

I am instructed to inform you that your letter of July 15 addressed to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N.S. Khrushchev, has been received. It has been noted with satisfaction in Moscow that you continue actively to work in the ranks of those men of science and culture who are conscious of the disastrous consequences of an atomic war and are striving to find ways for a speedy solution of the disarmament problem.

All people of good will welcome to-day the agreement terminating nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water concluded as a result of the negotiations held in Moscow between the representatives of the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain. We consider that this important step must be followed by other measures of restraining the armaments race and of strengthening peace - conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the N.A.T.O. countries and the states members of the Warsaw treaty, freezing, or still better, reduction of military budgets, implementation of a number of measures to prevent a surprise attack, including the establishment, on the basis of reciprocity, of ground control posts at the airdromes, railway junctions, main highways and large ports in the definite areas of the

Soviet Union and the U.S.A., as well as of other countries.

As you are aware, the Soviet Government has made the appropriate proposals on these questions.

As the experience of holding the Pugwash conferences has shown, meetings of scientists and the discussion of urgent international issues at them, first of all of the disarmament problem, have a definite positive significance.

It is in this light that we consider your suggestion to organize an unofficial meeting between the American and Soviet representatives for an exchange of opinions on the questions of disarmament. As regard the practical side of organizing such a meeting, we take into account certain difficulties which you have encountered in implementing your plan. Since, as you write, the American official representatives will be unable to participate in the suggested conference, the question, therefore, is of organizing an unofficial exchange of opinions only between the American and Soviet scientists. It seems to us that the meeting between the American and Soviet scientists suggested by you could take place during the regular Pugwash conference which is planned to meet in Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia) in September of this year. Noted Soviet scientists intend to participate in

this conference and they will be glad to meet there with you and your colleagues.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N.S. Khrushchev, conveys to you and to your wife his best wishes of good health and success in your noble work in defense of peace.

January 29, 1963

INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS

Discussion of proposals for general and complete disarmament by a small group of American and Soviet citizens, not acting as representatives of their governments, would have the purpose of exploring the area of possible agreement between the two nations on disarmament. The participants on each side would be selected so as to have both a technical knowledge of the problems of disarmament and an understanding of the concerns and views of their respective governments.

In their discussions, which would be informal, the participants would seek to understand each others' views about disarmament proposals that might possibly be workable. Both governments have agreed that the achievement of general and complete disarmament is a process which must proceed in steps. It is especially difficult to foresee at this time how the last stages of the process might work, without some experience with the first stages. Accordingly, it would seem useful for the group to concentrate on the problems of the earlier stages of the disarmament program, including the problem of transition from earlier to later stages.

Ideally, the end product of the discussion would be an agreed proposal or a number of proposals for the first stages of a general and complete disarmament treaty. However, in fact, any such agreed proposal would contain a number of crucial variables such as, for example, the rate of arms reduction, the length of the stages, the number of stages, on which agreement or disagreement among the discussants would be of no great significance, since these variables would ultimately be a matter for political determination in the course of a negotiation. What would be important, rather, would be discussion of, and agreement on, the considerations which are involved in the choice

of these variables, such as, for example, the relation of the rate of arms reduction to the character and degree of inspection, or the size of armed forces on each side needed for stability in the absence of complete disarmament.

The usefulness of the discussions need not depend on the two sides reaching agreements, even of a broad sort. If an appropriately selected group of participants failed to reach broad agreement and the nature of the disagreements are clear, this may be taken as a useful indication of the kind of difficulties that would be faced in any serious attempt at negotiation between the two countries.

The respective participants on each side would undertake the obligation to explain to the officials of their respective governments responsible for dealing with disarmament problems both the conclusions that had been reached and the nature of the considerations that led to these conclusions. The composition of the delegations should be such as to facilitate this task.

Since the discussants would not be representatives of their governments and not under instructions by their governments, it would seem appropriate to hold the meeting at some place away from both the American and Soviet capitals.

Because the American participants would have had some access to classified information, it might be useful to prepare a factual brief on U.S. and Soviet forces which could be used on an unclassified basis in the discussion.

January 15, 1963

Proposed Program

drafted by Leo Szilard

The following describes a program which may be carried out under the Subcommittee on Informal International Conversations among Scientists of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences:

The Premises of the Program

In wanting to have arms control and disarmament, Russia is largely motivated by the economic savings which would result from it. It stands to reason that this should be so, because Russia's arms expenditure represents a very large fraction of her industrial output. An agreement providing for far-reaching arms reduction would solve some of Russia's most pressing domestic economic problems and it would also permit her to extend her political influence by enabling her to give economic aid if she wished to do so, to other nations on an unprecedented scale.

The economic savings which would result do not provide a strong motivation for disarmament to America and America's desire for an agreement on arms control is mainly motivated by her desire for greater security. Many Americans in responsible positions know that America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in an all out arms race and therefore they desire an agreement that would provide for arms control and would stop the arms race.

The Russians argue, with some justification, that an agreement providing for arms control, but not for general and complete disarmament, would not create a stable peace because it would not eliminate the possibility that America and Russia may intervene militarily in conflicts that might arise in areas of the world which are geographically remote from both America and Russia. The trouble is, however, that general and complete disarmament would not automatically guarantee peace, and the issue of how peace may be secured in a disarmed world has so far not been adequately studied either in America or in the Soviet Union.

In the circumstances, America may make a proposal on arms control and disarmament which provides for general and complete disarmament to be arrived at in stages, but since no one knows today how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world, any such proposal would have to describe the provisions of the late stages of the agreement in such general terms as to be almost meaningless. If Russia were to accept any proposal that America may make in the next few months, there would be no way to give Russia any real assurance that the provisions of the later stages of the agreement would be implemented in the predictable future. Only the provisions of the first few stages of the agreement, which provide for controlled arms limitations rather than complete disarmament, could be defined in sufficiently precise terms to permit their implementation on a fixed time schedule, and the Russians may well ask themselves what would impell America to implement the later stages of an agreement if the early stages of the agreement were to provide for the kind of arms control which America needs for her security.

However, if the early stages of the draft agreement were to give Russia, in addition to increased security also far-reaching economic savings, then Russia might conceivably be willing to pay a commensurate price in terms of accepting adequate measures of inspection.

We do not know just how far-reaching economic savings the first stages of the agreement would have to bring in order to make the agreement acceptable to Russia,

in the absence of any tangible assurance that the later stages of the agreement would be implemented in the predictable future. Also, there are several possible approaches to the problem of arms control and it is not clear at present which of these approaches could the Russians accept with least difficulty.

It is proposed that a limited number of the informal conversations be set up under the program which are aimed at elucidating these questions and that a certain number of other informal conversations be set up under the same program, which are aimed at elucidating how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

Thus the informal conversations set up under the program would comprise two projects. We may designate the project which relates to the first stages of a disarmament agreement as the "Arms Control Project" or the "Angels" project and the project which deals with the problems of a disarmed world as the "World Security Project".

It is proposed that in both projects the informal conversations will be carried out by a joint Russian-American group who would work full time for a period of two or three weeks.

The same group could have more than one such session, perhaps two or three, and the sessions could be held about two months apart so that the participants would be able to return to their regular work between sessions.

Because the nature of the two projects is quite different the participants will be different and the techniques used for the two projects may differ from each other also. Accordingly any given session will deal with one of these two problems only and be either part of the "Arms Control Project" or part of the "World Security Project."

It would not be the purpose of the ~~arms control project~~ ^{World Security Project} to come up with ^a ~~the~~ consensus of the group on how the peace should be secured in a disarmed world. Rather the goal of this project would be to produce a working paper which would list several approaches to this problem and discuss in each case the weak points of that particular solution and the circumstances under which it would be likely to break down. By proceeding in the manner the solutions discussed would remain free from the stigma of representing a Russian or an American proposal.

Upon its completion the working paper would be transmitted to the interested governments and if there is no objection on the part of these governments the working paper may also be published.

In contrast to this the aim of the "Arms Control" project would be to find one or several approaches to the problems which would make sense to the majority of the Russian and American participants. The conclusions reached would be transmitted to both the American and Russian governments.

I have prepared a tentative set of "instructions" under which the participants of the "Arms Control Project" might operate and another tentative set under which the participants of the "World Security Project" might operate. Both of these drafts are attached.

The End

January 11, 1963

Tentative "Instructions" to the Participants
of the " Arms Control" ("Angels") project
by Leo Szilard

No one seems to know at present how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world and therefore if today one were to draft an agreement providing for general and complete disarmament, the provisions of the later stages of the agreement would have to be described in such general terms as to be almost meaningless. Such an agreement could not offer any real assurance that the provisions of the later stages would be implemented in the predictable future.

The provisions of the first few stages of the agreement could be defined however, in terms which are precise enough to permit their implementation on a fixed time schedule and they could provide for far-reaching arms reduction. If these first stages were to provide for substantial economic savings, as well as a marked increase in security, then such an agreement might perhaps be acceptable to Russia as well as America even in the absence of any assurance regarding the implementation of the later stages of the agreement.

The Angels project would be limited to the discussion of the first stages. The task of the participants would be to explore what kind of an agreement would be likely to be negotiable and, with luck, this exploration might provide some guidance in this regard to their governments.

There are several alternative approaches to the problem posed by the first stages and it would be the task of the participants to try and see if they can devise a package, or several alternative packages, which would make sense to most of the American, as well as most of the Russian participants.

If the participants came up with a draft which made sense to all of the American and all of the Russian participants, this would not necessarily mean that it would make sense to the American and Russian governments to the point where it would be acceptable to them as a basis of negotiations. It seems likely, however, that drafts which failed to win favor with either the majority of the Russian, or with the majority of the American participants, would not be likely to be appealing to both the American and the Russian governments.

Ruling out drafts might in itself be of some value, because America and Russia had better avoid conducting useless negotiations. One would hope, however, that the project might accomplish more than this and that it might produce--perhaps after a few fruitless trials--a draft which would make sense to both the American and the Russian governments. If this came to pass, the two governments would then have an opportunity to explore, through informal communication with each other, whether negotiations based on this draft, or some modification thereof, would be likely to lead to an agreement.

If the two governments were able to find out in this manner--before any formal proposals are put forward by either side--that negotiations conducted along certain lines may be expected to lead to an agreement, then they would be in a position to prepare public opinion ahead of time.

The task of the participants would be to determine what provisions would make sense to them, rather than what provisions their governments might be currently willing to accept or might be currently inclined to reject. This point may be illustrated by the following example:

America and Russia are at present agreed in principle that there may be a major reduction in the number of delivery vehicles, including long range rockets, during the first stages, but that the number of delivery vehicles would not go down to zero. Rather, America and Russia would each retain at the end of the first stages an agreed number of long-range rockets. What this number shall be, would have to be determined through negotiations between the two governments and it may be assumed that at the outset of their negotiations the American Government would tend to set this number rather high, and that the Russian Government would tend to set it rather low.

The discussion of this "number" among the participants may bring out the points of view which ought to guide the governments in determining the number of long range rockets that America and Russia may be permitted to retain at the end of the first stages. This would make it possible later on, when the measures of inspection that would operate during the first stages become more clearly defined, for the governments to bring reasoned arguments to bear on the issue of what the number of rockets retained ought to be.

It would not be the task of the participants to appraise what "number" the American and the Russian Governments might currently be prepared to accept and it would serve no useful purpose for them to come up with a compromise number which they might recommend to their governments. Rather, in this particular case, as in general, each participant ought to state what would make sense to him; he should state what number of rockets he thinks ought to be retained--depending on the measures of inspection that would operate during the first stages.

If each participant were to state what number he himself would regard as appropriate, and how high or how low he would be willing to go, this might give an indication of the difficulties that the governments might expect to encounter, when they attempt to negotiate this number. Thus if it turned out that most Russian participants would be willing to go up with this number, if necessary, as high as 100-200 and if most American participants would be willing to go down, if necessary, as low as 5 - 10, then presumably this would indicate that the number to be retained would be likely to be negotiable.

In order to minimize the risk that the participants might be too much guided in their own acceptance or rejection of a proposal, by what their governments might be currently willing to accept, the participants ought to refrain from communicating with their governments during the session periods.

February 4, 1963

W. Panofsky

Herbert York

Lou Henkin

Harvey Brooks

James Fletcher

Hans Linde

Roger Fisher

Henry Kissinger

Matthew S. Meselson

Born Denver Colorado 1930

Graduated From California

Institute of Technology
with Ph.D. in physical
chemistry.

Present Position Associate Professor
of Molecular Biology,
Harvard University,
Cambridge Massachusetts

Consultant to

United States Arms
Control and Disarmament
Agency

Participant in Pugwash meeting
in London September 1962.
(over)

not free to participate
from present until
February 1 '64.

January 11, 1963

Second draft of the "Instructions to the Participants"

by Leo Szilard

No one seems to know at present how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world and therefore if today one were to draft an agreement providing for general and complete disarmament, the provisions of the later stages of the agreement would have to be described in such general terms as to be almost meaningless. Such an agreement could not offer any real assurance that the provisions of the later stages would be implemented in the predictable future.

The provisions of the first few stages of the agreement could be defined, however, in terms which are precise enough to permit their implementation on a fixed time schedule and they could provide for far-reaching arms reduction. If these first stages were to provide for substantial economic savings, as well as a marked increase in security, then such an agreement might perhaps be acceptable to Russia as well as America even in the absence of any assurance regarding the implementation of the later stages of the agreement.

The Angels project would be limited to the discussion of the first stages. The task of the participants would be to explore what kind of an agreement would be likely to be negotiable and, with luck, this exploration might provide some guidance in this regard to their governments.

There are several alternative approaches to the problem posed by the first stages and it would be the task of the participants to try and see if they can devise a package, or several alternative

packages, which would make sense to most of the American, as well as most of the Russian, participants.

If the participants came up with a draft which made sense to all of the American and all of the Russian participants, this would not necessarily mean that it would make sense to the American and Russian governments to the point where it would be acceptable to them as a basis of negotiations. It seems ~~likely~~ ^{probable}, however, that drafts which failed to win favor with either the majority of the Russian, or with the majority of the American participants, would ~~be~~ ^{not} likely to be appealing to both the American and the Russian governments.

Ruling out drafts might in itself be of some value, because America and Russia had better avoid conducting useless negotiations. One would hope, however, that the project might accomplish more than this and that it might produce--perhaps after a few fruitless trials--a draft which would make sense to both the American and the Russian governments. If this came to pass, the two governments would then have an opportunity to explore, through informal communication with each other, whether negotiations based on this draft, or some modification thereof, would be likely to lead to an agreement.

If the two governments were able to find out in this manner--before any formal proposals are put forward by either side--that negotiations conducted along certain lines may be expected to lead to an agreement, then they would be in a position to prepare public opinion ahead of time.

The task of the participants would be to determine what provisions would make sense to them, thather

what provisions their governments might be currently willing to accept or might be currently inclined to reject. This point may be illustrated by the following example.

America and Russia are at present agreed in principle that there may be a major reduction in the number of delivery vehicles, including long range rockets, during the first stages but that the number of delivery vehicles would not go down to zero. Rather, America and Russia would each retain at the end of the first stages an agreed number of long-range rockets. What this number shall be, would have to be determined through negotiations between the two governments and it may be assumed that at the outset of their negotiations the American Government would tend to set this number rather high and ~~that~~ the Russian Government would tend to set it rather low.

The discussion of this "number" among the participants may bring out the points of view which ought to guide the governments in determining the number of long range rockets that America and Russia may be permitted to retain at the end of the first stages. This would make it possible later on, when the measures of inspection that would operate during the first stages become more clearly defined, for the governments to bring reasoned arguments to bear on the issue of what the number of rockets retained ought to be.

It would not be the task of the participants to appraise what "number" the American and the Russian Governments might currently be prepared to accept and it would serve no useful purpose for them to come up with a compromise number which they might recommend to their governments. Rather, in this

Instructions that may be given to the participants of a proposed study concerning the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world

by Leo Szilard

It is proposed to set up a non-governmental study carried out for a limited period of time with about 5 to 7 Russian and 5 to 7 American participants. The study would be carried out on a full-time basis for limited stretches of time of perhaps three weeks each, alternately in Moscow and in Washington. The purpose of the study is not to come up with a recommendation on how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world, but rather to examine a number of different ways how this could be done and try to understand in each case under what conditions the peace-keeping machinery which is envisaged could function satisfactorily and under what conditions it would be likely to break down. By proceeding in this manner none of the solutions cited would carry the stigma of being either a Russian or an American proposal.

The aim of the study would be to produce a working paper describing five or six different ways in which the peace might be secured in a disarmed world. The working paper would provide an analysis of each of the solutions proposed and clarify the advantages and disadvantages of each particular solution.

As mentioned before, the study would be carried out on a full-time basis in stretches of perhaps three weeks' duration each. The number of these three week stretches need not be determined in advance and would depend on how well and how fast the study progresses.

One would want to conduct the study part of the time in Washington and part of the time in Moscow in order to enable the participants to get acquainted with the preferences and objections of various members of the Soviet Government and of the American Government in regard to the various possible approaches to the problem under discussion.

I believe the study would be bound to fail if the participants thought they had to aim at reaching a consensus in favor of one particular solution. It would be almost equally bad if the study were aimed at coming up with a majority recommendation and maybe another recommendation of a dissenting minority. This is not the way to find out under what conditions some peace-keeping machinery that might be proposed would be able to function, and under what conditions it would fail.

I wish to illustrate what is involved by describing a discussion that relates to an ordinary machine such as an internal combustion engine. Clearly, if I said that such an engine ought to have a cylinder, a piston and valves and somebody replied that he agreed that it should have a cylinder and valves but he did not think that it ought to have a piston, we could not arrive at a useful analysis of such an engine. In order to arrive at a useful analysis the discussion would rather need to be of the following kind:

I might propose that the engine have a cylinder, valves and a piston. Someone might say that such a machine would work for a little while but then it would be bound to break down because the piston would mechanically chew up the cylinder. I might then say that this could be avoided by lubricating with oil. Someone might reply that such an engine might work a little longer but it would not work for very long because oil contains water and the water would chemically corrode the cylinder. I might then reply that there is a new process which makes it possible to remove the water from the oil. Someone might then say that this is a very new process and one would have to wait for more experience with it before one would know whether one can rely on it.

A discussion of this type would be a constructive discussion and might lead to a clarification of the difficulties that have to be faced.

The proposed study can succeed only if those who carry it out fully understand what is expected of them, and the participants must therefore have clear instructions in this regard at the time when they are invited to participate in the study.

Goldberger will be in Moscow:

Aug 29 - 27th

His school begins
Sept. 25th

Singer's office -

296-3300

1700 K St. N.W.

Buchler
Singer's
Office

Buchler

Re 76006

June 21, 1963

SUMMER AVAILABILITY OF STEVEN MULLER

Absolutely unavailable Dates - Sept. 4th, Oct. 4th

Available only with great difficulty - Aug. 17 - 31

Curriculum Vitae
of
Steven Muller

June 21, 1963

Born: 22 November 1927, Hamburg, Germany

Education: B.A. (political science) University of California at
Los Angeles, 1948
B.Litt. (political economy) Oxford University, 1951 (Rhodes
Scholar)
Ph.D. (government) Cornell University, 1958

Present Position: Associate Professor of Government and Director, Center
for International Studies, Cornell University

Experience: Assistant Professor of Political Science, Haverford College,
Haverford, Pennsylvania, 1956 - 1958

On Cornell University Faculty since 1958

Summer Visiting Professor of Political Science, UCLA, 1957
Columbia University, 1960

Member, Woods Hole Summer Study on Verification and Response,
Summer, 1962, (Run by Institute for Defense Analysis for US
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)

Consultant, Sept. 1962 to present, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs (Arms Control)

Member, United States delegation, Third Annual American-German
Conference, Bad Godesberg/Berlin, November 1962

Member, Summer Study on Problems of Arms Control and Disarmament
in Europe, Summer, 1963 and Consultant, US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

SCHOOL OF MATHEMATICS

May 15, 1963

Dr. Leo Szilard
Hotel DuPont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

Dear Szilard:

Thank you very much for your telephone call and for the letter which followed it. I am very much impressed with the good connections which you have established on the other side, and with the general seriousness of your whole enterprise.

Just because I regard this project as such an exceptionally serious and important matter, I am obliged to tell you that I cannot take part in it. I feel it would be altogether wrong to take part if I were not able to throw myself into it wholeheartedly, and to undertake some responsibility for selling within the American government whatever conclusions the meetings may arrive at. I cannot in all honesty promise to do this.

The most immediate difficulty which stands in my way is the arrival of a new baby which my wife is expecting about the beginning of September. We have two other small children, and no accessible grandmother or other relative who can take responsibility for the family off my shoulders. It is thus clear that I shall be obliged to return to Princeton suddenly and unpredictably at some time between now and the end of September, and I do not think that, under these conditions, my participation could be fruitful. Even if the baby should arrive early, it is unlikely that I could leave Princeton for any extended period before the end of September.

I am very sorry for having kept you in doubt so long about my availability. I hope most fervently that you will overcome the hesitations within the American government and have a meeting actually underway this summer.

Yours sincerely,

Freeman Dyson
Freeman Dyson

Law School of Harvard University

Cambridge 38, Mass.

February 13, 1963

Dr. Leo Szilard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Dupont Circle
Washington, D.C.

Dear Leo:


As I mentioned to you on the telephone yesterday I spoke with Carl Kaysen on Saturday. Based on our discussion I am encouraged to go ahead. You can count on me as being available for your "angels" project.

I have spoken with the Dean who was agreeable. He would be far happier if it should result in my being absent from classes three weeks rather than four.

Looking at the draft "instructions to participants" dated January 29 I would suggest two changes. One is the omission of the last paragraph. I think that an unclassified factual brief on forces would be highly useful but it should not be included in the instructions.

Secondly, I believe that the last paragraph of your draft instructions dated January 11 suggesting that participants should not communicate with their governments during the talks should probably be retained. I would thus suggest adding this paragraph to the draft of January 29th.

As ever,


Roger Fisher

RF:ap

BERNARD T. FELD

CURRICULUM VITAE:

Professor of Physics (since 1957) MIT,

Field: High energy nuclear physics, theory of elementary particles.

Experience in arms control and disarmament:

- 1) Active in organization of Federation of American Scientists in 1946; spent time in Washington in 1946 on May-Johnson bill struggle.
- 2) Chairman, Committee on Technical Problems of Arms Control, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 1958 - 1962.
- 3) Director, Summer Study on Arms Control, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, financed by the 20th Century Fund, 1960.
- 4) Participant: Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Baden - Baden (Austria) 1959; Moscow (U.S.S.R.) 1960, Stowe, Vt. (1961); Cambridge and London (1962).
- 5) Chairman, Committee for the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 1963 -
- 6) Member of the Continuing Committee of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, 1963 -

BERNARD T. FELD

Dates not available: 1 - 30 August
20 Sept. - 5 Oct.