

R-11
January 26, 1954

MEETING OF THE MIND

A Reminiscence of the

On the afternoon of December 2, 1942, the first Atomic chain reaction was set going in the presence of a handful of people on the campus of the University of Chicago. It was duly celebrated on the spot by opening a bottle of Chianti thoughtfully provided by E. P. Wigner. When everybody departed from the control platform to go home, Fermi and I remained alone. All that was left for us to do was to shake hands and go home also. As we shook hands, I said to Fermi, "I am afraid this day will do down as a black day in the history of mankind."

It was quite clear as early as that, that Atomic Bombs will be available within a couple of years and that they will pose a problem ~~for~~ the world which ~~can~~ ^{could} not ~~at all~~ be solved on the level which each political thinking has been moving both here and abroad before the war.

It took imagination, resourcefulness, devotion and faith of a handful of men to accomplish the liberation of Atomic energy. It would take imagination, resourcefulness, devotion and faith ^{of many} to solve the political problem ^{would this} what the existence of bombs confronts the world. ~~Was this likely to~~ be forthcoming after the war -- it didn't seem very likely, and to contemplate the consequences of failure was akin to having a nightmare. ~~The~~ ^{that} the path following the line of least resistance will lead us straight to ruin was clear enough and yet this was the path most likely to be followed by ~~the~~ Governments. Not so clear was ~~to us what ought to be done even though we had a vague notion that the problem~~ ^{PP We ourselves had at canvas no more than} ~~a vague notion in which direction~~ ^{is not insoluble if only we can think it through but we didn't get around to} ~~giving it any serious thought for another 2 years. For the time being, and~~ even later ~~on~~, up until the time of the collapse of Germany, we were haunted by the thought that Germany -- in possession of Atomic Bombs -- might force us to surrender before we were able to bring the war to an end. Only when Germany collapsed did we feel free -- at least those of us who were not directly concerned with the Bomb itself -- to shift our attention to the political problem created by the Bomb.

~~to even then it was quite clear~~
~~that the bomb will pose~~
~~a problem to the world which can~~
~~not be solved at the level of~~
~~Meeting of the Minds.~~
~~which political~~
~~was conducted~~

Insert 1.

At the time these words were spoken we thought the Germans were ahead

of us and even later on, up until the time of the collapse of Germany, we were
 haunted by the thought that Germany - in possession of atomic bombs might force
 us to surrender before we were able to bring the war to an end. Only when the
 Germans collapsed was this danger over and then those of us who were not directly
 concerned with the production of the bomb itself shifted our attention to the
 problem that the existence of the atomic bomb was able to pose to the world.

The first immediately consequence of the bomb was obviously to bring
 Russia and the United States within striking range of each other. It was clear
 with the rising military power of the United States we threaten Russia and the
 rising military power of Russia is threatening the United States. It was diffi-
 cult to escape. Situations of this sort have arisen before in history and they
 are rarely dissolved without war. The closest ~~in~~ ^{analogy} perhaps in such was
 the situation in Greece, before the war that destroyed Greece.

Insert 2.

The Vicious Circle.

Insert 3.

Foreign Policy not Enough.

Insert 4.

After a policy of expediency

Handwritten note on the right margin: "Handwritten note on the right margin"

If a policy of expediency can not solve the problem of war, it can at least defer war provided it is a wise policy. At times when two great military powers face each other and the rapid increase in the power of the weaker can threaten to over take the stronger, the temptation to prevent war is ever present. In an attempt to maintain its policy of power, the stronger one will be inclined to take one calculative risk after another and if this situation is allowed to persist, war is not only probable but certain. Our post war policy was in fact a policy of expediency and more over it was a policy of expediency which was based on false premises. Because we were able to convince the Government that Russia - will have atomic bombs at her disposal in eloquent numbers within five years after the war. The Government made no serious effort to reach an agreement that would limit atomic bombs from national armaments, but preferred to make the atomic bomb the corner stone of its defense policy. To them and to some of the governments in Western Europe believed that America's possession of the atomic bomb will guarantee the security of Western Europe until such time as Western Europe could be made militarilly strong enough to defend itself even without relying on the atomic bomb. As policies of expediency go, this would have been a possible policy if only the premises had been correct. If it is true that Russia has an adequate number of atomic bombs and means for their delivery, Western Europe will be in no position to fight on our side if war should come. As far as Western Europe is concerned, our foreign policy has pursued for the seven years that followed the war an unattainable objective, that this objective was unattainable, although clear to many. But, in America the foreign policy that is adopted by the President and in speeches which Mr. Truman made after he had left office, the program is clear that even though the Government of the United States announced that Russia had exploded atomic bombs, the President himself did not believe that this was effectual. Only if we keep this in mind is it possible to understand the foreign policy which the United States pursured under Truman. It seems rather tragic that not only did the United States disbelieve those of us who in 1945, predicted that Russia will have atomic bombs within five years, but even this became an accomplished fact which was still unable to accept this fact and the policies to it.

Insert 4

Meeting of the Minds.

The policy of expediency which we pursued since the end of the war starting in Germany with non-fraternization and the dismantling of German industry and ending with an attempt to re-arm Western Germany as a bulwark of Western Europe starting with forcing Japan to unconditionally surrender and ending up with trying to make an ally of Japan, does not contain even the germs of a wise policy upon which a safe system of peace could be based.

We ruled Japan for a number of years with not as much as touching Japan's main problems, her increasing population pressure which is due to excessive birth rate.

We were pursuing unattainable goals in our foreign policy but what is worse - had these goals been attained we would have ended up with a military strong Japan and the military strong Germany leading the war and Japan would have acquired domination of China, and Germany, the domination of Western Europe, and quite probably not only all Eastern Europe, which is precisely why we came in when we entered the second world war.

It is difficult to write about these things and at the same time to conceal one's conscience for the architects of this policy.

The public discussion is accompanied

December 29, 1953.

Meeting of the Minds.

On the afternoon of December 2nd., 1942, the first atomic chain re-action was set going in the presence of a handful of people on the campus of the University of Chicago. It was duly celebrated on the spot by opening a bottle of Chianti thoughtfully provided by E. P. ^EWegner. When everybody departed from the control platform to go home, Fermi and I remained alone. All that was left for us to do was to shake hands and go home also. As we shook hands I said to Fermi: "I am afraid this day will go down as a black day in the history of mankind."

It has been said that these words were
There are those who will say that these words are unduly pessimistic but might
today one ~~might~~ even ask whether they are not rather on the optimistic side; ~~and~~ *for*
after all they assumed that there will be history and today the continued existence of man is by no means a foregone conclusion.

view threat
In the face of the situation that faces ~~us~~ *mankind* the public discussion of the ~~issue~~ *problem* is pitifully inadequate and the remedies advocated by our statemen are ~~an~~ *inadequate* insult to our intelligence.

Politics has been defined as the art of the possible where science in the last decades has manifestly achieved the impossible. Clearly there is no solution to our problem unless politics does not become the art of the impossible.

Sometimes people ask why the human mind, that is responsible for the spectacular progress of science should not be capable of solving the problems of science which this rapid progress creates. There is no reason why it should not except perhaps that the minds responsible for the progress of science are not the same minds that grapple with the issues created by this progress of science.

To solve the problem ~~posed~~ by the existence of the atomic bomb today is no more difficult than it was to create the atomic bomb starting with the discovery of the existence of neutrons. ~~Withxxx~~ The solution of these problems requires thought and beyond that it requires discussion among those who do the thinking. Statesmen, of course, are capable of thought and frequently they appear to be engaged in discussion but there is one important difference between the discussion among statesmen and discussion among scientists.

Meeting of the Minds.

In view of the threat that faces mankind, the remedies publicly advocated by our statesmen are pitifully inadequate. The problem which faces us is ^{of course} difficult but it is ~~no~~ ^{by no means} more difficult than it was to create the atomic bomb ^{the problem of an} after the existence of the ~~newton~~ ^{newborn} was discovered. In order to create the atomic bomb scientists had to over-come their reluctance to think - a reluctance which they share with statesmen and other mortals, and because no single individual seems to be able to carry the ball at ~~one~~ ^{any} stretch for very long it took ~~frequent~~ ^{much} and open discussion among the scientists concerned before they ~~would~~ ^{more able to} arrive at the solution.

In December 1942, our attention was focused on the job at hand. ~~We~~ ^{at that} thought that the Germans were ahead of us. And up until the time of the collapse of Germany we were haunted by the ~~possibility~~ ^{thought} that the Germans ~~were~~ ^{must} in possession of atomic bombs and might force us to surrender. But, ~~in the~~ ^{when this} spring of 1945 ~~this~~ ^{and that possibility} danger was gone. Many of us in Chicago were not directly concerned with the production of the bomb shifted our attention to the ~~political~~ ^{point} problem ~~posed by~~ the existence of the atomic bomb. With time on our hands and our responsibilities fulfilled, we discussed the problem with a limited group of scientists, who were "in the know." It is deeply disconcerting to see that the proper discussion of this issue, which has been in progress now for over eight years, has even to date not reached the point which this limited group of scientists achieved in the limited time of their disposal.

Our discussions were of necessity limited to those who were in the know and came to an end with the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshimo. But even so, what this limited group of scientists achieved in the limited time of their disposal seems to have gone further than the public discussion of the issue which has ~~xx~~ been in progress now for over eight year.

Meeting of the Minds.

In view of the threat that faces mankind the remedies publicly advocated by our statesmen are pitifully inadequate ~~at best and frequently they are an insult to our intelligence.~~ Science today has become the art of the impossible while politics has remained what it was, the art of the possible. Clearly politics too, will have to become the art of the impossible.

In order to cope with the problem which now faces ~~us~~.

But to solve this problem is no more difficult than it was to create the atomic bomb after the existence of the neutron was discovered.

In order to create the atomic bomb scientists had to overcome their reluctance to think -- a reluctance which they share with statesmen and other mortals. But the willingness to throw over the shackles of precedent and to think thru the problem afresh is not enough. For some reason or another no single individual seems to be able to carry the ball of thought for very long, and it takes discussion among men to arrive at the solution of a difficult problem. Science is able to achieve the impossible because ~~sciensts~~ scientists have mastered the art of discussion. Statesmen do not lack the ability to think and occasionally they are able to shake off the shackles of precedent. Frequently they have time to solve the problems with which we are faced by negotiating with each other.

In science if a man says something to another the question raised will be: "Is it true?" In politics it is different. There, if one man says something to another the question ^{raised} ~~raised~~ will be: "~~What is his purpose?~~" For what purpose has he said it?" If scientists in their discussion with each other have to be concerned about their motives for each others utterances rather than factious truth. Science ~~trusts~~ ^{has} ~~scientists~~ to date ~~have~~ remained the art of the possible.

going
set
MEMO ON PEACE

the first
the first self-sustaining
On the afternoon of December 2, 1942, ~~the first self-sustaining~~ chain reaction was ~~demonstrated~~ *performed* in the presence of a handful of people on the campus of the University of Chicago. It was duly celebrated on the spot by the opening of a bottle of Chianti *thoughtfully* ~~generously~~ provided by E. P. Wigner. After everybody ~~left~~, *deposited from* the control platform to go home, Fermi and I ~~remained as the last ones to leave.~~ *remained alone*
All that was left for us to do was to shake hands and go home also. As we shook

hands I said to Fermi, "I am afraid this day will go down as a black day in the history of mankind." *on that occasion* It has been often argued ever since whether these words spoken ~~were~~ *me have* unduly pessimistic. But now that ~~there is such a thing as a Hydrogen~~ *ask whether* bomb, ~~you might even argue that these words were optimistic rather than pessimistic~~ *aren't rather optimistic* for after all they ~~were based on the premise~~ *assume* that there will be history which is by no means foregone conclusion. *P. December* In 1942 when these words were spoken, the ~~ir~~ *side* ~~pessimism~~ *as I expressed* was based on the following:

It was a foregone conclusion that Atom Bombs will be available within a couple of years. *that that*

~~It was evident that these Bombs will bring the United States and Russia within striking range of each other.~~

That these Bombs will bring the United States and Russia within striking range of each other was practically certain. *and if approved* In 1942 it seemed likely that as soon as the common enemy is defeated Russia and the United States will regard each other as potential enemies who will be on the opposite side in the next World War if War comes. *D*

F. B. report
On December 2, 1942 to those of us who attempted to look ahead into the future, it seemed quite probable that it will take less than 10 years before we shall face an International crisis as a direct result of what has been accomplished on that day. *P* It seemed very unlikely that the problem posed by the existence of Atom Bombs can be resolved on the level at which political thinking -- even the very best political thinking -- has moved before the war. It is difficult for you to describe the burden carried by those who were in the know.; the burden which cannot be lightened by discussing the issue with others except the handful of people who were in on the secret. In 1942, '43 and most of '44 these handful of people were too busy doing a job to be able to pay much attention to the consequences of their doing until Germany was clearly defeated.

Page 1

Meeting of
~~MEMO ON PEACE~~
The nuclear

December 9, 1953

Today I wrote
one that only
a miracle can
save us

On the afternoon of December 2, 1942, the first Atomic chain reaction was set going in the presence of a handful of people on the campus of the University of Chicago. It was duly celebrated on the spot by opening a bottle of Chianti thoughtfully provided by E. P. Wigner. When everybody departed from the control platform to go home, Fermi and I remained alone. All that was left for us to do was to shake hands and go home also. As we shook hands, I said to Fermi, "I am afraid this day will go down as a black day in the history of mankind."

~~As need not say more here whether these words were unduly pessimistic. It is true that we~~

It has been argued again and again ever since that time whether the words ~~expressed~~ spoken on that occasion were unduly pessimistic. But now that we have the

"Hydrogen Bomb", one might even ask whether these words aren't rather on the optimistic side; for after all ~~these words~~ ^{they} assume that there will be history and

~~which~~ ^(the continued existence of Man) today is by no means a foregone conclusion.

In December, 1942, when these words were spoken it ~~was clear~~ ^{approved} ^{Robert} that Atomic Bombs will be available within a couple of years. That these Bombs will bring the United States and Russia within each other's striking range was practically certain and there was little doubt that as soon as the common enemy is defeated, Russia and the United States will regard each other as potential enemies, ^{who} expected to be on the opposite sides in the next World War if war comes. Situations of this sort had occurred repeatedly in the course of history and they were ^{usually} resolved without war. ^{for} whenever two great military powers within striking range of each other regard each other as potential enemies, there is set into motion a vicious circle. ^{more and more} The governments of these powers will ^{must} be concerned to make sure to win the war if war comes but every step which either of them takes to improve her strategic and military position and every step the other takes in the response, lessens the chance to avoid the war. Clearly on the issue of who shall win the war, there is no possibility of compromise and the more logical their policies are, the more they will regard all other issues to be of minor importance. Therefore, the more logical they are the more single-minded and consistent their policies, the more inescapable war will be. Their actions will then follow the pattern followed by Sparta and Athens which lead to the Peloponnesian War which destroyed Greece. If such a vicious circle is ever broken it is broken either through vice or through virtue. It may be broken through vice for if the policies followed are ineffective, fallacious, confused or inconsistent, are dictated by the interest of certain pressure groups by the interest of the nation, the vicious circles may fall apart. The opposite case, that is the case

of virtue unlikely though it is, can also break the vicious circle, that is the vicious circle can be broken if the policies are dictated by wisdom.

In December, 1942, it was clear to those who tried to look into the future that the existence of the Atomic Bomb will post a problem which cannot be solved unless we are willing to use everything that history has taught us and then make one further step for which us in guidance. It seemed quite clear at the time that the problem posed by the Atomic Bomb cannot be resolved on the level at which political thinging -- even the very best political thinking -- has moved before the war. Before the war it was actually possible to resolve ~~an~~ an international crisis without war by following what may be termed enlightened foreign policy. But even the best of foreign policies had never achieved more than to postpone the war that is to lengthen the interval between two subsequent wars. Even before the first Atomic Bomb was tested on July 16, 1945 in New Mexico, those in the know had a pretty clear idea of the general direction which the development of Atomic Bombs will take and the rapid rate at which that part of destruction may increase withing the 10 years that will follow the war. No one who was in the position to see this development could get as enthusiastic about the foreign policy that could do more than postpone the war which will be all the more terrible the later it comes.

On the afternoon of December 2nd, 1942, the first atomic chain reaction was set going in the presence of a handful of people on the campus of the University of Chicago. It was duly celebrated on the spot by opening a bottle of Chianti thoughtfully provided by E. P. Wigner. When everybody departed from the control platform to go home, Fermi and I remained alone. All that was left for us to do was to shake hands and go home also. As ^{we} ~~I~~ shook hands, I said to Fermi, "I am afraid this day will go down as a black day in the history of mankind." ^P There are those who will say that the words spoken on that occasion were unduly pessimistic. But ^{now that we have the hydrogen bomb} ~~now that we have the hydrogen bomb~~, one might even ask whether these words ~~were~~ ^{aren't} rather on the optimistic side; for, after all, they assume that there will be history and today the continued existence of ~~man~~ ^{us} is by no means a foregone conclusion. For those Insert I

miss I In December 1942, when we had our little celebration, it appeared likely that atomic bombs would be available within a couple of years. That these bombs would bring United States and Russia within each other's striking range was practically certain, and there was little doubt that as soon as the common enemy was defeated, Russia and United States were going to regard each other as potential enemies who are likely to be on opposite sides in the next world war if war comes.

miss I Whenever two great military powers who are within striking range of each other regard each other as likely enemies, there is set into motion a vicious circle. There may be a number of issues between the two governments on which a compromise might be possible, ^{and such a compromise} ~~and such a compromise~~ ^{substantially} ~~would~~ ^{greatly} ~~lessen the chance of~~ war. ^{But these} ~~Most of the~~ ^{These} issues involved might be viewed from one single point of view by the two governments. ~~Thus,~~ ^{Thus,} the settlement of the issues, one way or another, increases the chances of winning the war or does the opposite. It is natural that, when war appears likely, a government should want to make sure to win the war if it comes. They should regard this one issue as all-important and all the other issues as secondary. Being clear on the issue of who should win the war, the two governments have no possibility of reaching a compromise. ^P Since every single issue has some bearing on this one major issue, no issue can be settled, at least not if the attempt to negotiate about it as if it were an isolated issue. Both governments might sincerely want peace, but ^{each} ~~if~~ single step they might consider to take in order to lessen the chances of war will lessen the chance of winning the war for one or the other of the two governments. In such a situation, the only steps that are actually taken are uni-lateral actions taken by one or the other of the two governments for the purpose of improving the strategic positions

and making more sure that they are going to win the war if war comes. And every such step that is taken and the counter-measure that it evokes increases the chances of war. The more single minded they are, the more logical their reasoning, and the more consistent their policies, the more inescapable will be the war.

Such situations have repeatedly arisen in the course of history, and they are rarely resolved without war. The actions of the two nations caught in such a vicious circle follows the pattern that was followed by Sparta and Athens, which led to the Peloponnesian war that destroyed Greece. Perhaps Russia and the United States could have avoided this situation if Wilkie's advice had been followed, who urged them to try to reach a settlement while the second world war was still on. But even if that had been done, it is unlikely that the statesmen would have found a solution to the problem which now faces the world. For the existence of the atomic bomb and the rapid increase in the destructive power of these bombs confronts the world with a problem which cannot be resolved on the level at which political thinking, even the very best political thinking, has moved before the war. There have been in the past long periods of peace, and by following an enlightened foreign policy, it was seen possible to avoid a war, but even the best of foreign policies have never achieved more than to postpone a war, i.e. to lengthen the interval of peace between two subsequent wars.

Among those of us who ^{were} ~~are~~ involved in the war of atomic energy before Hiroshima and who concerned themselves with this problem, found it difficult to get enthusiastic about foreign policy that could do no more than postpone the war which we knew would be the more terrible the later it came. For the purpose of this discussion, we might use as a starting point the lines written by H. G. ~~Morley~~ Morgenthau in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in May of 1950:

"I do not know whether a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union is possible. I do know, however, that no such attempt at a negotiated settlement has been made; instead we have wasted our time with polemics over isolated secondary issues which must remain insoluble as long as the basic issues remain unsettled. I also know that, in view of the present and foreseeable distribution of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, the choice before the world is between negotiated settlement and war, i.e. universal destruction. I finally know that no nation can survive the ordeal of a third world war, If it can survive it at all without being convinced in its collective conscience that it has done everything humanly possible to preserve peace. It is for these reasons that I deem it ~~absolutely~~ worthwhile

and even imperative to consider seriously the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union."

No such negotiations have taken place in the $3\frac{1}{2}$ years that have passed since these lines were written, and, in view of the confused state of our political thinking, one should perhaps add "Thank God". The time has come for us to ask if the problem which faces the world is to be solved, what is the nature of the settlement that might solve it, and just what kind of negotiations could lead to such a settlement. Are negotiations on the government level at this time likely to produce an answer to these questions? Or isn't rather what we need now most urgently between us and the Russians a meeting of the minds that could be followed by the kind of negotiations which will give us the type of settlement that will satisfy their needs and our needs? My job here would be easier if I could start from ~~the~~ scratch without first having to remove the rubble of the misconceptions that have been accumulated in the years that followed the war.

Meeting of the mind

Keep them pressing

~~was with the Roosevelt administration~~
~~the Charter of the United Nations~~

~~Unlikely~~

Treaty of alliance and unilateral
guaranty

✓ After the repeal of Germany
~~When the Charter of the United~~
~~Nations was drafted~~
It was only a few people knew of the
existence of the Japanese bomb
and about the time ^{when} the Charter
of the United Nations was under
discussion ^{most of the} management men
engaged in the work on the Project
felt very strangely that
the part of the U.S. might
to make the existence of
atomic bombs known to the
world so that the public
~~discussion of~~ otherwise -
so they could have the whole public
discuss the issue that
we have to meet in the post
war world will be based on
false premises, their appeal for

president was limited only
to the extent that some men
in key positions in our own
firm were "told" about
the bomb. ~~unfortunately~~
~~we unfortunately they were~~
~~informed not by us but~~
~~through deacon's~~

~~Among those who were~~
~~informed was Stettinius~~
~~then Sec of State. How do we know~~
~~this? Simply because some~~
~~afterwards~~

Soon afterwards Dr Shattuck
told Dr ~~Har~~ Arey over the
luncheon table at ^{the} ~~the~~ ~~club~~
Rocky Club that he had
learned from Stettinius then
Secretary of State that ~~the~~ the
U.S. now proposes a bomb so
small that it can be carried
in a pocket and so powerful
that it could meltish Tokyo
if detonated within the city
limits. ~~Dr Arey who~~ this
is how we learned that some
action was taken in response
to our request even though only
~~at~~ ~~advice~~ ~~that~~ ~~seriously~~ ~~we~~ ~~resend~~ ~~all~~ ~~what~~

REMARKS AND INSERTS:

Insert paragraph 4A on page 14B.

The ~~inclemintation~~ ^{inclemintation} of the agreement may take place in stages; ^{what} ~~what~~

~~are the chances to get safely through those stages?~~

~~are the stages~~

There is a serious problem involved here which may be illustrated by

the following example: ~~It is likely~~ ^{let us assume} that the agreement will involve,

~~at some stage,~~ ^{in the final} the dismantling of Russian air fields (as well as Americ

an) air instalations from which ~~the~~ bomb attacks could be launched.

~~against other nations. It is also likely that the agreement will~~

~~involve an opening up of Russia in some form or other but it is~~

~~sufficient for us to be sure that they are~~ ^{there to give us assurance} ~~to secret violations of~~

~~the agreement, as long as the agreement is not openly abrogated.~~

By the time ~~you~~ ^{we} reach the last stage of ~~inclemintation~~ ^{inclemintation}, with the

~~danger of remote and our military instalations dismantled as speci-~~

~~fied in the agreement, there is no reason why Russia should want~~

~~to keep the locality of her air fields secret.~~ ^{and object}

But how do we reach this final stage of ~~inclemintation~~ ^{inclemintation}? Should the

first stage merely provide for the opening up of Russia (as well as

America)? Otherwise the capability for an instant attack remains

undiminished.

And also the opening up of Russia (as well as America) is ^{in view of} ~~for reaching~~ ^{for reaching} enough to enable us to discover any secret evasion of the agreement.

But which should come first, the dismantling of the air installations or the opening up of the country? ^{yes} ~~to travel as spies or inspectors~~ ^{or whatever method of detection of violation might be agreed upon.}

^{those} In the final stage when all military installations and equipment ~~two have been eliminated~~ which ~~gives~~ ^{gave} Russia ~~and~~ ^{when two come to be} America the capability for an instant attack has been eliminated and war ~~is~~ ^{is} regarded as a remote possibility, such an opening up of the country which would enable ^{Russia} ~~us~~ to discover the location of ^{the} Russia's air installations ^{ought not} to be objectionable to Russia. ~~At least not in view of the great benefits that she will derive from the agreement.~~ But should one expect Russia to agree to the opening up of the country as the first step and leave the dismantling of military installations for a later stage? Would Russia argue that as soon as her country is opened up America will learn the location of all of her military installations and, if for some reason or other the implementation of the agreement stops ^{there} and goes no further, America would be in a position to destroy those installations in one single sudden attack and so deprive Russia of any possibility of retaliation. ^{and} ~~can~~ ^{can}, conversely, America be expected to agree to any appreciable dismantling of air installations prior to the opening up of Russia when in its absence ~~there~~ ^{American would not} ~~is no way of knowing~~ whether Russia has carried out the dismantling of her installations on the required scale. ²

Inset 5A.

Is it possible to ~~devise~~ ^a a set of partial abrogations which the United States or Russia could invoke if necessary?

~~The possibility of America or Russia using the legal right to~~ ^{ability} ~~abrogate as a support of a demand to be given greater assurance~~ ^{of abolishing} ~~against the possibility of secret evasions of the agreement would~~ ^{for obtaining if necessary} ~~be much stronger if there had been devised a set of partial abro-~~ ^{increased} ~~gations which can be evolved.~~ ^{They could desire} ~~If the United States, for instance,~~ ^{could} ~~suspects that there are some, perhaps not yet exceedingly dangerous,~~ ^{evaded by to stop} ~~but yet serious, evasions of the agreement and if she is unable to~~ ^{intro further} ~~get final ~~xxxxxx~~ assurance on this point, she would be ~~xxxxxx~~~~ ^{not} ~~faced with a dilemma of tolerating these evasions or ~~by~~ revoking~~ ^{the} ~~her right to abrogate thus precipitating a fresh atomic arms~~ ^{either} ~~which in these circumstances would almost certainly lead ~~xxxxxx~~~~ ^{fully abrogating the agreement and} ~~to~~ ^{me}

to war. But, if the United States and Russia have a well thought out plan for a brogation in status when they would remain legally free to carry the a brogations to any desired state, the United States could, in a moderate case, just invoke the first stage of this plan and, for instance, begin to build a small number of air installations, bombs and airplanes suitable for their delivery, and do all this preferably openly and still under the supervision of some International authority even though this would be a grave step to take and might lead to a complete reversal of the trend back into "full arms" race and complete secrecy, still there would be time to straighten out the difficulties by remedying the situation.

Only if the United States would fear that the agreement might be evaded on such a scale to create a situation which ~~xxxxxx~~ endangers the security of the United States ~~when~~ would the United States have

have to invoke simultaneously all stages of its abrogation schedule, the last stage of which would presumably impose complete secrecy on such questions as locality of air fields, type of bombs and planes, etc.

Meeting of the
ministers

BY: Joseph Alsop

THE WASHINGTON POST - January 18. 1954

// In the manner of Louis A. Johnson talking about the lesson he would "teach Joe Stalin," the Pentagon is now piously prating about our great superiority in atomic weapons. The fact is, we have had enough atomic weapons to devastate the Soviet Union for at least three years. Meanwhile, the Pentagon carelessly glosses over the really new factor in the air-atomic balance. This is the acquisition by the Kremlin of enough atomic weapons to devastate the United States. //

Meeting of the Minds

1. Meeting of scientists proposed
2. Negotiating from strength fallacious concept (1.) 2.) 3.)
3. The agreement in order to solve our problem must be self-generating
4. What incentives may induce Russia to continued cooperation
5. The agreement must be far-reaching enough to eliminate
instability which is inherent in the power conflict
6. At what level of thinking must we seek the solution of the
problem which the existence of the A¹-bomb posed to the world
7. ~~Some~~ changes will be acceptable only if possibility of world
war is regarded as remote
8. Most controversial points become irrelevant within a new setting
9. Agreement should satisfy legitimate national aspirations
10. Possibility of abrogation cannot be entirely disregarded
10A *Prerequisite abrogation. must be*
11. We must be sure there are no secret violations of the agreement
as long as it is not openly abrogated
12. How to enforce the agreement on countries who have no right to
abrogate
13. Suggestion for what it is worth (disarmament)
precondition
14. No ~~peace~~ negotiations, but stepwise implementation
15. The desirable may not be possible.

at the earliest possible date

EX 6

I must be

I propose that we
to suggest

~~Most of you probably agree~~

The purpose of this letter is to propose that we try to convene

a meeting of scientists from Russia, America, and a number of other nations in order to explore whether it is possible for us to reach

that
a meeting of the minds on the problem of the existence of the Hydrogen-Bomb poses to the world. One of the most important questions

that we would have to clarify in our minds would be the question

what kind of over-all political settlement between Russia, America

and the other nations involved would create a setting in which

the elimination of Atomic-Bombs and Hydrogen-Bombs from national

armaments would become acceptable to the American and Russian

governments as well as to the governments of the other nations

involved.

If it were indeed possible to reach a meeting of the minds

among a group of carefully selected scientists with such diverse

national background a great step would have been made in the

direction of peace. The public discussion of the issues involved

could then perhaps lead to a clarification of thinking and a finally

climate of public opinion that would be favorable in which negotia-

tions for an over-all settlement could be carried out at a govern-

mental level with some hope of success.

Before saying anything more about the nature of the proposed

meeting of scientists, I should like to set forth in the following

a few remarks concerning the nature of the problem which confronts us.

These remarks, some of the points of views which I shall stress, and

some of the tentative proposals which I will throw out, I put forward

mainly for the purpose of trying to define the spirit in which I

believe the proposed meeting could explore its subject matter,

with some hope of success.

at under
a
making
me
my for
now
for

to discuss
first of all

By
that it should
have to consider that may come up for discussion.
my proposals shall
are made
put forward in this association I am attempting to
define
before

It is my hope that these remarks

~~Moreover the contents of this letter might perhaps serve, if not as~~
 basis of discussion, then at least as starting point for the dis-
 cussion. ^{at the proposed meeting.} The public discussion of the Russian-American conflict
 which we have witnessed in these nine post-war years has obscured
 rather than clarified ^{obs} ~~the nature of the Russian-American conflict~~
 and the real difficulties which obstruct ^{its} ~~the~~ resolution of this
 conflict.

^{obscured} Nothing seems to me has ~~confused~~ quite ~~so~~ much the problem
 which we are faced than the popular slogan of negotiating from
 strength. ["] This concept ^{misuse} ~~applied to the negotiation of an over-all~~
~~settlement between Russia and the United States~~ ^{is a fallacy which}
~~probably originates through reasoning by analogy.~~ If you negotiate
 a business deal in private life and if you are in strong position
 when you do so you may ^{indeed} be able to settle most contraversial points
 in your favor and may get the other fellow to sign on the dotted
 line. After that you may be able to ~~make~~ him perform by taking
 him into court if necessary. But what good would it do to have
 Russia sign an agreement in which most ["] contraversial points are
 settled in ~~xxx~~ America's favor. Where is the court ^{before which} where Russia
^{Russia could be taken} ~~may be taken~~ and who could enforce the verdict of that court?

After the first World War, collective security might very well have
 been the answer to the problem of maintaining peace. ^{there exists} But today /
 no combination of nations that-short of ^a war of indefinite duration
 and unpredictable outcome--could attempt to coerce Russia or for
 that matter the United States. ^{And} ~~xxx~~ even if America today had over-
 whelming strength ~~this would be of little help in negotiating a~~
~~settlement~~ and were ready to use it this would help her only if what

in negotiations

she wanted to negotiate was unconditional surrender.

Yms
~~In these circumstances~~ *Between Russia and America* it seems to me that we ought to approach the problem of arriving at an over-all settlement ~~with~~

Russia ~~as follows~~ *rather in the following manner*
7 The agreement must be self generating

Since we know it is impossible to force either Russia or America to continue to observe an agreement we may just as well assume that America and Russia have reserved the legal right to abrogate the agreement at any time. For Russia and America to

reserve a legal right to abrogate might be *very* desirable *for other reasons also that will be* from a point of view which will be discussed further below. *The number of nations* Naturally it would

to be discussed later of course have to be limited to a small number of nations, since *The right to abrogate* agreement would be of little value if it could be upset by any one

could not last long of a large number of nations. *only the* *used not be limited to Russia and America but it must* *Just* Allowing Russia and America to

retain a legal right to abrogate puts emphasis on what should be obvious in any case that the agreement will remain in force only as long as both Russia and America want to keep it in force. One of the most important questions to which we must find an answer is in this. Can we devise an agreement that ~~will~~ offer ~~to~~ both Russia

and America such strong incentives for wanting to keep an agreement in force that we can be sure that the agreement will not be abrogated as long as ~~enlightened~~ *enlightened* considerations of national interest will guide the policies of these two nations. [If we think about the Russian

American agreement in these terms then it becomes quite clear that in negotiating our objective must not be to settle as many contraversial points

as possible in our favor then it becomes *pretty clear* ~~critical~~ that our main objective in negotiating/to settle as many contraversial points is possible in our favor *mainly* but rather that we must be concerned

In thinking about an over-all settlement this is one of the most important aspects of the agreement about which we must be concerned. If we can give a satisfactory answer to this question then we have gone a long way toward solving the problem that confronts us. We cannot of course disregard in any case a possibility of abrogation which would almost certainly be followed by a fresh arms race and along with it the serious risk of war. For this reason both Russia and America will have to examine carefully in just what kind of military and strategic position abrogation would leave them.

Other

Insurrection

Position in case of abrogation

Secret abrogation

End of present ~~struggle~~ conflict

10 | Insert II

on the right hand

2

What are the main incentive which such an overall settlement could provide for continued Russian cooperation. Any Russian policy if it's rational and is based on the national interest must be greatly concerned about security from attack and the economic development of the country. Security from attack means first of all the elimination of a threat of the Atomic Bomb which would permit a direct attack on the cities of Russia, And also the elimination of an attack by land armies based on Western Europe motivated by freshly awakened German nationalist movement. We should have therefore to examine what type of disarmament could give this kind of security to Russia, and whether the kind of disarmament that would do this can be reconciled with a legitimate desire for security of Western Europe, the United States and the rest of the world.

In And thinking of incentives which this agreement could offer to Russia in the economic field we ought not to think, I believe, of direct economic aid to Russia. Immediately after the ~~first World~~ War Russia was in great need of such economic aid, but today any economic aid which we might be able to give would be quite negligible compared to the economic advantages which the agreement could offer to Russia by creating a setting which would enable Russia to use her productive capacity for her economic development rather than for supplying heavily equipped large land army. ~~If conditions were created~~ Russia spends today about 20% of her national income on defense and if she could spend this amount on productive investment than civilian consumption in Russia would increase at the rate of 6% per year, which means that it would double every twelve years. Assuming the population increase

My

11

in Russia is kept within reasonable bounds there would be a rapid increase in the standard of living which would create a favorable climate for the successful operation of a stable government. Clearly, the type and degree of disarmament that the agreement might stipulate has a bearing not only on the issue of security but--as far as Russia is concerned--it ^{has} is also an important bearing on the ~~economic~~ incentives which it may offer to Russia with respect to her economic prosperity.

~~Russian~~ *autographed*
~~Rational~~ Considerations of the national interest

Perhaps I should have made it clear at the outset that my analysis will be limited to ~~rational~~ considerations of the national interest involved. An analysis which is so limited can at best give an answer to the question of what would be desirable, it can not give an answer to the question whether that which is desirable is also possible and how close the possible might come to the desirable ~~and whether what is possible~~. The political system in which a government operates determines to what extent the government may be able to act in accordance to ~~what~~ the national interest even though it may clearly recognize

even though ^{an enlightened} a government may clearly recognize what ^{ought} are to be done in the national interest the political system within which that government has to operate may severely limit the extent to which ^{its} the government's action may actually follow the national interest, ~~and it may not be possible for the government to do what it considers desirable to do.~~ What is possible for ^a the government to do may be very different from ~~the~~ what the government itself would consider desirable to do.

In any case usefully to discuss what is possible

must be sufficiently far reaching 11A

to demonstrate the desirability
that operates ~~in the~~ in a power. conflict

The economic advantages which far-reaching disarmament
would offer to the United States are not negligible, ^{either} But the

United States will reap these advantages only if ~~the~~ it ~~succeeds~~
~~will adopt a suitable economic policy~~ ^{and} ~~in adopting an economic policy~~. Today we are spending about \$40

~~billions~~ ^{that is no longer needed} billion for defense. If the government ~~can~~ spend this amount of

money, assuming there is no change in taxation, the government

would be in a position to send every family each year a check for

\$1000 in 12 installments with a request to please currently spend

it. This ~~of course~~ is not what would be ^{actually} done ~~and~~ there are ~~many~~

other ^{subsidizing} ways to ~~accomplish the same goal of maintaining full~~

employment. But no matter how it is done, the average consumption

of a family ^{has} could go up by a \$1000 a year if full employment were

~~maintained~~ ^{of the present} and defense expenditures ^{is} virtually eliminated. Even

so, for the United States, the increase of prosperity resulting from

far-reaching disarmament would not be per se a very important

consideration. ^{The agreement must}

The strongest argument for far-reaching disarmament is the ^{and broadly remove}

~~fact that it might eliminate the over-riding issue that dominated~~ ^{within the frame work of an}

^{caused the attack} ~~the Russian-American relations in these nine post-war years~~ ^{of an}

ⁱⁿ ~~greatly reducing the probability of war.~~ ^{precluded}

^{This one} ~~This basic issue which~~ ^{is}

bears responsibility for the dead-lock in these post-war years is

^{is} ~~simply~~ the issue of who shall win the war if there is war. In ~~this~~ ^a

^{is} ~~setting the more unlikely war appears to be the more~~ ^{whichever} the government

of the United States ~~will~~ ^{must} look on any proposed settlement of a given

contraversy from the point of view of whether that settlement will

increase or decrease her chance to win the war if war comes. The ^{same}

^{holds it must for} ~~Russian government scrutinizes of course any proposed settlement from~~

~~the same point of view~~ and since the issue of who shall win the next

and since the issue of who shall win the war if war comes is the one issue on which compromise is not possible, none of the controversial points which have strategic military importance can be settled as long as the possibility of war is uppermost in the minds of the American and ^{the} Russian governments. Any attempt to make progress towards a general settlement piecemeal, by taking up ^{such} controversial issues one by one is ^(therefore) doomed to failure. It is impossible to break the deadlock by proceeding piecemeal. ^{In this}

^{such a} setting, and as long as war appears to be probable, there is a strong temptation ~~both by~~ ^{top} Russia and ^{top} America to improve their ^{her} position by taking unilateral action. ~~Unfortunately, most steps~~ ^{But the same could} taken unilaterally for the purpose of increasing ^{her} ~~one's~~ chances to win the war if it comes also increases the probability that war will come and therefore a situation in which war appears to be probable is unstable and the danger is great that it will rapidly deteriorate because ^a the greater the probability of war the more likely a government caught in such a power conflict will take steps that while they will improve her military and strategic position, ^{even though} ~~would at the same time~~ ^{increase} the probability of war.

C In any case we would have to decide first what is desirable before we can consider what is possible.

This does not make it less important for a government to know what is desirable, for even though a government does what is possible it is vital for her to know to what extent the possible deviates from the desirable.

A few examples will help to clarify the point I am trying to make. It is generally accepted by the enlightened public and well-known to the administration that it would be in the national interest to abolish all tariffs step by step within a comparatively short period, say perhaps five or ~~xx~~ at most ten years. Yet the political system within which the United States government operates makes it impossible to accomplish this or even to make ~~x~~ really significant progress towards abolishing all tariffs, Even though a modest beginning has been made in this direction.

After the first World War it was ~~well known~~ ^{generally accepted by} ~~xx~~ the enlightened public in Germany and well known to the German government that the building of capital ships by the German Navy was a useless waste of German resources from the point of view of the national interest. Yet such ships were built in compliance with the wishes of the Navy not because the Navy thought that these ships were really needed for defense but rather that because in the absence of them the German Navy could not have had a satisfactory number of Admirals and possibilities for promotions in the Navy would be severely limited.

Those of us who know the United States are inclined to believe that we know what is politically possible, but we would do

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well to remember that to say what is possible in the political field is always a conjecture and what appears to be ^{im}possible today may well be possible six months or a year from now when men here and elsewhere may begin to understand the threat of the Hydrogen-Bomb.

~~But when it comes to say~~ But if we were asked to say which of those things that would appear to be in the Russian national interest are actually acceptable to the Russian government and politically possible in Russia the only wise course for us to take is to confess complete ignorance. Our Russian colleagues might be in the position to make conjectures or they might not.

Assuming for instance that an over-all settlement ~~xxxxxxconditions~~ were proposed which would give Russia military security to the point where it would be ⁱⁿ the national interest for Russia greatly to reduce her arms expenditure by greatly reducing the size of the army and eliminating most if not all heavy equipment by reducing the size and the heavy equipment of its military establishment would the Russian government be able to ~~xxx~~ do what is in the national interest or would the Army want to maintain a large military establishment irrespective of security considerations for the sake of maintaining a large establishment and would the political influence of the Army be great enough to prevent the Russian government from accepting far reaching disarmament.

Any discussion which we can carry on among ourselves here in America will have to be limited to the question what might be desirable from the point of view of American and Russian national interest. And any discussions that we might have with our Russian colleagues would have to clarify this question before we could proceed --assuming that it is deemed advisable to proceed--to the question of what might be politically possible.

Because of this there is an inherent instability in a power conflict
~~which operates through a vicious~~
 and unless a setting can be obtained the power conflict would then

~~would lead very quickly to war within a few years~~ ~~would lead to a rapid~~

~~increase in the probability of war within a period of a few years~~

~~during which war is~~

It follows that the political settlement and the degree and

kind of disarmament for which it provides must be far-reaching

enough to make war unlikely to the point where this vicious

circle no longer operates and the power conflict ceases to be the

factor that determines the course of events. What kind of political

settlement and what type of disarmament would accomplish this?

Clearly it is easiest to meet this requirement if we were willing to

enter into an agreement that would set up spheres of influence and

were determined to rigidly maintain some kind of a status quo.

If the problem of the existence that the A-bomb poses to the world
 could be solved at the level to which political thinking moved

before the war, then we should probably give serious consideration
 to such a rigid solution. Unfortunately then the existence of such

bombs posed a problem to the world which cannot be solved on that

level. Before the war the legitimate aim of foreign policy was to
 prolong the peace, that is to prolong the interval between wars.

This today is no longer enough. The over-all settlement which
 we need now is one that will create a setting in which it will be
 possible to move along some prearranged path and perhaps even at a
 prearranged rate towards the ultimate solution of a world government.

We cannot very well expect to come anywhere close to the ultimate
 solution sooner than within two generations, but we have to get
 there without going through another world war.

Because of such consideration, if this view is accepted,

[It seems to me that if we meet with our Russian colleagues
it will be necessary first to discuss what we believe is desirable
from the point of view of the national interest and only if a
meeting of the minds is reached on this level should we try to
go further if ~~indeed~~ it is possible to go further
~~proceed~~ and discuss how closely the desirable can be approximated
by what we and our Russian colleagues believe to be feasible.]

We cannot reconcile ourselves to having to go through another world war and if we were certain that another world war is to come than those who were instrumental in postponing its date would be rendering a very doubtful service to mankind.

Rather than to represent an uneasy armistice the over-all settlement ought to create a setting in which it will be possible to move along some prearranged path and perhaps even at a prearranged rate towards the ultimate solution of a world government. What matters is not ~~xxx~~ whether this ultimate solution is approached within one, two or three generations, what matters is that we have to get to that ultimate solution without going through another world war. If this general approach to the problem is acceptable then ~~xxxxxxxx~~ it would seem important that for a generation at least there should be no foreseeable need for major ~~negotiations~~ ad hoc changes in the world settlement. But can we maintain rigidly the status quo and have spheres of influence fixed for so long a period of time.

~~Postscript~~ Meeting of the
ministers.

I take from typist copy

~~It was clear enough - and~~
~~When these words were spoken~~
~~it was clear enough~~
One cannot see quite clearly -
at the time & when these words
were spoken that atomic
bombs will be available ~~before~~
within a few years and that
they will pose a problem for
the world which cannot be
solved at the level at which
political thinking, have and
abandoned, has been ~~moving~~
moving in the past. —

It took imagination ~~and~~
resourcefulness devotion and
faith ~~to reach the point~~ to
accomplish the ~~large tasks~~
liberation of atomic energy
it ~~is~~ would take the very
same ~~qualities~~ things to
cope with the problem that
the bomb poses for the
world & ~~that were our~~

Will they ever be approved in
the optical problem
What were the chances that
it was to help that man
He was now over 40 years
in 1838 when the man

In the spring of 1838 ~~man~~ even
we could show that man's
over where ejected from ~~optical~~
~~man~~ Uranium which was split
by neutrons ~~most~~ ~~physicists~~
~~the majority of our colleagues~~
~~the~~ only very few of our colleagues
believed that the chain reaction
could be achieved

~~Hubert H. H. H.~~

4

~~and the correspondingly herms~~
~~with the of an annul like~~

~~which might~~ That might ^{have} resulted
and thus ~~attain as early surrender~~
~~and thus obtain an early surrender~~
of Germany or Japan; It is
doubtful whether a policy of
containment than to ~~Hind~~
~~stop~~ them by their of an overall
settlement that will prevent
an atomic arms race; it is

rather to rely on the Atlantic
barricade and the ~~strategic~~ ^{the advantage of position} of the
for the defense of Western
Europe ~~there~~ and the North Atlantic
Alliance Plan to find a
~~political~~ political solution and it is

~~comes - to step up Hydrogen the
production of Hydrogen bombs
than to free ^{up} ~~sparately~~ sparsely ~~and~~
to the situation that will confront
us after the war, ~~now or then~~
~~within~~ three years from now ~~and Messrs~~~~

and make an adequate attempt
to motivate all ~~the~~ or moral and
intellectual resources in order
to prove at an ~~an~~ adequate
attempt at a solution on
the political level.

Plan ~~to~~ to find a proposal
subsidies that will make the
production of H units necessary.

Each of these 4 steps ~~does~~ solve
it may solve the problem of the
house

Only by making allowances for future ^{(technical} ~~future~~
technical advances which ~~are not~~
accurately predictable may be
~~marginally~~ guessed but not accurately
predicted ~~can we~~ ~~then~~ can we involve at
all ~~but a wise policy~~ policy that
will avoid incalculable risk

7

this point of view should
it seems to me provide
the credit best for any
overall political settlement
~~that anyone may propose~~
~~of post~~ It will be
~~between~~ between Russia and
the U.S. that may be proposed. —
Even without this best
the problem is a difficult
one for the power conflict
of the kind in which Russia
and the U.S. are caught ~~is~~
~~maintained~~ and ~~for as yet~~
~~more~~ is kept in being through
a vicious sort circle. Since
now ^{with Russia} appears probable the U.S.
will tend to ~~regard each issue~~
~~to regard every international~~
~~issue from the point of view~~
~~of~~ each time when some
settlement of an international issue
is up for discussion the U.S.
~~regards the proposed settlement~~
~~from the point~~ asks itself
will this settlement make
it more likely for her
to win the war if war comes.
Russia of course asks the same
question. ~~But~~ ~~to long~~ the overall

~~In this case~~ J
~~Since Russia~~ He is one who
should with the war if it comes
is clearly ~~not one who~~ ~~with~~
~~It and US can~~ ^{is} The one issue
on which R and the US can not
very well compromise ~~and~~
~~Therefore as~~ and as long as
individual is one ^{we} are considered
in this setting ^{which have strategic or military importance} The deadlock must
persist ~~as one or the other~~ ~~Russia or the U.S.~~ ^{take steps}
by ~~either~~ ^{neither} ~~under steps to support~~
~~some unilateral action without~~
~~which~~ any step that Russia ^{here}
~~may~~ takes ~~to~~ ^{may} take steps
the ~~either~~ ^{the} R or the U.S. may
take steps which will improve
her chances of winning the
war if it comes

^{The U.S. may}
~~If Russia~~ take a same unilateral
step that will increase her chance
to win in case of war ~~that also increase~~
~~the chance~~ but unfortunately such
steps ^{may} also increase the chance
that war will come. The same
of course holds for the U.S.

~~that is only a peace~~ ~~settlement~~ - but This is only
I believe the a peace conflict
at this type war not be

settled peace - meal. It
can be settled only ~~and~~
^{through some} package which makes the
probability of war ~~secure~~
and make it at one stroke

appear secure. ~~Any~~ The
package may come into
force in steps or in stages
if there might be
stages or steps through
which the settlement
the settlement might be put
into effect ~~in~~ if necessary
in ^{periods} steps or stages provided
that the serious is fixed
in advance and the first
step big enough to be
regarded as a serious
indication of sincere
intention that permits
no ~~face~~ ~~turn~~ ~~back~~ to
peace turn ~~any~~ back as
Munich ~~and~~ ^{away from} war and
begin to ^{to} face towards peace.

the perfect construction
No package, however carefully
balanced No package however
carefully balanced can be ~~completely~~
~~balanced~~ if attempted ~~the~~ perfect
It is always best and the