SECOND VERSION

September - 1954

INTRODUCTION

~~After Germany was defeated in the last war,~~ many of us who were involved in the development of atomic energy tried to visualize ~~the~~ at effect ~~that the existence of the~~ atomic ~~bomb~~ would ~~exert~~ on the World after the war. ~~The~~ actual development exceeded, ~~however,~~ our worst ~~fears~~ expectations.

At the time of this writing the atomic arms race has entered a stage at which the danger ~~of war has become greater than it was before.~~ It is generally believed that Russia's capacity to destroy the industrial regions of the United States will rapidly increase during ~~the next three years~~. ~~The~~ thought of a preventive is cropping up more and more frequently in speeches made by men who ~~have no~~ Government responsibility, such as retired Admirals and Generals. It is not likely that a decision to precipitate such a warwill come about ~~as a conscious decision of policy arrived at by~~ the Government of the United States. But ~~it is likely that~~ the fear of ~~a war that may come to us five or six years from now and will completely devastate our country~~ haunts ~~all~~ those who are responsible for ~~the~~ day to day operations in the field of foreign policy and national defense. ~~This fear exerts a subtle influence in the direction of making the men who are responsible for such day to day operations~~ more inclined to take ~~a~~ calculated risk ~~than would otherwise be the case.~~ If they ~~take a certain risk and~~ win, all is well, and if they lose, ~~there is some slight consolation in the thought that war had to come one way or another~~ sooner or later and ~~that~~ disastrous though it be, it would ~~have~~ been ~~much~~ more disastrous if ~~it had~~

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in which there is a proposal slight in Brussels potential

In these next three years of transition, thoughts of preventive war will ~~inimitably~~ inevitably remain with us unless men ~~will~~ should begin to see ~~that there is a~~ some way that may lead to peace. It might be that after these years of transition the danger of war might subside for awhile but then there may ~~be other~~ be a new dangers just around the corner. of atomic bombs remain in the arsenal of nations.

come later. ~~I believe this mental attitude is a direct consequence of the fact~~ that the atomic bomb has confronted the ~~United States~~ world with a problem to which our Statesmen can find no solution and unless there will emerge ~~some new concept that will convince the Statesmen that~~ there is a way to peace, ~~we cannot expect~~ things ~~to~~ get any better, ~~on the contrary they are likely to get~~ worse. ~~In these circumstances,~~ the danger of war will remain at ~~a~~ its high peak for the next three years. ~~and~~ If perchance we get through the ~~next three~~ years without war, the danger ~~even though~~ lessened ~~will remain.~~ Today three nations are in the possession of atomic bomb. How long will it take until the number will rise to four, five, six or ~~even~~ seven? If ~~perchance~~, there is one among them that has ~~a mentality of~~ pre-war Germany, ~~how many bombs will they need to bring about a World War in which Russia and America will destroy eachother, leaving a World which one such country might easily dominate? Is it not likely that~~ before long ~~local~~ military commanders in the United States will have at their disposal atomic bombs in order to make sure that massive retaliation will be instant and automatic. ~~In some~~ If in a period of heightened Russian ~~and~~ American tension ~~some small~~ such a country ~~decides~~ chooses to drop ~~its three bombs during the night,~~ ~~one~~ a bomb in Pittsburg, one in Detroit and one in Philadelphia, wouldn't our massive retaliation instantly hit Russia and wouldn't Russia hit us back? Would there be any way of waiting, investigating and finding out whose bombs destroyed ~~those~~ our three cities? It seems ~~clear~~ that the atomic bomb has posed a problem to the World to which none of the Governments have an answer. In the post war period under Byrnes, Marshall, Atcheson ~~and Dulles what~~ there emanated from the State Department were various slogans but never a policy that had even a remote chance of coming to grips with the problems. We heard of ~~the contentment~~ containment of Russia but it was difficult to see how ~~contentment~~ containment would prevent

Russia from building a stock pile of atomic bombs and producing planes suitable for their delivery. Under Marshall there was an emphasis on the military buildup ~~in~~ Western Europe. ~~It~~ but it was difficult ~~to~~ see how Western Europe can conceivably ~~participate~~ ~~in~~ be drawn into war when Russia ~~could~~ can destroy Western Europe within a few days by means of an atomic bomb.

Under Atcheson, the emphasis was on negotiating from strength but it was difficult to see how it would make sense to ~~build~~ strive for overwhelming military ~~strength and then negotiate a settlement~~ superiority in order to negotiate a settlement which would ~~call~~ call for universal disarmament, ~~quite apart from the fact that~~ or how it should be possible to achieving ~~an~~ overwhelming military superiority ~~except for a very short period is an obviously an unattainable objective~~ (and surely, transitory). If ~~The Government~~ an Iron of State could have afforded to be frank with the people, ~~it~~ they would have simply said that ~~they have no~~ they have no solution. ~~Clearly~~ The existence of atomic bombs poses a problem for the World which cannot be solved at the level at which political thinking, even the best political thinking, moved before the war. Even less can it be solved at the level at which the issue is discussed in the columns of our newspapers. ~~The dangers inherent in the Russian-American power conflict are evoking emotions which make a dispassionate discussion of the real issues almost impossible.~~

It took imagination, resourcefulness and courage to produce the ideas that went into the development of atomic energy and the bombs during the last war. and Many of these ideas arose through dispassionate discussion amongst a small group of people who dedicated themselves to this task. It ~~will~~ may take the same kind of imagination, resourcefulness and courage to develope the ideas which are needed to solve the political problem posed by the existence of the bomb and the same kind of discussion among dedicated people. ~~Neither~~ Government ~~s~~ at negotiations are

likely to produce those ideas, nor are they likely to emerge from the public exchanges of views of Statesmen, Generals, Admirals, radio commentators, newspaper columnists and editorial writers. It might well be that the real issues will not emerge and the right concepts will not be formulated until a group of scientists, British, American and Russian, band themselves together and dedicate themselves to this task. It is not that scientists have a greater insight into political problems than others; ~~there are scientists who are not interested in this type of problem and consequently are no good at it at all.~~ What raises the level of discussion ~~in a group of scientists~~ far above the level of those ~~the public discussion of political issues~~ as others is the fact that by nature and training scientists are addicted to thinking the truth and stating the truth. If we talk to eachother, we don't have to ask ourselves "For what purposes does he say what he says?" All we have to ask ourselves is whether it is true. Statesmen, Administrators, editorial wirters and all those whose professional success depends on making other people do what they want them to do, say what they say for a purpose. This does not necessarily mean that they say what is not true but ~~which of the truths they~~ state and stress ~~depends on the~~ the truths which serve the purpose which ~~they~~ happen to pursue ~~at the time.~~ If ~~the group of scientists discussing the problems of~~ those of us who discussed the problems of atomic energy had to concern ~~itself~~ themselves with who says what for what purpose, we could ~~the job could~~ not have been done. When it comes to a discussion that ~~which~~ cuts across national boundaries, a group of scientists can probably accomplish what no other group could equally well accomplish, ~~if for no other reason than~~ simply because they all speak the same language.

5. Because ~~of considerations of this type~~ ~~twice in the past there was~~ an attempt made to bring together ~~such a group~~ a small group of scientists. The first time it was vetoed by the American Government, the second time it was vetored by the Russian Government. ~~In spite of this~~ I believe that the time will come, and let us hope it will not be too late, when some such group will ~~get~~ be brought together and remain in conclave until they begin to see what the real problems are and how they can be solved. Among scientists in America today who are generally concerned about the problem, there are two schools of thought. There are those who believe that, if the Russian Government was guided by what is really desirable from the point of view of the Russian nation, there would be little difficulty reaching an overall settlement with the American Government. ~~At the same time~~ I bleieve that what would be desirable for the Russian nation is not acceptable to the Russian Government because of the political system under which Russia operates. Some of them add, the most of them don't, that what would be desirable from the point of view of America as a nation might not be acceptable to the American Government because of the political system under which the Americans operate. Those who take that view believe that an overall settlement that would really secure peace is impossible. The other group, to which I personally belong, differs from them in two respects. It will freely admit that the political system under which America and Russia operate had to be taken into consideration and that measures which appear desirable from the point of view of the nation may be inacceptable to the Government of the nation.

I believe, however, that what is and what is not acceptable to the Government cannot be known with any degree of certainty and that it depends on the setting in which it is proposed and that it is subject to change and above all subject to the change in mood which will be brought about in time when people will begin to understand the meaning of the hydrogen bomb. I therefore believe that it might be much easier to get acceptance from the Government involved for the measures which are needed. I believe that they make a mistake on two scores. First of all they worry too much that the Russian and American Governments will not accept what clearly is desirable from the point of view of wellfare and security of the Russian and American nations. Secondly, they worry too little over the difficulty of outlining an overall settlement of the problem that we could, with good conscience, recommend to these Governments as giving them reasonable assurance that it would not ~~become~~xxx work out well from the point of view of their nation's economic wellfare and military security. It is this second problem on which I propose that we concentrate in the assumption that the problem, though very difficult, is not insoluble.

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But in anticipation of it, I am presenting here certain considerations, for whatever they are worth, in the hope that might serve as a basis of make discussion, or at least as the starting point of ~~the~~ discussion.

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The bomb confronts the World with a problem which cannot be solved at the level at which the public discussion of this issue has been conducted in the columns of the newspapers. It cannot even be solved at the level at which political thinking - ~~even the best political thinking~~ - moved before the war. It might take as much imagination, resourcefulness and courage to arrive at the solution of this problem as went into the invention and development of the bomb. ~~None~~ of this has been, so far, forthcoming, nor is it likely to ~~be forthcoming~~ until the right kind of people band themselves together and dedicate themselves to this task.. It took discussion to bring forth the ideas which went into the making of the bomb. ~~It will~~ take ~~discussion~~ to bring forth the ideas which are needed to solve the political problems posed by the bomb. ~~It is not clear at this moment~~ Just when and how such a discussion ~~will~~ get underway ~~But, in the hope that such a discussion will get underway in the near future,~~ I am presenting here ~~in the hope that it may serve as a~~ basis of discussion, ~~certain points of views and~~ considerations.

The public discussion of the American-Russian conflict in the post-war years has obscurred rather than clarified the nature of the problem with which we are faced and the real difficulties which must be overcome if this conflict is to be resolved. ~~Just a~~ few years ago ~~we were told time and time again that the solution lies in~~ negociating from strength. We ought to arm and form alliances to make us militarily strong. Then we ~~could~~ sit down with Russia

and negociate ~~an~~ agreement ~~in which most, if not all, controversial points will be settled in our favor. This overall settlement will then provide for the elimination of atomic bombs from all armaments and it will provide for farreaching dis-armament.) This policy (if this indeed was a policy) was clearly based on an unobtainable objective of an overwhelming unbalance of military strength. But this is not what concerns us here.~~ What concerns us here is rather the basic fallacy which underlies the concept of negociating with Russia "from strength" in the present state of the World.

INSERT I

If you negociate a business deal in private life, and if you are in a strong position when you do so, you may indeed be able to settle ~~most~~ controversial points in your favor, ~~and may~~ get the other fellow to sign on the dotted line. ~~After that~~ he will have to perform or else you will take him into court.

But what good would it do to ~~have~~ make Reussia sign an agreement in which most controversial points are settled in our favor? Is there a court before which we could take Russia and is there anyone who could enforce the verdict of this court?

Collective security might very well have been the answer to the problem of enforcing agreements after the first World War. But today there exists no combination of nations that short of a war of indefinite duration and unpredictable outcome could ~~cause~~ coerce Russia, or for that matter the United States, And even if America today had overwhelming military strength, and were ready to ~~use~~ use it, she could use it in negociations only if what she wanted to negociate was unconditional surrender.

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This will compel us to find some way to maintain the ~~face the issue how such an~~ agreement ~~could be maintained~~ in force if one of the smaller nations should ~~cease to cooperate.~~ ~~which~~ try to abstract it and to force compliance with the agreement by such recalcitrant nations ~~if possible~~ without recourse to either ~~war~~ war or economic sanctions

Clearly being strong at the time when we sit down to negotiate might lead Russia to sign an agreement that suits our taste but it cannot make her keep the agreement unless we maintain indefinitely an overwhelming military superiority. Indeed, if America had overwhelming military superiority and were to base her negotiations on that strength, this strength would help her only if what she wanted to negotiate was unconditional surrender. Clearly in these circumstances the issue of whether or not a negotiated settlement can form the basis of peace depends on wheter or not we are able to devise an agreement that would offer both Russia and America such strong incentive for keeping the agreement in force so that they will have no desire to abrogate it. Since it is impossible to force either Russia or America to continue to observe the agreement if they would not wish to do so, it might, perhaps, be just as well to let them have the legal right to abrogate at any time after giving due notice. The advantage of letting them have this right will be considered further below, but it has to be stated right here that such a right to abrogate must be limited to a small number of nations. Clearly the agreement could not last long if it could be upset by any one of a large number of nations.

Allowing Russia and America to retain a legal right to abrogate emphasizes what is obvious in any case, that the agreement cannot possibly remain in force if either Russia or America no longer want it be in force.

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But whatever the reason for the Government's silence, whether consideration of this sort ~~or~~ simply a lack of agreement within ~~with the other~~ the Government itself ~~with~~ the question of what ~~war~~ we ought to ~~are to demand~~ demand, ~~there was certainly a conspicuous lack of leadership on the part of the Government on the issue of the peace settlement.~~ ~~the Govt never stat~~ the Govt never explained what ~~kind of~~ the peace settlement should be.

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The very concept ~~of the controversial issues~~ which ~~we want to settle~~ that there are "crucial" virtual controversial points must be in our favor must be reexamined ~~is a confusing one~~. In the present setting ~~of the cold-war~~ in which war must be regarded as likely ~~to come~~, the crucial ~~issues~~ points are those ~~which~~ that, depending on which way they are settled, will probably increase or decrease our chance to "win" the war when it comes. Since the issue of who shall win the war, if war comes, is the one issue on which compromise is not possible, ~~therefore it is impossible to settle any by any~~ ~~None of~~ these crucial controversial points ~~can be settled as~~ long as the possibility of war is uppermost in our minds. Any attempt to make progress towards a general settlement piecemeal by taking up such controversial points, one by one, is, therefore, doomed to fail. But within the framework of an overall settlement which, if it is worth having it at all, must ressolve the power conflict so that war will be regarded as a remote possibility. ~~These~~ very same controversial points may become points of minor importance. Because we have lived with a cold-war so long, it is a strain on our sluggish imagination to visualize ~~but, while~~ that ~~the settlement~~ that within the frame work of an overall settlement of these points might still be of considerable importance to the Germans, Koreans and Indo-Chinese, they will no longer be of ~~great~~ prominent concern either to America or Russia. Entirely different points even though they might

might have first claim to the attention of these two powers within the framework of such a settlement.

If in negotiating an agreement with Russia our aim is to settle all points (if not all) in our favor, then it is understandable that in all these post war years the Government has never made known what overall settlement she would regard as satisfactory. For obviously in the kind of negotiations we then envisage you cannot announce in advance what you would be willing to accept. Those terms would then automatically become the starting point of the negociations and you would have to yield on many points by the time you are through negotiating.

As long as America and Russia think of negotiation in these terms, the time for negotiations will never be right. For a number of years American military power was rapidly increasing as her stock pile of bombs was growing. As long as one thinks of negotiating from strength, it seemed imperative to postpone negotiations until later. Right now Russian military strength is rapidly increasing because of her growing stock pile of bombs and if she thinks in terms of negotiating from strength, she might think it imperative to postpone negotiations. The fact is that negotiating from strength cannot conceivably solve the problem which is before us. The only thing worth negotiating from strength is unconditional surrender and that is not a solution but rather a postponement of a solution and one which does not necessarily make it easier to arrive at a solution.

The very concept of the "controversial issues which have to be desided in our favor is a confusing one. The worse controversial issues are those which arise from the fact that in the present power conflict war must be regarded as probable. The worse controversial issues are those which, if settled one way or another, would greatly increase either our chance of winning that war when it comes, or else Russia's chance. Since on this one issue of who is going to win the war, if

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INSERT II

What are the main incentives which such an overall settlement could provide for continued Russian cooperation? Any Russian policy, if it is rational and is based on the national interest, must be greatly concerned about security from attack and the economic development of the country. Security from attack means first of all the elimination of a threat of the Atomic Bomb which would permit a direct attack on the cities of Russia. And also the elimination of an attack by land armies based on Western Europe motivated by freshly awakened German nationalist movement. We should have, therefore, to examine what type of disarmament could give this kind of security to Russia, and whether the kind of disarmament that would do this can be reconciled with a legitimate desire for security of Western Europe, the United States and the rest of the World.

In thinking of incentives which this agreement could offer to Russia in the economic field we ought not to think, I believe, of direct economic aid to Russia. Immediately after the war Russia was in great need of such economic aid, but today any economic aid which we might be able to give would be quite negligible compared to the economic advantages which the agreement could offer to Russia by creating a setting which would enable Russia to use her productive capacity for her economic development rather than for supplying a heavily equipped large land army. Russia spends today about 20% of her national income on defense and if she could spend this amount on productive investment then civilian consumption in Russia would increase at the rate of 6% per year, which means that it would double every twelve years. Assuming the population increase in Russia is kept within reasonable bounds, there would be a rapid increase in the standard of living which would create a favorable climate for the successful operation of a stable government. Clearly, the type and degree of disarmament that the agreement might stipulate involves ~~has a bearing~~ not only ~~only on~~ the issue of security but, as far as Russia is concerned, ~~it has also an important bearing on the incentives which~~ it may ~~offer to Russia with respect to her~~ greatly affect her economic prosperity.

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What are the main incentives which such an overall settlement could provide for continued Russian cooperation? Any Russian policy, if it is rational and is based on the national interest, must be greatly concerned about security from attack and the economic development of the country. Security from attack means first of all the elimination of a threat of the Atomic Bomb which would permit a direct attack on the cities of Russia. And also the elimination of an attack by land armies based on Western Europe motivated by freshly awakened German nationalist movement. We should have, therefore, to examine what type of disarmament could give this kind of security to Russia, and whether the kind of disarmament that would do this can be reconciled with a legitimate desire for security of Western Europe, the United States and the rest of the World

In thinking of incentives which this agreement could offer to Russia in the economic field we ought not to think, I believe, of direct economic aid to Russia. Immediately after the war Russia was in great need of such economic aid, but today any economic aid which we might be able to give would be quite negligible compared to the economic advantages which the agreement could offer to Russia by creating a setting which would enable Russia to use her productive capacity for her economic development rather than for supplying a heavily equipped large land army. Russia spends today about 20% of her national income on defense and if she could spend this amount on productive investment then civilian consumption in Russia would increase at the rate of 6% per year, which means that it would double every twelve years. Assuming the population increase in Russia is kept within reasonable bounds, there would be a rapid increase in the standard of living which would create a favorable climate for the successful operation of a stable government. Clearly, the type and degree of disarmament that the agreement might stipulate has a bearing not only on the issue of security but, as far as Russia is concerned, it has also an important bearing on the incentives which it may offer to Russia with respect to her economic prosperity.

Abstract

I have started out with this discussion on incentives that an over-all ~~making~~ settlement migh offer to America and Russia because ~~the~~ it illustrates how the various aspects of settlement, those relating to our desire for security and those relating to our desire for prosperity--are interrelated. This makes it very difficult to discuss these various aspects independently and yet they cannot be discussed all at once. I propose, therefore, to proceed by assuming for the sake of argument by adopting some one specific proposal relating to the nature and degree of disarmament that might be covered by the over-all settlement and then examining this one proposal from the point of view from which, in my opinion, such an over-all settlement has to be scrutinized. It should be understood that it is a discussion of these points of view rather than of the actual merits of the specific disarmament proposal on which I want to focus attention. What are these points of view?

1. Is It a Dead-End Street?

The problem with which the ~~threat of the H-bomb~~ existence atomic bombs confronts the world cannot be solved at the level at which political thinking has moved before the war. Before the war the legitimate aim of foreign policy was to prolong the peace, that is to prolong the interval between wars. Today faced with the threat of the atomic bomb we cannot reconcile ourselves to having to go through another world war, ~~and~~ ~~if~~ indeed if we were certain that another world war is unavoidable than those who are instrumental in postponing its date would be rendering a very doubtful service to mankind.

Therefore the over-all settlement which we need must not represent an uneasy armistice but must create a setting within which the world can move along some prearranged path and perhaps even at a

prearranged rate towards an organized world community and beyond that towards to the ultimate solution which is world government. What matters is not whether this ultimate solution is reached within one, two, or three generations; what matters is that it be reached without going through another world war.

2. Does It Remove Inherent Instability?

The power conflict in which Russia and the United States are caught at present is characterized by an inherent instability ~~much like that which characterized the power~~ conflict between Sparta and Athens that lead to the Peloponesian war and the destruction of Greece. In ~~the~~ setting ~~of such a power conflict, with~~ attention focused on the possibility of war, the government of the United States will look on any proposed settlement of a given contraversy from the point of view of whether that settlement will increase or decrease her chance to win the war if war comes. The same, of ~~course, holds true for Russia~~. And since the issue of who shall win the war ~~if war comes~~ is ~~precisely~~ the one issue on which compromise is not possible, no contraversial points which have ~~xxx~~ strategic or military importance can be settled. Any attempt to make progress towards a general settlement piecemeal by taking up such contraversial ~~issues~~ one by one is therefore doomed to failure. In the ensuing deadlock, one or the other of the two governments ~~may~~ take unilateral action ~~to~~ improve her military and strategic position ~~by action, which, while it may~~ increase her chance to win the war ~~if it comes, at the same time~~ increases ~~the probability for war~~. The over-all settlement must be far-reaching enough to make war appear to be no more than a remote possibility so that strategic considerations become of secondary importance. Only if a setting is created in which it ~~appears~~ more important to reduce the chances of war than to increase

~~the chances of winning the war if it comes~~

In the ensuing deadlock the only freedom left to ~~a nation~~ America or America and Russia who are which is caught in such a power conflict is the freedom to make unilateral action. But the action which ~~such nation~~ either Russia or America may take to improve her military or strategic position and in so doing increase her chance to win the war, will ~~in most cases~~ more likely also increase the probability that war will come. Thus there is an inherent instability in a power conflict and once the stage is reached when war is regarded as probable, ~~the situation may deteriorate very rapidly.~~ ~~within a few years it may become even though neither nation wants war, almost certain.~~

The over-all settlement, in order to be free from this inherent instability, must be far-reaching enough for war to be no more than a remote possibility so that strategic considerations become of secondary importance. Stability will be achieved only if a setting is created in which the Russian and American governments will each consider it more important to further reduce the chance of war--which ~~is small already~~ has been greatly reduced by the settlement--than to increase their chance of winning the war if it comes.

within a few short years ~~it may not take long until~~ war becomes a certain even though neither of the two nations wants war.

3. Would Secret Violations and Evasions of the Agreement be Instantly Detected?

4. Is There Any Danger ~~xxxxxRussia~~ of Premeditated Abrogation?

The possibility of abrogation of the agreement by one of t e great powers can never be entirely excluded. But it is necessary carefully to appraise the danger that occurs if one of the great powers which may contemplate abrogation at the time when she enters into the agreement. This is likely only in either of two cases.

a. If that power feels threatened at the time when the agreement is negotiated and signs up in order to avoid the threat, or

b. If that power has nothing to lose by signing, that is, if the early steps of implementation of the agreement do not represent a major investment, such as the destruction of armament which has been accumulated at great cost and the multiplying of factories which have been built for the purpose of producing armament.

5. Are There Sufficient Incentives for Wanting to Keep the Agreement in Force?

6. If There is an Abrogation, Followed By an Arms Race That Leads to War, What Will be Our Chances to Win That War?

Even though the agreement may offer great incentives both for Russia and America for wanting to keep it in force as long as the two governments are guided by enlightened consideration of the national interest, the possibility of abrogation by one or them cannot be entirely disregarded by the other. Both governments would want to know what their position will be if there is an abrogation, if the arms race starts from scratch, and if it is likely to lead to war. Would they then have a fair chance to win the war?

This is a point of course where America's and Russia's interest are not parallel, and the negotiations for an over-all agreement might break down over this point unless both governments are satisfied that the over-all agreement proposed would make the occurrence of abrogation exceedingly unlikely. If that is the case

then it may be that either America or Russia will be faced with a decision of accepting a smaller chance of winning a war that might follow an abrogation for the sake of a greatly increasing chance of avoiding the war in accepting an otherwise satisfactory over-all settlement.

7. ~~How~~ Can the observance of the agreement be enforced ~~and in particular how can the arms provisions of the settlement~~ be enforced ~~against~~ in the case of nations who have not been granted the right to abrogate? if necessary

8. Does the agreement remove at the outset the major forseeable causes for future trouble by ~~defining~~ ascertaining in what way and at what rate the legitimate political and economic aspirations of Germany, Japan, and other nations, ~~as well as a number of other nations which at present have colonial status,~~ may be satisfied?

and in particular ~~and arrangement how the manner in~~ and ~~and~~ the interval shall at all people may be legitimated

9. ~~Ifxthexagreement is to be implemented in stages are the stages succeeding each other fast enough~~?

9. Are the successive stages through which the agreement would be implemented properly devised?

Because of the initial distrust and for a~~n~~ number of other reasons, it will be necessary to provide for the implementation of the agreement in successive stages. The proposed stages will have to be scrutinized from two points of view. 1. Do they offer sufficient safeguards against an abrogation or evasion during the first couple of years of the agreement. 2. Do the stages succeed each other fast enough to eliminate at the very outset, or soon thereafter the inherent instability which characterizes the present power conflict.

insert here remarks about desirable and possible

In order to get away from generalities, we shall now attempt to make some rather definite assumptions about the kind and degree of disarmament which an over-all settlement prescribes. I cannot state with any conviction that these perscriptions come any where near what ought to be done. But it is impossible to come to grips with the problem unless we spell out some definite conditions and then analyze these from the point of view of the desiderata which we postulated above. I shall assume here that some political settlement has been defined which is acceptable to Russia and the United States, that this includes a unified Germany and some provision through which the territories formerly belonging to Germany will be returned to her in stages over a period of perhaps 25 years, that Poland might be compensated by Russia in about the same degree and by the same rate, that matters have been agreed upon which will enable Japan to solve her economic problem by adequate trade, that a moderately satisfactory solution of the colonial problem has been arrived at, etc., etc., and that we now must turn our attention to the problem of arms and the enforcement of the agreement if necessary in case of nations who have no legal right to abrogate the agreement.

What kind of disarmament and what degree of disarmament would offer the best chance for a stable peace. Clearly, as far as the United States is concerned, the elimination of all atomic weapons would in itself make her secure from possible attack provided there are no secret violations of the agreement. It would seem, however, that from the point of view of enlightened considerations of national interest, a disarmament limited to atomic weapons and say chemical and biological warfare might not be acceptable. Three years from

now--and this assumes the third world war will not break out within the next three years, Russia should be in the possession of atomic bombs, Hydrogen-bombs, and adequate means for the delivery to the point where she is invincible. The possession of these weapons guarantees in case of actual war with the United States that western Europe as well as the rest of the world will be neutral. If atomic weapons are elminated but all conventional arms remain as before, an armed western Europe centering around Germany might keep the power conflict alive and in the end endanger the security of Russia. Should Russia, out of such considerations, want to carry disarmament further than the next logical line that we might draft would be the complete elimination of all mobile weapons, such as tanks, guns, flame throwers, etc., but placing no limitations on machine guns which could be manufactured in unlimited quantities and perhaps freely traded across national boundaries.

insert

Along with the atomic-bombs one would also want to eliminate the means suitable for carrying such bombs, that is fast planes with a range of over 500 miles and long range heavy rockets. ~~Ewk~~ By doing so it would be much easier to detect any real dangerous secretive evasion of the agreement.

This kind of disarmament would give Russia all the security she might want and probably also give Western Europe more security than she could otherwise have. If we take into account that one would want to permit heavy guns and other heavy mobile weapons in built-in fortifications, if western Europe so desired, a Maginot Line could be built across Europe which would in case of abrogation successfully

protect Europe against a conceivable, if improbably attack by Russian land armies equipped with machine guns, until such time as an arms race that would presumably start from scratch as soon as an agreement is abrogated again would provide western Europe with heavy weapons. I believe that from a long range point of view this type of disarmament might have great advantages and that in particular secret evasions would become very difficult. We have to look however at this proposal ~~xxxxx~~ not only from a long range point of view but also from the point of view of the next 15 or 20 years. If this type of disarmament were in effect today it would not have been possible to defend Indo-China against the Vietminh (not that I want to imply that a successful defense of Indo-China is necessarily possible even if we were in the position to supply heavy mobile equipment to the forces fighting Vietminh. Yet in the near future it is likely that a successful defense of southeast Asia following the pattern of the defense of Indo-China would probably be much more difficult if not impossible if machine guns are the only weapons that are manufactured in quantity. Moreover, the number of governments that have come into being through a coup carried out by the army and which could not maintain themselves unless the government had heavy guns and tanks at their disposal. This is probably true of Egypt and Iran. These governments would probably not be willing to give up their arms and other nati ns that have an interest in maintaining them in power would support them. This I believe should be regarded as a minor point for no one in his right senses would want to maintain governments of this sort in office forever and t erefore a compromise might be arranged by virtue of which such governments may retain the equipment at present in their hands and perhaps even receive some additional, but after a certain date there

Suggestion for what it is worth

Insert on page 22

We must reconcile ourselves to the fact that no wholly satisfactory solution to this problem is possible. A large part of the population of the world lives in under developed countries and to date no form of democracy has been evolved that is likely to function successfully over appreciable periods of time in under developed countries in the sense in which democracy functions at least tolerably well in France, England, or the United States.

would be no further equipment of this sort manufactured by any of the national governments and import of this kind of equ p ment would automatically cease.

Insert on Shift in Contraversial points

This type of disarmament offers a great advantage that enforcement of the agreement if necessary with armed force against nations which have no right to abrogate becomes comparatively easy. If the national inter police has only machine guns, contingents of the international police which are stationed in those areas which ~~xxxxx~~ must be considered sensitive, need to be equipped only with light tanks, light guns, etc. in moderate quantities so that this in turn means that the internati nal police will not be regarded as a potential agressor by any of the nations who retain the right to abrogate.