

H-3

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY  
INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT, 1953-1958  
Directors: Professors Karl Polanyi and Conrad M. Arensberg  
Executive Secretary: Harry W. Pearson

SELECTED MEMORANDA ON  
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH  
(Not for publication)

Volume IV  
(Indices, Vols. I-IV)

1957



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT, 1953--1958

Directors: Professors Karl Polanyi and Conrad M. Arensberg

Executive Secretary: Harry W. Pearson

SELECTED MEMORANDA ON  
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH  
(Not for Publication)

VOLUME IV

CONTENTS

1. Karl Polanyi - Suggested Subjects for Interdisciplinary Project ..... 9 pp.
2. Karl Polanyi - Food Distribution and Equivalencies ..... 7 pp.
3. M. I. Finley - Aristotle on Exchange ..... 15 pp.
4. Karl Polanyi - The Tamkarum in the Cappadocian Tablets  
and in the Codex Hammurabi ..... 17 pp.
5. Marshall David Sahlins - Polynesian Socio-Economics ..... 12 pp.
6. A. P. Vayda - Notes on Trade Among the Pomo Indians  
of California ..... 10 pp.
7. Karl Polanyi - Notes on the Place Occupied by Economies  
in Societies ..... 53 pp.
8. Indices, Volumes I-IV ..... 3 pp.



MEMO 1 (Revised June, 1954)  
Not for Publication

1. Food transactions in tribal and archaic society
2. Origins of sale-purchase transactions
3. Activities in exchange, commercial trade and the fixing of equivalencies in exchange
4. The role of the market in early American trade
5. Characteristics of the early colonial empires
6. Trade and markets in the early American settlements

## COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

### INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT: ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH

Directors: Professors K. Polanyi and C.M. Arensberg

#### SUGGESTED SUBJECTS FOR OUR INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT

by

Professor K. Polanyi



### Suggested Subjects

1. Food transactions in tribal and archaic society
2. Origins of sale-purchase transactions
3. Aristotle on exchange, commercial trade and the fixing of equivalencies in exchange
4. The role of the tankar in early Assyrian trade
5. Thalassophobia of the early continental empires
6. Trade and markets in the early American settlements

#### 1. Food transactions in tribal and archaic society

Pre-state and early-state societies differ sharply in regard to approved methods of disposing of food stuffs. In the former, individual food transactions, if not altogether banned, are at any rate exceptional; in the latter, transactions concerning food and raw materials may form a common feature of economic life. The outstanding case is that of the bronze age states of Babylonia, Assyria or the Hittites. In regard to the necessities of life the reciprocal and redistributive movements characteristic of tribal society were here supplemented by exchange transactions at fixed rates or equivalencies as laid down by statute or proclaimed by government. Such a profit-free transaction represented a moralization of barter in respect to all the more important staples and resulted in a spontaneous mobilization of economic resources that was accompanied by a very great all round improvement in the general standards of existence. Thus the emergence of government with the power of setting up proclaimed equivalencies may well have a connection with that decisive upturn in the material level of man's livelihood which in this area was responsible for the rise of great cities and their civilizations. And the crucial step in this development appears to have been the introduction of the device of equivalency exchange in regard to food stuffs.



## 2. Origins of Sale-purchase transactions

*C (Kneip)*

Hints have been dropped by historians of law that the apparently elementary transaction of sale-purchase may be actually of a complex origin. As anthropologists would put it, it is the result of a process of convergence. In effect, two widely different lines of development led up to this institution: the one involving an interchangeable position of the partners, as in barter (type I); the other involving a position where, on the contrary, the position of the two sides is not interchangeable, as in an auction, or the distribution as well as the collection of staples at the gates against fixed payments (type II). In terms of our forms of integration, type I recalls bargaining exchange, type II, distribution from or delivery at a center. Clearly, the two types of transactions occur under contrasting conditions in regard to the relative position of the partners. With type I, supply crowd and demand crowd are on an equal footing, sometimes even overlapping, as at the stock exchange where movements of prices induce a change of sides as between some buyers and some sellers. With type II such an overlapping is inconceivable. The position of an auctioneer towards the demand crowd opposite, or the position of the rationing officer towards claimants to whom he is handing out food against fixed payments is entirely different from the position of those facing him. (This would of course be true also of the supply side, for instance of contractors making submissions to a board of public works, or with a compulsory delivery of grain at a fixed price.) Type I, representing bargaining exchange is most frequent in markets proper, while type II refers mainly to the disposal of public property by non-market methods. The latter was



instanced in the Greek and Roman auctioning of taxes and booty as well as in the Oriental and Sudanese institution of corn distribution at palace, temple, or city gate at a fixed price. Undoubtedly, both auction and sale-distribution have contributed to the development of the institutions of sale-purchase. Conjointly with barter -- whether at equivalencies or at bargained rates -- they represent the two main lines of advance that converged towards the comparatively late institution of sale-purchase. Naturally, under a market-system type II was eventually assimilated to type I: in the West the occasional auction was overshadowed by the market; in the East, the gates were superseded by the bazaar. This is, however, to simplify unduly; for the East also knew auction, and the West also distributed corn cheaply. Yet, by the time of the Roman jurists sale-purchase appeared as a simple development out of barter, having shed most of the traits reminiscent of its redistributive origins. Some of the more puzzling details of the sparse and fragmentary evidence regarding the early history of sale-purchase institutions, mainly in Greece and Rome, may thus fall into place.

### 3. Aristotle on exchange, commercial trade and the fixing of equivalencies in exchange

Aristotle's writings on what we to-day would describe as economic matters were conceived by him at a time when the market and its supply-demand-price mechanism had hardly yet made their appearance. Later centuries mistook them for a theory of market exchange. Yet in Attica commercial forms of trade were just coming into prominence. His dogmatic aversion against kapéliké could not well have sprung from any direct experience of the working of the market or the formation



of market prices. Aristotle hardly mentioned either. His so-called theory of price does not deal of the market mechanism but of the entirely different phenomenon, namely, of customary, statutory or proclaimed equivalencies and the problem of how to fix them correctly. In later times, after the emergence of the market system, the Aristotelian perspective was lost sight of by commentators and translators, so that the content and purport of his doctrines on "economic" subjects was largely misinterpreted as a theory of market exchange. The first book of his Politics and the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics make this clear; they also contain important information on what should rightly be termed "equivalency exchange," a basic institution of the archaic economy. This institution which decisively shaped his views on the nature of the human economy was entirely overlooked by posterity, having been mistakenly regarded as an unsuccessful attempt to formulate a theory of market-price.

#### 4. The role of the tamkar in early Assyrian trade.

Two groups of facts, taken together, must induce a revision of accepted views on the nature of the Mesopotamian economy. First, the archaeological evidence appears to exclude the presence of market places in ancient Mesopotamia; second, a critical review of the documentary evidence points in the same direction. Commonly, Babylonia has been looked upon as the cradle of the mercantile practices characteristic of modern economic life, and its manysided trade was regarded as altogether market oriented. Consequently, gainful motives, competitive attitudes and utilitarian value scales were taken to dominate the manner in which the acquisition of goods was institutionalized.



All this may have to be radically reconsidered in the light of our present understanding of the fundamental facts governing livelihood under Assyrio-Babylonian conditions. The organization of trade is naturally central to the problem. Hence, the significance of the so-called early Assyrian trade settlement in Kanis, with its leading figure the tamkar. Notwithstanding the singularity of the scene revealed by the "Cappadocian" tablets, the relevance of the early Assyrian tamkar to the general problem of trade organization in ancient Mesopotamia can not be doubted.

#### 5. Thalassophobia of the early continental empires.

The almost irresistible attraction which in more modern times access to the sea appears to have possessed for inland empires was absent with their archaic predecessors. Far from straining after the possession of maritime outlets, they shunned these. They abhorred the sea and its neighbourhood. Barren and indefensible, the coastal area was worse than useless, the abode of fugitive peoples of the land, and of the human flotsam of the sea, a source of ritual and political contamination. They certainly did not wish to be burdened by the possession of ports the trade of which would dry up as soon as the place was occupied by a great power. The counterpart of the inland empires, the thalassocracies, made of course use of the coasts, but they, too, did not cherish their possession. Their bases lay in safe island sites, peninsulas and archipelagoes, from which they roamed the waters, keeping only tenuous contact with the polluted beaches. Thus, where inland empire and thalassocracy met, the coastal area often remained a no man's land. This is the key to the ease of



Hellenic colonization. On the other hand, beaches and ports were generally unprotected but for the federations of local chieftainships or of small acropolitian kingdoms. And yet, the seemingly so precarious existence of the coastal peoples had a remarkable measure of permanency. This resulted from an invisible source that was no else than the vital function of these peoples in the economic life of the powerful political units that might otherwise have engulfed them. The great powers refrained from doing so, mainly because in their strong hands the neutral trading points of the coast lost their attraction to the foreign trader who supplied the continent with much needed imports. Indeed it is hardly possible to understand the development of the maritime trade that underlay Mediterranean civilization, unless one accounts for this peculiarity of the international power system on which the relative safety of coastal locations depended. It was well recognized by the contemporaries and must have directed the policies of the rulers of the archaic continental empires. As a result, the balance of power neutralized the ports effectively, for by keeping a virtually worthless prize out of the hands of the great powers, it served the interests of all.

Many instances are on record. The ancient Egyptians deemed the sea impure and had no ports of their own on the Mediterranean coast. Sumeria, Babylonia, Assyria, the Hittites and Mitanni exerted as a rule no pressure towards a permanent occupation of the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean. Even Israel left its modest Red Sea fleet in Tyrean hands. From the time of Gudea of Lagash, of Sargon of Agade, and of Elamite expansion, ambitious raids had been launched to procure the materials for palace and temple, yet we have



no knowledge of any attempt at gaining an exclusive possession of the coast. The story of Ugarit seems conclusive. During the long stretch of its third and second millennial history it appears never for any length of time to have been engulfed by the great powers of the hinterland. The same is true of its more southerly Phoenician successors, Sidon and Tyre, down to the beginning of the first millennium. In spite of the numerous records of Mesopotamian powers' sweep to the coast, these ports to our knowledge were never wrenched by one great power from the possession of another, they merely had to defend their independence from military pressure of varying intensity. The Ionian cities of Asia Minor equally were safe from continental aggression up to the Lydian moves of the seventh and sixth centuries, just as Greek settlements on the Nile Delta benefited from the enlightened self interest of Egypt. Similarly, later, in China, only most reluctantly did the inland realms reach out towards the sea when the coming of market trade radically altered the position. Assyria laid siege to Tyre in the ninth century, Babylonia in the sixth, Persia in the fifth, Alexander the Great in the fourth. However, Ptolemaic Egypt even then kept aloof, leaving Alexandria under a strictly autonomous regime. Some of the Greek towns of Asia Minor also remained free, down to Persian times. After that archaic thalassophobia disappears and the drive for maritime outlets becomes widespread. A new period of world history had begun.

#### 6. Trade and markets in the early American settlements.

Were the capitalistic forces of the East or the democratic forces of the frontier chiefly responsible for the type of life and



institutions that we find embodied in the American economy and society of the nineteenth century? The question may well involve a false dilemma which institutional analysis may help to avoid, by pointing out the singularity of American development. Consideration should start from the fact that in antiquity and in the middle ages trade is commonly either foreign trade or local "market trade"; trade in the middle distance or internal trade is a relatively late development. The one great exception was offered by England's North American colonies. Under the peculiar conditions of the time and place trade comparatively soon outgrew mercantilist regulation and ran in the channels of a territorial exchange economy. This fact may have been decisive for the formation of the American economy and society, as can be shown through an analysis of the close relationships that developed between trade institutions and market institutions at a relatively early time.

- - - - -



MEMO 2 (November, 1953)  
Not for Publication

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT: ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH

Directors: Professors K. Polanyi and C.M. Arensberg

Under the auspices of  
The Ford Foundation  
Behavioral Sciences Division

FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND EQUIVALENCIES

by

Professor K. Polanyi



## FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND EQUIVALENCIES

### (a) Resistance to the trading of food stuffs, primarily corn

Clear evidence of such resistance is forthcoming only when the tribal community is put under pressure by commercialized neighbors. Such was the state of affairs in 8th and 7th century Palestine exposed as it was to the influence of Tyre, the North Syrian aramaic kingdoms and the Babylonian sphere. With Amos, the first of the great prophets, protest against the mobilization of the produce of the soil sets in. His denunciation of the use of two measures (large and small) may have been directed not so much against fraudulent practices -- as it is usually understood -- but against the regular buying and selling of corn which (cf. the Nuzi material) involved the use of a large measure for wholesale and a small measure for retailing. (cf. 6 below). Fraudulent practices were punished with death. The measures were deposited in the local temple; the god was directly interested in maintaining them since his revenue was collected in these measures. The use of two measures (related as 8 to 10) was general with the Nuzi. These were Hurrites, and Hurrite influence, as we now know, was dominant in the whole central Near East in the period 16th to 12th century. The rate of 8 to 10 is traditional in the Niger bend in the Western Soudan; according to Herskovits even today the wholesale to retail price in Dahoman food markets relates as 80% to 100%.

### (b) Prohibition of gain made on exchange and on transactions in general

With an Aristotelian term, 'gain' means here 'gain made off the other man' (ap'allelon). In my terms it means gain made in bargaining



or higgling haggling exchange, or -- put still in another way -- on exchange as a form of integration. The gain made in an exchange at set prices is not made off the other man, it is another name for the interest which induces the partners to exchange at the set price. The bargaining exchange involves a different behavior, namely one through which the partners hope to influence the terms of the exchange in their favor.

Transaction means any voluntary vice-versa movements of goods (or services) between the partners. The main forms are sale-purchase, loaning-borrowing, renting-hiring. Since in early society the free alienation of land, cattle and slaves is exceptional only their use is alienated. In other words renting, hiring and borrowing antedate sale-purchase. The prohibition of gain on exchange, is therefore, primarily the prohibition of gain made on renting, hiring and loaning (the so-called usury laws). The Old Testament strictly prohibited gain on transactions; the Mishnah rigidly extended this prohibition to all transactions, such as the Old Testament had not yet envisaged; the Talmud, on the contrary, often maintains the semblance of law enforcement while actually making gainfulness possible (within reasonable limits). The Mishnah is dominated by the spirit of the Law; while the Talmud is an enforcement of its letter.

The study of the Mishnah repays the student of economic institutions of antiquity manifold. It was the lawbook of a religious community of a non-commercial character yet having occasional dealings such as are unavoidable even under primitive pastoral and peasant conditions. It does therefore not vise at commercial laws, but at moral laws, including those regulating occasional transactions. The



dominant concern is the exclusion of gain. All this was developed in the Mishnah out of one or two references in the O. T. to equivalency exchange as the result of tribal reciprocity behavior. The so-called prohibition of usury was a universal prohibition of gainfulness in transactions. Since the spirit of the Talmud was contrary to that of the Mishnah, on which it was based, the enormously informative material contained in the Jewish law books has not until now received any scientific attention on the part of the economic historian. Especially in regard to the institution of interest, the Babylonian law and practice is most confusing and obscure, which explains why the discovery of the cuneiform business practices has not contributed at all to the clarification of the vexing question of the prohibition of usury. In the Mishnah even the use of money as a 'standard' is employed to ensure the avoidance of gain; a woman lending bread is enjoined to note its silver price and to accept only bread to the same value in repayment, otherwise she might fall in the sin of 'usury'. This principle, as we will see, underlay Babylonian legislation and can be shown to have survived in Aristotle's notions on money, which he describes as a device for keeping exchanges equivalent; -- in the sense of banning all notion of gain from trade as a 'natural' means of maintaining self-sufficiency.

(c) Equivalencies and equivalency exchange as an institution regulating voluntary exchanges in antiquity.

It is an expression of the practice of reciprocity. He who happens to be short of one of the basic staples can expect his neighbor who possesses a stock of it, to let him have as much as required, no more, in exchange for another of the staples, at the recognized rate of equivalence, the whole transaction happening in kind and without the



intervention of credit. No gratuitous giving or receiving is envisaged. If one has nothing to give in exchange, one cannot expect to receive anything. In such a case, the man must give his family -- his wife or children -- to work off the debt, or work it off himself ('sell himself').

The main instance of the establishment of equivalencies by law is the Law of Eshnunna Art. 2. But similar equivalencies are known from the Nuze, the Solonic census, the Lex Aternia-Tarpeia in Rome in regard to fines, the Hittite Code; references to equivalencies, and changes in them are to be found in the Code of Hammurapi, and frequently, in 'the Cappadocian' tablets. Aristotle explained the institution as deriving from the increase in size of the primitive family, the members of which are forced to settle separately. At this juncture their former self-sufficiency ceases when they were using things in common which they actually possessed in common. Now, however, they would necessarily lack one thing or another, and would have to reciprocate in exchanging equivalents, according to the other's needs. The same is meant by Deut. 23, 19: 'To thy brother thou shalt lend that which he wanteth without usury', and Deut. 15. 7-8: 'and freely lend him sufficient for the needs that he has'. Ar. Pol. puts it this way; 'The barbarian peoples even now practice such exchange, kind for kind, of all staples such as corn and wine, as much as is necessary, but only so much and no more, changing from hand to hand, and of this sort of things of every one of them'. Ar. Pol. 1257a 24-28. In the Nichomachean Ethics Bk. V. Aristotle deduces the equivalencies from the status of the various sections of the population, and says the equivalency must be such as to be proportionate to their status. In another passage, he emphasized that one of the partners only is interested in any concrete case: the one



who happens to lack something and appeals to the other for supplying him with it. True reciprocity demands, therefore, that at another time he offer his former partner to supply him with what he might need. This is the graceful attitude to take, Aristotle comments, and nothing could, I feel, better illustrate the meaning of reciprocity than this elaboration. It makes abundantly clear, how exchange can be regarded as part of reciprocity behavior, while the marketing view has endowed barter and bargaining with the exact opposites of the generosity and grace that goes with the notion of reciprocity. (Let me here give another version of the Aristotelian passage quoted above: "for such peoples are expected to give in exchange necessities of life for other necessities of life, as much as required in the circumstances and no more, for example wine for corn, handing over the one and taking the other in return, and so with each of the other staples of the sort." Both translations are our own).

At this point my views, as you will notice, sharply differ from the traditional interpretation not only of Aristotle but also of the world he mirrored. I submit that Aristotle never dealt with economics in the modern sense of the term. That he had no price theory in the sense of a theory of the determinants of market price. That he had no notion of a supply-demand-price mechanism. This, his price theory, is nothing else but the sociology of the establishment of equivalencies, an institution of antiquity that later times ignored and overlooked. Actually, fluctuating prices in the modern sense of the term were unknown in his time; changes of equivalencies were the nearest to it. The phenomenon of fluctuating price was as yet limited to the very few organized markets such as the slave market at Delos, or the corn market



at the same place. But already the latter instance needs qualification. Although corn prices did fluctuate according to supply and demand, the relative prices of wheat, barley and Olyra did not; for almost two centuries their relation of 5:3:2 -- was rigidly maintained. Even this greatest of all freemarkets of antiquity was controlled to such an extent as no world market since that time was known to be. The reason was, of course, the absolute dominance of the Egyptian corn export monopoly authorities over the market of Delos.

The principle of no-gain was extended in antiquity so as to comprise wages, rent, interest and even profit as long as they were no more than the just compensation for a service, etc. The retail span of the marketing woman was assured to her through an operational device (cf. above); the loan was usually secured by a pledge which the creditor could use as long as the loan was not repaid (this is the so-called antichretic pledge); if no such pledge was given then as a compensation for the use, 'interest' could be stipulated. Rent, too, was such a compensation for non-use. The peculiarity of the conception lies in the idea that just price excludes gain. Equivalency exchange was thus made compatible with revenue from property.



MEMO 7 (March, 1954)  
Not for publication

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT: ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH

Directors: Professors K. Polanyi and C. M. Arensberg

ARISTOTLE ON EXCHANGE

by

M. I. Finley



It is a commonplace that the ancient world contributed nothing to economic theory or economic analysis. A glance at almost any modern history of economic doctrine will reveal the pattern: a quick bow to the Greeks and Romans, because it is necessary to begin at the beginning, with a few more or less patronizing remarks about their ideas; and then, with obvious relief, an immediate jump to the Middle Ages and the problems of usury and just price.

All this would be easy enough were it not for Aristotle. In the first place, Aristotle was a pan-sophist, whose range of original inquiry was without parallel in man's history. How did it happen, then, that a man who made monumental contributions to physics, metaphysics, logic, meteorology, biology, political science, rhetoric, aesthetics, ethics, each in full-scale works, and to sociology and constitutional history in somewhat less systematic writing, failed altogether to undertake a general analysis of the economy? This is puzzling enough. But then there is the further fact that some discussion of economics will be found in Aristotle's writing, chiefly in the first book of the Politics and the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. And that makes the puzzle worse, as commentators for more than a century have shown that what Aristotle wrote on economics is absurd, and hence completely out of character with the level of genius he maintained in so many other areas.

Roughly, post-Aristotelian discussion of Aristotle on economics may be classified into three groups or trends.

1. What may be called the Catholic view was expounded by Thomas Aquinas, primarily in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. (I have called this the "Catholic" view rather than the "medieval" because



it continues as the core of much modern Catholic writing, as in the excellent study of Aristotle by M. Defourny of the University of Louvain, published in 1932.) For Aquinas and his followers, the important thing in Aristotle's discussion was his distinction between the natural and the unnatural in economic relations. In a sense, Aristotle provided a pagan philosophic defense for the doctrine of "natural rights," hence of just price, anti-usury, anti-middleman, anti-excesses notions.

2. For Marx, Aristotle was at once the greatest thinker produced in antiquity and a perfect symbol of the materialist view of history. Because he was a genius, Aristotle was the first to raise the problem of commensurability in exchange of qualitatively incommensurable objects. But even though he was a genius, he could not solve the problem. He lacked "any concept of value" for the following reason: "Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality of men and their labor powers. The secret of the expression of value, namely, that all kinds of labor are equal and equivalent...is possible only in a society in which... the dominant relation between man and man is that of owners of commodities" (Capital, Kerr ed., I 69).

3. Virtually all other nineteenth and twentieth-century commentators, whether of the older classical school or in the post-classical tradition, are agreed that Aristotle simply fumbled. They may not see eye to eye on details, even on just what Aristotle was saying. Thus, some go so far as to believe that Aristotle had even stumbled on the fundamental scarcity definition of economics, without



realizing what he had discovered<sup>1</sup> or what it meant. But they agree completely that Aristotle had no notion of the mechanism of trade, markets, and prices; that his attempted analyses and explanations were absurd. The most recent, most systematic, and most sober discussion is Josef Soudek's in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 96 (1952) 45-75. The following quotation from Soudek may be taken as a fair summary of the more generous estimates: "There can be but little doubt that he has not given a satisfactory answer to the final question of every market economy, the rules of exchange, simply because he was preoccupied with the isolated exchange between individuals and not with the exchange of goods by many sellers and buyers competing with each other."<sup>2</sup>

Now there can really be no dispute with this judgment, or even with the more hostile judgments that have been expressed in the literature. As an explanation of the price mechanism of a market economy, what Aristotle has to say is no explanation at all. This will be perfectly obvious as we summarize his analysis, so obvious, in fact, that one may legitimately wonder why so much writing has been devoted to the point in the past. But the underlying assumption, that Aristotle was talking about a market (in the supply-and-demand sense) at all, is not nearly so obvious, nor so indisputable. And yet, for all modern commentators at least, that assumption has been so basic and so axiomatic, that it has not always been made as explicit as in the Soudek statement. More often it has been left unsaid.

Our first question, then, is this: What was Aristotle actually talking about when he discussed problems of exchange? Before we can



proceed to that question directly, four points about Aristotle and his methods of work must be made as preliminary statements.

1. It is essential first of all to efface the image of an ivory-tower philosopher spinning out of his head abstractions, ideal types, or what you will. Aristotle had an amazing command of empirical information about the social and political life of the Greek world. It is enough to point to the Politics and the Constitution of the Athenians. And what is more important, his concern was always with the real Greek world of his day, not with utopia, so that, in considering all of Aristotle's discussions of social and psychological problems, our starting point must be, first, that he was working from a base of massive empirical materials; second, that he was talking about what went on around him. Stated differently, it is methodologically wrong to assume that any analysis or judgment of Aristotle's is "unreal," "impractical," "visionary," or "absurd" because we do not at once see its practicality. or because it is "absurd," etc., in respect to our world.

2. Underlying all of Aristotle's thinking about man and his institutions is the notion that men are fundamentally, by nature, unequal. This notion is to be understood as a biologically rooted inequality, so to speak, and not as the mere consequence of chance, environment, social conditions. For example, when Aristotle says that some men are by nature born to be masters and rulers, and some to be slaves and ruled, that is to be understood literally. He makes room, to be sure, for accident, as in the case of men who are enslaved by war or piracy, but these contingent instances do not alter the basic point of a natural division.



3. Aristotle's well-known description of man as a zoon politikon is persistently mistranslated as a "political animal," whereas Aristotle meant something much more specific, namely, a "polis animal." Similarly, his Politics is, by title, not a work on "politics" as we usually understand that word, but a treatise on polis-science, if I may be permitted that phrase. Aristotle believed that the polis was the natural form of human social-political organization. Hence both his ethics and his political science were concerned with man within the polis. He was never concerned with the isolated individual, with Robinson Crusoe; nor with individuals abstracted from the political structure in which they existed. Virtue, for example, could not be discussed apart from the polis; the good man was the good citizen of the polis; and justice is a function of the relationship among members of the polis. Soudek thus makes a fundamental error when he writes that Aristotle was "preoccupied with the isolated exchange between individuals." Aristotle may be talking about exchanges between two individuals, not about "many sellers and buyers competing with each other," as Soudek says; but he was never concerned with an "isolated" exchange or any other "isolated" relationship. It is enough to point to the phrasing with which Aristotle concludes one part of his discussion of exchange in the Ethics (5.5.12): "for if the reciprocal proportion were not in this fashion, there would be no association."<sup>3</sup>

4. Aristotle thought that the natural goal of the economy was autarchy, self-sufficiency. In the first instance, this was the goal of each household, and, as the increase in households in the more primitive state led to the larger community, the polis, autarchy became the natural objective of that larger unit as well. Empirically, it is well



established that neither every household nor every polis can possess a supply of all necessities, salt and metal being the obvious stumbling blocks. Trade to secure these necessities would thus come within the notion of autarchy and therefore be natural. In other words, autarchy is not primarily home production of all necessities, but of a sufficiency that is the gauge of independence.

These preliminary points having been stated, we may turn to the question of what Aristotle was talking about, and we start with a consideration of the two contexts in which his lengthier discussions of exchange appear.

We shall take first the discussion in Politics I 3. Having established the naturalness of the family household and the polis as social groups, and the naturalness of the fundamental inequalities among individuals (man and woman, parent and child, master and slave), Aristotle finds it necessary to consider oikonomia, that is, the ways in which the household is sustained, and hence the nature of wealth, property, goods. But what is wealth, he asks. Is it, as Solon, for example, has said, something limitless, or is it a means to an end and therefore limited by that end (naturally limited)? And his answer, which rests on two considerations, namely, autarchy and a fundamental metaphysical doctrine of the relationship of ends to means, is definitely and categorically against Solon. Wealth is what is needed and useful for the maintenance of the household or the polis, and therefore it is limited. Those who think of wealth as unbounded confuse two quite different things.

But before we can examine that confusion, we must clarify a problem of terminology. Here as in other areas in which he was a



pioneer, Aristotle had difficulties with terminology. There was no technical language, in the sense in which a modern discipline has created its jargon, and in what we call the social sciences Aristotle was forced to resort to everyday words, to which he gave specific meanings as his context demanded. Unfortunately, modern translators have promptly introduced their own interpretations into Aristotle's text, and in the discussion with which we are here concerned, they have, almost without exception, completely destroyed the sense of Aristotle. The key word here is chrematistike. Its root is the verb chrao, "to need," "to use." From that came the noun, chremata, "things used," hence "goods," "property"; and chrematistike, "the art relating to the acquisition of property."

The errors of interpretation have taken two roads. One is to play on the synonymy of "need" and "demand" and thereby to inject the notion of demand in the modern market sense, when it is demonstrably absent in Aristotle. The other is to seize upon one connotation of the word chremata in everyday Greek parlance, "money," and thus to translate chrematistike as "money-getting," which it may mean, but  
 4  
 need not.

Actually Aristotle is very specific on this last point. There are two kinds of chrematistike, he says. One we may call the art of household supply, the obtaining of the means by which oikonomia, the management of the household, is made possible. This is what he takes up in the first book of the Politics. More narrowly, what are the natural means of acquisition, of supply? The answer: agriculture, hunting, fishing, mining, war, and, if necessary for autarchy and only to that end, trade. These are natural, proper and limited by their end.



But trade made necessary the invention of money (a discussion in Aristotle which will not be considered in this paper), and then there arose the second kind of chrematistike, money-getting for the sake of accumulating money. This kind of wealth, Aristotle concedes, is indeed boundless; but this kind of wealth and this kind of chrematistike (which would include kapelike, trade for gain, commercial trade) are unnatural, and therefore wrong. Elsewhere in the Politics (7.5.4-5, 1327a25), he says explicitly: "For the commerce of a polis should be for itself, and not for others. Those who themselves provide a market for all do it for revenue, and it is not proper for a polis to share in such gain, or to have such an emporion."

The context in which exchange is discussed in the Ethics (V 5) is altogether different. The whole of the fifth book is given over to an analysis of justice. Having first differentiated universal and particular justice, Aristotle proceeds to a systematic study of the latter. It, too, is of two kinds, he says: distributive and corrective.

Distributive justice is a concern when honors, goods, or other "possessions" of the community are to be distributed. (The word for "distributive," dianemetikos, has as its root the verb, nemo, which is one of the usual Greek verbs applied to division of property, as in an inheritance; hence an heir is a kleronomos.) Here justice is the same as equality, but equality is to be understood as a proportion, not as simple counting. In other words, distribution of equal shares among unequal persons, or of unequal shares among equal persons, would be unjust. The principle of distributive justice is to balance the share with the person. (The role of the natural inequality of men in this analysis hardly needs comment. Note should be taken that this has



nothing whatever to do with scarcity of goods, as it has sometimes been interpreted, making a forerunner of marginal utility out of Aristotle.)

The second kind of particular justice is involved when the action is not one of distribution from a pool of some sort, but a transaction between individuals. Then justice is "the straightening out in transactions." (Diorthotikos literally means "straightening out," but "corrective" is the standard translation and it is less clumsy and unobjectionable. "Transactions" are to be understood very broadly, including not only sale, lease, and other "voluntary" transactions, but also what Aristotle calls "involuntary transactions," such as fraud or theft.) In corrective justice, says Aristotle, the relative nature or worth of the persons is irrelevant. If there has been injustice, one has gained and the other lost; this inequality is the injustice and the principle of justice to be applied is the mean, that is, the reestablishment of equality by removing the gain and hence the loss.

And then, without warning so to speak, Aristotle comes to his main subject. He says: But there is actually a third type of particular justice, which is neither distributive nor corrective, although it shares elements with each, and that is justice in exchange. When goods are exchanged, justice requires that equality be retained, that there be neither gain nor loss on either side. How is that to be determined? That is Aristotle's question, and it is in that form that he comes face to face with the problem of determining the right rates of exchange and hence of insuring that equality and justice have been maintained.

In the Politics Aristotle did not consider this aspect of exchange. There he considered a prior question: How did exchange come



to take place altogether? His answer, briefly, was that it grew up when households grew, their membership became numerous, split up, and often the new smaller households were unable to produce all their own necessities. Then he asked: Exchange between these latter having become necessary, is it natural, and, if so, to what extent? The answer: If exchange serves to reestablish autarchy, it is natural; if it serves the ends of gain and money-getting, it is unnatural.

It is in the Ethics that he asks the question of what determines how much shall be exchanged for how much of (is equivalent to) something else. His answer is: reciprocal proportion. That means that the quantity of product A that is equivalent to a given quantity of product B is inversely proportionate to the ratio of the producer of A to the producer of B. In other words, equivalence, that is, justice, in exchange is determined by the relative status of the respective parties. Aristotle does not go on to explain what he means by what I have called status or how it is to be measured. But there can be no question that this is what he is talking about, and that this, the fundamental inequality of men again, is the determining principle  
5  
of exchange.

As an explanation of exchange values in a market economy nothing could be more absurd. The first principle of a market economy is the indifference in the calculations of the persons of the buyer and the seller. Yet for Aristotle, it is the persons who constitute the first principle, so to speak, of the calculation. And modern commentators have had a time with this, for, having committed themselves to the notion that Aristotle was talking about commercial trade and a supply-and-demand market, they have had no choice but to



treat Aristotle as an idiot or to insist that the text does not say  
 6  
 what it so patently does say.

What is the evidence that Aristotle is not talking about commercial trade? To be sure, he does not say explicitly in the Ethics that he is or is not talking about any particular kind of exchange. But as soon as we put the two discussions, the one in the Politics and the one in the Ethics, together, the conclusion is inescapable. We must remember that in the opening of the Ethics, Aristotle said directly that ethics is a part of politics; in other words, that the two works form a single unit (necessarily so in the light of his notion that justice and virtue are social, not individual, attributes). In the Politics he separated the two kinds of exchange, the natural and the unnatural. In the latter, which is the money-getting, commercial kind of exchange, justice is absent by definition. Stated in other words, there can be no equality in transactions in which gain by one party is the objective, for, to Aristotle, where there is gain there must be loss. Corrective justice applied to commercial trade would eliminate the gain, and hence destroy the very purpose of the transaction. And if there can be no justice in commercial trade, then there can be no commercial trade in Aristotle's consideration of justice in exchange.<sup>7</sup> This does not mean that Aristotle was ignorant of the existence of money-getting trade. On the contrary, in the Politics he was concerned with establishing both its origin and its nature. But in the fifth book of the Ethics he ignored it deliberately as outside the realm of his subject, which was justice.

A final question: What, if anything does this have to do with the realities of the Greek world of the fourth century B. C.?



It can be demonstrated that Aristotle's analyses of distributive and corrective justice pertain directly to very real problems and procedures of his day. Athenian court procedure provides proof enough. Unlike the ancient Near East, in which very detailed lists of fines and penalties were decreed for every conceivable kind of offense, Athens had virtually no fixed penalties (apart from the death penalty). In both civil and criminal trials, the court fixed the award or penalty, as the case might be, in most kinds of cases after a prior proposal made by each party to the action. Hence what Aristotle was doing was establishing the norms by which such a procedure achieved justice.

We must assume, unless there is powerful evidence to the contrary, that the discussion of exchange, which follows immediately after, is equally realistic. Heretofore the stumbling-block has been the unwarranted assumption that Aristotle was discussing commercial exchange; and behind that, the even more unwarranted assumption that all exchange is market exchange and all markets are price-making markets. Once we rid ourselves of these assumptions, we are able to proceed to the proper question, which is to find out just what in his society were the situations pertinent to this particular analysis by Aristotle. We cannot answer that concretely today, but that only makes the question all the more vital as a research problem in ancient economic history.



1. E. g., Johannes Kinkel, Die sozialökonomischen Grundlagen der Staats- und Wirtschaftslehren von Aristoteles (Leipsiz 1911).

2. The classical philologists, by and large, have simply assumed that the economists understood Aristotle on these matters and have been satisfied to repeat them. Collectors of curiosa may be interested in Van Johnson's "Aristotle's Theory of Value," American Journal of Philology, 60 (1939) 445-51, which showed that Marx did not understand Aristotle, and that Aristotle had a perfectly sound theory of exchange value.

3. I cannot go into the reasons for accepting the minority view that koinonia here means "the community" and not "the association of exchange partners" (the latter implying a Tauschgemeinschaft, a community of those who exchange). In the Magna Moralia, which comes from the Aristotelian school if not from Aristotle himself, the author explicitly says the koinonia politike (the polis-community) in this very context (1.23.12).

4. The Liddell and Scott lexicon defines chrematistike as "the art of money-making" and ignores the root-sense of acquisition of goods. The proper distinction, with regard to Aristotle, was seen by Defourny and by M. I. W. Laistner, in his anthology, Greek Economics.

5. Again Aristotle has a discussion of the origin and nature of money, which we may pass by.

6. As an extreme instance, Max Salomon, in an appendix to his Der Begriff der Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles (Leiden 1937), says: I cannot emphasize strongly enough that it is utterly wrong to interpret Aristotle as saying that the personality or rank of the respective



parties has anything to do with the determination of value. In reply: it cannot be emphasized strongly enough that this is what the text says, this and nothing else, twist it as one will.

7. Just before proceeding to his consideration of money, Aristotle points out that inequality of need (chreia) is a necessary condition of exchange. "Need" is obviously to be understood substantively, arising either from inequalities in agricultural crops as between one household and another (the case mentioned in the Politics) or from specialization (housebuilder and shoemaker, the case mentioned in the Ethics). By translating chreia as demand, and then taking "demand" in its modern price-making sense, rather than in its Aristotelian substantive sense of requirement, modern scholars have injected the market economy into the text. But this is patently bad methodology.



INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT: ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH

Directors: Professors K. Polanyi and C.M. Arensberg

THE TAMKARUM IN THE CAPPADOCIAN TABLETS

AND IN THE CODEX HAMMURABI

by

Karl Polanyi

1. Characteristics of the 'Capp.' texts from the point of view of the organization of trade.
2. Features of trade organization reflected in these characteristics.
3. Tamkarum activities as suggested by the 'Capp.' tablets.
4. W.F. Leemans on the Tamkarum in the Codex Hammurabi.
5. Criticism of Leemans' interpretation.



In Memorandum No. 10 "On forms of trade in the ancient Near East" the nature of the difficulties was indicated that we experience in our attempts to understand the organization of economic life in ancient Mesopotamia.

The presentation started from the "oikos controversy" and centered around the sui generis figure of the tamkarum in the "Cappadocian" tablets.

The "trustee" function of the tamkarum which we here underline was first referred to by Landsberger in ana ittišū in connection with the "Capp." tablets (p. 115). This aspect of the activities of the tamkarum appears to bridge the "Cappadocian" tablets to the C.H.

1. Characteristics of the 'Capp.' texts from the point of view of the organization of trade.
  - (a) No interest in the level of prices is expressed; except for metals, no fluctuation of prices is in evidence.
  - (b) No mention of price differentials as such is made.
  - (c) No mention is made of profits (nemēlu) made on the balance of transactions; in the very few occurrences it may mean surplus in kind (Überschuss).<sup>1</sup>
  - (d) No request is made to the other party, or indirectly to third party, to agree to the business proposals made; to the instructions given; or the decisions communicated.
  - (e) No mention of failure to secure the payment of the awarded sums as if arbitration awards were selfexecuting.
  - (f) Only a few witnesses are named on tablets. Apart from the interested parties only two, as a rule.<sup>2</sup>



- (g) As a rule, no persuasion is offered; nor are reasons given, for requests of money loans or advances; in the case of the tankarum, they are claimed as by right.
- (h) No doubts are expressed concerning the liquidity of one's own funds; not even the liquidity of debtor's funds is discussed;
- (i) No reference is made to financial immobility due to
  - (aa) the investing of the funds
  - (bb) debtor's delay or default
  - (cc) administrative tangle
- (j) No reference is made to losses as resulting from the balance of transactions; the few mentions of losses appear rather in the nature of a deficiency (Manko, Abgang) than of business losses.
- (k) The pledged slave is turned in to the tankarum or "entered" with him on default of the pledgor.
- (l) Money is "taken" at tankarum's on the turning-in of pledged slave (in these cases "taken" does not necessarily mean "borrowed").
- (m) Documents of overland transport are as a rule made out to the tankarum.
- (n) Legal advice is sought and received from the tankarum.
- (o) The tankarum is regularly credited and debited unilaterally via third party accounts.
- (p) Moneys or goods referred to as "belonging" to the tankarum or "given" to him as "on credit" are actually in his trust or safe-keeping and, unless otherwise stipulated, at the "call" of the depositor.



- (q) Dispositions of goods or money made by A vis à vis B and affecting C are valid and final without any reference to either B's or C's consent. The pattern of action implied is taken for granted, i.e., generally known and accepted by all parties.
- (r) The parties are sometimes represented by, or connected with, different tamkaru<sup>3</sup>

2. Features of trade organization reflected in these characteristics.

- (a) No risk on prices.
- (b) No risk of debtor's default. Risks are not of loss, but of little or insufficient profit.
- (c) Trading profits not made on price differentials, but on turnover<sup>4</sup>
- (d) Sales of goods to the consumer are for cash only; if (exceptionally) credit is given to the native, outstanding amounts are secured through a pledge, guaranteed by the native prince<sup>5</sup>
- (e) Obligations are, in principle, either covered or selfexecuting -- either through a cash deposit or through an active balance of the accounts carried in an authentic form on the basis of the documents by the competent authorities (kārum and/or City)
- (f) Risk is borne by the producers of the consignment ware who undertake its transportation and bear the eventual loss incurred on the sale of pledged slave, in case of debtor's default.

3. Tamkarum activities as suggested by the 'Capp.' tablets.

- (a) brokerage ( sell at equivalency  
( cf. Laws of Eshnunna art. 41 or 45
- (b) sale to the highest bidder sale for 'more or less'  
("auctioning")<sup>6</sup>



(c) slave deals <sup>7</sup>	have pledged slave 'enter' his house on default of karum trader's debtor
(d) advance of fares <sup>8</sup>	carriage to place of destination
(e) deposit in trust <sup>9</sup> (safekeeping)	money or goods 'given to' him in trust; to keep and care for over time
(f) limited loans	to lend silver for purchase of goods
(g) sequestration	seizing of inventory on death of karum trader
(h) control of caravan transactions -- shipping <sup>10</sup>	receipting of silver, sealing of bags, acceptance of bill of lading made out to him by caravan leader; organizing the caravan and lading involving administrative and legal supervision
(i) clearance of accounts <sup>11</sup>	accountancy payment
(j) handling of consignment goods <sup>12</sup>	exports of City ware
(k) acceptance of orders for city goods <sup>13</sup>	handling of City ware
(l) cooperation with ummi'anim	sequestration of property of firm at sudden death of the owner
(m) legal advice <sup>14</sup>	legal intermediary between karum and other bodies, intercession with karum, in trader's interest on debtor's account
(n) payment	authenticated payment to creditor from debtor's deposit (one of the earliest banker's functions)

#### 4. W.F. Leemans on the Tankarum in the Codex Hammurabi

Leemans' study on "The Old Babylonian Merchant" (1950), however much one may disagree with his views, offers a convenient approach to the subject.



- (1) The author comes to the conclusion that in the CH the t. was a kind of merchant whose occupations consisted in travelling abroad and acting as a money lender and banker. Essentially, this is also the traditional reading.
- (2) The objections to this view are both juridical and philological.
  - (a) His reading misrepresents the material content of the law.  
It ignores the structure of the Code which consistently puts the general rule first; followed by applications or specific cases, if any;
  - (b) this initial mistake leads to the juristically impermissible assumption that the text of the law, in referring to one and the same person in the same connotation, employs synonyms in designating them; Actually, the t. is referred to only in the sequel, i. e., in regard to the special cases and is therefore of necessity a person different from that mentioned already in the context of the opening paragraph.
  - (c) eventually, the author identifies the t. with the person referred to in the main context of the arts.
- (3) To return to the structure of those regulations: the general rule involves no mention of the t.; he comes into play only in the course of the specification, i. e., in the final paragraph. The articles of the CH analyzed by Leemans under the heading "tamkarum" do not therefore deal with the t. as such. His figure is taken for granted, as is that of the king or the priestess.
- (4) The main regulation is self-contained. Yet the case itself may imply the intervention of the t. (ransoming of feudal officer or harvest loan made on awilum land) or it may require his intervention



on account of the conflicting interests of the parties concerned, usually combined with a need for a clarification of the facts. The carrying into effect of the intention of the law and the safeguarding of the public interest may in such cases require the authority of a person who, summarily acting within his jurisdiction, is capable of substituting for law courts and the execution of arbitration awards.

- (5) In effect, with the exception of penalties (arts. 88-96) and the šamallu (arts. 99-107), the passages adduced by L. deal with a number of separate institutions, such as the feudal fief (art. 32); the status of the repatriated slave (arts. 280-281); married couples' mutual responsibilities for debts (arts. 151-152); death of pledged slaves (arts. 49-51, 66). duration of service of bonded person, free or unfree (arts. 117-119); short-term mortgages on awilum lands (arts. 49-51, 66).
- (6) The t. may be acting in his capacity of registrar of slave deals; broker in such deals from and to foreign countries; public seller of a pledged slave in case of default. As a rule this involves clarification and declaration of legally relevant facts, such as the place of origin of the slave; whether he was a captive, a bought or a born slave, a fugitive, etc.; the paternity of the female slave's progeny he had sold on the debtor's default; third party evidence in case of the violent death of a pledged slave; liberation of the repatriated slave.
- (7) The t. appears to possess diplomatic status abroad, especially in hostile territory (cf. Hit. Code and Tell el-Amarna correspondence).



- on account of the conflicting interests of the parties concerned, usually combined with a need for a clarification of the facts.
- The carrying into effect of the intention of the law and the safeguarding of the public interest may in such cases require the authority of a person who, summarily acting within his jurisdiction, is capable of substituting for law courts and the execution of arbitration awards.
- (5) In effect, with the exception of penalties (arts. 88-96) and the šamallu (arts. 99-107), the passages adduced by L. deal with a number of separate institutions, such as the feudal fief (art. 32); the status of the repatriated slave (arts. 280-281); married couples' mutual responsibilities for debts (arts. 151-152); death of pledged slaves (arts. 49-51, 66). duration of service of bonded person, free or unfree (arts. 117-119); short-term mortgages on awilum lands (arts. 49-51, 66).
- (6) The t. may be acting in his capacity of registrar of slave deals; broker in such deals from and to foreign countries; public seller of a pledged slave in case of default. As a rule this involves clarification and declaration of legally relevant facts, such as the place of origin of the slave; whether he was a captive, a bought or a born slave, a fugitive, etc.; the paternity of the female slave's progeny he had sold on the debtor's default; third party evidence in case of the violent death of a pledged slave; liberation of the repatriated slave.
- (7) The t. appears to possess diplomatic status abroad, especially in hostile territory (cf. Hit. Code and Tell el-Amarna correspondence).



- (8) The t. acts as a general depository of money or goods in the cases designated by law.
- (9) In some instances he seems vested with the functions of an official umpire or a referee.
- (10) He handles rural credit extended to an awilum whose cultivated land is rented out by the t. to a farmer.
- (11) The figure of the t., together with some specific institutions and devices accounts for the smooth flow of business life in the absence of regular judicial proceeding and without the risk bearing function of the private capitalist.
- (12) In the 'Capp.' tablets the activities of the t. appear to be essentially similar to those implied in his function under the CH.

##### 5. Criticism of Leemans' interpretation

Art. 32 If a tamkarum has ransomed  
 either a rēdūm or a bā'irum,  
 who was carried off (captured) in a campaign of the king,  
 and he enables him to regain his town,  
 then, if the (amount required for)  
 ransom(ing) is extant in  
 his house,  
 he shall ransom himself.

If the ransom is not extant in  
 his house,  
 he shall be ransomed in the temple  
 of his town.  
 If in the temple  
 of his town  
 the ransom is not extant,  
 the palace shall ransom him.  
 His field, his garden  
 and his house  
 are not given away for his ransom.

The Art. deals not with the t.'s claims. It regulates  
 the ransomed feudatory's obligations to reimburse the ransomer



while protecting the feoff (ilku), against the latter's claims. sequence "own house - district temple - palace" is obligatory also in regard to any third persons who might have advanced the ransom. This is in accord with the regulation in regard to the feudatory that "his field, his garden and his house are not given away for his ransom." Art. 32 therefore protects the feoff against third persons' claims and gives assurances to such persons that their claims for restitution of ransom will be met. (Attican law had a similar provision for the reimbursement of any person who had ransomed a citizen abroad. Since in Babylonia the t. was the officer entrusted with all slave transactions abroad, the question of ransoms fell into his competency.)

Art. 280 If an awilum (citizen purchases in a hostile country a male or a female slave of an awilum and after that he comes in his own country, the master of the male or the female slave recognizes his male or his female slave, then, if that male or female slave are children of the country, without any money their liberty shall be effected.

Art. 281 If they are children of another country, then the purchaser shall declare before the god the money he has paid, and the master of the male or the female slave shall give the money he has paid to the tamkarum and (thereby) redeem his male or female slave.

My reading:  
and the master of the male or the female slave shall give the money to the tamkarum which he (the purchaser) has paid (abroad) and (thereby) the master redeem his male or female slave.



Arts.  
280-281

Leemans identified the t. of Art. 281 with the awilum of Art. 280. This is altogether mistaken. In Art. 280 there is no mention of the t. because there is no need for a trustee. The native born slave bought by an awilum abroad, becomes free as soon as his former master recognizes him. Whatever be the rationale of that measure, the situation is covered by the rule that "Without any money their liberty shall be affected."

Art.281

The foreign birth of the slave is the complication. The foreign born slave does not go free, while the purchaser is not to carry the loss. It follows that some procedure is necessary to ascertain the actual price in case the purchaser is dishonest. The sum in question is deposited by the original master with the t. The rest of the procedure belongs to the t.'s regular business as an authorized slave dealer. (Note: A home born slave's price is 20 shekel; a foreign born slave has no such equivalency. Leemans quotes NII 195, lines 14-19, in regard to the Nuzi where the tankarum receives his standard 30 shekels for an Arraphan ransomed from Nullu.)

Art.151

If a woman  
who lives in the house of  
a citizen,  
in order that a creditor  
of her husband  
does not seize her,  
binds her husband (by contract)  
and has furnished  
a tablet (for stating this),  
then, if on that man,  
before he has taken  
that woman (as a wife),  
a debt out of loan  
was resting,

his creditor  
shall not seize his wife;



but if on that woman,  
before she has entered the house  
of a citizen,  
a debt out of loan  
was resting,  
her creditor  
shall not seize her husband.

Art. 152 If, after  
that woman  
has entered the house of a  
citizen,  
a debt out of loan  
comes into being  
on their account,  
they both  
shall satisfy the tamkarum.

Again Arts. 151 and 152 are treated by Leemans together; and again the t. of Art. 152 is falsely identified by him with the *bēl hubullim* of Art. 151. While, again, the point is precisely that no t. is needed in the first case, in the second a trustee's services are required.

Under Art. 151 there is a man, a wife and a man's creditor; the Art. states under what conditions that creditor cannot seize the wife for her husband's debt to him.

Under Art. 152 they are both liable for the debt. The creditor is entitled only to satisfaction once (whichever of them pays, or even if they both pay together). The matter is resolved through the intervention of the t. By depositing the sum with him, they are rid of their obligation. This is, of course, the common rule; but for married couples a special summary procedure out of court is established, in the general interest.

Art. 115 If a citizen has  
barley or silver (put out)  
on another citizen



and he has seized somebody as security  
and that seized person  
dies a natural death  
in the house of the secured creditor,  
that case  
does not entail a claim.

Art. 116 If a seized person dies in  
the house of the secured creditor  
by thrashing  
or by ill-treatment,  
the owner of the pledged person  
shall offer evidence against his  
tankarum,  
(and penalties, based on the talion principle, besides  
forfeiture of the sum lent, shall be inflicted).

Again the awilum of Art. 115 who happens to be a creditor is  
identified by Leemans with the t. of the next Art. who acts as  
a trustee for the third persons whose slave given as a pledge  
to the awilum dies of ill-treatment in the creditor's house.  
The complication is again the same as above. Under Art. 115  
the third person (who is the owner of the pledged person) has  
no standing as long as the seized person died a natural death  
in the house of the creditor. However, if the cause is as-  
serted to be ill-treatment, justice must intervene. Admitted-  
ly, the text is elliptic. Who in this case is "his tankarum"  
against whom the evidence is to be offered? This makes  
Leemans' mistake, in this case, excusable. That the 'seized  
person' need not be the debtor's slave. Cf. still unpublished  
text listing six different types of persons who might be  
'seized.'

Arts. 88-96 (Only preserved in fragment)

Art. 88: The maximum rate of interest for barley loans is  
33 1/3 per cent and for silver loans 20 per cent;



Art. 89: If the borrower of silver has no silver to repay, but possesses barley, he may repay barley according to the officially fixed rate of exchange, and probably the interest rate for barley had to be given;

Art. 90: If a tamkarum has taken more than the maximum interest, he loses all he has lent;

Art. 93: If the money-lender does not substract repaid sums (?) or adds the interest to the capital, he must return all the barley, which he has taken, in double.

Art. 94: If the tamkarum tries to practise fraud with weights, he loses everything he has lent;

Art. 96: gives another precept for the event that the borrower possesses neither barley nor silver to pay off his debt.

The striking thing is the frequency with which safeguards against abuse of power by the t. are introduced into the Code. Leemans regards it "as a hardly acceptable conclusion that private people were legally protected against the state (the king), in view of the times." This is to ignore the preface of the law as well as what we know of earlier laws, like those of Urukagina of Lagās, as well as much later ones, like Deuteronomy, directed against the oppression of the people by the powerful including the royal officials. However, we are dealing here with fragments only.

Art. 117 If a liability (arising from a debt) has seized a citizen and he (therefore) sells his wife, his son or his daughter or gives (one of these) ana kišsatim then for 3 years these shall work



in the house of their purchaser  
or their receiver ana kiššatim,  
in the fourth year  
their freedom  
shall be established.

Art. 118 If he gives a male or a female  
slave ana kiššatim,  
the tamkārūm shall let the term elapse  
and then may sell (his or her);  
there shall be no revindication.

Art. 119 If a liability (out of debt)  
has seized a citizen,  
and he (therefore) sells a female  
slave of his, who has borne him  
children,  
then the (original) owner of the  
slave can pay the silver, the tamkārūm has paid,  
and release his slave.

Art. 117 limits to three years the term of service of the  
wife, son or daughter of the awilum, given ana kiššatim. Art.  
115 refers to the t. "who shall let the term elapse and then  
may sell (him or her); there shall be no revindication."  
Art. 119 adds that if the slave "has borne him a child" then  
the (original) owner of the slave can pay the silver the t.  
has paid, and release the slave.

Leemans concluded that the t. must be identical with the  
money-lender. Yet Art. 117 deals with the family of the  
awilum sold or given ana kiššatim; Art. 118 with a slave  
given ana kiššatim; Art. 119, with a slave either sold or  
given ana kiššatim who had borne children to the debtor.  
Naturally, the t. comes in only in the case of the slave,  
since the freedman's family regain their freedom under the  
law automatically; a female slave given ana kiššatim is sold  
for the benefit of the creditor after three years, to any



third person; only in case a female slave has been sold outright, while having borne children to the original owner, can this man claim her release after having paid the t. the amount with which he (the t.) had reimbursed the creditor in the first place.

This Art. alone would prove the official standing of the t. in matters of sale of the pledged slave. The essential facts are (a) the paternity of the female slave's progeny and (b) resulting from her having been sold in the first place the creditor had been paid a definite sum. Since the law limits the compensation paid to the actual owner of the slave to that sum, the t.'s official knowledge of all the relevant facts is the key to the procedure envisaged by the law.



NOTES

1. EL 96 TC 73; EL 157 Sayce 1 = 1. 16 "erlangen wird" PSBA 1897 Plate 1; EL 144 LC 239; EL 226 VAT 13513; EL 246 Schmidt 2; EL 225 CCT 4 (?) = 219 (a) EL 311 Edinburgh 1922/397; EL 325 (a) Tübingen 2.
2. EL 191 Gol = Sil 3; EL 192 Jena 434; EL 214 BIN IV 183; EL 215 VAT 9293; EL 216 Giessen 1-6; EL 73 CCT 5<sup>a</sup>; EL 75 BIN IV 153.
3. TC II 75:7-10; Ališar 12:17-19; Contenau 10:4-5; Ališar 2:11.
4. BL TC 27, Šadūatum (commission), 1 shekel per Mina, i.e. 1.66%; BL TC 22 - If silver (sometimes gold) is transmitted the phrase is added: "Percentages are added to, the commission is included." nišpātum (percentages); BL TC 34; BL TC 28, TC 2.
5. EL 277 VAT 13529 q CCT IV 18<sup>a</sup>, 1. 9ff. Warning not to sell for credit; Palace - EL 217 TC II 71; cf. 209 De Clerq; BL 33 - Prince (named!) as a guarantor of marriage contract (financial stipulations); BL 32 - Arbiter between native and Assyrians; BL 32 - Jurisdiction of Prince in native affairs.
6. BL TC 95 and 96; EL KTS 18; EL CCT III 10; BL TC 7; EL 176 KTHahn 19 (!); EL 105 Giessen 1-7.
7. EL 87 CCT 6<sup>a</sup>.
8. BL TC 28 - "T. to advance half a mina for the fare which the T. allegedly refuses to do." BL TC 23 - "Demands assistance of Karum to travel to the city."
9. EL Intr. 12 KTS 43<sup>b</sup>; EL 108 VAT 13519; EL 109 KTHahn 24 (TC II also BL p 18f); EL 93 Edinburgh 1909/586; EL 12 KTS 43<sup>b</sup>; EL 138 Giessen 3-14 (?); EL 109 KTHahn 24; EL TC 22.
10. EL 118 CCT 14<sup>b</sup>; EL 123 Chantre 10; EL 129 BIN IV 122; EL 134 KTP 30; EL 135 KTS 49<sup>c</sup>; EL 139 BIN IV 127; EL 140 KTHahn 25; EL Dadša ref. 108, 226, 109, 123, Nab (i) -Sin 224, Aššur-rabi 110, Kukkulanum 139, 108, 140, 226, Ikkupia 135, 218, 225, Abiša 117; EL 116 VAT 9274; EL Intr. 108 VAT 13519; EL 93 Edinburgh 1909/586; EL 110 Jena 352; EL 143 Giessen 3-9, cf. 123ff, 145ff; EL 131 CCT 16<sup>b</sup> - NN receipts eight different sums of silver from various persons intended for different addressees.
11. BL TC 1 - letter of the "nominated ones" (?) to the karum in Kaniš call to pay 10 mina to the city. Unless Kaniš pays up the money will be taken from their money in the city. BL CCT 43 - A to NN informing him of his (A) having paid the copper in full from off the accounts of several other traders. A number of such unilaterally made transfers recorded by A. EL 165 CCT 28 1. 9ff - i se - er N. i-la-qi-u (or laqū'un) (note: A manner of payment with the effect of releasing the



debtor for the time being as if having paid by certified cheque.)  
 EL TC 22 l. 24ff; EL 268 CCT 48 l. 10-12 - (see note on reference  
 EL 165 CCT 28<sup>a</sup>; EL 189 KTP 43; EL TTC 22 l. 25 cf. p. 93 109  
 KTHahn 19 - 181 CCT 17<sup>a</sup> (!); EL 96 TC 73 l. 9; EL 277 VAT 13529 -  
 fined 1 mina for failure to acknowledge debt at once; BL TC 18 -  
 "Have made out two tablets (in regard to your remittances); debit  
 my account with one-half, with the other debit the account of the  
 tamkarum" ; BL CCT 43 - qātum = account.

12. EL 224 CCT I 1a ; EL 101 (JENA 280ff).
13. EL 87 CCT 6<sup>a</sup>.
14. BL TC 4 - "The T has advised us by letter to proceed thus." (from  
 a letter of NN advising A and B in regard to 260 hides of consignment  
 goods.)



MEMO 6 (November, 1953)  
Not for Publication

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT: ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH

Under the auspices of  
The Ford Foundation  
Behavioral Sciences Division

Directors: Professors C.M. Arensberg and K. Polanyi

POLYNESIAN SOCIO-ECONOMICS

by

Marshall David Sahlins



This paper may be considered as a generalized description of the aboriginal social and economic organization of the following Polynesian islands or groups: Hawaii, the Societies, Tikopia, Marquesas, Mangaia, Easter Island, Mangareva, Tonga and New Zealand. <sup>1</sup> Polynesian islands

---

1. The sizes of the largest socio-economic units in these islands are (approximately): Hawaii, 40,000; Societies, 20,000; Tikopia, 1,300; Marquesas, 1,500; Mangaia, 3,000; Easter Island, 3-4,000; Mangareva, 4,000; Tonga, 20,000; New Zealand Maori, 4,000. These figures refer to the largest groups participating in a single economic system; they do not necessarily refer to the total populations of the islands.

---

not mentioned do not necessarily have this organization. Statements are of a general nature; they usually do not pertain to any island in particular. Local variations around the general pattern to be described are not considered here.

The basic characteristic of the social structure of these islands is the organization of kinship groups along the lines of a genealogical tree. Organizations of this type may be called "ramified" social systems, while any particular delimitable group or branch of the genealogical tree can be called a "ramage" (Firth, 1936).

Each ramage has a leader or head and perhaps the best point of departure for a description of the ramified system is the customary mode of succession to the position of headship. Barring defects in personality, the mode of succession is primogeniture, the eldest son succeeds to the position of his father. <sup>2</sup> Given primogenitural succession, certain

---

2. Variations from island to island are occasioned by the differential role of women in the ramified system. But, with few exceptions, effective leadership is vested in the male, even though he may have an older sister.



For this reason the position of women and the role of women in the ramified social system may be neglected in this general discussion.

---

consequences follow which must be grasped if the ramified social systems are to be understood. The major consequence is that the oldest brother in a family is differentiated from his younger brothers on the basis of his potential succession to headship. This is not only a differentiation in prestige, but it is also a differentiation which permeates the childhood and entire life cycle of these individuals. For example, the life crises rites of birth, puberty, marriage and death of the eldest son are of an entirely different order of elaboration from the rites de passage of his brothers. But not only is the oldest brother differentiated from his youngers -- so also is every brother differentiated from each other in accordance with their respective order of birth and prospect of succeeding to the position of the father. Every brother is ranked by a principle of seniority.

The seniority principle in the family is a microcosm of the ramified social system. (The extension of ranking within a family to ranking within the entire society is well described in Tonga by Gifford, 1929). As a consequence of seniority, the descendants of an older son or brother rank higher than the descendants of a younger brother. In any given group descendent from a common ancestor we can thus distinguish a senior line from a number of junior lines, each ranked according to the order of birth of the brothers standing at the apices of the lines. By consequence, every individual in this group will hold a different rank, one precisely in proportion to his genealogical distance from the senior line of eldest sons.

The Polynesian societies considered here are often single ramified social systems. The entire society can usually be analyzed as composed



of sections of one genealogical tree at the apex of which stands the paramount chief who is the direct descendant in the senior line of the reputed founder of the society. People whose ancestors were related to the common ancestor of the society at a remote period are lower in rank than those descendent from a more immediate relative of the chiefly line. Descendants of younger brothers through younger brothers ad infinitum occupy the lowest statuses in the group (see Chart A).

The position of the paramount chief is reinforced through deification of his ancestors, themselves former paramount chiefs, and through connection (in belief) of this main line of descent to the important god or gods of the pantheon. The chief is then the direct descendant of the gods. By consequence, a certain degree of sacredness and power, mana, is felt to be an inherent aspect of chieftainship. This mana often extends to power over the fertility of the land, sea and people. And the chief is usually surrounded by a number of tabus which ostensibly protect his person from defilement, but which also function, through limiting his activities, to prohibit the exercise of personal despotism.

In every island, sections of certain sizes or orders of the ramified structure of the community are distinguished from other like sections and given names. These are ramage, groups of people tracing descent to certain persons on the genealogical tree of the society. One particular ramage is basic to all Polynesian ramified societies and is the unit out of which all higher order ramage are built. This unit is the household,<sup>1</sup> a patrilocal extended family. In accordance with ramification principles,

---

1. A family composed of a nucleus of related males, usually a number of brothers or a father and sons, their wives and offspring.

---



THE HIGH GOD

P

P

P

P

P

DEAD  
ALIVE

HIGH ← RANK → LOW

P = Paramount Chief

CHART A

The Genealogical System In Polynesia



the household is headed by the male senior in descent. Ramages of higher order as the Tikopian "clan," the Tongan "lineage" or the Maori hapu are composed of a number of such households having a common origin. Heads of these high order ramage are ranked in the society as a whole by seniority of the ramage ancestor, the man highest in descent being paramount chief of the tribe, island or group. Members of each household<sup>1</sup> take their status from the genealogical position of the household head.

---

1. This principle does not usually extend beyond the household level. That is, one "tribe" or "clan" is not stratified above another. Ramages of this type are more or less comparable in size and their heads are more or less comparable in status. Members of different ramages of equivalent order hold equivalent status if they are proportionally distant from the main line of descent in their respective ramages. Adoption, rearrangement of genealogies, matrilocal residence and affiliation with the mother's father's ramage are mechanisms by which high-order ramages of comparable size under heads of nearly equivalent status are effected. On some islands, however, an inferior ranked large ramage may grow in size and power and stratify itself above other ramages.

---

As Firth has pointed out, one of the most important features of ramages is "the principle of fission and dispersion in the creation of them." (Op. cit., 370). The genealogical tree metaphor gives the clue for ramage growth. As branches diverge from the trunk and twigs from branches, so does one household as it grows in numbers split from a parent household. The point of fission is usually between two brothers, the younger often moving off with his offspring. If this continues for some time, a new large order ramage can be created. The fission process results in a certain characteristic of settlement pattern, namely that ramages, even of high orders, are more or less localized groups. The relationship to a certain territory is not always exact; there is usually only a fairly good correlation between ramages and certain districts of



<sup>1</sup>  
an island. With the exception of the Maori and possibly Tikopia, the

---

1. This relationship has apparently confused many ethnologists who have emphasized the district, territorial aspect of ramified groups rather than the genealogical aspect (cf. Buck, 1938; Burrows, 1939).

A perfect correlation is often prohibited by the tendency for the group which has budded off to move into any uninhabited area. A certain intermingling of groups budded from different ramages in such areas is likely.

---

settlement arrangement is of a dispersed hamlet rather than a nucleated village type.

The ramified system is, as we have indicated, a framework of social stratification. Differential status is inherent in the very process of ramification. In every ramified society each person has, in theory, a different rank. In actuality one can recognize two or three groups of statuses, "status levels" as they have been called, which are functionally significant in terms of differential socio-economic prerogatives. But due to the gradation in status implied by ramification it is often difficult, for both native and ethnographer, to determine where one status level ends  
<sup>2</sup>  
and another begins.

---

2. No. Maori (with the exception of war captives), for example, since all can trace genealogical connection with chiefs, will admit that he is anything else but "noble." (Best, 1924).

---

The economic organization of ramified societies is identical to the ramage organization itself. In land and sea tenure for example, there is found that system which can be designated, "overlapping stewardship." Every individual has an enduring usufructory right to a section of the society's land and sea resources, but on the other hand, the head of every



ramage is the manager or steward of all lands used by individuals of his ramage. Ramage heads, for example, have primary control in determining what is to be planted on the land, or -- by the power of tabuing or prohibiting -- what land is not to be planted or what crops not harvested at the moment. As smaller ramage are incorporated in higher order ramage, so are lands of several small ramage incorporated in the lands of a higher order ramage. So then are the heads of high order ramage stewards administering the land of several lesser order ramage sections. For example, the household head in Tonga is the steward of lands held by individuals of the household. The head of the multi-household group ("lineage," it is called in the descriptive literature) is the steward of the lands used by households. And the paramount chief is the steward of all the lands in the domain of the society. The paramount chief can, by decree of tabu, prohibit the harvesting of crops, planting of land, fishing in the sea in any part or all of the territory held by the society.

Stewardship, as implied, means a certain control over production. The ramified social structure is, therefore, identical to the organization of production. As most production of food and other goods is usually performed by and within households, most of the regulation is by household heads. In each of the societies we are concerned with, however, there is a certain amount of communal activity involving supra-household labor.<sup>1</sup>

---

1. The scale, frequency and type of communal labor varies with local technological-environmental conditions.

---

Such activities are initiated by the head of the ramage involved, by the paramount chief if manpower from the entire social group is to be mobilized. The demand for labor is passed down the hierarchy of ramage heads until it



reaches the household level. As these are kinship societies, such demands for labor are not regularized and specified by law; the obligation to render service is an obligation toward a relative superior in rank, not to a

<sup>1</sup> government. The feeding and rewarding of supra-household labor is under-

---

1. Mechanisms for enforcing this social obligation as well as for preventing excess demands are discussed below.

---

taken by the ramage head who has initiated the project. The role of ramage heads in the distribution system, as will shortly be described, allows them to accumulate the necessary food and goods.

Even specialized production is organized along ramage lines. Where there are many specialists (usually they are not full-time professionals), the specialty is usually maintained within households or related households.

The system of distribution is again carried out on ramage lines. The major form of distribution in Polynesia is that characterized by Dr. Karl Polanyi as the "redistributive form of economic integration." (Polanyi, 1953). Surplus production, *i. e.*, food and stuffs as bark cloth, mats and the like produced beyond the immediate needs of the producers, are constantly or periodically (depending on the crop or time of production) passed up the social hierarchy from household heads to heads of larger ramage, and often to the paramount chief himself. The paramount chief is the apex of an accumulation system of the entire society. These accumulations are periodically redistributed among producers. The periods of redistribution (and often of accumulation) are occasioned by the many large religious ceremonies and feasts, by life crises rites, intertribal visits and the like. Accumulated foods and goods are also used by ramage heads to support extra-household communal labor and to subsidize specialized



production. It is for purposes of accumulating the wherewithal for these redistributive activities that stewards exercise their tabu powers over the resources of their steward areas. In this way certain crops are allowed to ripen and fish to multiply so that a surplus will be available when the occasion demands.

Several points may be made by way of differentiating the economic system described here from analogous institutions occurring in state organized societies and economies. The Polynesian type of socio-economic system has often been misleadingly called "feudal." The terms "tax," "rent," "tribute," "lord," "serf," "tenant," and the like are frequently indiscriminately applied in discussions of Polynesian economics. We submit that the use of such terminology obscures basic differences between socio-economic systems which are perhaps superficially similar. The ramified system is first and foremost kinship organized, this is not true of the organization of feudal economies or of any economy in which taxes, rents and similar phenomena are integral processes. Obligations, such as those of passing surplus up the hierarchy of the accumulation-redistribution system, as with demands for labor, are kinship obligations in Polynesia. There is no specification of the kind nor amount of goods or services "demanded" by ramage heads from their inferior ranked relatives. People are expected to give what they can. If a family lives near the sea it usually has an abundance of fish; if a family grows taro, it can usually afford to render up taro.

Nor are there specified punishments for refusing to yield surplus production to chiefs. The general underlying scheme regulating the application of sanction to "wrong-doers" is not law, in the Austinian sense, but lex talionis. Punishments, by necessity then, vary with the



kinship backing and support musterable by the respective parties involved. Naturally a high chief, by virtue of his position at the head of a large ramage, can muster a larger fighting force than a man low in rank, who can count only on immediate kinsmen. But the paramount chief has no monopoly of coercive power and he is not always able to punish with impunity those reluctant to yield their surplus -- especially if the recalcitrant is himself the head of a large ramage.<sup>1</sup>

---

1. There are also other mechanisms for preventing the abuse of power by high chiefs. Among them are deposition, assassination and migration and the debilitating effects of his personal tabu (see above).

---

\* \* \*

Polynesian social and economic institutions are thus seen to be based on ties of kinship and organized along the ramified framework of a genealogical tree. There is a high degree of co-relation between the organization of social groups on a kinship basis and the structure of economic processes as those of production and distribution. Because of this relationship, terminology as "tax" "rent" "tribute" and so forth can only be applied to Polynesia with great reservations, and it must be recognized that the social and economic implications of these terms would not at all be the same in Polynesian and non-kin organized economic systems.



References cited:

Best, Elsdon, 1924; The Maori, 2 vols., Wellington.

Buck, Peter, 1938; Ethnology of Mangareva, Honolulu.

Burrows, Edwin, 1939; "Breed and Border in Polynesia," American Anthropologist, 41:1-21.

Firth, Raymond, 1936; We, The Tikopia, London.

Gifford, Edward, 1929; Tongan Society, Honolulu.

Polanyi, Karl, 1953; "Semantics of General Economic History," (mimeo.), New York.

For other citations to relevant literature on aboriginal Polynesia consult:

Taylor, C. R. H., 1951; A Pacific Bibliography, Wellington.



MEMO 8 (March, 1954)  
Not for publication

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT: ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH

Directors: Professors K. Polany and C. M. Arensberg

NOTES ON TRADE AMONG THE POMO INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA

by

A. P. Vayda



Administered trade is that form of marketless external trade in which definite operations involved in the trade are organized by administrative authority. The best-known examples of trade between non-state societies are not of this administrative character at all but involve rather the exchange of presents between persons standing to each other in such relationships of reciprocity as guest-friends, Kula partners, etc. Special interest attaches therefore to accounts of trade involving administered elements among the primitive (i. e., not state-organized) Pomo Indians of central California.

#### THE BACKGROUND OF POMO TRADING

The heart of the Pomo land was the Russian River drainage in the Coast Range north of the San Francisco area. Settlement extended from Clear Lake far in the interior out to islands off the Pacific shore. Aboriginally, this well-watered and productive region was among the most densely peopled areas north of the Rio Grande. Total Pomo population has been estimated at some 7 or 8 thousand, distributed among no more than 75 village communities containing close to 100 persons each (Kroeber 1925:237-38). In pre-white days, there was complete dependence on wild foods, and these occurred in great abundance and variety. The region was "ideal Indian country" (Barrett 1952:47). Each community relied mainly on its immediate environs for its subsistence, but some foods had to be gotten from distant points, since there were geographical differences in the availability of such foods as lake fish, salmon, sea food, acorns, game, etc. Thus, for example, the people living in the interior journeyed to the coast for sea foods once or twice every year, and the coast residents made journeys inland



to get foods not common to their region. Permission to harvest what they wanted was usually granted to visitors. There was also a custom by which other communities would be invited over to share in a superabundance of some particular kind of food. The visitors brought a considerable amount of beads for their hosts if they accepted the invitation to the feast. Sometimes, the local over-supply of some given product (x) would be made the occasion not only of feasting by a host people and a guest people but also of a regular beads-for-x trade. This trade, well described by E. M. Loeb, is the particularly interesting feature of Pomo economic practices.

Before we turn to this, however, attention must be given to the use of beads by the Pomo, since this figures importantly in Pomo trade.

Beads of magnesite were used in many ways, and the less rare and less valuable beads of shell were even more used. In gift-giving, which had to be reciprocated (and with great liberality if prestige was to be attained), the standard of value, according to S. A. Barrett, always were beads, especially the clam-shell discs. Payments of beads were sometimes the means of settling inter-village feuds, such as those occasioned by trespassing (Barrett 1952:289).

At times, beads were used for buying such valued products as salt cakes at fixed rates from better-supplied communities. No community, however, held a monopoly of any such product. If they made proper presentation of gifts to the local inhabitants, any Pomo Indians could have access to the salt deposits, the clam shells and magnesite, the stones for arrow heads and the materials for paints -- all of which were procured from definite localities, usually regarded



as neutral ground thru intertribal custom (Loeb 1926:194-95).

Perhaps the greatest use of beads, however, was in discharging blood-revenge debts and in funerary and other offerings (Barrett 1952:289). Funeral customs, including the burning of the greater part of one's material possessions at death, contributed to preventing the growth of important inequalities of fortune (Loeb 1926:195, 199). Barrett does note that some "well-to-do persons" hired their work done, the payment often being made in beads. However, the greater the liberality of payment, the greater was the resultant prestige (Barrett 1952:290).

#### POMO TRADE

The following description of Pomo trade is compiled from the accounts of Loeb (1926:192-94) and Barrett (1952:352-53, 416).

Suppose, says Loeb, that the Lake people had an over-supply of fish. The Yokaia people might then be asked to come over for a feast. A good runner among the Lake people would be despatched as a messenger with a special "invitation string" to the Yokaia. The invitation string consisted of short sticks of willow or wormwood, tied, each separately, into a string. The number of sticks used equalled the number of days, usually between two and eight, intervening before the feast was to commence. A fish-tail was attached to the invitation string to indicate that the invitation was to share fish. (If it were to share acorns, an acorn would be attached.) The "big" chief of the Yokaia village received the invitation string, along with any accompanying message, and then made the announcement to his people. If the Yokaia chiefs decided to accept the fish feast invitation, they asked the men of the village each to contribute as many



beads as he could to a common fund. A single stick was broken off the invitation string for each day that passed. The Yokaia Indians moved, in a body, to the Lake village so as to arrive when the last stick had been broken off. At the Lake village, the Yokaia chiefs' spokesman presented the beads to the Lake chiefs' spokesman, saying, "Here are a few beads with which to help yourself." Then he told how pleased the Yokaia people were with the Lake people's invitation and friendship.

After this, there were several days of festivities prior to completion of the trade. The Lake chiefs freely fed the Yokaia visitors during their stay, apparently from stores that had been assembled especially for the occasion. The men visitors made free use of the sweat-houses; they gambled and sweated there.

In finally consummating the deal, the host chief divided up the presented beads into strings of hundreds. The Lake chiefs then determined in council how much produce they would give for each string of beads. After the beads had been laid upon the ground at some pre-arranged spot, the several family representatives of the Lake people went to their respective stores and each returned with measures of produce to the value of one string. The giver of the fish, after he had left a measure of produce on a common pile, went to where the strings of beads had been placed and took the string of a hundred beads to which he was entitled. This transaction of piling up the fish and taking the beads was kept up by the fish givers as long as they continued to desire to make the trade, or else as long as the beads held out.

When the fish were all piled up, the chief of the guests took possession. Up to this point, the Yokaia people had not been involved



in the transaction but had merely waited to take what was offered without making any effort to haggle. The Yokaia chief now allotted to each family a basketful or other equal portion of fish, going around as many times as the pile afforded. He kept for himself whatever remained when there was no longer enough to go around once more in the same proportion.

Some variations on these trading practices are reported from Morgan Valley, where the Lower Lake visitors traded beads not directly for fish but rather for the right, following a great feast, to go fishing in the creek belonging to the Morgan Valley hosts. This creek contained certain species of fish not found in the waters of the Lower Lake. Each of the Morgan Valley people is said to have had a certain section of the creek allotted to him, and all the fish caught in it were his. After the Lower Lake people had gone home, the beads and other presents which they had brought were distributed by the Morgan Valley chief to each of his people in accordance with the amount of fish caught from his section of the creek.

Pomo trade feasts resulted commonly from fish invitations and acorn invitations and occasionally from seed invitations. The Sherwood people annually took bows and arrows to the East Lake Pomo and accepted beads in exchange. However, it was more common for the Lake people to procure arrow heads or bows by traveling uninvited in parties of nine or ten north to the Sherwood people.

#### THE FORM OF INTEGRATION

Where administered trade, involving central collection and redistribution of goods, is found, we may expect a pattern of central



authority which employs redistributive methods in other areas of the economy too. The redistributive form of economic integration is, of course, quite prominent in some few of the world's culture areas, such as the Northwest Coast and Polynesia, but, if we exclude these culturally distinctive areas, it must be recognized that, as both R. H. Lowie (1920:207) and E. A. Hoebel (1949:301) have suggested, the outright pooling of food by an entire tribe or community for subsequent redistribution by some central agency is not at all frequent or common among primitive peoples; and it involves something quite different from the widespread primitive etiquette which requires that all comers be fed from any man's catch, harvest, or private larder.

Among the Pomo, as elsewhere in northern and central California (cf. Goldschmidt 1951:324), there was definite collection and redistribution of goods by chiefs, although on a smaller scale than in either Polynesia or the Northwest Coast. The Pomo chiefs, who were the organizers of the trade feasts, had the duty of dividing any product of community enterprise, reserving the odd portions for themselves. We quote Loeb:

When the members of several families or the entire village engaged in securing a quantity of food, it was brought to the chief for fair distribution. This he accomplished by awarding to each partner in the enterprise a measured portion as many times around as the store afforded, keeping for himself whatever remained insufficient for another allotment (Loeb 1926:237).

Everyone in the village brought food to a designated spot if there was to be a feast, and this food was also distributed by the chiefs (Loeb 1926:238).



## EQUALIZATION OF SUBSISTENCE

A noteworthy feature of the Pomo trading here described is its functioning as a cultural mechanism that prevented more than negligible inequalities in subsistence or food consumption. Like most external trade, this trade among the Pomo was partly a result of ecological diversity. People not well supplied locally with particular foods journeyed to trade feasts at villages having a superabundance of those products. The food was traded for beads. Thus, whereas prior to the trading there was inequality in the two peoples' resources of particular foods, it may be presumed that the operations of the trade transferred at least the major part of that inequality to the amount of beads possessed by each group.

These beads were prized mainly for the prestige which their possession and, even more, their generous expenditure bestowed. When the chiefs of a village accepted an invitation to a trade feast they called on the men of the village each to give as many beads to the common fund as he could spare. Every man must have given as liberally as possible, since therein lay prestige; therefore, a community that had received a "superabundance" of beads thru its trading may be expected to have disposed of that superabundance when it in turn was invited to a trade feast. It should also be recalled that the chief of the host village arranged for distribution of the beads according to the amount of food that each of his people contributed, but the visitors' chief allotted the food with no regard for the amount of beads furnished by the several members of his community.

In this way, external trade among the Pomo served to convert in-



equalities in subsistence into more or less temporary inequalities in the possession of beads not only between communities but also within communities.



## REFERENCES CITED

- BARRETT, S. A.  
1952 Material aspects of Pomo culture. Bulletin of the  
Public Museum of the City of Milwaukee, Vol. 20,  
Parts I-II.
- GOLDSCHMIDT, WALTER  
1951 Nomlaki ethnography. University of California Publi-  
cations in American Archaeology and Ethnology 42.
- HOEBEL, E. A.  
1949 Man in the primitive world. New York.
- KROEBER, A.L.  
1925 Handbook of the Indians of California. Bulletin 78,  
Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington.
- LOEB, E. M.  
1926 Pomo folkways. University of California Publications  
in American Archaeology and Ethnology 19.
- LOWIE, R. H.  
1920 Primitive society. New York.



MEMO 25 (Revised, March, 1956)  
Not for Publication

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT; ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH

Directors: Professors K. Polanyi and C.M. Arensberg

NOTES ON THE PLACE OCCUPIED BY  
ECONOMIES IN SOCIETIES

by

Karl Polanyi



Notes on the place occupied by economies in societies

by Karl Polanyi

Contents:

Prefatory remarks

- I. Limitations of market-derived economic disciplines
- II. The comparative and developmental study of economic institutions in early societies. Example: Prestige and the economy
  - (a) Unawareness of the economy
  - (b) Fields of empirical study
  - (c) Institutional analysis
  - (d) Archaic economic institutions
  - (e) Cora DuBois' 'prestige economy'
  - (f) Grain imports on Samos and fish procurement of the Pomo Indians
  - (g) The Proeisphora; the nexum; Babylonian Jewry
  - (h) Treasure and power
  - (i) Elite circulation of treasure: The Alcmeonids
  - (k) Tyrannis and treasure: The Peisistratids
- III. Semantics of money uses
  - (a) Pseudo-philosophies of money
  - (b) All purpose and special purpose money
  - (c) Exchange money
  - (d) The payment use of money
  - (e) Hoarding or storage-use of money
  - (f) Use of money as a standard
  - (g) Treasure and staple finance
  - (h) Babylonia and Dahomey



Prefatory remarks

These notes are set down as a contribution to a mode of approaching the economy, which is conceptual as well as empirical, and aims at a comparative and developmental study of the economy in its relationship to the rest of society.

The underlying theory that is here designated as institutional analysis has gradually developed out of such a purpose. The economy itself is seen as an institutionalized (or briefly: instituted) process in society resulting in material want satisfaction in a very wide sense of this term. The process itself consists of locational and appropriational movements, the coherence and recurrence of which is due to the manner in which it is embedded in the social context. From the point of view of the social sciences the common subject of interest might best be described as the shifting place occupied by economies in human societies. Clearly, short of further exploratory work any attempt at a mapping out of the specific subject matters for treatment by the anthropologist, the historian or the sociologist would be premature.

For mainly historical reasons inquiry is impeded by the pervasive influence of life under a market system with its focusing on the exchange, or catalactic, features of the economy. Hence the need for a redefinition of trade, money, and market institutions independently of such an outlook. Other patterns of integration besides exchange may then offer themselves for an empirical description of the economic process in its various parts.

Such preliminaries will allow us to proceed to the main task --- the identifying of the items on which all comparative and developmental



work concerning the place of economies in societies must ultimately rest.

We begin with general remarks on the character of the knowledge sought and the limited role played by the disciplines derived from the theory of the market (I).

This is followed by a discussion of some developmental problems that accompany the transition of the economy from kinship-organized to state-organized society. The duality of prestige and subsistence has been selected for special study. In this area the anthropologist and the historian of antiquity should be able to compare notes (II).

The last contribution concerns identifiable items in the money-uses of early society. Of trade, money, market, the three exchange institutions, trade and market have been dealt with in some detail in previous Memoranda; the semantics of money-uses is surveyed here (III).



I. Limitations of market-derived economic disciplines

Economic theory has, of course, the economy for its main subject, but all other social sciences also have time and again been faced with questions concerning man's livelihood. History, anthropology, and sociology have had to deal with the specifically economic aspect of their respective fields of study. Economic history was only the first offshoot of this specialization. Eventually, it was followed by economic anthropology, comparative economics, and, still more recently, by economic pre-history and economic sociology. So far, no attempt has been made to summarize their findings. Yet everyone would agree on the need for an understanding broader than those disciplines can singly provide. Issues of theory and policy, whatever be the direction in which problems and solutions are sought, could not fail to be advanced by such a synoptic treatment of the place occupied by economics in societies.

It should not be surprising that the disciplines grounded on economic theory can be of limited use only in such an undertaking. The questions that economic analysis is equipped to answer with a varying degree of precision concern such matters as the standing of life, the relative incomes of groups; variations in regard to productivity of labor, costs of production, shares in the national income, growth of capital, rate of interest; the fluctuation of prices including rent, wages, interest, freights; and so on. These terms carry no clear meaning outside of an organization of the economy where distribution is achieved through a system of markets, such as



markets for labor, capital, land, transportation, commodities, or entrepreneurial activities, and where efficiency and productivity also are measured through prices formed in markets. Indeed, experience has shown that economic theory applied to primitive or archaic economies tends to obscure the concrete features of the economy, and sometimes actually to distort them.

A comparative study of the various economies with our own as a model can therefore be but of little assistance because the market system is less than any other economy dependent for its functioning on the non-economic institutions in society. Except for the institutions of private property and the enforcement of contractual obligations, the market system functions independently of the rest of the community. No institutional links exist here between the basic kinship group, forms of local settlement, religious and professional associations on the one hand, the economic process on the other, which is, in principle, initiated and consummated by individuals as impersonal atoms. Hence an approach made in this -- the economist's -- frame of reference to the various forms of livelihood offers but few points of comparison in reciprocative or redistributive economies. If, then, the livelihood of peoples is to be studied as part of their general social organization, a different approach from that of comparative economics may be required.

The classical cliché, of production, distribution, exchange and consumption, has for the same reason shown itself to be of relatively slight usefulness in the discussion of primitive and archaic economies. Even in economic theory proper this classical subdivision is out of date; it survives only in peripheric areas such as economic



history. Since Thurnwald and Malinowski many anthropologists are reluctant to separate production, as was customary before. To the ethnographer it becomes a differentiated aspect of man's livelihood only after collecting, trapping, fishing, hunting and pasturing have ceased to supply his food. Even hoe-gardening is more a pattern of life than a distinctively economic institution. Production becomes a firmly organized part of the economic process only after the introduction of the growing of grain with its rigid seasonal discipline. Then does the economic process generate the institutional concepts of land, labor, and property so the mind can grasp the natural and human environment in its relevance to livelihood. Indeed, such terms as rent, wages and interest hardly apply to the conditions of pre-agricultural societies. Exchange also is a rare, and on the whole, insignificant feature in primitive economic life (always apart from trade, which is, however, an essentially external development). Finally, as to the sphere of consumption, that chief motivating force in neo-classical theory, it offers for study no more than culture traits.

The disciplines informed by the theory of the market have therefore no immediate relevance for an empirical inquiry carried on by the anthropologist, the historian, or the sociologist into the place occupied by economies in societies. Rather, the economist's formulations, mirroring as they do the facts and thoughts of everyday life, cause the social scientist unwittingly to absorb a shape of man's livelihood cast in the terms of a commercial civilization which was fundamentally foreign to many periods of history. A mere awareness of such a pervasive influence provides but insufficient protection



against its frustrating effects. To emancipate one's self from the economic spell more is required than enlightened intentions. As long as we do not dispose of any ready substitute for the traditional frame of reference given by the market system there is no alternative set of concepts for us to turn to.

We might be thought to be battling against imaginary difficulties. After all, the economist's vocabulary -- indifference curves, marginal utility, or consumers' rent -- does not abound in common parlance. The fact is that the words which really cause the awkwardness are precisely the most common ones like labor, land, property, trade, money, market, exchange, gain, payment, or prices; not because they have no meaning outside of our own commercial world, but because they are charged with associations which are inappropriate outside of it and often prevent us from identifying the very objects they are supposed to designate.

We cannot help employing the words to the use of which we and others have been brought up. But we may try to adapt them to the peculiarities of the subject matter. In practice this is best done by boldly re-defining our terms. Indeed, so incisively, that we can readily apply them in the new fashion, eventually employing both idioms side by side -- the common meaning as a first approximation, in order to be generally comprehended; the more technical definition, in order to give precision to our thinking. Only rarely will we find the two usages too far apart to be bridged.

A serious difficulty stems from the vagueness and ambiguity of the term economy itself. It has comparatively recently come into



use and has within a few generations acquired new meanings. We will start from the concept of 'economic' before proceeding to the two underlying meanings that are fused in it. To be clear about these is fundamental to our problem.

The concept of 'economic' refers to our material existence insofar as we have to economize with the means either because they are scarce anyway, or because it costs an effort to produce them. (For the lesser ambiguity of 'material' or 'physical' see below.) The usage is general; even theorists, whether economists or other social scientists, employ the word in this popular sense. Under a market system there would be no point in insisting that this concept is compounded of two logically independent meanings, namely material want satisfaction and economizing, since all material want satisfaction happens here through economizing action so that the two meanings coincide. For the economist to try separating them would be both artificial and superfluous.

Not so outside the field of economics proper. In a study of the place of the economy in society the distinction between the two meanings of 'economic' is vital. Ultimately these are also the source of the two meanings of the term 'economy' -- a fact which has been all too often overlooked. One designates the sum of the activities of an agent making choices in regard to the alternative uses of scarce means, the other refers to a sequence of events in a society, involving the interrelations between man and his environment, both natural and social. The frame of reference of the one is a definite personal agency, whose sphere of activities is designated; of the other, an objective process in society that results in



material want satisfaction. It is this process alone which is common to all human life.

The term 'material want satisfaction' that denotes the character of the process, is at first sight simple and clear. On a closer view this impression disappears. In effect, a slight effort is needed to circumscribe its scope. It repays to undertake it.

Want satisfaction denotes logically a means-ends relationship, but 'material' or 'physical' applies both to means and ends. Hence some of the uncertainty of meaning. In the one case it signifies that the means are material or physical, to whatever ends they be used, whether as food or for purposes of defence or in the pursuance of art; in the other case, that the ends (or wants) are material or physical like hunger or the need for shelter, by whatever means they be met, material or non-material, such as the services of a cook, the skill of an architect or the genius of a great painter. The word ~~material~~ or physical has been transferred from the lifeless object to man's recurrent, pressing bodily needs such as hunger and thirst. Owing to this metaphoric use of 'material' the economy can be succinctly described as serving 'material want satisfaction.'

## II. The comparative and developmental study of economic institutions in early societies. Example: Prestige and the economy.

One of the numerous issues that we face is the transition from primitive to archaic economic institutions. As an illustration we will adduce the role of the prestige factor in tribal and archaic economies.

Here is a brief synopsis of the discussion:

(a) To what extent is the economy as a distinct sphere of



existence differentiated in a kin organized society? (Unawareness of the economy.)

(b) Status as defined in tribal and archaic societies. Economic transactions tend to separate from the status transactions with which they were originally fused. (Fields of empirical study.)

(c) Semantic requirements of the identification of items in comparative and developmental research. (Institutional analysis.)

(d) Delimitation of archaic economic institutions proper as from 'earlier' and 'later' types (Archaic economic institutions.)

(e) The prestige factor (Cora DuBois' 'prestige economy').

(f) Prestige factors in foreign trade organization (Grain imports on Samos and fish procurement of the Pomo Indians; sitesis).

(g) Prestige factors in the organization of tax collection and the incidence of debt bondage (The proeisphora; the nexum; Babylonian Jewry).

(h) The social role of treasure (Treasure and power).

(i) Prestige goods in early Greek society (Elite circulation of treasure: The Alcmeonids).

(k) Treasure and native labor (Tyrannis and treasure: The Peisistratids).

#### (a) Unawareness of the economy

It is a remarkable fact that an awareness of economic matters as such is found to be absent in primitive society, or rather, merged there with other interests. While shoals of words focus on kinship, or magic, the same cannot be said of the economy. In tribal society the economic process is imbedded in the kinship relations that formalize



the situations out of which organized economic activities spring. What there is of production and distribution of goods as well as organization of services is therefore found instituted in terms of kinship. Various groups dispose of the grounds for hunting, fishing, trapping and collecting, of pasture and arable land. The hoarding of staples forms part of the corporate activities of the kin engaged in hostilities or ceremonial feasts. Treasure circulates by virtue of status, religious or military requirements. Partial appropriation of the same physical units of land, trees or timber to various strata of relatives fragments the notion of property. Utilitarian needs are often dependent for their satisfaction not on the possession of things but rather on the claim to solicited services. In the absence of prices, acts of barter lack the operational features inherent in a quantitative approach; instead, the qualitative and prestige impact of the 'valuables' steals the show. As a result, a man's practical orientation would be hampered rather than helped by an 'economic' focus for a way of life which has its points of reference outside of the economic sphere.

All this concerns, of course, only a subjective awareness of the economy. The objective process as it actually unrolls is given apart from any conceptual awareness. For the causational sequence to which we owe the availability of the necessities of life is present in whatever way men conceptualize their existence.

Kin, state, magic and religion, are the outstanding non-economic spheres to which the economic process is found attached in early society. These are also the originators of the status systems from which eventually economic transactions tend to 'peel off.'



Such a differentiation of the economic elements from the status factor may happen in more than one way. Gainful transactions may emerge, as a matter of course, as an approved by-product of non-gainful transactions carried on by status traders. Again, the early uses of money for payment, as well as its use as a 'standard' sprang from non-transactional situations such as fines, taxes, breach of privileges. The distinctively transactional use of money is connected with its eventual employment in price-making markets, where monetary gain could be realized. Gain made 'on prices' thus replaces the commission fee made on turnover. Eventually, the economy as a separate subsystem is brought to our consciousness. Step by step economic transactions proper, money as a means of exchange and gain made on prices made their appearance, though still not with the compelling force with which ultimately the system of price-making markets manifests the existence of an economic domain in society.

#### (b) Fields of empirical study

Accordingly, the study of the economy in early societies comprises several related empirical fields: primitive societies, mainly kinship organized, non-literate; archaic societies, as a rule literate, but not using money widely as a means of exchange. Both societies are 'contemporary,' or at least belong to the recent past. The third overlapping field is antiquity which includes both societies of the primitive and archaic types as well as 'modern' societies, i. e., such as widely employ money in exchange.

Primitive and archaic economies already form a unity of study, both for comparative purposes and in regard to the developmental



regularities that govern change. Social anthropology comprises these fields, from both angles. The manifest fact of growth compels the observer to watch the transformation of some tribal institutions into those of an archaic-state type. And the other way: The quest for the origins of the economic features of archaic type societies often calls for the unraveling of strands that, starting from kinship conditions, converge to form those features. To restrict inquiry to the field of primitive society would here amount to cutting oneself off from access to the developmental field. On the other hand, to limit inquiry to the more highly stratified peoples of the so-called underdeveloped areas and their archaic patterns would prove equally frustrating. We might miss noticing the sea-change that primitive economic institutions undergo as soon as the state emerges as the organizer of the polity, while at the same time a set of brand new institutions are added to the old ones.

### (c) Institutional analysis

Developmental study implies that the matter which is the subject of inquiry is itself changing; all comparative approach deals with similarities sought between manifold objects; no determination of function is possible without an insight into what part is being related to which whole, in what regard. Hence comparative and developmental work can hardly lead to cumulatively accretional knowledge unless there is certainty that the items described and analyzed are comparable and changes over time are referable to given forms. Particular care must therefore be devoted to providing ourselves with conceptual tools capable of identifying the details of the social



arrangements, culture traits and institutions.

From this consideration, primarily, stems our stressing identifiable items of research. Definitions shall be preferably in operational terms; where residual assumptions regarding values and motives are in order, such assumptions shall be made explicit. Descriptions shall provide details of social situations and processes, spelling out who does what, to whom, under what circumstances, how frequently, and to what effect. Quantitative determination of phenomena is sought wherever possible. Locational patterns, processes, mechanisms, operations and their functioning may be illustrated to advantage through the use of models.

Patterns of integration are empirical characteristics of the manner in which goods and burdens move as between persons, either in a locational or in an appropriational regard, or both. In kinship organized society reciprocity and redistribution, as well as their combinations, are frequently met patterns. In the early state exchange at set prices is frequent as a subordinate trait. Reciprocity relates the corresponding members of symmetrically placed groups, redistribution relates members of the group to a center towards which, and from which, the goods and services move, physically or dispositionally. Reciprocity therefore assumes symmetrical groupings, in regard to one or several axes; redistribution postulates centrality. Empirically, we find redistribution and reciprocity closely interlinked -- redistribution being 'to each in turn' and 'from each in turn.' Exchange at equivalents fits in with redistribution. Exchange as a dominant form of integration is present only in societies where the economic process is instituted through a self-regulating



system of price making markets. It assumes a competitive bargaining attitude between the persons that make up the supply and demand crowds, i. e., the multiplicity of persons wishing -- in exchange for other goods -- to acquire definite goods or rid themselves of definite goods, respectively. Equivalencies have no integrative effect; price-making markets have.

(d) Archaic economic institutions

We shall call 'archaic' such economic institutions as are absent from primitive society and only emerge in state societies, but fade again when money as a means of exchange becomes widespread. In effect, economic institutions that make their first appearance in state societies fall roughly into two groups: those such as the taking of interest, mortgage or business partnership, which continue into modern times, and those such as debt-bondage or antichretic pledge, which subsequently recede into insignificance or disappear altogether. Only those of this latter group deserve the name of 'archaic economic institutions' since they are restricted to early state societies.

In archaic society, as a rule, economic transactions are still accessory to status transactions, that is, goods follow the fate of persons. The appropriation of land and cattle to families is dependent as a rule upon status transactions such as adoption and marriage. Also, as a matter of status, landgrants or feudal allotments may accompany appointments to high priestly, military, or trading office.

On the side of negative status there is the institution of debt bondage and, of course, slavery proper. Apart from the slave



who was originally captured, bought, or enslaved in punishment for crime, and the home-born slave there was also the adjudicated slave, a formerly free person who on defaulting on a loan was sold abroad for the creditor's benefit. In the case of the Roman nexum the defaulting citizen -- a free man -- was bonded to the creditor and was held in custody, being made to work off his debt under the creditor's lash.

In regard to the securing of loans there was the practice of the antichretic pledge. The object given as a surety, whether land, cattle or slave, was not only handed over to the creditor, as is the rule with pledged objects, but the creditor was also entitled to use it. This often served a purpose akin to the taking of interest. Another form of surety was the pawning of children, an institution that had several important ramifications. When the work to which the child was put was specified, his condition could be likened to apprenticeship; if not specified, it was rather in the nature of debt bondage; in either case, pawning was temporary and the child remained a free person. This is distinct from the alienation of children for their keep during a famine as practiced in some periods in China and Babylonia.

Lending and safekeeping, which later changed into gainful transactions, were, as a rule, gratuitous, based on trust (*fiducia*), mostly on the assumption of a broad reciprocity, i. e., the carrying of burdens 'in turn,' benefiting 'in turn.' Loans are interest-free; objects given in safe keeping are expected to be taken care of to a reasonable degree without charge. Neither mutuum nor depositum regulare are yet transactions proper.



Sale by the public hand is in some regions exclusively by auction. The Greek word for sale (pōlein) means 'to put up for sale,' the actual operation consisting in display for sale to the highest bidder. In other regions, including parts of the Sudan, the employment of brokers is general in transactions regarding cattle and the office of auctioneer is occasionally combined with that of the broker -- both are public nominees essential to orderly marketing. While the broker is bound to 'the price,' the auctioneer sells at 'either more or less' than 'the price.' Sale can thus be ensured in the absence of markets. To this double role sometimes that of trustee is added.

Where the documentation of sales was obligatory as in ancient Mesopotamia, the practice was restricted to the alienation of specific goods, while transactions in regard to interchangeable goods or staples were not subject to documentation. In some parts of Babylonia revenue which went with the holding of a temple post seems occasionally to have been sold for a capital sum. The purchaser, it appears, acquired an income 'in kind,' consisting of the meat of the sacrificial animals offered by the faithful, maybe also of the oil or wine. The revenue could be left by the purchaser to his heirs and be divided among them.

We find equivalencies established for a number of standardized staples by custom, statute or proclamation; these also occur, as exchange-equivalents, in primitive communities such as the Tikopia or the Tiv. Under archaic conditions, equivalencies indicate the amount of staples of different kinds that can be substituted -- not exchanged -- for each other in the payment of taxes and rent, or, the other way, when claiming one's rations or wages in kind. Where reciprocity



relations obtain, equivalencies may indicate adequacy of the return gift rather than equality. Where the right to office-holding or the franchise was dependent on the amount of a man's revenue, equivalents of the adequate amounts of dry and liquid produce were statuated in equivalencies, as in the Draconian-Solonia laws. A similar device may have been in force for the payment of fines in early republican Rome by virtue of the Lex Julia Papiria and the Lex Tarpeia-Aternia. Equivalencies underlay various important devices employed in staple finance, i. e., the carrying on of operations 'in kind' on a large scale such as planning, budgeting, balancing, accounting and clearing, unavoidable in the practice of state or temple economies under archaic conditions.

Altogether, there is a remarkable employment of what might be called operational devices. These are manipulative short cuts in reckoning, such as the abacus, the keeping of statistical records by putting colored beads in multifarious boxes, and numberless other sometimes most ingenious ways of handling matters easily and simply with the help of contraptions or arrangements and thus avoiding complex or time robbing calculations. An outstanding instance is the elaborate dual system of Dahoman military and civilian administration, where symmetry served as an operational device for checking and control at almost all bureaucratic levels. In Whydah a retailer's margin was secured by counting cowrie differently, according to whether high figures or low figures were involved.

Treasure makes the round of the Trobriand Islanders in the Kula ring. In early Greece it circulates among gods, kings and chiefs either against other prestige goods or items of honor, power



and safety. This made for an elite circulation of treasure, as it might be called. Prestige goods such as precious metals, ivory, slaves, horses change hands only against each other, i. e., in a closed circuit. A primitive people, such as the Tiv, practice an equivalency exchange in prestige goods. So called leiturgies in classical Greece provided public services at the cost of the wealthy citizen, who was expected to supply the service, at his own expense, as an honorific obligation. Such honorific duties were also known to the early Romans who relied on their chieftains for the collecting from the fields and putting into the public storage crops owed as taxes in kind. The carting of the tithes was a leiturgy.

Prestige factors of one sort or other show up in primitive and early state alike. They shall serve as illustrative material for the problems of transition between tribal and state society.

(c) Cora DuBois' 'prestige economy'

Cora DuBois has given the somewhat misleading name of 'prestige economy' to a complex of honour, precedence and privilege items the pursuit of which is found to be an absorbing concern of peoples on an otherwise low subsistence level. Well-known instances are the potlatch of the Kwakiutl, the Kula trade of the Trobriand Islanders, the investments made by Manus 'Backers' in prospective betrothals of juveniles. Cora DuBois added to the list the Tolowa-Tututni, with their insult-fines and exploitation of mourning privileges by the 'rich men.'

The term 'prestige economy,' we said, is inaccurate. Admittedly the prestige sphere itself may form a means-ends hierarchy



of values that give direction to an almost self-contained pattern of economizing activities where lesser honors accumulate and add up to higher ones. Accountancy, installments, interest, lending, debt, and investment occur in a context strikingly reminiscent of monetarized economies. Nevertheless, these superficially businesslike activities bear here often only on prestige values and need not touch upon the economy.

On the other hand, prestige and subsistence are to some extent intertwined, at different levels and in manifold ways. Prestige motives as frequently stimulate subsistence activities as they paralyze them thus making prestige activities appear as a veritable parasite on the subsistence economy. Also 'prestige' may operate through devices involving specific challenges, as, for instance, insult of honor and rank, breach of precedence, ignoring of privilege, antagonistic competition. Fines may be exacted on behalf of the privileged; debts be made to fall due at the whim of the creditor; services imposed on the defaulter; ruin overtake the challenged at the prestige-bid of costly display.

One way of penetrating the web and woof of prestige and subsistence is to trace the effects of honorific duties (leiturgies), another is to follow the course of concrete prestige goods (mainly, treasure), and in either case attempt to determine how leiturgies or the circulation of treasure affect the core of the economy, namely, material want satisfaction.

Economic, in the sense here employed of 'referring to material want satisfaction,' is a term of degree. This is true both in regard to the extent to which material goods can be made to serve any kind of



human wants or needs, including defence, religion, education, sports or adornment, and the extent to which non-material activities, i. e., services, can be made to satisfy material needs such as food or shelter. These two groups so peculiarly bracketed by the use of the term 'material' encompass the world of the economic as commonly understood.\* With one notable exception: sex.

Among man's physical or bodily needs sex is distinct both in its reference to individual and to collective life. It is a nuclear element both in the biological structure of personality and in the biological maintenance of the group. In either case its role differs toto coelo from that of other material wants and needs.

The meaning of 'economic' employed here differs, as we know, from that used by modern economists, and more recently also by noted anthropologists, such as Melville Herskovits or Raymond Firth. We adhere to the substantive or 'subsistence' meaning; they use the formal, or scarcity meaning. Raymond Firth is therefore consistent in asserting that the exchange of prestige goods such as enter into the Kula trade 'must be classed as an economic transaction, since it demands a most careful planning of resources and an exercise of choice' ('The Institutions of Primitive Society,' p. 21). Under the substantive definition, not choice and scarcity but 'material want satisfaction' provides the frame of reference for the economic process in society. Kula goods have been therefore classed by us as 'prestige' goods although they are no doubt scarce and careful choice goes into their handling.

---

\* See above, pp. 8-9.



Cora DuBois has made a striking observation: Monetary payments, calculation, interest, profit, business partnership, accountancy, hard bargaining tend to occur in the prestige sphere of the economy, rather than in the subsistence sphere. In the latter exchange is 'in kind,' obligations are adjusted according to equity, mutuality is observed, and higgling-haggling is shunned. To the traditional thinking this must appear paradoxical indeed. The pursuit of 'rational' utilitarian aims is left to unbusinesslike (and thus 'non-economic') methods, while the attainment of 'irrational' prestige aims is vested with all the externalities of numerical precision, monetary accountancy and business like calculation!

For the sake of a consistent use of terms, we submit, the typical 'prestige economy,' that mimicry of modern business, should not be regarded as an economy that happens to comprise irrational non-utilitarian values, but rather as the sphere of a human passion creating a cultural pattern sui generis -- a pseudo-economy. It is directed at non-economic aims sometimes with the help of devices which for historical reasons we are wont to describe as 'economic' (because of their similarity to market procedures) though the connection of those devices with the economic process and its function of satisfying human wants of whatever sort is no more than incidental.

In contrast to such spectacular show-pieces of the 'prestige economy' as the Kula, the potlatch, or the Manus partnership in the backing of marriages, elements of prestige and honor do occasionally function as parts of the economic process. In one or two cases such isolated culture traits are found to develop in the early state into elaborate economic institutions.



For a closer view of the economics of prestige a notable institution of archaic antiquity, the leiturgies, will be called upon.

It was an onerous privilege of the wealthy in classical Athens to provide the polis with gratuitous services. Such honorific public duties were called leiturgies (literally: services to the public). Among them were the maintenance, manning and command of naval craft, the pay and rations of the crew being provided by the state (trierarchy); the training of the personnel for the annual religious exercises comprising the theatrical performances (choregy); provision of physical training for the young (gymnasiarchy and lampadarchia); transportation for visitors of state (pompe); contributing of funds for the import of cheap grain (sitēsis); advancing (proeisphora) of the extraordinary property tax (eisphora) collected from a group (synmory) of wealthy citizens against the members of which the advancer had a regress. The last two leiturgies -- sitēsis and proeisphora -- shall be discussed here.

(f) Grain imports on Samos and first procurement of the Pomo Indians

(Sitēsis)

About the middle of the 3rd century (ca. 245 B. C.) on the island of Samos, in the Aegean, a public fund endowed by the contributions of wealthy citizens was created for the improvement of the provisioning of the island. The administration of the fund was set up by the popular assembly, wealthy citizens of the two tribes of the polis contributing two talents each as a loan, the profits made on the capital thus loaned to be used to purchase grain for free distribution to all citizens. The corn was bought from the Samian temple's



continental domains at a price fixed by the assembly. It was to be distributed monthly among the resident citizens, who collected their ration personally between the 1st and 10th day of each month. Citizens were to benefit equally, rich and poor, married or single, with a family to provide for or not. Such was the practice in highly civilized Hellenistic Samos of the 3rd century, B. C.

On a primitive level a fairly close parallel may be seen in the manner in which the Pomo Indians of North West California procure their dried fish from the Yokaia Indians. The Pomo raise a fund of precious beads for export. This fund is made up of contributions from the wealthier members of the tribe, who give freely ornamental magnesite beads for reasons of prestige. Then the Pomo visiting party starts out to the Yokaia with the beads which meanwhile have been strung. After their arrival the strings are put on display and the Yokaia proclaim the exchange rate (equivalency) of bead vs. dried fish. The individual Yokaia then exchange for beads, pro rata, as many fish as they decide to go without until the fund of beads is exhausted. The Pomo take the dried fish home and there distribute them among the members of the tribe equally, irrespective of whether or not, and to what amount, leiturgical contributions were made by them.

Clearly, there is here a combination of various patterns, different phases of the trading transaction being instituted through different forms of integration. In the Pomo exporting phase, prestige goods are collected on an honorific leiturgical basis. In the importing phase, equivalencies are fixed by the suppliers of the dried fish, who are given a chance of viewing the total supply of beads so they can roughly gauge supply and demand, in physical terms. Exchange takes



place pro rata, i. e., at the equivalencies, but the supply offered by the subsistence economies reflects a mixed motivation on the part of those who contribute the dried fish. To the Yokaia the utilitarian concern of foregoing the fish is up to a point outweighed by the appreciation they attach to the beads. This appreciation contains, alongside of the prestige valuation of the beads, a not negligible utilitarian factor, namely, the use of the beads in acquiring in exchange subsistence goods from third parties, e. g., mushrooms from other neighbors. In spite of the foregoing, the imports are distributed amongst the members of the Pomo in a strictly equalitarian manner. This may be connected with the fact that for the Pomo the fish are a scarce subsistence necessity, while for the Yokaia they are a good of which there is normally a 'surplus.'

In classical Athens over long stretches of time the securing of the grain supply was largely performed through honorific services similar to the Samian example, of which accidentally a detailed account happens to be available. The Samian sitēsis was probably more elaborate than was the general practice in Athens, where grain was traditionally short and wealthy citizens in various ways claimed credit for their services around the procurement of grain.

(g) The Proeisphora; the nexun; Babylonian Jewry

The interdependence of honorific rights and duties of privilege and public service is illustrated by another leiturgy: the proeisphora. By the beginning of the 4th century in Athens it is a well developed institution for the collecting of the war tax. In



brief, the leader (hegemon) of a group (symmory) of wealthy citizens advances the extraordinary tax (eispheora) on behalf of the members of the symmory against which he has the right of regress. The 'leader' is held to this duty by virtue of his outstanding wealth. An onerous privilege of this kind can be traced back to the Odyssey, where Alkinous, king of the Phaeacians, calls upon his chieftains to honor the departing Odysseus with generous gifts, at the same time reminding them that their sacrifice would not burden them, since they naturally were entitled to recoup themselves from the commoners on behalf of whom they were advancing the gift (Od. N 11-16). Alkinous treats the collective parting gift of the chieftains as a kind of proeisphora in regard to the commonalty on behalf of which the tax is advanced. Such a practice may occasionally result in a dangerous type of indebtedness, namely debtbondage to the 'leader' who advanced the tax. One case is that of the Roman nexum, a particularly cruel form of debt bondage of which we possess a record. According to Livy, the nexum catastrophe of the 380's, sprang from the heavy tax burden consequent on the rebuilding of the walls of Rome after the Gallic invasion (388/7 B. C.). Many plebeians were absent in the war when the patricians voted an extraordinary tax to rebuild the walls on a grand scale, and to enable the censor to pay in advance the contractors who undertook the building, the patricians advanced the sum for which the commoners were assessed, making loans for them so that they could pay the taxes. The commoners thus found themselves heavily burdened by the debt incurred in their names and being unable to repay it from their neglected farms were led off to the private prison of their patrician creditor to work off their debt. The whole procedure seems to imply



some kind of symnory -- for which the patrician creditor was expected to advance the tax.

Another case is attested by the Babylonian Talmud, recording the consequences of the system under which Jewish colonies of the 5th century A. D. paid their taxes to the Sassanian authorities. The honorific duty of the rich to make advance payment for their poorer brethren involved the right of regress against their involuntary debtors.

With the Tolowa, we are told the 'rich man' is expected to pay the blood-money or fines for the commoners, but also we hear that he is entitled to a regress against tribesmen who happen to accumulate wealth. The mechanism of this recouping appears to lie in his power to call in debts owed to him and to declare his debtors insolvent and therefore beggars and despised. Compare also the 'kerekere' on Fiji, where, according to Sahlins, the dependence of the weaker upon the stronger springs from the latter's reluctance to accept the weaker's reciprocating gift, who thus remains his debtor.

The proeisphora of classical Athens and the right of regress which the 'rich man' of Tolowa practiced against the commoner, though on different levels, show a similar combination of the prestige element of honorific duties on the one hand, the possession of prestige goods on the other.

#### (h) Treasure and power

Treasure, the prestige good kat' exochen, was in ancient Greece a form of wealth that circulated only among the few. It took the form of tool money -- tripods and bowls -- made of gold or silver. Disposal



was either in exchange for other treasure or for items of prestige such as access to the gods and their oracles, to kings, chiefs and local potentates. Where prestige goods other than gold were given in exchange, such as horses, ivory, skilled slaves, works of art, or fine cloths, the counterpart too would have to be a prestige good. In some regions of the world it is not possible to acquire a slave or a horse for any amount of millet, nor can one bribe a general with silver; that requires gold. The élite circulation of prestige goods is thus met with in many archaic societies. Archaic Greece presents a notable instance.

Treasure operated in Hellenic antiquity as a portable form of power. The effects of its possession were unmediated. He who possessed treasure was ipso facto powerful, i. e., honored and feared. No doubt, the power conferred by the prestige was often an anticipation of long-range economic advantages. However, to draw a sharp distinction between political and economic power would have been artificial. The difference meant little in a world where personal services of various grades formed the main economic resource, and the disposal over this particular resource was organized through relations of a non-economic character, such as kinship, clientage, or semi-feudal dependency. Not before feudalism is fully developed do the political and economic advantages that accompany the holding of land become distinctly separated through an institutional differentiation of the two kinds of dependent services.

Before that time even the economic advantages conferred by the possession of treasure were usually embodied in political power.



Nevertheless, some forms of wealth were more immediately economic than others, such as land or cattle. Yet even in the case of such clearly economic holdings, the economic and political benefits were still too closely interwoven to admit of a neat separation.

In spite of this fusion of honorific and utilitarian motives, the economic effects of the movements of treasure can be distinguished. Indeed, the key to the performance of important economic tasks, especially of such as involved the massing of the efforts of labor, must in archaic society be sought in the workings of treasure.

A perfect instance of the uses of treasure in the crowded history of sixth century Greece was the rise of the Alcmeonid house, their ousting by the Peisistratids, followed by their triumphant return under Cleisthenes -- altogether a matter of two generations. Throughout the course of events is marked by notable economic achievements.

(i) Elite circulation of treasure: The Alcmeonids

The fortune of the house of the Alcmeonids which was legendary in the Greek world, was derived in the following way:

Now the Alcmeonidae were, even in days of yore, a family of note in Athens, but from the time of Alcmeon, and again of Megacles, they rose to special eminence. The former of these two persons, Alcmeon, the son of Megacles when Croesus the Lydian sent men from Sardis to consult the Delphic oracle, gave aid gladly to his messengers, and assisted them to accomplish their task. (Herod. VI, 125)

The Alcmeonids bartered their political influence with the god.

They were not to be disappointed:



Croesus, informed of Alcmeon's kindnesses by the Lydians who from time to time conveyed his messages to the god, sent for him to Sardis, and, when he arrived, made him a present of as much gold as he should be able to carry at one time about his person. Finding that this was the gift assigned him Alcmeon took his measures, and prepared to receive it in the following way. He clothed himself in a loose tunic, which he made to bag greatly at the waist, and placing upon his feet the widest buskins that he could anywhere find, followed his guides into the treasure-house. Here he fell to upon a heap of gold-dust, and in the first place packed as much as he could inside his buskins, between them and his legs; after which he filled the breast of his tunic quite full of gold, and then sprinkling some among his hair, and taking some likewise in his mouth, he came forth from the treasure-house, scarcely able to drag his legs along, like anything rather than a man, with his mouth crammed full, and his bulk increased every way. On seeing him, Croesus burst into a laugh, and not only let him have all that he had taken, but gave him presents besides of fully equal worth. (Herod. VI, 125)

In this manner, Herodotus concludes, this house became one of great wealth; and Alcmeon was able to repay the Delphic god by over-fulfilling his building contract, moreover bribing the Pythoness, acquiring divine influence with the Spartans, keeping horses for the chariot-race, and winning the prize at Olympia, which was traditionally the door to top-rank influence at home, especially if you had a first class foreign army to back you, such as the Spartan.

This in brief was the story of their triumphant return.

The Alcmeonids had fled Athens when Peisistratus finally resumed power. They made a number of futile attempts to recapture their home country. When their fortification of Lipsydrium, in Attica, was eventually reduced by Peisistratus, they

resolved to shrink from no contrivance that might bring them success, and accordingly they contracted with the Amphictyons to build the temple which now stands at Delphi, but which in those days did not exist. Having done this, they proceeded, being men of great wealth,



and members of an ancient and distinguished family, to build the temple much more magnificently than the plan obliged them. Besides other improvements, instead of the coarse stone wherof by the contract the temple was to have been constructed, they made the facings of Parian marble. (Herod. V, 62)

As we would say, they used their money in the contracting business, but instead of aiming at maximum monetary gain, they preferred to invest in improved public relations. Such a well considered act of generosity would win them acclaim in the Hellenic world and thereby increase their political influence. Herodotus makes the move a crucial step in their epic struggle to regain power in Athens. For treasure accounted here even more directly for a shift in the field of power.

These same men, if we may believe the Athenians, during their stay at Delphi persuaded the priestess by a bribe to tell the Spartans, whenever any of them came to consult the oracle, either on their own private affairs or on the business of the state, that they must free Athens. So the Lacedaemonians, when they found no answer ever returned to them but this, sent at last Anchimolius, the son of Aster --- a man of note among their citizens --- at the head of an army against Athens, with orders to drive out the Peisistratidae. (Herod. V, 63)

Aristotle, otherwise reluctant to repeat anecdotic embellishments, confirms the gist of the story of the restoration of the Alcmeonids by the Spartan army.

Having failed, then, in every other method, they (the Alcmeonids) took the contract for rebuilding the temple at Delphi, using for that purpose the considerable wealth which they possessed, with the view of securing the help of the Lacedaemonians. The Pythia accordingly was continually enjoining on the Lacedaemonians who came to consult the oracle, that they must free Athens; till finally she succeeded in turning the Spartans in that direction.... (Arist., Const. of Athens, XIX, 4)

But this would be to overlook the part of Croesus in the circuit of gold, honor and safety. The god of Delphi paid the



Alcmaeonids under the building contract the enormous sum of three hundred talents, much of which came from Croesus' treasury. Alcmaeon had no doubt acted as an honest broker between Apollo and the King of Lydia. However, Croesus misunderstood the Pythoness' unfortunate hint about the consequences of his crossing the River Halys. Herodotus saw with his own eyes the stupendous gifts of gold that Croesus had sent her; they were still displayed on the temple precincts when he visited there. But whoever was responsible for the error, the ruin of Croesus at the hands of Cyrus the Persian did not put a stop to the transaction: the god honored his obligations. The pyre was already lit on which Cyrus had condemned his prisoner Croesus to be burnt alive, when Apollo sent rain from the skies to smother the flames -- remindful of Croesus' 'genius and generosity' -- as the legend had it which inspired Pindar's ode in praise of the Pythoness.

Thus did treasure make the rounds among the few.

#### (k) Tyrannis and treasure: The Peisistratids

The origin and use of treasure in the case of Peisistratus shows similar features.

The Peisistratids, being of Eupatrid extraction, enjoyed reciprocity relations with the élite, although they could not, as did their Alcmeonid rivals, boast of the favor of Apollo. A family conference was held shortly after Peisistratus' second expulsion, at which it was decided to attempt to regain the sovereignty:

The first step was to obtain advances of money from such states as were under obligation to them. By these means they collected large sums from several countries, especially from the Thebans, who gave them far more than any of the rest. (Herod. I, 61)



State obligations owed to the Peisistratids imply reciprocal relations, maybe through prior gifts made by Peisistratus to the various states. In a much more primitive scene in the Odyssey, Athena, disguised as mortal Mentor, excuses herself from Nestor's proffered hospitality by proclaiming

I will go to the great-hearted Cauconians, where a debt is owing to me, in no wise new or small. (Homer, Od. III, 366-8)

Only old debts, and preferably large ones, were regarded as 'good.' Neither small debts nor recent ones were supposed to be due. Accordingly, ties of xenia between the Peisistratids and the Spartans, validated by gift-giving, made the latter hesitate so long to obey the Delphic oracle's injunction to make war upon the Peisistratids.

Peisistratus' wealth consisted largely in treasure. The family estate was in Brauron in Attica, which is near the Laurion district. Whether or not he mined silver from the Laurion mines -- in fact, whether or not the mines were worked in this period -- is subject to dispute. But there is no doubt that he acquired properties in the rich mining district of the Pangaeus region in Thrace at some period of his long exile.

How Peisistratus acquired these properties can be conjectured from a comparable incident in the same region. Darius was anxious to recompense Histiaeus, ruler of Miletus, for having saved the Persian army by preventing the destruction of the Danube bridge in their rear. Histiaeus asked for --- and received --- the city of Myrcinus, on the Strymon river on the Thracian coast. This was the region of the Pangaeus mines. The Persian general in Thrace, Megabazus, hearing that Histiaeus was walling-in the city, reproached Darius:



What mad thing is this that you have done, sire, to let a Greek, a wise man and a shrewd, get hold of a town in Thrace, a place, too, where there is abundance of timber fit for shipbuilding, and oars in plenty, and mines of silver, and about which there are many dwellers both Greek and barbarian, ready enough to take him for their chief, and day and night to do his bidding! (Herod. V, 23)

This recalls Thucydides' analysis of the crucial role of wealth in archaic Greece:

originally Pelops gained his power by the great wealth which he brought with him from Asia into a poor country. (Thuc. I, 9, 2)

A man of great wealth and ingenuity apparently could readily win followers among a poorer or more backward people by buying over their chiefs and gods as his allies and make them do his bidding. Of Peisistratus' Thracian stay Aristotle remarks tersely, "Here he acquired wealth and hired mercenaries."

### III. Semantics of money-uses

Because of the exchange use of money under our market organization of economic life we are apt to think of money in too narrow terms. No object is money per se, and any object in an appropriate field can function as money. In truth, money is a system of symbols similar to language, writing, or weights and measures. These differ from one another mainly in the purpose served, the symbols employed, and the degree to which they display a single unified purpose.

#### (a) Pseudo-philosophies of money

In a survey of money in early societies, we must be content with listing the purposes to which the quantifiable objects called money are put. This is achieved by pointing to the situation in



which we operate those objects and with what effect. We will find them called money, when used in any one of the following ways: for payment; as a standard; as a means of indirect exchange. The human situation must, of course, be given independently of the notion of money, just as the handling of the objects is described in operational terms independently of that notion. Payment occurs in a situation of obligation and a handing over of the objects has the effect of wiping out the obligation. Money ~~used~~ <sup>is the represent for a</sup> as a standard ~~is a quantitative tag~~ attached to ~~units of~~ goods of different kinds, either for the purpose of barter with the effect that, by adding up the numerals, we can ~~readily~~ <sup>the</sup> equalize the two sides in the exchange, or for budgeting and balancing ~~stores of different staples, thus producing staple finance.~~ <sup>of as required on</sup> Finally, there is the ~~exchange~~ <sup>acquired</sup> use of ~~such~~ objects, that is, acquiring ~~them~~ in order to acquire other objects through a further act of exchange. The objects employed <sup>in such</sup> in indirect exchange thereby gain the character of money. X -

A few side-lines are here avoided.

The distinction between tokens and what they represent is ignored. Either function as money objects and form part of the symbolic system. No difference is therefore made here between barley money, shell money, gold money, and paper money. To confuse the basic problem of money with that of token money (Zeichengeld) is a source of frequent misunderstandings. Tokens as such are no novelty -- fiction and abstraction belong to the original endowment of man. In Herodotus' well-known story of compulsory temple prostitution in Babylonia (I, 199) he records this operational detail: "The silver coin may be of any size; it cannot be refused for that is for-



bidden by the law, since, once thrown, it is sacred." Nor are mere tokens unknown in the primitive societies of our ethnographers. Some peoples of the Congo employ "simply as a token" straw mats or grass cloth, originally of square shape, but eventually reduced to a tangle of hay, "practically of no value at all" (Johnston, H. H., 1908, II, p. 740). Strips of blue cloth of standard width that had become in time useless rags were current as token money in parts of the Western Sudan. However, since paper money came to the fore, scholars felt induced to focus on the tokens instead of on the massive physical objects themselves (Thilenius, G., 1920; Petri, H., 1936). This modernizing fashion carried the day. The latest outstanding work of an ethnographer takes the token to be true money and accordingly dubs the actual money objects that it describes exhaustively as "money substitutes".... In the author's own words: "If 'money-substitute' (Geldsurrogat) were not too cumbrous a term, it would be used in place of 'money' throughout this book" (A. H. Quiggin, 1949, p. 2). Historians of antiquity have proved hardly less susceptible to modernizing on the matter of money. Since third millennium Babylonia possessed no paper money, the metals are regarded by them as the orthodox money material. Actually, all payments were made in barley. Bruno Meissner put this in the terms: "Money was primarily replaced by grain" (1922, I, p. 355). Professor Lutz thought that the scarcity of silver "necessitated the use of a substitute. Thus grain (chiefly, barley) often took the place of metals" (J. of Ec. and Bus. Hist. 1931-32). Throughout, token money ranks <sup>here</sup> as true money, since it is the most abstract and the least useful; next comes gold and silver, as substitutes; in their absence, even grain will do. This is a consistent reversal



of the sequence in which the physical money objects are primary. Yet, as we said, the existence of tokens should cause no complication; it is a matter of course in a monetary system. If paper money viewed as a token 'symbolizes' coins, then in our terms it symbolizes that which is already a symbol, namely, money. Symbols do not merely 'represent' something. They are signs -- material, oral, visual, or purely imaginary -- that have an effect in the situation into which they enter. This constitutes their meaning.

A similar disregard of the semantics of economic theory is forced upon us in the choice of terms when referring to the various money uses. Payment, standard, and means of exchange are distinctions originally developed by classical economists. Hence the understandable belief of some anthropologists that their application to primitive money implies an economistic bias. The reverse would be truer. Actually, modern economics does not rely for its monetary theories on such distinctions at all. Archaic society, on the other hand, shows an institutional setting where the use of quantifiable objects in precisely those three ways typically occurs.

(b) All-purpose and special purpose money

From a formal angle, modern money, in contrast to primitive money, offers a striking resemblance to both language and writing. They all possess a uniform grammar. All three are organized in an elaborate code of rules concerning the correct way of employing the symbols -- sounds, letters, money-objects -- and general rules applicable to all the symbols. Archaic society does not know 'all-purpose' money. Various money-uses may be fulfilled here by different



money objects. Consequently, there is no grammar with which all money-uses must comply. No one kind of object deserves the distinctive name of money; rather the term applies to a small group of objects, each of which may serve as money in a different way. While in modern society the money employed as a means of exchange is vested with the capacity of performing all the other functions as well, in early society the position is reversed. One encounters slaves or horses or cattle used as a standard when judging of prestige-conveying wealth, or anyway of large amounts, while cowrie shells are solely employed for small amounts. (Eventually, the unit slave or horse may stand for a conventional value representing a mere unit of account, real slaves being actually sold at varying prices.) We might also find that while real slaves are a means of payment of tribute to a foreign overlord, cowrie shells function as a domestic means of payment, or even as a medium of exchange. This may not exclude the use of precious metals for hoarding wealth, while such metals may not otherwise serve as money except perhaps as a standard, and in exchange for imports. Where the market habit is fairly wide-spread, money might moreover serve as a means of exchange to which end several trade goods might be in use, which otherwise are not employed as money at all. Numerous combinations of these variants occur. No one rule is universally valid, except for the very general but no less significant rule that money-uses are distributed between a multiplicity of different objects. Paul Einzig in his Primitive Money (1949), was to our knowledge the first to stress this fact.

No such fragmentation in the use of sounds is known in any language. In speech all articulate oral sounds, in script all letters



of the alphabet are eligible for use in all types of words, while archaic money in extreme cases employs one kind of object as means of payment, another as a standard of value, a third for storing wealth, and a fourth for exchange purposes -- like a language where verbs consisted of one group of letters, nouns of another, adjectives of a third, and adverbs of yet a fourth.

Moreover, in primitive society exchange is not the fundamental money-use. If any one be more 'basic' than another it is rather the use for payment or standard. These are common even where the exchange use of money is not practised. Accordingly, while in modern society the unification of the various uses of money happened on the basis of its exchange-use, in early communities we find the different money-uses institutionalized separately of one another. In so far as there is interdependence between them, we find use for payment, or as a standard, or for storing of wealth, having precedence over use for exchange.

Thus nineteenth century money, employing exchange symbols for various other uses, appears as an almost complete parallel to language and writing with its all-purpose sounds and signs. But to some extent the analogy holds also for primitive and archaic money, which differs from its modern counterpart only in the lesser degree to which the systems are unified. However, since the second quarter of the twentieth century, starting with Nazi Germany, 'modern' money begins to show a definite tendency towards a reverting to disunification. Under Hitler half a dozen different 'Marks' were current and each of them was restricted to some special purpose or other.



(c) Exchange-money

"Money is a means of exchange." This presumption belongs among the most powerful in the field of modern thought. Its authority may be gauged by the axiomatic manner in which it was formulated to cover the whole course of human history and even extended by anthropologists to primitive society. It is forcefully expressed in the following quotation: "In any economic system, however primitive, an article can only be regarded as true money," Professor Raymond Firth declares, "when it acts as a definite and common medium of exchange, as a convenient stepping stone in obtaining one type of goods for another. However, in so doing, it serves as a measure of value, allowing the worth of all other articles to be expressed in terms of itself. Again, it is a standard of value, with reference to past or future payments, while as a store of value it allows wealth to be condensed and held in reserve." (Art. 'Currency, primitive' in Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed.)

According to this representative view, the exchange-use to which money can be put is its essential criterion, not only in modern, but also in primitive society. Even under primitive conditions the various money-uses are asserted by implication to be inseparable. Only quantifiable objects serving as means of exchange can, therefore, be regarded as money. Their functioning as means of payment, as standard of value, or as means of hoarding wealth, is not decisive for their character as money, unless it implies their use as media of exchange. For it is this use which logically unifies the system, since it allows a consistent linking up of the various functions of money.



Without it there cannot be true money.

Such a modernizing approach to the problem, we submit, is largely responsible for the obscurity in which the characteristics of primitive money still abide.

(d) The payment-use of money

Payment in the modern sense of the term is the discharge of an obligation through the handing over of quantifiable objects, which function as money, if more than one kind of obligation is discharged, through the handing over of such objects. The connectedness of payment with money and of obligations with economic transactions appears to the modern mind self-evident. Yet the quantification which we habitually associate with payment already operated at a time when the obligations discharged were quite unconnected with economic transactions.

The story starts with the propinquity of payment and punishment on the one hand, obligation and guilt on the other. However, obligations may have origins different from guilt and crime, such as wooing and marriage; and punishment may spring from other sacral sources, such as prestige and precedence; eventual payment, then, with its quantitative connotation, may include operational elements not entailed in punishment.

The traditional view that civil law followed penal law, penal law followed sacral law, is only broadly true. Payment was due alike from the guilty, the defiled, the impure, the weak and the lowly; it was owed to the gods and their priests, the honoured, the pure and the strong. Punishment, accordingly, aimed at diminution in power,



sanctity, prestige, status or wealth of the payer, not stopping at his physical destruction.

Pre-legal obligations mostly spring from custom and give rise to an offence only in case of default. Even so the restoring of the balance need not involve payment. Obligations are, as a rule, specific, and their fulfilment is a qualitative affair, thus lacking an essential of payment -- its quantitative character. Infringement of sacral and social obligations, whether towards god, tribe, kin, totem, village, age-group, caste, or guild, is repaired not through payment but by action of the right quality. Wooing, marrying, avoid-ing, dancing, singing, dressing, feasting, lamenting, lacerating, or even killing oneself may occur in discharge of an obligation, but they are not for that reason payments.

The specific characteristic in the payment-use of money is quantification. Punishment approximates payment when the process of riddance of guilt is enumerable, as when lashes of the whip, turns of the praying mill, or days of fasting dispose of the offence. But though it has now become an 'obligation to pay,' the offence is atoned for not by depriving one's self of quantifiable objects, but primarily by a loss of qualitative values, or sacral and social status.

The payment-use of money links up with the economy when the units discharged by the person under obligation happen to be a physical object such as sacrificial animals, slaves, ornamental shells, or measures of food stuffs. The obligations may still be predominantly non-transactional, such as paying a fine, composition, tax, tribute, making gifts and counter-gifts, or honouring the gods, ancestors or the dead. However, there is now a significant difference. For the



payee does gain what the payer loses — the effect of the operation fits the legal concept of payment.

The ultimate intent of the obligation to pay may still be the diminution in power and status of the payer. In archaic society an exorbitant fine did not only bankrupt but politically destroyed the victim. For a long time power and status in this way retained their precedence over economic possessions. The political and social importance of accumulated wealth under these conditions lay in the rich man's capacity for making a big payment without undermining his status. (This is the condition of affairs in archaic democracies where political confiscation takes the form of exorbitant fines.) Treasure gains great political importance, as witness Thucydides' memorable passages in the *Archeology*. Wealth is here directly transmuted into power. It is a self-maintaining institution. Because the rich man is powerful and honoured he receives payments: gifts and dues are showered upon him without his having to use power to torture and kill. Yet his wealth, used as a fund for gifts, would procure him a sufficiency of power to do so.

Once money as a means of exchange is established in society, the practice of payment spreads far and wide. For with the introduction of markets as the physical locus of exchange a new type of obligation comes into prominence as the legal residue of transactions. Payment appears as the counter-part of some material advantage gained in the transaction. Formerly a man was made to pay taxes, rent, fines or blood-money. Now he pays for the goods he bought. Money is now means of payment because it is means of exchange. The notion of an



independent origin of payment fades and the millennia in which it sprang not from economic transactions, but directly from religious, social or political obligations, are forgotten.

(c) Hoarding or storage-use of money

A subordinate money-use -- storing of wealth -- has its origin largely in the need for payments. Payment, as we saw, is not primarily an economic phenomenon. Neither is wealth. In early society it consists largely of treasure, which is again rather a social than an economic category. The economic connotation of wealth (as of payment) derives from the frequency with which wealth is accumulated in the form of cattle, slaves, and non-perishable goods of common consumption. Both that which feeds the store of wealth and that which is disbursed from it gains then an economic significance. Only within limits, is this the case, however, since payments are still made as a rule for non-transactional reasons. This is true both of the rich who own the store of wealth, and the subjects who fill the store by their payments. He who owns the wealth is thereby enabled to pay fines, composition, taxes, etc., for sacral, political and social ends. The payments which he receives from his subjects, high or low, are paid to him as taxes, rents, gifts, etc., not for economic but for social and political reasons ranging from pure gratitude for protection or admiration of superior endowment, to stark fear of enslavement and death.

This again is not to deny that once exchange-money is present money will readily lend itself as a store of wealth. But, as in the case of payment, the condition is the previous establishment of quantifiable objects as media of exchange.



(f) Use of money as a standard

Money as a standard of value seems more closely linked with the exchange-use of money than is either payment or hoarding. Barter and storage of staples are the two very different sources from which the need for a standard springs. At first sight the two have little if anything in common. The first one is akin to transaction, the other to administration and disposal. Yet neither can be effectively carried out in the absence of some standard. For how otherwise than with the help of computation could, for instance, a piece of land be bartered against an assortment consisting of a chariot, horse-harness, asses, ass-harness, oxen, oil, clothes and other minor items? In the absence of a means of exchange the account in a well-known case of barter in ancient Babylonia shaped up like this. The land was valued at 816 shekels of silver, while the articles given in exchange were valued in shekels of silver as follows: chariot 100, 6 horse-harnesses 300, an ass 130, ass-harness 50, and ox 30, the remaining sum of shekels was distributed over the smaller items.

The same principle applied, in the absence of exchange, to the administration of vast palace and temple stores (staple finance). Their keeper handled standardized goods under conditions which from more than one angle required a gauging of the relative importance of these goods. Hence the famed rule of accountancy of 'one unit of silver = one unit of barley' on the stele of Manishtusu<sup>V</sup> as well as at the head of Article 2 of the Laws of Eshnunna.

Research data reveals that the exchange-uses of money cannot have given rise to the other money uses. On the contrary, the payment,



storage and accountancy uses of money had their separate origins and were institutionalized independently of one another.

A close connection between some money uses can nevertheless be shown to exist, such as between payment and storage, or between standard and exchange. The actual interconnections between the various money uses is a matter for empirical research.

(g) Treasure and staple finance

It seems almost self-contradictory to expect that one could pay with money with which one cannot buy. Yet that precisely is implied in the assertion that money was not used as a medium of exchange and still was used as a means of payment.

Two institutions of early society offer a partial explanation: treasure and staple finance.

Treasure, as we saw, should be distinguished from other forms of stored wealth. The difference lies mainly in its relation to subsistence. In the proper sense of the term, treasure is formed of prestige goods, including 'valuables' and ceremonial objects, the mere possession of which endows the holder with social weight, power and influence. It is, then, a peculiarity of treasure that both the giving and the receiving enhances prestige; it largely circulates for the sake of the turnover, which is its proper use. Even when food is 'treasured' it is liable to pass backwards and forwards between the parties, however absurd this might appear from the subsistence point of view. But food rarely functions as treasure, for interesting food, like slaughtered pigs, does not keep, and that which keeps, such as barley or oil, is not exciting. The precious metals, on the



other hand, which are almost universally valued as treasure, can not readily be exchange for subsistence, since apart from exceptionally auriferous regions such as the Gold Coast or Lydia, display of gold by the common people is opprobrious.

Nevertheless, treasure, like other sources of power, may be of great economic importance, since gods, kings, and chiefs can be made to put the services of their dependents at the disposal of the giver, thus indirectly securing for him food, raw materials, and labour services on a large scale. Ultimately, this power of indirect disposal, which may comprise the important power of taxation, arises, of course, from the enhanced influence exerted by the recipient of treasure over his tribe or people.

All this holds good, whether or not the treasure consists of quantifiable units or not. If it does, the handling of treasure may give rise to something in the nature of finance. In archaic Greece, for instance, he who owned treasure employed it to gain the favour of gods and chiefs or other politically influential agents, by forming the gold and silver into conventionally acceptable gifts, such as tripods, or bowls. Transactions of treasure finance were restricted to the narrow circle of the gods and chiefs. While some things could be paid for with treasure, very many more could not be bought with it.

Storage of wealth as an institution of the subsistence economy starts from the collecting and stacking of staples. While treasure and treasure finance does not as a rule belong to the subsistence economy, the storing of staples represents an accumulation of subsistence goods involving, as a rule, their use as a means of payment.



For once staples are stored on a large scale by temple, palace, or manor, this must be accompanied by such a use.

Most archaic societies possess an organization of staple-finance of some kind or other. It was in the framework of the planned transfer and investment of staples stored on a gigantic scale that the accounting devices were first developed which characterized the redistributive economies of the ancient empires over long periods of time. For only well after the introduction of coined money in Greece some six centuries before our era did money-finance begin to supersede staple-finance in these empires, especially in the Roman Republic. Nevertheless, even later, Ptolemaic Egypt continued in the traditions of staple-finance, which it raised to unparalleled levels of efficiency.

Redistribution as a form of integration often involves, under primitive conditions, the storage of goods at a centre, whence they are distributed and fall out of circulation. Goods passed on as payment to the centre are passed out from there and are consumed. They provide subsistence for army, bureaucracy, and labour force, whether paid out in wages, in soldiers' pay, or in other forms. The personnel of the temples consumes a large part of the payments made to the temple in kind. The raw materials are required for the equipment of the army, for public works, and for government exports; wool and cloth are exported too; barley, oil, wine, dates, garlic, and so on, are distributed and consumed. Thus the means of payment are destroyed. Maybe some of them are eventually bartered privately by their recipients. To that extent a 'secondary circulation' is started which might even



become the mainspring of local markets without disrupting the redistributive economy. Actually, no evidence of the existence of such markets has yet turned up.

The relevance of treasure and staple to the question of money-uses is therefore that they explain the functioning of the various money-uses in the absence of the market system.

Treasure goods which happen to be quantifiable may be used for payment. Yet such élite goods are not normally exchanged and cannot be used for purchase except in the sacral and foreign policy spheres.

The much larger sector of payments concerns, of course, subsistence goods. Such objects, when used for the discharge of obligations, i. e., for payment, are stored at the center whence they revert through redistributive payment and are consumed.

Treasure and staples, between them, offer therefore broadly the answer to the institutional problem set by the conditions of early society, where means of payment may be independent of the exchange use of money.

In the absence of money as a means of exchange in the irrigational empires a kind of banking enterprise developed -- actually large estate managements practicing staple finance -- in order to facilitate transfer and clearing in kind. It might be added that similar methods were employed by the administrations of the larger temples. Thus clearing, book-transfer, and non-transferable checks were first developed, not as expedients in a money economy, but as administrative devices designed to make barter more effective in the absence of marketing methods.



(h) Babylonia and Dahomey

In regard to its monetary organization, Hammurabi's Babylonia, in spite of its complex economic administration and elaborate operational practices, was typically 'primitive,' for the principle of differentiation of money-objects was firmly established. With many important reservations as to detail, the following broad generalization can be made: rents, wages and taxes were paid in barley, while the standard of value was universally silver. The total system was governed by the rule of accountancy, unshakably grounded on the equation '1 shekel of silver = 1 gur of barley.' In case of a permanent improvement in the average yield of the land (as would be caused by large scale irrigational works), the barley content of the gur was raised by solemn proclamation. The general use of silver as money of account facilitated barter enormously; the equally general employment of barley as a means of domestic payment made the storage system possible on which the redistributive economy of the country rested.

It appears that all the important staples functioned to some extent as means of exchange, none of them being permitted to attain the status of 'money' (as opposed to goods). This may also be put in the following terms: an elaborate system of barter was practised which was based on the function of silver as money of account; the use of barley as a means of payment; and the simultaneous employment of a number of staples such as oil, wool, dates, bricks, etc., as means of exchange. Amongst the latter should be counted barley and silver, care being taken to prevent these or any other staple developing



into a 'preferred means of exchange,' or, as we should say, money. These safeguards included the avoidance of coined money, the hoarding of precious metals in palace and temple treasury, and, more effective than all, strict legal provisions as to the documentation of transactions. The outstanding provision appears to have been the restriction of formal 'sale-purchase' transactions to specific goods such as a plot of land, a house, heads of cattle, individual slaves, a boat -- all of them specimens which might be designated by a name. In regard to staples or fungible goods, such as barley, oil, wool, or dates, no documentation of exchange against each other is in evidence during the millennia of cuneiform civilization.

On a very much smaller scale the eighteenth century African kingdom of Dahomey shows monetary conditions not dissimilar to those of Babylonia. Cowries were used as domestic currency in all four uses, but as a standard of value they were supplemented by slaves which served as money of account for larger amounts. Accordingly, the wealth of rich persons, the customs payments of foreign ships to the king, and tribute to foreign sovereigns, were reckoned (but only in the last instance paid) in slaves. These did not, however, here serve as a means of exchange, as in some Haussa regions. In this latter use cowrie was supplemented by gold dust, which was especially employed in ports of trade and other foreign contacts. As to storage of wealth, not only cowrie but also slaves were used. It is reminiscent of Babylonia that the rule of accountancy governing the system involved equation between slaves and cowrie, which it seems, was a matter of public proclamation; so was the export price of slaves, which was reckoned in ounces of gold dust.



Some features of the monetary system as it existed in the great Babylonian civilization are found here crudely duplicated, even though on a modest scale and on a pre-literate level. On the other hand, many important details, which the lapse of millennia has obscured, can perhaps be studied here at first hand.

Polanyi, Karl - Notes on the Economy of the Ancient Near East, 1955, 10 pp.

Polanyi, Karl - Notes on the Economy of the Ancient Near East, 1955, 10 pp.

Polanyi, Karl - Notes on the Economy of the Ancient Near East, 1955, 10 pp.



I

- Polanyi, Karl - Two Meanings of Economic, 51 pp.
- Arensberg, Conrad - Anthropology and History of Economic Institutions, 22 pp.
- Hopkins, Terence - Sociology and the Substantive Theory, 57 pp.
- Neale, Walter M. - The Market as the Economist and as the Economic Historian See It, 24 pp.
- Pearson, Harry W. - Surpluses and Economic Development: A Critique of the Surplus Theorem, 26 pp.

II

- Fusfeld, Daniel R. - Economic Theory and Anthropology, 21 pp.
- Pearson, Harry W. - The 'Oikos Controversy', 18 pp.
- Neale, Walter M. - The Indian Village and the Nature of Land Revenue, 28 pp.
- Polanyi, Karl - On Forms of Trade in the Ancient Near East, 22 pp.
- Polanyi, Karl - Aristotle on Economic Matters, 47 pp.

III

- Chapman, Anne M. - Port of Trade Areas in Preconquest Mesoamerica, 76 pp.
- Benet, Francisco - Sociology of Berber Highland Markets, 60 pp.
- Revere, Robert B. - Coast and Continent in the Ancient Near East, 40 pp.
- Polanyi, Karl - Hittite Policies in Regard to Coastal Areas, 19 pp.

IV

- Polanyi, Karl - Suggested Subjects for Interdisciplinary Project, 9 pp.
- Polanyi, Karl - Food Distribution and Equivalencies, 7 pp.
- Finley, M. I. - Aristotle on Exchange, 16 pp.
- Polanyi, Karl - The Tamkarum in the Cappodocian Tablets and in the Codex Hammurabi, 17 pp.
- Sahlins, Marshall David - Polynesian Socio-Economics, 12 pp.
- Vayda, A. P. - Notes on Trade Among Pomo Indians of California, 10 pp.
- Polanyi, Karl - Notes on the Place Occupied by Economies in Societies, 53 pp.



## AUTHOR INDEX

- Arensberg, Conrad M. Anthropology and the History of Economic Institutions, I, 22 pp.
- Benet, Francisco. Sociology of Berber Highland Markets, III, 60 pp.
- Chapman, Anne M. Port of Trade Areas in Preconquest Mesoamerica, III, 76 pp.
- Finley, M. I. Aristotle on Exchange, IV, 16 pp.
- Fusfeld, Daniel R. Economic Theory and Anthropology, II, 21 pp.
- Hopkins, Terence. Sociology and the Substantive Theory, I, 57 pp.
- Neale, Walter M. The Indian Village and the Nature of Land Revenue, II, 28 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Market as the Economist and as the Economic Historian See It, I, 24 pp.
- Pearson, Harry W. Surpluses and Economic Development: A Critique of the Surplus Theorem, I, 26 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The 'Oikos Controversy' II, 18 pp.
- Polanyi, Karl. Aristotle on Economic Matters, II, 27 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Food Distribution and Equivalencies, IV, 9 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Hittite Policies in Regard to Coastal Areas, III, 19 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Notes on Place Occupied by Economics in Societies, IV, 53 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_. On Forms of Trade in the Ancient Near East, II, 22 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Suggested Subjects for Interdisciplinary Project, IV, 9 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Tamkarum in the Cappadocian Tablets and in the Codex Hammurabi, IV, 17 pp.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Two Meanings of Economic, I, 51 pp.
- Revere, Robert B. Coast and Continent in the Ancient Near East, III, 40 pp.
- Sahlins, Marshall David. Polynesian Socio-Economics, IV, 12 pp.
- Vayda, A. P. Notes on Trade Among Pomo Indians of California, IV, 9 pp.



## SUBJECT INDEX

- Anthropology and the History of Economic Institutions - Conrad M. Arensberg, I, 22.
- Aristotle on Economic Matters - Karl Polanyi, II, 27.
- Aristotle on Exchange - M. I. Finley, IV, 16.
- Coast and Continent in the Ancient Near East - Robert B. Revere, III, 40.
- Economic Theory and Anthropology - Daniel R. Fusfeld, II, 21.
- Food Distribution and Equivalencies - Karl Polanyi, IV, 9.
- Hittite Policies in Regard to Coastal Areas - Karl Polanyi - III, 19.
- Notes on Place Occupied by Economies in Societies - Karl Polanyi, IV, 53.
- Notes on Trade Among Pomo Indians of California - A. P. Vayda, IV, 9.
- On Forms of Trade in the Ancient Near East - Karl Polanyi, II, 22.
- Polynesian Socio-Economics - Marshall David Sahlins, IV, 12.
- Port of Trade Areas in Preconquest Mesoamerica - Anne M. Chapman, III, 76.
- Sociology and the Substantive Theory - Terence Hopkins, I, 57.
- Sociology of the Berber Highland Markets - Francisco Benet, III, 60.
- Suggested Subjects for Interdisciplinary Project - Karl Polanyi, IV, 9.
- Surpluses and Economic Development: A Critique of the Surplus Theorem - Harry W. Pearson, I, 26.
- Tamkarum in Cappadocian Tablets and in the Codex Hammurabi - Karl Polanyi, IV, 17.
- The Indian Village and the Nature of Land Revenue - Walter M. Neale, II, 28.
- The Market as the Economist and as the Economic Historian See It - Walter M. Neale, I, 24.
- The 'Oikos Controversy' - Harry W. Pearson, II, 18.
- Two Meanings of Economic - Karl Polanyi, I, 51.