

HOTEL
DUPONT
PLAZA

DUPONT CIRCLE AND NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE N. W., WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

June 11, 1962

HUdson 3-6000

Dear [REDACTED]

In response to the proposal made in my speech, "Are We On The Road To War?", about 2,500 persons have expressed their willingness to support the Council and the Lobby if these are established. Currently pledges are coming in at the rate of over one hundred a week. Pledges received to date would seem to assure contributions in the amount of \$150,000 to \$400,000 a year, enough to enable us to make an effective beginning. In view of this response, a committee, the Scientists' Committee for a Livable World, was formed. Seven of the Fellows of this Committee have formed the Council for Abolishing War and the Lobby for Abolishing War. A description of the Council, the Lobby, and their Boards of Directors is enclosed.

One of the first tasks of the Council is to identify 20,000 persons who would wish to join the Movement. Your help in this task would be very welcome and might be decisive. I would like to ask you, if I may, to help the Council to find three to ten additional Members, if possible. "Regular Members" would be expected to make annual contributions in the amount of 2% of their income (or if they prefer, 3% of their income after taxes). "Supporting Members" would be expected to contribute either 1% of their income or \$100. Students and others who devote time and effort to furthering the Movement would also be regarded as Members of the Movement, even though they might be unable to make a financial contribution.

The initial operations of the Council and the Lobby will require a substantial financial expenditure. If you are willing to help to set up these operations and to expend for this purpose one-half of your total contribution for this year, please make out a check to the Council for Abolishing War and mail it either to me or, preferably, use the enclosed envelope which is addressed to Daniel M. Singer, Treasurer of the Council, at 1700 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

Concerning the other half of your contribution to the Movement for 1962, two alternatives, A - Political Campaign Contributions, and B - Tax Exempt Contribution to a Joint American-Russian Staff Study, are described in the attached memoranda. The Council and the Lobby would appreciate your indicating your preferences in the enclosed questionnaire. If you choose alternative A and intend to make a campaign contribution for 1962, please indicate in the questionnaire your preferences for particular Congressional candidates as well. The Lobby will then make specific recommendations to you in July.

To accomplish the political objectives of the Movement we are going to need in the months ahead the help of all Members, in one way or another. The sooner you and the others who receive this letter respond, the more effective will be the Movement in this election year.

Sincerely,



Leo Szilard

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL AND THE LOBBY

The Scientists Committee for a Livable World is a group of scientists whose sole function is to consult with each other on the problems involved in achieving a livable world. The names of the scientists presently on the Committee are annexed. The Fellows of this Committee--those whose names are marked with an asterisk--have the responsibility of establishing such operating organizations as are needed.

A meeting of the Fellows was called on June 1, 1962 and was attended by Professors Charles Coryell, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, William Doering, Yale University, John Edsall, Harvard University, Bernard T. Feld, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Maurice Fox, The Rockefeller Institute, David Hogness, Stanford University, and Leo Szilard, The University of Chicago.

At the meeting, two political committees, The Council for Abolishing War and The Lobby for Abolishing War, were established, and their Boards of Directors were elected. The same persons were chosen to serve on both Boards of Directors for an initial period of one year. They are: Mrs. Ruth Adams, Associate Editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Chicago; William Doering, Professor of Chemistry, Yale University, New Haven; Bernard T. Feld, Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge; Allan Forbes, Jr., producer of documentary films, Boston; Maurice Fox, Associate Professor of Biology, The Rockefeller Institute, New York; Morton Grodzins, Chairman of the Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago; James Patton, President of the Farmers' Union, Denver; Arthur Penn, director, theater and motion pictures, New York; Charles Pratt, Jr., photographer, New York; Daniel M. Singer, attorney, General Counsel for the Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D.C.; and Leo Szilard, Professor of Biophysics, The University of Chicago.

The Boards of Directors elected Professors William Doering and Leo Szilard to serve as Co-Chairmen of the Boards. The following officers for the organizations were elected: Bernard T. Feld, President; Allan Forbes, Jr., Vice-President; and Daniel M. Singer, Secretary and Treasurer.

At the meeting, it was resolved that, in addition to their financial support, supporters of the Council and the Lobby will be encouraged to participate if they desire and are able to do so in the formulation, propagation and achievement of the political objectives of the organizations. It was recognized that the promotion of these objectives depends not only upon effective action in Washington, but also on the ability of the supporters of the Council and the Lobby to give public currency throughout the nation to the best ideas and programs for the reduction of the danger of war, and the abolition of war as an instrument of national policy, and the creating of a livable world.

The Boards of Directors authorized Dr. Leo Szilard to announce the formation of the Council and the Lobby and to transmit the following documents, which are enclosed:

Memorandum A on Campaign Contributions for 1962

Questionnaire

Memorandum B on a Joint American-Russian Staff Study

The Council and the Lobby

Proposal for the Platform of the Council

June 1, 1962.

Memorandum A

on campaign contributions for 1962

by Leo Szilard

Because of its limited financial resources, the Movement might spread itself too thin if it were to support in 1962 more than two to five Congressional candidates. Therefore, if in the attached questionnaire you indicate that you may make a campaign contribution for 1962, the Lobby may recommend to you in July two to five candidates and you may then decide to support one of them. (Naturally, the Lobby would make certain ahead of time, that these candidates would welcome such campaign contributions.) The Lobby will ask you to make out your check directly to the candidate of your choice but to send it to Washington to the Lobby for transmittal.

The Lobby will base its recommendations on the best information available in July. However, it would be easier for the Lobby to arrive at their recommendations if those who intend to make a campaign contribution in 1962 express their present preferences in the enclosed questionnaire.

Since the Lobby is not yet in operation, I, myself, have consulted in Washington a number of persons who have good judgment, as well as a thorough knowledge of Congress, and these consultations have lead me to the following conclusions:

Individual Senators are in a much better position to make a positive contribution to U. S. foreign policy than individual members of the House and as long as our financial means are very limited, it might be well to focus our attention on the Senate rather than on the House.

The following Senators, who come up for re-election in 1962, could be expected to go along with any constructive foreign policy or defense policy that the Administration might adopt:

John A. Carroll (D., Colorado)
Frank Church (D., Idaho)
Joseph S. Clark (D., Pennsylvania)
J. W. Fulbright (D., Arkansas)
Lister Hill (D., Alabama)
Jacob K. Javits (R., New York)

Thomas H. Kuchel (R., California)
Edward V. Long (D., Missouri)
Warren G. Magnuson (D., Washington)
Mike Monroney (D., Oklahoma)
Wayne L. Morse (D., Oregon)
Thruston B. Morton (R., Kentucky)
Alexander Wiley (R., Wisconsin)

Among the Democrats, Clark, Fulbright, Morse and Monroney may be expected to go beyond just supporting the policies of the Administration and to press, on occasions, for improvement in these policies.

Fulbright will receive the Democratic nomination in Arkansas. His election is thus a foregone conclusion, and there would seem no need for the Movement to give him financial support. This would then leave, among the incumbent Democrats, Clark, Monroney

and Morse as the strongest candidates for receiving financial support from the Movement.

It seems that Senator Kuchel is going to be opposed by Richard Richards, who I understand is very good, and if this is correct, there would be no need for the Movement to get involved in the contest.

We do not as yet know who will oppose Senator Javits and some members of the Movement would perhaps want to give financial support to Javits, if the Democrats do not put up an adequate candidate. If you are among them you ought to mark the enclosed questionnaire accordingly for the guidance of the Lobby.

George McGovern, Special Assistant to the President in charge of the Food for Peace Program, and former Congressman, is contesting the Senate seat of Francis Case in South Dakota. Even though Francis Case may be considered a good man, McGovern is so outstanding, that he ought to receive financial support from the Movement.

Congressman Frank Kowalski (D., Connecticut) is seeking the Democratic nomination for the Senate in Connecticut, as does Abraham Ribicoff, at present Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. If Kowalski should receive the nomination presumably he ought to receive financial support from the Movement, even if he were running against an otherwise acceptable Republican candidate.

I am less clear in my mind, however, whether the Movement ought to support Kowalski in his contest with Ribicoff for the nomination. This is one of the several points on which your opinion is solicited in the enclosed questionnaire, (The primary in Connecticut will be in September.)

Congressman David S. King (D., Utah) is contesting the seat of Senator Wallace S. Bennett (R.) and depending on the financial resources likely to be available in the Fall, the Lobby might recommend in July that King be supported by the Movement.

*
* *
*

June 1, 1962.

MEMORANDUM B
on a joint American-Russian staff study.

by Leo Szilard

The text of my speech, "Are We On The Road To War?", contains the following passage:

"I believe that no substantial progress can be made toward disarmament until Americans and Russians first reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

"American reluctance to seriously contemplate general disarmament is largely due to uncertainty about this point. If it became clear that a satisfactory solution of this issue is possible, many Americans may come to regard general disarmament as a highly desirable goal.

"On the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world, progress would probably be made reasonably fast, through nongovernmental discussions among Americans and Russians. I believe that such discussions ought to be arranged through private initiative, but with the blessing of the Administration."

If the Movement is prepared to provide funds for this purpose, it would seem advisable to set up a study of the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world -- on a crash basis. Such a study would then extend over a period of three or four months, would be conducted on a full-time basis and the Russian and American participants would work jointly, part of the time in Moscow and part of the time in Washington, on the problems involved. The aim of the study would be to produce a working paper that would list a number of different ways in which peace might be secured in a disarmed world and examine in each particular case in what circumstances each particular solution might be likely to fail. By proceeding in this manner, none of the solutions could be labeled as an American or a Russian proposal and, being free from this stigma, the proposals would be more likely to receive sympathetic consideration on the part of the governments involved.

I assume that on the Russian side the study would be sponsored by the Soviet Academy of Science; on the American side it could be sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Science, Boston.

If the responses given in the enclosed questionnaire should show that the Movement is prepared to provide funds for the study described above, then I would suggest to the Council for Abolishing War that they try to set up such a study under the joint sponsorship of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and a sub-committee of the American Academy of Sciences, of which I happen to be the chairman.

If in the enclosed questionnaire you choose to support such a study, rather than to make a campaign contribution for 1962, and if the Council sets up such a study, then in the Fall the Council would advise you on how to make out your check and where to mail it. Contributions to this study would be tax deductible.

*
* *

QUESTIONNAIRE
drafted by Leo Szilard

FROM: _____
name and address (please print)

1.) I enclose a check made out to Council for Abolishing War, representing one-half of my contribution for 1962.

I do not enclose such a check. (For remarks please use another sheet.)

2.) I would prefer later on to expend the other half of my contribution for 1962 on a political campaign (rather than on a joint American-Russian staff study on disarmament.)

I would prefer later on to expend the other half of my contribution for 1962 in support of a joint American-Russian staff study on disarmament. (Tax-deductible)

3.) If you would prefer later on to expend the other half of your contribution for 1962 on a political campaign.

Please mark those two (of the five incumbents listed below) to whom you presently think such contributions ought to be channelled by the Movement.

Senator Wayne L. Morse, (D., Oregon)

Senator Joseph S. Clark (D., Pennsylvania)

Senator Jacob K. Javits, (R., New York)

Senator Frank Church, (D., Idaho)

Senator Mike Monroney, (D., Oklahoma)

Please indicate below whether you agree that George McGovern (contesting the seat of Senator Francis Case, (R., S. Dakota) ought to receive substantial campaign contributions from the Movement.

Yes

No

Don't know

Please indicate below whether you would agree that if Congressman Frank Kowalski, (D., Connecticut) receives the Democratic nomination for the Senate from Connecticut, he ought to receive substantial campaign contributions from the Movement.

Yes

No

Don't know

Please indicate below whether you think that Congressman Frank Kowalski, (D., Connecticut) ought to receive campaign contributions from the Movement in his contest with Ribicoff for the Democratic nomination.

Yes

No

Don't know

Please give comments on a separate sheet of paper.

THE COUNCIL AND THE LOBBY

BY

Leo Szilard

The Council

It is not possible to get the Government to do something that no one inside the Government wants done, and only those objectives are attainable at any given time for which support can be generated within the Administration. The views represented within the Kennedy Administration cover a wide spectrum however, and the interaction of private groups with the staff of the Administration might lead to the attainment of desirable political objectives, while still remaining within their spectrum.

In order to provide for such interaction, the Council would bring to Washington from time to time, scientists, scholars, and other members of the Movement, who are knowledgeable as well as articulate, and who, by discussing the relevant issues with the Administration, can facilitate the reaching of a concensus on the right conclusions, inside of the Administration.

The Council may arrange for seminars, to be held in Washington, Boston, New York and other cities, for those members of the Movement who wish to clarify their own minds on these issues in order to be able to present their views more effectively in Washington. Knowledgeable and articulate members of the Movement might take turns, each one spending one or two weeks in Washington, and when the Council is fully operating it might be desirable to have five to ten such persons available in Washington at any one time.

For the guidance of those who may speak in the name of the Council, the Council will draft a platform, which will be revised from time to time, and will indicate the objectives which the Council believes to be currently attainable. In the process of revising the platform the Council will hold hearings in Washington, D.C., and members of the Movement will be invited to express their views on that occasion.

He who speaks in the name of the Council need not necessarily be in favor of or argue for, all of its objectives; it is sufficient if he is wholeheartedly in favor of some of these objectives and capable of putting forward convincing arguments in their favor. When speaking in the name of the Council, members of the Movement would be restricted by the Council's platform to currently attainable objectives.

This would leave the members of the Movement free, however, to press as individuals, or through organizations to which they may belong, for objectives which are not currently attainable but which are desirable and, in time, might become attainable.

* * *

THE LOBBY

To designate this political organization as a Lobby is perhaps somewhat misleading. Ordinarily a lobby tries to promote or to obstruct the passage of certain bills, which are before Congress. The issues with which the Council is mainly concerned present themselves, however, only rarely in the form of bills before Congress, and, by the time they do, it is frequently too late to influence the course of events. Of greater concern to the Lobby than the passage of bills is, therefore, the general attitude of Congress on major issues of foreign policy and defense policy.

The attitudes prevailing in Congress may be influenced in several ways:

a) There are a number of men in Congress, particularly in the Senate, who are capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective and who are deeply disturbed by the present trend of events. By bringing to Washington, from time to time, men and women who can engage in constructive discussion of the issues involved, the Lobby could help such members of Congress to clarify their minds on what the attainable objective may be and how they might be attained.

In addition, by providing such members of Congress with adequate campaign funds, the Lobby could help them to have the courage of their convictions and to speak out when the need for speaking out arises.

It will be one of the first concerns of the Lobby that the good men who are now in Congress be re-elected and the Lobby will have to see to it that they shall not lack adequate campaign funds.

b) This, however, is not enough, and the Lobby will have to do what it can to increase the number of those in Congress, and particularly in the Senate, who can be counted upon to support a constructive foreign policy and to press for such a policy. To this end the Lobby will have to find, at the grass-roots level, men who have insight into the basic issues which enter into the making of a constructive foreign policy, and who would have a fair chance of being elected if they were to receive the nomination of their party. It would be the task of the Lobby to persuade such men to seek the nomination of their party and to help them to get it, by assuring them in advance of adequate financial backing.

Guided by the recommendations of the Lobby, members of the Movement who make a campaign contribution, would make out their checks directly to the candidate of their choice, but would send their checks to the Lobby for tabulation and transmittal. This would enable the Lobby to keep tab on the flow of campaign contributions and guide the Lobby in making, from time to time, recommendations on where subsequent contributions ought to go.

In order to be able to make adequate campaign contributions, the Movement ought to grow until it has 150,000 members, at which point its campaign contributions might amount to \$20 million per year. The campaign expenses of a candidate running for the Senate is estimated at about \$250,000 for a larger state, and at about \$100,000 for a smaller state. A contest for the House, in one of the smaller districts, might require \$10,000 to \$20,000 only.

* * *

Occasionally, such as, for instance, in the case of the United Nations bonds there may be a bill before Congress which would be of concern to the Movement. On such occasion the Lobby would communicate with the members of the Movement and suggest that they write, or otherwise contact, their members of Congress. Also it would urge those who are articulate to discuss the relevant issues with the editors of their local newspapers, columnists and other opinion makers.

* * *

The Lobby itself must not support so-called "peace candidates" who can not get the nomination of their party, because the Lobby, in order to be politically effective, must establish and maintain a record of fair success in political action. From the point of view of public education, so-called peace candidates could, however, fulfill a very important function. A candidate who runs for election and wants to get elected, cannot wage an effective educational campaign. But a candidate who is reconciled to the fact that he is not going to be elected, has a unique opportunity to educate the public, because he need not pull his punches; if there is a fight going on people will sit up and listen. Therefore, if the funds at the disposal of the Movement begin to exceed the amounts urgently needed for campaign contributions, either the Lobby, or preferably some other organization set up by the Scientists' Committee for the purpose, may support candidates whose main aim is political education of the public, rather than the winning of elections.

*

* *

June 2, 1962

The Scientists Committee for a Livable World

Those marked with an asterisk serve as Fellows of the Committee for 1962

Meselson and Szilard serve as secretaries of the Fellows in 1962

- Paul Berg
Professor of Biochemistry
Stanford University
Palo Alto, California
- * Geoffrey F. Chew
Professor of Physics
University of California
Berkeley 4, California
- * Charles Coryell
Professor of Chemistry
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts
- * William Doering
Professor of Chemistry
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut
- * John T. Edsall
Professor of Biological Chemistry
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts
- * Bernard T. Feld
Professor of Physics
Laboratory for Nuclear Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts
- Robert Finn
Professor of Mathematics
Stanford University
Stanford, California
- * Maurice Fox
Associate Professor of Biology
The Rockefeller Institute
New York 21, N. Y.
- M.G.F. Fuortes
Section Chief
Neurophysiology-Ophthalmology
National Institutes of Health
Bethesda 14, Maryland
- Donald Glaser (Nobel Prize 1960)
Professor of Physics
University of California
Berkeley, California
- Temporary address:
Department of Biology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Marvin L. Goldberger
Eugene Higgins Professor of
Theoretical Physics
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey
- Robert Gomer
Professor of Chemistry
Institute for the Study of Metals
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois
- Hudson Hoagland
Executive Director
The Worcester Foundation for
Experimental Biology
Shrewsbury, Massachusetts
- * David S. Hogness
Associate Professor of Biochemistry
Stanford University
Palo Alto, California
- Halstead R. Holman, M.D.
Professor of Medicine
Stanford University
Palo Alto, California
- Dale Kaiser
Associate Professor of Biochemistry
Stanford University
Stanford, California

Arthur Kornberg (Nobel Prize 1959)
Professor of Biochemistry
Stanford University
Palo Alto, California

Norman Kretchmer
Professor of Pediatrics
Stanford University
Palo Alto, California

Robert B. Livingston, M.D.
Chief, Laboratory of Neurobiology
National Institutes of Health
Bethesda 14, Maryland

* Matthew Meselson
Associate Professor of
Molecular Biology
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Herman J. Muller (Nobel Prize 1946)
Professor of Genetics
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana

Aaron Novick
Professor of Molecular Biology
Institute of Molecular Biology
University of Oregon
Eugene, Oregon

Arthur B. Rosenfeld
Associate Professor of Physics
University of California
Berkeley 4, California

Leonard I. Schiff
Professor of Physics
Stanford University
Stanford, California

William Shurcliff
Research Fellow, Physics
Cambridge Electron Accelerator
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

* Franklin W. Stahl
Associate Professor of Molecular Biology
Institute of Molecular Biology
University of Oregon
Eugene, Oregon

* Leo Szilard
Professor of Biophysics
The Research Institutes
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

Temporary address:
Hotel DuPont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

George Streisinger
Associate Professor of Molecular Biology
Institute of Molecular Biology
University of Oregon
Eugene, Oregon

11

PROPOSAL FOR THE PLATFORM OF THE COUNCIL

by Leo Szilard

The platform of the Council is supposed to define at any given time the political objectives which, in the opinion of the Council, are attainable at that time. It would be the responsibility of the Board of Directors of the Council initially to adopt a platform and to modify the platform from time to time as the need arises. The platform is meant to indicate to the members of the Movement the political objectives for which, in the opinion of the Council, support could be generated inside of the Administration or in the Congress.

I intend to propose to the Board of Directors of the Council of Abolishing War that it adopt, to begin with, a platform along the lines indicated below:

* * *

The problem which the bomb poses to the world cannot be solved except by abolishing war, and the overall objective is to have an enduring peace in a livable world. This might be attainable within the next 25 years, whereas a just peace may not be an attainable objective in the predictable future and if we stubbornly persist in asking for peace with justice we may not get either peace or justice.

It is necessary to abolish war in order to have a livable world, but it is not sufficient to do so. In order to have a livable world we must not only have peace but also a certain minimum standard of stable and effective government, economic prosperity and individual freedom in the less developed regions of the world. The problems which this involves would of necessity come within the scope of the concern of the Council.

* * *

Conceivably, war could be abolished within the predictable future within the framework of a general political settlement, through general disarmament. General disarmament does not, however, automatically rule out the possibility of war. In a generally disarmed world, with inspection going full blast, armies equipped with machine guns could spring up, so to speak, overnight.

The question of just how secure America and other nations would be in such a disarmed world would depend on the means that would be adopted in order to secure the peace. Few Americans in responsible positions have a clear notion at present of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world, and therefore most of them remain uncertain of whether or not they would really want to have general disarmament. No adequate studies of this subject have been made to date either in America or Russia.

The Russians are strongly motivated toward general disarmament by the economic savings which would result from it and it stands to reason that this should be so. A much larger fraction of industrial production is absorbed by arms in Russia than in America, and the needs of the consumers are satisfied to a much higher degree in America than in Russia. In the circumstances, Russia might be willing to go a

long way towards reaching the kind of political settlement which is a prerequisite for disarmament, in return for obtaining general disarmament. But until such time as Americans in responsible positions become clear in their own mind that they really want disarmament, they are not in a position successfully to negotiate with Russia an acceptable political settlement because they are not in a position to offer Russia the disarmament that she would want to obtain in return.

In any negotiations centering on the issue of disarmament the problem of inspection is likely to loom large. No major progress is likely to be made on this, or any other, issue involved until Americans in responsible positions are sure in their mind that they would want general disarmament under conditions which Russia could be reasonably expected to accept.

If America and Russia were able to reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how peace may be secured in a disarmed world, such a meeting of minds could open the door to serious negotiations of the other issues involved in disarmament. This is a point which the Council may have to devote its attention.

* * *

Until such time as the peace of the world may be secured through a disarmament agreement providing for adequate inspection and means which will be adequate for securing the peace in a disarmed world, we cannot rule out the possibility that a war may break out which neither America nor Russia wants.

Reducing the probability that such a war may break out must be one of the immediate objectives of the Council.

1.) A war that neither America nor Russia wanted may break out as a result of an all-out atomic arms race, and avoidance of such an arms race must be regarded as an immediate political objective.

We would be provoking an all-out atomic arms race if America were to operate with the threat that in case of war she would attempt to shift the power balance in her own favor by mounting an attack against the rocket bases and the strategic air bases of Russia.

There is an influential school of thought within the Administration which advocates that America should use the threat of a "first strike against bases" in case of war as an instrument of her foreign policy -- in order to deter Russia from obstructing objectives of our foreign policy. This does not mean that these people advocate that such "a first strike against bases" be actually carried out in case of war, and no one to my knowledge advocates that such a "first strike against bases" be carried out in time of peace, as a preemptive measure. What is being advocated is that America establish, and maintain, for a few years, strategic striking forces which would be capable of destroying in a massive attack, Russia's long range rocket bases and strategic air bases to the point where the damage caused by a Russian counter attack would remain within acceptable limits.

A threat of this type could be maintained only for a few years, probably five years at the outset; it would provoke responses on Russia's part and we might within a

year or two reach a point of no return in a rapidly escalating arms race. The Council ought to press in favor of a clear policy decision against building up a strategic striking force that would represent a threat to Russia's strategic rocket bases and air bases.

2.) A war that neither Russia nor America wants may break out if either America or the Soviet Union resorts to force in order to extend her sphere of influence. If America had openly intervened in the attempted invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles and had sent in the Marines, she could have conquered Cuba but the Russians might have responded by occupying West Berlin and there is no way of telling whether or not a Russian response of this kind would have resulted in war. If a war is to be avoided that neither Russia nor America wants, both countries must refrain from resorting to force, in attempting to reach their foreign policy objectives.

3.) The islands of Quemoy and Matsu represent one of the danger spots where a war might break out. It would be militarily, morally and legally difficult for America to defend these islands should they come under an all-out attack on the part of the Peoples Republic of China. In the past whenever these islands came under fire we took the position that we can not yield to force and when these islands were not under attack we conveniently forgot about them. The Administration is fully aware of the fact that these islands are a liability to us and ought to be evacuated, but they are dragging their feet. This is a matter which the Council might well wish to take up, after the elections, in November.

4.) The danger of a resort to force could be reduced if America and Russia stopped fighting meaningless battles in the Cold War. In this regard America could and should take the initiative, and the Council may have to devote attention to this issue.

* * *

If a war were to break out it could quickly escalate into an all-out war in the absence of any clear policy of how to keep the war limited until such time as it becomes possible to arrange for a cessation of hostilities. The adoption of policies aimed at preventing the escalation of a war must also be among the immediate objectives pursued by the Council.

5.) The danger that a war might escalate could be reduced if America and Russia adopted the policy of refraining from using atomic bombs in case of war unless atomic bombs were used against her. It is rather doubtful, however, whether the outlawing of atomic bombs would be an immediate attainable objective, at the present time. Moreover, the outlawing of atomic bombs in itself would not prevent an escalation of the war, for if there were a resort to force, even if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would presumably find it difficult to abide by its pledge and would be strongly tempted to resort to the use of atomic bombs.

If there is a resort to force, the means which are employed are, of course, important, and the refraining from using atomic bombs could be a very important factor in preventing escalation. But even more important than the means employed would be the purposes for which force is employed. If force is used for the pur-

pose of changing the power balance and thereby to attain certain foreign policy objectives, then escalation of the war may be inevitable no matter what the means that may be initially employed.

An example for this is what happened in Korea. When North Korean troops moved into South Korea, America intervened and pushed the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel. If America had been satisfied with the use of force for the purpose of making the conquest difficult and with luck to prevent it, the war would have ended at this point. But when American troops crossed the 38th parallel "in order to unify Korea under free elections", the People's Republic of China intervened.

If, in case of war, escalation is to be avoided, both the American Government and the Government of the Soviet Union must clearly understand that, today, if force is used and is resisted with force, the use of force must only have the aim of preventing an easy conquest and exacting a price -- if necessary, a rather high price. The aim must not be victory or anything approaching victory; it must not be a change in the power balance that would enable either America or the Soviet Union to bring about a settlement in its own favor.

Within this frame of reference the Council would have to consider the possibility that the Administration might be willing to adopt two closely interrelated policies which might be phrased as follows:

6.) America's Atomic Strategic Striking Forces shall be maintained only for the purpose of protecting America and her allies by being able to retaliate in case either America or her Allies were attacked by bombs.

7.) In case of war, if America found herself forced to use atomic bombs against troops in combat, she would do so only on her own side of the pre-war boundary, as long as the Soviet Union imposed the same restraint on her use of the bomb.

*

* *

2. "The Bulletin can fill orders for 100 copies or more at 4¢ per copy, including postage."

Reprinted from the
April 1962 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

Are We on the Road to War?

LEO SZILARD

"Are We on the Road to War?" is the text of a speech which Leo Szilard has recently given at nine American colleges and universities in order to invite students to participate in an experiment. The response could show whether a political movement of the kind described in the speech would take off the ground provided it were started on a sufficiently large scale. When the BULLETIN asked Dr. Szilard for permission to reprint the text of the speech, he agreed on condition that he may extend the experiment to the readers of the BULLETIN. Accordingly, those readers who believe that they would be willing to spend two per cent of their income for campaign contributions—provided that the political objectives formulated meet with their approval—are invited to participate in the experiment by writing Dr. Szilard before May 31, 1962, at the Dupont Plaza Hotel, Washington 6, D.C., giving their name and address and briefly indicating the degree of their interest. Reprints may be secured from the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 935 E. 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois. Single copies, 10 cents; 25 or more, seven cents each.

For a number of years now, you have had an opportunity to observe how we, as a nation, respond to the actions of the Russians, and how the Russians respond to our responses. Those of you who have watched closely the course of events in the past six months, may have been let to conclude that we are headed for an all-out war. I myself believe that we are,

and that our chances of getting through the next ten years without war are slim.

I personally find myself in rebellion against the fate that history seems to have in store for us, and I suspect that some of you may be equally rebellious. The question is, what can you do?

War seems indeed to be inevitable, unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present. You, as Americans, are not in a position to influence the Russian government; it follows that you would have to bring about a change in the attitude of the American government which, in turn, may bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian government.

It is conceivable that if a dedicated minority were to take effective political action, they could bring about the change in attitude that is needed. But such a minority can take effective action only if it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which it may unite.

Ever since the end of the war, the policies of the great powers have consistently followed the line of least resistance, and this line leads to an unlimited arms race. I do not believe that America can be made secure by keeping ahead in such an arms race.

There have been repeated attempts to stop the arms race by negotiating an agreement that would provide for some form of arms control. So far, all such attempts have failed, and each time they were followed by the continuation of the arms race, with renewed vigor.

Toward the end of the Eisenhower administration, it was generally expected that the next administration

would adopt a new approach to this problem and that a fresh attempt would be made to bring the arms race under control.

When Khrushchev was in New York a year ago last October, I tried to see him, in the hope of finding out how responsive he might be to such a new approach. I was told that they had scheduled fifteen minutes for me but, as it turned out, the conversation went on for two hours. At that time, it was not known whether Kennedy or Nixon would get elected, and I started off the conversation by saying that no matter who is elected, the government would try to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of stopping the arms race. Khrushchev answered—and he spoke in all seriousness—that he believed this also.

A year ago last November, I checked out of the hospital in New York, where I had been confined for over a year, took a taxi to the airport, and flew to Moscow to attend the sixth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. I was accompanied by my wife, who is also my doctor, and I stayed on in Moscow for about a month beyond the end of the conference. I stayed on in Moscow in order to engage in private conversations with our Russian colleagues, because I knew from experience that only in private conversations is it possible to get anything across to them or to discover what they really believe to be true.

None of our Russian colleagues brought up the issue of bomb tests in any of these conversations in Moscow, even though two years earlier some of them had been passionately interested in this issue. I found, however, an undiminished interest in far-reaching disarmament which would result in substantial savings. On one occasion, I had tea with Fedorov, the General

Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with no one present except my interpreter. I had met Fedorov before and I always got along well with him. On this particular occasion, he spoke to me as follows:

You must really believe me when I tell you that we want general disarmament. You have seen all this construction work going on in Moscow; it has been going on for many years; still we are not able to catch up with the housing shortage. If we had disarmament, we could not only solve this problem, but many of our other economic problems as well. Also, we could develop other nations on an unprecedented scale. So far, we are building only one hydroelectric dam in Africa—the Aswan Dam in Egypt; if we had disarmament, we could, and we would, build twenty such dams in Africa.

I tried to impress upon our Russian colleagues that the Kennedy administration would make a serious effort to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of arms control, but that the new administration would need time—six months and more than six months perhaps—to find its bearings on this issue and to get organized to deal with it.

When I returned to this country in February, I decided to stay in Washington for a while.

In Washington, my friends told me that the government was going to make a sincere effort to reach an agreement with Russia on the cessation of bomb tests and that a reasonable proposal would be made to the Russians on this issue. They would have liked to hear from me that Russia would be likely to accept such a proposal, but coming fresh from Moscow, I had serious doubts on this score.

The invasion of Cuba took me by surprise. When I first heard about it, it was not clear, as yet, whether we were going to give air support to the invading Cuban exiles and whether we would, if necessary, send in the Marines also. My immediate reaction was that of alarm, for I believed that if we did any of these things, we would seriously risk war with Russia. I did not think that Russia would try to intervene in the Caribbean area, and I did not think that the Russians

would launch long-range rockets aimed at our cities. I thought, however, that Russia might make some military move elsewhere, probably in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it would seem that I was wrong, for Tom Slick of the Slick Oil Company, in San Antonio, Texas recently set forth, apparently on good authority, that, if America had openly intervened in Cuba, at that point, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

I would not venture to appraise just how close we came to an all-out war on the occasion of the Cuban incident. I am reasonably certain, however, that if our intervention in Cuba had been successful, this would have blocked for many years to come any possibility of reaching an agreement on arms control with Russia. Failure to reach an accommodation on the Berlin issue might, of course, produce the same result.

I would not entirely exclude the possibility of war over Berlin, but to me, it seems more probable that this crisis will be resolved by some uneasy compromise, and that it will not lead to an all-out war. Russia may bring pressure on West Berlin in order to promote any one of a number of her foreign policy objectives, but on the larger issue, the issue of Germany, the true interest of America and Russia is the same. The true interest of both countries is to have Europe politically as stable as possible.

I am convinced that the Berlin issue could be satisfactorily resolved by negotiations, but this conviction is based on the belief that there is something that the Russians want that we should be willing to give them, and that there is something that we want that the Russians should be willing to give us in return.

There are many people who do not share this belief. They hold that the Berlin issue was artificially created by Russia for the purpose of humiliating America, for breaking up NATO, and for converting West Germany into a communist state.

Many people, perhaps the majority, believe that the Russians are very much like the Nazis; that they have concrete plans for bringing about, one way or another, our total defeat in Europe, and also for subjugating the whole world to their rule.

Many people have a black and white picture of the world; they believe that the nations fall into two classes: the peaceloving nations, and those who are not peaceloving. Amer-

ica, France, England, and generally speaking our allies, including Germany and Japan, are peaceloving nations. Russia and China are not peaceloving nations. Twenty years ago, the situation was somewhat different: at that time, Russia was a peaceloving nation, but Germany and Japan were not.

Many people believe that ever since the atomic bomb forced the unconditional surrender of Japan, America has unceasingly tried to rid the world of the bomb, and that Russian intransigence, alone, blocked progress in this direction.

When I listen to people who hold such views, I sometimes have the feeling that I have lived through all this before and, in a sense, I have. I was sixteen years old when the first World War broke out, and I lived at that time in Hungary. From reading the Hungarian newspapers, it would have appeared that whatever Austria and Germany did was right and whatever England, France, Russia, or America did was wrong. A good case could be made out for this general thesis, in almost every single instance. It would have been quite difficult for me to prove, in any single instance, that the newspapers were wrong, but somehow, it seemed to me unlikely that the two nations, located in the center of Europe, should be invariably right, and that all the other nations should be invariably wrong. History, I reasoned, would hardly operate in such a peculiar fashion, and gradually I was led to conclusions which were diametrically opposed to the views held by the majority of my schoolmates.

Many of my schoolmates regarded me as something of an oracle because I was able to cope with the mysteries of lower arithmetic which baffled them and one of them asked me one day quite early in the war who would lose the war. I said that I didn't know who *would* lose the war, but that I thought that I knew who *ought* to lose the war; I thought that Austria and Germany, as well as Russia, ought to lose the war. Since Austria and Germany fought on one side, and Russia on the other side, it was not quite clear how this could happen. The fact is, of course, that it did happen.

I am not telling you this in order to impress you with how bright I am. Nobody at sixty can claim to be as bright as he was at sixteen, even though in most cases it is not the intelligence that deteriorates, but the character. The point I am trying to make is that even in times of war,

you can see current events in their historical perspective, provided that your passion for the truth prevails over your bias in favor of your own nation.

After the first World War, when I lived in Berlin, a distinguished friend of mine, Michael Polanyi, asked me one day what I thought ought to be the rule of human conduct regulating the behavior of an individual in society. "Clearly," he said, "you cannot simply ask a man to be generous to other people, for if the other people are mean to him, and if he follows your rule, he may starve to death." "But," said Polanyi, "perhaps the rule ought to be 'Be one per cent more generous to people than they are to you.'" This should be sufficient, he thought, because if everyone were to follow this rule, the earth would, step by step, turn into a livable place.

I told him that, to my mind, this would not work at all, because if two people behave the same way toward each other, each is bound to think that he is 30 per cent more generous than the other. Clearly, the rule would have to allow for this bias. Perhaps if we were to stipulate as the rule of conduct, "Be 31 per cent more generous to the others than they are to you" such a rule might work.

America and Russia are not following any such rule of conduct. Moreover, their bias greatly exceeds 30 per cent.

Most Americans apply a yardstick to America's actions which is very different from the yardstick which they apply to Russia's actions. Whenever their bias in favor of their own nation gets into conflict with the truth, the odds are that the bias will prevail. As a result of this, they are not capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective. They may well realize that we are in trouble, but they cannot correctly diagnose the cause of the trouble and therefore, they are not in a position to indicate what the right remedy might be.

The people who have sufficient passion for the truth to give the truth a chance to prevail, if it runs counter to their bias, are in a minority. How important is this minority? It is difficult to say at this point, for, at the present time, their influence on governmental decisions is not perceptible.

If you stay in Washington, you may gain some insight into the manner in

which governmental decisions come about; you may get a feel of what kind of considerations enter into such decisions, and what kind of pressures are at work.

With President Kennedy, new men moved into the administration. Many of them understand the implications of what is going on and are deeply concerned. But, they are so busy trying to keep the worst things from happening, on a day-to-day basis, that they have no time to develop a consensus on what the right approach would be, from the long-term point of view.

There are also a number of men in Congress, particularly in the Senate, who have insight into what is going on and who are concerned, but mostly they lack the courage of their convictions. They may give a lucid analysis of the trouble in private conversations and then at some point or other, they will say: "Of course, I could not say this in public."

In Washington, wisdom has no chance to prevail at this point.

Last September, *Life* magazine printed an article about me which said that I was in Washington trying to find out if there was a market for wisdom. Thereupon, I received a flood of letters from colleges and universities inviting me to give lectures. Most people get some pleasure out of hearing themselves talk, and so do I; yet I did not see much point in going around the country giving talks, if all I had to say was that there was no market for wisdom. Therefore, I declined all these invitations; that is, I declined them all, until Brandeis University invited me to attend a special convocation and receive an honorary doctor's degree. At that point, my vanity got the better of me, and I accepted. At Brandeis, I spoke at dinner informally to the trustees and fellows of the university, and this was my closest contact with grass roots since I moved to Washington—if, indeed, you may regard the trustees and fellows of Brandeis as grass roots.

I told them at Brandeis that I thought we were in very serious trouble; people asked me what there was that they could do about it, and I had no answer to give.

Is there, indeed, anything that these people—and for that matter I, myself—could do at this point that would make sense?

When I got back to Washington, I started to think about this, and I believe it will be best now if I simply recite to you how my thoughts developed from this point on.

The first thought that came to my mind was that in cooperation with others, I could try to set up an organization in Washington—a sort of lobby, if you will—which would bring to Washington, from time to time, scholars and scientists who see current events in their historical perspective. These men would speak with the sweet voice of reason, and our lobby could see to it that they be heard by people inside the administration, and also by the key people in Congress.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished scholars and scientists would be heard, but that they might not be listened to, if they were not able to deliver votes.

Would they be listened to if they were able to deliver votes?

The minority for which they speak might represent a few per cent of the votes, and a few per cent of the votes alone would not mean very much. Still, the combination of a few per cent of the votes and the sweet voice of reason might turn out to be an effective combination. And if the minority for which these men speak, were sufficiently dedicated to stand ready not only to deliver votes, but also to make very substantial campaign contributions, then this minority would be in a position to set up the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington.

The problem which the bomb poses to the world cannot be solved except by abolishing war, and nothing less will do. But first of all, we must back away from the war to which we have come dangerously close.

Could such a dedicated minority agree not only on the long-term political objectives which need to be pursued in order to abolish war, but also on the immediate political objectives, the objectives which must be pursued in the next couple of years, in order to make the present danger of war recede to the point where attention can be focused on the task of abolishing war?

America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in an atomic arms race and an agreement providing for arms control is a necessary first step toward abolishing war.

An agreement on arms control does not seem to be, however, "around the

corner." It might very well be, therefore, that *in the immediate future* America would have to take certain unilateral steps. Some of the steps would be taken in order to reduce the present danger of war; other steps would be taken so that if a war breaks out, which neither America nor Russia wants, it may be possible to bring hostilities to an end before there is an all-out atomic catastrophe.

Such unilateral steps are not adequate substitutes for negotiated agreements, and they can carry us only part of the way, but still there are some unilateral steps which should be taken at the present time and I propose to discuss at this point what these steps may be.

The issue of bomb tests and the issue of bomb shelters are peripheral issues; they are more the symptoms of the trouble we are in than the cause of the trouble, and I propose to turn now to issues which I believe to be more relevant.

1.) Nothing is gained by America's winning meaningless battles in the cold war, and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed. Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among nations.

The first director of this agency was an American, and his term expired recently. Since, next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, America could have proposed that the next director of the agency be a Russian. Instead, America proposed a Swede, who was not acceptable to the Russians, and since America had the votes she was able to win one more victory in a meaningless battle of the cold war.

All this "victory" accomplished was to reduce the chances of finding some useful function for this agency, because the Russians resent being pushed around in this agency and there is no way for us to force them to play ball.

I believe that it would be important for the government to reach a major policy decision, and for the President to issue an executive order against fighting meaningless battles in the cold war.

We have a cultural exchange program with the Russians but their State Department and our State Department are playing a game of "if you hit our scientists, we shall hit your scientists." Accordingly, our State De-

partment imposes senseless travel restrictions on our Russian colleagues who visit this country. These travel restrictions are not aimed at the safeguarding of any secrets, but are merely a way of hitting back at travel restrictions which the Soviet government occasionally imposes on American scientists who travel about in Russia.

I believe that representations ought to be made, at as high a level of the administration as is necessary, for the Secretary of State to find some other assignment in the State Department for those who have, up till now, handled the East-West Cultural Exchange Program.

2.) I believe that America could and should make unilaterally two crucially important policy decisions and that she should proclaim these decisions.

First of all, America should resolve and proclaim that she would not resort to any strategic bombing of cities or bases of Russia (either by means of atomic bombs or conventional explosives), except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs, or if there is an unprovoked attack with bombs against one of America's allies.

Further, America should make a second policy decision and should proclaim this decision. In order to understand the meaning and relevance of this second decision, it is necessary to consider the following:

Soon after the war, when Russia did not as yet have any atomic bombs, she proposed that the bomb be outlawed. This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs, either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases, or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently, Sulzberger of the *New York Times* discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of such unilateral pledges, renouncing the use of the bomb. Khrushchev said, on this occasion, that if there were a war, even if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force must no longer be victory. The objective must only be to

make a conquest difficult and expensive.

If force is used then an all-out war, which neither side wants, can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory, or anything approaching victory.

Keeping this point of view in mind, *America could and should adopt the policy that, in case of war, if she were to use atomic bombs against troops in combat, she would do so only on her own side of the prewar boundary.*

In case of war America would then be bound by a pledge to this effect as long as Russia imposed a similar restraint on her conduct of the war.

Manifestly, this type of use of atomic bombs would be a defensive operation and moreover, it would be a very effective defensive operation, either on the part of Russia or on the part of America, as long as the restraints remain in effect on both sides.

Such a pledge would be no less clear than the simple pledge renouncing the use of the bomb, but it would be much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge. And if neither side aimed at anything approaching victory, then it would substantially reduce the danger of an all-out war.

When I discussed this issue in Germany three years ago, people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder-Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs. I do not know to what extent West German cities could be spared by a judicious tactical use of atomic bombs by American forces, but I do know that if America were to use bombs beyond the prewar boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

Recently, the United Nations Assembly vetoed with a more than two-thirds majority, 55 against 20, to outlaw the use of atomic bombs in war. The use of atomic bombs in warfare was declared by the Assembly to be a crime and a violation of the United Nations Charter.

Since the machinery of the United Nations was set up for the purpose of maintaining peace among the smaller nations, assuming the cooperation of the great powers to this end, attempts to regard a two-thirds vote of the Assembly as legally binding must necessarily fail. Still the United States must

not fly in the face of world opinion and simply disregard the vote of the General Assembly, when a two-thirds vote of the Assembly expresses the legitimate concern of the great majority of the nations that the use of atomic bombs in warfare might lead to a world catastrophe. Rather, out of respect for world opinion and in its own interest, the United States ought to go as far toward complying with it, as valid considerations for its own security permit. The restrictions on the use of atomic bombs in case of war which I am advocating, are advocated with this end in view.

Western Europe is not inferior to Russia either in manpower or in resources and it would be possible for Western Europe to build up within five years conventional forces to the point where it could renounce the use of atomic bombs against troops in combat in case of war. But even this would be to no avail unless the nations involved give up any thought of fighting limited wars for "limited objectives" and resort to force only to make a conquest difficult and, with luck, to prevent it.

As long as there is no agreement providing for arms control, and Russia remains in possession of large stockpiles of bombs, America has no choice but to maintain a strategic atomic striking force. However, it should maintain such a force only as protection against America or her allies being attacked with bombs. The number of bombs retained for this purpose need not be very large, and more important than the number of bombs retained is the invulnerability of the bases from which they would be launched. If these bases are invulnerable, so that no single massive attack against them could substantially damage America's ability to retaliate, then America needs to retain only enough bombs to be able to destroy in retaliation a substantial number of Russia's cities, after giving due notice to permit their orderly evacuation.

It must be made clear, however, that if America adopts the policy here advocated, she thereby renounces the threat of strategic bombing as a general *deterrent* because she could then make this threat only in case Russia would drop bombs, and drop them on our side of the prewar boundary.

I, personally, do not believe that America would lose much by giving up the threat of strategic bombing, because the deterrent effect of such a threat is negligible unless the threat is believable.

If America were to threaten to drop bombs on a large number of Russian cities in case of war, knowing full well that Russia would retaliate by dropping bombs on a large number of American cities, such a threat would be tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide. The threat of murder and suicide would not be a believable threat, in the context of the so-called Berlin Crisis, nor would it be a believable threat in the context of any other similar conflict in which America's rights and interests may be at stake, but not America's existence as a nation.

Those responsible for the planning of strategy in the Department of Defense would concede this much.

According to persistent press reports there is, however, an increasingly influential school of thought in the Department of Defense which holds that, in case of war with Russia, America may engage in strategic bombing, aimed at the destruction of Russian rocket bases and strategic air bases. America would not bomb any of Russia's cities if she can help it, as long as Russia did not bomb any of America's cities.

This school of thought holds that, at present, Russia does not have many long-range rocket bases and strategic air bases, that the location of many of these bases is known, and that most of them are vulnerable and could be destroyed by attacking them with bombs. By building enough long-range solid-fuel rockets (Minutemen) and submarines capable of launching intermediate range solid-fuel rockets (Polaris) America may be able to keep ahead in this game for the next five years.

Those who advocate such a policy believe that if America should succeed in knocking out, say, 90 per cent of Russia's strategic atomic striking forces, then the Russians would probably speak to us as follows: "We have enough rockets left to destroy a large number of American cities, but we know that if we did this America may retaliate by destroying all of our cities. Therefore, we are going to hold our fire and we propose to negotiate peace. We concede that the power balance has now shifted in America's favor and we are now willing to yield on a number of issues on which we took an inflexible stand prior to the outbreak of hostilities." If this were to happen America would have won a victory even though it may be a victory in a limited sense of the term only.

Naturally if there is a war and America resorts to the bombing of bases in Russia, one could not expect the Russians to sit idly by and watch America picking up step by step one base after another. It follows that America would have to start the strategic bombing of Russian bases with a sudden, massive attack and to try to destroy all vulnerable Russian bases of known location, in the first attack.

There are, of course, people in the Department of Defense who have serious doubts that America would actually carry out such a first strike against bases, in case of war, yet they believe that—at the present juncture—it is a good thing to threaten to bomb Russian bases in case of war because this is a more believable threat than the threat of "murder and suicide."

I do not know just how believable this threat is, but I do know that at best we are purchasing an increased restraint on Russia's part for a year or two, and that we are purchasing it at a very high price. For whether we adopt such a strategy or merely give Russia the impression that we have adopted such a strategy, we are provoking an all-out atomic arms race and may within a very few years reach the point of no return, in this regard.

Therefore, I believe that it is imperative to oppose: (a) the adoption of plans which call for a first strike against Russian rocket and strategic air bases in case of war, and (b) the adoption of the policy of "detering" Russia, with the threat that America would resort to such a first strike in case of war. I believe that the rejection of both these policies is an attainable political objective because there is considerable doubt within the administration of the wisdom of these policies.

3.) *America could and should resolve that atomic bombs and the means suitable for their delivery, which are supplied by her and which are stationed in Europe, shall remain in the hands of American military units which are under American command, rather than be placed under the control of NATO.* As long as America is committed to defend Western Europe, there is no valid argument for turning over bombs to the control of other Western European nations.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the United States government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of balancing any such pressure by bringing domestic

political counterpressure to bear on the government.

America should stand firm in opposing the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs by Germany as well as the production of means suitable for their delivery.

It is conceivable, of course, that all attempts to achieve arms control may fail and that in the end it will not be within the power of the United States to prevent Germany from producing its own bombs and rockets. At about the same time the United States may however also free herself from her commitments to defend Germany against external military intervention. But we are not concerned at this point with developments that may conceivably occur in the unpredictable future.

4.) Not every issue can be solved by Congress passing a law, and there are borderline issues where political action alone can bring no solution because the specific knowledge is lacking of how to go about the solution. The issue of general disarmament seems to be such a borderline issue.

I believe that, at the present time, little could be gained by bringing pressure on the administration to enter into formal negotiations with Russia on the issue of general disarmament, because—as they say, “You can lead a horse to the water, but you can’t make him drink.”

I believe that no substantial progress can be made toward disarmament until Americans and Russians first reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

American reluctance to seriously contemplate general disarmament is largely due to uncertainty about this point. If it became clear that a satisfactory solution of this issue is possible, many Americans may come to regard general disarmament as a highly desirable goal.

On the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world, progress could probably be made reasonably fast, through nongovernmental discussions among Americans and Russians. *I believe that such discussions ought to be arranged through private initiative, but with the blessing of the administration.*

The Russians know very well that America is *not* ready seriously to contemplate general disarmament and this, to my mind, explains why, in spite of being strongly motivated for disarmament, the Russian government displays in its negotiations on this issue much the same attitude as does

the American government. As far as negotiations on disarmament are concerned, hitherto both governments have been mainly guided by the public relations aspect rather than by the substantive aspect of the issue.

The Soviet Union’s attitude might change overnight, however, if it became apparent that America was becoming seriously interested in disarmament.

The Russians are very much aware of the economic benefits they would derive from disarmament, and I believe that the Soviet Union would be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it. It stands to reason that this should be so for the Soviet Union spends on defense an even larger fraction of her industrial output than America does.

America is at present committed to protect certain territories which are located in the geographical proximity of Russia. In the case of general disarmament, America would not be able to live up to any such commitments. Disarmament would therefore be politically acceptable to America only if it is possible for her to liquidate her present commitments—without too much loss of prestige and without seriously endangering the interests of the other nations involved.

Khrushchev seems to be very much aware of this. Therefore, if it came to serious negotiations on the issue of disarmament, and if it became manifestly necessary to reach a political settlement in order to permit America to liquidate her military commitments, then the Soviet Union might go a long way toward seeking an accommodation.

5.) General disarmament may, if we are lucky, eliminate war, but it would not end the rivalry between America and Russia.

It is a foregone conclusion that American efforts toward creating an orderly and livable world will be frustrated in Southeast Asia and Africa because of our failure to devise forms of democracy which would be viable in these regions of the world. The task of devising forms of democracy which would be suitable to the needs of such areas is not a task that the government can handle. Various forms of democracy may have to be devised which are tailor-made to fit the various areas. *A major private group could tackle and ought to tackle this problem.* If it is not solved, more and more underdeveloped nations may become dictatorships; some of them

may have a rapid succession of dictator after dictator and, in the end, the people may have to choose between chaos and communism.

It is a foregone conclusion that America’s efforts to raise the standard of living of underdeveloped nations may be frustrated in those areas where the birth rate is high, infant mortality is high, and there is little arable land left. Improvement in the standard of living will initially lead to a fall in infant mortality, and if the birth rate remains high, the population will shoot up so rapidly that economic improvements will not be able to catch up.

Our failure to develop biological methods of birth control, suitable for the needs of such areas, is responsible for this state of affairs. The development of such methods is not a task which the government can undertake. The government could not create research institutes which would attract scientists who are ingenious and resourceful enough to come up with an adequate solution. *A major private group could and should tackle this problem.*

If it should turn out that it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which reasonable people could generally agree, and if these objectives could count on the all-out support of a sizable and dedicated minority, then I should be impelled to go further, and I would plan to go further along the following lines:

I would ask about fifteen distinguished scientists to serve as fellows of a council which might be called Council for Abolishing War or perhaps Council for a Livable World. The fellows (who are all scientists) would elect the board of directors, but membership on the board would not be restricted to scientists.

This council would, first of all, assemble a panel of political advisors, and then in close consultation with these advisors, it would formulate two sets of objectives. To the first set belong those objectives which cannot be attained at the present time through political action because it would take further inquiry, and perhaps even real research to know, in concrete terms, what needs to be done. To the second set belong those objectives which can be pursued through political action because it is clear what needs to be done.

The fellows of the council would

set up a research organization aimed at the pursuit of the first set of objectives, and they would elect the trustees of that organization. The fellows of the council would also set up a political organization aimed at the pursuit of the second set of objectives, and they would elect the board of directors of that organization. Because one of the major functions of the second organization would be to lobby, we may refer to it for our purposes as the lobby.

The council would hold hearings, perhaps one every four months, and would subsequently proclaim in detail the immediate political objectives it proposes to advocate. It would communicate these objectives, perhaps in the form of a series of pamphlets, to all those who are believed to be seriously interested. Those who regularly receive the communications of the council would be regarded as members of the movement, if they are willing *actively* to support *at least one* of the several specific objectives proclaimed by the council.

It seems to me that there is no need to enlist those who are interested as members of an organization. What one needs to create is not a membership organization, but a movement.

The articulate members of the movement would be expected to discuss the relevant issues with editors of their newspaper and various columnists and other opinion makers in their own community. They would be expected to write to, and in other ways keep in touch with, their congressman and the two senators of their own state.

One of the functions of the lobby would be to help the members of the movement clarify their own minds on the political objectives they wish *actively* to support.

The members of the movement would be regarded as pledged to vote in the primaries as well as in the elections. As far as federal elections are concerned, they would be pledged to cast their vote, *disregarding domestic issues*, solely on the issue of war and peace.

The members of the movement would be regarded as pledged annually to spend two per cent of their income on campaign contributions. The members would be asked to make out a check payable to the recipient of the campaign contribution but to mail that check to the Washington office of the lobby for transmission. In this manner the lobby would be in a po-

sition to keep track of the flow of campaign contributions.

Those in high income brackets may be left free to contribute three per cent after taxes rather than two per cent before taxes.

All members of the movement would be free to wear an emblem that would identify them as members of the movement, if they wish to do so.

Those who can not spend two per cent of their income on campaign contributions may regard themselves as supporters of the movement if they spend either one per cent of their income or \$100 per year, according to their preference. Such supporters of the movement may receive the advice and guidance of the lobby on the

same terms as the members of the movement.

So that each member of the movement may know where his contribution should go, in order to be most effective in furthering the political objectives which he has chosen to pursue, the lobby would keep in touch with each member. The lobby would keep the members informed about the particular contests for seats in Congress which are of interest to the movement; but it may advise one member to take an interest in one of these contests and another member to take an interest in another of these contests.

For covering the operating expenses of the lobby and the research organi-

FOURTH PRINTING

Dr. Leo Szilard's

THE VOICE OF THE DOLPHINS

AND OTHER STORIES

FIVE stories of social and political satire in its most sophisticated form—a book of brilliant fantasy and, perhaps, prophecy, by one of the great scientists of our time.

A wealth of ingenious political thought is quickly discernible through a screen of make-believe in these stories which are both sharply witty and passionately serious.

The Voice of the Dolphins, on sale at all bookstores (clothbound \$3; paperbound \$1) is proudly published by

SIMON AND SCHUSTER
Rockefeller Center, New York

zation (which would be maintained independently from and operated parallel to the lobby), one would look to the members of the movement. Each year a certain group of the members would be asked by the lobby to contribute two per cent of their income to it, rather than to spend it for political contributions. One year this group might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "C." Another year it might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "R," etc.

The movement must not wield the power that it may possess crudely. People in Washington want to be convinced, they do not want to be bribed or blackmailed. He who gives consistently financial support to certain

key members of Congress, may evoke their lasting friendship and may count on their willingness to listen to him as long as he talks sense. He who talks to members of Congress, but does not talk sense, will not accomplish anything of lasting value, even if he temporarily sweeps some members of Congress off their feet by making huge political contributions to them.

There are many intelligent men in Congress who have insight into what goes on; the movement could help these men to have the courage of their convictions. There are others in Congress who are not capable of such insight; the only thing to do with them is not to return them to Congress, and to replace them with better men. This

may make it necessary to persuade better men to run in the primaries and to stand for election. To find such better men must be one of the main tasks of the movement, and the lobby must be prepared to help members of the movement to perform this task.

I did not come here to enlist any of you in such a movement or to launch such a movement. I came here to invite you to participate in an experiment that would show whether such a movement could be successfully launched.

First of all, I ask each of you to look into your own heart and try to discover whether you yourself would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives—as formulated from time to time—appeal to you and you thought that the movement could be effective.

Those of you who wish to participate in the experiment are asked to show a copy of this speech to people in your home community who might be interested and to determine who of these would be likely to be part of a dedicated minority that would give all-out support to a movement of the kind I have described.

I would appreciate your writing me, as soon as possible, how many people you have talked to and how many of these and who of these (name and address), you think, could be counted upon.


If the result of this experiment indicates that such a movement could get off the ground, provided it were started in the right way and on a sufficiently large scale, then the Council for Abolishing War would be constituted. Presumably the council would attempt to identify 25,000 individuals who would be willing to make campaign contributions in the amount of two per cent of their income. Presumably, if the council is successful in this, the fellows of the council would proceed to establish the lobby.

By the time the movement attains 150,000 members it would presumably represent about \$20 million per year in campaign contributions or \$80 million over a four year period.

Whether such a movement could grow further and come to represent not only a decisive amount in campaign contributions but also a significant number of votes, would then presumably depend on the future course of world events.



**If
you're not
already
subscribing,
why not
join us?**



"... the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* ... has been of help to me in understanding some aspects of the problems that have been thrust upon the world by the coming of the atomic and hydrogen bombs. As these problems concern our survival, authoritative information about them is of great importance. The *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* has supplied this information with all the authority of the experts. I would wish that large numbers of people all over the world should have the benefit of getting this information. ..."—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
434 South Wabash Avenue, Chicago 5, Illinois

Please enter my new renewal subscription to the BULLETIN as checked below:

1 year at \$6.00 2 years at \$11.00 3 years at \$15.00

On all orders sent to Illinois addresses please add 4% retail tax.

.50 enclosed for Pan American Postal Union and Canada
 \$1.00 enclosed for all other countries

Name

Address

For an additional \$5.00, enter a second subscription, which I would like sent to:

Name

Address

my remittance is enclosed please bill me later