

December 5, 1955

THE EFFECT OF THE ATOMIC STALEMATE ON THE CHANCE OF REACHING

A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH RUSSIA

by Leo Szilard

We may take it for granted that neither America nor Russia want an all out atomic war. Therefore if such a war should come, it is not likely to come as a sudden massive attack of the American Strategic Air Force against the cities of the Soviet Union or of the Soviet Air Force against the cities of America. Yet <sup>the</sup> danger of an all out atomic war will remain with us as long as there is no global political settlement that satisfies America and the Soviet Union and is acceptable to the other great powers who are involved. For ~~in the absence of such a~~

~~settlement, there will remain with us the danger of local conflicts, will~~

*arise from time to time*  
particularly in areas which are not fully controlled by either Russia or America; and if such a local conflict leads to war, America and Russia might very well intervene on opposite sides in the absence of a political settlement.)

In areas which are remote from the United States and are geographically close to Russia or China, America could hardly intervene successfully except by resorting to tactical atomic warfare, and no doubt, Russia would use atomic weapons also. Even though the use of atomic bombs in such <sup>a</sup> conflict might at first be limited to the tactical area, it is likely that it would soon be quickly extended to communication lines and ~~forward~~ air bases. Nearby cities are likely to be hit also and radioactive dust might settle in populated areas. The danger from radioactive fall-out from bomb tests is negligible because such tests are postponed again and again for days and weeks awaiting favorable weather conditions. But under conditions of warfare, precautions of this sort



cannot be observed. And if radioactive dust settles in populated regions, the demand for retaliation will mount. No one today can say with any degree of confidence that such a ~~local~~ war in which atomic weapons are used could remain localized and that an all out atomic catastrophe could be avoided.

This danger could be conceivably averted by eliminating the use of atomic bombs in local conflicts. But many of the areas which <sup>hardly</sup> America feels she needs to protect are geographically close to Russia and China. Clearly atomic disarmament of tactical units would favor those nations who are geographically close to the likely areas of conflict. In these circumstances, it is unlikely that in the absence of a political settlement an agreement on such disarmament can be successfully negotiated; and this, I believe, would remain true even if agreement could be reached on adequate measures of inspection.

The danger of a local conflict leading to an all out atomic war can, I believe, be averted only if it is possible for Russia and America to arrive at a political settlement. No political settlement can eliminate the possibility that war may break out in areas which are not fully controlled by either Russia or America, but it can reduce the chances of such a war. And above all, if the settlement works, it eliminates the danger that Russia and America may intervene on opposite sides. Is such a settlement possible?

It is my contention that the accumulation of stock piles of atomic and hydrogen bombs by America and by Russia has brought about a fundamental change in the situation and that now, for the first time since the war, there is a chance that a political settlement could be negotiated.



It would have been impossible, ~~I believe~~ for America and Russia to negotiate a global settlement any earlier in the post war period, for America and Russia were caught in a power conflict. In such a conflict, the overriding consideration <sup>that guides the</sup> ~~guiding~~ a nation is to improve the chances of winning the war if it comes. Military and strategic considerations take precedence above all else and since evidently on the issue of who is to win the war a compromise is not possible, the main issues of the conflict are not negotiable.

Oddly enough, the approaching stalemate between the Strategic Air Forces of Russia and America appears to eliminate these non-negotiable issues.

The stalemate between the Strategic Air Forces of Russia and America will arrive when the American Air Force can destroy Russia, when the Russian Air Force can destroy America, and when neither Air Force is in position to destroy the power of the other to retaliate. Only when the rival Strategic Air Forces are highly dispersed or otherwise protected against attack can we speak of a true stalemate.

It is by no means sure that such a true stalemate has been reached as yet, but once the stalemate is an accomplished fact, neither America nor Russia can thereafter ever be vanquished by each other or by any other nation. No territory that is really vital to America or Russia could ever be successfully invaded, and it is exceedingly unlikely that such an invasion would even be attempted, provided only that an adequate policy of using the Strategic Air Force for the protection of those vital areas is clearly formulated and is understood by all. Such a policy must proclaim a strictly limited use of the Strategic Air Force for the protection of the vital areas. Threatening massive retaliation



in a conflict in which Russia and America might be lined up on opposite sides will have no deterrent effect for it amounts to threatening "murder and suicide".

But if both America and Russia adopt an adequate strategy in defense of territories vital to them and base it on the limited use of the Strategic Air Forces then Russia and America will be both invulnerable. The deterrent effect of such a policy would be so strong that there could be no deliberate attempt at attacking territories that are vital, either <sup>to</sup> ~~Russia or to America~~. Therefore, the need for actually using the Strategic Air Force may never arise.

The fact that Russia and America are now becoming <sup>invulnerable</sup> ~~invulnerable~~ is a crucial new factor in the power conflict. Because of this fact the major issues that were not negotiable in the past are now fading out of the picture.

The United States has engaged in two world wars in this century. In both cases, she was largely motivated by the belief that if she permitted Germany to win and dominate the continent of Europe, Germany would become so strong that in a subsequent war she could vanquish America. Time and again, great powers have gone to war in order to prevent an adverse shift in the power balance and thus to avoid the risk of being vanquished in a subsequent war. Time and again, it proved impossible to resolve a power conflict because the parties to such a conflict could not negotiate any of the issues that had a bearing--and most of them did--on the the paramount issue of who is <sup>going</sup> to win the war if war comes. But today, both Russia and America can make themselves invulnerable and none of the outstanding issues



between them have any appreciable bearing on the paramount issue of "who is to win the war". Today, neither America nor Russia need to be concerned from the point of view of their <sup>heroic moral obligations</sup> ~~safety~~ about the emergence of any other nation as a major industrial power, be it Germany, Japan, or China because of the increase in war potential that would accrue to a potential enemy.

It is <sup>those</sup> ~~this~~ circumstances that makes a global agreement between America and Russia potentially negotiable today, while it was not negotiable prior to the onset of the stalemate between the Strategic Air Forces. <sup>From the point of view</sup>

Does this mean that such a political settlement can actually be negotiated today and will it be possible to obtain the concurrence of the great powers to an agreement that will fully satisfy the real needs of Russia and the United States? Clearly, such a settlement is of value only if it offers Russia, ~~and~~ the United States and the other great powers involved <sup>is largely all issues are reflected in a way or another</sup> a strong continued incentive for keeping the agreement in operation. Can such a global agreement be concluded? There are obviously great obstacles that must be overcome, and failure to agree is more likely than not. Still, I believe that we may have one chance in ten that such an agreement <sup>can</sup> ~~could~~ be negotiated, and if this is correct, then we ought to concentrate much effort on this narrow margin of hope.

Assuming that such an agreement can be concluded, it would probably <sup>at first and perhaps for a long time to come</sup> leave untouched the Strategic Air Forces of Russia and the United States. But the agreement could provide for severely limiting the armaments of the smaller nations in many areas of the world. Such a <sup>limitation of</sup> ~~reduction in~~ arms level would indeed seem necessary, particularly in those areas



which are not under effective control of any of the great powers. It would seem, moreover, that some method of enforcement would have to operate in those areas if we want to avoid the danger that one nation may invade the territory of another, ~~and thereby upset the balance~~ established by the overall agreement ~~which~~ <sup>that might lead an invasion</sup> in turn may lead to an abrogation of the agreement by one of the great powers. ~~Enforcement would seem necessary also in order to prevent the manufacture of atom bombs~~ <sup>and possession</sup> in such areas of the world. What kinds of enforcement would be least objectionable to nations situated in such areas?

We assume the nations in those areas will be largely disarmed ~~though they may~~ remain in possession of machine guns in unlimited quantities. Enforcement might then take the form of a small, mobile, regional police force, equipped with high fire power. Such a regional force might be under the control of a small number of nations which are selected with the concurrence of the nations of the region but need not include any of the nations of the region and need not include any of the great powers. Such a regional force could penetrate, if need be, to the capital of any of the nations of the region without effective interference by the national police, and if need be, arrest officials of the government in case of illicit manufacture of dangerous weapons. And, they could penetrate to military headquarters of an invading army equipped with weapons no heavier than machine guns and arrest the commanding generals.

Technically, such a regional force could easily enforce arms limitation and frustrate an attempted invasion, but the chief problem of enforcement by this method is a political one. If the member nations who control the regional police force have a strong enough interest in maintaining the

*could  
protection  
to all nations  
in the  
region  
and enforce  
any invasion  
but to  
eliminate  
the need  
for  
military  
forces*



<sup>the</sup>  
status quo for the sake of keeping global political agreement in force,  
then they will use the regional police force whenever needed to prevent  
a shift in the territorial status quo or the illicit manufacture of  
dangerous weapons. ~~There is no other function that such regional police  
force need to fulfill.~~

*where are regional ~~to~~ police  
forces*



Dec 5, 1955

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A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT *with Russia.*

*By* LEV S. ILARD

We may take it for granted that neither America nor Russia want an all out atomic war. ~~If~~ *Therefore it should* such a war comes, it is not likely to come ~~by~~ *as* a ~~fast~~ sudden massive attack of the American Strategic Air Force against the cities of the Soviet Union ~~or~~ *of* the Soviet Air Force against the cities of America. *Yet* The danger of an all out atomic war will remain with us as long as there is no global political settlement that satisfies America and the Soviet Union and is acceptable to the other great powers who are involved. *For in* the absence of such a settlement, there will remain with us the danger of local conflicts, particularly in areas which are not fully controlled by either Russia or America; and if such a local conflict leads to war ~~in the absence of a political settlement~~ America and Russia might very well intervene on opposite sides. *PP* In areas which are geographically remote from the United States and are close to Russia or China, America could hardly intervene successfully except by using *resorting to tactical warfare* technical ~~atomic weapons~~ *use atomic*, and no doubt, Russia would ~~respond by using such~~ *in such a conflict* weapons also. Even though the use of atomic bombs might at first be limited to the tactical area, it is likely that it would ~~soon be~~ *quickly* extended to communication lines and forward air bases. *Nearby* ~~Neighboring~~ cities are likely to be ~~affected~~ *hit* also and radioactive dust might ~~seriously affect the~~ *settle in populated* civilian population in the ~~area~~ *area*. The danger from radioactive fall-out from bomb tests is negligible because such tests are postponed again and again for days and weeks, awaiting favorable weather conditions. But under conditions of warfare, precautions of this sort cannot be observed. And if radioactive dust settles ~~in nearby cities~~ *in nearby cities*, the demand for retaliation will mount. No one today can ~~appreciate the chances~~ *say with any degree of confidence* that such a local



war in which atomic weapons are used <sup>could</sup> ~~can~~ remain localized and that an all out atomic catastrophe <sup>could</sup> ~~can~~ be avoided.

~~It is not likely that this danger can~~ <sup>could</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>conceivably</sup> averted by eliminating the use of atomic bombs in local conflicts. <sup>But</sup> Many of the areas which America feels she needs to protect are geographically ~~very~~ close to Russia and China. ~~It is therefore not likely that America will agree to a measure which would make it impossible for her, if need be, to defend these areas.~~ Clearly <sup>(atomic of tactical units)</sup> disarmament <sup>(likely)</sup> would favor those nations who are geographically close to the <sup>(likely)</sup> area of conflict.)

In these circumstances, it is unlikely that in the absence of a political settlement an agreement <sup>such</sup> on disarmament can be successfully negotiated; and this, I believe, <sup>would</sup> ~~will~~ remain ~~to be~~ true even if agreement could be reached on adequate measures of inspection.

The danger of a local conflict leading to an all out atomic war can, I believe, be averted only if it is possible for Russia and America to arrive at a political settlement. No political settlement can eliminate the possibility that war may break out in areas which are not fully controlled by either Russia or America, but it can reduce the chances of such a war. <sup>and above all</sup> Moreover, if the settlement works, it eliminates the danger that Russia and America may intervene on opposite sides. Is such a settlement possible?

It is my contention that the accumulation of stock piles of atomic and hydrogen bombs by America and by Russia has brought about a fundamental change in the situation and that now, for the first time since the war, there is a chance that a political settlement could be negotiated. <sup>P</sup> It <sup>I believe</sup> would have been impossible for America and Russia to negotiate a global settlement any earlier in the post war period, for America and Russia were caught in a power conflict. In such a conflict, the overriding



consideration guiding <sup>a</sup> ~~both~~ nations <sup>to improve the chances</sup> is ~~the possibility~~ of winning the war if ~~it~~ comes. Military and strategic considerations take precedence above all else and since evidently on the issue of who is ~~going~~ to win the war ~~the war could~~ a compromise is not possible, the main issues of the conflict are not negotiable.

Oddly enough, the approaching stalemate between the Strategic Air Forces of Russia and America <sup>appears to</sup> ~~eliminate~~ these non-negotiable issues.

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It is by no means sure that such a true stalemate has been reached as yet, but once the stalemate is an accomplished fact, neither America nor Russia can thereafter ever be vanquished by each other or by any other nation.

No territory that is really vital to America or Russia could ever be successfully invaded, and it is exceedingly unlikely that such an invasion would even be attempted, provided only that an adequate policy of using the Strategic Air Force for the protection of those vital areas is clearly <sup>formulated</sup> ~~proclaimed~~ and understood by all. <sup>is</sup> ~~clearly~~ such a policy must proclaim a strictly limited use of the Strategic Air Force for the protection of the vital areas. Threatening massive retaliation in <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ conflict in which Russia and America might be lined up on opposite sides <sup>will have no deterrent effect</sup> ~~could serve no useful purpose, for the threat of murder and suicide <sup>is</sup> ~~is not~~ an effective threat.~~

<sup>be it amounts to threatening</sup>  
 But if both America and Russia <sup>base it</sup>  
~~The fact that if they~~ adopt an adequate <sup>strategic base</sup> ~~policy of the limited use~~ of the Strategic Air Forces in defense of their vital territories, <sup>vital</sup> to them and



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The deterrent ~~factor~~ <sup>effect</sup> of such a policy would be so strong that there would be no deliberate attempt at attacking territories that are vital, either to Russia or to America. Therefore, the need for 'actually using' the strategic air force may never arise.

The fact that Russia and America are <sup>now</sup> becoming <sup>invulnerable</sup> invulnerable is a crucial new factor in <sup>the power conflict</sup> world politics, and it is ~~probably~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~most~~ <sup>factor</sup> important single ~~factor~~ obstacle that ~~has~~ <sup>has</sup> stood in the way of negotiating a global political settlement. Because of this fact the major ~~issues~~ <sup>issues</sup> that were not negotiable and therefore would have blocked any attempt ~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> reaching a political settlement with Russia <sup>are</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>now</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>now</sup> fading out of the picture. <sup>It is</sup> ~~It is~~ important to understand



*then*

*Insert*

Russia and America will both be invulnerable and will not actually have to use the Strategic Air Forces introduces an important new factor into world politics.

The United States has engaged in two world wars in this century. In both cases, she was largely motivated by the belief that if she permitted Germany to win and dominate the continent of Europe, Germany would become so strong that in a subsequent war she could vanquish America. Time and again, great powers have gone to war in order to prevent an adverse shift in the power balance and thus to avoid the risk of being vanquished in a subsequent war. Time and again, it proved impossible to resolve a power conflict because the parties to such a conflict could not negotiate any of the issues that had a bearing--and most of them did--on the paramount issue of who is going to win the war, if war comes. But today, both Russia and America ~~can be~~ *can make themselves* ~~defended by a limited use of~~ *completely invulnerable* ~~the Strategic Air Forces against all corners~~ and none of the ~~numerous~~ outstanding issues between them have any appreciable bearing on the ~~safety~~ *issue of "who is going to win the war!"* ~~of the territories that are really vital to them.~~ Today, neither America nor Russia need to be concerned from the point of view of their safety about the emergence of any other nation as a major industrial power, be it Germany, Japan, or China because of the increase <sup>in</sup> of war potential that would accrue to a potential enemy.

It is this circumstance that makes a global agreement between America and Russia potentially negotiable today, <sup>while</sup> ~~when~~ it was not negotiable prior to the onset of the stalemate between the Strategic Air Forces.

Does this mean that such a political settlement can actually be negotiated today and will it be possible to obtain the concurrence of the great powers to an agreement that will <sup>fully</sup> ~~satisfy~~ <sup>real</sup> the needs of Russia and the United States? Clearly, such a settlement is of value only if it



offers Russia and the United States and the other great powers involved a strong <sup>continued</sup> incentive for keeping the agreement in operation. Can such a global agreement be concluded? There are obviously great obstacles that must be overcome, and <sup>failure to agree</sup> it is more likely than not ~~that they cannot be over-~~ <sup>skill</sup> come, but I believe that we have one chance in ten that such an agreement could be negotiated, and <sup>may</sup> ~~I believe that~~ we ought to concentrate much of ~~our~~ <sup>if this is correct then</sup> efforts on this narrow margin of hope. <sup>P</sup> Assuming that such an agreement can be concluded, it would probably leave untouched the Strategic Air Forces of Russia and the United States. But <sup>the</sup> agreement could provide ~~for far reaching disarmament otherwise and in particular, it could provide~~ for severely limiting the armaments of the smaller nations in many areas of the world. Such a reduction in arms level would indeed seem necessary, particularly in those areas which are not under effective control of any of the great powers. It would seem <sup>move over,</sup> that some method of enforcement would have to be <sup>operate</sup> established in those areas if we want to avoid the danger <sup>that</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>may</sup> one nation invading the territory of another and thereby upsetting <sup>in turn may</sup> the balance established by the overall agreement, <sup>which</sup> ~~Such an invasion could easily~~ lead to an abrogation of the agreement by one of the great powers. <sup>enforcement</sup> ~~Also,~~ <sup>also in order,</sup> it would seem necessary to prevent the manufacture of atom bombs in such areas of the world. What kinds of enforcement would be least objectionable to nations situated in such areas?

We assume the nations in those areas will be largely disarmed though they may remain in possession of machine guns in unlimited quantities. Enforcement might then take the form of a small, mobile, regional police force, equipped with high fire power. Such a regional force might be under the control of a smaller ~~number~~ number of nations which are selected with the concurrence of the nations of the region but need not include any of the nations of the region and need not include any of the great



powers. Such a regional force could penetrate, if need be, to the capital of any of the nations of the region without effective interference by the national police, and if need be, arrest officials of the government in case of illicit manufacture of dangerous weapons. <sup>And</sup> ~~Yet,~~ they could penetrate ~~into~~ <sup>to</sup> military headquarters of an invading army equipped with weapons no heavier than machine guns and arrest the commanding generals.

*such a regional force could easily*  
 Technically, ~~there is no problem for such a force to enforce arms~~  
<sup>and</sup> limitation ~~or frustrate an attempted invasion.~~ <sup>but</sup> The chief problem of enforcement by this method is a political one. <sup>Well</sup> ~~But~~ <sup>enough in</sup> if the member nations who control the regional police force have a strong interest <sup>in</sup> ~~to~~ maintaining <sup>the status quo in order to keep in</sup> the <sup>value of</sup> global political agreement in force <sup>and avoid its abrogation by one</sup> ~~of the great powers,~~ <sup>then</sup> they ~~could~~ <sup>be probably trusted to use</sup> use the regional police force whenever needed to ~~be trusted~~ to prevent a shift in the territorial status quo or the illicit manufacture of dangerous weapons. There is no other function that such regional police force need to fulfill.



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A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

*with Russia  
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We may take it for granted that neither America nor Russia want an all out atomic war. <sup>therefore should</sup> If such a war <sup>comes</sup>, it is not likely to come by <sup>AS</sup> <sup>A</sup> some sudden massive attack of the American Strategic Air Force against the cities of the Soviet Union or <sup>OF</sup> the Soviet Air Force against the cities of America. <sup>YET</sup> The danger of an all out atomic war will remain with us as long as there is no global political settlement that satisfies America and the Soviet Union and is acceptable to the other great powers, who are involved. <sup>FOR</sup> In the absence of such a settlement, there will remain with us the danger of local conflicts, particularly in areas which are not fully controlled by either Russia or America; and if such a local conflict leads to war--in the absence of a political settlement--America and Russia might very well intervene on opposite sides. <sup>P</sup> In areas which are geographically remote from the United States and are close to Russia or China, America could hardly intervene successfully except by <sup>RESORTING</sup> using <sup>TO TACTICAL WARFARE</sup> technical atomic weapons, and no doubt, Russia would <sup>USE ATOMIC</sup> respond by using such <sup>IN SUCH CONFLICT</sup> weapons also. Even though the use of atomic bombs <sup>QUICKLY</sup> might at first be limited to the tactical area, it is likely that it would soon be extended to communication <sup>hit</sup> lines and forward air bases. <sup>nearby</sup> Neighbor cities are likely to be <sup>settle in populated</sup> affected also and radioactive dust might <sup>seriously</sup> affect the ~~civilian population in the areas~~. The danger from radioactive fall-out from bomb tests is negligible because such tests are postponed again and again for days and weeks awaiting favorable weather conditions. But under conditions of warfare, precautions of this sort cannot be observed. And if radioactive dust settles <sup>in populated regions</sup> on nearby cities, the demand for retaliation will mount. No one today can <sup>say with any degree of confidence</sup> appraise the chances that such a local



war in which atomic weapons are used <sup>could</sup> can remain localized and that an all out atomic catastrophe <sup>could</sup> can be avoided.

~~It is not likely that~~ this danger <sup>could conceivably</sup> can be averted by eliminating the use of atomic bombs in local conflicts. <sup>But</sup> Many of the areas which America feels she needs to protect are geographically ~~very~~ close to Russia and China. ~~It is therefore not likely that America will agree to a measure which would make it impossible for her, if need be, to defend these areas.~~ Clearly <sup>atomic of tactical units</sup> disarmament <sup>likely</sup> would favor those nations who are geographically close to the <sup>likely</sup> area of conflict. ↗

↙ In these circumstances, it is unlikely that in the absence of a political settlement an agreement <sup>such</sup> on disarmament can be successfully negotiated; and this, I believe, <sup>would</sup> will remain ~~to be~~ true even if agreement could be reached on adequate measures of inspection.

The danger of a local conflict leading to an all out atomic war can, I believe, be averted only if it is possible for Russia and America to arrive at a political settlement. No political settlement can eliminate the possibility that war may break out in areas which are not fully controlled by either Russia or America, but it can reduce the chances of such a war. <sup>and above all</sup> Moreover, if the settlement works, it eliminates the danger that Russia and America may intervene on opposite sides. Is such a settlement possible?

It is my contention that the accumulation of stock piles of atomic and hydrogen bombs by America and by Russia has brought about a fundamental change in the situation and that now, for the first time since the war, there is a chance that a political settlement could be negotiated. <sup>I believe</sup> It would have been impossible <sup>I believe</sup> for America and Russia to negotiate a global settlement any earlier in the post war period, for America and Russia were caught in a power conflict. In such a conflict, the overriding



consideration guiding both nations <sup>a</sup> is <sup>to improve the chances</sup> the possibility of winning the war if war comes. Military and strategic considerations take precedence above all else and since evidently on the issue of who is going to win the war if war comes a compromise is not possible, the main issues of the conflict are not negotiable.

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Technically, ~~there is no problem for such a force to enforce arms~~  
~~limitation or frustrate an attempted invasion,~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~but~~ the chief problem of enforcement by this method is a political one. ~~But if~~ ~~the member nations~~

who control the regional police force have a strong <sup>enough an</sup> interest to maintaining ~~the~~ ~~global political agreement in force and avoid its abrogation by one~~  
*the status quo for the sake of keeping*  
~~of the great powers, they could use the regional police force whenever~~ *then they will use*

needed to ~~be trusted to~~ prevent a shift in the territorial status quo or the illicit manufacture of dangerous weapons. There is no other function that such regional police force need to fulfill.







war in which atomic weapons are used can remain localized and that an all out atomic catastrophe can be avoided.

~~It is not likely that~~ this danger <sup>could be averted</sup> can be averted by eliminating the use of atomic bombs in local conflicts. <sup>and</sup>

Many of the areas which America feels she needs to protect are geographically very close to Russia and China. ~~It is therefore not likely that~~ America <sup>would find it difficult to</sup> will agree to ~~a~~ measures <sup>of</sup>

<sup>disarmament</sup> which would make it impossible for her, if need be, to defend these areas.

<sup>atomic arms</sup> Clearly disarmament <sup>of technical forces</sup> would favor those nations who are geographically close to the <sup>whole</sup> area of conflict.)

In these circumstances, it is unlikely that in the absence of a political settlement an agreement on disarmament can be successfully negotiated; and this, I believe, <sup>would</sup> will remain to be true even if agreement could be reached on adequate measures of inspection.

The danger of a local conflict leading to an all out atomic war can, I believe, be averted only if it is possible for Russia and America to arrive at a political settlement. No political settlement can eliminate the possibility that war may break out in areas which are not fully controlled by either Russia or America, but it can reduce the chances of such a war. <sup>May become it</sup> Moreover, if the settlement works, it eliminates the danger that Russia and America may intervene on opposite sides. Is such a settlement possible?

It is my contention that the accumulation of stock piles of atomic and hydrogen bombs by America and by Russia has brought about a fundamental change in the situation and that now, for the first time since the war, there is a chance that a political settlement could be negotiated. <sup>2</sup> It would have been impossible for America and Russia to negotiate a global settlement any earlier in the post war period, for America and Russia were caught in a power conflict. In such a conflict, the overriding



*In summary since the chances of*

consideration guiding both nations-is ~~the possibility~~ of winning the war if war comes. ~~Military~~ <sup>*Military*</sup> and strategic considerations take precedence above all else and since evidently on the issue of who is ~~going~~ <sup>*to*</sup> to win the war if war comes a compromise is not possible, the main issues of the conflict are not negotiable.

Oddly enough, the approaching stalemate between the Strategic Air Forces of Russia and America eliminates these non-negotiable issues. The stalemate between the Strategic Air Forces of Russia and America will arrive when the American Air Force can destroy Russia, when the Russian Air Force can destroy America, and when neither Air Force is in a position to destroy the power of the other to retaliate. Only when ~~the American and~~ <sup>*the*</sup> ~~Strategic Air Forces~~ are highly dispersed or otherwise protected against attack can we speak of a true stalemate.

It is by no means sure that such a true stalemate has been reached as yet, but once the stalemate is an accomplished fact, neither America nor Russia can thereafter ever be vanquished by each other or by any other nation.

No territory that is really vital to America or Russia could ever be successfully invaded, and it is exceedingly unlikely that such an invasion would even be attempted, provided only that an adequate policy of using the Strategic Air Force for the protection of those vital areas is clearly proclaimed and understood by all. ~~Clearly~~, <sup>*Such*</sup> such a policy must proclaim a strictly limited use of the Strategic Air Force for the protection of the vital areas. Threatening massive retaliation in ~~the~~ conflict in which Russia and America ~~might~~ <sup>*may*</sup> be lined up on opposite sides could serve no useful purpose for the threat of murder and suicide is not an effective threat. *But if both the world press*

~~The fact that if they~~ <sup>*strategic*</sup> adopt an adequate <sup>*based*</sup> policy of the limited use of the Strategic Air Forces in defense of their ~~vital~~ <sup>*the*</sup> territories, ~~which~~ <sup>*one*</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>*will*</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>*to*</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>*their*</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>*national*</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>*existence*</sup>



Then  
 Russia and America will both be invulnerable and will not actually have  
 to use the Strategic Air Forces introduces an important new factor into  
 world politics. *and it is as yet unexplored*

The United States has engaged in two world wars in this century.

In both cases, she was largely motivated by the belief that if she permitted Germany to win and dominate the continent of Europe, Germany would become so strong that in a subsequent war she could vanquish America.

Time and again, great powers have gone to war in order to prevent an adverse shift in the power balance and thus to avoid the risk of being vanquished in a subsequent war. Time and again, it proved impossible to resolve a power conflict because the parties to such a conflict could not negotiate any of the issues that had a bearing--and most of them did--

on the paramount issue of who is going to win the war if war comes. But today, both Russia and America can be easily defended by a limited use of the Strategic Air Forces against all *corners* and none of the numerous outstanding issues between them have any appreciable bearing on the safety of the territories that are really vital to them. *Therefore*

Today, neither America nor Russia need to be concerned *for instance* from the point of view of their safety about the emergence of any other nation as a major industrial power, be it Germany, Japan, or China because of the increase of war potential that would accrue to a potential enemy.

It is this circumstance that makes a global agreement between America and Russia potentially negotiable today, *while* when it was not negotiable prior to the onset of the stalemate between the Strategic Air Forces.

Does this mean that such a political settlement can actually be negotiated today and will it be possible to obtain the concurrence of the great powers to an agreement that will satisfy the needs of Russia and the United States? Clearly, such a settlement is of value only if it

*unless it leaves Russia and America vulnerable in a local war on opposite sides and the war gets out of hand*

*and the deterrent effect will be strong if it is not negotiable, they will be no strength deliberately attempted at affecting any of those "vital" areas - The need of actually using the S.S. hit minor towns near the edge of a heart empty of people*

*m*





offers Russia and the United States and the other great powers involved a strong ~~incentive~~<sup>incentive</sup> for keeping the agreement in operation. Can such a global agreement be concluded? There are obviously great obstacles that must be overcome, and ~~it is more likely than not that they cannot be overcome;~~<sup>future be agreed</sup> but I believe that we have one chance in ten that such an agreement could be negotiated, and I believe that we ought to concentrate much of our efforts on this narrow margin of hope. Assuming that such an agreement can be concluded, it would probably leave untouched the Strategic Air Forces of Russia and the United States. But ~~agreement could provide~~<sup>the</sup> for far reaching disarmament ~~otherwise~~<sup>and</sup> and in particular, it could provide for severely limiting the armaments of the smaller nations in many areas of the world. Such a reduction in arms level would indeed seem necessary, particularly in those areas which are not under effective control of any of the great powers. It would seem ~~that some method of enforcement would have to be established~~<sup>in some</sup> in those areas if we want to avoid the danger of one nation ~~invading~~<sup>may</sup> the territory of another and thereby upsetting ~~the balance established by the overall agreement.~~<sup>the balance</sup> ~~Such an invasion could easily lead to an abrogation of the agreement~~<sup>from may</sup> by one of the great powers. ~~Also, it would seem necessary to prevent~~<sup>enforcement</sup> the manufacture of atom bombs in such areas of the world. What kinds of enforcement would be least objectionable to nations situated in such areas? ~~also in order~~

We assume the nations in those areas will be largely disarmed though they may remain in possession of machine guns in unlimited quantities. Enforcement might then take the form of a small, mobile, regional police force, equipped with high fire power. Such a regional force might be under the control of a smaller ~~number~~<sup>number</sup> of nations which are selected with the concurrence of the nations of the region but need not include any of the nations of the region and need not include any of the great



powers. Such a regional force could penetrate, if need be, to the capital of any of the nations of the region without effective interference by the national police, and if need be, arrest officials of the government in case of illicit manufacture of dangerous weapons. ~~yet~~ <sup>and</sup> they could penetrate ~~into~~ military headquarters of an invading army equipped with weapons no heavier than machine guns and arrest the commanding generals.

Technically, ~~there is no problem for such a force to enforce arms limitation or frustrate an attempted invasion,~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~the chief problem of enforcement by this method~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~is a~~ <sup>are</sup> political one~~s~~. But if the member nations who control the regional police force have a strong interest <sup>in</sup> ~~to~~ maintaining <sup>the status quo in order to prevent maintenance</sup> the global political agreement in force and avoid its abrogation by one <sup>be trusted to</sup> of the great powers, they could use the regional police force whenever needed ~~to be trusted~~ to prevent a shift in the territorial status quo or the illicit manufacture of dangerous weapons. There is no other function that such regional police force need to fulfill.



## THE EFFECT OF THE ATOMIC STALEMATE ON THE CHANCE OF REACHING

### A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

We may take it for granted that neither America nor Russia want an all out atomic war. If such a war comes, it is not likely to come by some sudden massive attack of the American Strategic Air Force against the cities of the Soviet Union or the Soviet Air Force against the cities of America. The danger of an all out atomic war will remain with us as long as there is no global political settlement that satisfies America and the Soviet Union and is acceptable to the other great powers who are involved. In the absence of such a settlement, there will remain with us the danger of local conflicts, particularly in areas which are not fully controlled by either Russia or America; and if such a local conflict leads to war--in the absence of a political settlement--America and Russia might very well intervene on opposite sides. In areas which are geographically remote from the United States and are close to Russia or China, America could hardly intervene successfully except by using technical atomic weapons, and no doubt, Russia would respond by using such weapons also. Even though the United atomic bombs might at first be limited to the tactical area, it is likely that it would soon be extended to communication lines and forward air bases. Neighbor cities are likely to be affected also and radioactive dust might seriously affect the civilian population in the area. The danger from radioactive fall-out from bomb tests is negligible because such tests are postponed again and again for days and weeks awaiting favorable weather conditions. But under conditions of warfare, precautions of this sort cannot be observed. And if radioactive dust settles on nearby cities, the demand for retaliation will mount. No one today can appraise the chances that such a local war in which atomic weapons are used can remain localized and that an all