

Cunard White Star

"Franconia"

Hier ist was mir heute passiert
ist, ~~da der heute~~ ^{Vor vier Wochen} ~~wurde ich~~
nam Ihen Büro angerufen ein
gewisser John Smith habe mich
als ^{seiner} ~~Guardian~~ erklären und sie
wollten wissen ob ich es
annehme er hat schon die
bedenken anderer bedauert
und berichtet jetzt ~~sich~~
nur noch den drittem. Ich
sage ~~ein Prinzip hatte Zeit~~
hatte ich noch also ein
Prinzip ja, oder sollen
mir die Acten schicken.
Er stellt sich bewundern
hat gute Mann hat seit

Wahrscheinlich 5 mal keine Guardia gemacht
& das hat den der Gross herab gelassen - Kreyt
nach dem neuen Budget gibt alles ab
25. - Was das ist ist dort ich nicht
wissen erfahren da wäre gegen die
2 ist nach den Aktien in Buchhaltung
Bau also viele keine wichtige Entscheidung
die Guardia mit mir in helfen. ~~Recht~~
bis allem was ich in den Augen von
es mir ^{ganz} sympathisch; nunmehr
was das ist bin auch als der beherrschend ich
annehmen. ~~Die anderen beiden sind in~~
~~den gute Leute. - aber die Voransichten~~

~~Freigabe waren auch sehr gute Punkte~~
~~haben offenbar ^{sich} nicht~~
~~gehört ~~den~~ ~~Wunden~~ ~~erfüllen~~~~
motiviert aus den Daten nicht ersuchen, ~~ich~~
ja gern dem Mann die 2000 die wir im Osten werden

weil er uns auch über
Bord wirft & ~~das~~ ~~dein~~
Fell aber es ^{ganz} ~~fehlt~~ ja gegen
die Forderung ~~weil~~
sieh erst ein Urteil über
den Fall mit Holdake
und danach ~~so~~ die
Voraussetzung annehmen
oder ablehnen müßte.

Also der Mann kommt
mit mir und erzählt mir
folgendes. Er will ein
Mädchen heiraten, das
im Seydlitz ist ~~My~~ nach
Südabrika zu gehen
um dort bei ~~dem~~
Abt zu arbeiten und
da will er seine jetzige

Cunard White Star
"Franconia"

hier eingesehen sind in
Lindaport als Farmer nach
Wiederholungen, davon versteht
er zwar nicht, aber
er meint er könnte es
lernen. - ~~von~~ ~~beide~~ ~~Prayer~~
~~versteht sich~~ ~~da~~ ~~beim~~
vorangeführten Guardians
haben Ihre Zustimmung
in seiner Auswanderung
verweigert und zwar auf
Grund eines Gutachten
von Art 6 die sagen das
er mit den Indianer schlecht
versteht würde. ~~Das~~ ~~Paper~~

in der Natur an sich. Brauchte es keine Zwangs-
nung da beide Parteien Menschlich sind. —
das muss in nach Hülfe geben lassen damit wieder-
lich pariert in Frage aber da es mir leid
tut und ich nicht will dass er noch viele
Lassen unflüchtig hinaus droht schlage ich
vor dass er auch die Hülfe Frage unter-
in dem Vorst. Van Hedden fragen möchte ich
muss nicht, aber ich würde — er wird bei
schlecht mir die besten heute. — Sie stellen sich
mir Hedden sehr positiv. — darauf habe ich
mit des Hedden kommen und rede mit
Ihr ~~man will die nach Hedden~~ sehr rump
sind verständig wenn man ersten Angewandte
an habe ich das Gefühl das da irgend etwas
nicht stimmt + B. wo will die Herr Hedden
machen? Sie hat eine Stellung angestanden
bei Wern. Bei abgeben 25. November 1893

Was hat Sie den in Landen
~~Abschaffung~~ ~~habt~~ ~~den~~ ~~den~~
ist in der Buchhaltung
für den die Posten
besten gemacht. Wie to dem
~~Wenig~~ ~~hat~~ ~~den~~
van fransden mededel
den kragt ja jekt aller
van kanta fransden mededel
guter christen woewel
het dus in Vorjahren
ausgemacht 20 schmat 2000
100. ~~was~~ ~~traum~~ ~~denke~~ ~~ich~~
sind da der doch auch
wunderly udel, ich plante
nicht in minnen
dass vor einem Jahr
als noch dat 6 der Unt-
neder war ^{die} summe
als 100000 betrug.

3

Cunard White Star
"Franconia"

Was die Frau denn nun
 plant das ~~was~~ Sie mit
 Auntie Quardman findet
 die ihm noch Indes von
 besser & wird diese auch
 bleiben das wird es nicht
 sein werden. Oh ja das
 plant Sie schon und
 tut als ob Sie mich
 nicht als ich. Ich
 habe wieder sehr damit
 sich das Gefühl da
 kommt ihnen nicht
 aber ich muss nicht
 was ich nicht sagen

tränke, also sehr entlassene bei in Gnade sind
beschrieben mit worden. — Vor einer Woche ~~sein~~
die Kontostücke sehr mit Bergen ~~Wort~~ der jetzt bedektung
dies hier abt, ist, wenn die hier ist die
neue abfertigung für beurlaubung ^{zum} ~~von~~ ^{beurlaubung}
und so erzählt mir es wäre ihm aufge-
fallen das abt 25 doppelt soviel an proviant
wachsel verdient als abt 6 in der gleiche dort
ist er der Sache nachzugehen und hat festgesetzt
das die kulturen Madrien als quest provokative
beschäftigen und durch angelegene Medus
pläne fürordian nachher in provizieren
und die ein kommen in vergewissen. Per
das ist in eine kulture Sache und die kulture
meinen Kopf ab wenn mein Fall ^{hätte} nicht
auch so ~~trägt~~ ein Fall ist. also Bergen
versendet und er geht morgen mit abt 25

him in her mind shall
best was in the middle
de las dot. Perhaps
ouff or are live not
ein Agent provocateurs
Smith is the brother
Roll. —

Dr. Leo Szilard,

P.S. to our breakfast conversation.

What I meant to suggest was that you state quite explicitly your train of thought which, if I perceive it correctly, is this:

A creative solution can come only from the heart, that is from a moral or religious, not from a position restricted to the rational application of self-interest.

Yet to prevail for such a solution it must conform to the self-interest of the parties.

Hence the function of the Commission: to propose a solution; the function of the Board: to judge whether it conforms to self-interest.

Handwritten note on the right margin:
of and of the nature of the matter

Handwritten: What we need is incomparable

Handwritten: A group of creative ~~men~~ individuals by their very nature by the fact of Man rather than by enlightened self interest. Of course each ~~of~~ see what ~~substances~~ substances with which ~~they~~ they come ~~up~~ ^{might} ~~up~~ ^{the} ~~with~~ ^{might} be ~~responsible~~ ^{responsible} for the ~~fact~~ ^{fact} and if they are ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~responsible~~ ^{responsible}

... to our present conversation...
... I want to suggest that...
... your train of thought which...
... is this:
... can come only from the
... not from a
... application of
... self-interest.
... it must
... of the parties.
... the Commission to
... of the Board to judge

Proyent. FA 42913
2562

~~Clyde~~
Hurt FA 47354
Home wood
866

~~Frank~~ Glen Freyong

Dec 9813

W R - m h h p

15 A 5511

Page 2 of letter by L. S.

Concerns utilisation of patent
of atomic fission and distri-
bution of profits among
partners - Brasch-Lange, L.S.,
and his brother.

heutigen Tage erteilten Patente von Brasch und Lange dabei verwendet wird. Falls keines der Brasch- und Lange- Patente verwendet wird und das Rohr nicht mit Impulsgenerator betrieben wird, so erhalten Sie aus dem Erloes 25% und mein Bruder und ich 75%.

Fuer Anwendungen, die ausserhalb des Gebietes der Atomumwandlung liegen und bei denen ein Koerper durch den Kathodenstrahl direkt (d.h. nicht auf dem Umwege der durch die Kathodenstrahlen erzeugten Roentgenstrahlen) behandelt wird, koennen Sie sowohl ausschliessliche wie nicht-ausschliessliche Rechte vergeben. Die Verteilung des Erloeses bleibt einer spaeteren Vereinbarung vorbehalten.

Fuer nichterwachte Verwendungen der Roentgenstrahlen sollen spaeter gegebenenfalles Abmachungen getroffen werden. In Ermangelung einer solchen Abmachung soll derjenige, der die Verwertung vornimmt, 30% aus dem Erloes erhalten und der Rest soll zu gleichen Teilen zwischen Ihnen einerseits, meinem Bruder und mir andererseits aufgeteilt werden. Im Falle ich sterbe, uebergehen meine Rechte auf meinen Bruder.

Ihr

(Leo Szilard)

Vertrag

Ich, der Unterzeichnete, habe die Absicht, das Geschäft der Apotheke
in der Stadt ... zu übernehmen und zu betreiben.
Ich bin bereit, die Kosten für die Einrichtung der Apotheke zu
übernehmen und die Miete für den Laden zu zahlen.
Ich werde die Apotheke in der Stadt ... betreiben und
für die Miete der Apotheke verantwortlich sein.
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für die Miete der Apotheke verantwortlich sein.

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für die Miete der Apotheke verantwortlich sein.

(Ort, Datum)

December 8, 1950

As I sit down to write to you, I have no way of knowing whether by the time these lines appear in print there may still be left a chance of preserving world peace or whether the third world war will be on.

As I sit down to write to you, I have no way of knowing whether this letter will not come too late. By the time it appears in print, the United States and Russia might be at war with each other. If they are not, we might still have a chance of saving the world, slim though it may be. **P** As I sit down to write the United States finds itself out on a limb. In June, when the United States decided to intervene in South Korea, most of those with whom I have spoken felt that we had acted right, for doing otherwise would have meant betraying ^a ~~our~~ political friends. **1** Our intervention in South Korea had the moral support not only of what might be called well-informed opinion in America, but also of many people in Europe, and above all of India. The Korean campaign could have been ended when we reached the 38th Parallel. When we crossed the 38th Parallel, the aspect of our intervention suddenly changed. Our motive of crossing the 38th Parallel was presumably the destruction of the political system of North Korea, and the creation of a government in Korea which will be friendly toward the Western Powers.

When we crossed the 38th Parallel, our moral position changed overnight. For this act we no longer had the support of India. We were severely criticized all over Europe, and I found few people among those to whom I spoke in the United States who thought we were morally justified to do so. It is difficult to see why we moved into North Korea, but one may assume that we wanted to destroy the political system that had been built up with Russian assistance. Assuming, if there had been no Chinese intervention, we would undoubtedly have succeeded in destroying that political system, but there was never

any reason to believe that we would succeed in establishing another political system one that would give North Korea a better government than the one we destroyed, even though we might have created a government ~~xxxx~~ which mimicked the democratic forms of the Western Democracies. This is not the place to investigate to what extent our intervention in South Korea and above all the crossing of the 38th Parallel was defensible from the point of view of the United Nations Charter. It was ^ain assertion of the United States Government that its~~ix~~ actions were legal and this assertion was supported at least by the governments of all countries who were joined with us in the Atlantic Pact.

In the same breath in which we declared our intention to intervene in South Korea, we also took unilateral action in forbidding Communist ~~China~~ ^{China} to take military action against Formosa and for the government of Formosa from continuing its war against Communist China. If there was any legal basis for so acting, it was not so recognized by our most important allies, either England or France. At the time of this writing, we have not changed our stand on Formosa and by holding fast to the position taken, we have given Russia an option to break up the Atlantic Pact. At the time of this writing, the Chinese are pushing us out of North Korea. It is possible that the Chinese will halt at the 38th Parallel, but we have no right to expect that they will, unless we wish to assume that they possess greater sagacity and statesmanship and a stronger sense for a moral right than we displayed at the time when we decided to cross that parallel. By crossing the 38th Parallel, China will make it more difficult for the United States to retract the former position we took with reference to Formosa. With ^{our}~~an~~ opposition on Formosa unchanged, the Chinese can now provoke us to go to war with them by attacking Formosa. Because in the defense of Formosa, we must use Japanese basés, the Chinese can invoke and the Russians may

want them to invoke, their alliance with Russia. Russia can then declare war on us without having been guilty of a single act of aggression or any clear violation of the Charter worse than the violations of the Charter which we committed ourselves. If this happens in the course of the next few months, it is virtually certain that none of the countries of the European continent will feel that they are bound to join that war on our side, by the Atlantic Pact. With the continent of Europe neutral, England will be in a very difficult position, and if she does not remain neutral, she might adopt the principle of giving us all aid short of war. This is the option that we have given to Russia and ~~we can~~ whether or not she will take it up, no one can say; but it can be said at least that we are providing Russia with a strong incentive for taking up that option, for it is our declared purpose to make Western Europe militarily secure in the physical sense of the world by rearming Germany. Germany is still suffering from the after effects of the last war, and it might take another five years before a new militant nationalistic Germany will arise that will be a powerful ally, but also one that will have a strong vested interest in the unification of Germany and the recovery of the territories lost to Poland during the last war. It is difficult to see why Russia should wait until our plans become an accomplished fact. If she can involve us in a war with her in a manner which will leave Western Europe neutral and stop all further plans of rearmament. It seems to me that a child can see that we have manoevered ourselves into a position into which all the cards are in the hands of Russia and it is necessary to understand how this came to pass. The foreign policy of the United States after the war was successively ~~guided~~ carried on by Byrnes, Marshall, and Acheson. The foreign policies of these men were guided by the principle of least resistance, a principle which always prevails if one cannot formulate a basic concept

upon which to base a foreign policy which would give us at least a chance to establish durable peace. It is therefore necessary for us to examine now whether we can think of any basic principle that fulfills this requirement. The ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{intention} after the Second World War with Russia and the United States emerging as two overwhelmingly great military powers is inherently unstable and so many other similar situations have lead to war unless we decided to let our political actions by ~~guided~~ ^{guided} by some new principle.

There ~~were~~ ^{are} essentially two principles to which we can turn in order to attempt to preserve peace. One of these principles is that of collective security.

(Paragraph)

That this is the case was dimly recognized at the end of the war/ ~~xxx~~ ^{by} those who drafted the United Nation's Charter. These men realized that the ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{role} that the United Nations can play in the preservation of peace is of necessity a very limited one. The adoption of the veto in the United Nations reflected the recognition of the fact that it is not desirable to have an organization that will make decisions which it is unable to enforce. Any decision running contrary to the determinations of either the United States or Russia could clearly not be enforced except by resorting to a war of which the outcome must of necessity be unforeseeable. The ~~result~~ ^{result} of such a war could hardly ~~xxxxx~~ be called settlement.

Dr. Leo Szilard
The University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

February 17, 1955

Apparently, we have now succeeded in manoeuvring ourselves into a position where the Chinese Communist Government can virtually force us to intervene in the Chinese Civil War by attacking the off-shore islands, Quemoy or Matsu, and Russia can, by coming to the assistance of China, force Western Europe to declare herself neutral.

According to Don Irwin's report in the New York Herald Tribune of February 15th, officials in Washington feel that the Russians -- for the present at least -- don't want a Far Eastern war with the United States and that the Chinese without Russian supplies cannot successfully take on the fight. Why should China -- so Washington seems to reason -- fight for these off-shore islands when they could obtain them peacefully in exchange for a promise not to attack Formosa, which they could not conquer anyway without first running over the Seventh Fleet.

It is difficult for me to accept the validity of such arguments. To me it seems that we are offering China and Russia an option on a silver platter and there are strong incentives for them to take up that option. If and when China attacks one of these islands, China and Russia may obtain in return for military losses of minor importance which they may suffer, the neutrality of Western Europe and probably also the end of the North Atlantic Pact. They

might prefer to defer such an attack provided that they can be sure we are not going to withdraw the option; but is it likely that they will let us get off the hook?

We, ourselves, followed in recent years a policy of expediency with heavy emphasis on military, rather than political considerations, but in the policies followed by China and Russia, the emphasis is reversed. Therefore, I believe the odds are heavily in favor of a Chinese attack on the off-shore islands with a sufficient involvement of Russia to force a declaration of neutrality on Western Europe.

It is true that wisdom ought to lead the Chinese and Russians to doubt that such a war could remain localized for long and, somehow, to sense the unpredictable risks that all the countries involved would incur. But in this year of Grace, it would be tantamount to a miracle if wisdom should prevail and the Chinese did not attack. And if such a miracle did occur, we would need a second one: at long last, a Secretary of State who has vision.

Dr. Leo Szilard
The University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

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But what can we expect much more wisdom from us? We are not going to get off the hook and we have to assume that China and Russia will display more wisdom than we ourselves have. But can we expect the kind of wisdom that we ourselves are so conspicuously lacking? Would it not be more than we could handle? But

of course what are the chances
but ourselves are completely

Review

history in this kind of manner
is probably that that China and

Japan possess the mind of
this man when we ourselves

are ~~that~~ ~~lacking~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~correct~~ ~~sense~~?

would it not be sufficient
to do what we have done

the Chinese prepared
to attack those

islands? or what right
are we claiming in

subversion
when the stakes are

legion and
in all nations

is the closest to us
opinion of our own and our

not superior to the first
has been ~~never~~ ~~announced~~ ~~now~~

by our country

including
we are

of their

not secret

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO 37 · ILLINOIS
THE ENRICO FERMI INSTITUTE
FOR NUCLEAR STUDIES

October 24, 1956

Dear Colleague:

Your communication reached me yesterday and you will see from what follows to what extent, and in what sense, I agree with its main topic.

Right after the war ended, I proposed to the Department of State that we call a meeting of American and Russian scientists and try jointly to understand the implications of the atomic bomb for the world. My thought was that, if our Russian colleagues understand what the bomb really means they will be able to explain to their own government that it would be desirable to eliminate the bomb from national armament.

The same proposal was submitted a very short time later by some of my friends directly to the President of the United States. No action was taken on this proposal.

A few years later -- a couple of months before the Communist Party officially assumed power in Czechoslovakia -- the Emergency Committee of the Atomic scientists, of which I was at that time a trustee and of which Albert Einstein was the Chairman, and Professor Harrison Brown was its Executive Secretary, voted to propose an East-West Conference composed of American, English and French as well as Russian, Czechoslovakian and Polish scientists in order to think through, not the technical problems involved in international control of the atomic bomb, but rather the political prerequisites which have to be met in order to make such international control politically acceptable. This was to be not an open meeting where the danger of propaganda could hardly be averted,

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but a closed meeting of about fifteen to twenty men, held in a neutral territory such as, for instance, Jamaica, British West Indies. We decided to issue an invitation to such a meeting without asking for approval by the Department of State, but merely keeping the Department of State informed of all of the steps that we would be taking. The invitation was transmitted by Professor Harrison Brown to the Russian Ambassador Grmyko. After a few weeks we received a negative reply.

The number of American physicists, who are devoting enough time and attention to understand the problems involved, is not large and I fear that the number of Russian physicists who think about this problem might even be smaller. The situation might be better in England and perhaps not too bad in France, but in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, I cannot even guess.

To assemble a group of scientists who think about these problems might, I believe, be of value if it is possible to gather together those who are really interested in these problems. It is true that a group of scientists who try to discover the right path on this uncharted sea might have a better chance of coming up with something sensible than a group of politicians who might gather for the same purpose. The advantage that the scientists would have lies in the fact that, in general, if a scientist says something, his colleagues only need to ask: "Is it true what he is saying?", while if a politician says something, his colleagues' first question must be not whether it is true but: "Why is he saying this?". Because of this, a discussion among scientists has a much better chance of leading to a clarification of thought.

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It must be remembered, however, that a scientist can learn to be a politician and in that case, for our purposes, the above stated advantage is lost.

Further, it is also true that many of the creative scientists have the rare ability of thinking dispassionately on the subject in which you are interested while the thinking of their fellow men is beclouded by their political emotions. This, however, does not mean that all really creative scientists would be useful in the deliberation on the subject. For only those who are sufficiently interested to give the best of their thinking to the subject can be really useful.

The practical difficulties of bringing about what you are interested in appear to be great but perhaps not insurmountable. What one probably would need would be two meetings, each lasting for about three to four weeks. The number of participants should be about fifteen to twenty-five. Anything beyond twenty-five would be unmanageable.

The meeting has to be a closed one in order to avoid the suspicion that the meeting has been called for purposes of propaganda in the hope that the conference will endorse some predetermined political thesis. It also must be a closed one in order to avoid the danger that the scientists will not behave as scientists whose first loyalty is to the truth but will be seduced into becoming politicians who are what they are for a purpose. The greatest difficulty is the selection of the participants. If the participants are selected by the official bodies of the participating countries, such as the various national academies, I doubt very much that the participants will represent the creative minds of the

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participating countries. This danger would not be quite as great if one national academy were to take the initiative and were to ask, in each participating country, one to three individual scientists who have shown active interest in this field to select the participants from their own country. In that case the meeting would have a private character even though it has been initiated by one official organization.

You can see from these remarks that I regard the problem of doing something really useful along these lines as quite tough.

If political conditions get stabilized in your own country in the course of the next six months, perhaps your organization could take the initiative along the lines I indicated above. Right now is hardly the time for such a step to be taken.

You have raised some interesting points in your letter which I shall not attempt to answer here. However, I am writing an article at present for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists which will cover these points, I hope, to your satisfaction.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Gentlemen:

I am indebted to you for giving my staff an expression of your views on future problems related to atomic energy, especially domestic research and development and international relations. As you indicated in your conversations with Mr. Newman, you and certain of your colleagues, representing a large number of the scientists who have been engaged in work on nuclear fission during the war, are desirous of setting forth in some detail conclusions which you have arrived at as to the methods for developing atomic energy in the future so as to contribute most effectively to the national interest and to world peace. We shall be very glad to receive and have the staff carefully study any written plans and recommendations with which you and your colleagues may wish to furnish us.

It would be advantageous if you would place this matter in our hands at the earliest possible date. I hope that in doing so you will find it convenient to indicate specifically which of the atomic scientists associate themselves with the views expressed in your recommendations.

Sincerely yours,

Director

Dr. L. Szilard and
Dr. Edward U. Condon
1155 East 57th Street
Chicago, Illinois

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10/10/45