

Speech - Senate Floor Nov. 15, 1954

COEXISTENCE AND ATOMIC STALEMATE

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, recent developments abroad and at home justify, in my mind, interrupting the debate on the pending resolution. At an early date I shall discuss the pending resolution and modifications of it.

Grave problems and dangers confront our Republic, and they are of far greater importance than the pending business before the Senate. We must keep matters in their proper perspective.

Are "coexistence" and "atomic stalemate" synonymous terms? If they are not, just what is the difference? Is the former merely an inevitable prelude to the latter? And what of our foreign policy and our defense policy when such an atomic stalemate takes place? Does not atomic stalemate mean inevitable Communist nibbling aggression, rather than peace in our time? How many years remain when we still have some initiative left? These are some of the basic questions before the Government and the people of the United States.

Certainly they are so important and the results of the decisions made are so far-reaching that the Congress and the American people must be taken into the confidence of the administration.

No matter what the decisions are in the elections of 1956, a Republican administration and a Democratic controlled Congress in the months immediately ahead share a heavy responsibility for the survival of this Republic, and the possibility of a free world of freemen hangs in the balance.

The civilizations that flourished and died in the past had opportunities for a limited period of time to change the course of history. Sooner or later, however, they passed "the point of no return," and the decisions were no longer theirs to make.

Coexistence and atomic stalemate will result in ultimate Communist victory. Unless one believes that the men in the Kremlin have completely changed their long-term strategy of ultimately having a Communist world, and no longer follow the doctrine that, in order to achieve their ends, anything is allowable, including deception and treachery, we must face the fact that the Communist concept of peaceful coexistence means that the United States or other free nations of the world will be allowed to exist only until communism is able to subvert them from within or destroy them by aggression from without.

It is my belief that the Soviet Union is advancing the Trojan horse of coexistence only for the purpose of gaining sufficient time to accomplish what we may term "atomic stalemate." When would they hope to accomplish this objective? The target date is probably between 1957 and 1960.

There is some fallacious thinking that when that point arrives the world will have gained a stalemate peace because neither side will then dare to use or threaten to use its atomic power against the other. At that point, so the reasoning runs, the two great world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, will checkmate and immobilize each other

and a sort of troubled peace will settle down over the balance of the world.

Certainly we must face up to the fact that the superiority the United States has today in a stockpile of atomic weapons and the means of delivering them will be checkmated, and the nations which today are toying with neutralism will be actively proclaiming it.

Let us examine the possibility then of even a troubled peace. It is more likely that at that point, when the free world has become paralyzed and immobilized by the realization that the United States and the Soviet Union could act and react one upon the other with overwhelming devastation, that the men in the Kremlin will see their best opportunity to start with what for the want of a better term I will call "operation nibbling," wherein they will seek to take over the peripheral nations bite by bite.

At that point, through the capitals of what remain of our anxious allies and with loud voices from the neutralists, as well as from sources in our own country, will rise the anguished cry, "Should we risk all-out atomic war for Iran, Sweden, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, India, Finland, Burma, and so forth?" "For after all," the argument will run, "we have no treaty obligations to them." Then they will start down through our smaller allies first to soften us up. These will not all be nibbled at once, but will be spaced out so that as each country passes behind the Iron Curtain, it will increase the despair of the other victims and the paralysis of the nations which might be willing to resist.

Since stalemate would put the Soviet Union itself off limits, the intended victim of the aggression could only look forward to a localized war within their own frontiers with the destruction of life and property that would entail. Since there would be no hope of restraining this new type of Soviet aggression by placing the body of the octopus in danger, these nations individually, one by one, might prefer to accept Soviet terms rather than even call on the West for aid.

Before our eyes the people of the United States would see nation after nation nibbled away and when the realization finally dawned that this policy would inevitably result in our country becoming a continental Dienbienphu in a Communist totalitarian world, the chances of our winning such a struggle would be so lessened and the Soviet world so extended that they then would be prepared for an all-out challenge to us wherein we would be allowed the choice to surrender or die.

It seems to me that the responsible committees of the Congress should promptly summon the State and Defense officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fully inquire into our foreign and defense policy to find out where in their judgment it will take us and whether this clear and present danger which appears to me to exist is such that a basic change in the direction of our policy is warranted.

Time is running out and I would remind the Senate that in this day and age of the airplane and the atomic

weapon, time is not necessarily on the side of the free world.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. In the first place, I wish to congratulate the Senator from California for his very able and penetrating speech. It is along many of the lines which I tried to present in late January 1951 in a speech before this body on this very question.

I hope the Senator from California will not regard the question which I am about to put as being politically motivated, but I should like to ask whether the contention made in the midst of the recent political campaign by many members of a great political party that we will never favor having our troops fight on foreign soil is not a declaration which, if adhered to, would tie the hands of America behind her back and reduce the maximum resistance of the free world to Communist aggression.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I will say to the Senator, without being partisan, because I think when a danger confronts our Nation we should view it as Americans and not as partisans, that there may have been statements made by individuals on both sides which, from a national policy point of view, were not helpful. I have never believed that we should take such a position, but that this Nation should take whatever action our national interests might require at a time when a challenge might be confronting us in the world.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I will say to the Senator that I completely agree with him. It is the standard which I certainly try to follow.

But is there not a real obligation that candidates and parties should not, for the sake of temporary political advantage, take positions which might endanger the security of the country, and, indeed, the security of the entire world?

Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator is correct. That should apply to both parties, and all persons concerned.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Is there not a further lesson to be learned both from the experience of the past few months and something which I think is implicit in what the Senator has said, namely, that if we reach a state of atomic stalemate, in which each side has available terrible weapons but each side is also afraid to use them lest they precipitate an atomic war, the whole world is exposed to the danger of being involved by the piecemeal extension of communism to outlying areas of the world, but which rapidly eat into the very center.

Mr. KNOWLAND. That is what I was trying to outline on the floor, because that situation makes almost inevitable the Communist conquest of what remains of the free world.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I quite agree with the Senator. Is it not true, therefore, that we should not endanger the strength of our ground forces because it is the great merit of these forces that they can deal with local circumstances, restrain aggression, and yet minimize the danger of the expansion of a local struggle into a worldwide conflict?

Mr. KNOWLAND. In that regard it seems to me that would be a matter to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the responsible officers in the Government, including the Congress, should pay attention. I think, whether we speak of ground forces, air forces, or naval forces, we should take into consideration the totals available, consider our present allies, those who are apt to stand up when the chips are down, and what would be available in each category under a given set of circumstances. I do not think we necessarily have to limit it to what is available in the United States of America alone, assuming that we have allies who are prepared to stand with us. I think the further the Soviet Union moves along toward this condition of atomic stalemate the more apt they may be gradually to move some of our present allies—at least, there is danger of it—from a position of toying with neutrality to a position where they would jump over into the neutrality category.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am not trying to force a confession from the Senator regarding the wisdom or lack of wisdom of recent military policy, but I think the Senator is in general correct, and, in the light of his own proposition, it seems to me it was a great mistake for us to have reduced the armed strength of our ground forces from 20 to 17 divisions. I think we needed all those 20 divisions, and that the reduction of 3 divisions distinctly decreased our striking power and, therefore, led, by the force of example, to a net reduction in the total fighting strength of the free world. I say that without any reflection upon the motives of those who urged this decrease, but since we shall shortly be passing upon a new military budget, and in view of that fact and in view of the general policy which the Senator from California has, I think, stated very well, I think we should build up our armed defense instead of reducing it. Otherwise we are likely to be lulled to sleep.

Mr. SYMINGTON and Mr. FULBRIGHT addressed the Chair.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from California yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield first to the Senator from Missouri; and then I shall yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished majority leader upon his talk this afternoon, which I look forward to studying. No one has been more interested in the national security of the United States since I have been in the Government than has the distinguished senior Senator from California.

Does not the Senator from California believe that as things are now going, this country is, or shortly will be, in the same relative strength as against the Communists as the British found themselves to be against the Nazis in the late 1930's?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think there is that danger, which neither the Government nor the people of the United States dare ignore, except at their peril.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the majority leader. Will he further yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. With reference to the question of new missiles, atomic mutations, we now are at the point where, so far as I know, all distinguished military leaders believe it would be possible to almost destroy a country within a matter of hours or days. If that be true, would not the distinguished majority leader agree that we must now prepare differently than we did before? Previously we prepared, supported by the two oceans, to win a long war, if such a war was forced upon us.

In that any future war will entail tremendous original destruction, would not the distinguished majority leader agree that we must be so strong in the future that we can prevent any war, instead of trying to be in the old position of being able only to win a long war?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think the Senator from Missouri is correct because it is entirely possible that when we approach the position of a so-called atomic stalemate, and recognize the utter ruthlessness of the men in the Kremlin, it is possible that the decisive phase might end within 10 days.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In other words, the only chance we have, unless we believe in the good faith and sincerity of the Communist leaders, is to have them know, if they attack us in this atomic age, regardless of the effect of their atomic attack, we will be so strong that we can get up and in turn destroy them.

Mr. KNOWLAND. That is essential; but I think also it is essential that they be not allowed to expand their present strength to the point where they will have such overwhelming numbers in manpower and resources that they can attack with calculated risk.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Recently I read an article signed by a reputable reporter in a reputable newspaper which said that with respect to the policies of this country vis-a-vis Communist China and Formosa, the Secretary of State and three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt one way, while the fourth member of the Joint Chiefs felt another. The later decision made by the President was to go along with the fourth member.

I do not know if that article is entirely correct, but I do know it was from a reputable reporter—and it said the reason for the opinion of the fourth member of the Joint Chiefs, with respect to not going ahead with a more positive policy, was that the United States Army was too weak to adopt such a policy.

Would not the distinguished majority leader agree that if it be true our Army is too weak to go ahead with what the other three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought proper policy, the situation is indeed very serious, and is one which Congress should face promptly during the next session?

Mr. KNOWLAND. If all the facts in the article were correct—and I am not at this point prepared to say that they were or were not correct—and if the weakness in the ground force was not made up by other strength available in ground troops, I would say the premise of the Senator from Missouri was correct. But I should want to have more

facts than I presently have, based upon a newspaper article.

Mr. SYMINGTON. May I send the article to the Senator?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Many people have spoken about the reduction in the appropriation for the Air Force, in 1953, of more than \$5 billion, this against the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time. But few people realize that in 1954 the appropriation for the Army was reduced from some \$12.8 billion to some \$7.6 billion, which also represents a cut of more than \$5 billion.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Again, would not the Senator from Missouri agree, in that regard, that it would depend on where the cuts were made as to what the end result in firepower was; whether the cuts were primarily in service troops or PX troops, or whether they were in combat troops for frontline duty?

I am certain the distinguished Senator, however, who served as Secretary of the Air Force, rather than as Secretary of the Army, was thoroughly familiar with all branches of the service, and knows that for a good many years there have been many more troops supporting frontline troops than is customary in other countries, and certainly far more than the Soviet Union has in the same category.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator.

As a result of a talk made recently in Miami by the Chief of Staff of the Army about the strength of the Army—and I thought it a very fine talk—I am worried about the strength of the Army.

Just before Korea, in line with the recommendations of the Bureau of the Budget, the final military appropriation was under \$15 billion. After Korea, within 2 years, we were appropriating more than \$60 billion.

The last administration recommended some \$40 billion. That amount was cut in the first year of the present administration to \$33 billion plus; then, as a result of the 1954 action by this Congress, to \$28 billion plus.

It seems to me that if we are to be effective in our diplomatic policies, which the distinguished majority leader has followed closely and with profound thought, we must negotiate from a base of military strength with that premise.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I may say at this point, if the Senator will permit me to do so, that I fully agree that the Soviet Union will only recognize strength; and to negotiate from any basis other than strength would be to invite diplomatic, if not military, disaster.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the majority leader. Will he yield for a final question?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. With the premise which the Senator from California has so ably presented in his remarks, and with the premise of the figures stated, before we approve recommendations from the military this time, should we not give full consideration to what

negotiating from relative weakness as against relative strength means to the future security of the country?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think the responsible committees of the House and Senate as rapidly as possible should go into these matters, and certainly everything should be done, considering what I believe to be a present and imminent danger, to be certain that we are operating from a position of strength.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I, of course, agree that adequate military preparation is essential. But I wonder why the Senator feels that under what he calls co-existence and atomic stalemate the Communists are bound to win. What leads the Senator to that conclusion?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Reviewing again the remarks made, I think the problem is that there has been no indication that the Communist leopard has changed his spots. If that be correct—and I happen to believe it is, although I realize that men may honestly differ on that point—then it seems to me that the evident policy of the Soviet world is to gain a sufficient amount of time so that with the stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen bombs they can achieve what I have called an atomic stalemate. Once having reached that point, then what I believe now to be a clear superiority on the part of this Government and the rest of the free world will have been lost.

At that point, instead of bringing about a condition of peace, I think, to the contrary, there will have been opened up a vast new opportunity for the men in the Kremlin to pursue what I have called a nibbling operation, because at that point, if the free world would not dare to attack the center of the power, which I have termed the body of the octopus, it would limit any action which they might take to the peripheral countries, which, one by one, would be under attack.

Let us take Sweden as an example. Let us assume that the Russian Ambassador went to Sweden and said, "We demand that you yield to our terms to put in a coalition government. Unless you do, we are going to move Soviet forces across the frontier."

So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it would be able to proceed on the general theory that it would not be attacked on its own home base, and that any resistance offered by the free world would be offered by the sending of perhaps some Air Force elements and perhaps some ground forces to help Sweden. But from the Swedish point of view, Sweden would be limited to fighting on its own territory, perhaps with tactical atomic weapons, rather than strategic atomic weapons, perhaps with old-fashioned artillery, and the normal dislocations of war. So that Sweden would be faced with the prospect of suffering utter destruction, on a purely limited basis, without help in any effort to destroy the fountainhead of aggression. At that point the Government in Sweden

might determine that it would rather risk a Communist government in Sweden than to have its land devastated without any hope of ever regaining its freedom.

That is the difficulty faced by such countries. I believe the men in the Kremlin would press their advantage in countries all around the periphery. I believe it would be found that in the neutralist capitals of the world, in the capitals of our allies, and, indeed, even in the United States, persons in the Government might say, "Why should we become involved in a war when atomic weapons might bring destruction to the United States?" I am assuming this would take place at the time of atomic stalemate, when Russia and the United States would be about in the same position so far as atomic weapons were concerned. People would say, "Why should we take that risk for a country which is 10,000 or 15,000 miles away from us?"

Each time the Soviet Union succeeded in one of those peripheral adventures, more and more it would break the morale of the countries on the periphery, so that the next time they would be less likely to resist. In fact, they might even become so paralyzed that they would not even ask for the West to come to their assistance.

Perhaps if the nibbling process were to be so spaced that it would not be too big a challenge to the United States and what was left of the free world, we might find that piece by piece the other nations were being taken away from the free world, so that we would be left with what would be the continental Dien Bien Phu of the rest of the free world.

At that point, when Russia had expanded its manpower, resources, and industrial productivity, having reached the atomic stalemate position, Russia might then determine that it could risk an all-out Pearl-Harbor type of attack on this country, and if we responded in kind we would at least be thoroughly limited to the Soviet Union itself. In the meantime the Soviet Union would have gained the industrial potential, not only of the satellite nations which Russia now controls, but of other nations in Europe as well.

That is a possibility which I think should be given consideration by all persons having positions of responsibility in the legislative and executive arms of the Government, as well as by the American people as a whole.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the majority leader that those persons should give consideration to the problem. I had assumed that the present administration had given consideration to it. I know the matter has been very much in the minds of all of us in the Committee on Foreign Relations. It would seem to me, in view of what the Senator from California has said about the atomic stalemate, that he assumes that this country now has superiority, and that he is suggesting that perhaps we should use that superiority by attacking Russia now.

Mr. KNOWLAND. No; I have not suggested that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What is the alternative? I cannot see any other.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think the alternative is for this country to make it clear that we cannot and will not stand for any further Communist expansion, and if Russia makes the challenge of expansion, then I think we must face up to the full repercussions of deciding whether we should merely try to stop Russia on a purely local basis, or whether the body of the octopus should be brought under attack.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If I may pursue for a moment the question of expansion—the Senator from California realizes that Russia can expand by ways other than overt military aggression. I think we have made it fairly clear in Korea that we would not stand for any overt aggression. The policy was made clear to the world that we would not stand for any Communist overt aggression.

Mr. KNOWLAND. If the Senator will permit me, I should like to interrupt at that point. I repeat that I do not wish to get into a partisan discussion of the question, because it is too big a problem for that. People may honestly differ on the question, about what should have been done, and I know many persons who held positions of responsibility under the last administration felt the same way, but I say most respectfully that I think one of the great mistakes in history may have been that we limited our action to Korea, did not make use of the effectiveness of our strategic air arm, and left the munitions centers, the arsenals, the troop concentration points, the rail networks, and the supply depots which were just across the Yalu in a sanctuary. We limited our activity to the area between the Yalu and wherever the point of combat happened to be, whether it was at the 38th parallel or at the Pusan perimeter.

I am sure none of us want to see our country engaged in war, but in my opinion we must determine our policy. This is something which the people of the United States, as well as the Congress and the Executive, must think out well in advance. We must not have a policy which will engage us in a series of peripheral wars, limited entirely to countries which are the victims of aggression, whereas the aggressor could maintain himself in privileged sanctuaries, whether they were in Communist China or Communist Russia.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The point I was trying to make was not as to the policy or strategy we should adopt. We certainly gave a warning to the Soviets about the adoption on their part of a policy of overt aggression. The problem that concerns me so much is that there can be expansion by other means than by aggression, such as winning an election, or subversion in neutralist countries, if one likes that term, which is the term used by the majority leader, or anywhere else where people have not made up their minds. I guess "neutralist" is as good a word to use as any. Such a policy as has been proposed would not reach people in those countries at all, and I think many persons feel there is a greater danger of Soviet expansion in

that manner than there is of overt military expansion by force.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think the danger exists in both categories. For instance, Czechoslovakia is just as much behind the Iron Curtain, although she was taken over by the Communists by a coup d'etat, even though the Communists did not comprise as much as 20 percent of the population, if that much, as if Russian divisions had crossed the frontier and seized the country. I happened to be in Czechoslovakia just before that country lost its freedom. The pattern that was followed there was exactly the same pattern that had been followed earlier in Poland. In order to intimidate the people of the country, the Soviet Union had had maneuvers of their armored divisions along the Czechoslovakian-Polish frontier. Russia did not move a single tank across the frontier, but at precisely the time the local Communists were taking over Russia was holding maneuvers, and the clear intimidation and blackmailing effect of those maneuvers were that if the local Communists did not succeed in their coup d'etat the Communist forces would be prepared to move in and take over.

So I quite agree with the Senator from Arkansas that subversion from within may destroy freedom just as much as may aggression from without. I do not know that we have the final answer to that question, but I think we must face up to the problem. Otherwise we could lose all the countries on the periphery by the same method.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It seems to me it would be unwise to leave the impression that we would favor engaging in a so-called preventive war, because that would be disastrous to our relations with the rest of the world.

Mr. KNOWLAND. No; I think there is a difference between a preventive war and an act whereby a nation, without justification, without an act of aggression having been committed against it, engages in a Pearl Harbor type of attack. I think there is a big difference between the latter and saying that the Communists cannot expect to have the hands of the free world tied with an assurance that if an aggression is committed by the Communists, our actions will be limited to the ground or territory of the victim of the aggression. We might or might not determine that it was in the interest of maintaining a free world of freemen to take certain other action. Certainly we would not tell them in advance what the action would be. But Russia should not be allowed to proceed with any other aggression, either direct or indirect, with any feeling of security that our counteraction would be limited to the victim of the aggressor.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was under the impression that that was the policy of the present administration. That is what I understood the Secretary of State to mean when he talked about massive retaliation. It was with regard to any further overt aggression.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes; but the Senator from Arkansas was not referring to overt aggression. I think the picture as regards overt aggression has been made

fairly clear. The Senator had departed from the picture of overt aggression and had begun talking about subversion from within. I had said that a country could lose its freedom just as much by subversion from within as by overt aggression from without.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not quite understand the Senator. Would he go any further than the present administration's policy, expressed by Secretary Dulles—I assume with the approval of the President—with regard to the matter of massive retaliation? Perhaps the Senator does not like that term. I understood the Senator to refer to a policy of warning potential aggressors that if any further aggression occurred we would hit them with our atomic bombs. Would the Senator go any further than that?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Not unless they read into the statements of Mr. Dulles the interpretation that we would translate "massive retaliation" into atomic warfare. I do not think that necessarily follows. I think we will take whatever steps are necessary in the national interest, and to make sure that this Nation does not lose its freedom and that we do not lose the free world. But we do not necessarily use an elephant gun in hunting rabbits. I think it all depends on what the situation is and what the determination of the Joint Chiefs and the responsible authorities is.

The only point I have been making is that among some people abroad—and it may be true also of some in this country—there is the impression that a condition of peaceful coexistence will guarantee, in effect, a period of peace with the Soviet Union, or that a period when there is an atomic stalemate will assure that there will be no further Soviet aggressions. I merely wish to point out for the consideration of the Senate and the country that that will not necessarily mean that Soviet aggressions will stop at that point. On the contrary, I think it will open up to the Soviets an entirely new series of potential aggressions to which we must face up. We must not be living under the false impression that that period will bring about a number of years of peaceful coexistence.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the other hand, if we concentrate all our efforts on the military, to the exclusion of the other steps, and the Soviets should be smart enough not to engage in military expansion, but undertake expansion through peaceful means, such as a so-called point 4 program, we would be in a bad way. I understand they are now adopting our idea of the point 4 program, and offering to do the things we did under point 4 in many nations. If they do that, it seems to me that we shall be in a very bad way without any war at all.

Mr. KNOWLAND. It all depends. I think, as I stated earlier, that we have not necessarily yet found the solution. I do not think the previous administration found it. Perhaps this administration has not found out how to meet the problem of internal subversion.

Various suggestions have been made. I do not know that anyone has the complete solution. One policy we have followed is that, regardless of aggressions,

for example, upon our planes or in certain other directions, we would still continue our normal diplomatic relations with the countries committing the aggressions. I think that policy ought to be reviewed.

The argument made is that if we withdraw our Ambassador and send the Communist Ambassador home, so far as our Ambassador is concerned, we would lose a window in the other country. I think that factor must be weighed against the fact that the Communist embassies in our country, and in other countries of the free world, as has been shown by the Guzenko case in Canada, and as has been shown by some of the espionage cases in our country, are used as centers of espionage. So I think the breaking off of relations would be of greater disadvantage to the Soviets than to us. However, that is an arguable point.

Secondly, I think there is a certain amount of restlessness within a number of the satellite nations. It would certainly be to the advantage of the free world if those satellite nations could break away, one by one, from the Communist orbit. It might well be that with the breaking of relations with some of the nations which have given us ample reason for breaking relations, we would instill hope in the hearts of the once free people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and other countries, that someday they might again be free. Regardless of whether or not some people believe that recognition places the stamp of approval on a government, nevertheless, it does in fact give them a certain standing and prestige which the withdrawal of recognition would remove. It would have the reverse effect.

For that reason I think we must examine our entire policy and determine whether we are to sit back and do nothing in that regard, or find some new formula to help to resist the constant encroachment of the Communist world.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. I cannot possibly conceive of this country engaging in a preventive war. But if the prediction made by the distinguished majority leader, to the effect that during the next few years we shall reach an atomic stalemate, is correct—and I have no doubt that it is—will he not agree with me that we cannot afford to wait, in regard to making adequate provision to strengthen ourselves and our allies, until the time of that atomic stalemate arrives?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I quite agree with the Senator that the entire subject must be reviewed in the light of the present danger, and the potential dangers which confront us.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. The Senator has stressed the pressure to which the peripheral nations may be subjected as a result of this atomic stalemate, or even before

that stage is reached. Will he not agree with me that the very drastic reductions we have made in appropriations for the Air Force, for the Army, and possibly for the Navy, thus reducing our proposed air strength from 143 wings to substantially less than that, reducing our ground forces from 20 divisions to 17 divisions, and reducing our naval strength, must serve as a very great discouragement to the peripheral nations and the nations behind the Iron Curtain, as well as to our allies? Will he not agree that these actions on our part help inspire the belief abroad that we are not going to be strong enough to deal from strength, and that we are willing now to accept a position of weakness in dealing with the Soviets?

Mr. KNOWLAND. That would depend upon what the full facts were. For instance, I think we could have a lesser number of wings and still could have a stronger bombing potential, so that 1 or 2 planes could do what 150 or 500 planes might have done during World War II.

So far as the Army is concerned, I think it would depend upon what the situation was in regard to the firepower of the artillery, the infantry, and the armored divisions, in relation to the firepower previously existing, and whether some of the reductions had largely been in the supply forces and in the behind-the-line troops, and whether we could improve that situation, so we would not need as many men behind the lines, supporting the men in the front lines. I think we need to take all those factors into consideration.

I believe we have to consider what in the way of airpower we have, not only in the other services—the Navy and the Marines—but also among our allies, in terms of the common contribution, just as we have to consider what potentials there are in ground forces both in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.

Of course, all those things have to be taken into consideration before a categorical answer can be given to the Senator from New York. But I believe the overall strength needs to be maintained. We might have the desired strength; but if as a matter of national policy the American people were not prepared to support the use of that strength, even after having doubled its amount, that strength on our part would not necessarily constitute a restraining influence upon the Soviets.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield for another question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HICKENLOOPER in the chair). Does the Senator from California yield further to the Senator from New York?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. Will not the majority leader agree with me that there should be a careful reappraisal—on a bipartisan basis—of the results of the cuts in the appropriations for our military from \$40 billion to, I believe, less than \$28 billion in the past 2 years, involving a cut in our Air Force, from 143 wings to a lesser number, and a cut from 20 divisions to 17 divisions in our ground forces?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Of course the Senator from New York is making a statement that I would not wish to be understood as accepting. I believe it depends in both instances on whether we are talking about paper wings or wings actually in being. I think the Senator from New York will find that the proper congressional committees, including the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee and the Appropriations Committee, can delve into the question of whether there has been an actual reduction in firepower, or whether some of the reductions have been in types of planes which could very well be done without while we were concentrating upon building up the wings in being in both the tactical and the strategic air arms.

So the mere fact that there has been a change in the so-called paper wings does not necessarily mean—although I do not wish to argue the point now—that there has been a reduction in striking power.

Mr. LEHMAN. I suppose there is logic in what the majority leader has said. But from all the reports I have received in the past 2 or 3 years, I judge there has developed a very definite gap between the military strength of ourselves and that of Russia. I am not talking now about atomic strength; I am talking about the air forces and the ground forces.

I have also been told by excellent authority that this gap has actually widened instead of being narrowed, within the last year or two. I wonder whether the Senator from California can give me any information on that subject.

Mr. KNOWLAND. No; I am not in a position to do so at this time.

Mr. LEHMAN. I thank the Senator from California.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield to me?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. In the interest of trying to be helpful in this connection, I should like to say that a reduction from 143 wings to 100 wings has not actually occurred; it is not correct to say there has been such a reduction. In my opinion the reduction is from 143 wings to an ultimate goal of 137 wings. Furthermore, there is a difference in the spread of those wings. For instance, some of them are training or transport wings that can be eliminated.

Actually, the number of wings in existence last July, when I last checked the figures, was greater than the number we had a year before, and at least as many as were contemplated by the previous administration at that time.

I may also say to the Senator from New York and the Senator from California, that when the Senator from New York says we have reduced our ground forces from 20 divisions to 17 divisions, that statement also is not strictly correct, because not included in those divisions are the so-called combat teams, which, as I understand, are composed of artillery, infantry, aircraft, and so forth, and are in addition to the 17 divisions. Of course, we are equipping the 20 divi-

sions that are in Korea today, and are composed of Koreans. So, strictly speaking, we have not reduced the size of our Army to the extent that the statement of the Senator from New York would seem to indicate, when he referred to a reduction from 20 divisions to 17 divisions.

I should like to ask a question of the Senator from California, who formerly was a member of the Armed Services Committee: Is it not true that it will always be impossible for us to have as large a standing ground force as the Russians have? What we have to depend upon and what we need so badly today is an improved Reserve training program. Is it not equally true that the President of the United States has stated to the American Legion that in January he intends to submit to Congress, as one of the first measures he will suggest at the new session, a bill calling for a Reserve training program? I ask that question because at five different times last year I, as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, tried to get such a program submitted, but those in authority could not get together on a recommendation or plan.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Of course, an adequate Reserve program is essential because neither our economy nor our general history and tradition would support, nor would we wish to support, an army in being as large as the army the Soviet Union has. We would immediately have to curtail our production of planes, tanks, equipment, and so forth, to the extent required to keep any such force mobilized.

So I believe we need an adequate and efficient Reserve training program, and I think we need equally as much to consider the contributions of our several allies.

As the Senator from Massachusetts well knows, when the so-called ROK divisions—the divisions of the Republic of Korea—had proper training and proper equipment, they turned out to be among the finest divisions that fought in the Korean war. Certainly there is no reason why the troops of the Republic of Korea, in the defense of their own country, should not be equipped and trained to protect their own country; and certainly there is no reason why we necessarily should have to tie up 2, 5, or 10 United States divisions in Korea.

A similar situation exists in other areas of the world. I believe that the other nations, our allies, could themselves supply many divisions for the cost of equipping and maintaining one United States division. For instance, it has been estimated that anywhere from 10 to 15 Korean divisions can be equipped for the cost of equipping 1 United States division. A similar situation exists in the case of certain other countries, although perhaps not in so great a degree. Certainly our allies and associates should be prepared, in the common defense, to carry their fair share of the burden.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I should like to ask one more question, and perhaps make a brief statement, also. What the Senator from California says about the Reserve training program is

true; and I believe that the enactment of a measure bringing about such a Reserve training program is the most fundamental legislative improvement that lies within our power today.

Second, of course, we should reappraise, every year, the appropriations for our military equipment.

The other question I should like to ask the distinguished majority leader is this:

The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Omar Bradley, made a statement which has always appealed to me. He said that if we are to send ground troops into any situation, we should choose, to the best of our ability, where those ground troops are to go, and not be forced to send them somewhere as the result of action taken by some other country. I assume that is the same feeling which motivated General Ridgway in his testimony. I believe such a concept is fundamental to our future security. We should keep our ground forces mobile and send them to places of our own choosing.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I believe that statement is correct. However, we should understand that making that statement does not solve the problem, as I am sure the Senator did not mean to imply. For example, I believe it to be entirely sound policy to withdraw American divisions gradually from Korea and to replace them with Koreans in the defense of Korea. In that way the American divisions can be put into a mobile reserve.

I believe the same policy should be followed in Japan and in other areas of the world.

However, it is not possible precipitantly to withdraw those divisions unless at the same time we make sure that the withdrawal of the troops does not in and of itself encourage Soviet aggression. That is why I believe the policy of building up the ROK divisions in Korea is a necessary corollary to the withdrawal of American troops.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I had in mind sending our troops into some places, such as the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Missouri mentioned.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I quite agree that neither in our military policy nor in our foreign policy should we be placed in the position of merely reacting to Soviet moves, and to make it possible for them by their moves to determine what we will do, because that in effect would make us a captive of their policy. I do not believe that we should do that.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I appreciate very much the distinguished majority leader's frank approach, as always, to these troublesome problems. I am not sure that I fully comprehend all the implications that may flow from the distinguished Senator's statements.

I have not had an opportunity to study his words. I shall certainly do so during the evening. I do wish to ask a question of the distinguished majority leader.

First, I wish to say that I share the

Senator's very deep concern about the state of our Nation's defenses and about the necessity of our negotiating from a position of strength. As the Senator will recall, many years ago we were among 6, 7, or 8 Members of the Senate who insisted that adequate funds be appropriated to maintain what we considered to be our essential defenses.

With reference to the present time, what does the Senator believe we should add to the proclamations already made by the President and the Secretary of State insofar as warning Russia is concerned? Would he extend those proclamations? Would he go further?

At this time, does he believe that we have not studied the situation enough? Would he precede any announcement with a study, or would he make the announcement and then make the study? Would the Senator elaborate on that point?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I would say to the Senator from Texas that what I primarily had in mind in the remarks I made today was that throughout the world there has been an obvious development in the thinking of some of our allies and some of the neutral countries that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, merely because it has been expressed by the Soviet Union, can be relied on. I believe it to be a wrong premise. I do not believe that we can trust the Soviet Union today any more than we could trust the Soviet Union under Stalin or under Lenin.

I believe the historic Soviet doctrine is still precisely what it was before, and that is to destroy the free world whenever the Soviet Union has an opportunity to do so. It may take some considerable time. They may try to do it in a piecemeal fashion. They may await for an opportunity when it would be possible for them to do it more aggressively and in a whole-hog fashion. However, I do not believe that their basic policy has changed.

The mere fact that they say "We are now good" does not mean that we should accept that statement at face value. We should not do so, because the Soviet Union has violated every nonaggression pact it ever entered into, including the ones with Finland, with Poland, with Latvia, with Lithuania, and with Estonia, and the agreements with Nationalist China.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. What would the Senator from California recommend doing or not doing?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I would say to the Senator from Texas that, first, the administration should, as I hope it will and as I believe it will, call in the leaders of both parties during this session—and such a conference has already been called—and certainly during the next session, when the party of the Senator from Texas will be in control of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, in order to work together on some of the grave problems that face our Nation.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. With that recommendation the Senator from Texas is in hearty accord.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Secondly, I believe it is equally important that before

some of our friends abroad get the false impression that peaceful coexistence, as the Soviets use the term, or atomic stalemate, when it comes, will mean that they will be free from worry, we should at least point out to them some pitfalls in that policy. I have mentioned some of them today. We should point out those pitfalls before they commit themselves to the policy of the Soviet Union without realizing the full implications of that policy.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I want the Senator from California to understand that I agree with him wholeheartedly in the view that our foreign policy and our military policy need to be reviewed and strengthened.

I merely want to get a little more clearly what his ideas are and what he believes should or could be done. I believe the President has acted very wisely and considerately in arranging for a meeting on Wednesday of this week. I cannot anticipate what that meeting will produce. I am hopeful that some of the things the Senator has mentioned will be placed on the table as frankly as the Senator has placed them before the Senate today.

I am concerned, however, about the distinguished majority leader's statement, if I understood it correctly—I may not have understood it correctly—that he was recommending a study of the subject by committees of Congress at the present session. Is that correct?

Mr. KNOWLAND. No; not necessarily so. I purposely did not say that it should be done at the present session of Congress. However, I do think that time is of the essence. I believe that the year 1955 may be one of the most crucial years in the entire history of our Nation. Actually it may be a year such as faced the Roman Empire at one time, when it had the power to make decisions which might have saved it, but when they passed the "point of no return." From there they were no longer in control of the situation.

Therefore I merely say, on my own responsibility as a Senator, that the problem is of such magnitude and of such importance that there should be no center aisle dividing us in trying to find a solution which will preserve our Republic and make it possible for us to hand it to our children and grandchildren as strong as we received it from those before us. That is basically what I am trying to say.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I commend the distinguished majority leader for that statement. I certainly share his viewpoint on the necessity for uniting all America in a common determination to preserve our country.

I assume, then, that the majority leader does not contemplate any unilateral study of the subject by Senate committees during this special session of the Senate?

Mr. KNOWLAND. No; I do not have that in mind. Of course I have no doubt that I am not the only one who has been worrying about this problem. At least I have expressed a point of view I wished to get before the Senate while the Senate was in session at this time and while

we are preparing for the next session of Congress, as well as while distinguished representatives of foreign countries are visiting us.

In that way at least some thought will be given—as I know it is being given—in various countries, and by the public as a whole, to the question of what the full implications of the so-called policy of peaceful coexistence and atomic stalemate may mean.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I wish to thank the distinguished majority leader for the frankness of his statement this evening. I now have a much clearer view about the plans for this Senate session than I had when he began to deliver his statement because I thought the implication of a recommendation for study meant that perhaps the committees would start on this problem while we are trying to pass on the pending resolution. I certainly hoped the majority leader did not feel that the matter was of sufficient urgency to displace the pending business.

Mr. KNOWLAND. No. I will say to the Senator from Texas that I had no such intention. But I wish to point out that while we have 96 Members from 48 States engaged in the consideration of a matter which is of some importance to the Senate, other vital questions which may affect the life of the Republic are still arising in the outer world, and I hope that we will not become so deeply engrossed in the pending resolution that we will lose sight of other important matters.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I commend the Senator for bringing the matter to our attention, and I also congratulate him for not intending that the present business be set aside.

I think the most important job the 84th Congress will have is not only to examine and attempt to strengthen our foreign policy to give this Nation the initiative, but to be sure that the people of this country, as far as possible, are united behind our foreign policy. I think it is extremely urgent that we re-examine our defense policy and our military strength. It is my personal view that it will be absolutely necessary, in view of what the Senator has said, and in view of what we know to be the facts, to make this Nation as strong as is possible. I am afraid that today we are weaker than we should be.

I know, from my experience with the Senator in our respective leadership roles and on the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee, that this is not an issue that will be determined by partisan considerations. We all love this Nation, and we are going to march forward together and attempt to make this country so strong that no one will dare attack it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I thank the Senator.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I appreciate what coexistence means. I have always thought that a cartoon I once saw showing a birdcage containing a fat

cat and with no bird in the cage was an indication of what would happen under coexistence.

Mr. KNOWLAND. When I was in China in 1949 and was at Chungking the day before the Communists took that capital, one of the elder statesmen of the Republic of China said to me, "You know, Senator, we have an old expression in China that you cannot have coalition or coexistence with a tiger unless you are inside the tiger."

Mr. FERGUSON. That is the same idea which I expressed. But my question is this: I was under the impression that the Defense Department and the administration were studying our military situation from day to day and had made announcements. I think the settlement which was made in Korea was an indication of what we could expect if no determinations were reached.

Does the Senator wish to leave the impression that the administration today is not studying the questions which have been raised not only from the military angle but from the State Department angle?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Oh, no. I hope the Senator will read no such implication into my statement, because I am sure that almost daily the Joint Chiefs of Staff are sending papers to the Security Council, and the Security Council, under its responsibilities, is making determinations dependent on what happens in the world and what changes have taken place. But in the past several weeks there has seemed to be a growing feeling in the capitals of Europe that once they accept the Soviet theory of coexistence it will solve the problem; that that may make it unnecessary finally to rearm Western Germany; that the Soviet Union then is going to change from a lion to a lamb, and is going to be easier to get along with. I do not happen to "buy" that theory. I think we are going to see an increasing opinion being built up in some of the capitals of Europe and in some of the neutral nations, such as India, that if we would only accept the Soviet commitments and words at face value we could live in security and without fear of the possibility of an overt aggression from without or subversion from within. It is for that reason that I felt it was important to make the statement which I have made.

Mr. FERGUSON. I am glad to have that answer, because I feel we are doing our job on a daily basis with reference to the problem. I share the view that some nations are not aware of what penetration by communism can mean.

I think that in the near future one of the jobs of America, of this Congress, and the administration, is to create in the minds of leaders of other nations, our allies, an awareness of what can be accomplished by the penetration and infiltration of communism, and what would follow under the so-called definition of coexistence. It would take them all over, and we might stand alone if they do not realize that Communist penetration and infiltration are a means of destruction. I understood that the treaty with reference to the South Pacific, which we are now studying is an

indication that we recognize two forces, one, military, and the other, which is of great importance, that of penetration and infiltration.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I may be mistaken, but as a matter of fact, I think the Manila Pact is the first pact in which the free nations of the world ever sought to meet specific problems dealing with internal subversion and realized the importance of consultation together in the event of subversive activities in any of these nations affected.

Mr. FERGUSON. I think the sixth section of the Rio Pact is framed in almost the same language.

Mr. KNOWLAND. That is correct. Mr. FERGUSON. I wanted to have the RECORD clear as to the Senator's thinking on that point.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield. Mr. SYMINGTON. With reference to the joining of the question of adequate armed strength and preventive war, does not the Senator from California agree that the way to prevent any war is to have adequate military strength?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think the best chance we have of maintaining the peace of the world is to keep ourselves and our associates in the free world so strong that the very realistic men in the Kremlin will figure that their calculated chances of winning are so much less than their chances of losing that they will not precipitate a war or encourage any of their associates to precipitate a war. I think the greatest danger to peace is to operate from a position of weakness so that the contrary would be true, that they would figure their calculated chances of winning were much greater than their chances of losing. That would be our hour of greatest danger.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In other words, is not adequate military strength one of the greatest ways of preventing any war?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I am certain the Senator from Missouri agrees with me that it is not only necessary to maintain military strength, but also economic strength to support the military strength.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I do agree. Mr. KNOWLAND. But keeping in mind national strength in all of its broad aspects, we must maintain a strong America and a strong free world.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In other words, in the search for peace, it is of the utmost importance to have adequate military strength; is it not?

Mr. KNOWLAND. That is correct. There is no question about it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I do not know whether the majority leader is acquainted with the recent bipartisan report of the National Planning Association, which says America could spend more than \$10 billion additional on military strength and, at the same time, increase our standard of living and reduce our taxes. It says we probably could spend \$20 billion more and do the same thing; that we would only get into trouble if we got up to around \$33 billion more.

Does not the majority leader agree that we must have whatever is necessary for adequate military security, as

we face the great and growing dangers of Soviet communism?

Mr. KNOWLAND. When we live in a world in which if there is any relaxation on the part of the free nations we shall have our jugular vein cut, we must maintain alertness and strength.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the distinguished majority leader. Achieving what might be called a policy of strength through weakness, which has resulted in—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is the parliamentary situation? Has the Senator from California yielded the floor?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I assumed that the Senator from South Dakota wanted the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Chair understand that the Senator from Missouri is speaking in his own right, after the Senator from California had yielded the floor?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I thought I had yielded the floor.

Mr. CASE. Before the Senator from California yielded, I hoped he would yield to me, merely to permit me to ask unanimous consent for certain insertions in the RECORD.

Mr. SYMINGTON. May I address one more question to the majority leader?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from California yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I have no desire to hold the floor, but, as a courtesy, I yield to the Senator from Missouri. Then I shall be glad to yield for insertions, following which I shall be prepared to move that the Senate recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the majority leader for his typical gracious courtesy.

It seems to me that this policy of strength through weakness, which has resulted in reducing appropriations for our national defense somewhere between \$11 billion and \$12 billion, is one which seriously affects the future security of the United States. It also affects adversely any chance of handling what the majority leader, in his fine talk this afternoon, has presented as a problem for the United States.

I agree with our distinguished minority leader, when he said that the most important problem to come before the Senate at the next session will probably be what we must do to negotiate from a position of strength. We must negotiate our diplomatic problems from a position of military strength as against weakness if the former are to be taken seriously by any possible enemy.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I desire to ask 1 or 2 questions of the Senator from California. I did not have the opportunity to hear all of the Senator's comment, but I gathered the burden of his remarks, for which I commend him.

I ask the Senator, first, if it is not his belief that the present developments in Soviet foreign policy, in respect to what might be termed a softer attitude or a more conciliatory attitude, so far as Western Europe is concerned, and even the United States, as well, relate directly to the integration of the forces of West

Germany into the whole Western Defense Community?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think it is purely a technical move in the long-term Soviet strategic objective.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Is it not to be borne in mind that while there seems to be, on the surface, a lessening of the tensions in certain areas of Europe, nevertheless, while that is going on there is gross violation of the truce agreements in Korea and in Indochina? For example, in Indochina, where there is supposed to be a free movement of people between the Red- or Communist-controlled area and the rest of Vietnam, the movement literally has been stymied, and despite the protests of the truce commission nothing has taken place in respect to the protests.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I have likewise been concerned with the violations of the armistice and truce agreements in both Korea and Vietnam. At the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations, when Mr. Dulles appeared before the committee to give some preliminary testimony on the Manila pact, I specifically asked that the Committee on Foreign Relations be furnished forthwith with information in the hands of the Government of the United States relative to such truce violations, so that it might be available to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I again spoke today to the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and asked them to expedite the delivery of that information to the Foreign Relations Committee, and then, if they have subsequent information which they desire to send us, to do that. However, I am very much concerned about the violations that have been reported to have taken place.

Mr. HUMPHREY. We owe the Senator from California an expression of thanks for his initiative in the matter, because I think it is very important. If I may make one statement, I think what we have to point out for the information of all the people is that while there is an apparent facade of trying to approach understandings between the Soviets and the Western European countries, particularly, we must keep in mind that the policy of the Soviet Union for a considerable time has been one of pernicious attrition, of using truces, armistice agreements, and the philosophy of co-existence to penetrate certain areas without military aggression.

Mr. KNOWLAND. If I am not mistaken, it is a fact, and I think the Senator from Minnesota will recall it, that just prior to the aggression in Korea on the 25th of June 1950, there took place the big Communist-sponsored peace rally, known as the Stockholm peace conference, at which rally statements were made to the effect that everything was going to be peaceful between the Communists and the free world.

There are some people, who have had more and closer experience with the Communists than we have had, who really begin to worry when Communists start talking about peace, fearing that it may be a sign of an additional Soviet move.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I wish to thank the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I now yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

RESOLUTION OF CENSURE

The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution (S. Res. 301) to censure the junior Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the text of a letter which I have written under date of November 15, 1954, to the Honorable ARTHUR V. WATKINS, chairman of the select committee to study censure charges.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
CENSURE CHARGES PURSUANT
TO SENATE ORDER ON
SENATE RESOLUTION 301,
November 15, 1954.

The Honorable ARTHUR V. WATKINS,
Chairman, Select Committee To Study
Censure Charges, United States
Senate.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The letter which Secretary Stevens wrote late Saturday, and which you delivered to me yesterday (Sunday) afternoon responding to the questions which I asked him at the conference in your office earlier Saturday afternoon, considered with the material in the two letters which he brought to your office, together with the prior evidence in the matter, convinces me that it would be wrong to censure Senator McCARTHY on the second count—the Zwicker affair.

Therefore, I shall not vote for it.

You recall that after reading the McCarthy letter which Secretary Stevens brought in Saturday, I asked: "When was the letter actually received?" and, "What consideration was given to it?"

After the conference, I reread not only the testimony before our committee on the Zwicker matter but also the original Peress testimony before Senator McCARTHY in New York City. That hearing ended in New York City at noon on Saturday, January 30 on a quiet and sort of incidental question by Senator McCARTHY, "You haven't been asked to resign, have you?"

A short exchange apparently alerted both parties and then a foot race began—by Peress on Monday, February 1, to get immediate action on his discharge, by McCARTHY to get a court-martial instituted before Peress got out of the jurisdiction of the Army.

Secretary Stevens gives the first positive evidence as far as I know that Senator McCARTHY's letter of February 1, was delivered to his office by messenger that same Monday, and made known "to the responsible Army staff."

Further, that it was reviewed—presumably against the information which General Zwicker relayed through his immediate superior, Chief of Staff, First Army, New York, the same Monday that Peress had asked for immediate discharge instead of the previously agreed upon date.

Mr. Stevens' reply to my second question is that the McCarthy letter was then reviewed and that "it was concluded that there was no additional evidence to require modification of the prior determination of the Peress case * * * and that the best interests of the United States would be served by his prompt separation."