

An Oral History of

SANFORD LAKOFF and STANLEY CHODOROW

On May 19, 1999

1 **CHODOROW:** —you might say, the memory of the founding chairs—so many of them as
2 exist—and often also talking to other early faculty—their first recruitment successes—about the
3 intellectual vision and the, you might say, the execution or implementation of that vision in the
4 first roughly ten years or so in the history of that department. The kinds of questions we ask are:
5 What was the state of the discipline from the point of view of the chair, who has a take on this,
6 at the time? And what was the chair in relation to conversations with other people who were
7 already here in other departments—you know, they were recruited by people; very often people
8 in biology or chemistry, even though they were in the social sciences or humanities—what was
9 their take on the discipline? And what was it that they were going to try to do in relation to that?
10 And then, as recruitments succeeded and failed in those first years, how did the vision play out?
11 Sometimes where major changes have taken place at the end of a period. An example of that is
12 philosophy. For example, they put together a very distinctive kind of department. When it fell
13 apart—because people started to leave—they couldn't be rebuilt because it turned out they had
14 pretty much gathered everybody who was doing that kind of work here, and they couldn't find
15 replacements. So, in that case it's important to talk about the end of the ten years as well, but in
16 your case, it may not be. That is, what's very interesting in your case— And as I said, I think
17 when we met I was on one of the committees, though they started trying to recruit a chair for
18 political science before I got here. As a junior person I went through a series of interviews with
19 various people, and so I know—and we've heard from other founders on the campus—that it
20 took a long time—starting in the mid-Sixties; in '66 or so, '67—

21 **LAKOFF:** That's right.

22 **CHODOROW:** —to find someone to build this department.

23 **LAKOFF:** Yeah.

24 **CHODOROW:** So something was going on in one of two places: either the discipline was
25 fine but the people who were here were uncomfortable with it in some way and couldn't find
26 comfort in some person; or the discipline was roiling and it was reflected in this long search. And
27 I'm not sure—

28 **LAKOFF:** Right. I think they're— Maybe that's a good point at which to start. But I must confess
29 that I start with very limited information about this early period.

30 **CHODOROW:** Right.

31 **LAKOFF:** But what I was told was that it was partly a difficulty in persuading the people who
32 were selected to come because of high real-estate prices, which—

33 **CHODOROW:** Even then! [laughs]

34 **LAKOFF:** —I know something about. Yeah. And in my case that was not a problem, because I
35 was in Toronto which had already gone through a real-estate boom. So, I was able, in effect, to
36 trade my house in Toronto for a house here. But many other people told me—or some other
37 people, at any rate—that they had been considered or had been offered the chair here, but had
38 been unable to do it on a practical sense. The other problem, which you didn't allude to—and for
39 all I know it may not have been important, but I was told it was important—was that the
40 department was a political football. That is, that Third College in particular was anxious to get
41 hold of it and to use it as an instrument, if you will, and the other faculty people were resisting
42 that. And in that clash, it became difficult to set the intellectual framework for the department.
43 Now, that's about all I know.

44 **CHODOROW:** That happened in— [It was] '68 or '69 when that might have started?

45 **LAKOFF:** It could well be. Let me get to the point I do know about, and that is the actual way I
46 became appointed. It was not a direct appointment. I did not apply for the job. I was not even
47 solicited for the job. What happened is that Martin Shapiro who was interviewed, solicited for the
48 job—and as Stan [Stanley A. Chodorow] knows, he is a specialist in constitutional law, Supreme
49 Court stuff—and was at Harvard [University] at the time. And he was interested partly because
50 he was a California boy and was always interested in coming back here. But also, because the
51 University [of California, San Diego] — Another two reasons: one was that the university was
52 prepared to make a double appointment, one for him and for his wife [Barbara Shapiro]. His wife
53 at the time was, I believe, provost or vice-chancellor of something at—

54 **CHODOROW:** Wheaton College?

55 **LAKOFF:** —Wheaton College, thank you, in Massachusetts.

56 **CHODOROW:** She may have carried the title of dean, but it was essentially head of faculty
57 and chief academic officer.

58 **LAKOFF:** You're right, I'm pretty sure it was dean. I've gotten confused because of western
59 titles. But she was dean, and she was unhappy being dean. They were split because Wheaton
60 was in Norton and he was in Cambridge and it was a mess. So, they were thinking seriously of
61 returning to California, and if it were a joint appointment it would be nice. And the university was
62 willing to make a joint appointment, putting her in the history department. And I might say,
63 parenthetically, that I think the university's willingness to ignore the nepotism business in many
64 cases was a good idea. It really helped us make appointments which we otherwise would not
65 have been able to make. One could mention any number of them. Anyhow, but Martin was
66 always of two minds, shall we say, about being a department chair. But when Paul [D.] Saltman
67 first interviewed, we said, "Look, we've been through a lot. We've been trying to get people and
68 they keep turning us down and we're frustrated. You have to promise me that if you should turn
69 this down you will help us get somebody else." And Martin said that's a fair deal, and he did.
70 And at that time, I was teaching at the University of Toronto. I knew Martin from the days we
71 had both been at Harvard, and we were good friends. And I was on leave in Washington
72 [District of Columbia] at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and I had finally decided I wanted to leave
73 Toronto. I had resisted all sorts of offers, wonderful offers, before that—this was in '73, '74—and
74 the reason was anti-Americanism. I was just getting fed up with it. It didn't affect me directly; I
75 had tenure and all of that. But the atmosphere was just annoying, and I felt, you know, enough
76 trouble with my Jewish identity and my American identity. I did not need anti-Americanism.
77 [laughs] So it just was beginning to bother me. And somebody wrote in the Canadian University
78 Teachers' Bulletin, "The only Americans who teach in Canada are those who can't get jobs in
79 the U.S." You know, that's the kind of lovely comment that was bound to make you feel
80 welcome, right? So, I was in Washington and I sort of put the word out that I might be interested
81 in moving if opportunities arose. I don't think I had mentioned that to Martin. But at any rate
82 Martin called me one day, and he said, "Look, I'm considering going to this new university in
83 San Diego. Would you be interested?" And I had heard about the place years and years before
84 from Seymour Harris when I was at Harvard. And Seymour Harris went through the— I
85 remember he was walking through the halls of Littauer Center, asking all of us wouldn't we be
86 interested in going to this new university? And we said, "Where?" And then he said, "La Jolla." I
87 said, "Where's that?" you know. And I was such an easterner, I don't think I had been to
88 California. I had no idea. And I had this vision of a place with a lot of palm trees and sunshine.

89 That was about it. And so, I put it out of my mind; the whole notion of, you know, going to some
90 unknown place to retire, etc. etc. I said, "Forget it." And so, it was ironic that Martin mentioned
91 this, and it suddenly began to click in my mind: "Oh, yeah," I said. "That place that Seymour
92 Harris went to, yeah." Well, the long and short of it was that Martin had said to me at some point
93 he said, "Why don't you come out and be interviewed?" And I think I was in San Francisco for
94 an AAAS [American Association for the Advancement of Science] meeting, so I went up. And
95 the reason they were interested in me, I think, is that A) that I had a Harvard background, that I
96 had been the head tutor in the government department so I had had some administrative
97 experience. But more than that, I was interested in science and government. And Herb [Herbert
98 F.] York talked to me. And, you know, I had written a book called *Science and the Nation* and
99 another one called *Knowledge and Power*. And they saw that that might make an interesting fit
100 because there was already a program called "Science, Technology and Public Affairs" that Herb
101 was involved with. And I said that that would suit me very well. Anyhow, after I returned back to
102 Washington Martin called me up and said, "What were your impressions?" I said, "Well, it looks
103 really quite interesting to me because it's ground zero; there's no department there. One could
104 really do good things there. It's a beautiful place, and it seems to me that the university has
105 good standards." And he said, "Well, I'll tell you what: if you agree to be chairman, I'll agree to
106 go because I don't want to be chairman.

107 **CHODOROW:** [laughs] That's how Martin—

108 **LAKOFF:** Well, that struck me as a very promising beginning, because Martin had more
109 prestige in the discipline than I did. He was very knowledgeable about who was who, and not
110 just his field but in others. And I thought that the two of us would create a very solid base for a
111 department. And then I had no qualms about becoming chairman because I had been good at it
112 as head tutor, and I'd been offered deanships and what-have-you. So— I turned them down
113 because I didn't want to die at a young age— [laughter] Sorry about that. But okay; I said, "I'm
114 willing to do that." So that worked out, and one has to credit Saltman with that. Now, why were
115 they interested in Martin Shapiro? That's something important to bear in mind. They were
116 interested in Martin because they thought that they were going to set up a program in law and
117 social sciences—law and society, I should say— And the idea was that in lieu of having a law
118 school or maybe to sort of prepare the grounds for a law school, it would be a good idea to set
119 up a program. Now, I don't know whose idea that was. It must have been in some sense a
120 faculty idea, because I doubt that Saltman and [William D.] McElroy would have composed that
121 idea themselves.

122 **CHODOROW:** It certainly had something to do with the fact that Harry [N.] Scheiber had
123 arrived.

124 **LAKOFF:** Correct.

125 **CHODOROW:** I was here doing Medieval history.

126 **LAKOFF:** Correct, correct.

127 **CHODOROW:** Mike [Michael E.] Parrish was working on Frankfurter, and Joe [Joseph R.]
128 Gusfield was a senior person who—

129 **LAKOFF:** That certainly would make sense. But I'm sure that they didn't do this on their own; it
130 must have somehow grown out of some consensus.

131 **CHODOROW:** Right.

132 **LAKOFF:** But at any rate, that was the idea. And indeed, within a few months we had two
133 appointments lined up of people who were going to do law and society with us. One was
134 Malcolm Feeley, and another was a guy whose name is escaping me who was at the [State
135 University of New York at] Buffalo law school [SUNY Buffalo Law School] edited a journal
136 [name?] in this area. And they were both excellent appointments, and we thought we would be
137 off and running doing this program. But then came [Governor] Jerry Brown and the budget was
138 cut. And the university thought, "Aha, steady state is going to be ten-thousand, sixteen-,
139 eighteen-, twenty-?" And this program was cancelled, in effect, the law and society program.
140 And we had to rescind the two appointments we made. Malcolm Feeley went to [University of
141 California, Berkeley] Bolt Hall Law School, where he resides even unto now, and the other guy I
142 think stayed at Buffalo. And it was all rather embarrassing and, to put it mildly, disconcerting
143 because we thought we were going to have a major program going in at least that area. So, so
144 much for nice, integral planning and coordination and all that. Do you want me to continue along
145 these lines?

146 **CHODOROW:** Please.

147 **LAKOFF:** Stop me if I go off track.

148 **CHODOROW:** We'll interject if necessary.

149 **LAKOFF:** Yeah. The other thing that Martin and I thought we would do—and I in particular—
150 was to try to develop a strength in public policy. My thinking was two-fold: one was that although
151 indeed the discipline was in disarray at the time, one of the interesting developments had been
152 this great, new surge of interest in public policy. Now, in the past that had been the preserve of
153 schools of public administration. And generally speaking, they were rather stodgy and
154 bureaucratic, almost as if they were mirroring what they studied. But in the '50s you began to
155 get interesting developments such as the Journal of Public Interest, such as the rise of the
156 Brookings Institution and various other think-tanks, including the Rand Center [The RAND
157 Corporation]. And I had had some connection with a number of them and I had been sort of
158 peripheral—at least in working in science policy, anyhow. So, it occurred to me that it would
159 make a lot of sense to move in that direction rather than take Berkeley head-on in the, you
160 know, "Political Science" proper, but to end-run it so to speak, by setting up a sum program in
161 public policy. Before I came here— Before I went to Toronto I spent a couple of years at the
162 State University of New York at Stonybrook, and there I was assistant to the president, I set up
163 the college system—John Toll became chancellor at [University of] Maryland [original five
164 campuses]

165 **CHODOROW:** Right.

166 **LAKOFF:** And I also had the idea of setting up a school of social policy. And I tried to get the
167 Rand Corporation to consider opening an eastern branch that would deal with civilian stuff, not
168 military stuff. And I tried to talk Amitai Etzioni into leaving Columbia [University] to come here for
169 it, and Nathan Glazer and a whole gang of people to try to get— And I was very close to Irving
170 Kristol, so the public— I was going to locate the public interest there. But none of that worked,
171 for various reasons. It was not that anybody thought it was a bad idea, but it just didn't quite jell.
172 And when I left Stonybrook the chancellor tried to keep me by offering to make me provost of
173 the social sciences. And he said, "That will give you the chance to build anything you want, like
174 this school." And I said, "Look, you'd have to make me dictator of the social sciences [Chodorow
175 laughs], because I don't have the people with whom I could get along. You see, this is a big
176 difference between UCSD and Stonybrook: Stonybrook started with a pre-existing faculty, some
177 of whom came from two-year schools and what-have-you—it was a mess that way—and so
178 whereas here you had from scratch. And you have very good standards of appointment; it made
179 a big difference. That was a digression. Anyhow, so the idea was to do something in social
180 policy. And I had in mind a guy who was at Brandeis [University] at the Heller School [The Heller
181 School for Social Policy and Management] and was one of my first students. He is a specialist in

182 gerontology: the social science of aging. He is now the Henry Lewis professor at Case Western
183 Medical School. And so I had proposed that appointment with Martin's blessing; Martin liked the
184 idea all very well. And I had in mind also working with SIO [Scripps Institute of Oceanography]
185 because I had met somebody who over at the Woodrow Wilson Center did maritime policy. And
186 there would have been a sort of a link to the medical school, a link to SIO, and then I had
187 another guy whom I had in mind who didn't have much of an academic background, but he was
188 interested in labor policy. He had been a legislative assistant in Congress. He now is a big
189 honcho with the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. But anyhow— And he, by the way, has been
190 very instrumental in a program in Boston that links the high schools to industry—you know, by
191 apprenticeship. Anyhow. And all three of these guys would have been excellent people, and I
192 proposed them. Well, I proposed one appointment: that was the [Robert H.] Binstock
193 appointment—the guy from—the gerontologist—and I was immediately ambushed. I mean,
194 slaughtered by the other people in the social sciences, because they said in terms of—and it
195 made sense, from their point of view—you don't do policy analysis before you establish a base
196 in basic research. That is just not done. And the economists were horrified. They said, "We do
197 not do warehouse economics here. That they may do in Chicago and elsewhere where they
198 have business administration. We don't get involved in that." The sociologists said, "You will
199 notice in our catalog it says 'We do not prepare people for careers in social work.'" In other
200 words, they were desperate to avoid the association with applied social science. They were just
201 nervous about their standing, about their esteem. Now, a place like Harvard could have a joint
202 center for urban studies or a Kennedy school. MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology]
203 could run a program, you know, in anything because nobody would question its stature in terms
204 of basic research. Here, the social scientists in particular were very nervous that they were
205 going to get a reputation for doing applied social science, and that would put them— You know,
206 hurt their prestige.

207 **WESTBROOK:** Was that the climate throughout SUNY at the time?

208 **LAKOFF:** At SUNY?

209 **CHODOROW:** No, we're talking about here.

210 **LAKOFF:** I'm talking about here.

211 **WESTBROOK:** Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't realize it was the center over here.

212 **LAKOFF:** Oh, no. Stonybrook had no position on these matters.

213 **WESTBROOK:** Oh, okay. Sorry. I just—

214 **LAKOFF:** Although there was some of that. I mean, for example, there was a sociologist at
215 SUNY who did, when I mentioned Nathan Glazer to him—Glazer at that time was writing for the
216 public interest: books on affirmative action, things like that—he said, "He's not a sociologist."
217 And I said, "Then you mean Daniel Bell is also not a sociologist?" "He's not a sociologist." For
218 Harvard, they were okay—both of them were appointed at Harvard—but at Stonybrook, no,
219 because they were not sociologists. When you run into that sort of thing, you know, it's bad
220 business. Here that wasn't the objection. It wasn't that these people were not thought to be
221 social scientists; it was that it was the business of a political science department to do what
222 sociology, economics, anthropology and so on were trying to do: establish a foundation in basic
223 research. And then if you want to fool around in applied stuff, go ahead. Well, this was a
224 considerable setback to me, in my thinking, but I had no choice but to accept it. And what's
225 more, I didn't fully disagree with it because of course I agreed that we had to do important things
226 in basic research. And so, at any rate, that really killed that whole— And by the way, at that time
227 Cliff [Clifford] Grobstein was around and lots of other people who were very keen on social
228 policy. And what we did was to build it into the science, technology and public affairs program.
229 That was going to be the area in which we would do some work, at least, in applied social
230 science, if you will. One of our appointments was John [M.] Mendeloff, who subsequently left.
231 And he worked on environmental policy and cost-benefit analysis as applied to that. And of
232 course, Grobstein was working on cloning and this, that and the other thing. You know, he was
233 doing stuff on science policy. So, there was some area, some peripheral stuff on that score. The
234 other thing I want to mention is I ran into trouble at SIO. I ran into the colossal ego of John
235 [Dove] Isaacs who, you know, wanted something to be done on the law of the sea and so on,
236 but was damned if it were something to be out of his control; if the appointments were to made
237 on the upper campus rather than there. So the opposition of SIO, the opposition of the
238 economics department, the sociology department, the anthropology department—everybody but
239 the medical school, which never got the chance to say anything. I think the medical school
240 would have been delighted, because the guy I was thinking of eventually was appointed at a
241 medical school and would have brought all kinds of money in, etc. etc. Anyhow, none of that
242 worked. So, then we were back to square one, which was the regular appointment strategy. And
243 you might well ask, did we start with the notion that of where the discipline was and how we
244 wanted to fit in with it? I would say yes and no. To give you a little background on the discipline:

245 what had happened was that in the '50s and '60s something called "the behavioral revolution"
246 took place. And although some people had a fairly clear image of this, the truth is with even that
247 it was a bit eclectic. The basic idea was that these people were interested not just in empirical
248 research, because empirical research had been going on since Aristotle, but they were
249 interested in doing it in a more quantitative way. Something like cliometrics. And sometimes it
250 really wasn't empirical at all in the usual sense of the term. For example, it might involve game
251 theory or it might involve simulation. And it was very big at places like Yale [University] and
252 Stanford [University] and Northwestern [University]. Martin and I both came out of Harvard, and
253 Harvard was considered the best in the traditional approach to political science, meaning that it
254 was a collection of different things. You did political theory, which was really the history of
255 political thought. You did comparative politics, which really meant studying major European
256 powers. You did international relations which, far from being quantitative, was the sort of thing
257 that Henry Kissinger or McGeorge Bundy or Zbigniew Brzezinski were likely to do, which is, you
258 know, they study particular regions or diplomacy. They didn't really try to use mathematics at all.
259 The only place where mathematics did have a place at Harvard was in voting behavior—party
260 politics—and that spilled over into studies of Congress. They were already doing roll-call vote
261 analysis as well as voting behavior, and so it was sort of in its place. And only gradually were
262 they beginning to think maybe if a student wanted to substitute statistics for one of the
263 languages that was traditionally part, that could be considered because in a way it was a
264 language, right? You know, we debated endlessly about that. So, when I left Harvard in '64
265 there was beginning to be a little nervousness there that they were being left behind. That Yale
266 was taking the initiative, was the leader in the business, and Stanford was rising and MIT was
267 threatening. "Man, what the hell was going on," you know. "What do we need to do to catch up
268 with these bastards?" And Sam [Samuel P.] Huntington came back to Harvard from Columbia at
269 the time and he told me bluntly, he said, "Look, I like what Bob [Robert A.] Dahl and the others
270 are doing at Yale, and I think it ought to be done here." And he paid a certain price for that: you
271 may remember that Sam Huntington was denied admission to the National Academy of
272 Sciences, and the reason was they did not like his use of numbers. In a book he wrote about
273 South Africa that it had a .5 chance of escaping civil war or something like that, and .5 meant
274 "fifty-fifty." [laughs]

275 **CHODOROW:** Right.

276 **LAKOFF:** It was— And some mathematician really—who had it in for him for his politics, for his
277 ideology—went after him for the misuse of mathematics like that. But that was Huntington, who

278 really was not trained in that business and who was sort of a sympathizer rather than a doer.
279 However, there was a very strong influence on this behavioral business and it certainly did
280 affect the discipline. And when I ran into Gabriel Almond who, once at a meeting—when I was
281 building the department, he was at Stanford—he said snidely to me, he said, "What a pity a new
282 department should get going modeled after Harvard." [Mutual laughter] As though we needed
283 another Harvard. Well, the truth is that Martin and I did not have that in mind. And Martin was
284 very sympathetic to quantitative work that was going on. And we had decided that the only thing
285 we felt really sure about was that we needed to have a strong base in comparative politics. We
286 felt that if there was going to be a major development in the science of political science, it would
287 be because of the power of comparative study. And maybe, we thought, we could do some
288 things with political economy, the links between politics and economics. And part of the disarray
289 in the field was that there was no clear sense of what its margins were. There were some
290 people, like Seymour Lipset, who were political sociologists. There were others who were
291 political anthropologists. And then there were political economists: people who studied public
292 policy with respect to economics and so on. And many of us were linked to history, as I was,
293 studying political theory. So, the Harvard model, if you can call it that, was a very eclectic model
294 which was rooted in history, which was bleeding at the margins, which had some interest in
295 case studies. You know, you really couldn't easily characterize it. You could characterize the
296 behavioral model more or less by saying that everybody doing that stuff was interested in
297 empirical study using quantitative methodology. For example, what it meant is that not only did
298 you study voting behavior or Congressional roll-call, but like Glendon Schubert you looked at
299 Supreme Court decisions, and you tried to quantify them and even predict what the court was
300 likely to do in a particular case. When you studied international relations, like Dean Azinas [?] or
301 Bruce Russett, you quantify conflict situations and try to study international relations that way;
302 not in Henry Kissinger or realpolitik or realism style, or for that matter, Ken Wahl's, but rather in
303 a new way using these abstract models and numbers. And then you make simulations, you use
304 game theory and international relations, etc. So, everything that smacked of that sort of
305 approach could be considered behavioral. I ran into it at Northwestern [University]. One of the
306 places that offered me a job when I left Harvard in '64 was Northwestern, which was even more
307 extreme, more puritan, you might say, than Yale. And although they were interested in me to
308 teach political theory, because they had students who wanted to study it, they warned me: "We
309 are not running a zoo here; we don't have one of every kind." That was a nice way to put it.
310 You've either got to fit in and be willing to talk to a lot of people who work with computers and

311 the like or it won't work. And again, I really had no great objection to that. But I do remember
312 how shocked I was when I met some guy who was working at one of these primitive computers-

313 **CHODOROW:** With cards?

314 **LAKOFF:** —Yeah—and he was working on something to do with school politics. And I asked
315 him “What hypothesis have you got or what conclusions are you coming to?” And he looked at
316 me and he smiled benignly and said, “Oh, I've got some wonderful data.” And that was all he
317 said. He was just, you know, collecting data. And it bothered me that these guys were just
318 absorbed in the technique rather than in studying the substance of the stuff.

319 **CHODOROW:** I will tell you, by the way, that history in that period—there were similar moves
320 but not as wide-spread. But one department that I was interviewed in was at Pittsburgh
321 [University of Pittsburgh?], and it regarded itself as “pure” econometrics—I mean cliometrics.
322 And the only history that counted— “What counted best, counted most” as far as they were
323 concerned.

324 **LAKOFF:** Well, this is of course the time when [Edwin] Fogelman [?] and [*inaudible*] were doing
325 [*inaudible*], and there was this great feeling that the whole discipline was going to be
326 transformed. And something like that was happening in political science. But as I say, Martin
327 and I were not closed to it by any means but we were not part of the behavioral revolution, and
328 therefore we were not determined to do that. And we were also leery of sectarianism. We knew
329 that if you had too many people of one disposition they were likely to replicate themselves and
330 only themselves, and that would be bad. So, we finally decided that what we would do would be
331 to think in terms of I.Q. If guys were very smart, we had enough opportunity to bring them in and
332 work with them to develop programs. The other thing we decided on is what we called the
333 “senior strategy”: We were relatively senior and we thought the best thing to do would be to get
334 other people like us first, and then it would be easy to attract the junior people because they
335 wouldn't run such a big risk of coming to an unestablished department. A good idea in theory,
336 very difficult to pull off. What we found was we were getting people who were sort of
337 superannuated who thought, “Oh, it might be nice to retire in California.” I will mention a couple
338 of names—I hope this doesn't get into print.

339 **CHODOROW:** Oh. Well, it will be on the tape in the library.

340 **LAKOFF:** I don't mind it being on tape in the library, but I think it would be embarrassing if it got
341 into print. Can that be restricted? Okay. David Apter was at Yale, and he was a well-established
342 political scientist, and he was one of those who we considered. Later on, when we hired some
343 junior people and they heard that we were thinking of Apter they said, "Oh, no. He stopped
344 thinking years ago." It would have been a terrible appointment. Then there was Joe [Joseph]
345 LaPalombara, whom I still think is very good—had worked on Italy and did various things. But
346 Joe had recently been remarried and he thought, "Gee, it would be nice to come to California."
347 And that was the real reason that they were interested. And we wasted a lot of money and a lot
348 of time courting these people, and for one reason or another they were reluctant: housing
349 prices, their children were in school, all kinds of reasons. Why leave Yale, you know, to come to
350 an unknown place like this? We had one really weird experience: Walter Murphy at Princeton; a
351 wonderful guy, very well respected. I get a call one day from— Oh, I don't know who it is—I
352 can't think of his name offhand—but he works in the presidency at Princeton—Fred Greenstein.

353 So, Fred calls and says, "It dismays me to have to tell you this but I think you should know,
354 Walter Murphy is ready to leave Princeton." And I said, "Really?" I said, "I find that hard to
355 believe. But look, of course we'd love to have him." So immediately we flew him out, and finally
356 he concluded— I said, "Why do you want to leave Princeton?" He said, "Because I am
357 indispensable there and I cannot get anything done. I am on every Goddamn committee—they
358 can't run the place without me." I said, "Well, that's a strange reason, but all right." Finally, he
359 decided, he said, "I'm in a velvet trap." Because the housing situation was that he had land from
360 Princeton and the house, you know, the equity was not there, and he couldn't trade it up to a
361 house in La Jolla. That was the reason he gave; maybe there were others. So, we kept getting
362 frustrated. The worst example of this was when we tried to get Aristide Zolberg from
363 [University of] Chicago. We worked out a joint appointment, which was very hard. His wife [Vera
364 Zolberg] was not quite up to Ary's standards, but sociology, I think, was willing to make the
365 appointment. And we actually offered it, he had accepted, and then he changed his mind. Ooh,
366 was that embarrassing and difficult for us. You know, at first it looked as though "Ah, we were
367 getting somebody from the University of Chicago." He was a good guy, he would fulfill the senior
368 strategy, but it blew up in our faces.

369 **CHODOROW:** Right.

370 **WESTBROOK:** Did you know why?

371 **LAKOFF:** No, I really don't. He eventually wound up going to the New School [New School for
372 Social Research] in New York. I just have a feeling that they were reluctant to come to the west
373 coast.

374 **WESTBROOK:** But they left Chicago, right?

375 **LAKOFF:** They left Chicago eventually a few years later. But it was just, you know— What we
376 kept finding was that when people were older and well-established, unless they were ready to
377 retire it was very difficult for them to pull up roots. And so, the senior strategy, as I say, didn't
378 work. Meanwhile, we kept finding that the market for younger people was excellent. And in
379 particular, if we were careful about it we could get people—especially in that intermediate phase
380 where an assistant professor is bucking for an associate—who were not unknown quantities,
381 who had published, etc. And we made some beautiful appointments as a result. One was Gary
382 [C.] Jacobson, who was underplaced. He was at Trinity College.

383 **CHODOROW:** In Hartford [Connecticut]?

384 **LAKOFF:** Yes. And, you know, Martin had known him up at Stanford—

385 **CHODOROW:** He had done his degree on the west coast.

386 **LAKOFF:** That's right. And he was a rising star in American politics. American politics is sort of
387 the bread-and-butter area of the discipline, and we felt we would certainly be able to handle, use
388 somebody there. And then along came Sam [Samuel H.] Kernell, and that was— Sam was at
389 [University of] Minnesota but we liked his work very much; it wasn't quite as broad-based as
390 Gary's but it was more— You know, we called him "the jeweler", because he did little pieces of
391 things but he was good. And he had to come on an acting associate because the CAP
392 [Committee of Academic Personnel] or whoever it was wasn't altogether certain of it yet. We
393 were confident in him and he was willing to come on that basis. I might say that eventually when
394 we got a letter once from Dick [Richard] Fenno at [University of] Rochester—I guess it was in
395 connection with a promotion for one of those two—he said, "You have the best one-two punch
396 in American politics in the country in Jacobson and Kernell." And that began to get us some
397 notice. The people at [University of California,] Berkeley were slightly envious at that point that
398 we were getting— "Where the hell did we find these guys? Where—?" You know, etc. And then
399 we— Berkeley helped us; they recommended, I think it was, Peter [F.] Cowhey first as someone
400 we might look at. And we thought he was a cock-eyed genius, even if he was difficult to read.

401 And he brought along David [D.] Laitin, who had just gotten his Ph.D. And the people at
402 Berkeley said, "Look, David Laitin is very hard to characterize; he won't fit into a slot. You don't
403 need a Somalia expert, but don't think of him that way. He's brilliant." And we said, you know,
404 that fits the profile. We just want high-I.Q. people, let's not worry about whether we need an
405 Africanist or what-have-you at this point. We had not committed ourselves, mind you, to what
406 Harvard had done, mainly to build up all of the areas of the discipline. We just weren't sure what
407 to do at this point, with one exception: we wanted comparative politics. We were hoping to get
408 some interesting political [*inaudible*]. So those appointments were very important to us. You
409 know, people like that, because we had young people assuming the responsibilities of older
410 people. They were not treated as, you know, they would have been at Harvard or elsewhere—
411 as "water boys". But they were given adult responsibilities. Cowhey and Laitin were given some
412 extra money to take some time off and develop two of our basic courses: Political Science 11 &
413 12, Comparative and International. Did a wonderful job at it. But more important was their role in
414 recruitment, because they warned us off of older people who were sort of past their peak and
415 helped spot younger people who they thought were very good. And they had good judgment.
416 The next big development for us, I think, was the appointment of Arend Lijphart. Now, you
417 probably don't know who he is, but Arend Lijphart was just done being president of the
418 American Political Science Association—first time any member of our department got that
419 honor. It is a high honor. He also has won the Skytte [Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science
420 prize, which comes with fifty-thousand bucks and is the closest equivalent to a Nobel prize in
421 political science given by the Swedes, I think. And when we appointed him and he had— He
422 wanted to leave [University of] Leiden. He had been at Berkeley and he had gotten his Ph.D. at
423 Yale, but then he went back to Holland where he was born and had grown up, gone to school at
424 Leiden. But Leiden was very politicized, so he wanted out. He got no fewer than thirteen offers
425 from American universities. Anybody would have been happy to have him. To this day I don't
426 know quite how we managed it, but we persuaded him to come here. It was a major turning
427 point in the history of the department, because people who knew what was what realized that he
428 had had all those opportunities and had chosen us. I got a letter from Austin Ranney, who was
429 then at the University of Wisconsin, [Madison], saying, "Congratulations. You've done your
430 work. Your department is now set up." Because he had turned down Wisconsin to come here,
431 and Austin, who was a big figure in the discipline as a whole. So, in short, even though one
432 thinks of Arend now as a senior figure, in those days he was just barely a full-professor. You
433 know, it wouldn't have been the senior strategy kind of appointment, but it was a spectacular
434 one and it proved to the other universities that we were to be taken seriously. I forgot one thing

435 that happened; this is worth noting. And that is, it took me a little while to get here. I was
436 appointed in '74 but my friend and the chairman of the department at Toronto said, "You have to
437 come back here because you've had a leave—

438 **CHODOROW:** Oh yes, one of those rules?

439 **LAKOFF:** —and you have to spend at least the first half of the year here." And since he was an
440 old friend and all that, I couldn't turn him down. So, Martin became acting chair while I was in
441 Toronto. And the first thing, we had to advertise for positions. So, we got, oh, a thousand
442 applications for every position we advertised—literally a thousand. They were swamping the
443 place; nobody could handle them. You know, it was just Martin. So finally, he decided he knew
444 how to deal with this: he would write all of them a letter that would say, "Look, we are very likely
445 not going to make an appointment with anybody who didn't go to Harvard, Berkeley, Stanford—"
446 one of the leading universities. "If you're not in that position, chances are we're not going to be
447 able to take your candidacy seriously."

448 **CHODOROW:** [whistles] That's Martin. [laughs]

449 **LAKOFF:** That's Martin. And there was hell to pay. Every chairman at Rutgers [University] and
450 [University of] Iowa and God knows what blasted us. And I was catching this flack. I said, "Look,
451 I didn't do this: Martin did it. Go blame him." Well, you know, to give Martin credit it had the
452 desired effect: it cut down in a lot of paperwork. And once again, although people were angry at
453 us they knew we were serious. We were not to be trifled with. Some of it turned out to have a
454 good affect. I ate a lot of crow at various—Iowa and Rutgers cocktail parties and so forth. The
455 other problem we had was that there were three junior people already in existence at the
456 university. One was Mario Barrera, who worked on Chicano politics, and another was—

457 **CHODOROW:** They had come earlier through Third College?

458 **LAKOFF:** Yes. I don't know how they got here, but they were given appointments in political
459 science. The other was Dennis Pirages. And then there was Paul [G.] Pickowicz whose then
460 wife, I think, Kay Johnson—

461 **CHODOROW:** That's correct.

462 **LAKOFF:** They were not, you know—how shall I say?—altogether unqualified. They were
463 plausible people who, however, were very committed ideologically—all three of them. I mean,

464 Kay Johnson was desperate, desperately in tears over the failure of the Cultural Revolution in
465 China. And the thought of having term papers in any of her courses struck her as elitist. Mario
466 Barrera was interested in honing and promoting Chicano awareness and Chicano politics. And I
467 might say, parenthetically, this is worth noting for the historical record: In 1974, I was at the
468 Woodrow Wilson Center and I knew I was coming here, so I thought I should educate myself a
469 little about, you know, U.S-Mexican problems—border problems. Luckily for me, Carlos Fuentes
470 was also at the Woodrow Wilson Center, so I said, "Please, explain to me what I need to know."
471 And he said, "Okay. The first thing you need to know is that Baja, California, is not part of
472 Mexico—it's part of the United States. We regard it as the frontier. It's disgusting, it's American,
473 forget it." "And you don't worry about this as being—?" "No, no. It's all— It's yours." [Chodorow
474 laughs] And then he said, "The second thing I'll tell you is that they're going to give you a lot of
475 guff about Chicano—" "Xicano" is the way he put it to me. And he said, "They invited me to this
476 campus to talk to the students there." And he said, "The first thing I discovered is none of them
477 speak Spanish. Some Chicanos!" he said. "That's really a way to study your Mexican heritage."
478 [laughs] So, I mean, I came with that view— I tried to forget that. We had this "fronteras"
479 program—

480 **CHODOROW:** I will tell you, by the way, that Ramón Ruiz, who was here from about 1970,
481 regarded "Chicano" as a pejorative term which, in his youth and young adulthood, would never
482 be used. It was a terrible term. And it took him years and years, you know, to accept it.

483 **LAKOFF:** Right. And he eventually realized that it was important, and that's why he was a
484 proponent of the ethnic studies department—which I opposed later on. But I have great respect
485 for Ramón, as he knows. In any case, we had these three people. Pirages walked around with a
486 bandana around his head to show what side of the '60s barricades he was on. And I frankly felt
487 that they were an albatross on the department, and that we would be in real trouble if they were
488 given tenure. But I had no choice but to go through the procedures and have them considered
489 for tenure, because by university rules they were entitled to it. Eventually, I think, they did not
490 receive tenure. All three of them left, and rather bitter in two cases.

491 **CHODOROW:** Barrera went where?

492 **LAKOFF:** Barrera went to Berkeley—

493 **CHODOROW:** And he was very angry?

494 **LAKOFF:** He was very angry. And Pirages was bitter and tried to organize the students against
495 me and so on. But frankly— I mean— See, that was a bit of a handicap that the university put
496 on us because these people were not tenured, they had not been chosen with any agenda in
497 mind; they were just there. And as it happens, they all had a very ideological perspective on
498 things. You know, had we been a stronger department already, it's possible that I might have
499 looked with more favor on at least a couple of them. Not on Kay Johnson—I thought she was
500 worthless. But on Barrera, even though I disagreed with him, at least he had something
501 interesting going. And Pirages has done good work on more radical stuff. So, anyhow—

502 **WESTBROOK:** How were these three appointed?

503 **CHODOROW:** They were appointed in the Third College. There was a period when the Third
504 College revolution created a willingness on the part of the campus to appoint people without
505 departments. And there were several people who floated in programs of various kinds that
506 existed within Third College. And then when Paul [D. Saltman] came in as vice-chancellor, the
507 first thing— One of the first things he did was to say, "Every person who is appointed on this
508 campus must have a department. Must be in a department. Must be appointed by a department.
509 We'll never again appoint a person who is not—and there were a number. [Robi] Heifetz[?] was
510 another who was appointed without a department. He was in communication, but he had no
511 mentoring. There were no standards being set for him by senior people in a discipline.

512 **WESTBROOK:** What was the body that was conducting these searches? The provost?

513 **CHODOROW:** The provost and a faculty committee representing or acting on behalf of the
514 program. And there must have been eight or ten of those folks. So far as I know, none of them
515 survived—maybe one.

516 **WESTBROOK:** Was [Herbert I] Schiller appointed in a department?

517 **CHODOROW:** No. I think Schiller may have been the one that survived, but he was senior at the
518 time he got here. He was an established figure.

519 **LAKOFF:** Where we had some headaches, in our relations to Third College—for example, they
520 had a program of Urban and Rural Studies. I said, "What else is there besides urban and rural
521 studies"? And they got a Third World Studies Program and so on. They wanted us to work with
522 these programs. We really didn't have an awful lot of regard for them. There was a mutual
523 dislike. I remember Joe [Joseph] Watson saying to me, "Well, you know you can study African

524 politics as well as you can British and German.” And I said, “Well, anthropologists do that, but
525 there isn’t quite the same...

[END OF PART ONE, BEGIN PART TWO]

526 **LAKOFF:** Back to Third College, and we were very leery of getting tied in with them. That’s one
527 of the reasons why I think eventually we eventually worked a deal with [Earl]Warren College.
528 So, we could link with Warren college. Now of course that’s all over with. Now that it’s Thurgood
529 Marshall College, we have lots of positive relations with them. Nothing but the highest regard for
530 the provost, and so on, but at the time it was a very sensitive, in the early go. I want to get to
531 what was a major phase in our development after we made these early appointments, and we
532 were beginning to flesh things out. I mentioned one or two others. One was Sam [Samuel L]
533 Popkin. The Popkin appointment was made because we wanted to have somebody who worked
534 on quantitative stuff. And he did party politics, voting behavior. That was the case where there
535 was a dual appointment, and Susan [L. Shirk] was not by any means up to Sam’s level in terms
536 of her reputation, and I was warned against her by people at people at MIT [Massachusetts
537 Institute of Technology], who told me she was a flaming China radical. And, I wanted it to be
538 known that I overrode those objections, even though I had no sympathy with radicals at that
539 time. And I felt there was some promise in Susan’s work. I also want to make it known, for the
540 record, that Susan came to me and said that she had gotten interested in education and thought
541 she that she should continue that when she was in Texas. And I said, look you made a big
542 investment and study in China. China is a major country. I would not give it up in order to get
543 involved in education. If I were you, I would stick with the 'China-track', so to speak." And I hope
544 she remembers that; I don't think she does. But at any rate, I would claim some credit for the
545 fact that she did blossom as a China specialist. Sam Popkin was also a difficult case, because
546 he had writing problems. And we really had to work with him and on him to get his book *The*
547 *Rational Peasant: [The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam]* out. And it was really a
548 departmental project that succeeded. But again, we were warned that he might not be that
549 productive but we thought he would be a terrific person, a terrific teacher. And I think all in all,
550 we were more than vindicated by that appointment and the Shirk appointment. So, you've got
551 those two, and then came Peter Gourevitch. Peter Gourevitch was appointed— Again, we had
552 such a void in comparative politics; he worked on France. We felt we could afford to have
553 somebody. And he came with very good recommendations from Stanley Hoffmann and from
554 Henry [W.] Ehrmann, who was a visiting professor from Dartmouth [University] with us. So we

555 made that appointment. Oh, yes. One final appointment I want to mention, and that's Wayne [A.]
556 Cornelius. If I did nothing for this university other than that, I think I deserve some footnote
557 reference somewhere. [Chodorow laughs] Here's what happened: we felt we wanted to do
558 something—again, part of our comparative effort—on Latin America, and we began to feel that
559 we should make that perhaps the strong point of the comparative approach, given our location.
560 So, Sam Popkin mentioned Wayne to me because he had known him at MIT. I took a look at his
561 work, and I was crazy about it—his work on immigration. I thought it was marvelous. And then I
562 met the guy and I realized why everybody was so high on him: he's a dynamite bundle of
563 energy. Everybody says he invented the 28-hour day. [laughter] And so, you know, I was very
564 keen on having him. His wife [Ann L. Craig] had not yet finished her Ph.D. thesis. We tried to get
565 an appointment for both of them: couldn't do it. We got one for Wayne and then worked out
566 some deal whereby Ann would be involved with the fronteras program, the bicentennial project.
567 Paul [D.] Saltman was very helpful. He had phlebitis at the time and he was in the hospital. I
568 went to visit him, and he agreed to raise the ante a bit for Wayne. And then Wayne turned us
569 down, because MIT gave him instant tenure. He was not yet ready for tenure, but they
570 immediately gave him tenure. And meanwhile, she was still finishing her Ph.D.; they felt it was
571 not time to move. We did not make any other appointment in Latin American politics even
572 though we advertised for it. We were inundated with applications; we simply couldn't come up
573 with anybody who we felt was as good as Wayne. And thank God, we did not lower our sights.
574 We were tempted, we were bullied. Somebody from sociology called me up and said, "Look,
575 you've got a perfectly good guy there. Why don't you hire him?" I said, "Well, he's not as good
576 as Wayne Cornelius." "Well, who the hell do you think you are?" he said. "You're not [University
577 of California,] Berkeley, you're not MIT. This is a university who has to just go and take
578 advantage of its opportunities." [Chodorow laughs] I said, "Sorry. We're not going to do that.
579 You do it, not us." And then a year or two passed and we were getting desperate. We had
580 decided we would go to a junior level, get a new Ph.D., but it has to be as good as Wayne. So I
581 called up Wayne and I said, "Do you know anybody who is just coming out who might be, you
582 know who we could think of as a future Wayne Cornelius?" He took a deep breath and he said,
583 "You know"—he was living in Lexington [Massachusetts]—"the basement is flooded right now;
584 Ann has to commute to Clark University. If you were to revise the terms of your offer and restate
585 it, we might be interested." And he said that's all I'd have to hear. [mutual laughter] And I went to
586 Bill [William D.] McElroy and bless him for this. He said, "What do you need?"—Bill McElroy was
587 a wheeler-dealer—and I said, "I need a double-appointment. I need some money to give him a
588 head start, seed money, so that he could go out and get some more— A letterhead which would

589 say 'Program, U.S-Mexican Studies'. He wants to bring his secretary." He said, "You've got all of
590 those things. I'll give you \$30,000 out of the chancellor's discretionary fund." Dazzled.

591 **CHODOROW:** And \$30,000 was thirty-thousand dollars at that time. [laughs]

592 **LAKOFF:** Oh, yeah. Yeah. But he did something else. So I went back to Wayne, and Wayne
593 was very interested in all of this. And then what Bill McElroy did was to arrange for us to have
594 breakfast with Mr. [Theodore E.] Gildred —Ted Gildred . The Gildred family has interests in
595 Latin America, I think especially in Mexico. Some of the members of them live there. He has
596 been ambassador to Argentina— He was appointed ambassador of Argentina[1986-1989]. And
597 they [the Gildred Foundation] had given money for medical stuff, but never for anything in the
598 social sciences. So, I met with him, I showed him Wayne's [curriculum] vitae, and I explained
599 what we wanted to do. And lo and behold, he offered us I think it was \$300,000 on a matching
600 basis if Wayne could get that equivalent money from [the] [Andrew C.] Mellon [Foundation] or
601 whatever. And all this was because Bill McElroy had a good Stanford jock relationship with Ted
602 Gildred. And the next thing I knew, Ray [Raymond R] Ramseyer was really pissed at me
603 because he was the university [of California, San Diego]'s fund-raiser and he was deprived of
604 the commission on that deal. But it was the first money that ever came outside of the medical
605 business to UCSD, if I'm not mistaken. And boy, what that did. Wayne did indeed go and raise
606 the matching money and he started his program, the U.S-Mexican Studies program. When we
607 tried to upgrade it to a center for U.S.-Mexican studies we ran into turf protection on the part of
608 some unspeakable members of this faculty whose name I will not even mention, to whom I do
609 not speak to this day, who were so jealous of what it would do to their programs that they were
610 afraid to allow us to create a center where there was a program. Finally, we got the center
611 through over their objections.

612 **CHODOROW:** Were they involved with CILAS [Center for Iberian and Latin American
613 Studies]? Was it—?

614 **LAKOFF:** You might say that. I don't want to go that far because it would maybe identify who
615 these people were. I'm so livid about it I don't even want to mention them by name. But at any
616 rate, look at what happened: we had the program in U.S.-Mexican studies, Gildred then gave
617 four chairs to the university, which they were supposed to go one to political science, one to
618 history, one to sociology and economics. And I was even on the committee that was to give one
619 to—what was it to be?—the historians. We finally came up with somebody we really weren't that

620 enthusiastic about it, and Harold Ticho, to his great credit, turned it down and said, "You people
621 are not really that enthusiastic about him; he's not that good. We'll let the opportunity go." And
622 the economists said, "There's no economist who is a Latin Americanist who is any good. The
623 only economists who are good do micro- and macro-, and they do not—"

624 **CHODOROW:** Right, ceiling—

625 **LAKOFF:** So they passed on the chair; they couldn't find anybody. Berkeley found somebody,
626 mind you [laughs], who was very good—a Latin American economist—but our department
627 couldn't find anybody. Okay. Where did all four chairs wind up? In political science and two of
628 them went to the historians: the dean, Paul Drake, and Peter Smith. And—

629 **CHODOROW:** Both of them trained as historians.

630 **LAKOFF:** Yes.

631 **CHODOROW:** Most of their careers spent in that field?

632 **LAKOFF:** Yes, that's right. But, see, we're shameless: we will appoint historians. Anybody else
633 who is good, we'll appoint them. So the point is— Now and then what happened is that Gildred
634 gave us \$11,000,000 to set up the—what's it called?—the Latin American Studies Center. The
635 Center for the Americas [CILAS]. So in short, thanks to that one appointment, we—talk about
636 the domino effect—we got Wayne Cornelius, who set up the U.S.-Mexican Studies Program—
637 And by the way, what a brilliant program that has been. I mean, attracting fellows from the U.S.
638 and Mexico, putting the place on the map. The New York Times has often cited its work, its
639 books are advertised in foreign affairs and so on. [And] CILAS has been revived thanks to Peter
640 Smith, and Paul Drake before him. Far from being, you know, hurt by it, it was actually a benefit,
641 in fact. The four chairs were established. We are so strong now in Latin American studies and
642 political science that that's the only field where we can compete for graduate students with any
643 place, any other school, because they know we have the muscle—the intellectual muscle. And
644 notice, also, something about the various appointees that we've made. Peter Gourevitch was
645 the first dean of the graduate school of international relations and pacific studies [now School of
646 Global Policy and Strategy]. In effect, that school was made possible because we did a good job
647 setting up political science; we had a base on which you could build a graduate school and we
648 had a guy who could run it. The Latin Americanists all set up these wonderful programs and Ann
649 Craig, Wayne's wife, now provost of Roosevelt College. Susan Shirk became head of IGCC [

650 UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation] and is now deputy assistant secretary of state
651 [1997-2000]. I mean, it seems to me that generally speaking—I could mention one appointment
652 that was less successful—but when you consider what happened as a result of these early
653 appointments, we got an awful lot of mileage. I mean, the campus got a lot of mileage and the
654 department got a lot of mileage out of them. Okay. Let me stop on that individual track and now
655 get back to the issue you raised about the intellectual development of the discipline. We did a
656 study that was urged on us by Dick [Richard E.] Atiyeh when he was dean of the graduate
657 school [Dean of Graduate Studies and Research] to figure out what the future would hold for us.
658 And Dick was very conservative, and he thought we would have a maximum, I think, of fifteen
659 FTEs [full-time employees] at the time. We realized that there would be more, particularly if we
660 had joint appointments with the graduate school, etc. But if we counted even as much as, say,
661 twenty to twenty-five, it would mean we would be at best a middling size department. The
662 biggest department—I forget whether it was Berkeley or UCLA [University of California, Los
663 Angeles] or somebody—had something like sixty. The smallest was around fifteen. There you
664 were talking about MIT, and maybe [University of] Chicago was sort of in the middle.

665 **CHODOROW:** And I think Cornell [University] was around twenty-five—

666 **LAKOFF:** That's right. Cornell was right in that middle area. And we began to think, how can
667 we compete with these guys if we're that limited? Well, the first thing that occurred to us was
668 that we would have to underplay certain areas of the discipline. And we weren't sure which they
669 should be, because we had qualms about automatically excluding any area. What do you do
670 about Africa, let's say? Except for [David D.] Laitin, we have nobody dealing with Africa. We did
671 consider a guy who did some teaching for us and I liked very much, but the department couldn't
672 agree on him and he went to USC [University of Southern California]. And we were void pretty
673 much in Africa. In Soviet studies, which was at that time a major area, we again had nobody.
674 We thought seriously of making an appointment or two in that area, but again, we couldn't come
675 to terms. And for them it would have been awkward because there wasn't much reinforcement
676 in the university. No library compared to what went on in the east and Soviet studies. So, we
677 were void there. All we had was Ellen Comisso, who worked on Eastern Europe to some extent;
678 Yugoslavia and that sort of thing. What to do? Well, we finally said, "Look, we'll base our
679 comparative work on Lijphart, who does general comparative studies of democratic systems,
680 and on the Latin Americanists. When it comes to Africa, when it comes to the Soviet Union,
681 when it comes to the Middle East, we'll either go void altogether or maybe we'll pick up one
682 person here and there if we can. So that was pretty much how we resolved that issue.

683 American— We hadn't expected it to become such a strong point in the department, but with
684 [Gary C.] Jacobson and [Samuel H.] Kernell we knew we could attract others. So we decided to
685 allow that to expand. Jacobson, Kernell and [Samuel L.] Popkin, I should say. So that expanded
686 really dramatically with the appointment of [Mathew D.] McCubbins and [Gary W.] Cox to some
687 extent, and now [Elisabeth R.] Gerber and [Arthur] Lupia . We've now got a major department
688 with a very strong emphasis on the quantitative approach, especially— You know, these guys—
689 Gerber and Lupia —come from Caltech [California Institute of Technology] that's moving in that
690 direction. The comparativists who are not— I mean, there are some that have interest in
691 quantitative stuff in Lijphart's work, but it's not overwhelming. Political theory, we appointed
692 Tracy [B. Strong]. And you know, we wanted to make one or two appointments—I worked in
693 political theory—but we didn't— We decided not to make that a major focus, and I think given
694 the fact that Tracy runs the Journal of Political Theory, we've done about as good as we could in
695 that area without investing a lot of resources. And in international relations we were rather weak;
696 we had [Peter] Cowhey and not much else for a while until David [A.] Lake's appointment
697 recently. And now the journal *International Organization* is edited in the department by Lake and
698 Gourevitch. And with IRPS [School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, now the
699 School of Global Policy and Strategy (GPS)], of course, we now have some additional strength
700 both there and in the people in Asian Studies.

701 **CHODOROW:** Like Miles [Kahler] over there and—

702 **LAKOFF:** Right. And Miles fit the profile as far as political economy is concerned, as well. But
703 all of that came later. It's after my time. I don't want to claim credit for it. I'm merely saying that
704 we did some thinking about what the structure of the department should be. Now, by then—to
705 go back to the point I started with— the behavioral revolution had ended. And people said,
706 "Look, it's over. It's now incorporated into the discipline; there's no point struggling over it." And I
707 think that was wise and statesman-like and basically correct. Some areas remained pretty much
708 impervious to behavioralism. Others did indeed absorb some of it. Where do we stand now?
709 That's a much more complicated question, and I think it would be best to ask the people in the
710 department who have a better sense of where the department is moving. But I would say as far
711 as my initial effort is concerned that we were shaped by the other social science departments to
712 avoid the policy orientation to promote a basic research orientation. We followed not the senior
713 strategy that we started with, but a high-I.Q. strategy. It turned out that we played the market
714 and we played it very successfully in getting relatively younger people, people that are at the
715 beginning. Not altogether unknown, but at the beginning of major careers. And the result is that

716 we acquired a very good reputation around the country. And even as, say, ten years ago we
717 when we opened the graduate program, we began to get excellent applicants, even though our
718 rate of acceptance might not have been as high as it would be at Harvard [University] and so
719 on. We were getting the same sorts of people. And in some areas, like Latin America, we were
720 considered really at the top. So that there was really no great surprise when the National
721 Academy ratings came out and other ratings and put us more or less in the middle of Cornell
722 [University] and MIT—you know, at the bottom of the "Top Ten". Which, considering that we
723 started from scratch and that we still don't have the size of those other departments is pretty
724 good.

725 **CHODOROW:** Yeah. It's terrific, actually. Would you comment on a few things? One is —
726 You talked about the relations with and interaction with the other departments in social sciences
727 in regard to early recruitment strategies and direction, what happened beyond that?

728 **LAKOFF:** Well, I think what happened beyond that is that they developed a respect for us. And
729 I certainly did my best to cultivate good relations with them. And what I mean is that Freddy
730 [Frederick G.] Bailey sat down with me, and he was one of those who objected to the policy
731 approaches. And when we changed our orientation he certainly was supportive. And the people
732 in economics were often very complimentary to us. The sociologists, I think—if I can put it
733 bluntly—felt that they had to imitate what we were doing, because they had gotten into some
734 difficulty with their appointments and they began to shape up when they saw that we were doing
735 so well. So—

736 **CHODOROW:** And what you're referring to, I presume, is attempting to hire people who
737 were on the verge of tenure and getting already predictable in terms of their intelligence and
738 their—

739 **LAKOFF:** I think that other people realized that that was a good way to go. But it wasn't—
740 That's not quite what I meant. What I meant was that there was one point when the sociology
741 department was in trouble with the administration and with the faculty. They were almost put
742 into receivership, if I can put it that way. The other people in the social sciences were going to
743 appoint a temporary master to use bankruptcy proceeding language, and I resisted that and
744 said, "No. Let them alone but just put them on warning." But that will give you an idea, you see,
745 that we were regarded as the "shining example" of how you do things—and rightly so. I mean, I
746 think that the various ad hoc committees that were set up, the CAP [Committee of Academic

747 Personnel], did not give us trouble because they liked our files, and we were careful about
748 getting good letters and so on. So, in those scores, I think, we established our bonafideness.
749 And I do want to give credit to the—which committee is it—? You'll know the initials. The ones
750 who figure out who should get FTEs [full-time enrollment appointments]?

751 **CHODOROW:** Oh, the PRC.

752 **LAKOFF:** The PRC.

753 **CHODOROW:** Yes, the program review committee.

754 **LAKOFF:** That's right. The PRC was very helpful to us. After the debacle with the Law and
755 Social Policy Program where we lost 10 FTEs that were supposed to come to us, and after
756 Attiyeh said, "Well, you'll have fifteen but no more, and that's your steady state," people ignored
757 him. When we came up with good appointees they said, "Look, their enrollments are going up,
758 teaching is good—we can justify it." And Saltman was very helpful to deal with.

759 **CHODOROW:** The other question had to do with the development in the profession of
760 rational choice, which now the department just alluded to, appointments that are in their area.
761 And that has become very controversial in many departments. How did it happen here and
762 when did it actually start? When did they actually begin?

763 **LAKOFF:** Well, it was certainly after my chairmanship. But it started, really, with Popkin. Popkin
764 had come from Texas [University of Texas at Austin] where he had worked with a number of
765 people, including Joe [A.] Oppenheimer. And when he wrote his book on Vietnam, he decided
766 that that was going to be the focus of it. That's why the book is called *The Rational Peasant:*
767 *[The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam]*. And it argues against the old thesis that
768 culture determines things. Instead, the argument is that regardless of culture, everybody follows
769 a certain economic rationality. It's also sometimes known as the "economic approach" or
770 "political economy", which confuses the issue. Because Anthony Downs wrote a book called An
771 Economic Theory of Democracy—something like that—and there was another book by Brian
772 Barry called Economists, Sociologists and Democracy, which was very important in helping
773 people like Sam formulate their position. So Sam was very keen on it, and I think it had some
774 influence on Gary [C.] Jacobson. And Gary and Sam and Kernell agreed, therefore, to move in
775 that direction. And that's how we got McCubbins and Cox and Lupia. These people were not
776 just quantitative in their approach, but if they had a kind of central focus it was the rational

777 choice one. And that spilled over into the IRPS and occasioned the outburst by Chalmers
778 Johnson in which he called us the "Vatican of rational choice theory." [Chodorow laughs] Now, I
779 think that's a bit of an exaggeration because it may be true for the people I have mentioned, and
780 Susan Shirk might be considered a "fellow traveler" in all of that. But otherwise, I don't think one
781 could say that of, let's say, [Arend] Lijphart or Tracy Strong or, you know, any number of other
782 people in the department.

783 **CHODOROW:** Very interesting. Do you have any other—? This was terrific.

784 **LAKOFF:** I haven't mentioned everybody we appointed. There were a couple of others.

785 **CHODOROW:** Oh. I was thinking of Neil [Nathaniel L.] Beck, who came in fairly early.

786 **LAKOFF:** Yeah. Neil Beck did come in early. And it was at Popkin's insistence that we had to
787 move in quantitative approaches. I had turned down another appointee that he had
788 recommended, and finally I agreed to the Beck appointment. And the thinking was that Beck
789 would give us methodology—quantitative methodology—train graduate students and the like;
790 and he certainly has done that. On the other hand, he hasn't been the most productive member
791 of the department and I had qualms about that at the outset. You know, when you're a small
792 department you count on everybody to carry his weight. And that's why we tried to be very
793 careful, even when we made the joint appointments. I think we were vindicated because they
794 did carry their weight. And then, once in a while— You know, I mentioned we didn't do anything
795 in Soviet studies, but then when what's-his-name came along—

796 **CHODOROW:** There was a young man here for a while. He went—

797 **LAKOFF:** Phil [Philip G.] Roeder. Phil Roeder came along and he had terrific credentials. He
798 did very good work. He was a star at [University of] New Mexico. We said, "Look, we're not
799 going to get other people to, you know, who are willing to do that and make a big thing out of
800 Soviet studies. Let's hire Phil." And we did. And that worked out fine. Even on the legal stuff—
801 Martin Shapiro still does teach for us occasionally—you do know that? He comes down for free
802 and teaches a course for us. But we've got Peter [H.] Irons and Harry Hirsch, who handle that
803 area pretty well. Again, I would say that if the department were to be given another burst of
804 FTEs— Let's say the University [of California, San Diego] expands again and we have another
805 10 or 15, we might have to rethink the structure that we set up and decide to open up areas that
806 are just void in the department. But, given the fact that we decided on a few key cluster areas, I

807 think we've done pretty well on that level. I wish that there was, however, the same zeal now to
808 make the university the very best in the world that there was—to make it one of the best—when
809 I was appointed. I don't honestly think there is that zeal. I think a certain satisfaction has set in.
810 With the feeling that now it's maintenance time.

811 **CHODOROW:** Every organism, including institutional organisms, go through these cycles. It
812 will take a certain kind of energetic and willful, willpower and leadership, to turn that.

813 **LAKOFF:** Right. Otherwise, as I say, you get to the, you know, "Why make waves? Why look
814 for trouble? Just pat everybody on the back and say you're doing a wonderful job." But luckily
815 for us in the early days the climate here was really good for making good appointments. When
816 you came in with somebody who wasn't good—or good enough— you knew about it. So, there
817 was a certain peer sensitivity. You wanted to make sure that you got only people who were very
818 good.

819 **CHODOROW:** Okay, that was terrific.

820 **LAKOFF:** All right?

821 **WESTBROOK:** Thanks, yes.

822 **CHODOROW:** You did a wonderful job.

823 **LAKOFF:** Well, if you should come up with any second thoughts or what-have-you, just give
824 me a buzz.

825 **CHODOROW:** Thank you.

[END OF PART TWO, END OF INTERVIEW]