

G2/8930-B

WAR DEPARTMENT

War Department Gen. Staff
Washington

August 22, 1940.

Lieut. Colonel J. Edgar Hoover,
 Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
 United States Department of Justice,
 Washington, D.C.

My dear Colonel Hoover:

The following scientists are under consideration as
 advisors in matters pertaining to the National Defense Program:

EINRICO FERMI, Columbia University

MR. SZELARD, Columbia University

Inasmuch as these men would have access to secret matters,
 I am attempting to verify their loyalty to the United States. It
 would therefore be appreciated if you would have an investigation
 made of these subjects and report of same sent to this office.

There is inclosed herewith a copy of the report of
 investigation submitted by the G-2 of the Second Corps Area.

Sincerely yours,

J. A. CRANE,
 Colonel, General Staff
 Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Inclosure
 Cpy 1st Ind. from G-2,
 2d Corps Area; dated 8/13/40.

JANUARY

001

62-59520-1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AUG 29 1940
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

62-59520-1

G2/8930-B-254

COPY

1st Ind.

SVC/ks

Office of A.C. of S., G-2, Eq. 2nd Corps Area, Governors Island, N.Y.,
August 13, 1940. - To: A.C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. With reference to the basic letter, the following information is submitted:

71229

(1) ENRICO FERMI, Department of Physics, Columbia University, New York City, is one of the most prominent scientists in the world in the field of physics. He is especially noted for breaking down the atom. He has been in the United States for about eighteen months. He is an Italian by birth and came here from Rome. He is supposed to have left Italy because of the fact that his wife is Jewish. He has been a Nobel Prize winner. His associates like him personally and greatly admire his intellectual ability. He is undoubtedly a Fascist. It is suggested that, before employing him on matters of a secret nature, a much more careful investigation be made. Employment of this person on secret work is not recommended.

(2) MR. SZELARD. It is believed that this man's name is SZILLARD. He is not on the staff of Columbia University, nor is he connected with the Department of Physics in any official capacity. He is a Jewish refugee from Hungary. It is understood that his family were wealthy merchants in Hungary and were able to come to the United States with most of their money. He is an inventor, and is stated to be very pro-German, and to have remarked on many occasions that he thinks the Germans will win the war. It is suggested that, before employing him on matters of a secret nature, a much more careful investigation be made. Employment of this person on secret work is not recommended.

2. This information has been received from highly reliable sources.

/s/ S. V. CONSTANT

S. V. CONSTANT,
Lieutenant Colonel, Cavalry,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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Memorandum

W.H.
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM : SAC, WFO (140-0)

DATE: 12/19/61

SUBJECT: DR. LEO SZILARD
Special Consultant
National Institutes of Health
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Chicago, Illinois
SGE

During the course of an investigation of the employee's wife, GERTRUD WEISS SZILARD, (Bufile 138-4539) under the provisions of Executive Order 10422 it was ascertained that LEO SZILARD is currently employed by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in the captioned position.

Personnel files of the National Institutes of Health were reviewed on 12/7/61, and reflected that Dr. LEO SZILARD, born 1898, in Hungary, entered on duty on 5/19/58, as a Special Consultant (when actually employed), National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Blindness, National Institutes of Health with headquarters at Chicago, Illinois. Those files reflected that he is currently employed in that position.

LEO SZILARD has been previously investigated by the FBI and copies of reports in his case have been furnished to the CSC.

The above is being submitted for the Bureau's consideration under the provisions of Executive Order 10450 in the event any additional investigation is deemed necessary.

2-Bureau
1-WFO

JJG:sro
(3)

REC-1A

EX-115

140-0-66716

7-8-6
16 BEG 20 1961

REC 14

Date: January 5, 1962

EX-1

To: Director, Bureau of Personnel Investigations
Civil Service Commission

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: DR. LEO SZILARD
Special Consultant
National Institutes of Health
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Chicago, Illinois
SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Reference is made to reports of investigation of Dr. Leo Szilard which were forwarded to the Civil Service Commission on April 1, 1958.

Additional information concerning Dr. Szilard is contained in reports of an investigation of his wife, Gertrud Weiss Szilard, who was investigated in 1951 under provisions of Executive Order 10422. Copies of reports of that investigation have been furnished to the Civil Service Commission.

No investigation is being conducted by this Bureau concerning the captioned individual under Executive Order 10450 in the absence of a specific request. This is not intended as a clearance or disapproval of Dr. Snillard by this Bureau and it should not be disseminated to unauthorized persons or agencies.

PC COURIER SVC
25 JAN - 8
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~~51 JAN 15 1962~~

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

REFERRAL OF CASE TO FBI FOR
ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

NAME	SZILARD, Leo
DATE OF BIRTH	February 11, 1898
POSITION, AGENCY, LOCATION	Special Consultant National Institutes of Health Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Bethesda, Maryland (DS: Chicago, Illinois)
DATE:	12/4/58
FILE:	DISO:KVC:es

The enclosures identified below are referred for further consideration under
E. O. 10450.

REMARKS:

S.C.E.

Please refer to your notation dated June 24, 1958 on the reverse of
a security form returned in this case.

Jimmy Johnson
Kimball Johnson, Chief
Investigations Division

ENCLOSURES:

Letter from agency dated 11/21/58 which should be returned.

Letter (or CSC Form 257) from CSC regional office dated _____
(with enclosures as noted)

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

FF to CG, NY WF

Attn: 12-11-58

REC-95

DEC 5 1958

SECY. SECY. SECY. SECY.

FOR U. S. GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

Protested

*DI 236
OCTOBER 1954*

HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY

U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
R209

November 21, 1958

Mr. Kimball Johnson
Chief, Investigations Division
Bureau of Departmental Operations
U. S. Civil Service Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

Subject: SZILARD, Leo - DOB: 2/11/1898
Your File: DISO:KVC:es

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Reference is made to your Form DI 209 dated July 21, 1958, submitting the results of the FBI check in the case of Leo Szilard, Special Consultant, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bethesda, Maryland (DS: Chicago, Illinois), date of appointment 5/19/58.

Results of national agency* check and written inquiries under E. O. 10450 for nonsensitive position were received from Civil Service Commission, Chicago on CSC Form 352 dated October 21, 1958. Included with the report of national agency check was Form DI 17A indicating information available at House Committee on Un-American Activities and a reply on CSC Form 49 from

on which indicated question concerning loyalty of Dr. Szilard's associates. Under Remarks, stated "Prof. Leo Szilard has been intensely interested in political problems arising from the existence of 'Atom bombs' & 'H-Bombs' etc. He has discussed these problems with people of a wide range of political views, including Russian Scientists at at least one International Conference, the 'Pugwash Conference'."

The Public Health Service has advised that Dr. Szilard received an Excepted appointment (unlimited) on May 19, 1958 as a Special Consultant, National Institute of Neurological Diseases & Blindness. He consults with the Director, NINDB and members of his staff, and specifically gives to the Director of Basic Research and staff scientists advice regarding basic problems on neurochemistry, biophysics, and neurophysiology.

The National Institutes of Health have advised that the subject continues to be employed as a Special Consultant and that it is contemplated he will be appointed in the near future under the provisions of Section 208(g) of Public Health Service Act to the position of Physicist, \$17,000 per annum, NINDB. This is a nonsensitive position.

In view of the information developed as a result of the FBI check and national agency and written inquiries, it would be appreciated if you would refer this matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full field investigation.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick H. Schmidt
Frederick H. Schmidt
Director of Security

EX-105

REC-95

140-0-53245-

Date: December 16, 1958
To: Mr. Frederick H. Schmidt
Director of Security
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare
Washington, D. C.
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Subject: LEO SZILARD
Special Consultant
National Institutes of Health
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare
Chicago, Illinois
SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Your request for a full field investigation of the employee under the provisions of Executive Order 10450 has been referred to us by the Civil Service Commission.

A review of our files reveals that the results of investigation of the employee by this Bureau were furnished the Civil Service Commission on April 1, 1958. In view of this, it is suggested that you may wish to refer to this information in your consideration of this matter, with particular reference to your request for a full field investigation of the employee.

A copy of this letter is being furnished the Civil Service Commission for its information and enclosed with it is the material the Civil Service Commission requested us to return.

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b8C

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____

Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

1 - Civil Service Commission

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CSC enclosure: Letter from CSC dated
November 21, 1958

RECEIVED NOV 25 1958
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
60 DEC 23 1958
FBI - WASH. D. C.

NOTE: See cover memo Stanley G. Rosen, dated 12/15/58.

RWB:bow

RWB:bow:lmh

- 7 -

MAIL ROOM

60 DEC 23 1958

Jan 28, 1981
#1

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL REQUEST

62-59520

Date: December 26, 1946

To: Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Banks
United States Army Engineers
Manhattan Engineer District
Room 4252
New War Department Building

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: Leo Szilard

In accordance with the request of your office, there is attached a summary of information from the files of this Bureau regarding Leo Szilard. This information has been received for the most part from outside sources and has not been verified by investigation by this Bureau.

Attachment

JP:tlc

By messenger

Dec 28 1946

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEB 5 1947

RECORDED
INDEXED

25 FEB 4 00 PM '47
FBI - NEW YORK

DECLASSIFIED BY NSA ON 10/25/97
ON 10/25/97

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-4-00 BY SP5 RTG/jew

December 24, 1946

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

Re: Leo Szilard

Cr. by 1259
New Name & Category b
Date of Declassification Indefinite
J80317

Leo Szilard was born February 11, 1898, at Budapest, Hungary. He obtained a PhD Degree in Physics at the University of Berlin about 1922 and taught and did research work at that University from 1923 until 1933. While in Germany, he developed several patents, one of them with Dr. Albert Einstein, and received some royalties which have since terminated. He gave up residence in Germany in 1931. Between 1931 and 1938, he spent most of his time in England, but made several trips to the United States. Since 1938, he has been in the United States and was naturalized March 29, 1943. X

Szilard first thought of the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction in 1934 and worked out some general laws. From a promotional viewpoint, Szilard is reported to be the most prominent person in initiating the M.E.D. Project, although Dr. Enrico Fermi is reported to be more responsible for developing the basic patent of the Project. They both worked together on the problem in 1939 at Columbia University. Szilard brought the possibilities of the Project to the attention of President Roosevelt in 1939 through the assistance of Dr. Einstein and Dr. Alexander Sachs, and as a result of his activity, the Project eventually began with Szilard and Fermi being its first employees. X

Szilard was first employed on the Project on November 1, 1940, at Columbia University and then was transferred to the Metallurgical Laboratory pay roll on February 1, 1941. The United States Government desired to obtain Szilard's patentable ideas developed prior to November 1, 1940, and a disagreement developed. He suggested that he be paid a total of \$50,000 and wanted to remain on the Project but retain his rights in his patentable ideas. After extensive negotiations, during which he remained off the Metallurgical Laboratory pay roll from January 1 to December, 1943, Szilard signed a contract to transfer his patentable ideas in Nuclear Physics, with certain exceptions, to the United States Government on December 3, 1943, for about \$15,000. X

Investigation has indicated that Szilard is loyal to the United States, but was a source of considerable difficulty to the War Department because he disagreed with many things in the administration of the Project and was persistent in expressing his disagreement. Even before the atomic bomb was completely developed, he began a concerted campaign to utilize the developments of the Project to promote lasting peace after the war.

(Substantially all of the information set out in this memorandum was obtained from the MED files turned over to the Bureau)

~~SECRET~~

IP file
SEARCHED
INDEXED

ENCLOSURE

ATE 11-4-80 BY SP5RJG/JAI

Although he was one of the first to advocate secrecy of the Project, he had his own ideas how secrecy should be handled, and they differed from the ideas of M.E.D., who had the responsibility for security.

Szilard has been described as a brilliant, theoretical physicist with extraordinary creative ability and imagination, a complete egotist, an internationalist, an idealist, self-sufficient, aggressive, and persistent, but still of a kindly nature. It has been said that he feels that he has been badly treated by the Government and does not hesitate to tell anybody about it.

Szilard has always been very conscious of his rights in those ideas which are patentable. Although he has acknowledged that he is bound by the Federal laws and contractual relation between himself and the United States Government, he refused to recognize the rules and regulations of the Manhattan District - patent, security or otherwise - as binding on him. The latest information available is that there are still eight patents which Szilard has not signed, as copies have not been furnished him because of security reasons.

During 1945, prior to the use of the atomic bomb, Szilard was active in formulating postwar plans and the position of the United States in the world. He claimed that the first detonation would precipitate an armament race, and recommended the creation of controls so that atomic materials could only be used for industrial purposes and so that a minimum of one to two years would be required to convert this material into explosives. He circulated petitions at the Metallurgical Laboratory addressed to the President of the United States, asking that atomic bombs not be used against Japan on moral grounds. The publication of this petition was prohibited because of then existing security restrictions.

Szilard has been active in the Federation of American Scientists. He has also been active on the Committee on Social and Political Implications and its successor, the Atomic Scientists of Chicago. He was active in contacting various scientists, financial figures and persons with journalistic or political backgrounds to influence the action of Congress when it was deciding on legislature effecting the future controls of atomic energy.

Szilard resigned voluntarily from the Metallurgical Laboratory on June 1, 1946.

It has been reported that Szilard in 1939 wrote to Frederic Joliet-Curie, the French nuclear physicist, in an attempt to gain patent rights in atomic matters from Joliet-Curie for patenting by Szilard in the United States. Joliet-Curie instead went ahead and published his

Szilard is also said to have had contact and to have been in terms with Joliet-Curie when the latter was in the United States as representative of France to the United Nations Committee on Atomic Energy. It is to be noted that Frederic Joliet-Curie has been widely depicted in the American Communist press as being one of the Communists who contributed materially to the development of nuclear chain

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Chicago
 SUBJECT: Dr. LEO SZILARD, with alias
 ⑤ Leo Spitz
 INTERNAL SECURITY - R

DATE: October 29, 1946

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to my letter of June 19, 1946 concerning the above-captioned subject which letter was captioned "CINRAD".

For your additional information concerning subject, there is enclosed herewith one photostatic copy of a MED report dated December 26, 1946. The San Francisco Office is also being furnished a photostatic copy of this report with their copy of this letter.

DEF

(c)

b1

INTERESTING ARTICLES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-19-05 BY SP5 RJH/ak

TIME 11-19-05 BY SP5 RJH/ak

DATE 11-19-05 BY SP5 RJH/ak

CLASS 11-19-05
TBS

10-4-80

CLASS. DATE. BY SP5 RJH/ak

Reason 11-19-05 BY SP5 RJH/ak

Date of Review 11-4-90

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11-19-05 BY SP5 RJH/ak
 CLASS 11-19-05 BY SP5 RJH/ak

GEN'L. PART/RE

DRAFTED

216169 11-19-05 BY SP5 RJH/ak

216169 11-19-05 BY SP5 RJH/ak

50 MAR 10 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TC

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XXXXXX**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET*62*

Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- Deleted under exemption(s) _____ with no segregable material available for release to you.
- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request.
- Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.
- Document(s) originating with the following government agency(ies) Army, Intelligence, was/were forwarded to them for direct response to you.

____ Page(s) referred for consultation to the following government agency(ies); _____ as the information originated with them. You will be advised of availability upon return of the material to the FBI.

____ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):

For your information: _____

The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:
62-59520-26

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X DELETED PAGE(S) X
X NO DUPLICATION FEE X
X FOR THIS PAGE X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SAC, Chicago

November 7, 1946

Director, FBI

DR. LEO SZILARD,
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

RECORDED

62-39520-26

Reference is made to your letter dated October 29, 1946, in
the captioned matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED
OTHERWISE

RGF:aop

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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1A-4-80
Class. Init. By SP5 RJB/jek
Reason-FOIA (U, 1-2, 4, 2)
Date of Review 11-4-90

CONFIDENTIAL

1 PER 5 1947

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO. 100-10165

REPORT MADE AT	DATE WHEN MADE	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE	REPORT MADE BY
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS	4/14/47	4/10/47	[REDACTED] JPM-BOD
TITLE		CHARACTER OF CASE	
DR. LEO SZILARD, with alias Leo Spitz		INTERNAL SECURITY - R	

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS: APR No additional information of value obtained concerning subject.

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- C -

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REFERENCE: Bureau File 62-59520. Report of Special Agent [REDACTED] dated 12/23/46, at Chicago, Illinois. Bureau letter to Chicago, dated 2/4/47.

Q.R.5

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS:

The Field Office indices fail to reflect any additional information concerning subject's activities which would be of value to this case.

Confidential Informant [REDACTED] advised that although subject has numerous contacts throughout the United States, there is no information indicating that any of them are definitely subversive or Communistic.

b1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SPECIFICALLY
CATEGORIZED

11-4-90
Class. info. by SPC AIR/MS
Reason: [REDACTED] 1-2-4-2
Date of Origination: 11-4-90

C L O S E D -

APPROVED AND
FORWARDED:

SPECIAL AGENT
IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

RECORDED

COPIES OF THIS REPORT

- (5) - Bureau
- 1 - MED, Chicago
- 2 - Chicago

COPY IN FILE

COPIES DESTROYED

28 OCT 28 1964
50 APR 22 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XXXXXX
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XXXXXX**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

1 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- Deleted under exemption(s) b1 with no segregable material available for release to you.
- Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request.
- Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.
- Document(s) originating with the following government agency(ies) _____, was/were forwarded to them for direct response to you.

____ Page(s) referred for consultation to the following government agency(ies); _____ as the information originated with them. You will be advised of availability upon return of the material to the FBI.

____ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):

For your information: _____

The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:
62-09520-28, page 2

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Office M

andum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD
 FROM : J. P. COYNE
 SUBJECT: LEO SZILARD
 ATOMIC ENERGY APPLICANT

DATE: September 11, 1947

~~SECRET~~

11-4-90
 Class. & Ext. By *S05 RTG/ads*
 Person-FCLM/HI, 1-2, 4, 2
 Date of Revision *11-4-90*

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. E. A. Tamm
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Carson
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Hendon
 Mr. Pennington
 Mr. Quinn Tamm
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Nease
 Miss Holmes
 Miss Clegg

(c)

TC

11/11

In this connection, you are advised that this Bureau is not covering nor participating in the coverage of Szilard. For your information, it is pointed out that from information obtained from the Manhattan Engineer District Szilard from a promotional viewpoint was the most prominent person in initiating the N.E.D. Project. Szilard brought the possibilities of the Project to the attention of President Roosevelt in 1939 through the assistance of Dr. Einstein and Dr. Alexander Sachs, and as a result of his activity, the Project eventually began with Szilard and Dr. Enrico Fermi as its first employees. The U. S. government desired to obtain Szilard's patentable ideas developed prior to his employment on the Project and a disagreement developed. He was a source of considerable difficulty to N.E.D. because he disagreed with many things in the administration of the Project and was persistent in expressing his disagreement. Even before the atomic bomb was completed he began a campaign to utilize the developments of the Project to promote lasting peace after the war. He resigned voluntarily from the Project on June 1, 1946. No information has been developed reflecting that Szilard is communistically inclined.

ACIO

None. The above is for your information. It is pointed out, however, that the Atomic Energy Commission may have been the organization covering [REDACTED] and you may desire to have inquiries made of the Commission by the Atomic Energy Section as to the reason they might be covering [REDACTED].

RGF:cm

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY
 EXP. 10/9/47
 BY [REDACTED]

bl

9/11/1947

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2 - 14 CA 0 FORM NO. 64
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4 Office Mem
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• UNITEI

ERNMENT

7 TO : Mr. E. G. Fitch
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9 FROM : Mr. F. J. M. Beattie
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11 SUBJECT: LEO SZILARD
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DATE: September 10, 1947

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rossen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

b1

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I telephonically advised Mr. Bartlett of the Atomic Energy Section

of the above.

RECOMMENDATION: This memorandum should be routed to the Internal Security Section and the Atomic Energy Section for their information and any action necessary.

FJMB:abh

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

11-4-80
Class. 3
Reason-FOIA
Date offivised 11-4-80

APPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES

RB
CLASS 11-17-80

30

RECORDED
INDEXED

EX-27

5 OCT 15 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: Dr. Leo Szilard,

Former Atomic Energy Scientists

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: September 17, 1947

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Quarne _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beattie _____
Miss Gandy _____

TC

(N)

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BACKGROUND:

(C)

Mr. Beattie telephonically advised Mr. Bartlett of this Section concerning the above.

DETAILS:

TC

Agent [REDACTED] discussed this matter with [REDACTED] particularly the question as to whether or not the Atomic Energy Commission had requested coverage of any of the above three individuals either in the United States or during their travel abroad. [REDACTED] stated that the Commission had not requested anyone to cover these individuals in the United States, had not requested CIG to cover their activities in Europe, and were not in any way covering their activities with their own personnel. He did state, however, that the Commission had considered calling [REDACTED] into the Commission before his departure for Europe in order that he might be briefed on certain security measures which they desired him to take; however, up to the present time this has not been done.

b6

RECOMMENDATION:

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

RWL:mrd

CLASS 11-4-80
IF 11-4-80
TDB 11-4-80
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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NOTED BY ANOTE

11-4-80 SPS RTG ps
Class. & Ext. by SPS RTG ps
Section-FCI/IV, 1-2-4.22
Date of Refile: 11-4-90

31

22-1
10- OCT 13 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

TC

Office Memorandum

• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: September 12, 1947

TO : D. M. LAND

FROM : H. G. Pitch

SUBJECT: DR. LEO SZILLARD.

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LAWRENCE

Haley

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D/3
b6

Wilson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Garrison
Friedman
Nichols
Hoover
Tracy
Carroll
Spies
Gordon
Burke
Hawkins
Pemberton
Quinn
Rosen
M. Rosen
Miss Holmes
John Clegg
R. P. Fletcher
B. Sibley

TOP SECRET ATOMIC ENERGY SCIENTISTS

[REDACTED] of CIS advised Special Agent [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] Liaison Section on the afternoon of September 11th that [REDACTED] according to information received at CIS, [REDACTED] has been previously associated with the atomic energy program and [REDACTED] was scheduled to leave the United States for England some time during the period from September 8 to September 12, 1947. [REDACTED]

It is reported, [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] Szillard attended the conference of the World Federation of Scientific Workers [REDACTED] CIS [REDACTED] conduct a surveillance of [REDACTED] Szillard [REDACTED] also advised that at the present time [REDACTED] CIS does not have the passport number and the exact dates of departure are not known. [REDACTED]

This information was telephonically furnished to [REDACTED] of the Internal Security Section on the afternoon of September 11th, and [REDACTED] advised that Dr. Szillard has already departed from the United States. [REDACTED] further stated that a memorandum containing complete information in the files of this Bureau or [REDACTED] has been furnished to the State Department. [REDACTED]

RECOMMENDATION:

[REDACTED] It is recommended that the above memorandum be forwarded to the Internal Security Section for the attention of Supervisor [REDACTED]

JED:AB

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DEB:DT 1021161
LAWRENCE
R. J. G.
520 OCT 23 1947
520 OCT 23 1947

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Class. & Ext. BY SP-5-216 per
Reason: RGIMENT 11-4-2
Date of Review: 11-4-90
11-4-90

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29 SEP 25 1947
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5-9520-32

6 RA

Director, FBI

SAC, Boston

██████████ LEO SZILARD
INTERNAL SECURITY (R)

CONFIDENTIAL

9-18-47

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CONFIDENTIAL IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Reference is made to the Boston teletype of recent date to the Bureau concerning the difficulties of ██████████ with the Passport Division of the United States State Department.

Date of Review 11-1-90

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-17-78 BY SP12345

CONFIDENTIAL

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Further developments will be reported as received. It is noted that [REDACTED] has been able to corroborate many of the foregoing details independently of [REDACTED] (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BSG:md

17269 cc 2031

cc New York

Washington

Office M.....

IM • UNITI

APPENDIX

TO : Dr. M. Jadd

FROM : E. G. Fitch

1 SUBJECT: LEO SZILARD SZILARD
2 INTERNAL SECURITY - R
3

DATE: October 24, 1947

1. Lew
2. Lewy
3. Lund
4. Nichols
5. Rosen
6. Roy
7. Sarge
8. Lyon
9. V. C. B.
10. Arbo
11. Lendorf
12. Remond, Wm.
13. Quincy, T. A.
14. Ross
15. Sage
16. Stoen
17. Tracy

RECOMMENDATION:

26 It is suggested that this memorandum be referred to the Internal
2 Security Section for its information.
28

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62.595²⁰

Office I

WM • UNITED

GOVERNMENT

FROM : G. F. KEAY
SUSPECT: LEO SZILARD
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

DATE: October 14, 1947

BACKGROUND:

You will also recall that Leo Szilard is a long-time member of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago and has been quite outspoken in favor of internationalization of the atomic energy programs. In this regard he has been a constant influence on other scientists and has recently been under investigation by the Bureau.

DETAIL

While at the Atomic Energy Commission on other business on October 14, 1947 was loaned a copy of an editorial which appeared in the "Gazette and Daily," York, Pennsylvania, Wednesday morning, October 14, 1947, written by one Harry L. Shatzky. The editorial, in general, is critical of the State Department for failing to issue passports for these two individuals. It expresses the opinion that "American scientists, in general, are kept under constant surveillance for the purpose of secrecy." He criticizes the un-American Committee for Conscription and refers to their work as "witch hunting." He further states that our Secretary of State is contributing toward un-Americanism in the "more cases such as the Bok-Szilard case."

Attachment
RWL:AK

35

MEMO FOR MR. LADD

October 31

b1

[REDACTED]

The policy of the [REDACTED] in general has been to support the radical elements and even to follow the Communist Party line in its editorial.

[REDACTED]

ACTION:

Copies of the above-mentioned editorial are attached for the information of the Internal Security Section.

COPY

EDITORIAL

The Gazette and Daily, York, Pa., Wednesday Morning, October 1, 1947

FACT AND FANCY

I MENTIONED in my column of September 22 the circumstances of the State Department giving Doctors Dart Bok and Leo Szilard a jerking around when they applied for clearance to attend the International Science Conference in England.

They never did get those passports.

And the people in the State Department who were responsible for prohibiting these men from attending the conference were not fired from the Department for disloyalty or anything else.

THE WHOLE SHAMEFUL BUSINESS has been ignored by Secretary of State Marshall, yet it is, in fact, an international incident of considerable magnitude.

It is an international incident because it puts the whole world on notice that the highest department of our government dealing with international affairs has become irresponsibly insane.

If General Marshall's secret police want to drop in on me tomorrow morning and take me away for that remark, I'll be very happy to go with them quietly. For I would much rather have the visible company of the friendly guards at Leavenworth, Atlanta, or Lewisburg, than the invisible company of the State Department's secret police. I would much rather have the warm stone walls of visible imprisonment about me than the invisible walls of the secret imprisonment which seems to be the lot of any American today who is suspected of having a little brains or of having been in a position to know a little something.

THAT IS THE FACT. American scientists who made the great contribution of atomic energy to the world are prisoners of the government they served. Other scientists, astronomers like Dr. Bok, for instance, are their fellow prisoners.

Our security battalions, the spit and spittle boys, are fearful that these scientists might reveal the great secrets of nature which are the common property of scientists everywhere. So they must be kept under constant surveillance--these men who kept the secret of the atom bomb so well during the war; those men whose wives and families didn't know on what work they were engaged. Their reward for great knowledge and great service is to be made our prisoners.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-4-00

BY SP5 RJB/akb

AMULCP

COPY

WHEN THE UN-AMERICAN COMMITTEE of Congress first started
witch hunting in the atomic energy plants, one could reasonably
suspect that they were capitalizing on the fact that anything
they dug up there would be in the nature of a sensation, no
matter how small the findings or the allegations.

We had a Congress in session when this happened. Farnell
Thomas and John Rankin were allowed their little show. The War
Department welcomed it until they arose a little embarrassment
for the War Department. The War Department used the Un-American
Committee to promote its efforts to get control of atomic energy.

Nevertheless, there was a Congress which should have been
able to see the danger of this sort of thing. And there was a
State Department which should have seen the danger. And the
President's advisers should have seen the danger.

WE HAVE NOW REACHED a pass where, either because of ignorance
or intent, we are driving those we need most for our security into
a position where the last thing they want to do is have any con-
nection whatever with "Little Terror" or any phase of atomic
development. The monthly bulletin of the Atomic Scientists comes
out each month, giving us the depressing news of the ways physicists
are seeking to unburden themselves of connection with the govern-
ment. It tells us also of the difficulties of recruitment of
scientific talent.

The moment these men enter government service or have any
connection with groups which are interested in atomic develop-
ment, their loyalty to their government is suspect and their
freedom of movement is hobbled.

WE ARE SACRIFICING our whole future on the altar of fear;
terrified of the ignorance of our politicians and our diplomats.
We are jeopardizing the future of the world because these
scientists know something.

Anybody who knows something is likely to be subversive to
the ignorant. Therefore, anyone who knows something should be
imprisoned, if not with stone walls, then under the invisible
walls of secret surveillance.

That, I submit is madness. And our Secretary of State,
when he ignores cases such as the Bok-Szilard case, is con-
tributing toward madness run riot.

Harry E. Sharkey.

Copied from the Wednesday Morning, October 1, 1947 issue of
"The Gazette and Daily," York, Pa.

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Assistant Solicitor General
George T. Washington

November 1, 1947

Director, FBI

LEO SZILARD

"Letter to Stalin"

Logan Act

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INDEXED

Reference is made to your inquiry of October 31, 1947, concerning Dr. Leo Szilard's letter to Stalin which is being considered by him for publication in the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists."

Since it would appear that the problem here involved is one of legal interpretation, particularly regarding the application of the Logan Act (18 U.S.C. 5), I will defer to the judgment of the Department in this matter.

The items forwarded with your memorandum are returned herewith.

Attachments

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 6

★ NOV 3 1947 P.M.

LAWRENCE W. FORD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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OVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd
FROM : J. P. Coyne
SUBJECT: DR. LEO SZILARD

DATE: November 11, 1947

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. T. Tamm _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. McNamee _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Smith _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn _____
Miss _____
Mr. _____
Miss _____
Miss _____

This afternoon Supervisor [redacted] who is assigned holiday duty on your desk advised that he received a call from the Director's office which had received a call from Mr. George Washington, Assistant Solicitor General. After checking with the Director's office, I telephonically communicated with Mr. Washington and he advised as follows.

On October 31, 1947, Washington sent a memorandum to the Director inclosing a copy of a letter which Szilard had forwarded to the Attorney General indicating that unless the Department considered it objectionable he would publish a letter in the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists". You will recall that this was to be "a letter to Stalin" wherein Szilard was to make certain recommendations as to actions that Stalin might take which would preclude the possibility of war between the United States and the USSR. In the memorandum of October 31, Washington asked for the Bureau's advice relative to the problem which had been presented, namely, if the publication of the "letter to Stalin" would constitute a violation of the Logan Act.

Under date of November 1, 1947, we replied to the Department, stating that since the problem appeared to involve a legal interpretation of the Logan Act, the Bureau would defer to the judgment of the Department in this matter. Mr. Washington advised me that he called the Bureau's memorandum to the attention of the Attorney General and the Attorney General then requested a check of the Bureau's files for any derogatory information regarding Szilard. Mr. Washington advised that in accordance with the foregoing, he directed the memorandum to the Bureau on November 10, 1947, requesting such a check of our files. This memorandum was received late on the afternoon of November 10 and the purpose of Mr. Washington's call at about noon on November 11 was to ascertain the nature of the information which had been correlated by the Bureau on the basis of his November 10 request.

In the light of the apparent urgency of this situation I examined the main file on Szilard (62-59520) and at 3:45 PM today I telephonically furnished Mr. Washington with an oral summary of the pertinent data contained in that file. Specifically, I read off to Mr. Washington the summary which had been prepared on Szilard under date of December 24, 1946 (62-59520-serial 25). I likewise advised Mr. Washington of the additional pertinent data appearing in the main file subsequent to December 24, 1946. He thereupon asked if there were any indications of Communist affiliation on the part of Szilard other than that appearing in the last paragraph of the December 24, 1946, summary which reflects that Szilard was in contact with Frederic Joliet-Curie, the French nuclear physicist. I advised Mr. Washington that there is no additional information contained in the main file of this subject which would reflect Communist inclinations on his part. Mr. Washington advised that for the present the foregoing data would suffice for his purpose.

At this point I again directed his attention to the fact that the information supplied was the result of an examination of the main file only on

JPO:TD

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9 Mr. Ladd
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13 this subject; that we have a number of references on him (approximately 100);
14 that a complete summary of the derogatory information in our files, including
15 those references, would be prepared and forwarded to him as expeditiously as
16 possible.
17

18 There is presently in preparation a summary of the derogatory infor-
19 mation in our possession on Szilard and as soon as it is completed it will be
20 forwarded to you for transmittal to Washington.
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11
 OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
 November 11, 1947

1:15PM

Mr. George Washington, Assistant Solicitor General, telephoned in regards to a memorandum he had sent the Director yesterday concerning Leo Szilard. Mr. Washington indicated that he was in a hurry to ascertain what our reply was going to be. Mr. Washington was told that we would check on the matter and call him back.

Mr. [redacted] on Mr. Ladd's desk, was advised of the above, and as he was not familiar with the matter he telephoned Mr. Coyne at his home. Mr. Coyne got in touch with Mr. Washington and ascertained that on October 31st the Department forwarded a memorandum to the Bureau regarding an article which was to appear in a scientific magazine which had been authored by Szilard, an atomic scientist associated with the University of Chicago. The Bureau had replied to this memorandum, indicating that it would defer to the Department's views as to a possible violation of the statutes.

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-38-

After discussing the matter with the Attorney General, Mr. Washington sent the memorandum in question through yesterday, requesting that the Bureau furnish the Department with all information in its files concerning Szilard. Mr.

69 DEC 17 1947

had only a skeleton force on duty today, but that he would make certain that this matter was handled as expeditiously as possible.

An effort is now being made to locate the memorandum, and in the meantime Mr. [redacted] is reviewing the files on Szilard in order to prepare an answer for the Department. 7C

3:50PM Addendum

Mr. Coyne advises that he has reviewed the files on Szilard and furnished Mr. Washington an oral summary. He is also preparing a complete memorandum which will be furnished to Mr. Washington.

Mr. Coyne indicated that the memorandum in question from Mr. Washington to the Director had been located. He stated that it was sent through late yesterday from the Department.

djk *In future don't make
a period of such a
demand.*

H.

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62-547-39
Assistant Solicitor General
George T. Washington
DIRECTOR, FBI

November 18, 1947

~~LEO SZILARD~~

Strictly Confidential

DECLASSIFIED BY 259
ON AS PNTD

Reference is made to your memorandum dated November 10, 1947,
and to your telephone conversation on November 11, 1947, with Special
Agent J. P. Coyne of this Bureau concerning the captioned subject.

There is attached hereto at your request a memorandum which
contains a summary of information in the files of this Bureau concerning
Leo Szilard.

Enclosure

EHM:wma,mhc

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AND FIELD OFFICES

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LEO SZILARD

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November 18, 1947

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6-28-87100

The following information was furnished by another Government Agency!

Leo Szilard was born February 11, 1898, at Budapest, Hungary. He obtained a Ph.D. Degree in Physics at the University of Berlin about 1922 and taught and did research work at that University from 1923 until 1933. While in Germany, he developed several patents, one of them with Dr. Albert Einstein, and received some royalties which have since terminated. He gave up residence in Germany in 1931. Between 1931 and 1938, he spent most of his time in England, but made several trips to the United States. Since 1938, he has been in the United States and was naturalized March 29, 1943.

Szilard first thought of the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction in 1934 and worked out some general laws. From a promotional viewpoint, Szilard is reported to be the most prominent person in initiating the M.R.D. Project, although Dr. Enrico Fermi is reported to be more responsible for developing the basic patent of the Project. They both worked together on the problem in 1939 at Columbia University. Szilard brought the possibilities of the Project to the attention of President Roosevelt in 1939 through the assistance of Dr. Einstein and Dr. Alexander Sachs, and as a result of his activity, the Project eventually began with Szilard and Fermi being its first employees.

It has been reported that Szilard in 1939 wrote to Frederic Joliet-Curie, the French nuclear physicist, in an attempt to gain patent rights in atomic matters from Joliet-Curie for patenting by Szilard in the United States. Joliet-Curie instead went ahead and published his findings. Szilard is also said to have had contact and to have been on friendly terms with Joliet-Curie when the latter was in the United States as a representative of France to the United Nations Committee on Atomic Energy. It is to be noted that Frederic Joliet-Curie has been widely acclaimed in the American Communist press as being one of the Communist scientists who contributed materially to the development of nuclear chain reaction. add

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and wanted to remain on the Project but retain his rights in his patentable ideas. After extensive negotiations, during which he remained off the Metallurgical Laboratory pay roll from January 1 to December, 1943, Szilard signed a contract to transfer his patentable ideas in Nuclear Physics, with certain exceptions, to the United States Government on December 3, 1943, for about \$15,000.

omis Investigation by the above referred to Agency has indicated that Szilard is loyal to the United States, but was a source of considerable difficulty to the War Department because he disagreed with many things in the administration of the Project and was persistent in expressing his disagreement. Even before the atomic bomb was completely developed, he began a concerted campaign to utilize the developments of the Project to promote lasting peace after the war. Although he was one of the first to advocate secrecy of the Project, he had his own ideas how secrecy should be handled, and they differed from the ideas of M.E.D., who had the responsibility for security.

Szilard has been described as a brilliant, theoretical physicist with extraordinary creative ability and imagination, a complete egotist, and internationalist, an idealist, self-sufficient, aggressive, and persistent, but still of a kindly nature. It has been said that he feels that he has been badly treated by the Government and does not hesitate to tell anybody about it.

Confidential Szilard has always been very conscious of his rights in those ideas which are patentable. Although he has acknowledged that he is bound by the Federal laws and contractual relation between himself and the United States Government, he refused to recognize the rules and regulations of the Manhattan District - patent, security or otherwise - as binding on him. The latest information available is that there are still eight patents which Szilard has not signed, as copies have not been furnished him because of security reasons.

During 1945, prior to the use of the atomic bomb, Szilard was active in formulating postwar plans and the position of the United States in the world. He claimed that the first detonation would precipitate an armament race, and recommended the creation of controls so that active materials could only be used for industrial purposes and so that a minimum of one to two years would be required to convert this material into explosives. He circulated petitions at the Metallurgical Laboratory addressed to the President of the United States, asking that atomic bombs not be used against Japan on moral grounds. The publication of this petition was prohibited because of then existing security restrictions.

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Szilard has been active in the Federation of American Scientists. He has also been active on the Committee on Social and Political Implications and its successor, the Atomic Scientists of Chicago. He was active in contacting various scientists, financial figures and persons with journalistic or political backgrounds to influence the action of Congress when it was deciding on legislation effecting the future controls of atomic energy.

Szilard resigned voluntarily from the Metallurgical Laboratory on June 1, 1946. (62-59520-25)

[REDACTED] advised that Leo Szilard knew Philip Morrison "fairly well". Morrison is a leading physicist in the United States who was employed on the Los Alamos Atomic Bomb Project during World War II. At the present time he is a professor of physics at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, and is a consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission.

[REDACTED] It was determined that Morrison had been closely associated with Communists and the Communist movement since his college days.

7C
[REDACTED]
(116-8647-5 p. 9)
7C
[REDACTED]

Another Government Agency has advised this Bureau that while Leo Szilard was employed on the Atomic Bomb Project, he was acquainted with Dr. Edward U. Condon. (116-1486-2 Sec 1)

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[REDACTED]
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Another Government Agency has advised that Leo Szilard is a close friend of Katharine Way. At the present time, Miss Way is employed by the Atomic Energy Commission at Clinton Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, as a physicist. (* 116-1486-2 sec 1)
(116-11460-2)

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The files of this Bureau indicate that the Southern Conference for Human Welfare is infiltrated by members of the Communist Party and Communist sympathizers.

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[REDACTED]

Bart Jan Bok is the Assistant Director of the Harvard Observatory at Cambridge, Massachusetts, and is also the Chairman of the International Relations Committee of the National Research Council, Washington, D. C.

7C

[REDACTED]

The American Association of Scientific Workers has reportedly been the subject of attempted infiltration by Communists and Communist sympathizers and has advocated the free dissemination of scientific information.

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[REDACTED]

winter catalog for 1946 of the Samuel Adams School in Boston, Massachusetts, listed Bok as one of the staff of that institution. The school is reported to be a Communist dominated organization. (100-350104-30)

(62-59520-32)

On October 31, 1947, Assistant Solicitor General George T. Washington forwarded to the Director certain items in connection with Dr. Leo Szilard's letter to Stalin which was being considered by Szilard for publication in the "Bulletin of Atomic Scientists." (62-59520-33)

On November 1, 1947, this data was returned to Mr. Washington by the Director and he was advised that the problem here involved was one of legal interpretation, particularly regarding the application of the Logan Act (18 USC 8). The Director deferred to the judgment of the Department in this matter. (62-59520-36) (62-59520-33)

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STALIN TALK TO U.S. URGED BY SZILARD

Physicist's Open Letter to Him
Proposes Peace Meetings of
Scientists and Citizens

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
CHICAGO, Nov. 24.—Prof. Leo Szilard of the University of Chicago, who was the first to discover the chain reaction that made the atomic bomb possible, has addressed an open letter to Premier Josef Stalin of Russia, urging him to initiate a new type of chain reaction that might "remove the dead-lock" between Russia and the United States.

The letter was first submitted to Attorney General Tom C. Clark with a request for permission to send it directly to the Soviet Premier. Failing to receive such permission, Dr. Szilard made his letter public through publication in the current issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Dr. Szilard proposes to Mr. Stalin a number of unique suggestions, all aimed to bring about a more direct contact between the American and the Russian peoples, first, by a series of addresses by the Russian Premier to the American people outlining his basic ideas for the reconstruction of the post-war world, and, secondly, by a series of meetings of leading scientists and citizens from the major countries of the world for ironing out the controversial issues.

Such meetings also, Dr. Szilard points out, must be initiated by Premier Stalin himself. He adds, however, that "if called upon to do so," he (Dr. Szilard) would try to form a committee of American atomic scientists who, "acting as hosts," would gather "a group of citizens from all walks of life—men who are concerned about the welfare of America and who are also concerned about the welfare of the rest of the world, including Russia."

"Such a group," Dr. Szilard writes, "could meet with similarly constituted groups from Great Britain and France on the one hand, and Russia, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other hand. Russian scientists would surely cooperate if the initiative were taken by you (Stalin), and the scientists of all these other countries could then also be counted upon to help in arranging such a meeting."

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NEW YORK TIMES

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BREAKING THROUGH U. S. iron curtain, Dr. Leo Szilard, who was prevented by U. S. sources from broadcasting directly to the USSR his idea for a direct exchange of Soviet opinions between Truman and Stalin, published it as an "open letter" in the monthly *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.*" Szilard provided nuclear information which led to production of atomic bomb.

EX-552

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DAILY WORKER

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DEC 10 1947

DIRECTOR, FBI

December 11, 1947

SAC, CHICAGO

INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Reference is made to letter dated November 26, 1947, from Washington Field to the Director.

Attached hereto is the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December, 1947, wherein an article by LEO SZILARD appears captioned "Letter to Stalin".

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cc - Washington Field (62-4108)

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

DECEMBER 1947

25c

LEO SZILARD: Chemistry Major

EDWARD TELLER
A Point of View: The World's Responsibilities

MILTON BURTON
Communication Committee: Chief Historian and Forecast

HERBERT HOOKE
The First Step to a World Government

ROBERT M. COOPER
Proposed World Government
World Constituent Assembly

PETER A. STURZ
United Nations Directorate: Supply News Review

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK

Chicago, Illinois

No. 12

57-579-11

LETTER TO STALIN

Leo Szilard



In 1939, Dr. Szilard, as is generally known, took the initiative in bringing to the attention of President Roosevelt the scientific experiments which indicated that an atomic bomb was a possibility. This first step resulted in the mobilization of resources and skill which led to the atomic bomb. In the present article, Dr. Szilard discusses how Mr. Stalin, by taking the initiative, could in time resolve the present deadlock. Dr. Szilard would have preferred not to have published this article but rather to have sent a letter to Stalin dealing with these matters if permission to send such a letter, within the meaning of the Logan Act of 1799, could have been obtained. The memorandum on page 351 which he presented to Mr. Byrnes some time before the first bomb was tested in the New Mexico desert illustrates the type of clear thinking which forecast the present difficulties.

I take the step of writing this "Letter", because I am deeply concerned about the deterioration of Russian-American relations, and also because I believe that the general sentiment which moves me to this action is shared by the majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy.

The steady deterioration of Russian-American relations has many disturbing aspects, but perhaps none is as serious as the lasting effect which it may have on the minds of the American people, as well as the minds of the people in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Here in America more and more men will say to me in private conversation that war with Russia is inevitable. These are men who are capable of thinking independently and are not guided by whatever editorials they may read in their newspapers. To me their attitude is a symptom of grave danger because, once the American people close their minds on this subject war, in fact, will have become inevitable.

There are those who argue that there is no danger of an early war because at present Russia is too weak to start one and there is no precedent for the United States embarking on a preventive war. That there is no such precedent is, of course, true; but neither have the American people ever before been in a position where they

had to fear that if they remain passive during a protracted period of uneasy peace they may live to see the day when war—if it breaks out—will be brought to their homeland.

I do not mean to say that the United States may start a preventive war against Russia within the next six months; what I mean to say is that if the present trend continues for six months, a fateful change might take root in the minds of the American people and the situation would then be beyond remedy. Thereafter it would be merely a question of time, a few short years, perhaps—until the peace would be at the mercy of some Yugoslav general in the Balkans or some American admiral in the Mediterranean who may willfully or through bungling create an incident that will inevitably result in war. If the present trend continues for six months, more likely than not, the further course of events will be out of the control of the two governments involved.

The main reason for the present trend is the fact that two years have passed since the end of the war and no appreciable progress has been made toward a settlement. Russia and the United States have reached a deadlock.

All this does not come as a surprise to most of us who had worked in the field of atomic energy during the war and had time to adjust our thinking to the implications of the bomb. It was clear from the start

The following is part of a letter which Dr. Leo Szilard sent to the Attorney General under date of October 25, 1947. The article as printed is a revised version of the manuscript originally submitted to the BULLETIN and the Attorney General.

Enclosed is a copy of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" which I have submitted to the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS for publication.

If it were in every respect proper for me to do so, I would write a letter to Mr. Stalin embodying the thoughts contained in the enclosed article and would seek some way of transmitting such a letter to him through the good offices of some prominent person who is known to him. It would be my hope that if my letter were transmitted to Mr. Stalin in such a manner he would perceive the genuine anguish which prompted my writing it and that he might therefore give consideration to its contents.

If such a letter were in fact to be transmitted to Mr. Stalin through some proper and desirable channel I would probably want to postpone indefinitely the publication of the article.

The enclosed article does not touch on any specific dispute or controversy with the United States and the letter which I would send to Mr. Stalin would merely follow its text, possibly shortened by omissions. You may, in the circumstances, think that the transmission of such a letter would not come under the Logan Act of 1799. On the other hand, you might think that the transmission of such a letter might come under the Logan Act or some other similar act and therefore, in accordance with the Logan Act, I am herewith making the formal request for permission or authority of the Government for the transmission of such a letter in the meaning of the Act.

that the existence of the bomb and the manner in which it was used would not make the settlement easier but rather more difficult. We knew that the world could be saved from another war only if both the United States and Russia were able to rise above the situation, and before this can come to pass one of them will have to take the lead.

Situations of this general type are not without precedent in history; they occur also on occasion in the lives of individuals, and the story of one such occurrence made a very deep impression on me. In 1930, twelve years after the end of the First World War, I met a classmate of mine and we talked of what had happened to us since we had separated. He had been a lieutenant in the Austrian Army, and in the last days of the war in the Carpathian Mountains he was in charge of a patrol. One morning they had heard by way of rumor that an armistice had been concluded, but being cut off from communications they were unable to obtain confirmation. They rode out on patrol duty as usual, and as they emerged from the forest, they found themselves standing face to face with a Russian patrol in charge of an officer. The two officers grabbed their guns and, frozen in this position, the two patrols remained for uncounted seconds. Suddenly the Russian officer smiled and his hand went to his cap in salute. My friend returned the salute, and both patrols turned back their horses. "To this day," my friend said to me, "I regret that it was not I who saluted first."

Perhaps by writing this "Letter" today I may make some slight amends for my friend's tardiness, for in these troubled times it is not without some personal risk for an American scientist to write a "Letter" such as this one.

Today Russia and America find themselves standing face to face, each of them fearful of what may be the other's next political move. The American people want peace. The Russian people want peace also.

As I see it, Russia wants peace—as does the United States—not only for the next five or ten years, she wants peace for good. And if I am correct on this point then peace can yet be saved; it can be saved by you, yourself.

It is within your power to resolve the deadlock and thereby to permit a change in the course of United

States foreign policy, but you can do this only if you decide to throw off the self-imposed shackles of the old-fashioned, and also of the new-fangled forms of diplomacy.

Russia and the United States are deadlocked on almost every point on which they have negotiated in the recent past. On every such point, Russia may have very good reasons for not yielding, and the United States may also have very good reasons for not yielding. I am not going to suggest that you should now yield on this point or that one, or that you should now "appease" the United States.

THE APPROACH SUGGESTED

What I am suggesting in this "Letter" are a series of interconnected steps which are within your power to take. Because they are most unusual steps, these suggestions may appear quixotic to many and ridiculous to some.

What I am suggesting in this "Letter" may come somewhat as a shock to you. It may also come as a shock to some of my fellow-Americans who will read these lines. But this is not the time to hold back for fear of being exposed to ridicule or unwarranted accusations.

My first specific suggestion is that you speak directly and personally to the American people. What you may say to them, and you might wish to speak to them once a month, will be news, and because it will be news, it will be carried by the radio stations in the United States and will be reprinted in the newspapers. Naturally you would want to speak in Russian, but your interpreter could convey your speech sentence by sentence in English. Your speech could be recorded and released simultaneously in Russia and America.

The American people listen to their presidents because what the President says to them may affect their lives, and they will listen to you for exactly the same reason. But there is one important difference; you will be speaking to them as the head of a foreign state; your speech will be without effect with them unless it is felt to be one hundred percent sincere. The sincerity of your expression, as well as the other tokens of sincerity which you may be able to

present to the American people, will determine whether your speeches will strike home.

If your speeches to the American people were given full publicity in Russia, you would go a long way towards convincing the American people that you mean what you are saying to them.

And you would go a long way towards convincing the American people that they may expect fair play from you if you invited the President of the United States to address the Russian people just as often as you speak to the American public and accorded just as much publicity to his speeches in Russia as is given to yours in America.

All the machinery through which the American public is being kept informed in the United States would be at your disposal, and it would remain at your disposal in the absence of any attempt to use it for purposes of propaganda.

That you would be heard by the American people is certain; but how your speeches would affect them would depend both upon the substance and the tenor of these speeches.

What indeed should be the substance of your speeches?

What I suggest, in the first place, is that in your speeches you present to the American people a clear picture of a general settlement within the framework of a post-war reconstruction of the world, a settlement that would enable Russia and the United States to live in peace with each other.

At first you will be able to give such a picture in rough outline only; gradually you may be able to fill in more and more of the details. You might convey the details, perhaps, by issuing from time to time supplementary official reports.

By the time you have filled in the details, you will have given the American people more than merely a picture of a possible post-war world; you will have presented them with something that will amount to an offer for a post-war settlement.

You might well ask at this point, because it is indeed a crucial question, whether such a unilateral offer on your part, if it is generous, would not put you at a disadvantage from the point of view of later negotiations. You could easily make it clear, however, that your offer has to be taken as a whole, that you are perfectly willing to modify any one sin-

gle point to meet the wishes of the United States Government, but that for every point that the United States wants to have modified in her favor, you may ask that some other point be modified in Russia's favor. As long as this is clearly understood, you need not, and should not, hold back for the sake of later bargaining.

Such are the means through which you may be able to convince the American people that—in your view as well as in fact—private enterprise and the Russian economic system and also mixed forms of economic organization can flourish side by side; that Russia and the United States can be part of the same world; that "one world" need not necessarily be a uniform world. Until such time as the American people as well as the Russian people shall be convinced of this all-important point, we shall remain headed towards war and not towards peace.

I am told that these days the opposite thesis is presented by authoritative writers in Russia. And if this opposite thesis should be accepted as correct in America as well as in Russia—if it should be generally believed that there is indeed some inexorable law which, in the long run, makes war between your country and ours inevitable, then those in the United States who are now working for the preservation of peace would begin to feel that they were merely delaying the war which will be all the more terrible the later it comes.

THE RESPONSE

EXPECTED

Naturally you would want to know how the American people would respond if you should decide to take the initiative and adopt a new line of approach towards the United States. Would you really be able to break the present deadlock and thereby bring about a change in the course of United States foreign policy?

There is a vast body of men and women in the United States who view with genuine concern the rapid deterioration of Russian-American relations. Many of them have grave doubts in their hearts as to the general wisdom of the present course of United States foreign policy, while they regard with equal misgivings the Russian counterpart of this policy.

If they do not at present take a stand in favor of changing the course steered by their own government, it is first of all because they do not see with sufficient clarity any practicable alternative course under present circumstances. Moreover they may believe that any attempt to bring about a change must necessarily come to naught as long as the speeches of your delegates will continue to follow a line of reasoning which is unacceptable to the large majority of the American public.

If you succeed in the difficult task of formulating in your own mind a practicable solution of the post-war issues and in conveying your picture of such a solution to the American public, then gradually, as you make statement after statement and issue report after report, a complete picture of an acceptable post-war settlement may unfold before the American people. By the time you will have filled in the details, and thus have implicitly extended a comprehensive offer, you also will have removed the block which had caused the deadlock.

This should have a direct and immediate effect on the foreign policy of the United States. Most Americans believe that those who are at present in charge of guiding American foreign policy were driven to the present policy because none other appeared practicable to them in the circumstances. It is generally believed that they are men of good will, who can be expected to change the present course the very moment they see a satisfactory way out of the present impasse.

You may or may not concur with this opinion. But in any case it is clearly within your power to give the American people a choice between two alternative courses of foreign policy. And if they do have a choice, the American people will exercise their choice—this I fervently hope—in favor of a course which may lead to peace. They will exercise their choice through all the mechanisms by which public opinion influences government policies in America. And those who are at present in charge of steering the course of American foreign policy may, to borrow a phrase of Mr. Stimson's, "either change their minds or lose their jobs."

In this "Letter" I am trying to cope with a difficulty of communications which might be insurmountable. We in America have a crude and oversimplified picture of how political de-

cisions come about in Russia. You in Russia may have a similar picture concerning America. It might be therefore difficult for a Russian to go along with the basic assumption of this "Letter", that in America the most important factor for political decisions is not a public opinion created by the press but rather the attitudes and opinions of the individuals who constitute the American public, and that these attitudes and opinions may become the controlling factor in certain circumstances. But if this "Letter" had not one chance in a thousand of receiving serious consideration in Russia, I still would want to write it rather than to face the charge of seeing the approaching catastrophe without even raising a hand trying to avert it.

If the conclusion were reached that the measures advocated in this "Letter" would be effective, if adequately implemented, it would become necessary to face the difficulties of implementation. The difficulties of formulating an adequate solution to the post-war issues which would be acceptable to both Russia and the United States, as well as the rest of the world, are greatly increased by the absence of any interchange of thought between Americans and Russians who are not encumbered by the responsibility of representing the views of their Governments. It is perhaps understandable that atomic scientists should particularly stress this point and that they should discuss with each other whether there is any proper way in which they could help to bring about such an interchange of thought. The difficulties which stand in the way of achieving this or even a reasonable substitute thereof are obvious. But in view of their special responsibility it is perhaps not unnatural that atomic scientists should wish to assist in the implementation of some significant endeavor aimed at the permanent establishment of peace.

The general sentiment underlying this "Letter" is, I know, shared by the majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy, but the specific thoughts embodied in this "Letter" and the decision of writing it are my own and I am not speaking for any other person or persons.

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WORKING FOR A MIRACLE

On a superficial reading, and given the present trend of public opinion, Mr. Szilard's "Letter to Stalin" may bring to the author and, by implication, to the atomic scientists, an accusation of pro-Soviet leaning, or at least, of great naivete in respect to political realities in general, and the Soviet system in particular.

Those who have followed the educational and political activities of the atomic scientists, know that the reason why a majority of them feel keenly the necessity of a comprehensive settlement with the Soviet Union and are skeptical about the long-range value of a policy of "containment" is not ideological sympathy or political nearsightedness, but the sober reflection that in the age of atomic and bacteriological warfare, no "containment" can be a lasting guarantee of the incapacity of a nation with the dimensions and industrial and scientific potential of the Soviet Union, to challenge the rest of the world. They know that if we were permitted to drift into such a conflict, the Soviet Union, despite a vastly inferior industrial power, would have the advantages of lesser vulnerability, easier dispersal, better psychological preparation for total war and habi-

tual regimentation of national life.

Starting from these premises and refusing to consider a "preventive" war as a morally justifiable alternative to a more dangerous war later, Mr. Szilard is looking desperately for a way out of the deadlock. In a letter reprinted on this page, he describes the reasoning by which he concluded that one such way might be to induce the Soviet leader to approach the American people directly. Mr. Szilard sees the American people and the Soviet leadership as the main forces on the world scene; if these two make up their minds that war is inevitable, nothing will be able to prevent it, since the Russian people has no voice of its own, and the American government is only an agent of the people.

Obviously, this concept is quite different from the Soviet "line", which blames the trend toward war on "warmongering" by a capitalist-dominated government and press.

How much chance there is of the Soviet leaders heeding Mr. Szilard's advice, or of using the proffered channels of communication for something other than their usual pronouncements? Mr. Szilard acknowledges that this chance is very small.

Why, then, does he deliberately expose himself to accusations of political naivete?

As witnessed by his memorandum of 1945 (reprinted in this issue), Mr. Szilard early recognized that the atomic bomb would make the maintenance of an "armed peace" very difficult, if not impossible, and that only the "miracle" of a comprehensive settlement (Mr. Fermi has defined a miracle as an event which has only a 10% chance of happening) can prevent a war between the two remaining major powers.

Recent developments give little reason to dismiss Mr. Szilard as a foolish prophet. He apparently thinks—and he may be right—that by now, the chances of preserving the peace have become so small, that every approach which may conceivably break the deadlock, is worth trying. Not being content like many others, with waiting for a miracle, he feels that he must do something to bring it about.

Many will think that the kind of miracle Mr. Szilard is trying to conjure up is the least likely to materialize: it is up to them to analyze what "miracles" have a better chance of happening, and go to work to increase their probability.

E. R.

COMMENT TO THE EDITORS BY DR. SZILARD

November 13, 1947

Dear Sirs:

Since the permission requested in my letter to the Attorney General of October 25 was not granted, I did not ask for further postponement of the publication of the article entitled "Letter to Stalin." I had discussed this article with quite a number of persons outside the atomic scientists' movement, and perhaps some of the questions raised, and the objections made, deserve to be recorded here.

One objection took the stereotyped form of "Why do you address yourself to Stalin? Why don't you write to President Truman?" Curiously enough, this very same phrase was used by two groups of persons—those whose outlook is close to that of the Administration and those on the left who oppose the foreign policy of the Administration. While these two groups use the same phrase, they

do not, of course, mean the same thing at all.

"Those on the left" mean that by writing such a "Letter" I am acknowledging that Stalin is the real obstacle to peace and I am neglecting to mention that actions on the part of our own Administration have contributed to, or have been largely responsible for, the present disturbing situation.

Those sharing the Administration's point of view seem to feel that, by addressing myself to Stalin, I am acknowledging that Stalin has a greater desire for peace, or has a greater ability to recognize the right path to peace, or else has a greater power to bring about a change than President Truman or his administration. These men will also say to me that those who are in charge of guiding American foreign policy are men of great ability who have an intense desire for peace. And if I accept this view as correct—they say to me—

then I ought to propose to Stalin (if I must propose anything to him at all) that he make a comprehensive offer to the Administration, rather than that he address himself to the American people.

My answer to them is, of course, that their view of our policy-makers—which incidentally is shared by the majority of the American people, as stated in my "Letter"—is irrelevant, for Mr. Stalin will base his actions on his own views rather than on ours. In my "Letter" I have, therefore, suggested a course of action which Mr. Stalin can follow even though his view may differ from ours. I suggested that if and when he has a case—and at present there is no case before us—he can take it to the highest authority in America—the American people.

Why did I not write to President Truman? First of all, because I cannot say to the President that if he

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ATOMIC BOMBS AND THE POSTWAR POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD — 1945

The following are excerpts from a memorandum prepared by Dr. Leo Szilard in March, 1945. This memorandum was to be placed before President Roosevelt, but owing to his sudden death, it did not reach him. Referred by the White House to James F. Byrnes it was placed before him by the author in a personal interview on May 28, 1945 (six weeks before the first bomb was tested in New Mexico). These excerpts contain none of the secret information which was embodied in the original document. It is believed that this was the first document which discussed the implications of the atomic bomb with respect to our future relations with Russia and the question of international control of atomic energy. It also contained the original suggestion of denaturing fissionable materials for the purpose of making more difficult their use for the manufacture of bombs.

The development of the atomic bomb is mostly considered from the point of view of its possible use in the present war and such bombs are likely to be available in time to be used before the war ends. However, their role in the . . . years which will follow can be expected to be far more important and it seems that the position of the United States in the world may be adversely affected by their existence. The following might very well turn out to be the future course of events:

Before the end of the war we shall use atomic bombs against Japan. These bombs will be much less powerful than we know could be made and which in all likelihood will be made within . . . years yet the first bomb that is detonated over Japan will be spectacular enough to start a race in atomic armaments between us and other nations.

In a few months Russia's war with Germany may be over. The work on uranium will then undoubtedly be given a high priority there but it will perhaps still not be carried out on a large industrial scale until we detonate our first atomic bomb and thus demonstrate the success of this development. For a few years after that we shall almost certainly be ahead of Russia. But even if we assume that we could keep ahead of her

in this development all the time, this may neither offer us protection from attack nor necessarily give us substantial advantage in case of war . . . years from now.

. . . years from now Russia may have accumulated enough of some of the active elements which may be used for constructing atomic bombs to have an equivalent to . . .

Clearly, if such bombs are available, it is not necessary to bomb our cities from the air in order to destroy them. All that is necessary is to place a comparatively small number of such bombs in each of our major cities and to detonate them at some later time.

The United States has a very long coast-line which will make it possible to smuggle in such bombs in peace-time and to carry them by truck into our cities. The long coast-line, the structure of our society, and our very heterogeneous population may make an effective control of such "traffic" virtually impossible. One can easily visualize how a "friendly" power in time of peace may have such bombs placed in all of our major cities under the guidance of agents. This might be done free from aggressive intent. Such a power might know or suspect that we have accumulated a quantity of atomic bombs and fear our defenses are so strong that after the outbreak of hostilities it would be

difficult to reach our cities by air. In such circumstances it may be exceedingly difficult for its "government" to refuse to take "precautions" which its "army" considers necessary . . .

So far it has not been possible to devise any methods which would enable us to detect hidden atomic bombs buried in the ground or otherwise efficiently protected against detection.

If there should be great progress in the development of rockets after this war, it is conceivable that it will become possible to drop atomic bombs on the cities of the United States from very great distances by means of rockets.

The weakness of the position of the United States will largely be due to the very high concentration of its manufacturing capacity and of its population in cities. Thirty million people live here in cities of over 250,000. This concentration is so pronounced that the destruction of the cities may easily mean the end of our ability to resist. Keeping constantly ahead of the Russians in our production of these heavy elements will not restore us to a strong position. No quantity of these "active" materials which we may accumulate will protect us from attack and so far as retaliation is concerned, we might not be able to do more than to destroy the large cities of Russia which are few in number and the economic importance of which is in no way comparable to the economic importance of our own cities. Thus it would appear that we would not gain an overwhelmingly strong position in a war with Russia merely by accumulating an enormous quantity of these elements or by increasing, as we might, the efficiency of our bombs from . . . to a much higher value.

The strong position of the United States in the world in the past thirty years was essentially due to the fact that the United States could out-produce every other country in heavy armaments. It takes a very large number of tanks, airplanes and guns to bring about a decision in a war and as long as tanks, airplanes and

guns are the major instruments of war the large production capacity of the United States gives it an advantage which may be considered decisive.

The existence of atomic bombs means the end of the strong position of the United States in this respect. From now on the destructive power which can be accumulated by other countries as well as the United States can easily reach the level at which all the cities of the "enemy" can be destroyed in one single sudden attack. The expenditure in money and material which is necessary to reach this level is so small that any of the major powers can easily afford it provided... For us to accumulate active materials in quantities beyond that necessary to destroy the cities of the "enemy" would probably give us some advantage in the war, but it is difficult to say whether the importance of such "excess" amounts of material would be really substantial. Out-producing the "enemy" might therefore not necessarily increase our strength very much.

The greatest danger arising out of a competition between the United States and Russia, which would lead to a rapid accumulation of vast quantities of atomic bombs in both countries, consists in the possibility of the outbreak of a preventive war. Such a war might be the outcome of the fear that the other country might strike first and no amount of good will on the part of both nations might be sufficient to prevent the outbreak of a war if such an explosive situation were allowed to develop.

One of the questions that has to be considered is whether it might be possible to set up some system of controls of the production of these active materials. Such controls would ultimately have to extend to every territory on the earth. Whether it is politically and technically feasible to set up effective controls and what we could do to improve our chances in this respect are questions that urgently require study and decisions. Some further remarks on these questions are made below, but other considerations might be put forward as soon as the question receives the attention of the Government.

A system of controls could be considered successful only if we could count on a period of grace in case the controls were denounced or obstructed by one of the major powers. This means that the system would have to be of such a nature that at least... would lapse between the time the

Russians began to convert their installations for the purpose of manufacturing atomic bombs and the time such bombs became available in quantity... .

SYSTEMS OF CONTROL OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED

From a formal point of view all countries may be considered as potential enemies, but it is perhaps not too optimistic to assume that we may disregard the possibility of a war with Great Britain in the next fifteen years. It appears, however, rather unlikely that jointly with Great Britain we could police the world and thus prevent by force the manufacture of all of the "active materials" anywhere in the world, including Russia.

It might perhaps be possible to set up jointly with Great Britain and Russia some sort of joint control of the manufacture of the active materials everywhere in the world if we could get Russia to agree to such a control which of necessity would have to extend to her territory. The purpose of such a control would be to prevent the active elements from becoming available in a form in which they could be used for the manufacture of atomic bombs. This would not necessarily mean that the development of atomic power has to be suppressed but only that the elements involved must not be prepared in certain forms and degree of purity.

This point raises the following question: What forms of atomic power can we permit to be organized if we want to make sure that the available materials and facilities cannot easily be converted for the manufacture of atomic bombs? Some thought has already been given to this question with the following result.

There are two types of active materials. Materials of the first type can be diluted by the abundant isotope of uranium in such a way as to rule out the possibility of using them for atomic bombs while leaving unimpaired the usefulness of the materials for industrial purposes. A chemical separation from the diluting material would be impossible and a conversion into materials which can be used for atomic bombs would take...

Material of the second type which can be used for atomic bombs can be "denatured" by... . Whether more elaborate methods can be worked out

which will permit the detonation of the denatured material is a question which would have to be carefully scrutinized. These lines merely serve to indicate that there might perhaps be a satisfactory solution to the problem of reconciling the requirements of safety of the United States with the desire not to hamper the development of atomic power for industrial purposes.

Unfortunately it is by no means sure that a satisfactory solution of this problem is in fact possible. It would be much easier, safer, and would require a much less tight control to arrest the development of atomic power by scrapping and outlawing the large and easily visible installations which characterize the first stage of this development.

CONTROL OF RAW MATERIALS COULD BE CONSIDERED

If Russia, the United States and other countries were willing to forego the use of atomic power for peacetime purposes, one could have a system of control that would be fairly simple since it would be almost sufficient to control the movements of raw materials. Ores of uranium would have to be mined under control and transported to some "neutral" territory. Whether or not it would be permitted to have in a neutral territory installations belonging to... and atomic power plants is a question of minor importance. It appears likely that if the major powers were willing to forego the use of atomic power, a system of controls could be set up without encountering too great difficulties.

AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM OF CONTROLS WOULD HAVE TO BE MUCH TIGHTER

On the other hand, if the United States, Russia, and other countries should have atomic power installations within their own territory, a very tight system of control would be needed in order to make sure that the nations would not have to face a sudden attack by atomic bombs. For a control of this sort to be effective, it would be necessary that our agents and the agents of Great Britain move

freely around in Russia, be allowed to keep contacts with Russian civilians, secretly employ Russian civilians for the purpose of obtaining information, and have entry into every factory or shop throughout the vast territory of Russia.

That there may be dangerous loopholes in control systems which might be set up is illustrated by events that took place in Germany after the first World War. At that time, there were many Germans who were willing to give information to the Inter-Allied Commission about violations of the control regulations, but those who actually did so were publicly tried under the German Espionage Law and were given heavy sentences. The Treaty of Versailles did not stipulate that the German Espionage Law must be revoked.

Clearly, it would be desirable to create a situation which would permit us to appeal in various ways to physicists and engineers everywhere for information that would uncover violations of the controls. This would give us additional assurance that such violations would be detected but it presupposes that we succeed in creating conditions in which we would guarantee the personal safety of those who volunteer such information and the safety of their families.

Since Russia cannot be expected to agree to such a control unless she obtains the same rights of control in the United States and Great Britain the question whether Congress and the people of the United States are willing to agree to such a control might become of paramount importance.

HOW COULD RUSSIA BEST BE PERSUADED?

As to our chances of persuading the Russians to accept mutual control, much may depend on the proper timing of our approach to Russia. It would appear that such an approach would have to be made immediately after we demonstrated the potency of atomic bombs...

Events may be expected to move so fast that if it is intended to reach an agreement with Russia and other countries such an agreement would have to be complete before the next presidential elections...

IF THE CONTROL IS INTERFERED WITH

While it may be a great step forward to establish a tight control on the atomic power development by a reciprocal agreement with Great Britain and Russia and extend it to all territories of the world, yet we cannot disregard the possibility that one of the major powers, for instance Russia, after a few years—during which the controls may have operated quite successfully—may begin to place difficulties in the way of an effective control of activities conducted on its own territory. It would be quite essential that the people of this country and the world be brought to understand from the start that any difficulties which any nation may place in the way of the established controls would have to be considered as tantamount to a "declaration of war".

Such a "declaration of war" would have the effect that the United States and other countries involved would at once begin to manufacture atomic bombs. If up to that time the control had been effective, it would take... to convert the materials and installations involved in the utilization of atomic power to the manufacture of bombs. In such an "armament race" in which all countries would have to start, so to speak, from scratch, the position of the United States might be quite favorable, provided the development of atomic power had been kept up at a high level.

Clearly if any major power deliberately wants to start a war, there will be a war and all that we can hope to achieve by the reciprocal control which we have discussed is that a war may not break out as a result of an armament race.

Still, it would seem that if the situation were generally understood there might be some hope that having succeeded in setting up a system of reciprocal control and having kept it in operation for a few years, neither the United States nor Great Britain nor Russia would attempt to interfere with this system of control in such a manner that its acts would be considered by the other partners as a menace. We would then perhaps have a chance of living through this century without having our cities destroyed.

An attempt to manufacture atomic bombs undertaken by any of the smaller countries would be of minor importance since it could be met by

immediate armed intervention using ordinary methods of warfare such as tanks and airplanes.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A SYSTEM OF CONTROLS

In discussing our postwar situation the greatest attention was given in this memorandum to the role that Russia might play. This was not done because it was assumed that Russia may have aggressive intentions but rather because it was assumed that if an agreement can be reached with Russia, it will be possible to extend the system of controls to every country in the world...

Dr. Szilard's Comment

(Continued from Page 350)

Made a comprehensive offer for settlement of the post-war issues the Russian government would respond favorably. I cannot possibly have any basis for knowing how the Russian government would respond to any such approach. On the other hand, I can say how I believe the American people would respond to such a new approach on the part of the Russian government.

Moreover, while I would not wish to say that the conduct of our own foreign policy could in no way be improved upon under present circumstances, I do not believe that the problem which faces the world today can be solved at the level of foreign policy in the narrow sense of the term by the Administration; nor do I believe that it is within the power of the Administration to offer to the world a satisfactory solution of this problem without the full support of the American people for a bold and constructive solution. Since I have developed these thoughts in a previous article—"Calling for a Crusade" which appeared in the April-May issue of the BULLETIN—I need not again go into this point here. But I might perhaps add that today it no longer seems likely that popular support or popular pressure for a bold and constructive solution will be forthcoming unless the people would have reason to believe that they could expect the Russian government to be cooperative.

Leo Szilard

Alfonso Lopez, of Colombia, wondered how it was possible to prevent warmongering when East-West disagreement appeared to be intensifying. No accord had been reached regarding peace treaties, atomic controls or disarmament. No progress had been made in conciliation since the last session of the Assembly, he said.

Hector McNeil, British Minister of State, said: "I do not pretend, or attempt to pretend, that there is no relation between the uncontrolled private manufacture of arms and propaganda in favor of war. There is unfortunately too much evidence on the subject of uncontrolled manufacture of arms and its co-relation, propaganda, for me, as a member of my government, to shut my eyes to this fact."

The British Laborite said there would doubtless be a full disarmament discussion at the appropriate time, and added: "Equally, I fear that the committee will have the greatest difficulty persuading themselves when they examine the evidence that the representatives of Soviet Russia have not been primarily responsible for the lack of progress on this essential and urgent subject."

COMPROMISE RESOLUTION ON WARMONGERING

October 27. Australia, Canada and France succeeded in blending their views into a joint resolution to (1) condemn all propaganda which might disrupt peace, (2) request governments to promote friendly relations by available publicity and propaganda, (3) transmit this resolution to the Conference on Freedom of Information, meeting in Geneva next March. This omitted any atomic clause.

Mr. Vishinsky declared it would be "ridiculous" to speak against war propaganda, and at the same time to increase armaments.

"We do not suggest any solution," the Soviet delegate said. "We simply say the United Nations affirms the speediest implementation of the General Assembly resolution. Isn't it one of the measures that would redound against war? . . . You are not against that? Or are you?"

The Soviet resolution was rejected by paragraphs. On the atomic clause, the vote was forty to seven against

it, only Egypt joining the Slav bloc (the Soviet Union, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine and Yugoslavia), with seven nations abstaining. The joint resolution against war talk then was committee approved, 56-0, with Haiti absent, and was sent to the full Assembly.

MEMORANDUM ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

On biological warfare, Dr. Zlotowski told reporters Oct. 3 that he would bring that issue up in the atomic commission, after an eleven-page memorandum had been circulated to Assembly delegates by the American Association of Scientific Workers.

The very existence of biological weapons, the Polish delegate contended, demonstrates that "it is absolutely necessary to have as a first step the immediate prohibition of weapons of mass destruction."

"From the point of view of atomic control, one may argue that this prohibition is meaningless as long as we don't have the mechanism to inspect development."

"In the case of biological warfare, the value of such a mechanism is extremely doubtful—or impossible. So first, at least, there should be an agreement to prohibit such weapons—for the moral value, anyway."

This view—counter to the majority opinion—would again defer establishment of controls over mass-destruction weapons, pending an initial prohibition.

Dr. Zlotowski argued that the U.N. should work to eliminate causes of war, rather than believe control of weapons would provide real safety. He envisioned a future which would see uranium resources playing the same role in international rivalries as oil has done.

So he contended any control must be such as would least interfere with individual nations' economies, while preventing any country from establishing dominance in the atomic field. Unless war causes were removed, he said, biological weapons would enable a disastrous war even if some nations lacked atomic bombs.

LETTER TO STALIN

(Continued from Page 349)

POSTSCRIPT

Having presented a number of suggestions outlining in detail—perhaps in too great detail—a course which you might wish to adopt, I feel that I ought to go one step further at the risk that what I am going to say may seem out of proportion with the main theme of this "Letter."

The vast majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy are free from any anti-Russian bias and they do not include Communists in either the narrow or wider sense of the term. If I were called upon to do so, I would try to form a committee drawn from their ranks who, acting as hosts, would gather a group of American citizens from all walks of life — men who are concerned about the welfare of America and who are also concerned about the welfare of the rest of the world, including Russia. Such a group could meet with similarly constituted groups from Great Britain and France on the one hand, and Russia, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other hand. Russian scientists would surely cooperate if the initiative were taken by you, and the scientists of all these other countries could then also be counted upon to help in arranging such a meeting.

If the issues which face the world today were freely discussed in such an international group of private persons, after some initial faltering, the picture of a bold and constructive solution of these issues might emerge, and public opinion all over the world might then rally to such a solution.

In governmental negotiations the discussion is always hampered by the fear that once a point is conceded it is difficult to go back on it. But in such a discussion among private individuals it may be possible to deal with the controversial issues in the proper setting of a wider framework, and some of them may then appear reduced to their true proportions.

If a sufficient number and variety of those persons who would participate in these discussions would feel free to present their private opinions as distinguished from the official positions of their own governments, a free flow of thought might ensue, which could make available a valuable fund of ideas and suggestions upon which the governments could draw later on in their negotiations.

There could be, of course, in these discussions, no disclosure of any kind relating to the subject of atomic energy.

Phony Scare May Cripple Atom Projects

By Albert Deutsch

Whom the gods would destroy they first make feeble-minded. One regards with fascinated horror the antics of the political hacks in Congress who, acting out of their monumental ignorance, are hysterically striving to put free American science on a party-line basis.



Deutsch

It would take the razor-edged wit of a Voltaire or the keen artistry of a Daumier to distil the full measure of irony in the current goings-on in Washington, where a scared and stupid section of Congress is encasing our atomic science in a straitjacket under the catastrophic delusion that they are safely locking it away in a secret vault.

The vindictive assault on the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission presently conducted by military brass-hats, political brass-heads and brass-cheek publishers may wind up not only with wrecking one of the most efficient governmental agencies but with the effective destruction of our leadership in the development of atomic energy.

The motivations for the present attack on the Atomic Energy Commission through the whipping up of public hysteria are mainly of three types:

1. The militarists who hope to regain complete control of our atomic energy program as they enjoyed in wartime, wresting this control from the five-man civilian Atomic Energy Commission.
2. The reactionaries in and out of Congress who have never discarded their desire to "get" New Dealer David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the AEC and one of the nation's topmost executives.
3. The vocal ignoramuses to whom "Reds" and "Russia" are trigger-terms evoking outbursts of frenzied terror in automatic response to the coupling of "Red" and "Atom."

Somebody ought to tell these victims of atomic jitters the truth about the so-called "atom-secret"—namely, that there is no secret.

Somebody ought to tell them the shaping of the atom bomb was made possible by a bunch of foreigners and refugees like Niels Bohr, Albert Einstein, Leo Szilard, Enrico Fermi and Lise Meitner. Out of every 10 leading atomic scientists, only one was an American. Even an avowed Communist like Frederic Joliot-Curie, head of the French Atomic Energy Commission, played an important role in the development of atomic science.

Somebody ought to tell them that only a minute part of atomic science is our "secret"—the mechanical know-how in certain military aspects of fashioning atomic weapons.

Somebody ought to tell them that the field of atomic energy will soon envelop virtually the same

ment sponsored projects. They have left in disgust over the continual badgering, fear of losing their right to their private lives, and concern over their most precious heritage—the freedom of scientific investigation.

Somebody ought to tell them how high-salaried scientific posts in Government-sponsored atomic energy projects are going begging while brilliant men go into academic work or private industry at lower salaries rather than give up their essential liberties.

Somebody ought to tell them how the Nazis lost their chance to develop atomic weapons first by putting into positions of scientific leadership mediocre party-liners who throttled the first-raters and killed scientific incentives. (Dr. Samuel A. Goudsmit, a leading nuclear physicist now at the Brookhaven Atomic Energy Laboratory,

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ATOMIC PARLEY HERE IGNORES SECURITY O.K.

BY WALTER TROHAN

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

Washington, Aug. 18 — Federal security officers are disturbed over failure to erect security safeguards at an international meeting of atomic scientists in Chicago next month, which will be financed with federal funds.

Altho the state department was advised of the impending sessions of the Institute of Nuclear Studies from Sept. 1 to Sept. 22 at the University of Chicago, invitations were sent out before the scientists could be cleared.

Invitations went out to associates of Dr. Klaus Fuchs, convicted German-born British atomic spy, and of Dr. Frederic Joliot-Curie, member of the Communist party who was ousted as French high commissioner for atomic energy.

Many Oppose Secrecy

Security officials are concerned that the invitations went out before security clearance could be initiated to what the atomic energy commission said is a conference at which scientists "will try to pick each other's brains."

While the meeting is to be confined to "completely unclassified" material many of the attending scientists are strongly opposed to the secrecy regulations of the atomic energy commission and have made no secret of their position in scientific journals.

Justice and state department security officers said there is no way to keep the scientists from talking of the most rigidly classified matters among themselves.

Organized by Dr. Allison

The Institute of Nuclear Studies consists of a group of atomic scientists from the team of men who built the first atomic pile at the University of Chicago in 1945. It also includes scientists brought to the university to continue their

nuclear studies.

The September conference was organized by Dr. Samuel K. Allison, one of the team which set off the first self-maintaining nuclear reaction. The office of naval research agreed to finance the conference.

Under the complicated book-keeping system employed, an atomic energy commission spokesman said, the commission probably will put up some of the funds. The university is contributing facilities and some funds toward the conference, it was assumed here.

Fuchs' Associates Included

Allison advised the state department of the impending conference, and listed the foreign scientists he expected to invite. Before security officials could make any investigation, the invitations were sent out.

On the list are Dr. Egon

Bretscher and Dr. R. F. Peirls, atomic energy commission spokes-

man said.

Szilard, a Hungarian born scientist, who taught at the University of Berlin until Hitler came to power, has argued he is convinced that it is possible to set up atmospheric chain reaction as a result of atomic explosions.

Morrison was named by Sen. McCarthy [R., Wis.] as having a long record of affiliation with subversive organizations and as having hailed soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb as a boon to peace.

Morrison denied connection with subversive organizations and maintained his right "to write, speak, and act independently and publicly, whatever Sen. McCarthy

One Accused by McCarthy

Among American scientists who will attend the conference are Dr. Leo Szilard of the University of Chicago, Dr. Frederick Seitz of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, and Dr. Philip Morrison of Cornell. All are opposed to secrecy surrounding atomic research, an

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Mr. Pleske
Miss Gandy

Security Officers Concerned Over Atomic Meeting

By WALTER TROIAN

Federal security officers are disturbed over failure to erect security safeguards at an international meeting of atomic scientists in Chicago next month, which will be financed with federal funds.

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Security officials are concerned that the invitations went out, before security clearance could be initiated, to what the atomic energy commission said is a conference at which scientists "will try to pick each other's brains."

Built First Atomic Pile

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All on a kiloed the N.Y. paper

Among Those Invited

On the list are Dr. Egon Bretscher and Dr. R. F. Peirls, British scientists who were associated with Fuchs in Britain's atomic energy development. Fuchs passed on secrets he gathered, while working with atomic projects here, to Moscow.

Also on the invitation list is Dr. Lew Kowarski of France, who was associated with Joliot-Curie, the French Nobel prize winner physicist, who is a Communist.

While these men are assumed to have been cleared by their governments, security officials said there should have been opportunity for clearance by this government.

Among American scientists who will attend the conference are Dr. Leo Szilard of the University of Chicago, Dr. Frederick Seitz of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, and Dr. Philip Morrison of Cornell. All are opposed to secrecy surrounding atomic research, an atomic energy commission spokesman said.

Szilard, a Hungarian-born scientist who taught at the University of Berlin until Adolph Hitler came to power, has argued he is convinced that it is possible to set up atmospheric chain reaction as a result of atomic explosions.

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