted with high enthusiasm in the university community, cautious skepticism in Congress, and outright hostility among some conservatives. In the three years of the Agency's history the skepticism and hostility have all but disappeared by reason of the proven worth of the Agency, although too little is at present known by the public about its work to engender the support merited by its accomplishments.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AGENCY

Some of the problems of organization which were confronted in the beginning period of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are still with us. They resulted from the fact that, prior to 1960, little had been done to establish a permanent corps of disarmament experts within the American Government. In

the fifteen years between 1945 and 1960, with the exception of the three-year period of Governor Stassen's service as disarmament officer, there was no organized group of trained men to work continuously on one of the most complicated and difficult of all political questions.

After Governor Stassen's appointment in 1955, a centralized organization came into being for the first time, although by 1957 its entire staff of professionals and clerical workers was only 54 in size. A great deal was accomplished with this staff, and there was a quality of thinking and planning behind the negotiating team which rendered Governor Stassen's work effective in the disarmament negotiations themselves.

Following Governor Stassen's resignation in 1958, the machinery for disarmament negotiation was transferred from the White House, where there was direct access to the President, to the State Department, where it became lost in the State Department apparatus. By Fiscal Year 1960 there were only twenty persons on the disarmament staff of the Department.

In December 1959, the Democratic Advisory Council through its Advisory Committee on Science and Technology published a document "A National Peace Agency, December 1959" which suggested many of the ideas which were incorporated into the ACDA legislation. Among those active in the preliminary stages of the idea were Harold Urey, Polykarp Kusch, Harrison Brown, Charles Lauritsen, the late Trevor Gardner, Ralph Lapp, and the chairman of the Science and Technology Committee, Ernest Pollard.

Senator Humphrey cooperated with the staff of the Advisory Committee, as did the then Senator Kennedy; both men introduced bills in 1960, Senator Humphrey for a National Peace Agency, and Senator Kennedy for an Arms Control Institute. In response to these and other pressures and suggestions the Eisenhower Administration in September 1960 organized the U.S. Disarmament Administration within the State Department.

When the Kennedy Administration took office, efforts to create a new agency for disarmament were intensified and new bills were introduced in the Senate and the House. Many of the supporters of these early efforts wished to have an agency for war and peace similar to the National Institutes of Health, with a heavy emphasis on research. However, it became apparent that such an agency would be out of the main stream of decision-making. John McCloy, after a considerable amount of study of the matter, took the same position. The bill that was finally written and passed provided both for research and for the day-to-day work of backing up negotiations.

In 1960, as plans developed, the Administration and the Secretary of State favored an independent Agency; the career men in the State Department were opposed. The argument was that ACDA would be too visionary in its approach to foreign policy problems, and that since disarmament was part of international affairs, it was the proper province of the Secretary of State. On September 8th, 1961, the Senate passed a bill by a vote of 73-14 placing the Agency within the State Department. Three weeks later the House, by a vote of 290-54 voted for an independent Agency which would work with the Secretary

of State. A compromise was reached whereby the Director of ACDA serves as the "principal adviser to the Secretary of State and the President on arms control and disarmament matters." The Act states further that "the director shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters." Section 31 of the Act states that the Director shall conduct research "under the direction of the President" without mentioning the Secretary of State.

The character of the debates on the question of where to put the Agency in the Governmental structure showed that many Senators and several Congressmen feared that the Agency might become a force for liberal policies. This reluctance to create a strong agency was reflected again in the controversy over whether the Agency should have the authority to construct its own laboratory facilities.

The Administration bill concurred with the earlier bills and gave the Director the authority to construct laboratory facilities if he thought it necessary. The Atomic Energy Commission protested on the grounds that the Agency would thus duplicate work already being done elsewhere; although the issue was in reality a question of how powerful the Agency would become. Both the House and the Senate committees eliminated the authority for laboratories from the bill.

Another amendment to the original proposal was the elimination in the House of the Agency's Office of Public Affairs. Fear was expressed during debate that the Agency would set up a propaganda office, and the measure was whittled down to the appointment of a Public Affairs Advisor. This has not only hampered the Agency's efforts to disseminate information about arms control and disarmament affairs, but has made it impossible for ACDA to gain the visibility which its importance demands.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE AGENCY

Under Section 2 of P. L. 87-297 (The Arms Control and Disarmament Act) the Agency has four primary functions:

- (a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formation;
- (b) The preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field;
- (c) The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament; and
- (d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.

Four separate bureaus have been established:

1. Bureau of International Relations: The bureau, headed by Jacob Beam is divided into two offices: a) The Office of Political Affairs which is responsible for the day to day conduct of international negotiations on disarmament and testing; b) The Office of Political Research and Analysis which assesses the international implications of arms control and disarmament proposals and examines long range international trends and developments.
2. Economics Bureau: The bureau, headed by Archibald S. Alexander, investigates not only the economics of disarmament but also its social consequences. With the appointment of Alexander the bureau has assumed responsibility for the major portion of the social science research of the Agency as a whole.
3. Science and Technology Bureau: The bureau, headed by Dr. Herbert Scoville, is responsible for research on the scientific and technical aspects of disarmament and arms control.
4. Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau: Advises on military weapons systems as they relate to arms control and disarmament. Dr. George E. Pugh is acting head of this bureau.

In addition to the bureaus, ACDA is composed of the Disarmament Advisory Staff which recommends policy, the General Advisory Committee of 15 private citizens appointed by the President, a Reference Research Staff which performs library functions, and an Executive Staff and Secretariat which performs administrative functions.

ACTIVITIES

The Agency, as the primary agency of government responsible for disarmament and arms control negotiations, in cooperation with other agencies, was responsible for three negotiations instruments of great significance: An Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World; A Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in all Environments; and A Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Underwater. The Agency has also been responsible for the formation of the agreement concerning direct communications between the United States and Russia - and the limited test-ban treaty.

In addition to drafting these documents, ACDA was deeply involved in the disarmament and test-ban negotiations at Geneva in 1962-63 and was the primary advocate of our test-ban position on behalf of the Administration, during the Congressional debates of last year.

From the Beginning ACDA has been heavily oriented towards research.

For the first year of the Agency's operation Congress appropriated \$1,831,000 of which \$725,000, or one-third, was budgeted by the Agency for research. In Fiscal Year 1963 the Agency allocated \$4,000,000, almost two-thirds of its total budget of \$6,500,000, for research. The Agency plans once again to increase the percentage of its total budget for research. For Fiscal Year 1964, the Agency's appropriation is \$7.5 million, approximately two-thirds of which again the Agency plans to allocate to research. Since the inception of ACDA in September 1961, it has let twenty-eight contracts and awarded nine grants in addition to the Agency's own staff studies. The total amount spent or committed to research to date is thus over \$4,725,000.

The Agency's research program is divided into two categories: "Concept studies" which deal with the implications of arms control and disarmament studies and "supporting studies", which are concerned with specific technical aspects of arms control and disarmament. As ACDA became better acquainted with the subject matter it began to shift its research emphasis from support to concept studies. In Fiscal Year 1962, for example, two-thirds of the research contracts entered into by the Agency concerned inspection and verification. In Fiscal Year 1962, for example, only 2/5 of the research contracts let out by the Agency concerned inspection and verification.

The grant program began to function in June of 1962; of the nine grants awarded by the Agency only one is for a study of inspection and verification. The Agency staff has also performed research on the broader implications of arms control and disarmament. It should be noted, however, that the total amount of money spent in support studies is greater than on concept studies; according to an ACDA spokesman, technical studies are by their nature more expensive than the others.

For Fiscal Year 1964, ACDA plans to give more emphasis to social and behavioral science research. As part of the increasing awareness of the importance of such research, the Agency is forming a Social Science Advisory Board which will consist of experts in the various disciplines who will advise ACDA on research and other matters in the field of social sciences.

In addition to conducting such research, ACDA has published a total of 19 documents and has sent representatives to various conferences, forums, study groups, etc., at the rate of approximately one a day.

FUNCTION

Section 32 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act States:

"The Director is authorized and directed to prepare for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of such other Government agencies as the President may determine, recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy...."

It is therefore clear that the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has, under the general direction of the President and the Secretary of State, primary government responsibility for the formulation of arms control and disarmament proposals and his Agency is the governmental fountain-head for all such proposals.

This is the way the Agency works:

When the staff prepares a proposal which the Director feels should be seriously considered, he circulates it to the members of the Committee of Principals. This Committee, established in 1960 to advise the President on disarmament, is composed of the Secretary of State as chairman, the Director of ACDA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directors of CIA, AEC, USIA, NASA, the President's Advisor on National Security Affairs, and the President's Scientific Advisor. After the Agency's draft proposals are circulated, written comments are sent to it. ACDA then reviews the comments and circulates a revised draft to the Committee of Deputies. This committee consists of the deputies to the members of the Committee of Principals. After the issues are further clarified by the Committee of Deputies a formal meeting is held by the Committee of Principals, each member of which is by this time thoroughly briefed on the proposals. There is no voting in the meeting of the Principals, but each member makes his views known so that the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency can make his recommendation to the President with a clear indication as to where consensus exists and where it does not. The recommendation initiated by ACDA is then taken to the President by the Director of the Agency. The United States draft of a test-ban treaty, for example, was formulated in this way.

POTENTIAL

The Agency, even with its structural and political limitations, has the potential for steadily increasing its capacity for negotiations and as a primary governmental source for disarmament studies and proposals. At present there are a total of about 220 persons employed by the ACDA. Excluding secretarial and clerical personnel there are 113 persons, 13 of whom are in military service, 36 are foreign service officers and 64 have previous governmental experience or have been recruited from private life. It is expected that ACDA will continue to broaden the scope of its research. Such areas as the psychological barriers to disarmament will be explored and there will be, for example, an increase in its efforts in regard to the economics of disarmament. These two areas, among others, have not been sufficiently explored.

As the Agency becomes more established there is no doubt that its effectiveness and activities will increase.

POSSIBLE ACTION IN THE FUTURE

1. During World War II the State Department set up committees in various universities to work on post war problems. These campus-based groups of

scholars were all given the same assignment at the same time. Each group sent its report to a coordination center at Harvard University which sent a report based on these studies to the State Department. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency could explore the possibility of establishing a similar arrangement in order to receive diverse and valuable opinions on problems of disarmament which would not otherwise be available to it.

2. Authority is given to the Agency in Section 42(f) of P.L. 87-297 to "establish advisory boards to advise with and make recommendations to the Director on United States arms control and disarmament policy and activities." Under this section ACDA could establish such advisory boards throughout the country consisting of representatives of all segments of the community, including labor and industry.

3. The Agency could also play an increasingly important role in the "dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament." The dissemination of information on this issue is one of the most important functions that it could perform. ACDA is attempting to meet this obligation, but much more could be accomplished in this area. For example, the Agency could issue a monthly bulletin or newsletter indicating the latest developments in the disarmament field and could increase the number and scope of its publications. In addition, ACDA could hold periodic briefings and seminars with representatives of the mass media, labor, business, and others; it could hold regional meetings on defense and disarmament such as the one held last year in New York City sponsored by Congressman William Fitts Ryan. Other meetings could be encouraged within the academic community, where there are many scholars interested in the work of the Agency but insufficiently informed as to its activities and needs. Such meetings both in the universities and the community at large would be particularly important in areas of the country in which lack of knowledge on disarmament matters is greatest.

Finally, citizens' organizations, should be given the opportunity to learn more about the work of the Agency and to include the issues on disarmament and arms control among their central items for discussion and community action. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is the focal point in the Administration for creating and advocating proposals designed to prevent war and to encourage the development of a peaceful world order. In carrying out its work, it needs and deserves the highest degree of public understanding. The present report has been prepared in the hope that the information contained in it may help to increase that understanding.

The above article, a condensed version of which appears here, was prepared by the National Research Council on Peace Strategy and has been reproduced in abbreviated form with their kind consent.

The Council adds the following Council comments to the last paragraph:

a) To improve the functioning of the Agency in terms of personnel stability and policy consistency and development, career state and military personnel should not be placed in charge of bureaus. The Council would recommend retired persons, university and/or business persons as a better choice in this respect.

b) The Agency should be permitted more flexibility in contracting - i.e., individual consultants should be allowed to be paid out of non-obligated contractual funds when required.

c) The Agency should have a formalized liaison relationship with its United Kingdom counterpart as does the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. This liaison should be carried out, on a quarterly basis, at the Bureau Chief plus two or three deputy levels, and should be extended to other Allied groups as well.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



WASHINGTON BULLETIN

November 1966

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036

Founded by Leo Szilard in 1962. OFFICERS: BERNARD T. FELD, President; ALLAN FORBES, JR., Vice-President. BOARD OF DIRECTORS: WILLIAM DOERING, Chairman; RUTH ADAMS; BERNARD T. FELD; ALLAN FORBES, JR.; MAURICE S. FOX; JEROME FRANK; MATTHEW MESELSON; JAMES G. PATTON; CHARLES PRATT, JR.; CHARLES C. PRICE

1966 ELECTION RESULTS

In the 1966 elections, the Council for a Livable World supported 24 candidates. Council supporters transmitted contributions on a priority basis to six Senatorial candidates: Clifford Case, New Jersey; Mark Hatfield, Oregon; Ralph Harding, Idaho; Lee Metcalf, Montana; Roy Romer, Colorado; and Teno Roncalio, Wyoming. Of these, three were successful: Case, Hatfield, and Metcalf.

The Council assisted from unallocated political funds, in addition to Hatfield, Harding, Metcalf, and Romer, the Senatorial races of E. L. Bartlett, Alaska; Edward Brooke, Massachusetts; Walter Mondale, Minnesota; and John Sparkman, Alabama. All of these latter candidates won their races.

The Council also contributed from unallocated political funds to the Senatorial primary campaigns of Thomas Adams, Massachusetts; Armistead Boothe, Virginia; Robert Ellsworth, Kansas; and Howard Morgan, Oregon. All of these candidates lost their primary contests.

The following candidates for the House of Representatives were assisted from Council political funds provided by Supporters in the Spring and Fall: George Brown, California; Edward Cadenhead, Oklahoma; Jeffrey Cohelan, California; John Dow, New York; Donald Fraser, Minnesota; Henry Helstoski, New Jersey; George Leppert, California; Charles Porter, Oregon; Weston Vivian, Michigan; and Theodore Weiss, New York. The following five of these candidates were successful: Brown, Cohelan, Dow, Fraser, and Helstoski.

In sum, 12 of these 24 candidates supported through the Council won their races. Of these 12, 3 were candidates for whom direct support was urged.

By election day, Supporters of the Council had contributed in 1965-66 a total of \$93,895 directly to candidates with priority given to Metcalf, Hatfield, Romer, Roncalio, Harding, and Case in that order. In addition, from the unallocated political funds provided by Supporters, the Council gave a total of \$37,500 to Senatorial races in amounts ranging from \$1,000 to \$5,000. Of this sum, \$28,000 went to the Senate races of Bartlett, Brooke, Harding, Hatfield, Metcalf, Mondale, Romer, and Sparkman. In Senate primary races, \$9,500 went to Adams, Boothe, Ellsworth, and Morgan. All of the House candidates were supported from unallocated funds totaling \$6,500.

THE 1966 ELECTION RESULTS

OF RACES IN WHICH A CANDIDATE WAS RECOMMENDED BY THE COUNCIL
(All figures based on unofficial published reports)

<u>Candidates - Senate</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Popular Vote</u>	<u>Percent</u>
* Sen. Clifford Case + Warren Wilentz	New Jersey	1,258,672 783,192	61.6 38.4
* Ralph Harding Sen. Len B. Jordan +	Idaho	112,175 140,046	44.5 55.5
* Gov. Mark Hatfield Rep. Robert Duncan	Oregon	341,553 317,588	51.8 48.2
* Sen. Lee Metcalf + Gov. Tim Babcock	Montana	109,151 95,351	53.4 46.6
* Roy Romer Sen. Gordon Allott +	Colorado	263,821 366,034	41.9 58.1
* Rep. Teno Roncalio Gov. Clifford Hansen	Wyoming	50,734 56,011	47.5 52.2
* Sen. E.L. Bartlett + Lee L. McKinley	Alaska	37,580 11,932	75.9 24.1
* Edward Brooke Endicott Peabody	Massachusetts	999,210 647,474	60.7 39.3
* Sen. Walter Mondale + Robert A. Forsythe	Minnesota	605,581 512,470	54.2 45.8
* Sen. John Sparkman + John Grenier	Alabama	426,273 264,348	61.7 38.3
<u>Primaries</u>			
* Thomas B. Adams John F. Collins Endicott Peabody	Massachusetts	51,483 265,213 321,035	8.1 41.6 50.3
* Armistead Boothe Sen. H. F. Byrd, Jr.+	Virginia	212,885 221,213	49.0 51.0
* Robert Ellsworth Sen. James Pearson + (2 others)	Kansas	66,401 88,283 15,609	39.0 51.8 9.2
<u>Council-Supported House Candidates</u>			
Rep. Jeffrey Cohelan +	California, 7th C.D.	82,846	64.4
George Leppert	California, 10th C.D.	69,679	30.9
Rep. George Brown +	California, 29th C.D.	53,923	52.1
Rep. Weston Vivian +	Michigan, 2nd C.D.	62,327	48.9
Rep. Donald M. Fraser +	Minnesota, 5th C.D.	84,279	60.0
Rep. Henry Helstoski +	New Jersey, 9th C.D.	73,967	50.8
Rep. John Dow +	New York, 27th C.D.	32,420	57.0
P-Theodore Weiss	New York, 19th C.D.	16,151	48.6
Charles Porter	Oregon, 4th C.D.	46,550	36.7
Edward Cadenhead	Oklahoma, 1st C.D.	45,441	30.2

* Council supported + incumbent P- primary only

Of the three Congressional elections in which the Council and its Supporters have participated, these of 1966 have been the most crucial and the most sharply-contested. Few important foreign policy issues figured in the 1962 campaign, and those which were brought up were not clearly defined. The far right was ill-organized and looking ahead to 1964. In 1964, however, the Council's successes of 1962 made it and the candidates it supported prime targets of extremist attack. In the tidal wave of anti-Goldwater sentiment which swept the country, almost all Council-backed candidates were carried into office.

This year political observers were in general agreement that the elections, as is usual in mid-term years, would result in corrective action to 1964. This is exactly what has happened. While the Council's won-lost record may not at first glance appear as impressive as in 1964, under closer analysis the results are gratifying and encouraging.

The two most vital races from the Council's point of view were those of Governor Hatfield in Oregon and Senator Metcalf in Montana. Both these men were victorious. A third Senate race in which Vietnam played a central role was that between Attorney-General Brooke and former Governor Peabody in Massachusetts. From its unallocated reserve fund for Senatorial candidates, the Council made a direct contribution to Brooke. Although the national press tended to overlook the significance of the Vietnam issue in this race, it was probably the most clear-cut confrontation on Vietnam of any Senate race in the country. Peabody was an all-out supporter of President Johnson's conduct of the war and indicated he would go along with any action the President might take in the future. Brooke called for a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam as an important step to negotiation, opposed the use of napalm, and advocated including the NLF in a peace conference. Brooke held to these positions throughout the campaign; if anything, he intensified them in the closing days. His resounding victory was one of the most significant of the 1966 elections.


The liberal wing of the opposing party in the Senate, until now relatively small and ineffective, has been enormously strengthened by the election of Brooke, Hatfield, and Charles Percy in Illinois. This development will undoubtedly have a restraining effect on United States foreign policy even though these men are freshman Senators.

From the accompanying tabulation of election results, Council Supporters will note that for the first time the Council has participated in a number of primary races. Leo Szilard's original formulation of the Council's operations called for extensive involvement in primary campaigns as a means of identifying promising new political figures and assisting them to enter politics at the national level. The Council is not yet ready to undertake this sort of program on a

large scale, but this year it has given substantial aid to four primary candidates for the Senate, and one for the House. The Council was enabled to take this new step because of increases in both the number of its Supporters and the funds made available to it. The basic criterion for giving contributions in primaries was the candidate's position on Vietnam. The Directors considered it a matter of the greatest urgency that the conduct of the war figure prominently in as many Senate races as possible. In two of the four Senate primary races, Vietnam was the central issue because of the presence of Council-backed candidates.

The Council's consistent record of success in three election campaigns since its formation in 1962 can be accounted for by two factors. First, because Supporters almost invariably follow Council recommendations in making their contributions, it is possible to direct funds to candidates in accordance with their respective needs. Second, by channeling the great bulk of contributions into the most important campaigns only, the Council can provide assistance in amounts large enough to have a significant, often decisive, effect on the outcome of these races.

In the Congressional elections of 1962, 1964, and 1966 Council Supporters have provided substantial campaign assistance to 22 candidates who have won election to the United States Senate and who will take their seats next January in the 90th Congress. There is no other independent, non-partisan, political organization in the nation which can point to a record even remotely comparable to that achieved by the Council through the loyalty and perseverance of its Supporters.



Allan Forbes, Jr.
Vice President



Congressional Record

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Senate

HOW TO SAVE LIVES AND POLITICAL FACE IN VIETNAM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, it now appears that the United States is faced with the distinct possibility of a major land war in Asia. Seventy-five thousand U.S. troops are already there, and it is reported that this number may reach 200,000 by the end of the year and perhaps many more than that by next spring. That would be a force on the scale of the Korean war with the added dimension of a much more elusive enemy. We do not know whether or not such a major American campaign would draw in the main body of the North Vietnam Army—a well-equipped, disciplined force of 350,000 men. If that army were to become involved in the war in the south, a much larger commitment of American forces—perhaps a million men—would be required if our side were to prevail. Also unpredictable is the reaction of China and Russia. Neither do we know what kind of political system would emerge even if we were somehow able to wear down the guerrillas and their allies.

We are talking here, however, of a major war involving thousands of American casualties, the expenditure of billions of dollars, vast bloodshed and destruction for the Vietnamese people, and an uncertain outcome. There are other possible side results of such a war that may be even more serious in the long run than the war itself, including:

First. The worsening of relations between the world's two major nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Second. The strengthening of the most belligerent leadership elements in the Communist world and the weakening of the moderate forces.

Third. The growing conviction in Asia whether justified or not that the United States is a militaristic power with a low regard for the lives of Asiatics and an excessive concern over other people's ideologies and political struggles.

Fourth. The derailment of efforts toward world peace and the improvement of life in the developing countries, to say nothing of its impact on our own hopes for a better society.

The proponents of a large U.S. military effort in Vietnam base their case on the domino theory and their fear of the paper tiger charge. This theory, first propounded by the late John Foster Dulles more than a decade ago, has been the guiding light of the foreign policy establishment ever since.

According to the domino theory, if South Vietnam goes Communist, this will topple Thailand or Cambodia which will then topple Burma, Malaysia, and so on through the list of Asiatic powers including the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.

It is not always made clear whether the dominoes are expected to fall because of Chinese aggression or because each country in turn infects its neighbor with the virus of communism. Be that as it may, as the theory goes the United States must stand firm in South Vietnam to prevent the dominoes from falling no matter what the cost.

The related paper tiger theory holds that unless the United States stands firm, we will lose face in the eyes of Asiatics and American power in the Pacific will collapse.

This was the rationale that led Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower to take up the French mantle after France was expelled from French Indochina by Ho Chi Minh in 1954 and other U.S. aid to President Diem to build an anti-Communist barrier in South Vietnam.

Despite the fact that numerous governments have come and gone in Saigon since the fall of Diem in 1963, we have been holding on to that bastion at a steadily mounting cost ever since until we now stand on the brink of a major land war in Asia.

The questions now before us are:

First. Do we continue to accelerate the struggle toward a major war?

Second. Do we call it off and withdraw our forces? or,

Third. Do we consolidate our present position, keep our casualties at a minimum and hold out indefinitely for a negotiated settlement?

A POLICY OF MODERATION—HOLDING THE LINE

I strongly recommend the third course. I urge that we stop the bombing attacks in both North and South Vietnam. Bombing is largely ineffective in a guerrilla war and more often than not kills the wrong people. We should also stop the jungle land skirmishes which subject our soldiers to ambush. Instead, let us consolidate our troops in a holding action in the cities and well-defended enclaves along the coast. We can hold the cities and the coastal enclaves with few casualties and with little likelihood that the Vietcong will attack frontally. Such a plan would provide a haven for anti-Communist progovernment citizens including the religious groups. It would demonstrate that we are not going to be pushed out, thus giving consolation to those who hold the domino theory and fear the paper tiger label. We would by this policy respect our commitment to the various governments in Saigon that have held power since 1954. It is the best strategy for saving both lives and political face—the two most sensitive factors to be considered now.

Furthermore, it is based on the realities of the present political and military map of Vietnam. While we are in control of the cities and the coast, the guerrillas control most of the rural and village areas. To dislodge them would be to destroy in the process thousands of the innocent civilians we are trying to save.

A recent news report described the despair of American officers who arrived in the village of Bagia which our forces recaptured from the Vietcong after 3 days of U.S. bombing, machinegun, and rocket attacks. What the officers found were weeping women holding their dead children or nursing their wounds and burns. The village church and the school had been destroyed; the people who had been considered progovernment were filled with bitterness toward their rescuers. Meanwhile, the handful of Vietcong guerrillas in the village, who were responsible for our attack in the first place, had melted into the jungle and were never found. Surveying the human tragedy in this village an American officer said:

This is why we're going to lose this stupid damn war. It's senseless, just senseless.

A policy of restricting our military efforts in Vietnam to a holding action in

the cities and the coastal enclaves will avoid this kind of self-defeating jungle warfare, which we are ill-equipped to fight, but which the other side is best equipped to fight. We can supply, feed and defend the urban and coastal areas with a modest effort and minimum loss of life. This is a strategy that calls primarily for restraint and patience until such time as the Vietcong get it through their heads that we will not be pushed out. I have been critical of our unilateral involvement in Vietnam. I think the original commitment and its acceleration was a mistake. But we made the commitment, and I would be prepared to support the kind of holding action outlined above for as many years as is necessary to reach an acceptable settlement of the struggle.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I am glad to yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Is this distinguished Senator from South Dakota familiar with the original commitment, with exactly what was promised and not promised, by President Eisenhower in his letter of October 23, 1954?

Mr. McGOVERN. My understanding is that in President Eisenhower's letter he stated, in effect, that the United States was prepared to give to the Diem government in Saigon aid consisting of military advice and presumably some economic and technical assistance, but that the commitment was conditioned on the carrying out of reforms on the part of the government in Saigon.

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator is quite correct. It was conditioned upon reforms. Those reforms never took place. Instead of reforms, brutal tyranny resulted—the imprisonment of many persons without trial, the execution of others, and widespread suppression—which alienated the possible support which a friendly, progressive, enlightened government, carrying out the reforms which President Eisenhower had in mind, would have secured.

It might be helpful if the Senator would include in his remarks the text of that letter. I shall be glad to furnish him a copy of it. It shows that the offer was tentative in nature. In it President Eisenhower stated that he would send our Ambassador to explore with President Diem, who was then President of the Council of Ministers, how aid could be rendered to make the Government viable so as to resist aggression. There was no firm commitment whatsoever to send our troops there.

This historic fact is important to bear in mind, because this administration has escalated the commitment. I do not share the view of President Johnson that our honor is at stake. "Honor" is a highly emotional word. It is a challenge to all Americans who naturally do not want our national honor violated. There is nothing in the history of the original commitment, which is what President Johnson referred to when he said that three Presidents have promised this aid, to indicate that the commitment was other than a tentative offer of exploration of aid, depending, as the Senator from South Dakota has said, on "standards of performance" by the South Vietnam Government and on reforms. Those reforms have not taken place. Therefore, it would have been perfectly

reasonable, when the Diem regime failed to carry out any of those reforms, and when, in addition, it was overthrown—I will not say overthrown with our assistance, but we were not unwilling to see the Diem government overthrown—and since that time, has been followed by one administration after another, none of which had popular support, to assume that whatever commitments had been made could have been considered voided. It is a source of regret to me that that has not been done. It is one of the weaknesses in the administration's positions, and its reiterated assertions about our solemn commitments are not borne out by the facts.

Mr. McGOVERN. I agree with the Senator from Alaska that the nature of our commitment today is drastically different from what it was 10 or 11 years ago, or even 1 or 2 years ago. But having made those commitments as recently as a few weeks ago, it is difficult at this point to see how we can easily back away from them.

What I propose today is that we try to respect those commitments with a minimum loss of life and with limitations designed not only to hold the casualties of our troops at a minimum, but to hold the losses among the people of Vietnam to a minimum.

In a few moments I shall elaborate on the point that we ought not to contend that the fate of the world hangs on the outcome of events in Vietnam.

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator is correct. I take it that he has read Walter Lippmann's column in this morning's Washington Post?

Mr. McGOVERN. I have and I greatly appreciated the point of view which he expressed so well.

Mr. GRUENING. In effect, Mr. Lippmann expresses what I have been saying on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere for the last year and a half. He disputes the basic assumption on which our present policy is predicated; in other words, he asserts that our security is not in jeopardy by what happens in Vietnam; that we are, in effect, going it all alone; that nothing that happens in Vietnam imperils the safety of the United States; that the freedom we are allegedly protecting fails to exist.

I would add that it seems to me we could comply with such commitments as we made, assuming we made them, without a military force. If a peacekeeping arrangement could be made in Vietnam, the killing on both sides could be stopped. Then plans could be worked out to hold an election, which was promised by the Geneva accords but has never been carried out. We could keep alive the hope of a united South Vietnam and North Vietnam without killing countless people.

We cannot succeed in persuading the people of Vietnam that we are their friends after we have bombed them with napalm to the extent that we have. It will now be next to impossible to create the feeling that we are their friends or that our intentions are what we said they were in the beginning.

Mr. McGOVERN. I appreciate the comments of the Senator from Alaska. He will observe, as I outline my ideas, that they are very much in line with what he has just suggested.

THE POLITICAL HAZARDS

The strategy I have suggested—the tightening of our defenses in South Vietnam and the holding of the cities and the enclaves in the coastal area—is a policy that involves primarily political patience and military restraint. It requires that we put the issue of Vietnam in a more reasonable perspective. We must stop talking about it as though the honor of America and our stature in the world depend upon South Vietnam. Our top officials ought to quit preaching that the fate of the human race and the cause of all mankind centers in Saigon. In the first place, it is not true. American military power in the Pacific is largely in the firepower and maneuverability of our 7th Fleet plus our island air bases. That enormous firepower, the mightiest military force in the Pacific, will remain no matter what goes on in Vietnam.

Second, exaggerated talk, front page news reports of almost daily bombing missions, B-52 raids, and daily jungle forays focus excessive attention on the Vietnamese issue both at home and

abroad. This has the effect of diverting attention from much more important issues related to our national interest such as the strengthening of the Atlantic Community, the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, Soviet-American relations, the control of nuclear weapons, and other steps toward peace that promise a better life for the people of the earth. It also wastes energy and talent and planning that we need to concentrate on such crucial countries in Asia as India and Japan.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I want the Senator from South Dakota to know, first of all, that I have read his prepared speech. I interrupt him at this time only because I have a luncheon engagement with constituents which requires me to leave the Chamber soon.

The Senator has my deep admiration. He was one of the first to register his disagreement with the general thrust of American policy in southeast Asia. The Senator has had very little company these past months, during which there has been so much hesitation to speak out, even among those who privately question the wisdom of our course.

The Senator from South Dakota realistically points out that we are deeply involved in southeast Asia, that commitments have been made—whether wisely or unwisely—and that the question before us at this time is, Where do we go from here?

It is with that question that the Senator concerns himself in the remarkable address which he is making on the floor of the Senate this afternoon.

His address is in line with the general purpose he has sought to serve. His objective has been to avoid an American involvement in a full-scale land war against Asians on the mainland of Asia. Perhaps it is still possible to avoid such a war. I believe that the President wants very much to avoid it.

The course of action which the Senator from South Dakota has suggested today commends itself strongly to me as a way in which we might still avoid a tragic American involvement in a full-fledged war in southeast Asia, the cost, extent, and consequences of which defy assessment.

I know that the position of the Senator has often been a lonely one. I am happy that newspapers in his own State have, to some extent, realized this and have paid him proper credit for his courage.

The people of South Dakota have reason to be very proud of Senator McGOVERN. With his consent, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD, following the remarks of the Senator, an editorial entitled "Sincere Dissenter," published in the Watertown Public Opinion of April 19, 1965; an editorial entitled "Stand for Peace," published in the Daily Republic of March 5, 1965; and an editorial entitled "Time To Review Our Vietnam Policy," published in the Sioux Falls Argus-Leader of April 25, 1965.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from South Dakota for the position he has taken. I hope that his speech will be widely read and soberly reflected upon by those in the States Department and White House who direct our foreign policy.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Idaho for his encouraging and thoughtful remarks, not only because he is a distinguished and highly regarded member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and a recognized voice in the field of foreign policy, but also because the Senator, perhaps better than any other Senator, has consistently enunciated a policy of common sense with reference to our responsibility in southeast Asia.

The statement made by the distinguished Senator from Idaho—first for the New York Times magazine and then on the Senate floor—in which the Senator warned against the dangers of an overextension of American power in Asia is one of the finest statements made on the larger issues of American foreign policy.

I appreciate the comments of the Senator this afternoon.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his kindness.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I agree with the remark just made by the distinguished Senator from Idaho that the President is searching for a way to peace in Vietnam. He has always been a man of peace and he wants with all his heart to find an honorable settlement to the war in Vietnam. However, the over-emphasis on the need for our growing military presence in southeast Asia by those who insist that the honor of our Nation rests on the future of Vietnam places a very hazardous political foundation under the administration effort. It invites the American people and the world to watch most closely the very area where the chances of a happy outcome are most questionable. This not only distorts an issue of secondary importance beyond its real significance, but it is poor diplomacy and even poorer politics. If we keep insisting that the image of America in the world depends on the politicians and generals of Saigon, we are going to be in bad shape.

President Johnson has a legislative and administrative record that is virtually unprecedented in American history. It ought to be the pride of our country and the envy of the world. But unless members of the foreign policy establishment who do not have to face the electorate quit making Vietnam appear as the top concern of the administration, they will create grave political hazards for a great President and his supporters in the Congress—to say nothing of weakening our country in the eyes of the world.

The Korean war, rightfully or not, destroyed the confidence of millions of Americans in the peacekeeping capacity of the Truman administration. General Eisenhower capitalized on that anxiety and wrecked the presidential bid of Governor Stevenson by pledging to go to Korea and negotiate an end to the fighting. Those opposition politicians such as the minority leader of the House who are now urging the President to step up the bombing attacks may be speaking with sincere motives. But it is not without passing interest that President Johnson rolled up a landslide victory over Senator Goldwater last fall in considerable part because the overwhelming majority of Americans favored the policy of restraint advocated by the President. The voters rejected Senator Goldwater's prescription for bombing raids and a stepped-up war in Vietnam. It is hardly a political favor to the President at this point to urge him to appease the minority and disappoint the majority by a still larger and larger war effort. Yet, recent public opinion polls indicate that the minority, who supported Senator Goldwater last fall, are more pleased with our accelerating war effort in Vietnam than is the majority who voted so enthusiastically for the President.

Stopping the bombing raids and the daily battles in the jungles, quietly consolidating and holding the enclaves along the coast and in the cities, and reducing the number of exaggerated statements about the importance of Vietnam—these steps will help to quiet much of the clamor and publicity associated with the issue and will help to put it in a more reasonable perspective.

RESULTS OF THE RECOMMENDED HOLDING ACTION

The beneficial results of such a policy of moderation and restraint as I have urged this afternoon are these:

First. It will demonstrate to friend and foe alike that we have the staying power to keep our commitments without needless fanfare and unnecessary bloodshed.

Second. It will enable us to conduct our commitment according to the guidelines that are most practical for us, rather than playing the game according to guerrilla rules, which include the jungle ambush, at which they are the admitted masters.

Third. It will take the Russians out of a dilemma that is pressing them back into a more belligerent alliance with the Chinese.

Fourth. It will ease the pressures on such friendly allies as the Wilson government in Britain.

Fifth. It will remove much of the diplomatic and political hazard for the administration both at home and abroad.

Sixth. It will reduce the necessity of calling up our Reserves and stepping up

the draft while saving countless millions of dollars that can be used to improve our society and our economy here at home.

Seventh. It will reduce the danger of world war III and improve the chances for further steps toward peace.

Eighth. Finally, and most significant of all, it is the practical way of saving political face while at the same time holding to a minimum the loss of human life—the lives of our soldiers and the Vietnamese people.

Mr. President, in accordance with the suggestion of Senator GRUENING, I ask unanimous consent that the text of President Eisenhower's letter to the president of South Vietnam pledging U.S. aid on October 23, 1954, be printed in the RECORD following the editorials inserted at the request of Senator CHURCH.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Watertown (S. Dak.) Public Opinion, Apr. 19, 1965]

SINCERE DISSENTER

There are many degrees of political courage, but South Dakota Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN is exhibiting one of the greatest—espousal of the unpopular side of a great national issue, even as his political peers try to shut him up.

The issue: Should the United States become increasingly involved in South Vietnam as the dangers of an escalated war loom greater?

MCGOVERN's stand: No.

He stands fast on this line and hasn't been chary about saying so, even when such personal friends and influential big names as HUBERT HUMPHREY and McGeorge Bundy have urged him to keep silent on behalf of national unity. MCGOVERN keeps right on opposing the U.S. role in Vietnam and doing so out where lots of people see and hear him.

Chicken? Appeaser malcontent? By no means. MCGOVERN points out that he is neither a pacifist nor an isolationist but simply, "I don't believe military aid can be used effectively in southeast Asia. The problems there are ones of internal political revolution."

In other words, in the McGovern book, America is charging along a jungle path in Vietnam that is not only militarily futile but very costly and extremely dangerous. He recently told Bucknell University students, "It seems clear that we are now on a spiral of blows and counterblows which could lead to a major war under the worst possible conditions for the United States."

He has recalled his food for peace days and reflected, "The extensive traveling that I did in Asia and Latin America convinced me that the basic problems in these areas are ones of hunger, illiteracy, and bad government. These are the problems we should attack. In South Vietnam we inherited the hostility and mess that came from 50 years of French misrule and exploitation."

MCGOVERN obviously is under no illusions as to the political hazard of his own position. For the junior Senator from a prairie State to so adamantly oppose a major policy and commitment of his own party and administration, and to do it repeatedly, while spurning big brother attempts to shush him, takes a brand of nerve one doesn't see very often these days, particularly not in politics. And to compound it, MCGOVERN displayed something of the same independent attitude when he openly expressed his disappointment over some facets of the administration's new farm program and vowed to work to correct them.

MCGOVERN's views have not prevailed, and it is unlikely that they will. But whether they do or not, the man who endorses them and does so most effectively, has increased his stature among many people for his sincerity, his steadfastness, and his willingness to go for broke in behalf of an ideal he honestly believes is right.

[From the Daily Republic, Mar. 5, 1965]

STAND FOR PEACE

Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN, Democrat of South Dakota, and a small handful of colleagues have taken a courageous stand for a negotiated settlement of the war in South Vietnam. They are bucking the Johnson administration policy, which has been given strong support by leading Republican Congressmen. The prevailing view is that the United States cannot and will not pull out of the turmoil in southeast Asia, that if a stable South Vietnam government can be established, the military operations against the Communist Vietcong will succeed.

Senator MCGOVERN early this week outlined what he called his "minimum terms" for a settlement in a talk at the University of South Dakota. He called for: Closer confederation between North and South Vietnam, with local autonomy; economic ties and railroad links between the two nations; U.S. financial aid in developing the Mekong River Basin; neutralization of both countries, withdrawal on both sides of outside troops

and advisers, and no effort made to dictate political ideology; establishment of a U.N. Commission to guarantee national borders, provide police protection, and guarantee fair treatment for tribal groups.

The U.S. effort in South Vietnam has been discouraging ever since President Eisenhower permitted Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the late, great advocate of brinkmanship, and the CIA, under his brother, Alan, to intervene through the back door. As the St. Louis Post-Dispatch observed recently, it will be Eisenhower "who will be charged by history with the initial responsibility for our Vietnam military adventure, wherever it may lead."

President Johnson has made the decision that we must remain involved in the conflict, indeed, we must pursue the enemy with more vigor, and carry out reprisals for attacks allegedly engineered by North Vietnam. He could hardly do otherwise in view of the steps initiated in the Eisenhower administration and continued under President Kennedy. Any sudden reverse—a quick withdrawal—could not but lose face for the United States. Those concerned about the possibility of an escalation into a large-scale war, however, are rightfully wondering what the final goal of our southeast Asia policy is. We cannot maintain the status quo indefinitely; we cannot risk World War III by going all out for a military victory, even though we have the strength to do so.

The only sane solution, it seems, is a gradual disengagement from the military operations. That is what Senator MCGOVERN and his small group are proposing—encouraging negotiations or mediation looking toward military neutralization. It can be accomplished over a period of time and bring honor, not dishonor, to the United States. President Eisenhower negotiated a settlement in Korea after he took office. It was neither a victory nor a defeat for us. Korea remains split as Vietnam is now, and a U.N. Commission patrols the buffer zone between North and South. The same course of action today is as valid today as it was in 1953, and MCGOVERN's group rates public encouragement for their pursuit of a peaceful and honorable settlement.

[From the Sioux Falls (S. Dak.) Argus-Leader, Apr. 25, 1965]

TIME TO REVIEW OUR VIETNAM POLICY

The expanding military activity in Vietnam is disconcerting and more and more people are beginning to wonder just how and where it will end.

About the developments in Vietnam today is a scene of frustration and uncertainty comparable to that which prevailed while the Korean struggle was underway several years ago.

In respect to Korea, there was confusion about our objectives and our methods. The same attitude exists now.

The conflict in Korea was terminated, happily, before it broadened into a major war. Many like to believe that the Vietnam episode will end similarly. But there's doubt, plus bewilderment, accentuated by the realization the problem seems to become more perplexing week after week.

KEEN PUBLIC INTEREST

This deep concern about Vietnam was very likely the reason why an overflow crowd assembled at luncheon in Nettleton Manor Thursday to hear Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN, of South Dakota, discuss the matter. The luncheon was first scheduled to be a small one with members of the public affairs committee and the directors of the chamber of commerce. But so many were eager to be present that the public generally was invited.

Perhaps the interest was intensified by the fact that MCGOVERN previously had indicated a difference with the administration on Vietnam policy, suggesting that we should explore the possibilities of negotiating a settlement.

In his Thursday speech here, he explained why he considered negotiation both desirable and feasible. And, judging from the reception he received and the close attention paid to his remarks, there were many in the audience who shared his opinion.

THE ALTERNATIVES

The question about alternatives naturally arises. If we don't negotiate, what do we do?

One answer is to say we should either go into Vietnam with great enough strength to smash the opposition. Another is that we should withdraw.

Flaws can be found, however, with both of these suggestions.

If we go into the conflict with a full determination to smash the opposition, we invite sharp retaliation from both Red China and Russia. And that means moving right to the brink of major war and perhaps over it. We faced the same problem in Korea and our leaders wisely refrained from taking that gamble.

The other prospect—that of withdrawal—is also inadequate. If we do so, it may be maintained through the Asiatic southeast that we are, as the Red Chinese insist, just "a paper tiger." Withdrawal would be heralded widely as an American defeat and a Red Chinese triumph and it could be charged that we had deserted those who had depended on us.

WE DO HAVE STRENGTH

Between the two alternatives—an all-out smash or withdrawal—is the possibility of negotiation.

There are those who say that this isn't the time for a discussion of that and we should wait until we are ready to negotiate from strength. This means, of course, after we have beaten North Vietnam into a state of at least partial submission.

One may be sure, though, that the Red Chinese also may be reluctant to allow us to acquire this so-called position of strength. There will be growing resistance.

But what seems to be overlooked by many is that we are right now, as Senator MCGOVERN pointed out Thursday, in a position to negotiate from strength.

We have the power in the Pacific and Asiatic waters to smash Red China to bits. The Red Chinese know this. And when you have that kind of strength behind you, you aren't negotiating from a position of weakness. We could approach the conference table with some mighty powerful cards on our side and those negotiating with us would be well aware of this.

WHAT WE DID IN KOREA

Every major step taken in this extraordinary day and age involves, of course, a calculated risk.

That was the case when President Eisenhower aided in the negotiation of the settlement in Korea. But the fighting was stopped and our prestige was unharmed.

It is entirely possible that the same step can be taken in respect to Vietnam. With proper negotiation, very likely something can be done to maintain a degree of prestige on both sides.

Just what can be done in respect to the self-government of Vietnam is, I grant, a disturbing problem. The Government has changed freely there even under our supervision and may shift just as readily in the future.

OPEN MINDS NEEDED

What may be said in general is that the whole situation is so confusing that it is well that our minds be kept open. Negotiation may or may not be the answer but surely we should explore its possibilities in complete detail.

We are heading directly, as someone said the other day, along a collision course with Red China. Let's utilize the power of our strength to try to make a change before it is too late.

F. C. CHRISTOPHERSON.

EXHIBIT 2

AID TO THE STATE OF VIETNAM

(Message from the President of the United States to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam, Oct. 23, 1954)¹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Vietnam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war, and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Vietnam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Vietnam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Vietnam, to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of government how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

Mr. CLARK subsequently said: Mr. President, earlier today the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MCGOVERN] made what in my opinion was an extremely well considered and carefully thought out

¹ Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 15, 1954, pp. 735-736.

speech on the subject of how to save lives and political face in Vietnam.

He gave me the opportunity to read the speech before he delivered it. I regret that I was not on the floor at the time he delivered it. I hope every Member of the Senate and also the leaders of the Johnson administration, including the President himself, will take the few minutes necessary to read this analysis of our situation in Vietnam as presented by the Senator from South Dakota.

To me, his arguments are unanswerable. We all know that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], whom I see on the floor, has advocated a point of view which is a few favor. There have been many traditionalists on the floor who have supported the position of the President of the United States. I find myself somewhere in between those two positions, although the Senator from Oregon may correct me if I do not properly present his point of view.

I go 100 percent with Senator McGovern in his recommendation that we should consolidate our present position in Vietnam, keep our casualties at a minimum, hold out indefinitely in certain strong points, backed, I imagine, as a matter of precaution, by the sea, and well fortified, from which we could not be dislodged. I believe this course of conduct is the wisest one to pursue, as opposed to what certain people have represented as the scuttle-and-run-program, on the one hand, or, on the other, to accelerate the struggle toward a major world war, or even, for that matter, to accelerate the struggle so that coffins will begin to come back to us with American boys in them, by the hundreds and perhaps thousands, as we make what seems to me to be a very unwise effort to recapture a certain amount of real estate which has very little actual value to the United States, and also very little practical or even symbolic value.

Mr. President, I commend the Senator from South Dakota for what he has said. I particularly invite the attention of Senators to his comment with respect to our national honor. He says:

The overemphasis of the need for our presence in southeast Asia by some people who insist that the honor of our Nation rests on the future of Vietnam places a very tenuous and hazardous political foundation under the administration effort.

It has been said many times that we are merely following a policy laid down by three Presidents—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—in defending our national honor.

Mr. President, on Thursday of last week I undertook to mention this subject. My comments appear at page 17195 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

I asked a series of questions which I indicated I hoped the President of the United States would answer when he completes his review of the situation in South Vietnam and comes down to tell Congress and the American people what he thinks should be done.

The first question I asked was: "Is it really true that our national honor is at stake in South Vietnam, and if so, why?"

I do not want to close my mind on this subject, but from what I have heard so far and from whatever analysis I have been able to make in connection with my own ethical sense, I do not see any basis whatever on which we are presently committed to fight a major land war on the land mass of Asia in defense of our national honor.

We never undertook during the days when President Eisenhower was in the White House to do any such thing; and we never undertook during the days when President Kennedy was in the White House to do so. All we said was that we would help the South Vietnamese with financial aid and military advice. That we have done. That we can continue to do.

I cannot see that any of the commitments made by the Johnson administration would lead to the conclusion that, as one government succeeds another in Saigon, as we find more and more irresponsible individuals coming to the head of that government—and I may say, more and more dictator-like types coming to the head of that government—we must commit more and more American boys to combat.

As I indicated a moment ago in colloquy with the majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], I cannot see how our national honor is involved.

Perhaps I am obtuse. If so, maybe the supporters of an accelerated war in the Senate will explain how our national honor is involved.

The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGovern], with great stress, spoke about the impact on the South Vietnamese people of the combined air attacks, mortar fire, and machinegun attacks we are making to recapture certain villages.

What is this real estate we deem so important to take?

The Senator from South Dakota refers to the news report referring to the area around the village of Bagia, which our forces recently captured from the Vietcong after 3 days of bitter fighting.

Mr. President, it has often been said that this is a dirty war; and indeed it is. What we are interested in, it seems to me, is an effort to maintain a situation in which the people of South Vietnam can determine their own fate. For that reason I agree we should not scuttle and run. I do not think we can pull out.

But on the other hand I do not think we are doing ourselves or the people of South Vietnam any good—and I do not believe we are doing the cause of freedom any good—by a military effort which results in killing women and children to recapture a certain amount of useless real estate.

Mr. President, the newspapers this morning carry a series of shocking pictures showing the torturing of Vietcong prisoners by members of the South Vietnam Army.

I have long regretted that we are unable to get in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD pictorial material which is so important for understanding. There are also magnificent cartoons which in a few short lines, in a few short words, can describe a particular situation so much better than we in the Senate can in speaking 1, 2, or 3 hours.

The Philadelphia Inquirer this morning has a picture on its front page and in the caption it is stated:

Vietnamese soldier beats a captured Vietcong guerrilla during interrogation after a major assault on Tetam Loc village in South Vietnam.

The Washington Post this morning has 3 pictures on page A-10 and the captions are "Grilling of Vietcong suspects can involve torture. At left, a U.S. marine rounds up suspects after capture near Tamloc, 40 miles southeast of Danang. A suspect, who later revealed an arms cache, gasps for breath above, as South Vietnamese soldier pours water on cloth held over nose and mouth. Militia beat other captured suspects."

In the New York Times this morning, page 7, there are three pictures under the caption, "South Vietnamese Use Sticks and Water in Interrogating Suspects." The first caption is:

One of 13 men captured by South Vietnamese soldiers in Tamloc area, southeast of Danang, is beaten by questioner.

The second caption is:

After placing a cloth over this man's face, the soldiers pour water on him, as a further inducement for him to talk. He finally told where two shotguns were hidden.

The third has a caption:

Another of the 13 is beaten as the interrogators seek to obtain information about locations of guerrillas and arms.

Mr. President, I know that if we had a complete pictorial display, there would probably be 10 pictures of torturing by the Vietcong of South Vietnamese and Americans also for everyone punished or tortured by the South Vietnamese, or the Vietcong guerrillas.

But, after all, what are we fighting for? We are fighting for the freedom of people to determine their own way of life, and we are fighting, to some extent—and I make the statement in all seriousness—we are fighting to keep America in the eyes of the rest of the world, a nation which has a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.

The type of warfare we are fighting in South Vietnam today I feel very much is destroying in the eyes of the world the view that America has a decent re-

spect for the opinions of mankind, which was the major, or one of the major, bases of the Declaration of Independence.

Mr. President, in conclusion, I commend my friend from South Dakota [Mr. McGovern] not only for what he said, but his courage in saying it.

I hope before the President comes to Congress and the country with his recommendation for further action, he will give prayerful thought to the viewpoint of the Senator from South Dakota, who, I say, does not stand alone on the floor of the Senate.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

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August 9, 1966

Dear Council Supporter:


In late June, a "Citizens' White Paper" entitled The Politics of Escalation was presented at the White House by a group of distinguished citizens. The study was prepared by scholars at the University of California at Berkeley and Washington University in St. Louis. It describes a pattern of escalation following initiatives, both inside and outside Vietnam, to bring about negotiations. Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana sent a copy to each Senator.

The accompanying Congressional Record reprint is a speech Senator Hartke made based on information in The Politics of Escalation. His remarks bring the study up to date at the time of the Ronning mission and the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings. The Council calls Senator Hartke's speech to your attention as a reminder that the Senate remains our most important public forum of discussion on matters relative to war and peace.

If you would like to obtain a copy of The Politics of Escalation, published in a paperback edition with a forward by Arthur Schlesinger, send 80¢ to:

Foreign Policy Roundtable
Box 125
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri 63130

Sincerely yours,



Bernard T. Feld
President



Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 89th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

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No. 108

Senate

OUR POLICY OF ESCALATION

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, yesterday's news from Saigon confirmed what had been rumored for several days. We have now moved into a new phase of the escalation which continues ever upward, as for the first time we have loosed our bombs in the very outskirts of Hanoi. The decision has been taken to bomb oil and supply depots so close to the centers of population that civilian casualties in the north are bound to result. This is the policy which the hawks have advocated, including Barry Goldwater during the campaign of 2 years ago:

What will be the results?

I have asked this question before. In an address on April 19 at Ball State University in Muncie, Ind., I asked what would be the response to just such an action. I said:

Do we know what the response will be? We are told that Hanoi has available, not yet committed to any action, Russian MIG's of the latest design, capable of outlying our Skyhawks. At what point will the decision be made to put them into battle? As time goes on will the Chinese send not only non-combatant work crews to aid Hanoi, not only technicians but actual combat troops? If this happens, what will be our response? It is our announced endeavor, each time we step up the pace, to make the results too costly, to halt the response from the other side. But the history of the case, and not in Vietnam only, is that escalation breeds escalation.

Are we truly looking for peace? Or are we obsessed with the need to keep pushing ever further and further the military escalation whose results are a stiffening of morale and a constant deterioration of the purported search for peace?

Listen to the words of a great leader, Winston Churchill, who was certainly no "nervous Nellie," concerning the use of military force properly and when needed. In the first volume of his six-volume classic on World War II, "The Gathering Storm," Churchill had this to say:

Those who are prone by temperament and character to seek sharp and clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign power, have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their heads, to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in the majority of instances, they might be right not only morally but from a practical standpoint . . .

How many wars have been precipitated by firebrands! How many misunderstandings which led to war could have been removed by temporizing!

I am fearful that there are among the President's advisers, at least, are those who, in Churchill's words, "are prone by temperament and character" to plunge impatiently for the way of the firebrand rather than exercise the patience needed for the peaceful compromise.

Last week I distributed to each Member of the Senate a copy of a citizens' white paper entitled "The Politics of Escalation." This publication was initiated by a personal investment of \$100 each by 10 professors of Washington University in St. Louis, who were joined in its preparation by a group of professors from other schools, particularly the University of California at Berkeley. They have not sought to adduce new facts, but they have made an examination of what has occurred in the twin

realms of military escalation and diplomatic peace efforts during the period November 1963, through January 1966.

In the tradition of scholarship, they have footnoted and documented their work thoroughly. Likewise, they have sought objectivity in their report, refraining in the recounting from expressions of conclusions or opinions which could not be substantiated. I must confess that their material tends to become bogged down in the recital of facts, statements and dates to the point where it is not always easy to follow.

But this historical study of facts and events, including some peace proposals which did not come to light until weeks or months later, brings to attention an apparent pattern of action which I fear is once more being repeated. The authors have not charged, nor do I, that our increases in military pressure, in escalation, have time after time been the response to new pressures for that "peaceful compromise" of which Churchill spoke. But the fact is incapable that, in the juxtaposition of events on the peace front and on the military front, time and time again just as there appeared some possibility of movement toward a negotiated reduction of the conflict, our military escalation has been tightened another notch. In the careful words of the professor-authors in their summary and conclusions, in citizens' white paper entitled "The Politics of Escalation," it is stated:

Available evidence does not prove that escalations were intended solely or primarily to counter efforts at compromise or negotiation. A study of the chronology of American escalations within the political context reveals, however, that the major American intensifications of the war have been preceded less by substantially increased military opposition than by periods of mounting pressure for a political settlement of the war.

It is not possible to find the road to peace by escalating war. But because that has been our policy, enunciated by the President in his Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, and because other nations of the world do not agree with that policy, our supposed search for a way out of the dilemma has been met with increasing skepticism by those traditionally our friends. In the Baltimore speech, President Johnson said of our objectives:

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

Our military policy of nullifying aggression has consistently taken precedence over a diplomatic policy of exploring with earnest diligence the avenues which could lead to the same end, and which must in the long run do so.

Let me cite some specific case histories which find their parallel in the bombing now 2 or 3 miles from the heart of Hanoi and Haiphong. The first took place in July and August 1964, when peace pressures were followed by the events of Tonkin Bay and a climactic air strike against three coastal bases. The second was the opening of U.S. bomb attacks in the north on February 7, 1965, during the visit to Hanoi of Premier Kosygin. The third escalation, following a peace effort by interested third parties, was the bombing of a major power station a dozen miles from Haiphong, closer than any bombing until yesterday's.

On July 23, 1964, President de Gaulle called for a meeting "of the same order and including, in principle, the same participants as the former Geneva Conference." The foregoing is a quotation from his statement.

On July 25 the Soviet Government addressed a communication to the 14 nations that had participated in the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1961-62, urgently suggesting reconvening of the Conference. Here was the voice of Russia added to the voice of France.

On July 26, according to the French publication *Le Monde*, Nguyen Huu Tho, leader of the National Liberation Front, stated the willingness of the Vietcong political arm "to enter into negotiations with all parties, groups, sects, and patriotic individuals. The NLF is not opposed to the convening of an international conference in order to facilitate the search for a solution."

Hanoi endorsed the proposal and appealed for reconvening "as rapidly as possible to preserve the independence, peace, and neutrality of Laos and to preserve the peace of Indochina and south-east Asia." Here was added, on August 4, the voice of North Vietnam.

By then Peking had also given its endorsement to the proposal, speaking with the voice of one more vitally interested nation.

Within the same period, Secretary General U Thant put forward the same suggestion for reconvening of the Geneva Conference. U Thant referred to his frequent reiteration of that view stated on May 24, 1966, when, in a speech to the convention of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, he said:

I have said that peace can only be restored by a return to the Geneva Agreements and that, as a preparatory measure, it would be necessary to start scaling down military operations, and to agree to discussions which include the actual combatants. * * * The solution lies in the hands of those who have the power, and the responsibility, to decide. If they seek a peaceful solution, the United Nations and many of its Members stand ready to help them in all possible ways.

What was the U.S. response to all this growing pressure for a Geneva-type conference, to the proposal for such a conference by President de Gaulle, by Russia, and by U Thant, with the support of Hanoi and Peking?

On July 24, the day after De Gaulle's statement, President Johnson said in his press conference:

We do not believe in conferences called to ratify terror, so our policy is unchanged.

On the following day, July 25, an order was issued dispatching an additional 5,000 to 6,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam. Our unchanged policy was that of escalation, not negotiation, it would seem.

About the same time, the United States was being accused of aggression in several incidents in the Tonkin Bay area. Hanoi protested to the International Control Commission on the 27th of July that Americans and their "lackeys" had fired on North Vietnamese fishing vessels. On July 30, they claimed that South Vietnamese patrol boats had not only raided North Vietnamese fishing vessels in the Tonkin Gulf but had also bombarded the islands of Hon Me and Hon Ngu under protective cover from the U.S. destroyer *Maddox*, and again lodged a

complaint with the Control Commission. On August 2 came the first of two incidents that resulted in the famous Tonkin Bay resolution, which many of us now regret.

According to the North Vietnamese, the *Maddox* entered their territorial waters which, like many nations, they contend extend to a 12-mile limit. Three North Vietnamese torpedo boats engaged the *Maddox*, which was undamaged, and U.S. planes sank one of the torpedo boats, damaging the other two. According to the official U.S. version, this was an unprovoked attack because we hold to a 3-mile limit on territorial waters.

I am not charging that the sequence of events proves a causative relationship between the pressures for peace and the actions of the United States which followed. I am merely stating the facts as reported. But among those facts are the dispatch of more troops ordered on July 25, and elevation to great importance of the Tonkin Bay incidents. The climax here was caused by further action on August 4, when the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy*, another destroyer, were reported to have been attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats, two of which were sunk. The next day came retaliation—heavy U.S. air attacks on three major North Vietnam coastal bases, which were demolished along with destruction or damage to 25 boats. President Johnson issued a directive. Where standing orders to U.S. warships had been to "repel" enemy attackers, they were now ordered to "destroy" them.

This instance of peace pressures as a prelude to hard military action came at a time when Premier Khanh was tottering, and one result of the dramatic show of power, a use of power out of proportion to the size of the provocation, was to shore up his regime and lessen the chance of peace talks.

II

Everyone now acknowledges that a vital decision in the war was taken when the United States, on February 7, 1965, began the bombing of North Vietnam which has taken another turn of intensification in the last 24 hours. What were the circumstances and the facts?

Premier Kosygin was in Hanoi at the time. The New York Times on February 2 reported that there was "developing speculation in the administration that Mr. Kosygin's trip might be the opening move in a broad Soviet attempt to mediate between the United States and the Hanoi regime for a settlement of the Vietnamese war."

In the previous month of January, there had been a great deal of internal unrest in Vietnam, an outbreak of pro-neutralist and anti-government, and anti-American demonstrations. On January 7, a general strike was called in Hue, and by the 13th it had spread to Danang, where Vietnamese civilians failed to report for work at the U.S. air base. Editorials appeared in Saigon papers demanding negotiations and deploring continuation of the war. Police on January 17 fired on demonstrators in Hue and Dalat, wounding four students. Shortly after, 30 were wounded in a demonstration by 5,000 Buddhists in Saigon. The U.S. Information Service library was sacked at Hue. And on January 27, the civilian regime was overthrown by Nguyen Khanh.

So, before the first North Vietnam bombing raid of February 7, there was a climate ripe for the kind of peace effort speculation accorded to Kosygin. On February 16, Russia did propose to North Vietnam and China the convening of a new international conference based on "unconditional negotiations" which would have met President Johnson's call for "unconditional discussions." A week later De Gaulle publicly called for negotiations without preconditions, and a day afterward, U Thant again made a similar appeal. At the time he said, significantly, since the Russian overtures to Hanoi and Peking were not made public until months later:

The great American people, if only they know the true fact and the background to the developments in South Vietnam, will agree with me that further bloodshed is unnecessary.

We were told that the bombing of the north on February 7 was our retaliatory response to the guerrilla raid on Pleiku

in which eight Americans were killed. But in view of the climate toward peace, the unrest in South Vietnam, is it possible that the decision had been taken and the bombing planned and that only a sufficient cause for public consumption was needed?

Again, I do not make the charge that the United States was eagerly awaiting an opportunity for escalation in order to stall off the possibilities of negotiation leading to retirement or de-escalation. But the Pleiku attack occurred early in the morning of Sunday, February 7, Vietnam time, which was Saturday afternoon in Washington. And the American plane strike started with 12 hours afterward. Had the attack been planned in advance, and was Pleiku a suddenly suitable pretext?

Two days earlier, on February 5, the New York Times had called the turn:

Now again the Asian Communists, this time in South Vietnam, seem ready to bid for power through a negotiated settlement. The Soviet Union, apparently fearful that a continuation of the war in South Vietnam may lead to United States bombing of North Vietnam, is reappearing in the role of a diplomatic agent.

While the Russians were fearful of our bombing escalation to the North, were we afraid of their peacemaking de-escalation and seeking to forestall it?

III

Let me relate now a third instance in which there occurred a juxtaposition of peace efforts and escalation.

As Senator MANSFIELD's report early this year made clear, the 34,000 American troops of May 1965, had increased to 165,700 in November. There had been a stepped-up response by the Vietcong, with increasing numbers of North Vietnamese regulars coming into the battle area. Incidents initiated by the Vietcong had also escalated, as the Mansfield report shows on page 3:

The Vietcong initiated 1,038 incidents during the last week in November and the total number of incidents which had increased steadily throughout 1965, reached 3,588 in that month.

Our escalation of the war, obviously, was being met by escalation. The north was supplying more and more support, although according to the Mansfield report North Vietnam still accounted for only about 14,000 out of the total 230,000 on that side.

On December 17, it was revealed by the St. Louis Post Dispatch that Washington had received a month earlier, on November 20, a message delivered to Ambassador Goldberg by Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani. It reported the interview of Prof. La Pira with Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong, who expressed a strong desire for a peaceful solution—specifically, a cease-fire, a halt to the landing of American troops, and acceptance of Hanoi's four points, which Ho Chi Minh characterized as "application, in other words, of the Geneva accords."

Prof. La Pira's discussions were on November 11. Our reply by Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Fanfani's November 20 letter was delivered to him in New York on December 6, and on December 13 Mr. Fanfani notified Secretary Rusk that his own summary of the reply had been delivered to Hanoi. This was an escalation of peace efforts.

On December 15, American planes for the first time bombed the Haiphong area, destroying a power station 14 miles from the city. Of this, the San Francisco Chronicle on December 20 noted:

Some U. N. delegates . . . pointed out that the war had been escalated after the States reply was related to Hanoi.

A few days later, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch stated that on December 8, Ambassador Goldberg had been explicitly warned "that Ho would not enter peace negotiations with the U.S. if the Hanoi-Haiphong area were bombed."

Now, again, I am not charging that we deliberately sabotaged another peace effort. But facts are facts, and it is my firm belief that it is essential for the American people to have the facts.

Too often we have learned, as in this case in mid-December, that events of great significance in the area of peace possibilities, occurred a month earlier.

IV

But what, it might be asked, about the bombing lull of 37 days early this year, from December 24 to January 31, 1966?

Was this not a true effort for peace, they will say?

During the same time there was a 12-hour cease-fire from 7 p.m. Christmas Eve until 7 a.m. Christmas Day, and later the New Year—"Tet"—cease-fire of January 20 to January 24. Otherwise the ground war continued. One cannot but ask why, if these cease-fires could be arranged for such short special occasions, a cease-fire for negotiation of peace could not also be developed, if escalation of peace were as much our concern as escalation of military action.

The lull in the bombing raids was accompanied by well-publicized travelings about the world by our emissaries on announced peace missions—which in the case of the Philippines and Korea included urgent invitations to step up the size of their troop contingents. But aside from the short cease-fires, as I have said, ground action did not halt.

We cited the buildup of forces on the other side as a major ground for the decision to resume bombing. At the same time, we continued with a more rapid buildup of our own forces. And on January 27 we launched Operation Masher.

This, said the New York Times, was "the largest amphibious operation by the United States since the 1950 Inchon landing in Korea."

The plan—

Said the times—

is to move three infantry and three artillery battalions repeatedly across a 450 square-mile section of Binh Dinh Province to look for a battle.

"To look for a battle," is the phrase used by the paper.

On January 28, they found it. Near Anthai, on a sandy beach, 300 U.S. 1st Cavalrymen reported meeting 500 or so of the enemy and killing 103 in a 2-day battle. The next day the order went to Pearl Harbor which led to resumed bombing raids on January 31.

As the bombing was resumed, it was stated that we had not seen signs of response from Hanoi to our policy of lull. Yet, until our Operation Masher, there had been a remarkable absence of clashes with North Vietnamese regulars.

Were we sincere in our charges against Hanoi for its troop buildup during the pause? Secretary Rusk said on February 1, the day after bombing resumed, that the Vietcong and North Vietnam "made clear their negative view by deeds as well as words throughout the period of the suspension of bombing. Infiltration of men and material from the North into South Vietnam continued at a high level"—New York Times, February 1, 1966, page 12.

In the same report of his press conference, the question was asked:

Mr. Secretary, how do you interpret the fact that there's been no large-scale direct contact with North Vietnamese troops since the latter part of November?

In his reply the Secretary spoke of "indications at the present time that there is very active contact with North Vietnamese forces there." This very active contact was the result of the Operation Masher action "to look for battle." The "high level" of infiltration was estimated at from 1,700 to 4,500 men a month. But during the 37 days of the bombing pause our own increase of men entering the area was a buildup of more than 14,000, with 6,000 men arriving during the 10-day period of January 18-28.

Were our apparently frantic and highly publicized peace missions by any chance giving to the world a picture such as Mr. Rusk painted of the North Vietnamese? Did we, by any chance, at least as much as the North Vietnamese, present a "negative view by deeds as well as words throughout the period of the suspension of bombing"? Could it have been said of us that we acted in the same good faith we charged Hanoi with breaking when our own "infiltration of men and material continued at a high level"? Were we then already irrevocably committed, and had we been a long time so committed, to complete reliance on military power and to ignor-

ing the bright potentials for peace whenever they appeared?

As one of a group of Senators who sought by a letter to the President for a decision to extend the bombing pause, I believed that we needed to present a positive, not a negative, view "by deeds as well as words." The answer to our letter was a citation of the Tonkin Bay resolution, which at the time of its passage certainly did not envision any use as justification in these circumstances of what the Senate believed was a specific narrow endorsement. We were not alone, and while we may still be a minority of those who speak aloud, although there has been a rising chorus of those who cry for the firebrand policy of more and more escalation—a cry rooted in the same desire I hold to end the conflict—there has also been a rising demand for cessation of this policy in favor of a negotiated peace.

That demand, by those of us who in Churchill's words desire to "seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise," was being voiced at the time by other nations than our own. Said the New York Times on January 20:

The Governments of Britain, France, and Japan, all allies of the United States, and the Communist Governments of Europe as well as the governments of a number of non-aligned nations are said to be pleading for several weeks or even months of restraint.

But again the opportunity passed. We chose the road of escalation.

Now we have chosen the road of escalation again, as our 46 planes swung in over the close-in targets at Hanoi and Haiphong. Is there any parallel of juxtaposition now with a preceding peace-making effort carrying the danger of success? Or is it merely coincidence that once again, as late as Sunday, there have been articles analyzing the possibilities of success inherent in the efforts of Canadian diplomat Chester Ronning?

Regardless of what the answer may be, it is worth noting that a dispatch by David Kraslow, of the Los Angeles Times, datelined from Ottawa on last Saturday, June 25, and appearing in the Washington Post on Sunday, stated as a point "readily acknowledged by high Washington sources" that—

Canada has opened up, through Ronning, a unique and useful channel to Hanoi.

The Johnson Administration has not lost sight of the fact that the Hanoi regime readily receives Ronning and is willing to talk to him, even though he represents a nation closely allied with the United States. We recognize the potential importance of this—

A Washington official said.

Then later in the article comes this statement, which perhaps deserves to be italicized as importantly prophetic:

The question of further American escalation of the war, it is felt here, is closely related to the Ronning missions. The Canadians are extremely sensitive on this point. Major military escalation by the United States, informed sources here suggest, could torpedo the Ronning operation and deeply embarrass the Canadian government.

It is believed that Ottawa has discussed the matter of escalation with Washington in connection with the Ronning probes.

Again I ask, is it only coincidence that such a report appears on Sunday and our new escalation takes place on Wednesday? Or is there here a recurrence of a familiar pattern, a pattern in which professions of peace interest are only words while the deeds which follow are a hard application of military force through increased escalation?

One can not be sure—

Wrote Mr. Kraslow, concerning what the prospects of Mr. Ronning's efforts might be—

a speck of hope, a possible opening. We cannot tell—

He said—

because Ronning's findings are being closely held. The Canadian and North Vietnam governments agreed there would be no public disclosure of the details of Ronning's conversations with the leaders in Hanoi.

But the ground for hope lay in the fact that:

Few Westerners have the access that Ronning has to senior officials in North Viet Nam. From his long service in China and in other parts of Asia, Ronning is personally well acquainted with many leaders in Peking and Hanoi. . . .

Ronning is considered one of the ablest Asian hands in the Western world. Now 71, he was summoned from retirement in western Canada for the Viet Nam assignment. . . .

Ronning had important roles in both the 1954 Geneva Conference on Viet Nam and the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos. He was in charge of the Canadian mission in Red China from 1949 to 1951.

The recent trip was Mr. Ronning's second to Hanoi—the first was in March—in a Canadian effort which has special significance when it is recalled that Canada is one of the three members of the International Control Commission established by the 1954 Geneva Conference. The Canadian operation is described as "a long-range, infinitely complex and delicate diplomatic probe that involves a number of governments besides the warring parties."

What chance will Chester Ronning have to complete this delicate mission, now that our military escalation has loosed a torpedo against it? Have we by design, by purpose, by commitment to expanding military action ever further and more dangerously, closed another door looking on the garden of peace? When, if ever, will we know?

Yesterday the wires and the cables were humming with the adverse reactions, as well as others favorable, from at home and abroad. Or perhaps that statement is not quite correct—there seem to have been no really favorable cables from abroad. Even Prime Minister Wilson, whose policies with the United States are tempered by the fact that he is a supplicant for support from us for bolstering of the pound sterling, was not deterred from expressing regret and stating:

Nevertheless, we have made it clear on many occasions that we cannot support an extension of the bombing in such areas.

Russia's reaction bears out the wisdom of the judgment of our majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, when he said:

The action will bring about greater amounts of aid from the Soviet Union and Peking.

Moscow said as much when they said:

Our country and the other Socialist states are providing, and will continue to provide, the necessary aid in the just struggle of the Viet Nameese people.

I have noted before the erosion of our friendship with other nations caused by our actions in Vietnam. By our go-it-alone policy, disregarding the overtures of those who would initiate helpful moves toward peace, by our disregard for world opinion, we have increasingly cut ourselves off from a leadership traditionally based on moral qualities of compassion and generosity and true democracy rather than military might. Now we are engaged in an undeclared war against half of a small nation all of whose people, after 20 years of constant struggle, want to find a way out of their morass of civil conflict.

We played a leading role in founding the United Nations. We gave it a home in Manhattan. We developed the Marshall plan. We supported UNRRA and UNICEF, and with a just cause in Korea we secured its moral and military support. But now we defy the principles of the U.N. Charter, and we move out of step, as a cartoon in the Washington Post on Sunday devastatingly portrayed while charging that our lack of allies comes about because they are all out of step with us.

We have sought with billions in our military pocketbook, billions which we in the Senate have helped too eagerly to provide, and with the big stick of unchallengeable power, to make clear in Vietnam that "father knows best." We are determined to fasten the blessings of democracy on everyone, whether they want it or not, and nowhere more so than in Vietnam. Our escalation is costing a very high price in world opinion. We are no longer isolationist by rejecting the rest of the world, but we are becoming isolated because the rest of the world now rejects us.

We stand all but alone in Vietnam.

Most of what token help we are receiving is reluctant, as with the Philippines whose President has had such difficulty in securing commitment of his legislature to the troops he has promised.

In Korea, our only substantial ally, the

troops are bought. We are paying all the costs for the 20,000-man contingent in Vietnam, and we will pay for any new commitments and contingents.

Except for the few hundred Australians and New Zealanders involved, other nations have confined themselves to humanitarian measures such as sending medical teams, flood relief, or hospital equipment.

A consortium of West German businessmen has provided China with the promise of a steel mill.

It is rumored that some of their contacts for financial support have run back to our own country. It is significant for us to remember that not one country in North or South America has troops by our side. In all the continent of Europe, not one country has troops by our side. In all the continent of Africa, not one country has troops by our side. Excluding Korea—unless we want to count the Philippines—in all of Asia, not one country has troops by our side.

The major countries in all the continents of the world are against us.

I cannot help repeating what the Japanese told me when I was there. They said:

We have been in Southeast Asia once. We are not going back. Besides, we want your military bases out of Okinawa. We want Okinawa returned to Japan. We want your military bases out of Japan.

I asked at that time what I thought was a pertinent question:

Who will then defend your against the Chinese Communists?

Their very easy reply was:

You must remember that we are second cousins to the Chinese, and we are trading with them.

I asked how much they traded with them and if there was any restriction on the items. They said:

We are trading with them to the extent that we think it is best to do so, and when it is profitable. We do not intend to let their business go by the wayside.

We think of Peking as our enemy. Our friends are selling their surplus wheat to China, a country that we say is directing the activities of North Vietnam.

Our neighboring country to the north, with whom we have friendly relations and a common boundary, Canada, has just recently completed a long-term agreement to sell their surplus wheat to China.

The grain bins on the northern border of the United States have been discovered to be depleted of their surplus grain. It might be interesting to find out how much of that surplus wheat has found its way across the border and over to the enemy, Peking.

VI

The earth-bound politics of Vietnam cannot be solved by the airborne cavalry of America.

The anonymous southeast Asia statesman who made that memorable summing up to Emmet John Hughes, as he reported it in the May 30 Newsweek, put our hard choice clearly when he continued:

You now have probably a last decision to make. You may try to smother all forces in Vietnam seeking compromise and peace—thus pitting them all against you. Or you may try to work with the best of these forces in their confused attempts at negotiation, so that the very imperfect end of it all still will allow you to leave with dignity.

Have we now made our last decision, the decision that, come what peace opportunities there may, our way shall be irrevocably that of military escalation, of might that loses us our tradition of right, of acceding one after another to the successive unsuccessful next steps which pave the road to atomic holocaust in the sacred cause of anticommunism?

It takes no courage to do what we are doing today. We drifted into the situation at first, without planning. But to plan escalation of what has been called this "dirty little war" into an ever larger, dirtier, more tragic conflict is worse than no planning at all.

Secretary General U Thant has portrayed what is happening when he said:

Little by little, larger forces and more powerful armaments have been introduced, until an anguished and perplexed world has suddenly found that a limited and local conflict is threatening to turn into a major confrontation. And though the fear—

I want to emphasize this—

and though the fear of a much larger conflict may still have a restraining influence upon the demands of military strategy, the temptation to win a military success may still prove stronger than the more prudent call to reason.

U Thant has long since, and repeatedly, set forth three measures by which we must proceed for peace. With these I agree: return to the Geneva agreements; include the actual combatants in the discussions; and "start scaling down military operations" rather than escalation.

To do these things instead of what we are now doing requires courage. We must resolve, in the words of John Emmet Hughes, "to ignore all zealots who still shout their preposterous prescription that a little more military medicine can cure political sickness." We must give up the mythology that says the National Liberation Front is a figment of the imagination. The Geneva accords were signed by France and by the Vietnam, not by the state of Vietnam whose delegate stood by protesting. The willingness to deal with such an entity as the NLF, a nongovernment, requires courage, but its recognition appears the major sticking point in much of the discussion about negotiation.

And we must deescalate rather than move always as inexorably as a juggernaut toward the horrors of conflict with China and the dropping of the hydrogen bomb. We should follow the sage advice of General Gavin, and in moving back to enclaves we should hold and negotiate.

When we in Congress consider proposals for watersheds and dams and projects of the Corps of Engineers, we rely heavily on the careful calculation of what the corps calls the cost-benefit ratio.

What is the cost-benefit ratio in Vietnam? A truthful answer to that question, including the costs of our go-it-alone policy in the loss of America's now tarnished moral leadership among the nations, is too great for persistent escalation. Let us work as diligently for peace.

One final proposal. Russia is a co-chairman of the Geneva Conferences of both 1954 and 1962. Britain is the other co-chairman. As a first step, I propose that they together demand a convening of a third Geneva Conference to bring us back to an implementing of the Geneva accords, with whatever modifications may be found necessary. I shall reiterate this proposal directly to the British people in a BBC satellite broadcast this evening. I propose that the situation has become so serious that it is the duty of the other nations concerned to answer such a call, and that the process must be strengthened and implemented in whatever way is possible through the United Nations, to whom our unilateral action is doing all but irreparable damage by the destruction of its usefulness.

For the problem is one of self-discipline. We have not found it hard to call for United Nations action in the Congo, in Cyprus, in Israel, and in Jordan. But we in the United States, who are able by our power to act in a different way from the small powers, must also subject ourselves to the good judgment and the cooperative appraisal of the world community. Otherwise, we have perhaps once and for all lost our right to moral leadership and become only another in the long parade of powers, from Alexander's Greece to our own day, who have trusted to might instead of right.

U Thant said in his speech last month:

The solution lies in the hands of those who have the power and the responsibility, to decide. If they seek a peaceful solution, the United Nations and many of its members stand ready to help them in all possible ways.

It is we who have the responsibility, it is we who have the power. It is we who must turn toward a peaceful solution and withdraw from this pattern of escalation, courageous in the right, to find the answer in peace at the bargaining table.

During the delivery of Mr. HARTKE'S speech.

Mr. CLARK. Is it not true, I ask the Senator from Indiana, that a reconvening of the Geneva powers has also been advocated by U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations?

Mr. HARTKE. Not only has he advocated it, but advocated it repeatedly. He has pointed out the point which I am trying to make in my remarks today: The real prelude to this is that the powers responsible—and I hope we recognize that we are involved, now, in that war over there—must try to create the climate, not for greater resistance, not for pent-up emotions, but for constructive action.

All I can say to my friend from Pennsylvania is, I wonder how interested we would be in peace if we saw bombs dropping on the outskirts of Washington, D.C.? I think it would intensify our efforts to resist, and to say, "We will never come to the peace table with those people."

Mr. CLARK. It has been said there is a crisis of credibility in our country with respect to our earnest desire to end the Vietnamese war through negotiations. The Senator from Indiana has pointed out, with powerful logic, the many occasions on which, while talking peace, we have stepped up and escalated the war.

I appreciate the Senator's comments, and I congratulate him on the splendid address he is making. I hope the suggestions we have made in this short colloquy will receive some attention, both at Foggy Bottom and the White House.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HARTKE. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from South Dakota, who for a long time has led a tremendous fight in the Senate toward a peaceful solution of this problem.

I should like to point out, parenthetically, before I yield, that I do not believe the Senator from South Dakota, who carries the highest decorations of this Government, should come before us with a feeling that he is not a patriot.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I appreciate the overly generous estimate of me that has been stated by the Senator from Indiana, but I really rose to commend him on the clarity of his expression today.

The Senator from Indiana has made a number of statements in recent months on the difficult problem in Vietnam. I believe that his contribution this afternoon represents his finest effort. I commend him not only on the clarity of his statement, but also on the remarkable courage that he has displayed in everything he has said this afternoon.

The Senator from Indiana took on a new leadership role in the Senate early this year, not that he had not made many great contributions in the past. But in speaking out as he has, and in using his talents and skill to persuade others to speak out, I believe he has made a contribution to the better understanding of the issues in Vietnam and to the discussion of those issues in the Senate and across the country.

As the Senator from Indiana has said, the easiest thing in the world to do in time of war is to join the parade. No great initiative is required. No great intelligence of courage is required to drift along with the crowd in time of war.

One of the greatest Americans reminded us a good many years ago that the first casualty in time of war is the truth. Therefore, I was happy to hear the Senator from Indiana emphasize the right of the American people to know the truth. One way by which they find the truth is through the discussion of various points of view in the Senate.

I believe the Senator from Indiana would be the first to agree that men of good will can disagree on this issue and on how it should be dealt with. One method by which a better understanding of the problem can be attained is the kind of frank expression of opinion with which he has favored Senators today.

In my opinion, it will be more difficult

for honest dissent to be heard henceforth. The more the bombs and the guns roar, the more difficult it is for thoughtful voices to be heard over that kind of escalation.

I know of no Member of the Senate who loves public service and loves political action more than does the Senator from Indiana. I know that he does not risk his political career lightly; but he takes that risk by speaking out at a time when the war is heating up, because he loves his country, he loves his family, and he loves the peace of the world more than he is concerned about his own political security.

I suspect that there will be some temporary applause for the recent action. But when the people learn once again that this is not the answer to the kind of problems that face us in Vietnam, the disillusionment will set in again.

Again, I applaud the Senator's speech in the Senate this afternoon.

Mr. HARTKE. I thank the Senator from South Dakota for his fine words.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I join in the tribute that the distinguished Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] has extended to the senior Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE].

I would ask the senior Senator from Indiana whether we are not simply increasing the dosage of a medicine that has already failed to cure the patient? We notch up the war to a still higher level after years of continuous escalation, even though the whole process has brought us no closer to a negotiated settlement than we were 12 months ago, and even though the number of American troops engaged in the war has increased by more than tenfold?

I cannot see the logic that leads our decisionmakers to the conclusion that what has failed before is now suddenly going to succeed by notching the war up to a still higher level of general danger.

Does the Senator from Indiana agree?

Mr. HARTKE. I most certainly agree with the statement of the Senator from Idaho.

Yesterday the distinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] issued what I suppose would be considered a rather straightforward statement. I had occasion to talk to the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] before he left for his home State. He said:

Not alone do I mean what I say, but I feel it more deeply than I said it.

I wish he were here because what he said in those statements is exactly what the Senator from Idaho said, and that is that the same advice which proved faulty in the past is being used over again, and the same reasons are being given for the same type of action.

Hopefully and prayerfully, if this would bring the end to the war, I believe that the American people would applaud it. But to claim every other week that peace is virtually around the corner has the same effect as the economic effect of the claim of the end of a depression being just around the corner. This stirring of hope when there is no hope is worse than being brutally truthful about the facts.

I think that the American people are stronger than the leadership gives them credit for being. I think they have the courage to face up to the facts of life and courage to be a little humble in front of the rest of the world, if that be the requirement. They have the courage to send forth their youth, as they have demonstrated in past military efforts. We have love of country but we also have love of man. I think that we underestimate the character of the American people. I do not wish to cast a reflection on the American people for an eternity which they do not deserve and unfortunately that is happening more and more each day.

I wonder how we will justify it with our conscience, the conscience of the Nation, in years to come.

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Dear Supporter:

On 15 November 1963, we recommended for your priority support three Senatorial incumbents, chosen from a group of seven outstanding Senators on the basis of our assessment of their individual needs for funds at that time.

As we have previously informed you, your response was gratifying indeed; it has enabled these Senators to get off to an early start in difficult re-election campaigns.

We promised last November to propose further candidates for your support this Spring. Our list last November consisted of the following Senators:

Quentin N. Burdick, North Dakota
Gale W. McGee, Wyoming
Frank E. Moss, Utah
Albert Gore, Tennessee
Philip A. Hart, Michigan
Eugene J. McCarthy, Minnesota
Edmund S. Muskie, Maine

To this list we now propose to add

Joseph M. Montoya, New Mexico

present Representative and candidate for election to the Senate in 1964, and

Ralph R. Harding, Idaho

candidate for re-election to the House of Representatives.

In the judgment of the Council Directors after personal interviews by some of our directors plus consultation with our political advisors and other knowledgeable individuals and agencies in the Nation's capital concerned with the selection of candidates, all of these candidates are worthy of your

support and the Council will be pleased to transmit contributions submitted in their behalf. However, on the basis of the assessment of the status of their campaigns and of their relative needs at this time, the Council recommends that priority should now be given to support of the campaigns of Senators McGee, Moss and Muskie and Representatives Harding and Montoya. The Council further recommends that, unless you have specific desires relating to the support of some particular candidate, that contributions now be given to the following priority candidates according to the following recommended alphabetical apportionment:

Montoya	A-D
McGee	E-K
Muskie	L-P
Moss	Q-S
Harding	T-Z


You will note that, with its recommendation of Congressman Harding for support, the Council is departing from the precedent of soliciting support only for candidates for the Senate. However, we feel that in this case, the re-election of Mr. Harding is the first step towards our support of this outstanding young legislator for election to the Senate in 1966. Our reasons are spelled out in greater detail in our resume of Mr. Harding's qualifications.

A short resume of the qualifications of the individuals on our priority list, with a summary of voting records on a group of relevant issues, is given in the enclosures.

In late August, the Council will make further recommendations based upon our assessment of the situation at that time.

We urge you now to forward the first half of your 1964 contribution to one or more of the individuals selected above. A form and a return envelope are enclosed for your convenience.

Sincerely



H. Ashton Crosby
Executive Director for the
Board of Directors

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Washington, D.C.

April 30, 1964

Memo to: Board of Directors

From: H. Ashton Crosby
Executive Director

Please review this draft and submit your
comments.

DRAFT OF ACTION PROGRAM

During the Winter of 1962, Leo Szilard nuclear physicist and molecular biologist, a leading figure in the conception and execution of the Manhattan Project, winner of the 1959 Atoms for Peace Award, gave a speech, "Are We on the Road to War?" at a number of major academic centers across the country. In this speech, Szilard expressed his concern at the drift toward nuclear war and proposed a national political organization to work for a comprehensive disarmament agreement and the abolition of war. The immediate and enthusiastic response resulted in the formation of the Council for Abolishing War in June 1962 which became the Council for a Livable World on

The Council maintains a full-time staff in Washington, and under the guidance of its Directors and Advisors, conducts a broad program of operations.

The underlying idea of the Council is that a modest number of thoughtful and dedicated persons, united on a set of obtainable and responsible objectives, can have a significant impact in support of constructive United States foreign and defense policies. Supporters of the Council pledge to contribute 2% of their annual incomes or 1%, or \$100, either to the campaigns of recommended congressional candidates or else directly to the Council in support of its general activities.

In each election year, the Council recommends to its supporters a number of congressional candidates who can be counted upon not only to support the Administration's constructive policies, but also to

press for improvements in these policies. The Council's recommendations also take into account each candidate's chance of success, his need for support and the qualities of the opposing candidate. The Council attempts to concentrate its efforts on those campaigns in which relatively modest contributions can have a decisive effect. For example, in 1962, the Council transmitted \$22,000 to the campaign of George McGovern (the former director of Food for Peace under President Kennedy), representing approximately 20% of his total campaign costs. McGovern won the campaign by 600-odd votes and as a Senator has attracted national acclaim for his thoughtful statements on foreign policy and defense spending.

GENERAL ACTIVITIES

The Council maintains close contact with members of Congress and the Administration who are deeply concerned with the need for arms control and disarmament. Under Council auspices, scientists, scholars, and others come to Washington to speak with members of the Administration and Congress, and to press for specific changes in policy and legislation based on the objectives set forth in this action program and in various Council position papers. Some of these discussions are completely informal, taking place in the office of the official concerned. At other times, the Council prepares testimony or background research for congressional hearings or federal agencies. The Council also conducts a regular series of

seminars for Senators and their assistants under informal circumstances where a wide range of subjects can be frankly discussed.

Another major undertaking of the Council is the conduct of study and research in the areas of foreign policy and disarmament. Most Council studies culminate in position papers which are widely distributed in Washington and to Council supporters.

1964 ACTION PROGRAM OF THE COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Alarmed by the potential destructiveness of nuclear war and by the increasing independence and power of other states, the United States and the Soviet Union have taken a few preliminary steps on a road which could lead to a secure peace. The bitterness of the cold war has begun to abate. Treaties have successfully been negotiated for inspected Antarctic disarmament, for a hot-line between Washington and Moscow, and for a limited nuclear test ban. There has been an agreement not to place bombs in orbit and reciprocal reductions in defense spending have been announced. In addition, a quantitative (40%) reduction in the production of fissionable materials has been announced by the United States in conjunction with a Soviet announcement to forego the construction of two additional re-actor plants.

The climate has definitely altered. One can place this movement as emanating from the Cuban crisis where both nations looked into the nuclear abyss and recoiled in horror; or one can attribute America's willingness to use nuclear weapons over vital interests

in the Cuban crisis as having frightened the Soviets into a more tractable frame of mind. It doesn't matter too much and there are unquestionably a variety of contributing causes. For one thing, the Revolution is now 40 years old and Russia has emerged as one of the two great world powers with all that such a role implies in terms of relationships and responsibilities. For another, the schism between the Soviets and the Chinese has forced a major change in Soviet policy toward the West. Moreover, the Soviets have, in addition to a chronic agricultural crisis, a rising consumer demand and a definite strain with respect to the allocation of resources to the economy in terms of building both missiles and a better life. Hence, there is a definite pressure for change. We realize full well that an adversary relationship exists and will continue to exist between the US and the USSR in the political, ideological, and economic fields. But this is a challenge we can accept and face with confidence. It is possible also with the passage of time that the growing interdependence of all nations with each other will see a lessening of even this adversary relationship. And there are two areas of absolute interest and agreement between the US and the USSR, namely, that there will not be a nuclear war; and no proliferation of nuclear weapons. With responsible leadership it is possible that the nuclear super-powers can accommodate some of their outstanding differences, implement substantial arms

control and disarmament measures, and conduct international affairs in a manner which will prevent the outbreak of deadly quarrels within the world community.

Unfortunately, this is not the only course which lies before us. The world still lives on the brink of unparalleled disaster. Many potential danger areas exist, in any one of which a serious miscalculation by a major power could lead to world war. Violent events in central Europe, South America or Southeast Asia could set off a train of events which would lead to United States and Soviet military opposition. In that case, there would be great danger that nuclear weapons would be introduced and that the war would erupt into general nuclear conflagration.

There is still the possibility of a new outbreak of the arms race. So long as the strategic arms race concentrates on offensive weapons such as missiles carrying nuclear bombs, the race becomes self-limiting. There has come a point in the race when, within wide limits, a further increase in offensive power on either side has no significant effect on the strategic balance. The result is to provide a breathing space for political adjustments and disarmament measures. But this respite cannot be viewed as more than temporary. Technology never stands still. For example, the seemingly innocent placement of missile defenses about cities would set missile and anti-missile programs against each other and could precipitate an unlimited arms race.

These developments can be avoided and the world can begin to free itself from the threat of nuclear war only if the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union institute and enlist broad support for imaginative and responsible policies. It is the aim of the Council for a Livable World to help initiate and support such policies in the United States on a quid pro quo basis.

Some of the policies advocated by the Council could be adopted immediately by our government. However, the administration of a democracy cannot act in ways for which there is insufficient congressional and popular support even if it knows that such actions would be in the best interest of the nation. In too many cases we are handicapped by policies based on old myths rather than current realities. There was a time when we could defend our citizens by military strength but great military strength no longer insures the defense of the nation. Although our strength has grown tremendously since the arms race began, so has the number of Americans grown who would die in a general nuclear war.

In the years since World War II, the international scene has changed profoundly. The Soviet Union is nearing the living standards of Western Europe and its society is opening. Meanwhile, its satellites have recovered significant, even if limited, independence. Half the world's population has been reorganized under new national governments of great variety.

The simple policy of containing our adversaries, of not recognizing them, of not trading with them, fails to take account of today's realities. When adversaries have the power to annihilate one another within hours and might be brought to do so by the force of unpremeditated events, they cannot afford isolation. In place of containment we must substitute growing interdependence even side-by-side with deterrence. Beneficial political changes we have been unable to bring about by containment and isolation may well be fostered by new forms of cooperation and competition. The Council for a Livable World will support those congressmen who are willing to speak out against the continuation of the myths of the past.

AIMS OF THE ACTION PROGRAM

The overall goal of the Council for a Livable World is to establish a livable world free from nuclear war. In working toward this goal, the Council has the following general aims:

1. To raise the level of congressional and public discussions of foreign and defense policies.
 - a) Support election campaigns of outstanding congressional candidates willing to speak out on the problems of securing a peaceful world.
 - b) Provide advice, testimony, and study papers on important issues and support seminar programs for congressmen and their aids, to bring to them information and advice on important issues.
 - c) To arrange for addresses by legislators and other distinguished persons on important issues of foreign policy and defense, to widen the public discussion of these matters.

2. To remove the main obstacles to arms control and disarmament agreement.

- a) Open up for discussion the economic consequences of arms reduction, with the hope that planning now can ease the path toward arms reduction.

3. Prevent the arms race from breaking out anew and to obtain an arms reduction agreement at an early date by advocating:

- a) The non-deployment of anti-ballistic missiles by both sides.
- b) A mutual freeze on nuclear weapons, and perhaps some form of bomber disarmament.
- c) Observation posts in Central Europe.
- d) Mutual reductions in armament levels and defense budgets.

4. To increase stabilizing measures of cooperation and interdependence between nations.

- a) Increasing international exchange programs.
- b) To work toward bringing China in the family of nations, by exploring means of increasing trade and travel contacts.

If, after reading the program of the Council for a Livable World, you are interested in becoming a supporter or in obtaining further information, you are cordially invited to write to the Council for a Livable World, 1346 Connecticut Avenue N. W., Washington, D. C.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

National Office: Dupont Circle Building

1346 Connecticut Avenue N. W., Washington, D. C.

Phone: Columbia 5-3800, Area Code 202

Members and supporters need not be in complete agreement with all the major objectives of the Action Program; but they should be wholeheartedly in favor of at least one. When speaking in the name of the Council, members are restricted to the current Program. However, they are free to press, either as individuals or through other organizations to which they may belong, for objectives not contained in the Program.

Local and regional groups will conduct seminars open to all members and supporters based on the Action Program for the purpose of clarifying the relevant issues in order that they may be able to present their views as effectively as possible when speaking with members of the Administration and Congress. If the Washington lobby is to succeed it will need the cooperation of its members in generating substantial grass-roots support for the specific objectives of the Action Program through public discussion and the communications media.

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SHOULD THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE?

John Silard

In 1960 Secretary of State Herter first proposed creation of a NATO multilateral strategic nuclear force. When Premier de Gaulle made manifest his break with the United States and his determination to develop a French nuclear capacity, the Administration's response was a strong espousal of the Multilateral Nuclear Force. The MLF was intended as a face-saving device for the United States, which would quiet claims in England and Germany for independent nuclear capability by the offer of a nuclear "partnership" among the allies who hold out against de Gaulle's unilateralist policy.

The initial lukewarm reaction among our NATO allies and here at home, has induced the belief within the last year that the MLF is a dormant proposal. That belief is erroneous. Having won the formal approval of the Administration, plans to activate the MLF have progressed under the leadership of a contingent in the State Department for whom MLF is a major commitment. The Navy, too, has become interested because of the potential accretion to its operations with the fleet of nuclear vessels contemplated by the MLF. Meanwhile, President Johnson's proposal for a nuclear freeze to be negotiated with the Soviets has been stalled at Geneva by the Russians who point out that we cannot coincidentally activate a freeze and build a strategic nuclear fleet. Moreover, while it was anticipated that the opposition of the Labor Party in Great Britain would preclude activation of the MLF, there is growing doubt whether the Labor Party will hold to its present position if it wins the elections. In sum, MLF plans are proceeding in the face of disinterest both among our allies and at home, while opponents within our own Government cannot effectively exert their influence as long as our official policy remains wedded to the MLF.

What is the MLF? Essentially, it is a "partnership" in the operation of a fleet of vessels equipped with strategic nuclear weapons. The Polaris-armed vessels would be manned by mixed forces from various NATO participants, with a veto by anyone of the major participating nations on the firing of the weapons. Of course, the veto renders the "partnership" unequal, since the United States with its nuclear forces in Europe thereby remains the only country which can independently of its allies activate a nuclear exchange. Accordingly, some German advocates of the MLF hope that ultimately the veto will be removed, and Germany will thus obtain its own nuclear force through the MLF. We have encouraged this hope by assurances that MLF is only the beginning of a "true European" force. That was the suggestion made by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Schaetzel in a presentation in September 1963 in Oxfordshire, England. Yet such a veto-free MLF would be quite contrary to our present proposals at Geneva for a nuclear freeze and an agreement against further proliferation, with the result that there exists a present inconsistency in our overt representations to the Soviets and our thinly veiled promises to NATO countries.

Clark Raps Congressmen In the Military

Says They Should
Be Forced to Quit
As Reserve Officers

By MICHAEL B. SISAK
Of The Bulletin Staff

Senators and congressmen who hold reserve military commissions should be forced to give them up, Sen. Joseph S. Clark (D-Pa) said here last night.

Clark said 15 senators, including Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz) and J. Strom Thurmond (D-SC), and 70 congressmen are holding reserve commissions unconstitutionally.

Clark addressed 500 persons at a meeting of Council for a Liveable World, an arms control group, in University Museum, 33d and Spruce sts. He flew here from Washington.

Clark said the commissions have resulted in "clear conflict of interest" when these congressmen vote on the military budget and defense bills, Clark said.

He said the commission holders should resign their commissions.

Calls Many Friend

"Many of these men are friends of mine," he said. "They are men of integrity and many of them, I am sure, are no less ardent for peace and disarmament than they would be if they had no affiliation to the military.

"But the Founding Fathers put the prohibition against dual office-holding in the Constitution for a good reason, and I think the Constitution should be obeyed whether it can be en-

forced or not.

"If ever Congress has a need to be impartial and free from conflicts of interest, whether apparent or real, it is in matters of military budget.

Assortment of Generals

"Certainly one would not want to have an assortment of generals, colonels, captains and majors having the final say on the defense budget.

"Decisions of this magnitude must be made by civilians who are free to act for the nation as a whole without any limiting ties to the military establishment.

"To put a man in both camps, and make him both a senator and a general, presents a blatant and clear-cut conflict of interest."

The day a congressman takes office, he should be without a commission, Clark said.

Recruiting in Congress

"It is widely known on Capitol Hill that there is intense competition among the services to recruit members of Congress into their respective reserve units," he said.

"They try to outbid one another in granting congressmen and senators rapid promotion and in offering alluring junkets and secret briefings to congressional reservists."

Clark said there is no justification for the practice.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD
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A principal argument advanced by proponents of the MLF is that England, Germany, and possibly other nations will follow de Gaulle's independent force example unless we can offer these nations a larger nuclear role within the NATO Alliance. Initially, it might be questioned whether the modest nuclear capability which France will attain is more troublesome in its military and political implications than the prospect of a large European strategic force with Germany a predominant participant. Exposition of the view that such a development would be less disturbing than the political and military implications of the MLF, appears in the March 1963 issue of The Reporter in an article by Henry A. Kissinger, and it will not be repeated here. We examine here in its short and its long-term implications the "anti-proliferation" argument made for the MLF:

1. MLF in the Short Run. It is clear that for the 1960s, MLF proponents vastly over-estimate European desire for a larger nuclear role. It is said that without MLF the Germans would soon follow the example of de Gaulle in developing an independent nuclear capacity. But with respect to Germany, not only would an independent nuclear force violate the existing treaties, it would cause a reaction by the Russians, as well as the United States, of a dimension which would give the Germans serious pause before entering on a provocative and expensive nuclear program.

There is, in fact, no evidence that the Germans presently desire a nuclear force of their own. What the Germans do desire in the short run is assurance that the United States is committed to employing its nuclear forces in Europe to forestall any form of aggressive action from the East, and that our weapons are targeted so as to assure that a nuclear exchange would also involve Russian territory, not just German soil. Yet for this modest German concern, the MLF goes too far. Bringing technical personnel from European nations into a second-level role in the targeting and deployment of our existing strategic missiles, would go most of the way towards meeting existing German concern about the United States nuclear umbrella. The MLF, on the other hand, will create an entirely new nuclear force at sea, which is both expensive and unnecessary in strategic military terms. Moreover, it may kindle rather than quiet nuclear aspirations among our European allies, and thus propel the very sentiment it is claimed the MLF would foreclose - the aspiration for independent nuclear capability. If we espouse the view that our allies' self-respect requires parity of nuclear participation with us, it will not be long before they espouse the same view. By contrast, without our active salesmanship, nuclear arms development may remain unpopular in Germany, England, and other nations.

2. MLF in the Long Run. While the MLF is more than is needed to meet the present concern of our allies, on the other hand it is inade to meet what are likely to be the long-term aspirations of NATO nations. As Kissinger's analysis points out, the force of de Gaulle's

position for independent nuclear capability is based upon the realization of some fundamental differences of outlook between the United States and European nations. Thus, as much as our nuclear posture in Europe serves to preserve our close relations with allies and to hold the line for our positions vis-a-vis the Soviets, we may yet be increasingly disinclined actually to use these weapons in an exchange which could precipitate an all-out war of annihilation between the United States and the Soviets.

Moreover, the glue in the NATO alliance has been the existence of the common enemy in the East, but a predictable progression of closer relationships with the Soviets, fear of a resurgent Germany, and conflicting economic interests such as those reflected in the split over the Common Market, may radically alter the present community of interest between the United States and some of its NATO allies.

To the extent that anticipations of such changes exist in Europe, there will be growing interest in independent nuclear forces or a European nuclear force not subject to a United States veto. In the case of Germany, there will be the added incentive of the role of swing-nation which the pseudo-partnership will not satisfy. In sum, as much as the MLF exceeds the presently manifested desire for NATO-nation participation in the nuclear deterrent, it will fall short of the long-term European demand for independent nuclear capability.

It may therefore be anticipated that the strongest pressures will ultimately arise for abandonment of the United States veto on the use of the MLF, and that such pressures may in time succeed with the result that the MLF will have paved the way for the very proliferation of nuclear weaponry which it is supposed to forestall. Alternatively, if NATO countries cannot attenuate or force abandonment of the United States veto, they may then proceed with the development of their independent nuclear forces, with the added stimulus and know-how which we ourselves have provided through the MLF. It seems clear, therefore, that the MLF is not a proper answer either to the existing or to the longer range nuclear aspirations of our NATO allies, and will more likely hasten than retard the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe.

B. SUBSIDIARY ARGUMENTS FOR THE MLF.

1. MLF As a Bargaining Device. Some Administration officials who are not advocates of the MLF would nevertheless continue on our present course on the theory that in future bargaining with the Soviets over arms control in Europe, the MLF would provide an additional pawn for trading. Yet as an experienced negotiator knows, one may bargain with assets, but it is difficult to bargain to an advantage with liabilities. If MLF is a free world liability, it cannot become a bargaining asset with the Soviets.

Even more importantly, the "bargaining pawn" argument disregards the fact that if the MLF actually comes into being, it may be impossible to convince our own allies to give it up for an arms control agreement. Once a strategic European force is in existence, our NATO allies may say with

some credibility that if it was worth creating for the collective security, it is worth keeping and ought not to be surrendered short of a complete and general disarmament agreement. It is therefore probable that while creation of the MLF may provide an additional pawn for trading with the Soviets in an European arms control agreement, it would represent a pawn which our own allies will refuse to trade.

2. MLF As a Mere Multilateral Substitute for Bilateral Controls.

Proponents urge that the MLF multilateral control with vetoes by major participants, is not materially different from the existing bilateral control over tactical and medium range nuclear weapons in Europe. These proponents argue that with respect to the present nuclear weapons in Europe there is already a system of shared control with the situs nation, and that all the MLF will do is to add more trigger fingers whose concurrence would be necessary for the firing of the weapons.

Apart from some question whether the MLF controls will in fact not give increased leverage to other nations with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, this argument blurs the critical distinction between strategic and tactical weapons. The decision that our NATO allies should share in the deployment and control of tactical weapons located in Europe may have been right or wrong, but it was a radically different decision from that posed by the MLF. For a decision to fire the missiles in the MLF would be to launch an attack on the Soviet Union with weapons of medium range so deployed as to be able to reach Soviet targets. In such an event there would ensue a nuclear war in which countless millions of Soviet and American citizens would perish. By contrast, the decision to give our NATO allies bilateral controls over tactical weapons was only a determination that a nuclear exchange initiated within the boundaries of NATO nations properly requires their participation in the decisional process. Accordingly, the MLF cannot be passed off as a mere extension of a bilateral control system to a multilateral control system, for the weapons of strategic war deployed in the MLF have radically different significance for the United States from the Nuclear weapons over which we presently share controls with NATO allies.

3. MLF as Step Toward a Western European Strategic Force.

A final argument made by some proponents, is the converse of the principal "non-proliferation" rationale for the MLF. Under this argument, it would be desirable to move toward a Western European alliance possessing its own strategic nuclear weapons free of United States control and United States responsibility. The proponents who welcome such a force, urge that the MLF is desirable not because it will end the spreading of nuclear weapons but because it will promote it.

To the extent that this view rests on the desire for a Western European unity it may, for sake of argument, be conceded that such a force would in fact promote some accretion in the unity of the NATO alliance. Yet the chief reason for such unity would be not fear of the Soviets, but fear of the Germans - the anticipation that without participation by other allies, the MLF would be a German-American nuclear alliance. Certainly, this is a fragile base for European "unity."

Moreover, the price paid in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries and the destabilization of the nuclear balance between the Soviets and the United States by this third force, is a price too high to be paid. In the last analysis, the integrity of the MLF proposal itself becomes subject to question when it is advertised simultaneously as a device which will contain and a device which will promote strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

C UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR MLF SUPPORT.

There are five major unfavorable aspects to the continuing United States insistence upon creation of the MLF:

1. Nuclear Freeze and Non-Proliferation Agreements Imperiled. President Johnson's proposals at Geneva for nuclear freeze and non-proliferation agreements, have been imperilled by our support of the MLF. The Russians quickly seized upon the MLF, pointing out that we could not both stand still and move ahead at the same time, and would have to abandon the MLF if we are serious about the proposed agreements. The Russian claim of inconstancy is somewhat confirmed by William Foster's quoted statement in the Herald Tribune of January 24, 1964 that the United States freeze proposal would not include the MLF. And as the editorial in the Washington Post of February 12, 1964 points out, there is some inconsistency between our offering NATO the MLF as the beginning of a European force and our asserting to the Soviets that it is consistent with a nuclear freeze.

2. De-emphasis of Conventional Force Expansion in Europe. Replacement of nuclear with conventional defensive capability in Europe has been a major policy of the Administration. To the extent that the MLF will be costly to our NATO allies and emphasize their continued protection through nuclear response, it militates against the Administration's stress on the need for conventional capability among our NATO allies.

3. Production of European Rift Rather Than Unity. Our European allies are not requesting the MLF but are having it forced upon them by our insistence¹. With the exception of some element in Germany, the MLF is not welcomed among the other nations, who must join it from fear of German predominance. The MLF is thus a rift-producing issue among our allies. And it is also causing serious internal political friction in NATO countries since it requires them to cast their lot unequivocally either with the United States or de Gaulle. Such a sharp choice situation

¹USIA Research and Reference Service report, dated April 5, 1963: "The reaction of the Western European press to U.S. Ambassador Merchant's recent trip indicated an overwhelming rejection of the kind of multilateral nuclear force (MLF) envisaged by the United States. Editorial comment was heaviest and most negative in West Germany. The rejection of the multilateral nuclear force within the NATO framework was commonly based on the belief that the United States was offering a hastily improvised and confused politically motivated and exorbitantly expensive device which would afford West Europe neither increased security nor increased voice in nuclear decisions. Supporters of the United States suggestion, for the most part a minority of Italian, British, and Scandinavian voices, saw it as the lesser of two evils and a possible starting point for discussions. By the end of the Merchant trip, most papers were openly speculating that the multilateral nuclear force plan in its present form would be scrapped with the debate continuing on the central issue of nuclear interdependence within the Western Alliance. Hopes were also expressed that the United States would find a way to dispel the confusion aroused by its original multilateral force proposals."

has unfavorable consequences upon West Germany, and by drawing another divisive line among our allies, disserves the European unity and settlement aspirations entertained by many within our Administration. As the Kissinger analysis in The Reporter pointed out: "The effort to isolate France by developing in the nuclear field a structure in which West Germany would be the key European member may in fact overstrain the fabric of European cohesion and Atlantic solidarity, and also undermine the domestic stability of West Germany. It is in nobody's interest - least of all West Germany's - to set in motion events that can only end with suspicion and concern in most of the countries of the West about Germany's nuclear role. This is bound to aid the Soviet thrust to divide the West through the fear of Germany. A divided country, which in the space of fifty years has lost two wars, experienced three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme inflation and the trauma of the Nazi era, should not - in its own interest - be placed in a position where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet pressure, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy."

4. Political Repercussions in the Congress. It also seems clear that the MLF is not presently favored in the Congress, or likely ultimately to win its support. It probably violates or strains the McMahon Act by giving nuclear information to other countries. It gives concern to those who have worried about a re-emerging Germany as a predominant European power which controls European fortunes. It is not favored by those who value our nuclear monopoly and the direct controls which we have retained upon the strategic weapons of potential annihilation. Meanwhile, the Administration has completely by-passed the Congress. The closer we approach activation of MLF, the larger will be the cumulative weight of these Congressional concerns.

5. Nuclear Race Escalation. Following the test ban, there have been widespread hopes that a way would be found to reach a plateau in the nuclear arms race in which there would be a leveling off of nuclear forces within present limits, and no expansion of weaponry to countries which are nuclear-free today. Apart from the additional numbers of strategic weapons and nations with such weapons which the MLF would involve, it is today the single proposal for a new advance which stands in the way of a leveling off of the nuclear arms race. This is a serious new ground for a reassessment of the MLF proposal.

D. THE LARGER CONTEXT: ENDING THE EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY OF ARMAMENTS.

Almost all current debates about the MLF are limited to the existing political and military relationship in Europe. All are predicated upon the assumption that there remains a military threat in Europe from the East which requires degrees of nuclear capability in Western Europe. First, however, it must be noted that except for the special problem of Berlin, conventional forces are demonstrably adequate for the defense of Western Europe against conventional force attack. Moreover, the very hypothesis of an attack upon Western Europe becomes less and less credible as the years pass. Without Soviet participation, such an attack would be

meaningless in military terms and therefore unlikely of initiation; with Soviet participation it would unquestionably initiate a world war, which again provides a highest level deterrent. Nor is it clear just what Soviet hope would impel such an attack. Our present military posture in Europe is based on a threat which no one believes.

The fact is that we have continued to give a preemptive position to military policy and nuclear power in Europe, in an era when the real problems of Europe are economic and political rather than military. Our continuing diplomacy of weaponry, both against the Soviets and vis-a-vis de Gaulle, stands in the way of the traditional diplomacy, prevents desired economic and cultural exchange, and other normal adjustments between countries as well as the necessary political developments within them. The MLF perpetuates obsession with military response to rifts with the Soviets and between the Allies, in an era which calls not for an arms polemic but for the progression of relationships between sovereign states.

Those who would promote a detente and ultimately a settlement in Europe, must look beyond such merely military alignments such as the pseudo-partnership of the Multilateral Nuclear Force. For the nuclear arms race and the diplomacy of armaments in Europe will not cease as long as the United States itself is the chief promoter of new nuclear weapons systems. On the other hand, a return to the traditional international diplomacy in Europe would foster a climate in which national possession of nuclear arms would appear less vital either for national prestige or national security. As long as the United States remains ready to employ its nuclear strength against a nuclear attack in Europe, there is in fact no security necessity for national nuclear forces. And the demand for nuclear arms in NATO countries attributable to the desire for national prestige and self-esteem, reflects a desire which we ourselves are fostering when we proclaim by devices such as the MLF that our NATO allies must have a first-ranking role in the operation of a strategic weapons system. In short, the only way in which our NATO allies can be induced not to strive for a strategic nuclear system of their own is if we ourselves cease our obeisance to nuclear power as the cornerstone of European policy and European defense.

Today we welcome agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Latin America and other areas where they are not presently deployed. One may hope that tomorrow we may recognize that in Europe, too, the proper goal is not an accretion in nuclear armaments but the replacement of the nuclear confrontation by political and economic settlements and conventional forces adequate to assure that they are honored. At a time when we should seek to move away from the nuclear arms race, the multi-lateral nuclear force is a move in precisely the wrong direction.

E. ALTERNATIVES TO UNITED STATES PROMOTION OF THE MLF.

There are essentially three alternatives to the present United States position:

1. Abandoning the MLF. While this may constitute long-term wisdom for the United States, it is unlikely that we would renounce the MLF in the near future without at least a serious quid pro quo from the Soviets. It should be noted that if the United States abandons the MLF, it may continue to adhere to its opposition to the independent development of nuclear capability by Germany, and other nations, and we may expect some success in holding our allies to that position at least for the next few years.

2. Initiating a Slow-Down of MLF Activation. This seems the most desirable immediate step, but there is always difficulty in taking the first step away from an established course. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings might serve as a temporary brake. A slow-down should pave the way toward ultimate recession by the United States from the MLF proposal.

3. A Replacement for MLF. A more modest nuclear "partnership" might be proposed to meet the present concerns of NATO allies. Second level technical people could be brought into the targeting and planning phases of our existing strategic nuclear force, to give added assurance of our readiness to employ the nuclear umbrella. To the extent that we are, in fact, ready to employ that umbrella, it seems highly desirable that our allies be assured that this is so. By this means we may satisfy some present concerns among our NATO allies without creating a new strategic striking force in Europe and opening the door to an independent European nuclear "third force" with its troublesome political and military implications.

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Home work

27 April 1964

Memo to: Board of Directors

FROM: H. Ashton Crosby,
 Executive Director

I would like to get this out by 1 May. Please forward your comments, if any, by return mail if possible.

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Apr 28 Chauncy
16 Stuy
Cambridge
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Manfred Eisen
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MEMORANDUM

To: All Council Supporters

On 15 November 1963, we solicited your support for three Senatorial incumbents based on our assessment of their individual worthiness, records and specific needs.

As we have previously informed you, the response was magnificent, and has enabled these individuals to get off to an early start in their re-election campaigns.

We stated in November that we would support additional candidates in the Spring of 1964, including new senatorial candidates. The following recommendations made at this time are based on a synthesis of the views of the Council Directors plus the considered judgment and evaluation of the most knowledgeable individuals and agencies in the Nation's Capital concerned with selection of candidates:

For the Senate

Joseph M. Montoya - New Mexico
Gale W. McGee, Wyoming
Edmund S. Muskie, Maine
Eugene J. McCarthy, Minnesota

For the House

Ralph R. Harding, Idaho

The following additional individuals are on our recommended list and worthy of support, but on the basis of relative needs, the Council recommends priority be given now to the above listed candidates:

Quentin N. Burdick, North Dakota
Frank E. Moss, Utah
Philip A. Hart, Michigan
Albert Gore, Tennessee
Winston L. Prouty, Vermont

A short resume of each individual on our priority list is included below:

Congressman Joseph M. Montoya, now serving his fourth term as a Member of the U. S. House of Representatives (was elected to the 85th Congress in 1957 to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Representative Antonio Fernandez.) Immediately upon his election, he was appointed by Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn to the House Judiciary Committee. This was the first time that a Representative from New Mexico had been appointed to this important committee.

In the field of international affairs, Rep. Montoya has been selected by the President and by the Congress to represent the United States on many missions of great importance. He was a member of the Executive Committee of the Inter-American Parliamentary Organization and has been a delegate to the Interparliamentary Conference. Congressman Montoya strongly supported H. R. 9118, the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. In addition, Congressman Montoya has been a strong advocate of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and although as a representative, he did not have an opportunity to vote for the Treaty, he spoke in its favor and urged its support. Senator Mechem, his opponent, will have strong right-wing support and AMA support.

The Council once again recommends support for Senator Gale W. McGee who first won election to the Senate without prior political experience in 1958 while a Professor (Ph.D. University of Chicago) of American History at the University of Wyoming. In terms of Senator McGee's record, the Council feels amply justified in urging support. His voting record by Council standards has been perfect, but in addition he has taken forceful and public stands on a variety of issues which have caused him to suffer attacks from the radical right. In speaking on the Senate floor on the Test Ban Treaty, Senator McGee stated: "If the pioneers who settled the West had had the same state of mind as those who seek iron clad reservations to the Treaty, none would ever have passed the Mississippi. What the treaty is - is a small chance to improve the outlook for human survival -- what the treaty does for us then is win a chance, albeit a small chance, to bring peace to mankind."

As a member of the Appropriations Committee, he has consistently fought for larger appropriations for major State Department programs such as the Agency for International Development, The United States Information Agency, The Alliance for Progress, Non-Military Oriented Foreign Aid Programs, and the like. He is being opposed strongly by the American Medical Association for his support of Medicare, by the Farm Bureau and by the Right to Work groups. His opponent, who titles himself a Goldwater Republican, will probably be John Wold, a former Republican State Chairman of Wyoming.

Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, running for re-election has had a distinguished record. He first received national attention when he defeated the Republican Governor of Maine for the governorship in 1954 at a time when the Democratic party in Maine to quote Senator Muskie "was not at the bottom of the barrel, but under the barrel." After two terms as Governor, he defeated the incumbent Republican for the Senate seat in 1958. He has had an outstanding Senate record; in the domestic field sponsoring the Civil Rights bill, Medical Care for the Aged, Accelerated Public Works and Area Redevelopment Administration Acts, etc. In the field of foreign affairs, he has been an active and outspoken champion of the United Nations, of Foreign Aid and various measures supporting the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has been a consistent advocate for seeking ways to

alleviate the arms race and has made a number of speeches throughout the country on this subject. His record on foreign affairs by Council standards is perfect.

Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota is running for re-election to the Senate, having been elected in 1958 after serving 4 consecutive terms in the House. Senator McCarthy is widely known as a speaker and writer on political, economic, and social problems. He has contributed articles to many journals and has spoken at forums and conferences in this country and abroad. Senator McCarthy is the author of Frontiers in American Democracy, Dictionary of American Politics, and The Challenge of Freedom.

Senator McCarthy came to national attention when he placed Adlai Stevenson's name in nomination at the Democratic Convention, a speech President Johnson said was "the best speech I ever heard made at a political convention."

His record in the Senate has been exemplary, both in the Foreign and Domestic fields, and through his speeches, articles and books, he has been in the forefront of those advocating reason and enlightenment in the conduct of our foreign relations.

In contrast to past procedure, this Spring we are advocating support for one House member for a particular reason. In the case of Congressman Harding, Democrat, of Idaho, conversations with Senator Church and other political individuals in Idaho, indicate that Congressman Harding will be the logical choice of the Democratic party to run for the Senate against the Republican incumbent, Senator Jordan, whose term expires in 1966. Congressman Harding's record in the House has been superior and our criteria relative to selected issues rates him at or close to a perfect score. On the contrary under almost any criteria desired, Senator Jordan's record has been minimal. Congressman Harding, even though he comes from a district that is strongly Republican in orientation and was the first Democratic Congressman to be elected in 24 years, has supported progressive legislation consistently in the House of Representatives.

He supported the nuclear test ban treaty, needed foreign assistance programs, was one of the original supporters of the Peace Corps and is a stout advocate of the United Nations.


In addition, Congressman Harding has been outspoken in attacking the John Birch Society and other members of the extreme right.

He faces an especially difficult campaign for re-election, not only because of the normal Republican make-up of his district and his battle with the extreme right, but also because Senator Len Jordan (R. Ida.), an extreme right anti-test ban treaty senator,

recognizes that Harding appears at this time to be his most probable opponent in 1966 and is dedicating his office and the effort of his supporters to the defeat of Harding in the 1964 congressional election. In consequence, the Council believes it important that Ralph Harding be returned to Congress as an essential prerequisite for his future campaign for the Senate two years hence.

In late August, the Council will review the election scene and make further recommendations based upon our assessment of the situation at that time.

We urge you now, however, to forward the first half of your 1964 contribution to the individuals selected above. A form and a return envelope are enclosed for your convenience.


H. Ashton Crosby,
Executive Director

	<u>1</u> <u>Test Ban</u>	<u>2</u> <u>ACDA</u>	<u>UN3</u> <u>Bonds</u>	<u>Stronger</u> <u>UN 4</u>	<u>Wheat</u> <u>Sale5</u>	<u>Aid</u> <u>6</u>	<u>Viet</u> <u>Nam7</u>
McGee	Y		Y	F	Y a Y b Y c	-	
Muskie	Y	Y	Y	F	Y a Y b Y c		F
McCarthy	Y	Y	Y		Y a Y b Y c		
Mechem *	N	N	N		N a N b N c		

* Republican incumbent opposing Montoya

- 1) Y signifies vote in favor of ratification; N a vote against
- 2) Y signifies vote in favor of authorizing 20 million appropriation for FY 64-5. N a vote against.
- 3) UN Bond issue - Y a vote in favor - N a vote against
- 4) An F signifies co-sponsorship of S. Con Res. 64 (Sen Clark) which expresses support for President's efforts to achieve general disarmament and requests President to formulate specific proposals for establishment of International peacekeeping machinery.
- 5) Wheat Sale is in three parts: a is a vote to table the Mundt amendment. A Y vote is in effect a vote to facilitate the sale of wheat. An N is a vote against. b second motion to table the Mundt amendment. Same as the first. c A vote for Y is a vote to delete from the foreign aid bill the ban against Government guarantees for financing wheat sales to Russia. A "Y" vote in effect facilitates wheat sales. A "N" is a vote against.
- 6) A "Y" is a vote for the Lausche amendment - an "N" is a vote against the amendment which is a vote for most favored nation treatment of Poland and Yugoslavia.
- 7) An "F" is co-sponsorship of Sen. Church's resolution against military and economic assistance to the Diem Regime (prior to its overthrow) unless it ceased repression and made a vigorous effort to secure popular support.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

1346 Connecticut Avenue N. W., Washington, D. C.

Executive Committee Meeting, April 24, 1964

PRESENT: John Silard, Daniel Singer, H. A. Crosby, Bernard Feld,
Allan Forbes, Matthew Meselson, Ruth Adams

1. The Executive Committee of the Council meeting Friday evening 24 April unanimously agreed to donate through Senator Clark \$1000.00 to Mrs. Genevieve Blatt in her primary campaign against Judge Musmanno. This \$1000.00 was in no way a commitment upon the part of the Council for further contributions to Mrs. Blatt should she win the primary. Senator Clark's office was notified by telephone at 2100 that evening.

2. It was unanimously agreed by the Executive Committee that the Senate Seminars will be continued and that we should bring certain scientists in to address the Senators. Drs. Ruina and Panofsky will be asked to address the Senators in July.

3. It was agreed that Council members should be informed of the taped seminar in which five senators - McGee, McGovern, Church, Pell and Nelson participated and that the tape would be made available to any Council group on loan.

4. It was thought that sometimes newsletters contain too much information in terms of too many pieces of literature in the envelope. Consequently, hereafter when the Council has a number of studies or other items to go out, they will follow at two week intervals.

5. It was the unanimous consensus of the Executive Committee that meetings be scheduled in the future as follows: The Executive Committee will now meet every two months and its meeting will be combined with the Board of Directors meeting which will meet three to four times per year. The meetings of the Executive Committee should span four days with one day devoted by the Executive Committee personnel for political action, viz, visiting senators, etc. Special meetings may be held as required.

6. The financial and administrative reports were unanimously approved by the Executive Committee.

The meeting adjourned at 2300.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

1346 Connecticut Avenue N. W., Washington, D. C.

Board of Directors meeting April 25, 1964

PRESENT: John Silard, Daniel Singer, H. A. Crosby, Bernard Feld,
Allan Forbes, Matthew Meselson, Ruth Adams, Jerome
Frank, Charles Pratt

The Board of Directors meeting convened at 0900 on 25 April, 1964. The first item of business for the Board was the selection of candidates by the Council to be submitted to the members for their financial support. After considerable discussion and reviewing the records of a number of individuals, the Board unanimously approved the following slate:

Congressman Montoya in his race for the Senate to receive 25% of the total contributions from supporters.
Senator McGee, running for re-election, to receive 25%.
Senator Muskie, running for re-election, to receive 20%.
Senator Moss, running for re-election, to receive 20%.
Congressman Harding, running for re-election, to receive 10%, or \$5000.00 to be guaranteed by the Council in the event contributions from supporters is not ample to meet this amount. Congressman Harding, running for the House, was supported as an exception due to the fact that in two years, Senator Jordan, the Republican, will be up for re-election in Idaho and Harding will then run against him.

Mr. Cohen from the ADA came in and discussed the political situation with the Council and in general agreed thoroughly with the Council's selections, the exception being that he believed we should probably support Lindsay and Bradford Morse, both Republicans, even though they are in the House because of their prominence and future importance within the Republican party.

The council, in addition, placed on its recommended list of candidates, the following: Burdick, McCarthy, Gore and Hart.

Mr. Rathjens came in at 1330 to discuss general Council policies and took up the status of the forthcoming Geneva negotiations on disarmament. He talked about the proposed U. S. missile freeze and discussed the fact that the U. S. proposals had a built-in bias with respect to the types of equipment we were willing to either freeze or destroy and that they were not compatible with existing Russian equipment. As an example he used the TFX and the Pershing as having no real Russian counterpart. However, he did point out that this bias was a natural concomitant to any proposal in order to bargain at a later date. The major differences to date in the way of

an agreement are still the old ones of inspection and verification procedures; and in terms of a freeze, the characteristics of the weapons plus the quantity, in that their system is more vulnerable than ours. A freeze appeals to the Russians in economic terms in that the strain on the Russian economy to keep up the missile race is far greater than on the West.

Mr. Rathjens thought a non-proliferation agreement is possible with possibly the MLF standing in its way. With respect to the MLF, he suggested that the Council avoid promoting any head-on Senate-Administration clash but that it might be possible to send letters to the White House from Humphrey, Fulbright, etc., expressing not outright opposition to the MLF as much as suggesting a slow down in the movement to get the MLF into an operational force until we really see how much or little the MLF may be to our best interests.

Mr. Sohn next visited the Council and discussed disarmament negotiations with the Russians and made a number of points:

1. That the bomber burning (B-47) deal was entirely possible with the Russians.

2. That a non-proliferation agreement was possible and that a formalized agreement not to use force to change boundaries was possible.

Mr. Sohn then brought up the question of MLF and whether this stood in the way of any kind of a deal. He pointed out that MLF was not that simple and that it was inexplicably connected to other military and political actions and events in Western Europe. For example, there are some 700 Russian IRBM's now targeted on Western Europe. One of the major reasons the Germans desire the MLF is to insure that the MLF weapons are targeted on these Russian IRBM's. If in a quid pro quo with the Russians we give up the MLF, we must then compensate the Germans for having given this up. His suggestions was that we might work a deal with the Russians in which they would remove their IREM's targeted on Western Europe. This would compensate the Germans for the loss of the MLF; the Russian compensation would be our giving up the MLF. He thought this was a possibility but felt that the Council should go very slowly in doing anything to kill the MLF such as having a number of senators make speeches against it, etc., for the following reasons:

1. At the moment the Russians fear the MLF and we have very good leverage in bargaining with the Russians with this proposal.

2. If a ground swell of opposition to the MLF is started, the Russians will then realize that the MLF has no support in this country and its bargaining value will be nil.

The Board of Directors felt that in addition to inviting guests to Board meetings, Senators should also be invited to come in. Additions to the Board of Governors was discussed and the following names were suggested: General Omar Bradley, Dean Francis Sayre, John McCoy, American University, Paul Hoffman of UNESCO, Jack Conway, AFL-CIO, Mike Nichols, Director, and Charles Tyroler, Public Relations. Mr. Pratt was to contact Mike Nichols and the Executive Director was to work on the possibility of developing information on General Bradley, Paul Hoffman, Jack Conway, Charles Tyroler and Dean Sayre.

The next executive committee meeting will be held on the 11th of July in Washington and the next Board of Directors meeting the weekend of 22 August at Martha's Vineyard.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD-1345 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC

MEMO

8 May 1964

TO: BOARD OF DIRECTORS and ADVISORS

FROM: H. A. Crosby, Executive Director

Once again we are having trouble with Mr. Holmes Alexander, this time of more serious vein in that he is now telephoning or personally visiting senators whom we are close to (both parties) and threatening them with unfavorable publicity if they continue to accept our support or associate with the Council, i.e., make speeches, etc. He is using Dr. Szilard's Pugwash article on inspection as an example of Council policies. In addition, he calls the Council a unilateral disarmament, pacifist organization. I have written him a letter, copy enclosed, for the record.

The subject of a leak has come up in regard to how he got the name of the individual who wrote the original speech for Burdick. In addition, Senator Burdick has stated that Alexander came to his office with an actual file copy of a letter Burdick wrote us in October 1963. Senator Burdick claims that there is a leak with the inference that it is in this (the Council's) office.

I have looked into this. Burdick's letter to us on Senate stationery is still in our files. The copy could not have been leaked from here as we received only the original which is time stamped. The leak is probably in Burdick's own office. As to how the author's name (Rodberg) got to Mr. Alexander, I am at a loss to explain. Alexander talked to John Silard and did not have the name. Later he called John back and had the name.

This office has two employees--(I was in Europe at the time). Mr. Alexander called and spoke to my secretary who, fortunately, did not know who had written the speech and hence could give him no information. I don't believe Miss Payne had any information either and, in any case, he did not speak to Miss Payne.

In endeavoring to get a senatorial speaker after Burdick bowed out, I saw administrative assistants of Moss, Muskie, Morse, Nelson, Pell, McGee. Only Moss, Burdick and Nelson received copies of the speech. I retrieved copies from Moss and Burdick -- Nelson still has his but no name on it. Neither Moss nor his assistant knew who prepared the speech as I purposefully did not tell them. Burdick's office did know but only by word of mouth.

Distribution of the speech went to Directors and advisors with Rodberg's name and some advance copies to Syracuse without, of course, any authorship name. Leaks are hard to explain---I can assure you that this office is not involved. I did write Rodberg at the ACDA and thank him. I should have written his home. It is possible, but unlikely that the leak is in the ACDA.

Other information Alexander has can be easily explained. He unquestionably has a dummy who is on our mailing list.

Also, it should be recalled that we are now a going, potent organization. We mail to in excess of 200,000 persons per year. We give substantial amounts of money. Hence, we are a target and will continue to be. The only thing that bothers me is that Alexander has a vendetta going against Dr Szilard and can be an extreme nuisance, not in his writings, but in his telephoning senators with distortions. Consequently, I believe the action program has a priority for your approval. Once, this is out, I can send it to various senators, calling their attention to Alexander and indicating the program illustrates our policies period.

copy

8 May 1964

Mr. Holmes Alexander
National Press Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Alexander:

I noted in one of your columns the other day a few statements which were erroneous. One of these had to do with the Council supporting Stuart Hughes in his campaign for the Senate in 1960. The Council never, at any time, recommended support for Mr. Hughes. The second point had to do with unilateral disarmament. The Council has never advocated unilateral disarmament. It is an organization devoted to developing realistic and practical programs in the fields of arms control and the easing of international tensions, taking into consideration the national and international political climate. The Council stresses the concept of responsibility and is well aware of the practicalities and limitations inherent in disarmament negotiations and the necessities of safeguarding our national security. Our programs are advanced within this context.

Thirdly, we are not a pacifist organization. As a retired regular officer with the well-being of my country foremost in my mind, I would never be associated with an organization advocating pacifism or unilateral disarmament.

I would suggest that you come talk to me if you desire first-hand information on the Council.

Sincerely,

s/

H. Ashton Crosby,
Executive Director

HAC/evp

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD - 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM

May 1, 1964

To: The Board of Directors

From: H. Ashton Crosby

This is the unedited raw transcript. For your information, I have eight 1-hour tapes and thirty-nine (25 each) 1/2-hour tapes of Sections I and II remaining. Twenty-two (11 each) have been requested and dispatched to various radio stations across the country.

I

This Scientist-Senators seminar is sponsored by the Council for a Livable World, an organization founded by Dr. Leo Szilard, the founder of the atom bomb, to seek practical and obtainable objectives leading to lessening the risks of nuclear war. We have in the Seminar today Senators Church of Idaho, Pell of Rhode Island, McGovern of South Dakota, McGee of Wyoming, Nelson of Wisconsin. The scientists are Dr. Bernard Feld, President of the Council, a nuclear physicist from MIT, and Dr. Matthew Meselson, a director of the Council and a biologist from Harvard University. Dr. Feld, would you like to propose a question--the first question?

Dr. Feld: It seems to me now that for a long time now the world has been living in the shadow of a massive increase in improving technology for delivering these weapons at long range and the great fear that somehow or another, despite the fervent desires of the leaders of the world that these weapons should not be used, that somehow or another there might be a conflict in which these weapons would be used. And it has only been in the last year or so that we can count the real beginning--the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty banning nuclear tests in outer space, under the seas, and in the atmosphere that one has started to feel an easing of the tensions, and feeling that somehow or other we may be moving toward, if not agreements to disarm, at least understanding about not pushing the arms race; that there may be some hope and expectation that the accumulation and the spread of weapons might be cut off; and that perhaps if not tomorrow, at least in the foreseeable future, we might be able to start moving toward a reduction of these weapons and start working out a method for keeping the peace without the constant fear that in fact such weapons would be used. And I would like to explore with you gentlemen to begin with, what you think the situation is. Is it in fact true that we are now much further from the danger of war, that we can now breathe more easily and perhaps bend our efforts toward constructive things of long term nature which might help to reduce armaments, or is this an illusion?

Senator Church, would you like to comment on this, Sir?

Senator Church: Well, I would say first of all that there have been some hopeful developments. I think that we are not so far along as to say that we have achieved

~~developments. I think that we are not so far along as to say that we have achieved~~
a detente with the Soviet Union or that the dangers that you speak of, Dr. Feld,
no longer exist. Indeed they do! But the test ban pact was symptomatic of a break-
through at least which may be the first step toward more rational control of nuclear
arms and a tempering of the nuclear arms race. I think the turning point, however,
goes back beyond the actual ratification and signing of the nuclear test ban pact.
I think the turning point may well have been the Cuban missile crisis of 1962,
because up to that time there had never been a test of our resolve to employ nuclear
weapons in a showdown situation. And I think that up until that time there were
those in Russia who could say to Mr. Khrushchev or indeed Mr. Khrushchev could say
to himself; "How can I be sure that in a showdown situation my nuclear arms will
not act as a kind of blackmail that will force the United States to give way and, if
so, then these nuclear arms will have utility in achieving the foreign policy ob-
jective of the Soviet Government." I think that when that showdown occurred and we
did not give way, it became evident that nuclear arms could not be rationally em-
ployed by the Soviet Union or by the United States and that then they began to look,
on both sides, for some sort of settlement. The nuclear test ban was the first
accord reached, following the crisis.

Thank you.

Senator McGee: I would amend what Senator Church just said with one other step that
I think is of considerable significance. I think it was a kind of one-two punch
development; that the Cuban agreement was certainly the ultimate and the climax, but
it was preceded by a very significant showdown in Berlin a year before. In August
and September of 1961 I think we were put to a second kind of test that preceded
Cuba. And I think that the combination of those two served to clear the air a good
bit. It proved our intent. Our willingness to resort to force if necessary. And
I think this was important. I think the best evidence of it, the real fact of it is
reflected in the kinds of tensions we now find in the headlines. We are now down to
the second-rate or third-rate crisis which will probably always be with us as long
as we have independent nations and people. I mean now we are hearing about Cypress

and Zanzibar and Panama and Mr. de Gaulle in an entirely different context than formerly was the case. And rarely do we hear anymore about the pending imminence of the holocaust that was commonly referred to. So I do think in fact that Senator Church is correct and that the point of the question is valid. Namely, that we have reached a point not of relaxation, but a point where it is all the more imperative that we probe and probe and probe again to try to find a basis for the next breakthrough, a common ground for a mutual agreement, whatever it is; I think history alone will ultimately be judge as to whether we took advantage of every opening we had to explore the chances of something a little better.

Thank you, Senator McGee.

Senator McGovern: Well, I would agree wholeheartedly with what Senator Church has had to say, and also Senator McGee, with reference to the importance of the Cuban missile crisis. I think there is no doubt but what the cold war took a turn in October of 1963, or rather 1962. Both sides looked into the nuclear abyss in a sense; not only the Soviets but ourselves, and I think that neither side liked what they saw. It was a combination of willingness to use great power plus restraint, both by President Kennedy and by Premier Khrushchev that enabled us to emerge from the Cuban crisis without a shooting war. I would say that a second turning point came with President Kennedy's great speech at American University on June 12, 1963. I think the measure of restraint and wisdom, the willingness to be examined, foreign policy attitudes on the part of ourselves, as well as on the part of the Soviet Union, which was represented in the spirit and the tone of that speech directly paved the way for the test ban agreement that emerged some weeks later.

Thank you. Dr. Meselson, do you have any questions you would like to ask?

Senator Nelson: Well, if you are going to change the subject, I would just like to comment very briefly on what has already been said.

All right, Senator Nelson:

Senator Nelson: I think that the point that I believe was recently made by the Secretary of State, and I think by the President, too, that the public must understand that foreign policy must be flexible; and that in fact we are living in a world

that is changing with great rapidity and it is necessary that we be prepared to adapt ourselves and adopt positions that reflect the change in the polar system around the world; and in this sort of thing that we have been talking about I think that some fair amount of influence upon Mr. Khrushchev and the attitude he has taken has been caused by two events: 1) the developing association of nationalism and independence within the Soviet Bloc starting out with Yugoslavia in the late '40's and ending up with Poland and Czechoslovakia and the rest of them refusing to be just tools of the Soviet Union, and secondly the tremendous force being exerted within the Communist Bloc by Communist China. And I think Mr. Khrushchev recognizes that China is in a revolutionary state; she represents almost a billion people--7800,000,000 (seventy-eight hundred millions) of people. They are in an explosive political situation; it is likely that they may very well start expanding off into Southeast Asia and I think much of the Russian attitude has been tempered by these developments within its own sphere and that it will continue to be so.

Thank you, Sir.

Senator Pell: I fully agree with Senator Church's views and those of my colleagues, that what Cuba did was to establish our creditability, our willingness to use nuclear weapons, and also it made us realize the holocaust that would follow from a nuclear war. We were aware of what a nuclear war would mean in theory in the past but I think if each of us and each of our listeners to this discussion would ask themselves if they first understood what a nuclear war would mean to them, they would go back to October of 1962, and would probably agree with Professor Einstein when we recall his words; when asked how World War III would be fought, he said with nuclear weapons, but World War IV would be fought with rocks.

Thank you very much. Dr. Meselson, I believe that you have a question that you would like to propound.

Dr. Meselson: Yes, I would like to continue the discussion by asking if there are new opportunities opened up by the realization on both sides that a resort to the use of nuclear weapons is beyond the realm of rational possibility, what are some of these opportunities that are opened up? Maybe to mention some specific subjects, although

I don't mean to limit our discussion today, or should we be discussing some of the proposals at Geneva? The President has proposed that there be placed a freeze on the numbers of bombers and missiles in the world; a negotiated and inspected and controlled freeze on those numbers. There have been on the table at Geneva proposals for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries; there is a proposal at Geneva to reduce the number of long-range bombers and there has been talk about reciprocal cuts in budgets. Are there opportunities in Europe that should be followed up in your opinion, gentlemen? For instance, in Europe should we be sharing nuclear weapons with our allies or should we be instead freezing the level of nuclear weapons in Central Europe as has been proposed by some. At the present, what sort of policy should we have regarding nuclear weapons and our allies; and beyond these questions what sorts of general changes do you anticipate might take place in relations with the United States and the Soviet Union in the area of trade in general; diplomatic, cultural, people to people exchanges?

That was a rather involved question, Dr. Meselson.

Dr. Meselson: I just meant to mention a lot of topics.

Senator McGee: Well, this is a 13-part series, isn't it, Mr. Chairman? There is our agenda for the next several weeks. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that at this point with that overpowering list of possible new areas to explore; that as we explore these with the understanding that basically we are exploring them with the Soviet Union; that meanwhile as Soviet-American relations seems to be shifting in their available topics for discussion it well may be that the whole power structure of the world is shifting such that new power poles will have to be given serious thought and that the only changes will be relative changes. It might even end up with the Soviets and the Americans now in the new NATO or whatever substitution is made for that alliance concept against the Communist Chinese. And we may be premature in thinking that our only alternatives are either to take advantage of the present easing of tensions in order to project something that we have thought about all these years as something possible with Russia, only to have the necessity for the old posture restored with the threat of China.

Thank you, Senator McGee.

Senator Church: I wonder if we could reach in for a specific or two here. I agree generally with what Senator McGee has said as to the situation in the world, it is certainly a situation of rapid change but it seems to me that when we reached the nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union we did so because we found a commonality of interest. That the Soviet Union and United States were the two principal nuclear powers and as such they had a common interest in deterring the spread of nuclear weapons and keeping the nuclear arms race under some kind of reasonable restraint. Now the nuclear test ban pact was the first step in that direction. It seems to me they might find a like commonality of interest in the matter of an agreement which it would be in the natural interest of both sides to enforce for their own sake. That would prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons. That is to say, I think we should explore an agreement whereby the Soviet Union and the United States would undertake a commitment not to sell or otherwise make available nuclear weapons to countries that do not now have them. When you consider the terrible consequences of nuclear war and the possibility that such a war might be ignited by accident or by an act of madness or irresponsibility with every additional national finger on these triggers, the risks go up at an alarming rate. So this seems to me to be a real opportunity and I think we ought to press for an agreement if we could possibly get one, before nuclear weapons spread to so many other countries.

Dr. Feld: Let me just project here. It seems to me that although there has been some talk in Geneva about the possibility of such an agreement, the one very serious obstacle which is standing in the way is the current proposal to build a multi-lateral nuclear force, a force of surface ships which would be manned by a mixed NATO crew in which the decision [which would contain] on Polaris missiles carrying nuclear warheads, [and which] the decision concerning the use of these strategic thermonuclear weapons would be a joint one. Now this has been regarded by many, certainly by the Soviet Union, as a first and very significant step toward the proliferation of the spreading of nuclear weapons to other countries. And certainly it does seem to be a very significant step in this direction. It would seem to me

that the chances of a meaningful agreement would be greatly enhanced if we would give up this project. I wonder what you think the prospects are in this direction?

Senator Pell: My own view is that the multilateral force could have a conciliatory effect in preventing the proliferation of weapons if we accept the fact that it will only be the multilateral force that will be permitted to have nuclear weapons, new nuclear weapons, in the future. I might disagree with my colleague that the immediate danger is who you give the weapons to. The immediate danger in terms of the next ten years, that is immediate in the viewpoint of history, is that almost every technologically advanced nation will be able to develop them themselves. There is no one on God's green earth who can keep Saigon or Israel or West Germany from developing these weapons themselves. But if we get the MLF separate it might serve as a siphon for the development of new weapons which only go into its force. In addition to that, you have the fact of life, unpleasant as it may be, that West Germany is today the strongest ground military force in Europe and the thought that they can be prevented indefinitely from having this type of weapon, I think is not very solid from the viewpoint of history and their own past history. If we could divert their energies also into an MLF I think it also would serve as a lightning rod for the trend of development for other nations of this dreadful weapon.

Senator McGovern: M. Chairman, I respect the point of view that Senator Pell has just suggested. I think there is some rationale for that position. On the other hand, we have no assurance that developing a multilateral force will do anything other than what the desires for more nuclear capability on the part of every country. And what it may very probably do is to provoke a similar response by the Soviet Union. We have no assurance whatsoever that if we were to develop floating nuclear weapon systems in the sea around Europe that the Soviets would not counter by putting missile tubes on rather cheaply constructed ships and floating those fortresses off shore all around the United States. In other words, in introducing a new weapons system, introducing what the Soviets would regard as a new threat to their interest it would seem to me that their most likely response to that new ingredient in the

cold war would be a similar system as close as they could possibly put it to American interests.

Thank you, Senator McGovern.

Senator Church: I would like to say another word about the MLF. Senator Pell raised the question that there may be no way to prevent the undue spread of nuclear weapons and I agree there very well may be no way. But one possibility would be the kind of pact that I referred to a few minutes ago. If other nations could be then induced to join that pact and to agree not to develop nuclear weapons systems of their own, the same way that so many other nations, more than one hundred now, have joined in the nuclear test ban pact. Now it is true that there is no immediate prospect that we would get China or France to concur, but in time, once we establish such a pact and undertook to mobilize well behind it, in time we might obtain very universal agreement. And so I think this is worthy; the promise, the possibilities that are in it, are worthy of full exploration. I am fearful that the MLF scheme is likely to get nowhere in view of the reception it received in Europe--whatever merits it may have, I am doubtful that it is going to be accepted and I think we ought to reappraise it in the light of European reluctance. I would be willing to accept it if the Europeans would go along with it on the basis of the fact that it could be a bid--a kind of transitional device leading to an integrated European nuclear defense command which would avoid the kind of proliferation we get with a separate national British and France and perhaps ultimately German nuclear force. And that between the two an integrated defense command would be much to be preferred. But even that is very questionable as we look ahead. So I should think that the possibilities of reaching such an agreement with the Soviet Union ought to be sufficiently promising as to justify a strong diplomatic initiative on our part to achieve that objective.

Senator McGee: It is still a matter of playing the odds, Mr. Chairman. As long as we have the two principal poles of power in Moscow and Washington, let's face it, the odds are still better with every effort being mobilized and made for a breakthrough to reach some kind of disciplining of the nuclear capabilities in the world.

The simpler we can keep it, the easier the opportunity to reach some kind of a basic agreement. However, discouraging the impasse in Geneva may appear to be, I still believe that we have got to make an even greater effort on the existing base. I have no objection to exploring these other alternatives very cautiously but I likewise think we need to be realistic in a power sense.

In your opinion then, Senator McGee, the MLF really complicates?

Senator McGee: In my judgment the chances of its complicating are far greater than the chances of its making easier.

Senator Nelson: I agree with the other practical factor regarding MLF and that is that France is going ahead anyway in making a bomb and unless I misunderstood it I think that the British labor leadership has said that they are not in favor of it; and the prospects are that they would probably lean in the opposite direction. So without the participation of France and England it wouldn't look like a very fruitful arrangement.

Senator Church: Well, with the labor party, Senator Nelson, as you know, since you and I were in London in January listening to the defense debate in the House of Commons, the Labor Party is strongly of the view that no further money should be spent by the British Government to keep up in the nuclear arms race and they would like to see this separate nuclear deterrent of theirs retired once it becomes obsolete. This I think is greatly in the American interest and in the interest of what Senator McGee says, of keeping this present power relationship as bi-polar as we can. So I am encouraged by that development on the British scene.

Thank you, sir, Senator Church. You have a question, Dr. Meselson.

Dr. Meselson: Yes, I would like to interject for consideration this. Whether there is a multilateral force with nuclear weapons shared by our Western allies or not, nuclear weapons are likely to spread as long as there is a high premium in prestige, on the possession of large numbers of such weapons. I would like to ask the question: How can we hope to prevent this spread, with or without a multilateral force, without having some sort of ceiling, a leveling off placed on the nuclear force and the importance placed in diplomacy on nuclear forces by the United States and the

Russians? The proposal of President Johnson to have a freeze on these numbers seems to me to offer the best kind of hope to stopping the spread to other countries.

Senator Pell: There is a third point here that we might consider. That is, in developing nuclear weapons by an independent and individual nation it has to test or explode prior to having the weapon in stockpile. And I know I have asked myself if we were dead serious with the Soviets and we really were a bi-polar combination in this effect if we could not almost unilaterally, the Soviet Union and the United States, at some point say they would consider any test anywhere a hostile act and invoke force if necessary to erase that site of testing. That is a rough way of doing it but it would prevent any proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Senator McGovern: With regard to Dr. Meselson's suggestion about a general agreement on levels of weapons on force level, I think that what we are more likely to see is a series of moves by the Soviet Union and the United States which they take in recognition that it is in their interests to do so, even in the absence of any general agreement. We have seen this as Senator Church says in the case of the test ban agreement. We have also seen it just recently in the announcement first by President Johnson almost simultaneously by Premier Khrushchev that the two great powers were reducing the production of enriched uranium. Something like a 40% cut--the stuff out of which nuclear weapons is made. No, so far as I know, that was not based on any general agreement reached at Geneva but apparently there was some exchange between the White House and the Kremlin that led to this decision. It was followed rather quickly by an announcement on the part of the British that they were cutting back the production of nuclear material. I think the same kind of thing can take place with reference to the bomber force in the two countries, with reference to additional missiles and perhaps we will see a series of steps of that kind even in the absence of a general agreement.

Dr. Feld: These steps I think are certainly significant and at the moment seem to me to be also the main path along which we are likely to move in the direction of limiting reducing armament.

PART II

This Scientists-Senators Seminar is sponsored by the Council for a Livable World, an organization founded by Dr. Leo Szilard, the founder of the atom bomb, to seek practical and obtainable objectives leading to lessening the risks of nuclear war. We have in the Seminar today Senators Church of Idaho, Pell of Rhode Island, McGovern of South Dakota, McGee of Wyoming, Nelson of Wisconsin. The scientists are Dr. Bernard Feld, President of the Council, a nuclear physicist from MIT, and Dr. Matthew Meselson, a director of the Council and a biologist from Harvard University. Dr. Feld, would you like to propose a question--the first question?

Dr. Feld: Yes. At some point I think we have to face up to what to me seems to be a critical question, and which is a purely political one, and I would be very much interested in hearing the opinions of people who understand such political matters much better than I do. But certainly it seems to me that central in this problem of a detente with the Soviet Union in weaponry or anything else lies the question of Central Europe, and in particular Germany. We have been fortunate in the last year or so. Tensions are sufficiently eased so that there has been no additional pressure or new crisis over Berlin. But Berlin remains a sore spot in the Central Europe--a tiny island isolated from the rest of West Germany. A tremendously attractive spot where all the intellectuals of Eastern Germany would like to get across that wall if they could--a tremendously sore spot in many respects. On the other hand, one of the reasons, of course, why we are interested in the multilateral force is just because there are very strong German pressures to do something which would lead eventually to the unification of Germany, a desire which seems to be a reasonable one on the part of the German people. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we are not going to make any very great progress toward a real detente and particularly toward the important thing of not only freezing but cutting back on the awesome arsenals of nuclear weapons which both sides now possess until we arrive at some kind of an understanding about how to proceed there and certainly we should be giving it very serious thought at this time.

Senator Pell, you recently wrote an article on Berlin. Would you care to talk about this?

Senator Pell: Yes. I was very struck with Senator Fulbright's speech concerning the separation of myths and reality in our foreign policy. When we come to examine the question of Germany in re-^{un}ification in the world as it is today, I think we are examining a myth because neither the West nor the East as long as they are confronting each other as they are would permit the loss to them of their Germany. To be specific, it is inconceivable that the Warsaw Pact, the Communist nations, would permit to be reunited with the West, East Germany which is their second largest industrial satellite and a great source of strength. Nor is it conceivable that we of the West NATO powers would permit the loss to us of West Germany which is the very bastion of our defense forces in Europe today. The only kind of unification of Germany that can occur is in a world -- Central Germany at least--that is more at peace than is the present state and would be an area of perhaps the withdrawal of nuclear forces--something of that in the future. But the time is also right. So for the moment, my thought is that we should remove all fringe areas that can lead to an escalation of conflict. And one of these is the question of consultation and crisis in Berlin. We have been very lucky for six months in Berlin. But they can start up again very easily and my own view is that we should attempt to get a status quo there that will not change and get a corridor of lands, roads rather, of access to Berlin which can avoid any problems of access which is presently written in the treaties we do not enjoy; in fact, there is no written guarantee anywhere of our land access to Berlin, specific access, and in return for that I think we can recognize the fact that the Oderneisse territories will probably remain under Polish rule and also the fact that the East German government exists.

Senator McGee: We can go one step further, Senator Pell, and say that even if we were to explore this very seriously at all, in regard to Germany, that it could well worsen the relative position of change that we have arrived at that gives us the opportunity to talk frankly about more peaceful openings in the immediate future. As I see it, to raise the German question in central Europe for settlement now because of the easing there might be the very worst thing we could do in an attempt to resolve other tensions, and I certainly agree that we ought to make it a fringe

Sen. Pell:

approach rather than make it one of the central targets for our attempt to reconstitute some of the kind of atmosphere. This is the question generally: That ~~with the lessening~~ *at the mercy* of troop commanders who can take action on their own in this part of the world, many of us around the table, including our chairman, Colonel Crosby, were troop commanders in World War II and know the hastiness with which an incident can blow up and my thought is that we should do what we could to remove the possibility of these incidents.

McGee - Two Germanies will probably be with us for a long time to come and can probably be livable if we use the opportunity that that kind of account represents to resolve others.

Pell - Unless the world becomes more peaceful and the detente comes. When the detente comes there is no reason in God's green earth why the two Germanies could not be unified.

Dr. Meselson: It seems to me that it is entirely correct that we can at this stage only hope to mirror some of the fringe difficulties which Senator Pell has referred to. I think though that we may have to go beyond that because at present something that I know about the new Republic opinion in West Germany and I presume the same is true in East Germany--I recently heard a report from a visitor in East Germany that confirms this--that there is almost no public discussion of any of these issues. And anything that looks like a bi-lateral agreement between the Russians and the United States over German problems, even if it should involve corridors to Berlin, in recognition of the Oderneisse Line, is likely to stir up the least rational and most excitable kind of political response I would imagine both in East and West Germany. I wonder if before we attempt to make any progress, even in the fringe areas, we should try to progress not to a set of specific actions but to the kind of atmosphere in which the United States and the Soviet Union would let it be known that in their view the problem of unification of Germany is primarily a problem for the German people; that the United States and the Soviet Union wish them well in this endeavor but that they would not under any conditions tolerate the use of force in this endeavor, but do something to make it clear that in the view of both great

powers that it is a German problem with which we will not attempt to manipulate in the future, in which we encourage the Germans to begin to think about realistically for themselves. I think this would have a very salutary effect, although I haven't spelled out any detail ways we could do it. Because for many decades now the supply of reality to the German people has been severely cut off--most extremely, of course, during the time of Hitler. But even now because of various taboos and dangers which Germany faces on both sides of the curtain there has been a very short supply of just good news, of good reality, so that until the people within the country of Germany are stirred some how to take these responsibilities upon their own shoulders I would be afraid that they would view any intervention from the outside as, say, they viewed the Versailles Treaty, as grounds for future resentment in future dangers.

Senator McGee: Don't tell me there are five Senators speechless.

McGee
~~Dr. Feld:~~ If someone has a magical formula for solving the dilemma in Middle Europe,

Dr. Feld: speak up.¹ There are no magical formulas, obviously, but it seems to me that sometimes just because of the tendency that we have to regard every proposal from the other side as being apriori, unfavorable to us, we may very well lose some important opportunities. I am referring particularly to the recent proposal made by the Polish Prime Minister--the so-called Gromyko proposals--which suggested that inspected ~~truce~~ *freeze* on nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Now this kind of a thing may not sound like a tremendously important disarmament measure--it certainly has nothing very realistic with disarmament--it is a measure mainly of detente and tension easing, but it seems to me the kind of proposal which if we could find it possible to convince our allies, to convince our German allies and our NATO allies to go along with, contains a number of features which are extremely desirable. It is the first proposal from the East which I have heard of which proposes inspection over armaments in contrast to inspection over disarmament; it proposes a freezing of armaments with a surveying inspection system to count the armaments which were made to make sure that no new ones have been produced. It accepts the principle that it is better to prove the current situation even if the current situation should be more favorable to the West, which it is in this particular case, than to allow the continued growth of it which will

become even less favorable to the East if it continued at the present pace and in general it does the kind of things which we have thought in this country, which our government has tried to convince the Soviet Union that it should want to do, namely, to stop ^{where we are} ~~World War~~ now, to look around to make sure that you know that you have stopped by having inspection, and then to see if out of this can grow the possibilities for further amenities involved. The countries involved in this particular case are West Germany, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It is roughly equal populations with a rather larger area in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. And the proposal is a very simple one: that there shall be no more nuclear weapons introduced into this area and that there shall be inspections of the type which is necessary to make sure that this indeed is the case.

The inspections by whom?

Dr. Feld: The inspections would be by an international body, the mechanics have not been discussed unfortunately in any great detail, but presumably inspections by an international body, I would hope constituted within the United Nations. This has not been either proposed nor excluded in the proposal.

Dr. Feld, didn't Ambassador Kennan make a similar proposal some years ago, at least for a nuclear free zone...

Dr. Feld: Yes, Ambassador Kennan's proposal went much further and I would hope that the proposed proposal might lead in this direction. His proposal was that in fact all nuclear weapons should be removed from this same area which would seem to me to be a very useful kind of proposal. But the Poles are much less ambitious about that; they are willing just to stop where we are now. Now, the point I am making is that indeed as you gentlemen have mentioned that there are some things that can happen and one would hope that they would. And the important thing, it seems to me, is that they should not be excluded from happening either because we are too inflexible or because we allow our policy to be unduly influenced by the inflexibility of German politicians. Both of these things I think are a great danger and something which we should remain continually aware of.

Maybe it is American politicians. None present.

None present.

Senator McGee: Well, I think that is more than a facetious remark because the proposal itself is the kind that lays itself open to a tortured misrepresentation in our own country, and you build up--we have been so long in an aura of suspicion and fear of this [mythical] enemy, the Russian Communist, that you find a reflex of opposition before there is any weighing of the hard exchange that could be involved, or even a step forward that might be made, and that is where it will run into its political grind here in our own domestic front. It raises a question of whether our own people are even ahead of our Congressmen on this question--whether they are ready to talk realistically about that. Sometimes I think we have laced ourselves into our own strait-jacket.

Senator Church: In any case, Senator McGee, the current Geneva talks have now been recessed for the purpose of allowing the participants on all sides to reflect upon proposals that are now at issue there, and I should hope that this particular proposal you mention, Dr. Feld, will be one that we will give serious and critical analysis to during the recess period. It has aspects that are very promising, particularly with reference to the inspection feature on which the Russians and the Communists generally have been so sticky in times past.

But when Senator McGee referred to the possibility that the American people may be ahead of their government in this field, I perked up my ears because I have been interested in the reaction across the country to Senator Fulbright's speech. I think that it was Senator Pell who mentioned Fulbright's address. On the whole, that reaction has been very affirmative. I know that the newspapers in my state that are quite conservative and inclined to be partisan and therefore have no basis for approving anything that Senator Fulbright says on that ground, have responded in a very positive way.

I understand his mail--the constituents' mail--has responded favorably, too. People may be tiring of the old litanies that don't seem to have much application to the changing conditions of life in the world as they once had. This is a very encouraging sign on the precinct front.

Colonel Crosby: That is very true.

Senator McGee: That is why this may be the opening or the opportunity for I say members of the Senate as the case in point to stand up and provide some measure of leadership and of galvanizing the public, both sophistication and curiosity in this realm, may be possible for this kind of breakthrough. We don't have to think back very far to remember when we may have missed our opportunities in some small breakthrough in the past, when we were a little bit asleep at the switch and there might have been a disposition on the other side for some kind of a minor agreement or a concession, and this may be another one of those times where we should make the serious effort to see what the state of the mind is and what kind of leadership can be mobilized to move it forward.

The sphere of history, I think, is usually underestimated. We can all go back to the only war in which we fought and the roles were completely reversed of our friends and our enemies. History can move very fast indeed.

Dr. Feld: The responses to Senator Fulbright's talk have been most encouraging. It has been an indication that in fact the Senate can and does take very seriously its job of advising as well as consenting in foreign policy and this is something that a lot of us have been hoping to see much more of than we have in the last few years. There is another aspect of this which has been built up, I think, much too frequently in arguments--a reason why perhaps we are not prepared to move forward very rapidly in this field and this has been the great overriding fear that perhaps--well, let's not even talk about disarmament--but just the slowing down of the pace of the arms race might have serious economic consequences. However, there would be a great reluctance to face up to these problems and a great pressure not to do anything about it just because of these economic consequences. Seems to me that that is another one of these myths, and I would hope that it could be exploded very effectively.

McGee — Someone said, Dr. Feld, that one of the dirtiest tricks the Russians could pull on us would be to declare peace. Said we aren't quite ready for that concept yet in this country. Of course, there are many ramifications to that.

Fell: I guess our colleague, Senator McGovern, has taken the lead in this area in the very thoughtful and far-reaching and excellent legislation he has introduced.

Senator McGovern: I have introduced a bill which I don't pretend is the answer to the problem of converting from wartime production or from war production to the production of peacetime goods, but I do think it is a step in that direction. The legislation was introduced last October along with the sponsorship of several of the senators around this table and a number of others, I think now totalling 12 senators and some 22 members of the House of Representatives. What it seeks to do, Dr. Feld, is to set up a Conversion Planning Commission within the government at the very highest level. It would be chaired by the Secretary of Commerce but would have representatives of the Department of Defense, Space Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Labor, and other agencies of the government that are involved in our defense program and that would be involved in any transition from defense production into the production of peaceful goods. I think the economy is presently capable of making an adjustment from defense industries to peacetime industries but it is helpful to have some planning both in a private sector and in the government so that we spend the same kinds of energies and brain power and talent on devising alternatives to arms production that we have invested in our defense industries. That is really the purpose of this legislation.

Senator McGee: Senator McGovern, also, isn't your legislation designed to cover the contingency of changing from one weapons system to another as much as from war to peace.

~~Senator McGovern~~: That is correct. We know that even in the absence of any general agreement on disarmament, that there are certain industries that are going to suffer the reduction of defense spending or the allocation of that spending to other parts of the economy. If McNamara gets his way and we quit producing bombers in the United States and rely almost entirely on missiles for our strategic nuclear power, this is certainly going to have a very real impact on the aircraft industry. And that has been going on for the past year or two. Several thousands of people have been thrown out of work in the aircraft industry already as a result of this shift in the

character of our defense establishment.

Church!
Senator ~~McGee~~: On the other hand, Senator McGovern, just look what is underway now in a very modest way with President Johnson's declared war on poverty. He is getting the money to finance this war against the chronically depressed areas, pockets of unemployment, conditions of impoverishment, which pretty well afflict 20% of our people, by economies in our defense program. Now they are very modest economies, but instead of increasing the overall cost of the government he is attempting to transfer about a billion dollars out of the defense budget brought about by the elimination of unnecessary bases, and the reduction of excessive production of uranium and plutonium and these other economies that are being effected. In transferring that billion dollars where it is not needed in defense to finance the whole of the Administration's newly declared effort of improvements in standards, to increase employment opportunities and give employment where it is needed to people who have been chronically unemployed. Now if that can be done on, ~~say,~~ ^{so} as modest a scale and this money put to so constructive and important a public use, think what we could do with greater savings.

Chairman: Senator, is there no reservoir of existing plans and studies that we could draw upon for this? Is this what you are saying?

Senator McGovern: I'm saying that there is entirely too little in the way of personnel in our government today that are giving full-time attention to the problems of conversion.

Senator McGee: Would it be correct to say there are less than half a dozen?

Senator McGovern: That is about right. We have a very tiny shop over in the disarmament agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, that gives part of their attention to this problem. There are a couple of people in the Defense Department that are trying to provide a few helpful suggestions to communities the day after they announce that the airbase is being closed, but when you consider that \$50 billion annual investment we are making in defense in this country and then compare that with what we have done to plan for the day when we may no longer need that defense establishment, or at least may not need all of it, it is a shocking revelation.

I became interested in this field, Senator McGee, almost a year ago when I began thinking about some of the alternative uses that we might put our excess military spending into and I found that there are just very few places in the government where you can go to for guidance in that field.

Thank you, Senator McGovern. Dr. Meselson.

Dr. Meselson: I wonder if it would be fair to go even a little beyond this and say that if the national defense need can allow reduction in the defense budget, that it is not just the case that the economy can stand it with good planning, but the fact that the economy needs it. I was just reading a book by a Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, in which the point that although government expenditures in the defense area have served a certain role in stimulating investment, they have gone very frequently to the wrong part of our economy. What is happening is that there is a group of our citizens who are undertrained and getting less well-trained, who are unable to consume and getting less well able to consume goods, so that little by little this part of our population slips away from the bulk of the society, develops different attitudes, begins to feel that it is on the outside, becomes less productive so that the whole thing becomes a vicious circle. Myrdal suggests this: the kind of government support to the economy that would make sense would be the kind that looks to see where the economy is weak, tries to steer activity there. Would it be accurate, do you think then, to state that why don't we plan our economy to make the transition when it is possible within the requirements of national defense, but in fact it must, if it is going to start growing at a rate faster than the one percent per year we are growing now.

Senator McGee: I think the urgency is a foregone conclusion and it must be that sort of thing. How we pull it off is another question. It is to assume that we can take these great energies and great resources that have been channeled into defense and simply by our resolve to shift them--that is making a pretty broad jump there. We can do wonders in the name of defense. In fact, we have had to do many non-defense things that were necessary, under the guise of defense in order to get enough public sentiment and enough Congressional sentiment to pull it off--even in the realm of

education. And I think we make a mistake in assuming that we have a free alternative to divert these monies to a constructive and non-warlike endeavor or non-defense endeavor. That is part of the educational job that has to be done. That is part of the sophistication of our new opportunity that has to be done. It is much easier to get a big nation like ours to gear to war than it is to gear to peace.

Senator Nelson: I think that is one of the -- just to comment on Senator McGee's observation, I think that is one of the tragedies and we saw it here on the floor of the Senate last August when the \$50 billion defense bill comes on the floor of the Senate and is there something like 120 minutes and passes unanimously; whereas we spent 3 1/2 weeks debating foreign aid bill of \$3,400,000,000. As Senator McGee suggests, the tragedy is that everybody is prepared to spend any amount of money on defense and the most conservative members of Congress are the biggest spenders. But when you turn around and start talking about an expenditure in the so-called public sector, whether that be in housing or education or conservation of our resources, when you start talking there, immediately you have no support. I not only blame the Congress for it, I blame the country. It is too bad that the people of this nation are so excited about the important values with which we ought to be concerned, but they do not support substantial investment in the public sector where it needs to be invested and we are running behind in an accelerated pace, so to speak, in this area. And if we can, and I hope we can over the next number of years, reduce the defense investment monies of all the countries in the world by mutual agreement. But as we reduce these defense spendings by \$10 or \$15 billion at some future stage, we are going to need to spend these \$10 or \$15 billion in the fields of education, in the fields of the Appalachias taking care of the pockets of poverty and in the conservation of our resources, in the education of children. As Senator McGee suggested, it is a real travesty when you consider that the way to get support for education is to have it in the Defense Education Act. Well, education is education and one of the most important things we do in our society and we shouldn't have to tie it in with the military program in order to get support for it.

Senator Church: Well, Senator Nelson, don't you remember that hit song in the Broadway musical--My Fair Lady---...I have become accustomed to her face... Well, I think that you are putting your finger right on what is the matter--it is simply that.

We have become accustomed to our appropriating a great deal of money; we are accustomed to the cold war; we are accustomed to theory of imminent attack from this source or that; so we feel that any amount of money spent on defense ought to be rubberstamped. There was a time prior to the second World War, during the twenties, when we were accustomed to the very opposite attitude. And no amount of money for a very modest defense establishment could be approved in the Congress. The adjustment, psychology, general consensus was entirely different. Nowadays the President makes an announcement that he is cutting back on extensive production of uranium or plutonium that ought to invite some applause from his audience, and his audience sits perfectly still, even though the audience realizes that we have enough nuclear warheads in our present arsenals to blow this planet all the way to Venus. He has to go on and say we ought not to manufacture this stuff just as a kind of WPA project, before he can excite any kind of response from his audience. Now until the American psychology turns around and adjusts to this new situation, the first symptoms of which we have been examining here in the course of this discussion this afternoon, we are going to have trouble moving ahead on any new course.

Senator McGee: The ^{current} ~~quickest~~ thing, Senator Church, is that we are really not a nation of warriors. Never have been in our history. We are a people of ideas, we are a people of great economic capability and imaginativeness. Some here, I am sure were present the day I was when Mr. Khrushchev visited up here on the Hill and visited the Senate and he was willing to acknowledge then that in the military sense we have reached pretty much a ~~detente~~ in fact that each could destroy the other and himself along with it; but he said on that occasion we declare war on your economics. Now this is the kind of war that we can win. Here is where we are best equipped, but we have been so busy in our concept of stopping the Russians that we have forgotten all about starting people. And I think this is the reason that we are missing a great opportunity to wage an aggressive, constructive, hopeful kind of program on

positive terms, on positive grounds, that writes a language that is universal with all peoples, in addition to our own.

Senator McGee: I think that the opportunity for the beginning on this is now impending, is now at hand. What frightens me is that it is so difficult to shift the momentum.

Senator Church: I just question one thing. I wonder if we don't pat ourselves too much on the back with the notion that we are a very non-military people and a very peaceful people. I want to believe that. All of us around this table want to believe that. [But I ask you--go out into the parks of Washington, ride up and down in this capital, and you will find in every public square some brass general on some brass horse charging this way or that way commemorating some battle in some war. And I have been in many national capitals around the world. I have never been in one which focused so much attention in its public squares and monuments to military people and military exploits.] I just think we had better examine pretty carefully what our basic disposition in this country really is if we are going to move ahead in a more constructive way if the future gives us that opportunity.

Senator McGee: Well, I submit, Senator Church, that in the pages of our country's great history you could hardly suggest or find there a personalized American mind. Our wars have been hazard and our warriors have mostly been civilians for the most time. Yet, our generals who have done less in war have been the first to be rewarded by being made President in the United States. I think this is symptomatic of how we tend to glamorize and idolize those that are most popular....

McGee: I think given the great tradition of the military in the history of the world that most military historians would not look upon the American record as a great fount of military tradition. I think this is the real point that we are making.

Senator Church: That is the classical view but I just question that.

Dr. Feld: We must be in general a very confused people. We certainly have the tendency to admire these military exploits and yet it was the United States

or one of our states that invented the idea of the League of Nations--we never joined it. And there is still I think this evidence of confusion about our being peace-loving and yet not willing to go all the way throughout our history. Nevertheless, I think our country has certainly been capable of exerting the required vision when it was called for. We were certainly a very strong force, if not the strongest force, for the United Nations, the concept of the United Nations, and the implementation therefor. And I would hope that it will dawn on our people that it is not enough to say, we're opposed to wars, but we don't think nuclear war is tolerable. We also have to recognize that we are living under this awesome threat of nuclear weapons and before this threat is eliminated we have got to turn around not just stop, but cut back, and perhaps we can do this.

Chairman: I think our time has run out, gentlemen. Thank you very much.
