

F. A. S. NEWSLETTER

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

June 7, 1950

1749 L Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

A-816

ATOMIC WEAPONS --

Citizens' Soul-searching. A significant conference on "The Atomic Era -- Can it Produce Peace and Abundance" took place in New York late in April under the sponsorship of The Nation Associates. The consensus of 27 speakers was that human society is faced with the momentous choice between total war with total destruction, or fundamental changes in international structure which will make war obsolete. All agreed that war was not inevitable, but that measures to prevent it must go beyond control of atomic weapons to the basic causes of the cold war itself.

Many speakers urged recognition of the revolutionary state of the world which has resulted from the unequal impact of scientific technology. They saw the tremendous upward movement in Asia, and the potential abundance offered by modern technology, as equal to atomic energy in their revolutionary effects. With a single exception, all looked to a strengthened UN as the only existing institution capable of resolving international differences. Many, however, favored a meeting of the Big Three -- after the Western World had developed a more realistic view of the needs of the world at large.

In the specific area of atomic control, there was general agreement that the Baruch Plan requires modification, that the ending of the monopoly on atomic weapons has created a changed atmosphere, and that as countries other than the U.S. and Russia engage in atomic enterprises, they will create an additional force for peace. Various speakers suggested: that the idea of international ownership of atomic resources and producing agencies should be abandoned; that comprehensive international inspection should be retained; that a convention should be adopted outlawing the use of atomic bombs, and declaring the first use of such weapons to be a war crime.

Two interim control schemes were suggested. One called for a stand-still agreement, coupled with UN inspection to insure execution, that all competition in atomic production should cease and existing bombs be put under UN seal for a specified time. Another proposed a 10-year agreement, automatically renewable at the end of the ninth year, under which the U.S. and USSR would surrender their stockpiles to an international authority, large-scale atomic operations would be forbidden, large-scale installations would be dismantled, and previously produced explosives accounted for. Such an interim agreement should come into effect quickly and as a whole.

Other proposals were made relating to the role of the UN, world organization, programs for Asia and Europe, and a settlement for Germany. The establishment was advocated of an international center to accelerate the peacetime development of atomic energy, with research financed by an international fund. Speakers at the conference included Harrison S. Brown, Hugh C. Wolfe, Edward U. Condon, Norbert Wiener, David Bradley, and Louis N. Ridenour. The proceedings of the conference are available as a supplement to the May 20 issue of The Nation, obtainable singly or in bulk from The Nation, 20 Vesey Street, New York 7, New York (single copy, 20 cents).

United Nations. Second among Trygve Lie's "Ten Points for Peace," which the UN Secretary-General discussed directly with the Big Four powers on his recent 5-week "pilgrimage of peace" is: "Resumption of East-West talks within the UN on prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and control of atomic energy."

Submarining Atomic Power. On May 10 Harry Truman, speaking from the observation platform of his special train in Pocatello, Idaho, assured his early morning audience that he had issued the order for the A-bomb release in 1945 and would do so again -- if he had to. On the same day, David Lilienthal, speaking in St.

WHICH WAY U.S.A. ?

Louis, voiced a fear that continued emphasis on military aspects of atomic energy at the expense of its wider applications will merely serve to make the AEC a "front for the Pentagon."

The following week, on the heels of its indefinite postponement of an experimental atomic power plant near Schenectady, the Atomic Energy Commission announced that General Electric will build an atomic engine for submarines paralleling a similar project by Westinghouse. The AEC publicity emphasized that research and development work already done on the intermediate power breeder reactor can be utilized for the naval reactors, and that they in turn will contribute data and experience to the development of future commercial power reactors. To cynics, the AEC peacetime reactor program appeared sunk.

Over-reliance on the A-Bomb? In a letter published by the N.Y. Times (Apr. 30) and Washington Post (May 5), 18 members of the faculties of Harvard and M.I.T. voiced apprehension for what appears to be the almost total reliance of our military planners on the use of the A-bomb and strategic bombing of the enemy as our first line of defense. The 3 main points of their argument are (1) atomic bombing will not act as a deterrent to localized or limited aggression, (2) it would leave our allies such as Britain extremely vulnerable to retaliation, and (3) if successfully executed, wholesale A-bombing of an enemy country would make post-war reconstruction extremely difficult if not virtually impossible. A Washington Post editorial commenting on the letter points out that the more American defense is built around strategic bombing, the more this strategy gains public acceptance and the more difficult it is to backtrack. The real danger lies in an increasing dependence on what may be an illusion of strength.

In a reply to the letter, former Secretary of War Robert Patterson asserts that the real value of an atomic stockpile and a Strategic Air Force lies in their deterrent value to Soviet aggression, and that if they are to serve this purpose, we must keep ahead of the Soviet Union on both counts.

Outlaw the Bomb? Petitions to outlaw the atomic bomb circulated by the French Partisans for Peace headed by Joliot-Curie, are reportedly attracting great support abroad. The Vienna radio on May 27 said 100,000 had signed such petitions there. The campaign, aimed at national legislatures, had its origin in a left-wing peace rally in Stockholm, which urged world-wide support for "absolute interdiction" of atomic weapons. According to the AP, a resolution was adopted which demanded rigorous international control to assure suppression of the bomb, and added: "We consider that the government first to use the bomb, no matter against what country, would be committing a crime against humanity and should be treated as a war criminal."

World Red Cross Appeals for A-Ban. The International Committee of the Red Cross has asked all signatories to the Geneva Convention on the rules of war to take "all steps to reach agreement on a prohibition of atomic weapons and, in a general way, of all non-directed missiles." Otherwise, the Committee's letter, made public May 2, said, "the foundations on which its mission is based will disappear," because "law, written or unwritten, is powerless when confronted with total destruction that the use of this arm implies." The World Red Cross in effect offered to act as a medium for bringing the powers together to reach an atomic truce. The preliminary response of the U.S. State Department was "only the Soviet Union stands in the way of agreement on this important matter. Any agreement which is based only on the good faith of the signatory nations is not better than the good faith of the individual nations concerned." An

(Continued on page 4, Column 1)

THE SECURITY FRONT

Security Legislation. Authority for summary dismissal would be given to the State and Commerce Departments in the omnibus appropriation bill passed by the House May 11. Military agencies already have this power under other acts. The authorization contained in the Rooney rider (Commerce) and the McCarran rider (State) had been deleted from the bill by a parliamentary maneuver (see May 3 Newsletter), but were re-inserted. The bill is now in the hands of the Senate Appropriation Committee. Unless it is acted on by June 30, all regular federal agencies will be without funds. The summary dismissal provisions, lumped into Sec. 1113 of H.R. 7786, have not attracted the protests from unions and citizen's groups they deserve. The FAS has opposed the Rooney rider because it constitutes an unwarranted blanket extension of security beyond specific projects and personnel requiring it.

Summary of Clearance Procedures, a mimeographed bulletin of the Scientists' Committee on Loyalty Problems, has been brought up-to-date and reissued. The bulletin includes details of government loyalty and security procedures, and general advice for individuals who may require it. Copies are available from SCLP, 14 Battle Road, Princeton, New Jersey.

Charges that Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer had attended a secret, closed Communist Party meeting are not being taken seriously by responsible persons. According to official government records, it was known that Steve Nelson, a Communist Party organizer, had visited the Oppenheims in 1941 to report on the circumstances of the death in action of Mrs. Oppenheimer's first husband while both he and Nelson were fighting on the side of the Spanish Loyalists in the 1930's. This social contact was known to Gen. Groves and the FBI before Dr. Oppenheimer was cleared for top-secret activities. Among the many defenders of Dr. Oppenheimer was Rep. Nixon (R. Calif.), a member of the House Un-American Activities Committee, who said he has "complete confidence" in the loyalty of Dr. Oppenheimer. Numerous editorials have deplored the smear attack, pointing to the harm being done to our national security by such tactics in discouraging scientists from working for the government.

Security Risks and Disloyalty. The long battle between the Regents and the faculty of the University of California over non-Communist oaths erupted again at a meeting of the Regents May 26. According to the San Francisco Chronicle, Regent John F. Neylan, who has spearheaded the drive for a stringent loyalty oath for the faculty, stated that he would seek dismissal of any faculty member who fails to sign the new contract form which requires the signer to take cognizance of the non-Communist policy of the University. He attacked Dean Joel Hildebrand of the College of Chemistry for employing in his department a man held to be a "bad security risk" by AEC security boards. The man in question, named publicly by Neylan, is a research assistant completing his degree this June. According to the Chronicle, records show no charge of Communism or disloyalty, only his wife's association with an alleged Communist and his writing of a letter in 1940 protesting the prosecution of two labor leaders for having bought phonograph records in the Washington Book Shop (later listed as subversive by the Attorney-General). The accused denied all charges saying, "I never was a Communist and never was disloyal. I believe the findings of the loyalty board were unjust. I still don't know who my accusers are. I have never had a chance to face them."

Professor Wendell M. Latimer, dean of Chemistry until this year, approved employment of the accused as a teaching assistant. He said, "The AEC has very strict rules about security risks, which naturally include guilt by association, but such associations do not mean a man is disloyal nor disqualify him for a job. (The accused) is an excellent student and ready to take a permanent job. He has all kinds of excellent recommendations, as a student and as an American. But this kind of thing -- who can tell what will happen?"

Atomic Secrecy. The protests against the gag imposed by the Atomic Energy Commission on public discussion of thermonuclear reactions have grown since the report ("Keep Your Trap Shut") in the last Newsletter. The American Civil Liberties Union, in a letter to the AEC, urged the Commission to relax its censorship rules so that the nation can obtain needed information

on the H-bomb. The May issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, in a widely quoted editorial, gives a particularly clear statement of the issues involved. It points out that scientists, because they are the best informed on these matters, have a responsibility in informing the public. Past experience indicates that they will not speak out lightly or irresponsibly. Dr. R. F. Bacher, in a speech at Long Beach, Calif., again emphasized the importance of keeping the public informed so that they can have an adequate understanding of our atomic policy.

As the month ended, it appeared that the AEC was reconsidering its policy. Commissioner Gordon Dean, in a speech delivered May 28 in Columbus, O., indicated it might be wise in the interest of national security to declassify certain scientific and technical information which the Russians must have possessed in order to achieve an atomic explosion. According to a syndicated article by Michael Amrine, published June 3, a major change in atomic secrecy policy is in the making as a result of conferences between officials of the AEC and their congressional "watchdog," the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Commission on National Security? On May 22, the Washington Post launched a campaign for the appointment of a Presidential commission on national security. In an editorial, "The Road Back to America," the Post said, "For weeks the Capital has been seized and convulsed by a terror. It is a terror akin to the evil atmosphere of the alien and sedition laws in John Adams' Administration. The rising distrust, the roaring bitterness, the ranging of Americans against Americans, the assault on freedom of inquiry, the intolerance of opposition -- all this malaise, it seems to this newspaper, has its roots in a deep and troubled state of the Nation's mind. Fear and frustration abound -- fear of the unseen struggle in which we are locked, and frustration because of our inability to get directly at it."

The Post went on to point out that we face unique dangers in the present crisis but asserted that the current hysteria is no answer to them. Rather it saw the methods of the extremist anti-Communists as "burning down the house of the American way of life in order to get at the rats in it." It quoted approvingly George Kennan's remark that "the atmosphere of public life in Washington does not have to deteriorate much further to produce a situation in which very few of our more quiet and sensitive and gifted people will be able to continue in government."

With these things in mind, the Post urged the creation of a commission on national security "to survey the major aspects of national security -- the internal menace of the fifth column, civilian defense, development of new weapons, the size and use of military expenditures, economic restoration of our friends and allies." It envisioned this commission as "unpartisan" and consisting of individuals in whom the public has the highest confidence. "It would catalyze the decencies of America. In the light of full and trusted information -- which proper composition of the commission would ensure -- new laws can be worked out by the Congress wherever necessary for our internal security."

The editorial and its suggestion evoked a good deal of discussion and reaction throughout the nation. By and large, comment was favorable, although interpretation varied depending upon the special bias of the commentator. The President saw little merit in the idea, remarking that there was no need for a supergovernment of any kind. The Post replied tartly that it has no intention of suggesting a supergovernment, that presidential commissions to deal with special problems are an old and respected mechanism in American constitutional processes.

The editorial re-crystallized a problem, a portion of which the FAS had sought to dramatize last summer when it proposed a Special Commission on Science and National Security. The effects on science and scientists of the hysteria to which the Post calls attention have, of course, been of steady concern to the FAS for three years. The Condon episode, numerous unwarranted loyalty and clearance difficulties experienced by scientists, the O'Mahoney rider on AEC fellowships, the recent Smith amendment to NSF legislation -- all these bear testimony to the general problem the Post now high-lights. Relevant, too, is the Federation proposal to establish a special commission on the effects, both foreign and domestic, of the H-bomb and the Soviet achievement of an atomic explosion.

As the tempo of attack by the "primitives" and rabble-rousers quickens, there are signs that the more reasonable elements of the population are becoming aroused. But the voice of reason will have to be raised oftener and more loudly if we are not all to be swept to destruction by the witch's broom of fear.

REVIEWS - -

SCIENCE IS A SACRED COW, by Anthony Standen; E. P. Dutton and Company, 221 pp; \$2.75.

It appears from the glowing reviews exhibited on the back cover of this book that intelligent criticism of the actions and statements of certain scientists is badly needed. Unfortunately Mr. Standen's understanding of science, scientists, and scientific method is inadequate to provide this. His avowed purpose is to expose the sophistry in science resulting from the attempts of certain individuals to over-extend the scientific method into realms where it does not belong. In fulfilling his mission, Mr. Standen engages in some sophistry of his own. Writing at the intellectual level of the New York Daily News, which devoted some of its limited editorial space to a thumping endorsement of this book, Mr. Standen attempts to rationalize the philosophy of the National Patent Council in much the same way that Soviet writers have tried to rationalize the Marxist philosophy of science.

The real value of studying science, in Mr. Standen's opinion, lies not in the thinking habits which it implants in the minds of its students, but in the basic knowledge provided on the operation of television sets and dishwashers. He attacks the science educators -- "the hucksters of science" -- for claiming that their survey courses help the student to a better understanding of the scientific method and man's relation to his physical environment. There is certainly much that can be done to improve the teaching of elementary science, but the shallow, confused, and rambling discussion in this book will contribute very little to this end.

Another point which Mr. Standen makes is that all scientists do not have equal intelligence, especially in these days of mass education when large numbers of mediocrities are turned out by our universities. Having made his point, however, he goes on condemning Science and Scientists indiscriminately. Yet it is apparent from his criticism that he has never read (or at least understood) the real thinkers of science and that his whole argument, except for brief recourse to the Greek philosophers, is founded on the usual rehashed ideas of the popularizers of science.

In order to expand these few notions into a full-sized book, Mr. Standen insists on taking his readers through the entire range of the sciences (all four of them) in a worm's-eye view which should rank with the worst of the popular expositions that he detests so much. Physics gets a pat on the head as the only field of science at all worthy of the name. After straightening out a few points about the wave theory of light and quantum mechanics, the author proceeds to take a few good pokes at biology and psychology. Biology is just a mass of undigested facts with a few generalizations like the Theory of Evolution. The insidious campaign of biologists to include man in the animal kingdom and treat him as such, damns them in the eyes of the author. Psychology or the study of the soul gets a brief treatment in a somewhat similar vein.

The real sneers, however, have been saved for the social scientists: Here for the first time, he accuses scientists of trying to take over and run things. All of his vituperation and innuendo are concentrated on the people who he claims have been trying to put "should" and "ought" into science.

In a somewhat incongruous penultimate chapter, the author recommends the study of mathematics for its own sake and for a fuller appreciation of the real truth.

The alarming fact about this book is not that it is so bad, but that so many lay reviewers think that it is so good. This is perhaps the most telling argument in favor of Mr. Standen's thesis that our scientific educators are failing in their job. I do not believe as do most of the reviewers that Mr. Standen is either funny or brilliantly amusing. He is earnest and deadly serious.

- - W. J. Horvath

MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT, edited by Eugene Rabinowitch; published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 128 pp; \$1.00.

In "Minutes to Midnight" Professor Rabinowitch has put together an intelligently edited and very readable account of the attempts to bring about international control of atomic energy. Here we find the significant parts of the speeches, reports, and public pronouncements which comprise the outward manifestations of the struggle to achieve international control. The whole story is presented competently and honestly in terms of the information available, without trying to be cutely omniscient about behind-the-scenes maneuvering.

The outline of the book is largely chronological, starting with the Szilard and the Franck reports, and the Stimson Memoirs. It presents the Acheson-Lilienthal report in considerable detail,

together with other plans which came out at the same time, and then discusses the fate of these ideas in the UN. The book concludes with some of the alternative plans which have been suggested and which have had much less concentrated attention.

From the account of the pulling and hauling in the UN debates, this reviewer gained a refreshed perspective on the positions taken by the opposing sides. One impression that grows is that the USSR seemed to have certain valid arguments against the majority plan, which they did not adequately exploit. Thus the Russians should reasonably look with suspicion on a very powerful international control commission, from which their only appeal would be to the Security Council where they -- without veto -- would certainly be in the minority. Not to do this would require a confidence in the objectivity and integrity of the other members of the Council which the Russians can hardly be expected to have. Now the Russians might well have developed this point with telling force. Instead, they plodded ponderously from one non-sequitur to another, succeeding ultimately in stopping debate by a roadblock of unreason. If it was their original purpose to prevent any kind of agreement, then they accomplished their purpose in such a manner as to produce the greatest harm, probably to themselves, and certainly to the UN of which they are a part. On the other hand if they had any desire for atomic security, their behavior can only be described as colossally stupid. In trying to reason with the Russian delegates, the members of the UNAEC must have had the same feeling of frustration as that of a man trying to explain nuclear physics to his mother-in-law.

The evidence presented in this book well demonstrates that the international control of atomic energy could lead to peace only insofar as it set a pattern for other more fundamental agreements and cooperations. But this attempt has failed. The world is now desperately in need of bold fundamental ideas which would have a real appeal to the integrity in men and thus stimulate their enthusiasm and hope for creating a stable world.

In producing this book Prof. Rabinowitch has performed an important service in public information. Even for the person who can maintain card files and clippings, it is a real service to have the significant material brought together in one volume, competently annotated and edited. For the average reader, "Minutes to Midnight" is invaluable. - - W. M. Schwarz

ATOMIC ATTACK, published by the British Association of Scientific Workers, 15 Half Moon St., Picadilly, London W1, England, March 1950, 22 pp; one shilling.

This well-written pamphlet clearly and bluntly emphasizes that Britain would suffer more than the U.S. or Russia in an atomic war. In a foreword, Nobel Laureate P. M. S. Blackett asserts that adequate protection for Britain cannot be achieved: "The cost of the necessary passive defense measures, dispersal, underground factories, shelters, etc., is widely outside the economic possibilities of this economically hard-pressed country." The overall conclusion: ensure that the fatal Third World War does not take place.

The Federation of American Scientists consists of scientists and some interested laymen concerned with the impact of science on the modern world. The FAS Chairman is W. A. Higinbotham, of Brookhaven; the Vice-chairman, Hugh C. Wolfe, of Cooper Union. Policy, determined by the elected Council, is carried out by the Executive Committee and by the Secretariat, which prepares this occasional Newsletter and is otherwise appropriately active on the Washington scene. Applications for membership may be sent to the Washington Office. Non-member subscription to the FAS Newsletter is \$3.00 per year.

MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION (A-816)

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Present Position _____

Annual Dues for Members-at-Large:
Regular Member* \$5 & \$3; Supporting \$10; Patron \$25
*Regular members with more than \$2500 annual income pay \$5.

Red Cross (Continued from Page 1).

Associated Press dispatch on May 15 reported favorable comment on the Red Cross appeal by Izvestia, "in the Soviet Union there always will be support of any measure if it is really directed toward outlawing the atomic weapons."

Elder Statesman. An appeal to world powers to destroy their atomic bombs was drafted by Orlando of Italy and endorsed on May 27 by the heads of both branches of the legislature and other top Italian personalities of various political parties.

Pious but Pessimistic. In the apparent absence of official interest in new studies of the problems raised by the A- and H-bombs, the establishment of unofficial groups has been discussed in a number of circles. On June 3, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America announced the formation of a Commission of Christian Scholars to study the moral implications of area bombing and the military use of nuclear bombs and other weapons of mass destruction. The Commission, headed by Angus Dun, Protestant Episcopal Bishop, includes W. W. Waymack, former AEC commissioner, and Chester I. Barnard, a member of the original Acheson-Lilienthal commission and now president of the Rockefeller Foundation. The group begins its work in a somewhat pessimistic mood. Bishop Dun remarked that its assignment was one "in which failure is almost certain."

French Atomic Energy Workers. From the atomic energy center, located at Fort de Chatillon, comes an appeal addressed to "our colleagues in all nations," to throw their "influence behind all those who demand the banning of weapons of mass destruction." Signed unanimously by the workers at Chatillon, the message received by FAS May 9, continued, "It is our firm belief that the use of these weapons in a conflict could reduce neither its horror nor its duration, but on the contrary would lead to the annihilation of millions of human beings and of the material and cultural achievements of civilization."

Dr. Frederic Joliot-Curie, one of the world's leading nuclear physicists, was dismissed April 28 from his post as head of the French Atomic Energy Commission, and expelled from the French Institute of Scientific Research. Dr. Joliot-Curie, a member of the French Communist Party, had stated that the French Commission was concerned only with peacetime uses of atomic energy and that nothing of military importance would be divulged to the Soviet Union. He had also stated that "Communist scientists will never contribute a particle of their science to a war against the Soviet Union."

The officers of the American Association of Scientific Workers, in a telegram to Premier Bidault, protested the removal as a "severe loss to science," and expressed regret that the "nature of the French Atomic Energy Commission appears to have been altered in conformity with mounting international tensions."

Reaction in the U.S. press was generally favorable to the ouster. Abroad a considerable number of protests were registered.

National Science Foundation Act of 1950 was signed by the President on May 10 at Pocatello, Idaho. Calling the establishment of the NSF a "major landmark in the history of science in the U.S.," Mr. Truman said the fact that the world has not found post-war security underscores the need for the NSF. "The (NSF) will stimulate basic research and education in nearly every branch of science, and thereby add to the supply of knowledge which is indispensable to our continued growth, prosperity, and security." It is known that the President has received many suggestions for the 24-man, part-time National Science Board, and that these are being given careful consideration in the White House and Budget Bureau. The Director cannot be selected until the Board has been nominated, approved by the Senate, and has met at least once. Despite Drew Pearson, there are no rumors worth spreading regarding the possible appointments.

Science in the State Department. As we go to press, a long-awaited report appears in the form of the Department of State's "Science and Foreign Relations." With the unanimous approval of an Advisory Committee of the National Academy of Sciences, the Berkner Report, to encourage free, international scientific inquiry and exchange of information, recommends the establishment of a Science Office headed by a "front-rank scientist" and the appointment of scientific attaches in our diplomatic missions abroad. It further recommends greater governmental activity in the fields of both pure and applied science to counter the present pre-occupation with technology and relative neglect of basic inquiry. Pointing out the American tendency to underestimate the importance of foreign scientific progress, the report goes on to state that scientific progress in America requires that we have free access to and be fully aware of scientific thought everywhere, and that this access implies a two-way flow of information.

The report's value lies not so much in any specific recommendation as in its indication that there are important forces within the government (the report was approved by two high-ranking science policy committees in the State Department) that see a danger to American science and the national welfare in present misguided attempts to build scientific secrecy into a major bulwark of American security.

New AEC Commissioners are expected to be nominated momentarily. The terms of the present incumbents (Pike, acting chairman; Smyth, Dean, Murray, and one vacancy) expire on June 30, and the President's new appointees should by then have been confirmed by the Senate.

Lame Duck. Former AEC Commissioner Strauss has repeated in recent speeches that it would be disastrous for the U.S. to dispose of atomic bombs under any international agreement. He lists as "atomic fallacies" that: (1) U.S. disarmament will produce USSR disarmament; (2) the H-bomb would wipe humanity off the planet; (3) secrecy has driven the best scientific brains out of the atomic project and is hindering research progress; (4) public atomic energy information is insufficient.

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F. A. S. NEWSLETTER

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS
Jules Halpern, Chairman

1749 L Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C.
May 30, 1952 -- No. 52-5

DAMAGE FROM U.S. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS GROWS

PAULING APPLIES AGAIN FOR PASSPORT

Linus Pauling, internationally known theoretical chemist twice refused a passport in recent weeks (N. Y. Times, May 12), has reapplied to the State Department for sanction to attend a scientific meeting in England. In letters to the President and Secretary of State on May 16, Pauling reasserted his belief that "denial of a passport to me would do damage to the U.S." by alienating the opinion of his wide circle of acquaintances among distinguished British scientists. He cited, in confirmation, a letter to the London Times (May 5) from Sir Robert Robinson, past president of the Royal Society, expressing "surprise and consternation" at "the drastic action taken by the American authorities in this and several similar cases (e.g., that of Dr. E. B. Chain)."

CONTROVERSY HEIGHTENED

By making his difficulties public, Pauling revealed what has for some time been known privately -- that major scientific figures are being denied the right to foreign travel. He thus added new fuel to the controversy over recent restrictions on international travel under the McCarran Internal Security Act.

Pauling's new application is to spend about a month in England this summer to present an invited paper before the Faraday Society and for other "purely scientific purposes." In a second direct appeal to the President, Pauling expressed his conviction that "refusal of a passport to me...would constitute the unjustified interference by the Government not only with the freedom of a citizen, but also with the progress of science." He asked that "if my present request for a passport be denied I be provided with a statement of the reason for the action."

In an earlier statement, in which he announced the second refusal of his original request, Pauling said he was informed that the decision had been made "because of suspicion that I was a Communist, and because my anti-Communist statements have not been sufficiently strong." Asserting that he had never been a Communist, the Cal. Tech. chemist pointed out that in recent years, his work on the theory of resonance in chemistry was banned in the Soviet Union (see NL 52-3) and added, "The action of the State Department...represents a different way of interfering with the progress of science."

SCIENTISTS PROTEST

Calling Pauling "one of the most prominent and inventive scientists in this country," Professor Albert Einstein on May 21 wrote to Secretary Acheson that "to make it impossible for him by governmental action to travel abroad would -- according to my conviction -- be seriously detrimental to the interests and reputation of this country."

Thirteen members of the Florida State University chemistry faculty recently announced that they have
(Continued on Page 4, Column 1)

PSYCH MEETING MOVED TO CANADA

Latest refugee from the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Visa Division of the State Department is the American Psychological Association. Instead of inviting the International Congress of Psychology to meet with them in New York in 1954, the APA will journey to Montreal and join Canadian colleagues in playing host to the Congress. The avowed reason for the shift is to spare the expected 600 foreign scientists from the humiliating and paralyzing delays which they might meet in attempting to enter the US.

APA ATTACKS McCARRAN ACT

Commenting on the move, Fillmore H. Sanford, APA executive secretary, sharply attacked current US official attitudes as "visaphobia." "I think," Sanford said, that "what scientists object to most in the McCarran Law is the fact that it uses an axe in dealing with a problem that needs a razor-sharp approach. The law causes trouble to all foreign scientists who are invited to this country. In effect it prevents a visit from any scientist -- however brilliant his ideas -- who has ever had any connection for any reason with any group that now is 'suspicious.' Foreign scientists regard this indiscriminate procedure as both ludicrous and dangerous. American scientists see it as a threat to the healthy growth of American science and as a legalized attack upon freedom of communication."

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The Washington Post on May 5 and 20 added its editorial voice to the growing protest against US visa policies. Commenting (May 5) on the FAS Visa Committee report, the Post observed that "the harsh fact of the matter is that the US is getting to be, like Russia, a place where international meetings can no longer be held. Too many eminent men who belong at such meetings are excluded by the McCarran Act."

The newspaper went on to say that top State policy officials have "tried to temper the McCarran Act's rigidity with reason and to institute some semblance of expeditiousness into the handling of visa applications. But they appear to have been thoroughly frustrated by the indifference -- not to say the hostility -- of the Visa Division. The policy there seems to be to keep all applicants out by sheer neglect of their applications. Men who construe exclusion as the sole key to national security are unlikely to understand the importance of bringing the best available brains into the country to help with scientific research."

VISA STATISTICS

The magnitude of the visa problem created by the McCarran Act is indicated in testimony of the Chief of the Visa Division before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. H. J. L'Heureux reported that backlogged visa cases jumped from 651 in mid-1950 to 6,617 in mid-1951. By the end of 1951, the figure stood at 9,187.

FAS asks New BW Statement

Biological warfare, and the charge of its use by US forces in Korea, continues to be a major issue in the US-USSR propaganda war. Both within the Soviet Union and in left-wing publications throughout the world, the charge is being repeated by individuals high in political and military circles. The purported evidence is claimed to have been examined and endorsed by medical and scientific authorities, some trained at French, British, and American universities. To cap it off, the North Korean radio, on May 4, claimed that two captured American airmen had confessed to dropping BW bombs last January 13.

RENEWED US DENIALS Against this is the flat and vigorous denial by US authorities that BW has been used in Korea. On May 17, Defense Secretary Lovett said that anyone making this charge "lies in his teeth" and suggested that the Communist charges may be a prelude to their own use of BW. "The moment they get into that sort of thing," he said, "they open a vast area which the decent world has abstained from." The Secretary's position was seconded on May 22 by Gen. Ridgway.

FAS STATEMENT These renewed high-level denials came after the FAS Council, in a press release on May 5, had called for "a new and clearer statement on the extent and purposes of the US biological warfare program." The Council saw such a statement as necessary "to combat the effects of recent Soviet charges of use of BW weapons by UN forces in Korea." Approving the efforts of US representatives to obtain an impartial on-the-spot investigation, the Council nevertheless pointed out that the effectiveness of the Soviet charges in influencing world opinion is not "wholly dependent on their accuracy."

"The question raised in the world's mind is not so much whether we did use BW in Korea, but whether we are in fact prepared and willing to use it in the future," the Council said. "The question is given point by US official statements that we are developing BW weapons, and by recent reports that the Defense Department is seeking funds for expansion of its BW program, possibly including mass production of actual BW agents."

The Council urged that a new US statement, "as a minimum, emphasize that the US government is willing and anxious to conclude with other governments an agreement formally repudiating any use of biological warfare under arrangements ensuring that the repudiation will be effective."

Recognizing that full guarantees against the threat of BW are impossible except in the framework of more general political and disarmament agreements, the Council regarded its minimum recommendation as essential to remove "any doubt that, should war be forced upon them, the American people have no intention of introducing biological weapons into the world's already terrifying arsenal."

POSSIBLE U.S. POLICIES In discussion prior to approval of its statement, the Council weighed several conceivable US positions on BW:

- 1. Unilateral renunciation of BW, with cessation of all research.
- 2. Continued research for defensive purposes governed by a unilateral declaration that BW attacks would not be conducted under any conditions.
- 3. Continued research but with a unilateral declaration that BW attacks would never be conducted first by the US.
- 4. Continued research with no unilateral declaration on

BW use, but with intensified and well-publicized US efforts to achieve effective international agreement regulating BW.

RELEVANT FACTS AND OPINIONS In evaluating these alternatives, the Council considered the following facts and opinions offered by delegates:

1. Because of its nature, BW research is largely inseparable from public health research. The most effective defense against BW is a strong public health organization.

2. Research on defensive BW requires research on offensive BW, since counter-measures are frequently highly specific for each potential BW agent.

3. Large-scale production and stockpiling of BW agents does not appear necessary for either defensive use or research and hence is interpretable as preparation for BW attack or counter-attack.

4. Since it has not yet been used on any significant scale, the potential of BW as an actual weapon of war is assessable only with difficulty, particularly with the security now surrounding it. Its threat would appear to be greatest where public health conditions are poor, which means particularly in underdeveloped areas where the US-USSR propaganda battle is most intense.

5. The effects of BW are likely to simulate and intensify disease tendencies already existent in a population and hence charges of an attack are difficult to disprove.

6. Effective inspection and control of BW, if possible at all, would involve measures at least as demanding of international cooperation and good-will as those for atomic control. It is unlikely, therefore, that agreements giving mutual security against BW can be reached without general political easement and a framework of general disarmament.

7. Nonetheless, the moral and emotional components of BW are so large that our attitudes toward it can importantly influence not only the world's opinion of our objectives, but our objectives themselves.

MEMBERS' VIEWS SOUGHT With these considerations in mind, the Council adopted the minimum statement summarized above and directed that discussion by the membership be encouraged, with the hope that a more detailed and specific statement can be formulated at the Council meeting next fall. All members are asked to fill in and return to the FAS Office the questionnaire on page 3. Opinions in full are also solicited.

WHO KNOWS ? -- an Open Letter

Is the AEC program operated efficiently? Are our national resources and scientific manpower being utilized in the most advantageous way? Could private industry develop industrial atomic power faster?

Roland Sawyer asks such questions in "an open letter to atomic scientists," (Christian Science Monitor, May 8). Aware of security restrictions, Sawyer still decries the lack of constructive criticism from atomic scientists who are experts on these specialized matters. Their silence in the public press, says Sawyer, may be because they "do not realize the latitude that is open... or...don't know how to get their criticisms published."

There was hope for some answers from the series of public hearings the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy announced would begin on April 16. These hearings -- to star Dean, Bradley, Acheson, and "distinguished scientists" -- have been postponed indefinitely so far as is publicly known.

Meanwhile, the Monitor's questions are fair and should be answered. Does FAS accept the challenge?

Should FAS Seek Stronger UN ?

Should efforts to achieve a stronger United Nations be added to the program of FAS? This question was forcefully raised at the Washington Council meeting by John Toll of Princeton. After some debate, it was deferred to allow general discussion by the membership. Contributions on the subject are solicited and will be published in the Newsletter as space permits.

PRO -- Those who argued affirmatively said, in brief, that: (1) Effective international atomic control, disarmament, and a stronger UN are inseparable issues and all are stated or implied in basic FAS objectives. (2) The time is ripe for action, since US disarmament proposals are still in the formative stage and circumstances are forcing the US to expand and particularize its proposals. (3) Under the UN Charter, consideration of amendment of the Charter is automatically on the agenda in 1955 and preparatory work on US proposals for amendment should begin now. (4) Including support of the UN on the FAS program could recapture and enliven the interest of many FAS members.

CON -- Negative arguments were along two general lines: (1) FAS has earned and maintained its reputation by acting in areas where the opinion of scientists as a group are especially pertinent. Members specifically concerned with strengthening the UN can better work through organizations which are attacking the more general problem. (2) FAS should hesitate to endorse one particular solution, placing its emphasis on "openness" and "enforceable world law," regardless of the means.

ACT ON LEGISLATION ? Pending in Congress are 18 resolutions and bills favoring a stronger UN and 4 opposed. One of the first group, House Concurrent Resolution 64, drew generally favorable comment from Council delegates:

"Resolved, That it is the sense of the Congress that it should be a fundamental objective of the foreign policy of the US to support and strengthen the United Nations and to seek its development into an organization of such defined and limited powers as are essential to the enactment, interpretation, and enforcement of world law to prevent aggression and to maintain peace."

Extensive hearings on a similar resolution were held in the 81st Congress. Despite a very large list of sponsors and wide public support, the resolution never reached the House floor.

On the opposite side, hearings are now being held on Senate Joint Resolution 130, introduced by Bricker and 57 other Senators. It would initiate a constitutional amendment to declare treaties (such as the UN Charter and therefore its actions) secondary to US national and state laws, rather than coequal as at present.

"UP-DATE" AIMS OF FAS ? Another suggestion was to revise and "modernize" the preamble to the FAS Constitution. Incorporating specifically the objective of strengthening the UN would signalize opposition to the growing anti-international sentiment in the US and encourage the various organizations working for world order. Delegate David Hill, of Vanderbilt, proposed revision of FAS aims to place greater emphasis on: (1) "openness" as an essential principle on which progress toward world cooperation must be based, and (2) recognition of the logical development of our society in the direction of enforceable world law.

A-CONTROL -- New Look ?

The mounting international armaments race, unchecked by progress towards international control, spurred FAS (see NL 52-2) to urge appointment of a special commission to take a new look at control possibilities under present conditions. On April 28, Secretary Acheson announced the formation of a "panel of consultants to advise and assist...the Government in connection with the work of the UN Disarmament Commission."

The panel is composed of five prominent citizens: Vannevar Bush (Carnegie Institution of Washington), John Dickey (President, Dartmouth), Allen Dulles (Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency), Joseph E. Johnson (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and J. Robert Oppenheimer (Institute for Advanced Study). Full-time "secretary-field worker," according to the Alsop brothers (May 21), is McGeorge Bundy, young Harvard government professor and Stimson biographer.

In setting up the panel, State Department policy-makers, say the Alsops, "did not hope for important results, but thought a try had to be made for the look of the thing abroad." News that the meetings of the UN Disarmament Commission seem to have become an arena for propaganda only underscores the importance of the new panel. Its deliberations must be swift but deep, and its recommendations should go directly to policy-makers at the highest level. It should not be the purpose of the panel to merely give a new look to our diplomacy. A more difficult but essential task is finding an active and fruitful new approach that can dissolve the present stalemate.

Please Clip and Mail to FAS

This issue of the FAS Newsletter has been designed to be easier on the eyes -- with a sacrifice of about 25% of previous lineage. Since the NL represents an annual expenditure of some \$600 and much effort by volunteers, it should conform to members' desires. Your opinions on the NL, and on BW policies (p. 2), will greatly help in keeping FAS activities close to the wishes of its members. Returns will be summarized in the next NL. -- Ed.

- NL** ☐ The NL is a worthwhile FAS investment.
- ☐ The format of this issue is distinctly preferable to that of previous ones.
- ☐ The lineage lost in this issue should be made up by addition of another page increasing NL costs by about a third.
- [Indicate yes (+), no (-), no opinion (?).]
- BW** ☐ is the alternative on p. 2 which comes closest to what I believe should be the basis for US policy on biological warfare.
- [Insert alternative number or indicate no opinion (?) or belief that no further FAS action is desirable (0).]

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Annual membership dues: Regular - \$5 (with income below \$2500 per annum - \$3); Supporting - \$10; Patron - \$25. Non-member Newsletter subscription - \$2/annum. New Membership and introductory subscription to Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - \$7.50.

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Pauling (Continued from Page 1).

formed a Florida Committee on Science and Public Affairs to mobilize opinion in protest against State Department action in the Pauling case and similar ones "which have hindered the conduct of international scientific meetings held in this country recently."

STATE EXPLAINS

The State Department on May 24 issued a statement explaining its authority and procedures in granting passports. Reviewing legal decisions and precedent, it found basis for its powers in "the exercise of the Presidential authority to conduct foreign relations and as a matter of statutory law." It pointed to legislation (McCarran Act) and judicial decisions (in the case of the 11 Communist leaders) asserting that Communists are participants in a conspiracy which constitutes a "clear and present danger to the United States" and which is furthered through international travel. Therefore, since February 1951, the policy has been followed that "it would be inappropriate and inconsistent for the Department to issue a passport to a person if information in its files gave reason to believe (italics in original) that he is knowingly a member of a Communist organization or that his conduct is likely to be contrary to the best interests of the U.S."

The Department maintained that any applicant who is refused a passport is usually informed "in a general way" of the nature of the evidence and information against him and "has every right and is given every opportunity to request further consideration of his case and may present any evidence or information which he may wish to have considered." It asserted that the consultations which take place "between officers of the Passport Division and officers of other divisions of the Department and with the Foreign Service abroad, in effect, constitute in a given case a most fair and comprehensive board of review action."

McCARRAN ACT IMPLICATED

Recent testimony before the House Appropriations Committee made clear the close connection between the McCarran Act and recent passport policy. The Act makes unlawful issuance of passports to Communists or members of "Communist organizations." Compilation of a list of such organizations is entangled in court proceedings. Said Mrs. Ruth Shipley, Chief of State's Passport Division:

"So without the fundamental list [of members of Communist organizations], which would make our work much easier, we are endeavoring to carry out the spirit of

the act by applying the information which we have from the various intelligence agencies of the Government and our own records relating to Communists. We have done quite a good job of it. We have stopped a good deal of travel. There have been over 200-and-some-odd passports which were refused...We have handled 199 cases abroad, and we still have 251 cases active abroad where we are trying to eliminate the passports and bring the people home, because they are actively engaged in work against the interests of our Government."

PASSPORT CONTROL CHALLENGED

The arbitrary power to grant or deny passports has been challenged in a suit brought recently before the Federal District Court in Washington. The American Civil Liberties Union is sponsoring the case in behalf of Miss Anne Bauer (see NL 52-3), a naturalized citizen now living and working in France as a free-lance writer. Miss Bauer is asking for an injunction and a court declaration that the regulations under which the State Department acted (passport provisions of the McCarran Act) are unconstitutional.

Commenting on the Bauer case, the Washington Post said editorially on May 13, "The courts have already held unequivocally that administrative agencies may not take away a bail bondsman's license or an automobile driver's license, or even a license to sell beer, without a hearing. Certainly there ought to be a hearing in any case involving the revocation of a license to travel."

SCIENCE FOUNDATION NEWS

APPROPRIATIONS A recommendation for the 1952-53 NSF appropriation is expected from the Senate Appropriations Committee this week. The bill will then go to the full Senate and eventually to conference with the House -- which several months ago slashed the President's request from 15 to 3.5 million dollars.

APPOINTMENTS The terms of 8 members of NSF's first National Science Board expired May 10. The President has reappointed and the Senate has confirmed all 8 for full 6-year terms. The Board has 24 members, 8 terms expiring in each alternate year. Those reappointed are: Aberle, Barnes, Barnard (Chairman), Bronk (Executive Committee Chairman), Cori, Dollard, Loeb, and Potter.

F A S NEWSLETTER

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For Release: Sunday, February 24, 1963, A.M.

SCIENTISTS URGE U. S. TO ADOPT "NO FIRST STRIKE" NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The Federation of American Scientists today urged that the U. S. state clearly that it will not initiate a massive nuclear attack except in response to such an attack first launched at the U. S. or its allies by the Soviet Union.

Defense Secretary McNamara recently testified:

"We are approaching an era when it will become increasingly improbable that either side could destroy a sufficiently large portion of the other's strategic nuclear force, either by surprise or otherwise, to preclude a devastating retaliatory blow."

Taking note of McNamara's testimony, FAS pointed out that "a Western strategic strike in response to a Soviet non-nuclear provocation would be both inhuman and irrational," since "the Western Alliance has the resources necessary to protect these vital objectives by means of local or tactical forces."

* * * * *

FAS is a nationwide organization of 2500 scientists in all disciplines concerned with the impact of science on national and international affairs. Chairman--Freeman J. Dyson, Inst. Advanced Study; Vice-Chairman--Bernard T. Feld, M.I.T.; Secretary--W. A. Higinbotham, Brookhaven Nat'l Lab.; Treasurer--Jack Orloff, N.I.H.; L. C. Dunn, Columbia; Gary Felsenfeld, N.I.H.; John S. Toll, U. of Md.

FAS STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY

The Federation of American Scientists is opposed to the use or threat of use of strategic nuclear forces in massive attack on any country except in response to initiation of such an attack by that country. Such a "no first strike" policy has not been clearly accepted by the United States. We urge that it should be accepted, and that United States forces and military planning be made consistent with this policy.

Explanatory Text

The Federation of American Scientists has previously advocated that the United States should not employ nuclear weapons except in response to their use by others. We reaffirm the desirability of this "no first use" policy, believing it to be a military and political step that is very much in the interests of the United States and the Western Alliance. Until such a "no first use" policy is adopted, we urge that the United States should at least adopt an explicit "no first strike" policy.

A "no first use" policy means that under no circumstances would the United States be the first to employ nuclear weapons in any situation. Such a policy naturally assumes adequate non-nuclear forces to cope even with a major non-nuclear attack. A "no first strike" policy, on the other hand, means that the United States would never be the first to launch massive nuclear attack, but would retain the option of responding to a non-nuclear attack, either with tactical nuclear weapons or with

limited use of strategic weapons against targets not involving cities. A "no first strike" policy could be announced and implemented immediately, without waiting for any massive build-up of non-nuclear forces.

It is sometimes argued that if confronted by a sufficiently serious provocation other than strategic attack, such as a major non-nuclear assault on Western Europe, Western strategic forces could execute an attack against Soviet strategic forces that would be likely to disarm the Soviets sufficiently to protect the Western Allies against devastating retaliation. While no one in or out of the United States Government can have certain knowledge of the numbers, effectiveness, and manner of employment of Soviet weapons, it seems clear to us that this view is almost surely wrong in fact and dangerous in its consequences.

Even if Western forces are greatly superior to those of the Soviets, the West could not count on escaping devastating Soviet retaliation in response to a Western first strike. A very modest number of surviving Soviet weapons -- fired from submarines or otherwise -- would suffice to produce upwards of 100 million casualties in Western Europe and the United States. The improbability of escaping such Soviet retaliation for a nuclear strike has been emphasized by Secretary of Defense McNamara in his recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.

It is not necessary to argue that important political objectives, such as Berlin, would not justify such casualties. It is quite sufficient to point out that the Western Alliance has the resources necessary to protect these vital objectives

by means of local or tactical forces. The existence of an adequate local defense would probably be as effective, in discouraging the other side from attacking, as the threat of a massive strategic first strike. And the local response would have the enormous advantage that, even if the other side should start local attacks of the kind we are hoping to deter, we should still have a good chance of defending our objectives at a cost much lower than 100 million casualties. In this sense, a Western strategic strike in response to a Soviet non-nuclear provocation would be both inhuman and irrational.

A somewhat stronger argument in favor of retaining the option of a strategic first strike is that, however irrational such a strike may be, the threat of it discourages the other side from dangerous and provocative actions. Some have argued that Khrushchev himself used the threat of a first strike safely and effectively to discourage the allies of the United States from allowing further U-2 flights to be made from their territory. And it is argued that President Kennedy's successful handling of the recent Cuban crisis relied heavily on an implied threat of a United States first strike.

There are two answers to be made to this argument which refers to Cuba. First, as the President himself has emphasized, the successful outcome of his Cuban policy rested primarily on the fact that the United States possessed overwhelming superiority of non-nuclear force in the Caribbean area. The outcome would probably have been the same, with or without the additional threat of a nuclear first strike. Second, in so far as the Cuban settlement was a victory for the policy of first-strike

threats, it was a very dangerous victory. A policy of first-strike threats may succeed nine times out of ten, but the tenth time, when it fails, is a total disaster.

Though it is not wise to be dogmatic about the evolution of military technology, it seems to us highly unlikely that the basic technical character of the present situation can be made to change. Specifically, it seems most unlikely that the United States can of its own effort restore a situation in which Western strategic forces, when confronted with a non-nuclear aggression, could execute a disarming strike against Soviet forces at an expectable cost that would seem rational in comparison to alternative non-nuclear means to protect the objectives concerned. Furthermore, a major attempt to restore this kind of superiority would probably fail its object, but would exacerbate the arms race in highly dangerous ways, and might well increase the probability of war.

It does not appear that the Soviet Union has itself diverted to military procurement the resources that would be required for a serious attempt to achieve decisive strategic superiority, a fact that has probably been helpful in keeping the arms race from going to much higher levels. While we are convinced that under present circumstances the United States must maintain the ability to retaliate effectively to any likely scale of Soviet nuclear attack, we believe that the United States should restrain itself from procurement of strategic weapon systems beyond those needed for such deterrence.

We believe that the long-range security of both major nuclear powers requires large balanced reductions in the military

forces of both nations. Until such substantial disarmament can be achieved, it is vital that our military policies be so formulated as to minimize the danger of precipitating an all-out nuclear war, and to minimize the motivation of other states to acquire nuclear weapons.