

1 of several cc's in E-49A
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois
August 2, 1955

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Humphrey:

You asked me what function I thought the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee might fulfill in the short period of time and with the limited means available between now and the first of January, and you suggested that I put my thoughts on paper.

The main issue as far as substance is concerned, it seems to me, can be phrased as follows: "What kind and what degree of disarmament is desirable within the framework of what political settlement?" It seems to me that one would only add to the already existing confusion if disarmament were discussed without stating clearly what is being assumed concerning the political settlement within which it would have to operate.

I assume that few Senators will be available between the impending adjournment of Congress and the first of January, and thus the question is what could be accomplished by a competent staff. I believe such a staff could hold conferences of the following sort:

Men like Walter Lippman, George Kennan, and perhaps five to ten others who in the past have written on one aspect of the problem or another, would be asked to prepare their thoughts on the "whole problem" and to tell to a critical audience, assembled by the staff, what they would regard as a desirable settlement. They must imagine that somehow they are endowed with such magical power of persuasion that they could convince the rulers of Russia as well as the Administration and the Congress of the United States to follow their ideas, and then say - what kind of an agreement would they want Russia and the United States and the other nations involved to conclude with each other? Each speaker ought to give one complete set of answers to all the important questions that would arise from his assumptions, describe the kind of political settlement which they would favor, the kind and degree of disarmament that they would regard as desirable, and the steps through which disarmament could be carried to its final stage. They would have to give answers to such questions as - "can Russia be trusted to keep an agreement" and "how can we be sure that the disarmament provisions will not be secretly evaded," etc., etc.

August 2, 1955

Each of them could be given, if needed, a full day in which to expound their views and the assembled audience would ask questions in order to elucidate points which have not been made clear and in order to point up the areas which remain to be filled in.

Who should this "audience" be? It seems to me that one should be able to assemble a group of able people, perhaps not more than fifteen, who are interested in the problem, willing to attend these conferences, and come forward with constructive criticism. A number of such men can be found in Washington, some even among the administrative assistants of both Republican and Democratic Senators. Others might be brought here from elsewhere. Columnists and editorial writers of some of the leading newspapers might be induced to take part in these conferences. It should be possible to get one man of your own choice each from the State Department, from Stassen's office and from the Atomic Energy Commission who would address questions to the speakers and point out difficulties.

It would be desirable to base these conferences only on information which is in the public domain and to disregard all "secret" information.

If these conferences are well prepared, they can be compressed into a period of four weeks and perhaps less. This should make possible the participation of those who could not get away for a longer period from their regular jobs and also should keep expenses down to a minimum.

These conferences would not be hearings, and they would be limited to those invited. A record would be kept and it would be the function of the staff to edit the record of the discussion in order to end up with a document from which all irrelevant matter has been deleted. This document is meant to point up the issues that are worthy of the Subcommittee's further attention and may be made the subject of public hearings later on.

For preparing these conferences, guiding them and editing them, it ought to be possible to draw in, on a volunteer basis, three or four men who would work with the regular staff of the Subcommittee. These men should serve on a full time basis each for a stretch at a time, and they might take turns, provided there is a sufficient overlap. These men could help to decide who should be invited to present their views, secure their acceptance, discuss with the invitees ahead of their appearance the issues to be covered by them, and guide the conference sessions.

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey

-2-

August 2, 1955

These men need not be paid a salary, but they ought to be compensated for their expenses, as should be those who may be brought in from out of town for the period of the conference to serve in the "audience."

With best wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Confidential

The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois
August 2, 1955

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Humphrey:

You asked me what function I thought the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee might fulfill in the short period of time and with the limited means available between now and the first of January, and you suggested that I put my thoughts on paper.

The main issue as far as substance is concerned, it seems to me, can be phrased as follows: "What kind and what degree of disarmament is desirable within the framework of what political settlement?" It seems to me that one would only add to the already existing confusion if disarmament were discussed without stating clearly what is being assumed concerning the political settlement within which it would have to operate.

I assume that few Senators will be available between the impending adjournment of Congress and the first of January, and thus the question is what could be accomplished by a competent staff. I believe such a staff could hold conferences of the following sort:

Men like Walter Lippman, George Kennan, and perhaps five to ten others who in the past have written on one aspect of the problem or another, would be asked to prepare their thoughts on the "whole problem" and to tell to a critical audience, assembled by the staff, what they would regard as a desirable settlement. They must imagine that somehow they are endowed with such magical power of persuasion that they could convince the rulers of Russia as well as the Administration and the Congress of the United States to follow their ideas, and then say - what kind of an agreement would they want Russia and the United States and the other nations involved to conclude with each other? Each speaker ought to give one complete set

August 2, 1955

of answers to all the important questions that would arise from his assumptions, describe the kind of political settlement which they would favor, the kind and degree of disarmament that they would regard as desirable, and the steps through which disarmament could be carried to its final stage. They would have to give answers to such questions as - "can Russia be trusted to keep an agreement" and "how can we be sure that the disarmament provisions will not be secretly evaded," etc., etc.

Each of them could be given, if needed, a full day in which to expound their views and the assembled audience would ask questions in order to elucidate points which have not been made clear and in order to point up the areas which remain to be filled in.

Who should this "audience" be? It seems to me that one should be able to assemble a group of able people, perhaps not more than fifteen, who are interested in the problem, willing to attend these conferences, and come forward with constructive criticism. A number of such men can be found in Washington, some even among the administrative assistants of both Republican and Democratic Senators. Others might be brought here from elsewhere. Columnists and editorial writers of some of the leading newspapers might be induced to take part in these conferences. It should be possible to get one man of your own choice each from the State Department, from Stessen's office and from the Atomic Energy Commission who would address questions to the speakers and point out difficulties.

It would be desirable to base these conferences only on information which is in the public domain and to disregard all "secret" information.

If these conferences are well prepared, they can be compressed into a period of four weeks and perhaps less. This should make possible the participation of those who could not get away for a longer period from their regular jobs and also should keep expenses down to a minimum.

August 2, 1955

These conferences would not be hearings, and they would be limited to those invited. A record would be kept and it would be the function of the staff to edit the record of the discussion in order to end up with a document from which all irrelevant matter has been deleted. This document is meant to point up the issues that are worthy of the Subcommittee's further attention and may be made the subject of public hearings later on.

For preparing these conferences, guiding them and editing them, it ought to be possible to draw in, on a volunteer basis, three or four men who would work with the regular staff of the Subcommittee. These men should serve on a full time basis each for a stretch at a time, and they might take turns provided there is a sufficient overlap. These men could help to decide who should be invited to present their views, secure their acceptance, discuss with the invitees ahead of their appearance the issues to be covered by them, and guide the conference sessions.

These men need not be paid a salary, but they ought to be compensated for their expenses, as should be those who may be brought in from out of town for the period of the conference to serve in the "audience."

With best wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

LS:srr

Leo Szilard

WALTER F. GEORGE, GA., CHAIRMAN

THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, R. I. ALEXANDER WILEY, WIS.
J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK. H. ALEXANDER SMITH, N. J.
JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA. BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN. WILLIAM LANGER, N. DAK.
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT. WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND, CALIF.
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY. GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
WAYNE MORSE, OREG. HOMER E. CAPEHART, IND.

FRANCIS O. WILCOX, CHIEF OF STAFF

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

December 9, 1955

Dr. Leo Szilard
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
5734 University Avenue
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Dr. Szilard:


I was delighted to find that your thoughtful analysis of our disarmament problem reached the printing stage in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists for October. Thank you for sending me a copy.

As you know, I think your contribution in this field is a special one, and I am making certain that my staff in the new Disarmament Subcommittee is fully acquainted with your article. I hope that you can see to it that any of your future articles or suggestions are brought directly to the attention of Mr. Francis Valeo, the Acting Staff Director of the Subcommittee. From time to time, I shall remind him of my earnest interest in your ideas on this subject.

Tam Hughes tells me that he also has discussed these matters with you recently, and I trust that through Max and Tam we will be kept informed of both your whereabouts and your new contributions.

I shall be disappointed if you do not stop in to my office again the next time you are in Washington.

Sincerely,


Hubert H. Humphrey

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS

THE ENRICO FERMI INSTITUTE
FOR NUCLEAR STUDIES

December 15, 1956.

Dear Senator Humphrey,

X

I wish to thank you for your very kind letter of Dec. 10th. Recently I was asked both by Harper's and Foreign Affairs for an article which I am at present preparing. I am not sure that either of the two will really like it, and I am not even certain that I shall like it, but in any case I would want to make the point of view expressed in it, the theme of my prepared testimony - if after reading this letter you still want me to testify. The recent pre-election controversy on whether or not we shall stop testing large bombs was, I believe, based by both parties on a false premise. This premise is, that if only Russia and we could agree on some fool-proof method of inspection, we would then want to eliminate atomic bombs from national armaments. I am inclined to think even if Russia offered us a fool-proof inspection system - we would not be likely to want to eliminate atomic bombs from national armaments; and moreover, I am not at all certain that we should want it.

X

The relevant questions, I believe, are now as follows: has not the fact that the great powers possess large bombs in large quantities opened up a new possibility - never before present - for establishing a stable peace? What would it take to make such a peace really stable? What philosophy must both America and Russia adopt concerning the "strategic" use of the bomb in order to eliminate the danger of an all out atomic

catastrophy? At present there is a strong incentive for the smaller nations to acquire bombs also; what needs to be done to diminish or eliminate such an incentive?

Clearly in the absence of a new philosophy concerning the use of the bomb - and we certainly have not developed such a philosophy until now - the possession of bombs by the individual nations represents a serious danger. But if we adopted a new philosophy concerning the use of the bomb that would stabilize the peace, would the world not be better off with the bomb than without it? In the past I have strongly pleaded for the elimination of atomic bombs from national armaments because there was a serious danger that an atomic war might break out as a result of the arms race, but if now - as we approach a stalemate between the strategic air forces of America and Russia - it becomes possible to eliminate this danger, then we must re-examine the issue of atomic disarmament. Now that both Russia and America have learned how to make hydrogen bombs, even in case of total atomic disarmament another world war would end up being an atomic war.

MEMORANDUM TO HUMPHREY

It seems to me that the situation is as follows:

There is an ever present danger, if the great powers stockpile large quantities of large bombs, that through an error (or malicious provocation) by a third power America and Russia will annihilate each other. Navigation is an ancient art and one should think that the use of radar must make the oceans safe even if visibility is low, yet recently even though their radar equipment was in perfect order as the Stockholm and Andrea Doria approached each other, the Stockholm took a right turn and the Doria made a left turn and the two ships collided. The danger of an atomic catastrophe arising from the mere existence of large stockpiles of bombs could, however, be minimized by reaching an understanding between America and Russia under rules which will control the action of their strategic air forces and the intercontinental ballistic missile command. I submit that the problem presented by the mere existence of bombs can be solved even though they may not have been solved up to now. The real danger that faces us at present lies elsewhere. Neither Russia nor America wants an all out atomic catastrophe or an entanglement that might lead to it, but Russia and America do not control the world. If there is a conflict between two nations which leads to an armed attack - in the absence of a political settlement - it might well happen that Russia and America will intervene militarily on opposite sides. In certain circumstances we or Russia or both may then resort to the use of atomic bombs in technical warfare, and finally the initially local conflict might end in an all out atomic catastrophe.

From the point of view of averting this danger the most important single requirement is a political settlement between America and Russia, and by the term 'political settlement' I mean an understanding that will give us assurance that in any of the foreseeable armed con-

flicts Russia and America will not intervene militarily on opposite sides. It is my contention that the stalemate between the strategic air forces of Russia and America, towards which we are rapidly approaching, makes such a settlement possible, and that such a stalemate introduces in this respect a factor which is favorable and which has never before existed in world politics. It is this new factor which makes it now possible to reach a settlement, while during the ten years which followed the second world war we were caught in a situation in which none of the controversial issues could be negotiated. The reason for this change is a simple one: today both America and Russia can destroy each other to any desired degree, and neither can destroy by a sudden attack the power of the other to retaliate. Nothing of this sort ever existed before.

The U.S. fought two wars in this century, and each time she intervened mainly in order to avert a shift in the situation of world power which would not have endangered her security. If Germany had won the first world war, or if Germany had won the second world war, and if atomic bombs did not exist, the U.S. would have found herself in a position where she might have been conquered in the following war. But once a stalemate in bombs has been achieved between the U.S. and Russia, neither of these two countries will from here on ever find herself in a situation where she could be conquered in case of war. As a result one of the controversial issues around which their policies revolved in the past ten years, retain importance, at least not from the admittedly narrow viewpoint of military security.

In these ten years almost every controversial issue, had it been decided one way or another, would have brought about a shift in the balance of power. It would have either increased the danger that in case of war America might have been defeated, or it would have

increased the danger that in case of war Russia would be defeated, but since it is clearly not possible to reach a compromise on the issue of WHO should win the war, none of these controversial issues could be negotiated. Today, however, with both Russia and America invincible it is far less important HOW any one of these issues is settled. Important is only that all of them should be settled one way or another. If we can make sure today that neither the security of Russia nor America demands any change in the status quo nor would any change in the status quo that does not involve the territory of either country change the fact that both America and Russia are unconquerable. It should, therefore, be possible today to reach a settlement with Russia in the sense of making certain, that ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ none of the foreseeable existing conflicts/^{that} may lead to an armed attack, neither Russia nor America will intervene militarily on the opposite sides. This is what I should regard as a minimum requirement from averting the danger of an atomic war, but this minimum requirement is clearly not enough. Russia and America are not alone, and if we allow things to drift as we allowed them to drift in the past ten years, one nation after another will acquire atomic bombs. We need hardly be disturbed by the fact that Great Britain possesses atomic bombs, but the possession of atomic bombs by certain other nations might be much more disturbing.

Today even many of the smaller nations have ~~xxxxx~~ a strong incentive to acquire atomic bombs because this would seem to increase what they regard as their military security.

If we want to avoid this trend we will have to take measures that will diminish or eliminate the incentive for these nations to move in this direction.

As far as the smaller nations are concerned, i.e. excluding powerful nations as Germany, Japan, England, France, China, Russia and the U.S., or any conflict in which these nations are directly involved, these smaller nations could be given full security and they would be able to reduce their arm expenditure by maintaining in the troubled areas of the world regional professional armed forces, maintained in ~~xxxxxx~~ each case by a group of nations who are acceptable to the nations of the region. Whether they would operate with the blessing of the U.N. they would not operate under directions of the U.N. or the Security Council but under the directions of the nations which maintain them.

Once it becomes clear to the smaller nations that the status quo will be rigidly enforced, that neither of them is in danger of being conquered, and that neither of them can hope to add to its territory by bringing about a forcible change, these smaller nations will not persist long in impoverishing themselves by maintaining large arms expenditures, nor will they want to go to the cost of maintaining a strategic air force and stockpiling bombs.

If my contention is correct, and if the strategic stalemate between the great powers permits the great powers to arrive at a political settlement that will free the world from the danger that the great powers will intervene on opposite sides in an armed conflict, then clearly we ought to aim at maintaining the stalemate, say for the next 25 years. Total nuclear disarmament would lead us back to the world which existed before the war. This would not eliminate in any way the chance of another war breaking out, and once Russia and America and the other great powers have learned how to make bombs, any major war between them would end up being an atomic war and might terminate with an all out atomic catastrophe. There was a time when there was reason to fear that world war might break out as a result of the atomic

arms race but the world is - which the stalemate between the great powers - over this hump. Now the danger is not that the atomic arms race per se will cause a war. Now, from the point of view of causing a war, having allies is more dangerous than having bombs. The danger comes from the absence of a political settlement among the great powers and above all from the fact that the great powers have not understood to what extent the valid premises of political thinking upon which foreign policy in the past was rightly based, have lost their validity. Not so long ago we were dependent for our military security on our allies, and if one of our major allies brought herself into war and was in danger of losing that war, we might have been forced to intervene in order to avert to be pushed into a strategic position where we could be subsequently defeated also. This situation has now altogether changed or is about to change.

August 16, 1957

Senator Hubert Humphrey
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Humphrey:

I should greatly appreciate your reading the attached note when your time permits and giving me your general reaction at your convenience.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

m
Encl.

May 8, 1958

Senator Hubert Humphrey
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Humphrey:

Following our conversation in Boston, I talked to Col. Leghorn over the telephone, who said that he would write to you today about the possibility of his testifying before your Committee.

Col. Leghorn and I would talk about the same general topic. While we may say essentially the same things, we will undoubtedly say them in a very different manner and therefore it might be useful if both of us appeared at the same Session of your Committee. My prepared statement would probably consume about $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours, and Col. Leghorn's statement might take between an hour and $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours. We are both anxious to be able to answer all questions that might be raised by any of the Senators present, and we might thus take, in toto, perhaps as much as $4\frac{1}{2}$ hours of the Committee's time.

I could appear any time during the last week of May or the first week of June, at the Committee's convenience, and I believe Col. Leghorn could be available during the same period, with the exception of one day, which he will specify in his letter.

I expect to be in Washington later on in May, and I shall contact your office to let you know where in Washington you may reach me.

With best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

cc Col. R. Leghorn
LS:dmp

May 8, 1958

Senator Hubert Humphrey
The Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Humphrey:

Enclosed you will find, for your information, a copy of the Memorandum which Leghorn, Wiesner and I handed to Topchiev on the last day of the Quebec meeting, and further, a copy of the letter which I wrote Topchiev today on the basis of the conversation that I had with you in Boston.

It was a great pleasure to see you on the occasion of your visit to Boston.

With best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

Enclosures
LS:dmp

Boston, Massachusetts
May 13, 1958

Senator Hubert Humphrey
Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Humphrey:

Col. Leghorn and I wrote you a few days ago concerning the possibility that we might testify before your Subcommittee if you should wish us to do so. Col. Leghorn forgot to say in his letter that he could not make himself available on June 3. I should perhaps add that the second week of June would be just as convenient both to him and to me as the first week of June.

I shall arrive in Washington this coming weekend and shall be staying at the Shoreham Hotel. In the next few weeks I can be reached during office hours at Extension 3501, Oliver 6-4000, or by mail c/o Robert B. Livingston, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda 14, Md.

With every good wish,

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

Copy to Col. Leghorn

June 20, 1958

Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Humphrey:

Attached you will find a copy of a letter which Colonel Leghorn wrote to Topchiev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, concerning the proposed meeting which I discussed with you in Boston. Today we had a telegram from Topchiev in response, setting the date as July 28. Unless objections are raised by the United States Government to our going to such a meeting, we are going through with the plan as originally projected. The meeting is supposed to last for about two weeks.

You will receive a communication in this matter from Colonel Leghorn and I might call you over the telephone within the next few days in order to obtain your reaction to all of this.

If we are going through with the plans, both Colonel Leghorn and I expect to be rather busy with preparing material for this meeting. For this reason, we are both wondering how

2-Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey

June 20, 1958

you might feel about dropping the plans for Colonel Leghorn and me to testify before your Subcommittee prior to the recess. If it is all the same to you, it might be preferable for Colonel Leghorn and me to appear before your Subcommittee after Congress reconvenes.

With best wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

Attachment

Leo Szilard

CC: Colonel Richard Leghorn
Professor J. B. Wiesner

LS:md

THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, R. I., CHAIRMAN

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK.
JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.
WAYNE MORSE, OREG.
RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.
JOHN F. KENNEDY, MASS.

ALEXANDER WILEY, WIS.
H. ALEXANDER SMITH, N. J.
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA
WILLIAM LANGER, N. DAK.
WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND, CALIF.
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
HOMER E. CAPEHART, IND.

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF
DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

July 3, 1958

Dr. Leo Szilard
c/o Robert B. Livingston
National Institutes of Health
Bethesda 14, Maryland

Dear Dr. Szilard:


Thank you for bringing to my attention the letters you received from Academician Topchiev, General Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. I note that he says the Soviet Academy of Sciences will have no objections to my participation in a conference in Moscow this year. I appreciate your initiative in bringing this possibility to Academician Topchiev's attention, and also his friendly response.

Unfortunately this Congress is going to remain in session longer than we had originally anticipated. That fact, as well as commitments which are now unavoidable for me following the adjournment of Congress will make it impossible for me to participate as an observer in your projected meeting in Moscow. I hope you will express my regrets to Academician Topchiev.

If your conference is held, I wish you every success and look forward to meeting with you and any other participants upon your return to the States.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,


Hubert H. Humphrey

THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, R. I., CHAIRMAN

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK.

JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.

MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.

WAYNE MORSE, OREG.

RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.

JOHN F. KENNEDY, MASS.

ALEXANDER WILEY, WIS.

H. ALEXANDER SMITH, N. J.

BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA

WILLIAM LANGER, N. DAK.

WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND, CALIF.

GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.

HOMER E. CAPEHART, IND.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF
DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, CLERK

July 22, 1958

Leo Szilard
The Enrico Fermi Institute for
Nuclear Studies
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Dr. Szilard:


I have had an opportunity to read your letter of July 21 to my Legislative Counsel, Mr. Thomas Hughes. Indeed it is time that the Democrats developed a clear-cut statement on foreign policy, particularly as it relates to the Middle East.

The majority of the Democrats do not agree with the action of the Administration. The majority of Democrats are highly critical of the Administration's failure to develop a constructive Middle East policy. There have been some discussions about this among Democrats and you can expect that our position will be more clearly outlined in the days to come.

Let me share with you some of the things I have been saying recently about the Middle East.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,


Hubert H. Humphrey

Enclosures

V-73
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
MINNESOTA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.


May 31, 1960

Dr. Leo Szilard
The Enrico Fermi Institute
for Nuclear Studies
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Dr. Szilard:

I wanted you to know that Mr. Joseph Rauh has passed on to me your article which is soon to appear in LOOK Magazine. I have had a chance to merely glance through it, but I plan to give it further study on the plane to Chicago this afternoon. I am delighted to have it. Thanks so much for sending it to us.

Sincerely yours,


Hubert H. Humphrey

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
MINNESOTA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 7, 1961

Dr. Leo Szilard
c/o ~~Simon and Schuster~~
630 Fifth Avenue
Rockefeller Center
New York 20, New York


Dear Dr. Szilard:

Many thanks for your book, The Voice of the Dolphins.

I am sure that the light it sheds on the necessity for disarmament and the terrifying potential of the alternatives to an agreement will contribute to a more constructive psychology in this area.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,


Hubert H. Humphrey

Thus the main issue is: how can we make reasonably sure that we shall not have another world war? Before the Bomb~~s~~ existed, America fought two world wars, and if the Bomb did not exist today she might have to fight another world war for exactly the same reasons for which she fought the first two.)

If by incorporating the Bomb into the armaments of the great powers ^{as well} and the right kind of philosophy concerning the potential use into the minds of their statesmen we can eliminate the danger of another world war, then the answer to the issue of avoiding atomic war might be the retention of the Bomb~~s~~ rather than ~~atomic~~ disarmament.

The present situation is of course an exceedingly dangerous one, and world war may break out through circumstances which are not in our control nor in the control of Russia. There might arise a conflict between two nations and because we have not reached a political settlement with Russia, America and Russia might intervene militarily on opposite sides. Either we or Russia or both might then have to resort to the technical use of atomic weapons and what started as a local war might then end up with an all out atomic catastrophe. What we now need far more urgently than disarmament is either political settlement with Russia in the following sense: We must reach an understanding that we make certain that in none of the foreseeable local conflicts shall we or Russia militarily interfere on the opposite sides. I believe that if such a settlement is possible, it is possible precisely because we are approaching a stalemate between the strategic air forces of America and Russia and if this is correct a strong case can be made out for preserving this stalemate, say for the next 25 years.

Dear Senator Humphrey,

I wish to thank you for your very kind letter of Dec. 10th. Recently I was asked both by Harper's and by Foreign Affairs for an article which I am at present preparing. I am not sure that either of the two will really like it, and I am not even certain that I shall like it, but in any case I would want to make the point of view expressed in it, the theme of my prepared testimony. *This article is not really about disarmament.* The recent pre-election controversy on whether or not we shall stop testing hydrogen bombs was, I believe, based by both parties on a false premise. This premise is, that if only Russia and we could agree on some fool-proof method of inspection, we would then want to eliminate atomic bombs from national armaments.

am inclined to think
~~I personally am convinced that even if Russia offered us a fool-proof inspection system-- and I personally have no doubt that such a system is possible - we would not be likely to want to eliminate atomic bombs from national armaments,~~ And moreover, I am not at all certain that we should want it.

The relevant question now is this: What I would want to examine, if that is alright with you, has not
is the question of whether the possession of hydrogen bombs by the great powers ~~has not~~ opened up the possibility - never before present -

to establish a stable peace ^{and in particular} to try to state

^{indeed} ^{really} ^{would}
What it would take to make ~~this~~ peace stable. Clearly this word

^{What}
~~would involve an entirely new philosophy on how the existence of the~~
~~must we adapt concerning both America~~
~~bomb should be used politically and what kind of strategy~~
~~and Russia adapt concerning the~~
~~concerning the possible use of the bomb both we and Russia would have~~
~~to adopt.~~ ^{"strategic" use, as the bomb}

^{clearly} ^{At present there is a strong}
^{incentive for the smaller}
In the absence of a new philosophy concerning the use

of the bomb - and we have not developed such philosophy ^{until} up ^{until} now -

the possession of bombs by the individual nations represents a

serious danger.

^{* But what if we adopted a}
^{different philosophy?}
Because I realize that ~~this~~ position could easily be

^{my}
~~misinterpreted as a bellicose position - which, of course, it is not -~~

^{to explain why I'm here}
~~it would be necessary for me to review the views which many scientists~~

^{by}
~~along with me have emphasized in the past. We have strongly pleaded~~

^{for the elimination of atomic bombs from national armaments merely}
~~and only I plead no longer. In the past~~

^{but}
~~because~~ there was a serious danger that an atomic war might break

out as the result of the arms race. But as we approach a stalemate

between the strategic air forces of America and Russia it may be

possible to reach an agreement that will eliminate this danger. [#] We

can do better than that only if we can create conditions which

eliminate as far as possible all incentives for the great powers to

wage a war and above all the danger that they may interfere in a local conflict militarily on the opposite side.

Once
 If the danger that an atomic war breaks out as a result of the arms race *once* ^{*over*} is ~~passed~~, atomic disarmament loses its previous great importance. *Now that* ~~Once~~ America and Russia have ^{*both*} learned how to make atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs, in case of ^{*a*} world war they will make such bombs ^{*and*} if necessary from scratch ~~and~~ the war will become an atomic war. *In any case* On the contrary, the existence of atomic and hydrogen bombs, if only we understood what the proper philosophy is concerning their potential use, may create a situation where the vicious circle that operates in the power conflict and creates a deadlock in which none of the controversies can be settled, may no longer operate.

We must, therefore, now ask: could we not, by ~~retaining~~^{retaining} the bomb as part of the national armament of the great powers but adopting an entirely new strategy concerning these bombs, get a greater advantage from the point of view of achieving stable peace and would we on the contrary if we eliminated the bomb, not revert to the kind of power conflict that occurred again and again in the course of history - in the absence of a stalemate between the strategic air forces?

Is there not in these classical power conflicts a vicious circle operating that almost inevitably leads to war ^{can} and/not the strategic stalemate be developed to the point where this vicious circle no longer operates?

kind of things that
 These are the ~~questions on which I would like to talk,~~
I should like to discuss if you would
 if you wish me to talk about them, I ~~would~~ prepare a statement composed
me to be exposed before your office
 of perhaps three sections and submit to questioning after each section,
 but I fear that this might easily consume 2 1/2 hours. ~~Particularly~~
that - answer pause
 if the questioning takes up as much time as the reading of the state-
 ment itself.

I am spending this coming week of 17th in N.Y. where I can be reached by Mr. Dan Jacobs over the telephone at ext. 2134, Pl. 5-5800 (St. Moritz Hotel) and I shall write Mr. Jacobs to advise him of this and to say that I shall be glad to testify any time on

January 16 or 17 provided that after reading my letter you think

that I should.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,