LIST OF PARTICIPANTS FOR STRATEGY FOR PEACE CONFERENCE

JANUARY 17-20, 1963

ALBERTSON, Maurice L.
Director of The Research Foundation
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado.

AMME, Captain Carl H., Jr., USN(Retd)
Defense Analysis Centre
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, California.

AMRINE, Michael
Public Information Consultant
American Psychological Association, Inc.
1333 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

BABCOCK, Major General C. Stanton
U.S. Army (Retd)
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, California.

BARBER, Arthur
Deputy Assistant Secretary to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.

BARCHOFF, Herbert
President, Eastern Rolling Mills
1122 East 180th Street
New York 60, N.Y.

BARGMAN, Abraham
Political Affairs Officer
Disarmament Affairs Group
U.N. Secretariat
United Nations
New York, N.Y.

BARTH, William P.
The Centre for Research on Conflict Resolution
University of Michigan
820 East Washington
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

BECHHOEFER, Bernard G.
Scharfeld, Bechhoefer, Baron & Stambler
1710 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

BEEBE, George A.
Director, Institute for International Order
11 West 42nd Street
New York 36, N.Y.

BLANCHET, Jeremy
International Affairs Bureau
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
U.S. State Department
Washington, D.C.

BOATMAN, Colonel Beryl L.
Assistant to Executive Vice-President
Aerojet General Corporation
P.O. Box 296, Dept. 10, Bldg. 59
Azusa, California.

BIDERMAN, Albert D.
Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc.
Washington, D.C.

BRAY, Mrs. Sally G.
Rustic Lane
Cincinnati, Chio

BRENNAN, Dr. Donald G.
President, Hudson Institute
Quaker Ridge Road
Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y.

BRODY, Richard A.
Assistant Director
Stanford Studies in International Conflict and Integration
Stanford University
Stanford, California.

BUSSARD, Dr. Robert W.
Space Technology Laboratories, Inc.
1 Space Park
Rodondo Beach, California.

CHAPMAN, Dr. Seville
Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc.
Buffalo 21, N.Y.

CONWAY, Reverend E. A., S.J.
Director, Centre for Peace Research
The Creighton University
2500 California Street
Omaha, Nebraska

COWAN, William W.
American Foundation for Continuing Education
300 East 46th Street
New York, N.Y.

COWEN, Myron M.
1116 Woodward Building
Washington 5, D.C.

CRANE, Robert D.
Director, Space Research Institute
World Rule and Law Centre
Duke University
Durham, N.C.

DAVIS, Captain E. D.
Department of Social Sciences
U.S. Military Academy
West Point, N.Y.

DAVIS, R. H.
System Development Corp.
2500 Colorado Avenue
Santa Monica, California.

DEUTSCH, Morton
Bell Telephone Laboratories
Murray Hill, N.J.

DONOHUE, Robert T.
Geophysics Corp. of America
Burlington Road
Bedford, Mass.

DOUGHERTY, Dr. James E.
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
133 South 36th Street (Room 102)
Philadelphia 4, Pa.

DUBIN, Mel
President, Slant/Fin Radiator Co.
130-15 89th Road
Richmond Hill, N.Y.

ECCLES, Rear Admiral Henry E.
101 Washington Street
Newport, R.I.

FERGUSON, Allen R.
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California.

FISHER, Colonel Sydney G., USAF
Assistant Deputy Director of Aerospace Plans
D/Plans, SCS/P & P
Department of the Air Force
Washington 25, D.C.

GANGE, John
Director, Institute of International Studies & Overseas Administration
University of Oregon
Eugene, Oregon

GARBER, Dr. Elizabeth M.
League of Women Voters
3950 N. Dunbarton Street
McLean, Pa.

GARLAND, Brigadier General W. M.
USAF (Retd)
Director of Intelligence Requirements
Bissett-Berman Corporation
2941 Nebraska
Santa Monica, California.

GARTHOFF, R. L.
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State (Room 7317)
Washington 25, D.C.

GATHRIGHT, Wreatham
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
U.S. State Department
Washington, D.C.

HARNER, Miss Evelyn L.
Technical Military Planning Operation
Defense Electronics Division
General Electric Company
735 State Street
Santa Barbara, California.

HEFNER, Robert
The Centre for Research on Conflict
Resolution
University of Michigan
820 East Washington
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

HERZFELD, Charles M.
Assistant Director
Ballistic Missile Defense Research
Advanced Research Projects Agency
Washington 25, D.C.

HIBBS, Albert R.
Chief, Arms Control Study Group
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
4800 Oak Grove Drive
Pasadena, California.

HOAG, Malcolm W.
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California

HUDSON, Richard
Editor, War/Peace Report
New York, N.Y.

HORELICK, Arnold L.
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California.

HUDDLE, Franklin P.
Hughes Research Laboratories
3011 Malibu Canyon Road
Malibu, California.

JONES, Lt. Col. D. P., USAF
Hq SAC, USAF
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

JONES, William
Deputy Director
Office of UN Political Affairs
Bureau of International Organization
State Department
Washington, D.C.

KALKSTEIN, Marvin, USAF
Cambridge Research Laboratories
Bedford, Mass.

KATZ, Amron
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California.

KATZENBACH, Edward L.
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense
for Education & Manpower Resources
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.

KINTNER, Colonel William R.
Deputy Director
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
133 South 36th Street (Room 102)
Philadelphia 4, Pa.

KOLKOWICZ, Roman
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California.

KURTZ, Howard G.
Handy Associates, Inc.
405 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y.

KRAMISH, Arnold
The Rand Corporation
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

KYBAL, Dalimil
Missiles & Space Division
Lockheed Aircraft
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

LANIER, Addison
Thos. Emery's Sons, Inc.
4500 Carew Tower
Cincinnati 2, Chio

LAPP, Ralph E.
Quadri Science
La Salle Building
Washington, D.C.

LEAVITT, William
Associate Editor
AIR FORCE Magazine
1901 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

LEISS, Amelia C.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
345 East 46th Street
New York 17, N.Y.

LEVINE, Robert A.
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California.

LOOSBROCK, John F.
Editor, AIR FORCE Magazine
1901 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

MAGISTRALE, Victor
Arms Control Study Group
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
4800 Oak Grove Drive
Pasadena, California

MERRIAM, Robert E.
President, Spaceonics, Inc.
Geneva, Illinois.

MICHAEL, Donald N.
Director of Research
Peace Research Institute
1329 18th Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

MILBURN, Thomas W.
Chief, U.S. Naval Test Station
China Lake, California

MONTENEGRO, David W.
Office of Public Affairs
State Department
Washington, D.C.

MOORE, Edward F.
39 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

MOORE, John F.
Consulting Scientist
Lockheed Electronics Co.
Route 22, Plainfield, N.J.

MOORE, Wayne R.
Special Assistant to President
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa

MOORMAN, Lewis J., Jr.
National Bank of Commerce Building
San Antonio 5, Texas.

MOULTON, Harland
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
U.S. State Department
Washington, D.C.

MURPHY, J. Morden
Vice President (Retd)
Bankers Trust Company
11 East 90th Street
New York, N.Y.

NICHOLSON, Dr. George E., Jr.
Chairman, Department of Statistics
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N.C.

O'BRYAN, Henry M.
Bendix Corporation
1730 K Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

OLIVER, Edward
Hq USAF (AFXPD-RD)
Washington 25, D.C.

OSGOOD, Charles E.
Director, Institute of Communications Research
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois.

O'SULLIVAN, Tom
Manager, Arms Control Section
Division of Strategic Studies
Raytheon Company
Waltham, Mass.

PARTRIDGE, General Earle E., USAF (Retd)
1317 Hermosa Way
Colorado Springs, Colorado.

PETRIE, George W., III
Program Director, Executive School
International Business Machines, Corp.
Astor's Lane, Sands Point
Port Washington, L.I., N.Y.

PHELPS, Professor John B.
Institute of Defense Analyses
1666 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, D.C.

POLLIN, William
Chief, Section on Psychiatry
Laboratory of Clinical Science
National Institute of Mental Health
Bethesda 4, Md.

PUGH, Dr. George
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
U.S. State Department
Washington, D.C.

QUINN, Garry L.
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

READ, Thornton
Centre of International Studies
Princeton University
Princeton, N.J.

RHAME, William T.
President, Texstar Corporation
National Bank of Commerce Building
San Antonio 5, Texas

ROBERTS, Dr. Richard B.
Carnegie Institution of Washington
5241 Broad Branch Road, N.W.
Washington 15, D.C.

RODGERS, Dr. Richard C., M.D.
3014 Estralla Street
Tampa 9, Florida

SAGERT, Lieutenant Colonel Stanley A.
Hq USAF (AFXPD-PY-APA)
Washington 25, D.C.

SCHAIRER, Dr. George S.
Boeing Aircraft
Seattle, Washington

SCHRATZ, Captain Paul, USN
United States Navy
Joint Chiefs of Staff (SAAC)
Washington 25, D.C.

SCHWARTZ, Leonard E.
Stanford Research Institute
808 - 17th Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

SCHWARTZ, Dr. Martin D.
Division Director
Aerospace Sciences, Space & Information Systems Division
North American Aviation, Inc.
12214 Lakewood Boulevard
Downey, California.

SCHWARZ, Sanford
Office of the Secretary General
United Nations Secretariat Building
Room 3545
United Nations, New York.

SEADLER, Stephen E.
W. A. Scheaffer Pen Co.
733 Avenue F
Fort Madison, Iowa

SEAMANS, Henry W.
Chief of Organization Liaison
Office of Public Affairs
State Department
Washington, D.C.

SHERMAN, Professor Richard
Department of Economics
College of Commerce
Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio

SLAWSON, John
President, American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street
New York, N.Y.

SLICK, William
Princeton University
Princeton, N.J.

SOHN, Professor Louis B.
Professor of Law
Law School of Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Mass.

STEVENSON, Eric
Institute for Defense Analyses
1666 Connecticut Avenue
Washington 9, D.C.

STILLWELL, Major General Richard
Commandant of Cadets
U.S. Military Academy
West Point, N.Y.

STONE, Albert M.
Technical Assistant to Director
The Johns Hopkins University
8621 Georgia Avenue
Silver Springs, Md.

STONE, Dr. Jeremy J.
Hudson Institute
Quaker Ridge Road
Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y.

SYKES, Colonel Philip A., USAF
Deputy, Special Assistant to the JCS for
Arms Control
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington 25, D.C.

TAUBENFELD, Howard
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
United Nations Plaza at 46th Street
New York, N.Y.

THOMPSON, Dr. L. T. E.
Special Projects Office
Ordnance Bureau
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

TEEPLE, John B.
Editor, Journal of Arms Control
Bendix Systems Division
Ann Arbor, Michigan

VAGTBORG, Dr. Harold
Chairman of the Board
South West Research Centre
8500 Culebra Road
San Antonio 6, Texas

VAN ATTA, L. C.
601 Toyopa Drive
Pacific Palisades
California.

WEINBERG, Harold
United Aircraft Corporate Systems Centre
Windsor Loocks, Conn.

WEINLAND, Dr. Robert
U.S. Naval Test Station
China Lake, California.

WIGET, Francis X.
7909 Ninth Avenue South
St. Petersburg 7, Florida

WITZE, Claude
Senior Editor
AIR FORCE Magazine
1901 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

WOLK, Herman S.
Historian, SAC Headquarters
Omaha, Nebraska

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CONFERENCE TO PLAN A STRATEGY FOR PEACE

"We look upon arms control measures as an essential means of enhancing security and international peace.....Arms control and armament are not contradictory, but rather complementary aspects of a responsible national security policy."

"We are impressed by the need for basic research and planning in the entire arms control field--including the military, political, diplomatic, legal, economic and technological facets of the problem. This research should devote equal attention to the short-range problem of next steps toward arms control and the long-range problem of the kind of world peace system toward which the United States should be working."

"We wish to emphasize the need for more active steps to develop and implement a working system of international law, without which a permanent and just peace cannot be achieved."

Conference to Plan A Strategy for Peace

FINAL REPORT



ARDEN HOUSE
Harriman, New York
June 2-5, 1960

CONTENTS

PREFACE

In April, 1960, an invitation was sent to leaders in business and the professions throughout the United States to participate in "A Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace." Mrs. Albert D. Lasker joined me as co-host in sponsoring the Conference.

Following the background addresses, participants met in four separate discussion groups for three simultaneous periods. Consensus reports from the four discussion groups were considered at a Plenary Session and resulted in the final recommendations of the Conference as herein published.

This record of timely addresses delivered, the reports of the four separate discussion groups of participants, the recommendations adopted by the group as a whole, and the list of participants explain what happened at Arden House over the weekend of June 2-5, 1960, as we met to consider "A Strategy for Peace."

We were fortunate to have with us for a limited time, The Honorable Philip Noel-Baker, M.P. of Great Britain, Nobel Peace Prize Winner.

While we did not and could not in one weekend produce blueprint specifics, Conference participants assure us that the interaction of the thinking of individuals from many disciplines and backgrounds was catalytic, productive and timely.

To all who gave encouragement and assistance in the planning of this Conference I express my deep appreciation.

We are discussing another Conference and continuing activities, but meanwhile, we hope that this record may stimulate further discussion of "A Strategy for Peace."

TOM SLICK

TOM SLICK

OIL PROPERTIES
RANCHING
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE BLDG.
SAN ANTONIO 5, TEXAS

APRIL 18, 1960

This is to invite you to meet with a group of leaders in business and the professions over the weekend of Thursday evening, June 2 to Sunday noon, June 5, at "A Conference to Plan a Strategy For Peace." The purpose of the Conference is to discuss fresh approaches in planning U.S. policies to attain a secure and just peace.

For the past several months a number of concerned individuals and I have been discussing the continuing unresolved world problems with persons in government, business, education and science.

There appears to be general agreement that a more adequate definition of U. S. goals is needed. There also seems to be agreement that a group combining practical business experience, the knowledge of the scholar, and experience in science and government can contribute outstandingly toward defining objectives and suggesting practical means of achieving them.

I am convinced that wise decisions and recommendations needed for long-range comprehensive planning can come from the concerted efforts of people from many fields of endeavor. This Conference could perform a useful function in outlining the specifics of a long-range plan. In fact, having such a plan would in itself be a significant step toward its achievement. Our discussions might also lead to a continuing study group whose work could well be a great contribution toward resolving the serious international problems facing us.

Prominent individuals in and out of the government have encouraged the holding of this Conference. President Eisenhower in the enclosed letter has given encouragement

to such a meeting as well as to the coordination of our efforts with those of his recently appointed Commission on National Goals.

It is also my conviction that the thinking citizens of our country have an inescapable responsibility for helping our government to arrive at policies and plans which may well affect the future of all human beings.

I hope you can accept this invitation to be a guest and participant at the discussions to be held at Arden House, New York, June 2nd to 5th, 1960. Details about transportation from New York, etc. will be sent to you later. I look forward to hearing from you at your early convenience.

The suggested agenda and schedule are enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

Jam Slick

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 11, 1959

Dear Mr. Slick:

I was pleased to receive your letter of June twenty-fifth informing me of progress in the development of your idea to form a private group of prominent citizens to develop a long-range, basic peace plan.

I certainly think you are to be commended for the public spirit which prompted this proposal. While we in government continuously are wrestling with this problem, a group of eminent citizens outside of government certainly could develop ideas that would be of help to us in our continual search for ways to reduce world tensions.

I am particularly happy that you have arranged to coordinate your efforts with those of the Commission on National Goals, and am sure that your activities can be mutually beneficial. I hope that you will keep us informed of further progress in your most worthy and important endeavor.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Mr. Tom Slick
National Bank of Commerce Bldg.
San Antonio 5, Texas

AGENDA

A CONFERENCE

THURSDAY, June 2, 1960

8:00 P.M. PLENARY SESSION

Chairman: Dr. Arthur N. Holcombe, Chairman
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace

Purpose of Conference
Tom Slick

Address
Dr. Leo Szilard

"World Overview—The Political Situation"
Robert R. Bowie, Director, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University

FRIDAY, June 3, 1960

9:00 A.M. PLENARY SESSION

Chairman: Dr. Arthur N. Holcombe

"The Relationship of Military Technology, Strategy and Arms Control"
Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Director, Research Laboratory of Electronics, M.I.T.
Richard S. Leghorn, President, ITEK Corporation

"Possible Approaches to Peace"
C. Maxwell Stanley, Stanley Engineering Company

2:15 P.M. SEPARATE GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Focus on:

Disarmament, arms limitation control, inspection and enforcement; the role of the United Nations; the dangers of "indirect" aggression under substantial disarmament.

TO PLAN A STRATEGY FOR PEACE

8:00 P.M. PLENARY SESSION

Chairman: Robert W. Dowling, President
City Investing Company

"The Economic Consequences of Disarmament"
Leo Cherne, Executive Director, Research Institute of America

"Building the Law Structure of Peace"
Dr. Arthur Larson, Director, The World Rule of Law Center, Duke University Law School

SATURDAY, June 4, 1960

9:00 A.M. SEPARATE GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Focus on:

a) Development of a system of world law including its relation to arms control, inspection and enforcement and to the United Nations as presently constituted or to be modified.
b) Economic effects of disarmament, including fear of possible adverse effects on economies; potential rewards from constructive use of disarmament savings; and the economic climate which might be a prerequisite of disarmament.
c) Timing of cold war political problems prior to or in conjunction with an arms control agreement.

2:00 P.M. SEPARATE GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Focus on:

a) Residual problems and possible dangers, military and other, under disarmament.
b) Acceptance of a long-range, comprehensive peace plan by the West, the neutral nations, and the Communist Bloc:
—In the case of the USSR—what about satellites
—Alternative procedures to be considered in the event of initial refusal by the USSR, which might result in later acceptance.

AGENDA (Cont'd)

SUNDAY, June 5, 1960

9:00 A.M. FINAL PLENARY SESSION

Chairman: Dr. Arthur N. Holcombe

Coordinated reports of group chairmen and rapporteurs. Consideration of continuing studies and procedures directed toward development of specific proposals.

DISCUSSION CHAIRMEN AND RAPPORTEURS

GROUP A: Chairman: Dr. Roger Hilsman, The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Affiliated with the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Rapporteur: Michael Amrine, American Psychological Association

GROUP B: Chairman: Prof. Robert G. Neumann, Director, Institute of International and Foreign Studies, U.C.L.A.

Rapporteur: George A. Beebe, Director, Institute for International Order

GROUP C: Chairman: Dr. Max F. Millikan, Director
The Center for International Studies, M.I.T.

Rapporteur: Gerard J. Mangone, Professor, Political Science and International Law, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University

GROUP D: Chairman: C. Maxwell Stanley
Stanley Engineering Company

Rapporteur: Professor Robert Hefner, The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan

INTRODUCTION TO CONFERENCE

DR. ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, *Chairman, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace*—Presiding

REMARKS OF TOM SLICK

DR. HOLCOMBE: *We have met here for a purpose. What this purpose is can best be stated by the gentleman who has organized this Conference, Mr. Tom Slick.*

It is not for me to anticipate what he will say. I can, however, tell you something about him.

Tom Slick is a member of the great American public who believes in the power of public opinion. He intends that all of us shall take a hand in developing that power, with a view to getting better protection against what is often described as "an unthinkable war," but which is, in reality, a war that could easily happen under inept or unlucky political leadership in the unstable and troubled world in which we now precariously live.

Tom Slick is also a man of action who believes in careful planning. When there is a problem to be solved and work to be done, the plan should be well considered and the work carefully laid out in advance, which is one reason why we are here.

Tom Slick is a man of courage who refuses to admit that the difficult is impossible.

We have lived to see the end of the battleship and of the dreadnaught, unlamented victims of technological progress, so called. We are now witnessing the protracted death agonies of the aircraft carrier and the man-piloted bomber, additional unlamented victims of technological progress.

We have a right to believe that what has been accomplished by the purposeful planning of skilled munitions-making technologists can be achieved also by similar planning on the part of political technologists.

Political structures and processes may be less tangible than space rockets and sky cruising satellites. But they can be even more potent and durable. They can make obsolete the very rockets and satellites which already threaten to cause such vast disturbance in our times.

Tom Slick is a man of imagination who is able to see how the leaders of mankind, by taking thought, can do for this generation what has been done for earlier generations through political technology and constitutional engineering.

It is not necessary to begin with a finished blueprint for a federalized world. It is enough to find guidance in the example of such constitutional engineers as the inspired authors of the celebrated Virginia Plan, drafted for

use in the Federal Convention of 1787, which, although far from being the model of the eventual Constitution of the United States, served very well as a point of departure for the makers of our more perfect union of states and of people.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Slick.

MR. SLICK: I want to welcome all of you very sincerely, and thank you for coming. This is a happy occasion for me tonight. It is the culmination of five years of planning.

What I have thought, in planning this Conference, is that over the years, in my experience in business and in philanthropic activities, I have always found that the first step to success was to work out a carefully devised plan of what we hoped to achieve and, if possible, to include in the plan some indication of the steps to get there.

For example, when we started the Southwest Research Center in San Antonio months were spent with the leaders and people involved. Full time was spent in assembling into one plan what we wanted this organization to do, and what steps we thought it ought to take to get there. We were finally able to get this on one sheet of paper.

Southwest Research Center is now quite a complicated organization but the original outline of the steps toward the objectives has been of tremendous usefulness over the years. The Center has now been in existence for some ten years and has, I believe, made creditable progress.

It seems to me that long-range yet specific planning is not illogical in achieving the goal of our hopes, a secure and just peace.

It also seems to me that if we could arrive at "a plan" we would have come a long way in the direction of achieving what we want.

A friend of mine was with a very high Government official recently. This man, in a position to know exactly our posture in defense, made the specific statement that under certain circumstances the flight of a flock of geese could set off a nuclear war which might destroy our civilization.

So, continuance of our present course is far from desirable, as all of us here indicate, I think, by being here and being willing to give time to think of an alternative course.

It seems to me that we should aim at a rather specific plan of what we hope to achieve. I would suggest that we think in this framework in our discussions over this weekend.

If we are to arrive at a plan, somebody has to think about it—Now. I believe that all of us are inclined to think that somebody else can do it some time, or, let the Government do it.

I have talked with some of the key people in the Government and they not only say that presently there is no long-range plan in existence, but that the circumstances under which work is done in Washington, day-to-day pressures, immediate problems and brush-fires which have to be extinguished, are not the favorable circumstances for long-range thinking and planning.

These Government officials urge outside groups to try to start thinking in the long-range direction. If we agree that "a plan" must be the starting point toward peace, as I think holds true in business and other activities, what sort of plan should we be thinking of?

In the first place, to me it seems there should be a *long-range plan.* We will need *short-range elements,* but those should all be fitted into the context of a longer-range plan. The plan should be *comprehensive.* If you consider one aspect, for instance, disarmament by itself, without provision for the settlement of disputes, without inspection, without enforcement, without provision for the growth of world law, this can be dangerous.

We need a *practical* and *specific* plan, obviously. If it is too general and theoretical, it will not serve the purpose. We can lose by generalities.

When we talk about *who* should do it, and *where,* I think a group like this is not an illogical group to attack this problem. We have here a balance between businessmen, scholars and professional people.

I believe the thinking of these individuals, interacting with each other, is necessary. I would hope that this group could make a start.

I realize that to aim for a comprehensive long-range peace plan on a weekend is completely unfeasible. But I think that this group could debate out some of the key, specific questions and perhaps set up an agenda for future studies. Perhaps, to use a term from my part of the country—in the ranching business in Texas—we could "fence the problem in" a little bit.

As Dr. Holcombe said (and I think it an apt historical parallel) we may well be today where the Virginia group was in advance of our Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia. We may be faced with similar seemingly insuperable problems. Of course, we could say that our forefathers were concerned with a more uniform racial group, the same language, the same legal background, and were on the same continent. But the communication of ideas is today far faster between the nations of the globe than it was between the towns of the colonies.

On balance, I think there are many more similarities than dissimilarities in our respective situations. The important point is that they sat down and hammered out what proved to be successful groundwork for the Philadelphia Convention.

I believe, with further reference to Dr. Holcombe's comparison, that a private group like this might over a period of time constitute itself into a planning group for an international meeting which might take place in the future.

I would like to talk on one topic before we turn to those who are the key to what we want to accomplish this weekend—you, the participants, and the speakers who will give us background before our deliberations. A subject of great interest to me is the incentive that we might have in a long-range, successful disarmament plan—the *rewards.* We must look ahead. It may be a long while before we achieve substantial arms control, but if we have in sight some rather specific rewards, incentives may count.

I believe that in achieving steps toward controlled and enforceable disarmament, which, personally, I think is not beyond the realm of hope, and may not be so far distant as people think, we have a tremendous amount of reward incentive.

The President and others have said when we achieve some measure of disarmament we should take some of the savings and put them into helping the underdeveloped nations. That's fine as far as it goes. But I suggest that at an early stage there be a formal commitment of a specific and substantial part of disarmament savings, perhaps even a half, for a few years, for domestic and international betterment programs. I think our country can stand some improvement. I think substantial portions of these funds should be used to support scientific research, medical research, education and cultural activities of various types. Half might be given back to the people who are paying—the taxpayers who are paying for arms at the present time.

This means that we should have not only a high priority for helping the underdeveloped nations, but should also look toward the rewards of armament savings for our own country.

In conclusion, I welcome all of you as you assemble to address yourselves to the most important concern of our time—a long-range strategy for peace for the world.

ADDRESS: DR. LEO SZILARD

DR. HOLCOMBE: *We have with us tonight an unanticipated guest, Dr. Leo Szilard, one of America's greatest atomic scientists.*

There are atomic scientists and atomic scientists, and among them are some distinguished for imagination and conscience. Back in the early part of World War II when the news came to this country that a German savant had succeeded in splitting the atom, there were nuclear scientists with the imagination to foresee the political consequences of such an achievement.

Our unexpected but most welcome guest this evening was the man who, at that point, foreseeing those political consequences went to Albert Einstein and persuaded him to write a letter to President Roosevelt, which in turn, initiated one of the greatest gambles that a President of the United States ever made with the taxpayer's dollar.

At the end of the war there were atomic scientists with not only imagination but conscience. They realized they had unchained a demon and they went to the highest authorities within reach with the suggestion that the new device, the new weapon of war, be not used to bring about the utmost destruction of which it was capable, but be first used in a manner more consistent with the conscience of mankind.

With the desire not to cause more destruction and death than was really necessary under the circumstances, our unanticipated but very welcome guest was the scientist who, more than any other, spoke for the conscience of the atomic scientists at that time.

It is a great privilege to present to this audience Dr. Leo Szilard, who knows what he wishes to say to you, and I am happy to be able to give him that opportunity.

DR. SZILARD: Perhaps I can explain my presence in more concrete terms. I have just completed a paper of 3500 words, and when I was invited to this meeting by Mr. Slick I thought it a good opportunity to distribute a few copies, get some criticism and say a few words to draw attention to my views.

I would like to read a few passages from my paper and otherwise tell you what it is about, and make a few assertions which I'm willing to defend.

I should also warn you about one thing. Having written papers on disarmament, I am now an expert. And an expert has been defined as a man who knows what cannot be done. So I shall make a few unsupported assertions about what cannot be done.

I am not concerned here about the distant future. I do not know what will happen ten years from now. I am only planning to discuss decisions which the United States will have to make during the term of office of the next President. There are some basic decisions, I think, which cannot be delayed beyond this span of time and I will talk about those.

Let me read to you these remarks:

"It is now almost certain that during the term of office of the next President, America will be forced to make a fateful decision concerning the problem that the bomb poses to the world. There are two alternative approaches to this problem, and America will have to choose between them. America and Russia will either have to get rid of the bomb or they will have to find a way to live with the bomb.

"The acid test of either approach is whether it is capable of abolishing war. Any war in which America and Russia intervene on the opposite sides might turn into an atomic war. This would hold true even if we had complete disarmament; for the world may get rid of the bombs that have been stockpiled but it cannot get rid of the knowledge of how to make the bomb. In a setting of virtually complete disarmament, troops might be equipped with machine guns only, at the outset of the war, but soon thereafter heavier weapons would make their appearance and so would, before long, atomic bombs.

"Clearly, as far as the Great Powers are concerned, only by excluding war between them can we solve the problem that the bomb poses to the world."

The first question which I am raising is this—would it be possible to get rid of the bomb in the setting of general and virtually complete disarmament? And would this exclude war between the Great Powers?

The Russian Government has now actually proposed that general and complete disarmament be put into force within a few years.

And the time has come for us to ask ourselves in all seriousness, first, under what conditions would virtually complete disarmament lead to a stable peace, and second, is it likely that those conditions may be obtainable in the predictable future?

Now you know there are many people who doubt that there would be any way of making sure that Russia would not retain a large number of bombs hidden away in secret.

In my opinion, the difficulties of instituting safeguards against secret evasions are grossly overestimated at present.

The problem of inspection is really very difficult, perhaps impossible of a good solution if you think in terms of partial disarmament, which still leaves important military secrets which need to be safeguarded.

Under those conditions, a really effective inspection is not acceptable, that is, not acceptable to Russia.

The situation changes completely if disarmament goes far enough, so that it eliminates the need to safeguard military secrets. In such a situation I am at least convinced, and I will not discuss it in detail, that there is just no difficulty at all to discover secret evasions.

I can discuss this after my talk is over, and let me say that I am more than ever convinced that I am right about this, particularly since both Edward Teller and Russian colleagues agree with me on this point.

So I am just asserting that there is absolutely no difficulty about instituting safeguards against secret evasions, provided the state of disarmament is such that no military secrets need to be safeguarded.

If there are still rocket launching sites left in Russia, however, and the locations of these have to be kept secret by Russia, then we cannot eliminate the possibility of secret evasions.

So here is one of my unsupported assertions, that there is no major difficulty with inspection, if we have far enough reaching disarmament to eliminate all secrets.

To my mind, the issue that may be in doubt is not whether general and virtual complete disarmament is feasible, but rather, to what kind of a world it would lead.

I assume that total disarmament would mean world wide control of heavy weapons. Machine guns could still be produced overnight.

The question is, would it then be possible to have a security system which would satisfy America. You see, America has, in the post war years, assumed the role of a world policeman, devoted mainly to maintaining the status quo.

If America is unwilling to relinquish this role, except if there is a reliable world security which guarantees the security of all nations, then I think there will be no disarmament in the foreseeable future.

If America decides, as she might, that a completely disarmed world where there are only machine guns left, really would guarantee her security, (and clearly, in a world with only machine guns neither Russia nor America is in danger—no one could conquer either Russia or America with machine guns)—if America were willing to settle for her own security without demanding a world security system, then general, virtually complete disarmament would be obtained very fast—within a few years.

As I say, under these circumstances, the problem of inspection is just no problem at all.

Of course, you could say why should we be talking about complete disarmament; why aren't we satisfied just with arms limitations?

Here, I should like to make a remark which is, perhaps, relevant. I should like to distinguish between "genuine disarmament" and "arms limitation." Now, whether you have one or the other does not depend on the level of armaments which America and Russia are permitted to retain. It depends on something else.

For instance, Richard Leghorn has proposed that if we had far-reaching disarmament, perhaps America and Russia should retain a limited number of bombs and rockets. By retaining such a limited number of bombs and rockets, America and Russia both could have a sort of insurance that if the other nation secretly hides bombs and rockets, nothing really bad can happen.

Now, if America and Russia retained bombs and rockets in limited number, for the sole purpose which I just described, i.e., merely as insurance against secret violations, then this would still represent genuine disarmament.

But if America and Russia retain a limited number of bombs as a deterrent—which, say, America could use if some nation equipped with machine guns attacks its neighbor in some remote area—this would not be genuine disarmament. It would be what you might call arms limitations. It would create a situation in which considerable economic savings could be achieved. It would create a situation in which the chance of an accidental war could be reduced, but it would not be genuine disarmament and would not eliminate the possibility of war between the Great Powers.

If America is not willing to settle for anything less than a world security system, then I say, there will be no disarmament in the foreseeable future, and in that case, America will have to live with the bomb.

Now, you see, it is very important to reach a decision on which way we'll go within a few years. If we are willing to negotiate for genuine disarmament, then we ought to conduct formal negotiations with Russia. I think these could then move forward very fast, because we would be agreed on the goal.

If this is not the path we are going to go—and if we conclude that we have to live with the bomb, then there would be not much point in entering into formal negotiations with Russia. Instead, we would need to have informal discussions with Russia, both on a private and the government level, for the purpose of reaching a meeting of the minds—on how to live with the bomb and avoid a war which neither of us wants.

I think there is a small, but not negligible chance that war could be abrogated even though the bombs are retained. About this, I have written in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, in the February 1960 issue, an extensive article entitled *"How to Live with the Bomb."*

That article may have given the impression that I am proposing to retain the bomb and at the same time to abrogate war.

In the present article which I am writing, I am making it clear that I am not proposing anything. I am predicting what is going to happen, if we live with the bomb and if we succeed in avoiding an all-out war.

Clearly, we cannot safely live with the bomb and retain the threat of massive retaliation. When America can destroy Russia to any desired degree and Russia can destroy America to any desired degree, then threatening massive retaliation is tantamount to threatening murder and suicide.

This is not a believable threat in a conflict in which our national existence is not at stake, even though important national interests may be involved. Because it is not a believable threat, it has no deterrent value.

The other alternative advocated by quite a number of people, that we should base our security on our ability to fight a limited atomic war, leaves me cold. I just don't believe it is likely that a limited atomic war would remain limited to the contested area and in what I have written I describe what would happen if we tried to fight a limited atomic war in the vicinity of Russia.

I think the Russians would do something which would make it impossible to fight such a limited atomic war. I have written in some detail of what might happen in this regard if we don't have disarmament.

I think I have now summarized some of my views and I shall be happy to discuss the points which I have raised.

I make a positive assertion that inspection is not a problem at all, and a negative assertion that collective security is not attainable. It is not attainable in the predictable future. I don't know what will be the situation ten or fifteen years hence.

But collective security is not obtainable during the tenure of the next President and I am here concerned only with the decisions that must be taken within the next four years.

ADDRESS: ROBERT R. BOWIE

"THE WORLD OVERVIEW–THE POLITICAL SITUATION"

DR. HOLCOMBE: *For a man to give us a satisfactory description of the political condition of a contemporary world, he must possess certain qualifications. He must have some first-hand knowledge of politics, and he must know a good deal about the world. The latter knowledge he can get by travel and public service abroad, and by operating a foreign affairs research center at home. The former, he can get by service as a departmental Assistant Secretary in Washington. He must also possess a capacity of imaginative thinking about world politics.*

This, he can cultivate by timely service at the head of a foreign policy planning staff, at our national capital.

Our next speaker can meet these tests. He possesses all these qualifications. I have the very real pleasure of presenting to you Robert R. Bowie.

MR. BOWIE: Thank you very much, Dr. Holcombe. You've very kindly listed the qualifications which you think anybody should have in order to talk to this group about the broad subject assigned to me. I rather think that he has to have the qualities of an old Quaker that I knew.

He was a principal member of the Quaker Congregation, and he felt a personal responsibility for the way the service went. As you know, in the Quaker service they wait for somebody to feel the urge to pray, and then he gets up and prays.

Well, nobody had felt the call and it was about two minutes before twelve, and he thought this was a reflection upon the congregation. So he rose and prayed as follows: "Oh Lord, use me. Oh, Lord, use me, if only in an advisory capacity."

And I'm very much afraid that a person who proposes to deal in twenty five minutes with the political situation of the world could be charged with the same attitude.

The subject of your meeting, it seems to me, could not be more important. A strategy for peace, particularly as outlined by the man who is responsible for the meeting is obviously a very vital topic. And it's particularly encouraging that, at this stage, private people, private groups, are undertaking serious reappraisal of what's being done in the world, and why we're doing it.

So I applaud this meeting. It can be very valuable.

Now, as I understand it, my purpose is really to try to sketch, in a broad way, what seem to be the crucial political features in the world situation, which you at least ought to have in mind as you think more specifically about the problems which Mr. Slick has referred to.

At the start it is important to ask ourselves, perhaps ,what kind of a peace we're thinking about. What do we mean by peace when we use it in this con-

nection? In specific terms, what kind of peace is a feasible goal within the setting in which we're living and working?

Because no peace effort, no plan, is going to be successful or enduring unless it is based on solid reality and not on illusions or wishful thinking.

And so I would like to devote my time to trying to suggest some of the implications of the situation, some of the conditions which set the framework within which any such endeavor has to take place.

First, we could think of peace as a way of achieving stability in the world. Is this something which is feasible?

If you mean stability broadly, it seems to me that this is not a feasible aim. The hallmark of our time is change of the most fundamental and radical sort which runs all through the political structure of the world we're living in, and will continue to do so.

Now, I don't want to take too much of my time to elaborate on this, but perhaps I could just recall to you some things that you know, which should be underscored at this point.

As I see it, the world is essentially being transformed and has been over the last few decades, under the impact of a number of very basic forces. One of these is the force of nationalism and self-determination. Another is the force of industrialism and technology. A third is the force of communism.

In their various ways these forces are transforming the world and have been for the last few decades, and will continue to do so over the coming decade.

We've seen, for example, the end of colonialism for all practical purposes. Three quarters of a billion people, in the last ten years, have achieved independence, and are attempting to start up independent nations in twenty-two countries. In the next decade or less, there will be another twenty, probably, who will also join them, particularly in Africa.

These are people who are working in the direst kind of poverty. I don't need to elaborate the statistics. You know that the average living standard is probably a hundred dollars a year. They suffer from extreme illiteracy, disease and backwardness of all sorts.

In many of these areas, population is growing at a very fast rate, two per cent or more, and on top of this, many of them lack the institutional base and skilled people to supply the basis for effective government.

Therefore, political troubles are bound to develop in many of these areas which have inadequate means to govern themselves effectively, and to carry out the enormous economic effort to improve living standards.

I do not need to belabor this point. In at least forty per cent of the world, this is a formula for instability, for all sorts of future conditions which are going to result in the opposite of a nice, neat, stable world.

Then, there is the change which is being wrought by the growth of the Soviet bloc and Soviet power. Again, I don't need to belabor it. Just think, though, that in the period since the war this movement has extended its control from two hundred million people to nine hundred million. The G.N.P. has been rising in the Soviet Union at double the rate of our country. Their scien-

tific progress and technology have been outstanding. They are maintaining a military establishment which is at least the equal of ours, and so on.

There is no doubt that this is bought at terrible cost in terms of repression and of other things that we consider disgraceful. But it is obviously bringing about change both in the Soviet Union and in China.

Also, you have the change in Europe itself. First there was the terrific decline in the role of Europe immediately after the war, and then the recovery, and the efforts toward integration, in order to regain a place in the world commensurate with its past and its capabilities. And this again is something that's still going on and will have a significant effect on the character of the world.

Finally, you have the whole area of weapons technology. I will not dwell on this, except to say that we certainly have not seen the end of it; and this, too, is not something which is compatible with the kind of stability which we imagine existed in large part in the nineteenth century.

In other words, if we conceive of peace as something which will produce a neat, quiet, stable world, then it is just not within our grasp. Therefore, we will be very foolish if this is what we set ourselves as our objective because it seems to be doomed to frustration.

The second action you could have, if you thought about the kind of peace, would be an opportunity for a cooperative world all around, including the Soviets.

I don't say that this is out forever. It may well be that at some future time it may be possible to have the kind of world in which genuine cooperation with the Soviet Union may be possible.

But in the time span to which we must address ourselves, over the next period, I do not think that this is a feasible way to conceive of a peaceful world. One of the dangers is that we may be lulled by our hopes and desires into assuming that is what the Soviets have in mind when they talk about coexistence.

I think this is a false conception, and that it will be counter-productive to let ourselves entertain this sort of illusion. On the contrary, it seems to me that Mr. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders have made it quite clear that their conception of coexistence is a very different kind of policy and a different kind of world.

We must assume that they are confident that communism is the wave for the future. Khrushchev seems quite sincere when he says our grandchildren will live under a communist government. This basic philosophical tenet which they hold has been reinforced, if anything, by their actual experience since the war—the spread of communism and the growth in the Soviet Union. To my mind their experience has so far had the effect of strengthening this view. Mr. Khrushchev certainly asserted it over and over, again and again, when he was here. I think we should take it at face value.

Furthermore, we should expect that they are going to try to spread this doctrine, this gospel, by every means available to them, by energy and effort, other than, probably, all out war. I'll come to that in a minute. Again, Mr. Khrushchev has repeatedly said that co-existence means the "continuation of the struggle"—I am quoting—"between the two social systems, but by peaceful

means, without war. We consider it to be an economic, political and ideological struggle, but not military."

Now, I think again that this is a real fact. It does seem that the Soviets have come to realize the suicidal character of all-out war as things now stand and that one can therefore take at face value Mr. Khrushchev's repeated statement that a nuclear war could only be a catastrophe for all concerned.

At the same time their great progress in technology, in missiles, which makes him cocky, creates a real danger that they might try to use threat of force, or blackmail, in ways that could be very seriously disruptive.

Furthermore, we should not assume that they have totally renounced the use of force. The repression in Hungary, and the threats of force in Berlin, all indicate that they are prepared to use force and threats when the opportunity offers and when it doesn't involve undue risk.

In the meantime their prime focus is on the under-developed countries. There they are going to exploit the example of Soviet progress, which they hope to present as more relevant to the needs of the under-developed countries than that of the capitalist world. They are trying to gain acceptance and respectability by their aid programs and other means, and to paint the West as imperialist and still seeking domination, whereas they are the genuine friends.

Coexistence, as they see it, means the spread of communism. In his discussions with Mr. Harriman and Mr. Lippman, Khrushchev made quite clear that he conceives the status quo to mean a situation with built-in tendencies to become communist. Therefore, anybody who opposes this trend is opposing the status quo. The only way in which you can really be peaceful is not to oppose this inevitable tendency.

This may seem to us a rather Quixotic definition of the status quo, but it is quite definitely the way he conceives it.

They will try to exploit the kind of world we have, the world of change, the world of turmoil, for purposes of expanding their kind of system. And it's very unwise not to see that they quite genuinely believe that this is a superior kind of system and people ought to be appreciative when they bring it to them.

So it's quite wrong to think of them as people who feel themselves to be doing evil and who are, therefore, troubled by a guilty conscience. They genuinely feel themselves to be doing good, and this makes them all the stronger in terms of what they are trying to accomplish.

So much for my second proposition: we cannot possibly expect in this period a world in which total cooperation with the Soviets is possible; a world in which we can live together on the same basis we can live with the Western European countries.

Third, do we mean by peace, a world which is placidly safe?

Again, I think this is out of the question. Certainly the world we are now living in is far from that. Even if we assume we have effective deterrents, as Mr. Slick said, it's full of dangers. It's open to possible use of blackmailing. However, this area seems to me to be one in which there can be a genuine common interest between ourselves and the Soviets.

I do think that they have as much interest as we have in not being blown

to bits. Whether they will in fact recognize this, and be prepared to pay the price which will be involved in efforts to do something in common, will be one of the principal subjects to which you will, I assume, address yourselves.

Dr. Wiesner will talk about this, I am sure, and I certainly don't want, therefore, to take any more time on that aspect of it. I would merely say, however, that even if the Soviets have a common interest, and even if they recognize this common interest, there are many difficult problems to be solved in trying to find any common basis for cooperation in this field, while the struggle is going on in all other fields.

But I don't exclude the possibility that something can be done in this area. Certainly no opportunity for any progress to remove or reduce the dangers under which we are living should be missed.

Only when you take full account of those dangers can you properly judge proposed alternatives which are also going to entail risks. There is no earthly way to devise a foolproof system of inspection or other devices for maintaining disarmament. You're going to have risks in it. This is why I say that no matter how successful any plans you have may be, there is no way to make this world safe in the sense that it won't be full of serious risks for all of us.

So I don't think that peace can mean having a world in which everybody will be really safe and snug and cozy, as we would like to think we were in our childhood.

What are the implications of all this?

You may feel a little bit like a couple of hobos I like to tell about. They were sitting on a curbstone, and had been talking in a philosophical way about the world, and had come to some rather pessimistic views. One of them finally paused and said, "This is one helluva world." And the other one turned to him and replied, "Compared to what?"

That would be my minimum answer to anybody who says I have painted a dreary picture. But it is not by any means my total answer. The fact that the world is not going to be safe from all risks, that the world is in a state of change and turmoil, the fact that we can't anticipate a world free from struggle, doesn't mean that we should all become depressed.

It seems to me that a great deal turns on how we look at the world. How do we look at our situation? What can we do about it?

If you put yourself back into the situation in which our fore-bears lived, in the early period of the country, and even into the nineteenth century, actually, they also faced a domestic situation which was not unlike this.

There wasn't real stability in the sense we think of it. There wasn't real personal security. There wasn't real freedom from risks for the people who were moving out and opening up the frontier. Indeed, it was a very risky, very hand-to-mouth kind of existence. And, yet, they thrived on it.

And the reason they thrived on it was they didn't take it as a frustration. They took it as a challenge. This is essentially a frame of mind, a point of view.

If you feel that somehow the turmoil ought to go away, then you are bound to be frustrated. If you look at the world and take it as it is, and don't try to

sugar coat it, but recognize also that human beings have the capacity to change their fate if they work at it, then it's a challenge. It can be very invigorating. After all, one of the principal satisfactions in human life is the feeling of using your talents and expending your energies in a worthwhile cause.

The situation in which we find ourselves offers plenty of opportunity for that kind of effort. Let me just indicate a few. First, we should recognize the nature of co-existence; we should take full advantage of it.

We should seek in every possible way to negotiate seriously in areas which do have some elements of common interest or reciprocal interest. One of those surely is in the field of arms control. Another, I think, is in the field of exchanges, the opening up of the two societies, particularly the Soviet society, but also our own society, more freely than we have been inclined to do. We should not be quite so nervous that we are likely to be subverted because people come who hold different views. But, after all that, the basic question remains, what kind of a world do you want to live in and what are you going to do to try to make this hope come true?

Here you face the whole vast problem of the under-developed countries: what happens in that area is basic, I think, to our own survival.

I've tried to suggest that there's no nice, neat answer. No matter what we do we're not going to achieve stability and reliability in any easy way. But we certainly can affect the situation. Whether or not moderate leaders are able to maintain control of these countries and govern their destinies, is going to turn very largely on what the developed countries do in the way of transferring capital, and skills, in the way of education and helping them to build their institutions.

Otherwise, chaos and frustration will almost surely create situations and attitudes which the communists can effectively take advantage of.

The West cannot possibly survive as a small island of five hundred million in a sea of two billion five hundred million hostile people under communist domination. And that would be what we would face, in my judgment, in the long run.

But here our self-interest runs exactly parallel to our ideals or our values. Basically, when people have been brought into your neighborhood, as these people have, by the forces of communication and technology and transportation it is an obligation to help them.

When you profess the values which we do about human dignity and human life and human worth, you cannot fail to do something or try to do something about the conditions which exist.

We have been much too lacking in our courage to recognize that idealism has its place in the picture. We ought not to feel that we have to defend and justify our action solely in terms of self-interest. I happen to think our self-interest also dictates it, so there's not a choice here between the two. But I think we'd do the job with more conviction and better conscience if we would also recognize that in doing it we are living up to our best values.

In any event, that's my personal view.

Then, similarly, with respect to the developed countries, we should do more with their help and with the help of the less developed countries, to

build a world order founded on the recognition of the inter-dependence which is a fact today. We would be foolish not to recognize it and draw the conclusions as to the kinds of common instrumentalities and forms of action which it calls for. I won't develop that because I think another speaker is going to talk on some of those aspects.

Finally, it seems to me that the ultimate hope must be that the Soviet Union itself will evolve and will downgrade the expansionist purposes which it now seems to follow.

This is perfectly conceivable. At the present time it is a hope. We can't prove that it will occur. Certainly many changes have taken place inside the Soviet Union in its society in the direction of less brutal methods, more legality of a sort. There has been a general improvement of the conditions of life for the Soviet people, and I think there's real pressure for the improvement of their material conditions. These pressures will doubtless continue.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the party is unable to control them. Clearly the party's control is stronger, if anything, than it was in an earlier stage, and the party can continue to carry on in an orthodox way for quite a long time, even though many parts of the society do not fully share its purposes or doctrine.

But I'm not at all certain that this can go on indefinitely. The Soviet rulers are no more capable than anybody else of indefinitely evading the consequences of the evolution at work in Soviet society, and the fact that basic aspirations of the Soviet people simply do not jibe with more orthodox Communist party purposes.

But, we shouldn't assume that this change is necessarily going to happen soon. Indeed, it may never happen if Soviet conceptions come true. If the party's conceptions come true, and history seems to bear out their assertions, it's very hard to see why they won't continue to live by these standards.

So, part of the task of re-education is to see to it that they don't succeed in the purposes of expansion.

I must close now. Clearly the task which lies ahead of us is a tremendous task. It is a hard challenge because it calls for actions which must be essentially long-term in character. Mr. Slick put it very well when he said that there's no sense in having a short term program for the kind of world we're living in. Of course, we've got to do many things of a short term character, but unless these are infused with some conceptions of where we're going and why we're going there, I doubt very much that we will have the energy and patience to do even those things over the necessary period of time.

Fundamentally, what we must do are things which are bound to take a long time. Economic development in the newer countries is sure to be a slow process at the very best, if it can be brought off at all. The problems of bringing about any kind of world order are bound to be slow and discouraging. The hope for change in the Soviet system itself is certainly going to be a long-term enterprise.

These are the hardest things for democratic societies to do. Unfortunately, all of our institutions tend to put our attention on the short run. We have our elections every two to four years, and people are looking for short-term issues.

Newspapers tend to play up the things which have a short-term, immediate impact, and so on through the whole range of things we do and are educated by.

It is very difficult for a democratic order to set itself long-term goals and to live by them, but this is the challenge to which we must rise. This is why this meeting is extremely constructive. In a weekend even a group like you cannot master these problems. But a weekend is long enough to come to convictions as to the kinds of actions which are necessary, the kind of courage which is demanded, and the kind of dedication we must have if we're going to get through this very difficult period with our way of life intact.

ADDRESS: DR. JEROME B. WIESNER

"THE RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL"

DR. HOLCOMBE: *Ladies and gentlemen. This morning, we've changed the general theme, from pure science on which note we closed last night, to engineering and technology.*

The man who spent his life in liberal arts teaching institutions always wonders what these engineers and technologists do to achieve their eminence. We know they are eminent. We accept that fact, but how did they reach that eminence?

Well, we have a very good illustration of one who rose to the top in our first speaker, Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner. He is Professor of Electrical Engineering and Director of the Research Laboratory of Electronics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is acting Head of the Department of Electrical Engineering and has been a leader in the rapid development of the communications sciences. He is Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Center for Communication Sciences, established at M.I.T. in 1958, to study communication processes in both man-made and natural systems. He has also been active in the technology related to America's international problems. He is a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

He was a member of the Committee which prepared the Gaither Report, and was staff director of the American delegation to the 1958 Geneva Conference on Prevention of Surprise Attack.

I could tell you much more about him, but that should be enough to establish his credentials for his appearance here today, and we will plunge forth into the middle of affairs.

DR. WIESNER: I've been billed as an expert on arms control, and I think I'm an example of what's wrong with the American posture in this field.

I've become an expert in arms control by spending a small fraction of my time during the past two years, working on the problem of arms control. Unfortunately, like most of the other experts on arms control, I don't have many answers.

My background is primarily one of military technology. I came out of college at the time that World War II was beginning and soon went to the radiation lab of M.I.T. where I worked on radar problems and later went to Los Alamos and worked on atomic weapons. After the war I went back to M.I.T. to be a professor of communication engineering.

About one-third of my time since then has been spent on the development of military weapons systems. I've worked on air defense; I was a member of the Von Neumann group that began our large scale missile effort and I've worked on many other military problems. I come to an arms control problem with all the biases and prejudices of someone who has been working very hard on military weapons and, unfortunately, most of the people who work on arms control come at the problem from this same background.

We come at the arms control problem from an attempt to provide the nation with as much military strength as we can afford and with great impatience with those things that get in the way of that objective. It takes a considerable effort to convince oneself that any arms limitation agreements are desirable, and that they could probably provide greater military security than any realizable new weapon. By now I am convinced that controlled arms limitations are not only desirable, but imperative. Though I also believe that until they are achieved, we must maintain our military strength.

The lack of experts on arms control matters is one of the great difficulties in getting a coherent and sensible disarmament policy in the United States. Most of the people involved in arms limitation planning are people with military responsibilities or military backgrounds and who know all the things that are wrong with our present military posture and consequently view the possibility of limiting the military system still further with considerable concern.

I first became involved in disarmament problems as a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Prior to that I had been the Staff Director of the Gaither Study. During the Gaither Study I became convinced that it was not feasible really to protect the American people if a global nuclear war was to occur, and further, that both we and the Russians would suffer very terribly if such a war occurred. In fact, I became convinced that so long as the Soviet Union was prepared, as it seems to be, to attempt to match our military effort, that there was no hope of avoiding a terrible loss of life in the event of a major nuclear war, regardless of the magnitude of our defense effort.

It was very clear that there was nothing we could do that would really protect all of us if such a war occurred. By building fallout shelters we could change the scale of the catastrophe—something worth doing. But even at best, if we did all the things we could think of—if we built fallout shelters, worked very much harder than we are now doing on air defense and missile defense, even if we committed twice the resources we are now committing to defense—we could not prevent a major nuclear war from being history's greatest catas-

trophe. The task we must work on is to assure that such a war does not take place.

It was with this very sobering background that I, together with some other members of the President's Science Advisory Committee, found ourselves working on technical problems related to arms limitation and control.

Since then, the Science Advisory Committee has had several panels working to understand these problems, a quite impossible job for a few part-time people, a fact which everyone connected with our group is now fully aware of. We didn't realize this fact initially. I think there exists a misunderstanding, a quite natural one, that most people begin with. It is this. If one understands military systems, he is qualified to plan arms control systems, because the same knowledge is applicable.

More often than not this is wrong. That is, the problems encountered—both technically and conceptually—may be very, very different, though a familiarity with military technology is a good background for studying disarmament problems. As an example of these differences, the concept of inspection—if you exclude unilateral inspection or intelligence—has had no place in the design of military systems. Furthermore, in planning military systems, we have not been forced to analyze the overall consequences of any individual change in weapons or deployment, though we probably should have been.

Each of the military services has its own concepts about the nature of a future war and the weapons required to fight it, and ordinarily each of them is permitted to implement its plans independently, at least, in part, and afterwards they are coordinated to create a national military posture. We never really assess how effective the overall system is because we can't agree upon our national military objectives. Our military effort is, in fact, limited by the amount of money the country is prepared to spend and by past history regarding the division of funds rather than by any rational estimate of the need or of our capability to meet it.

However, in an arms control environment, where the intent is to limit the military effort at a level below that which the country is prepared to support financially and in a situation where there is a defense department, an atomic energy commission and a very large industry committed to a specific level of defense, the consequences of any arms limitation step must be explicitly defensible. The proponent of arms limitations is expected to demonstrate that such a course is indeed better than the all-out arms-race alternative. This is very hard to do, in fact, almost impossible to do, because as I have already said, there isn't really any adequate means of assessing the present course.

While nearly everyone believes that the arms race is very dangerous, some of us believe that it's more dangerous than others do. But practically no one believes that we can continue the violent arms race with the intense research and development effort, and the intense build-up of nuclear weapons all over the world, without running a great risk of a nuclear catastrophe occurring within the next decade or two.

If Leo Szilard is still here, he can check a figure I am going to quote. He once placed a ten per cent per year chance on the probability of a nuclear war occurring—I don't know where he got that number. Some people would

put it lower and some higher. Even only a two or three per cent chance per year of having a war in the next decade is too high to accept. Obviously no one can really evaluate the a priori probability of a war; though the risks appear great, they are not quantitatively assessable.

This inability to evaluate actually or agree upon the risks of the arms race makes agreement on the value of arms limitation difficult, for you have to convince people, and usually people who are antagonistic to any limitations, that such steps are safer than something else which can't be measured.

To assist in overcoming this difficulty it is very desirable to create a vested interest in arms control; to develop a cadre of people whose full-time occupation is research and development on means of arms control and on the analysis of the political and military problems of arms control. There have been a number of recommendations to create a full-time substantial arms control staff and one of these should be put into effect. Until this is done, progress is condemned to be very slow.

When I recommend a large arms control staff I may give the impression that the arms control problem is tougher than it really is. We could go a long way with just a little common sense, but we could go further, do it quicker and with much greater confidence if a thorough understanding existed of the myriad of individual problems involved. We won't be able to judge the total value of such studies until we have had a major effort for some time. A major effort, compared to past efforts, would be twenty people working full-time, though a much bigger effort can easily be justified.

An obvious example of the difference between the kind of effort required to develop a weapon and that required to provide an adequate means of controlling its further development or production is given in the nuclear test ban case. In recent months our lack of understanding of underground seismic phenomena and the lack of a well-understood seismic detection system for detecting underground nuclear tests has been a principal stumbling block in the way of an international agreement to stop nuclear testing. The United States has belatedly begun an intensive development and test program to create the necessary monitoring devices and to get the experimental data needed to make possible intelligent discussion. It is appropriate to ask why this work was not begun a long time ago. After all, the nuclear test ban has been a possibility for a number of years and was formally explored at the London Disarmament Conference in 1957. Yet only in 1960 was a study initiated to understand the technical details of the monitoring problem. Why? Probably because sensitive seismic detectors are not needed in the development of nuclear weapons so there was no need to develop them in conjunction with the development of weapons.

The experience with the test ban also points up another important fact, that it is difficult to evaluate any single disarmament step by itself. There are principally two reasons for attempting to negotiate a nuclear weapon test ban: (1) to prevent radioactive fallout caused by explosions being carried out in the atmosphere, and (2) to carry out a first step arms limitation measure in the hope of building up confidence which would permit further arms limitation steps to be taken. To eliminate the fallout hazard, only tests in the atmosphere would have to be prohibited, a ban which would be easier to moni-

tor. The total prohibition of nuclear testing would require monitoring for clandestine underground and outerspace tests, a very much harder task if an essentially violation-proof system is desired.

A great deal of judgment is required to balance properly the possibility of clandestine testing, and any dangers therefrom, against the importance of making a serious start on arms control. Even more important is the fact that with certain arms limitations and control—for example, an adequately monitored agreement prohibiting national ownership of nuclear materials—a test ban monitoring system might be unnecessary. This suggests that some partial disarmament measures may require an expensive inspection system which might be less important in the case of more comprehensive disarmament. This difficulty can only be avoided by having an adequate understanding of the details of arms limitation systems that might be acceptable to the country—an understanding that can only be obtained by intensive study of the problem. In spite of the gaps in our understanding of the arms limitation problem, we have spent enough time on the various problems to be reasonably certain that effective systems can be devised. In fact, they can be outlined now. Without considerable further study, however, it will be difficult to convince skeptics of their feasibility. Furthermore, at this stage of our comprehension of the problem, we will probably insist on far more control than would be required if we had a better grasp of it.

I would like to contrast our arms control effort to the country's ballistic missile design effort, for the nation is in the same uncertain state of mind with regard to the feasibility of arms control that we were regarding the feasibility of missiles in the early days. The Von Neumann Committee had examined the problem adequately to be certain that solutions existed in spite of the skeptics who, incidentally, were mighty numerous and died hard. In the Spring of 1953 we became convinced by intelligence information that the Soviets had an effective, hard-driving ballistic missile effort and that the United States had to match it. In spite of this and as late as 1957 a high ranking military officer, still on active duty, told me that I was doing the country a serious disservice by overselling ballistic missiles and he went on to say that we would not see operational missiles during his "active lifetime." Within a few months after the Von Neumann Committee report we were able to put three or four hundred scientists and engineers to work on the then identifiable problems of the ballistic missile. Not much later there were twenty or thirty thousand people working on them. During the past five years we succeeded in overcoming all of the serious technical problems that had to be solved before we could make long-range ballistic missiles. I have the same confidence today regarding the technical and military feasibility of arms limitations. The thing most lacking is the determination and courage to make a serious attempt. I say this, for we can now demonstrate a probable solution for each of the difficult problems that can be raised, though some of the solutions would probably not be readily acceptable. The arms control problem is much more complicated than developing a ballistic missile, yet for some inexplicable reason many people believe that we can understand the complicated problems of arms limitation and disarmament without working on them.

Another thing that has troubled me about the arms control problem is that technical reasons are often used, possibly unconsciously, as the reason

for not entering into arms limitation agreements that we wish to avoid for other reasons. This has been a most serious stumbling block in the past. If the leaders of the United States really understood where they wanted to go in the disarmament field, if the whole Government felt as strongly about wanting to do something about arms control as does the President, and if the Congress wanted to do something, the technical problems would fall by the wayside.

Another really difficult question to answer is the one that Dr. Szilard raised last night when he talked about the Soviet proposal for complete and total disarmament. It is this—what kind of a world do we want to live in? Or do we think we can best survive in? Do we want a totally disarmed world? And if so, are we prepared to cope with the new political situation which would then exist? Much thought and study must be given to these questions as well as the technical-military problems if we are to move ahead with confidence.

My own view has always been that it would not be sensible to agree to any general disarmament until there is a satisfactory international security force and an acceptable international legal mechanism to manage it. I believe that the development of an arms control system has to proceed in steps. We should first try to stop the accelerating arms race and to achieve a situation in which there was less tension and fear, one in which we were willing to begin reducing arms and in which the Soviet Union would be willing to become a more open society. A step by step program should be well thought out and its general characteristics agreed to so that the participants know the objectives and have, as a minimum, general agreement about the steps as well as on a possible timetable.

Fortunately the short-term trend in weapons development makes these objectives appear to be reasonable ones. Both sides are developing weapons which will have a considerable degree of security against surprise attack. Because this situation can't be expected to last forever, we should work hard now to get arms control agreements.

I should add just a word of caution. While the nature of weapon systems development may, when the weapons actually exist, make each side feel relatively secure from surprise attack and consequently somewhat more relaxed as far as each other's overt actions are concerned, there will still be the danger of accidental war, technological surprise, the escalation of limited nuclear wars, and the spread of nuclear weapons to many other countries. Obviously the last problem requires restraint on the part of the present nuclear powers for we can't really expect that the other nations will refrain from building nuclear weapons unless the present nuclear powers show some restraint.

Now I want to say something about the various control problems associated with arms limitation systems. The main problem is, of course, posed by the nuclear bomb. Ideally, in any arms limitation system, one should strive to eliminate, if possible, or at least greatly reduce, nuclear stockpiles. We will follow the latter course if we elect to depend upon limited mutual-deterrent systems.

In a controlled mutual-deterrent system an agreement is made to limit the level of armaments in order to create a situation in which both sides re-

tain sufficient nuclear deterrence to provide protection against clandestine weapons, but not enough military power to assure the success of a surprise attack. It is obviously desirable to limit the permitted deterrent forces to small size in order to limit the maximum damage that would be done if matters do get out of hand. However, counteracting this objective is the fact that the clandestine force required to upset the deterrent balance is smaller if the legal force is smaller. For this reason a better inspection system is needed to monitor agreements permitting only a small deterrent than is necessary if the permitted forces are large.

How big should a nuclear deterrent force actually be? There have been a number of proposals for missile deterrent forces. Mr. Leghorn will make one when he speaks later on, ranging from one hundred to one thousand missiles. Most designers of deterrent systems consider only ballistic missiles, obviously bombers could be used also, though it is more difficult to protect them against surprise attack. I believe that with a 300-1000 missile size force —if the missiles are of a mobile or hardened type—little or no inspection is required to ensure that an attacker will be deterred from carrying out a surprise attack by his fear of the consequent reprisals.

If deterrent forces were to consist of smaller numbers of missiles or aircraft and associated nuclear weapons, inspection would be necessary. Then it will be necessary to make an inspection system to ascertain with a high degree of confidence, that a nation has handed over, as it has agreed to do, all but the legal number of its nuclear weapons to an international control agency or destroyed them or taken whatever other actions were agreed upon. Though this problem has been studied some, there is little agreement regarding what is an adequate inspection system corresponding to various levels of deterrent force. One reason for this uncertainty follows from the fact that there is really no agreement on the question of what constitutes an adequate deterrent. Many military planners believe that the initial forces must be large enough to ensure that several hundred targets within the Soviet Union can still be destroyed in order to constitute a creditable deterrent. Others who have thought about the problem believe that the certainty that ten of its cities would be demolished is more than adequate to deter any nation from starting a nuclear war. There is obviously a vast difference between the deterrent forces and inspection systems dictated by these two points of view.

An inspection system can involve the use of technical devices such as radars, seismic detection devices and aerial cameras to list just a few of the great variety of equipment available for use. It can also depend upon physical examination by inspectors. Such inspectors, watching factories and transportation facilities, would make clandestine production and deployment extremely difficult. We could also use the kind of information program that Dr. Szilard has proposed, the essence of which was to get the inhabitants of a country—particularly its scientific and technical population—to regard arms research and arms production to be illegal. A proper governmental publicity program describing the international commitments that the country has assumed and encouraging citizens to report suspected violations would then make the chance of successful large-scale violations very small. In a strange way, the Soviet Union has taken a step in the direction of such a program. During a recent trip to Moscow, I was quite surprised by the extensiveness

of the peace program that the Soviet Government is already waging on its own people. Evidence of it appears in most of the newspapers and on billboards around the countryside. Of course, one can challenge whether or not it's real or just a cover for Machiavellian intent, but I have the belief that in Pavlov's country the leaders must realize such activities can't be carried out for very long without really conditioning the people to expect peace and abhor things military.

About the prospect of arms control: I am convinced that it is technically possible to make an inspection system which is fair enough and safe enough to be acceptable to both sides. Unfortunately it appears to be difficult to implement inspection systems, even those which appear acceptable when fully operating, for there appear to be special hazards during the implementation period. This is a very difficult problem, sort of the chicken and egg problem, due to the asymmetry of the security fears of the East and West. The Russians, as some of us have known for a long time, are pretty sensitive about disclosing military information as has been clearly demonstrated in the U-2 incident. There is a good reason for this. A large share of their military security during the last fifteen years has come from their ability to maintain secrecy. We've had bombers armed with nuclear weapons all around their periphery and much of their security—in their minds at least—has come from the fact that we didn't know where the important Russian targets were. It is not surprising that the Soviet leaders place a considerable value on this secrecy.

We do not value secrecy as do the Russians, because we are an open society. We would find it difficult to hide the location of military installations if we wanted to. In any event, we have chosen not to depend upon such secrecy.

Russian secrecy has had many very bad effects. The lack of good information concerning the actual status of the Soviet military organization, particularly information about the quality and size of their long-range bomber air force and their long-range ballistic missile force, has caused us to build considerably bigger deterrent forces than we would have if the facts had been clearly known. I now believe that we grossly over-estimated the Soviet bomber force and consequently spent much more money and effort on air defense and upon retaliatory bomber forces than could have been justified had the actual facts been known. It appears that the Soviet leaders built a bomber force adequate to be a creditable deterrent to us, but not one capable of carrying out the massive surprise attack against which we have tried to protect ourselves.

Because of our fear of surprise attack, the United States is not willing to begin reducing the level of its nuclear armament before an adequate inspection system is functioning. For the perfectly understandable reasons just given, the Soviet leaders will not accept extensive inspection without extensive arms reductions. While this appears—at first glance—to be an unsolvable dilemma, it is not. By the proper timing and geographic disposition of an inspection system, coupled with a phased reduction in the level of armaments, a mutually acceptable plan could probably be created.

In the short time available to me, I have to oversimplify greatly the arms control problem. I have not had time to discuss such important problems as control of field armies, control of naval forces, control of biological and chem-

ical warfare, prevention of technological surprise, and many other vital questions which must also be considered.

To summarize, it is my conviction that it is technically feasible to have effective arms limitations. I believe that it is possible to design and build an inspection system sufficiently good to enable a small missile deterrent force to provide adequate deterrence against deliberate surprise attack. I also believe that it is possible to handle the very difficult implementation problem that I discussed earlier. In other words, if we and the Soviet Union really desire to halt the arms race and each obtain our military security through a controlled system of arms limitations, it is technically possible to do so. But to do so will take more determination, more courage, more understanding, and more effort than either has so far been prepared to put into the attempt.

ADDRESS: RICHARD S. LEGHORN

"THE RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL"

DR. HOLCOMBE: *The next speaker will discuss the same general topic, but from a different point of view. In fact, he is well qualified to discuss this subject from three different points of view: as a military man, as a technologist, or as a business man. However, he has enjoined me to play down his military record. He wishes to be represented here as a business man, so I will say no more about his military record, except that it was an honorable one.*

I ought to say something about his record as a technologist. It was well described by Professor Bowie last night in his story about the Quaker, who prayed that he might serve in some capacity, even in a merely advisory one. Our next speaker has been a military adviser in civilian life, and I want to emphasize civilian life. He has served in various governmental advisory positions, particularly in the area of security and arms control. He has been a consultant to the air staff and the U. S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. He served in 1959 as technical director to the President's Joint Disarmament Study Commission, as consultant to the Surprise Attack Disarmament Conference in 1958, and consultant to the President's Special Assistant for Disarmament Affairs in 1955 and 1956. He has also acted as consultant to the National Aeronautics Space Agency, and the President's adviser on Science and Technology, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.

However, it is not in that capacity that he appears today, but as a business man. On graduating from MIT twenty-one years ago, he went to work for the Eastman Kodak Company, and rapidly rose to important positions in business administration. Beginning as a developmental physicist, he became assistant to the vice-president, dealing with patents and inventions, and assistant to the vice-president in charge of international sales, and then he himself

took charge of the European Division, and directed operations of seven subsidiary companies in Europe.

After the war, he eventually, operating under our American free enterprise system, struck out in business for himself. With others, he organized the ITEK Corporation of which he became President, as a pioneer corporation operating in the field of information technology.

He became a leading spokesman for this new field, and its efforts to solve modern information handling problems. He has built up in the short space of three years a multi-million dollar business, and he is qualified to speak here as a business man.

MR. LEGHORN: My remarks this morning will deal with the pursuit of rational world security arrangements. In view of the time limitation, I may tend to make assertions. I shall, of course, be glad to defend them during the discussion period.

A precondition to the pursuit of rational world security arrangements is that we in the United States exercise a little rationality in the resolution of our own widely disparate armament and disarmament policies, that we strive to agree among ourselves on a comprehensive security concept. As long as we continue in confusion, we shall make no progress toward the true national security, and we shall be hamstringing our exercise of world leadership.

This security concept must, of course, take account of the total Soviet conflict strategy, as well as harmonize our defense and disarmament policies. Our problem, then, is two-fold: designing these total security arrangements while correctly assessing and successfully coping with the total Soviet conflict strategy.

By this point in our history, we should have learned that peace is not a vacuum. We have gone through the Rhineland experience, World Wars I and II, and Korea. Unless we are to postulate an imminent millenium, in which there are no conflicts of interest between nations, and no imperialistic ambitions or aggressive tendencies any more, we must take as our premise that peace cannot be equated with a vacuum of arms.

This misleading objective, this vacuum called disarmament, can distract us from the pursuit of our genuine objective, a just and enforceable peace. Our domestic peace is maintained by security measures which in essence are deterrent systems. It should be obvious that world peace can be maintained in no other way. The most rational world security system would, of course, see deterrent arms organized among nations, alliances, and the U. N. in such a way that force levels are the very minimum required to maintain peace.

I believe that we can identify three approaches to rational world security arrangements. I hasten to add that although we can embark on all three simultaneously, we shall have to reconcile ourselves to reaching their respective goals in series.

The first approach to rational world security is the stabilization of national deterrent arms at a level sufficient to deter resort to war as a means of resolving international conflicts.

The second approach is the development of international law and the investment of the United Nations with authority and power to enforce it.

We shall not reach the end of the journey, however, until we succeed in a third approach, comprehensive national arms reduction with the transfer of full responsibility for enforcing the peace to the United Nations.

With regard to the first approach, I am convinced that national deterrent arms can be organized into a rational collective security system for preserving the peace, replacing the madness of the current spiraling arms race. Admittedly, this security system is not the desired ultimate goal. But neither the goal of a secure peace nor the goal of a juridically functioning United Nations can be reached until the national deterrents of the major powers are stabilized. Caught in a headlong arms race, the world cannot turn around until it first stops. There may be in fact some reduction of arms in this first, stabilizing phase, which is all to the good. There is reason to believe, however, that reduction to too low a level during this early phase would tend to decrease rather than increase stability.

In all probability we shall have to live under the umbrella of national deterrents for a considerable length of time. But the more unquestionable are these deterrents of war and violent conflict resolution, the more they will require the resolution of conflicts by non-violent means such as diplomacy, arbitration, world law and judicial decision. We should not regard a temporary system of stabilized national arms as an unmitigated evil. It should be considered, rather, as a helpful precondition to the development of a functioning system of world law which, in turn, is a necessary precondition to the eventual reduction of national arms to internal police force level.

We should face up to the difficult fact that there is in the world today a high level of ideological conflict—one of the toughest kinds of conflicting interests to deal with—and at the same time a very low level of ability to resolve world conflicts in a non-violent manner. As long as this condition prevails, the deterrent force levels on both sides of the Iron Curtain will have to be substantially high, in order to make clearly unprofitable any resort to the resolution of such conflicts by violent means. What is more, it is likely that the reduction of these force levels will be paced by the evolution of effective non-violent techniques for resolving conflicts, instead of being paced by any arbitrary time schedule.

The second approach to world security, the development of U. N. enforcement power, awaits, of course, the development of international law and the assignment of political authority to direct the means of enforcement. Major progress in this area can hardly be made quickly. As I see it, the problem is not the relative straightforward matter of organizing a U. N. security force, but rather the monumental job of achieving a legal, judicial, and political context in which it can operate. Although we should pursue this objective vigorously, and concurrently with the programs to stabilize national deterrents, we should not expect too rapid progress.

We have seen in the past ten years some examples of direct action by the United Nations in military conflict situations. In Korea, major national contingents entered at the invitation of the South Korean government and in the name of the United Nations. This force did not stop at defending the invaded territory, but pursued the invader into his homeland. Later, in the Middle East, a force recruited by the U. N. and stationed on the border, provided a combined inspection function as well as deterrence to border incidents.

There seem to be sufficient reasons to consider establishing a permanent U. N. force of reasonable size, prepared to perform a broad spectrue of functions, from observation and deployment for purposes of deterrence, to military action in support of self defense measures to repel invasions. The force should obviously be of a highly mobile nature. It could not be used unless authorized by the U. N., and invited by the nation in which it would be physically located. The U. N. force could be supplemented, under similar conditions, by U. N.-recruited national contingents for use in purely defensive situations. The key, however, to successful development of U. N. security forces may well be acceptance of the concept that they will only be used to support pure self-defense—that is, only on the defender's side of the pre-aggression, de facto political boundary.

The third approach I mentioned is a major reduction of national armaments under adequate U. N. controls. As of today, the West remains reluctant to accept the Khrushchev brand of complete disarmament in four years, principally because of concern about effective arms controls. There does seem to be a tendency in the West, however—and one that I consider dangerous—to think in terms of a time schedule for the disarmament of nations—perhaps not four years, but yet a definite schedule. There is an equally dangerous tendency to think of the disarmament of nations as the first order of business, and something that might be accomplished prior to the development of reliable U. N. machinery for the enforcement of peace.

This, to me, is an unrealistic approach. It is national deterrent arms which are maintaining whatever stability there is in the world today. We should not plan to get rid of them until the necessary international legal and judicial institutions are established, and until U. N. enforcement authority under proper political direction has proven its adequacy. This third step is, of course, disarmament in the realistic sense of the word—a major reduction in national force levels under comprehensive controls to levels required for internal security. I believe strongly that any significant progress here must await the establishing of the U. N. as a reliable keeper of the peace.

When we arrive at this stage, it would be safe to transfer forces for the maintenance of peace from national and alliance control to international or U. N. control. This might best be done in three phases:

First, as U. N. enforcement authority develops, new nations and nations not protected by alliances can rely progressively more on the U. N. than on national means for security against aggression. As the U. N. demonstrates its ability to provide security, more and more nations would accept its protection.

Second, when all but the nuclear powers are able to rely on the U. N.'s peace enforcement prowess, we can envision the reduction of *conventional* forces throughout the world, under adequate controls, down to the levels needed for internal security.

Third and last, there would come the controlled elimination of *unconventional* mass destruction weapons from national armaments. Frankly, I find it hard to believe that we shall reach this happy state until the institutions for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts are well developed, and until world armament laws are enforceable on individuals.

I hope that it is clearly understood that in the sequence of steps I am

suggesting, the elimination of retaliatory rocket weapons would be the last, not the first.

Now, let us examine the nature of the military-technological situation of the 1960's. By way of introduction I may say that it contains features unique in all history, features which, I believe, will make it feasible to stabilize national deterrent arms.

Two factors will, I think, help us to achieve substantial stability, on condition that certain reasonable and negotiable arms controls are instituted. The first factor relates to lessening the need for quick reaction capabilities in nuclear weapons, and their stabilization as retaliatory deterrents rather than as counter-force deterrents. The second relates to conventional weapons and the achievement of stability under the umbrella of mutual nuclear deterrence, by strengthening the defense and giving it a quicker reaction capability until it is strong enough to take the profit out of an offensive.

In the late 1940's, after the war, we placed our primary reliance on simple retaliation. We had a few bombers and atom bombs; the Russians had none. We had little conventional power, so the threat of atomic bombing was our primary security reliant.

During the early part of the 1950's we shifted our aim from Russian cities to Russian military installations. That is, we put our primary reliance on a counter-*force* strategy, instead of a counter-*economy* strategy. This was the correct U.S. strategy for the 1950's. We had overwhelming superiority in both bombs and bombers. In view of the Russian development of atomic weapons the best strategy in the event of war was to destroy Russia's few long-range bombers and the atomic weapons which could really hurt us.

In the 1960's a different situation confronts us. The availability of solid and possibly storable liquid rocket propellants will see retaliatory weapons highly invulnerable both to counter-offensive blows and to aerospace defenses. Because it will take very many weapons either in offense or in defense to destroy one retaliatory weapon, the achievement of decisive supremacy by either side will be impractical.

This situation can eliminate the decisive advantage of a first-strike initiative which currently exists with vulnerable aircraft and first generation missiles. Furthermore, the current advantage of surprise nuclear attack tempts preemptive action and, because it requires instant reaction to warnings, risks wars through accident and miscalculation. Thus, the technology of relatively invulnerable, solid rockets will provide major opportunities to stabilize the world's military environment.

Furthermore, stability of mutual deterrence with these invulnerable retaliatory weapons does not depend on precise equality in numbers, provided we do not stabilize at too low levels. Thus, tacit agreements backed by intelligence information may prove a useful interim to formal agreements on force levels. And formal agreements will be facilitated because inspection does not need to maintain precise equality, as a few violations cannot upset the strategic balance.

These invulnerable weapons will also permit abandoning our declared policy of *instant, massive* retaliation in favor of *certain, sufficient* retaliation. We can introduce enough delay in retaliation to reduce substantially the risks

of accidents and miscalculations. These characteristics also will facilitate policies with our Allies for collective control of these weapons, for it will be easier to define the conditions under which collective decision will determine their use.

Once both sides have the capabilities and understanding that first-strike initiative cannot sufficiently eliminate second-strike capability, the stage will be set for serious discussion of ways of availing ourselves of this mutual invulnerability to bring about deterrent stability.

This stability of deterrents in the 1960's will be based on approximate strategic parity between the West and the Soviets. This parity in nuclear rocket weapons would, initially, be at a relatively high level, but this level would be substantially less than that which would allow enough weapons for mutual annihilation.

This nuclear deterrent stand-off might be outlined as follows:

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R.—or N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw group—might have 1,000 highly invulnerable, long-range rocket weapon systems. I slightly prefer 500 to 1,000 and my colleague Jerry Wiesner prefers 300 to 500, but the optimum number is not too important today. One hundred is too few, too unstable, and ten thousand is both unnecessary and too risky. The danger of technological surprise would be minimized by mixing qualitatively different methods of launching—mobile land-launch, submarine and sea-surface launch, and perhaps airborne launch—with weapons dispersal and hardening of sites.

In this period, arms information, however secured, must be adequate to warn of any impending counter-force superiority, whether from technological breakthrough or through the building of additional armed forces.

We shall soon have reconnaissance satellite systems which, with other open sources, intelligence techniques, and a limited amount of inspection, should provide enough information for the stabilizing process. This information, I should remind you, need not be exhaustive, since exact equality in weapons, item for item, is not required for this stability of deterrents.

Once second generation rocket weapons, which can be hidden completely and fired instantaneously, become available in quantities, systems to warn of impending surprise attack will be of minimum value. The key to nuclear stability is information adequate to preserve qualitative and quantitative parity of retaliatory systems.

The controlled limitation of production of large rocket weapons can be an excellent means of consolidating the stability of mutual nuclear deterrents. Also, experimental and practice launchings might be controlled through a mutually-agreed reporting and observation system. Additionally, agreed nuclear test suspension or limitations on large tests will help nuclear stability through impeding the development of rocket counter-force capabilities.

All of these means for stabilizing mutual nuclear deterrence, it should be emphasized, will take some years to negotiate and establish.

What seems immediately feasible, both technically and politically, is the establishment of a control system to keep weapons of mass destruction out of orbit. The West should press the initiative it took last year, while there is still some question as to the military usefulness of outer-space weapons.

To keep nuclear-armed aircraft from upsetting the retaliatory stand-off, surprise warning systems will remain useful, as will controls on bomber deployment and continued emphasis on nuclear air defense. Controls on bomber-force levels would later help to consolidate stability and help to prepare for comprehensive arms control, but they are not essential to the achievement of nuclear stability. The same may be said for the long-standing Western proposal to transfer substantial amounts of nuclear material from military to peaceful stockpiles: useful, but not essential for the achievement of deterrent stability.

Now, for a few words on stabilizing conventional deterrents. The following seem to be important elements in the military-technological conventional arms situation:

First, a global war will not be fought with conventional arms.

Second, military technology and certain political factors today are such that the conventional local defense could be made strong enough to repel decisively, and therefore deter, any local conventional offense.

We should pursue eight types of action to achieve deterrent stability of conventional arms:

1) We should strive for approximate equality of Communist and Western conventional strengths. To overcome a conventionally-equipped defense, a conventionally-equipped offense will require, in men, tactics, and equipment, a superiority of something like two or three to one. Thus, equality favors the defense in the sense that the offense is faced with a high probability of failure. It is well to underline the fact that today the Communist bloc, including China, has only about 15 per cent more active military personnel than the Western bloc. If Khrushchev carries out his announced reduction to 2.4 million men, the total men under arms on each side will be roughly equal.

2) Strategic mobility of Western conventional forces is essential to balance the current Communist advantage of internal lines of military communication throughout the Eurasian land mass. Air and sea lift, supplemented by a few selected overseas bases for conventional forces, can provide strategic mobility to strengthen Western conventional deterrent power and thus enhance conventional military stability.

3) Information to warn of surprise attack should be our third pursuit. Surprise is an advantage for the offense. Eliminating surprise strengthens the defense and thus also enhances military stability. Aerial inspection—while of limited value in warning of rocket surprise attack—can very adequately warn of mass conventional attacks.

4) Disengagement of conventional forces will promote deterrent stability by reducing tension and accidents, and by insuring more time to ready the defense.

5) Technology can greatly strengthen the conventional defense. The machine gun has long been effective against men, but recent developments can greatly improve anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Additionally, technology can provide greatly improved airlift, and greatly improved reconnaissance and warning systems. Also, if arrangements are possible which permit a nation in pure self-defense against massed conventional attack to use unconventional

(chemical or nuclear) weapons only on its own territory, deterrence to mass conventional attack would be vastly increased.

6) Conventional arms controls, while not essential to conventional deterrent stability, can help insure parity of numbers. Also, reductions should be aimed first at arms that tend to be employed offensively, such as tanks and bombers.

7) An important element of deterrence is the intent to resist, and the clear demonstration of this will to a potential aggressor. Mutual security pacts and the presence of allied soldiers on the territory of weak nations will strengthen conventional deterrents.

8) Lastly, U. N. deterrent power can greatly improve conventional deterrent stability. While we must not expect that it will be adequate in any Western-Communist confrontation, it could contribute towards stabilizing conventional deterrents. It might, moreover, be especially effective initially in dampening intra-Free World conflicts, which will continue to develop in the Middle East, Latin America, and among the new and emerging nations of Africa.

Parenthetically, I would note that a rough equality of men under arms does not mean that the West would necessarily have conventional parity with the Communist bloc. The West has been diverting men and money into pursuing counter-force superiority, and into unrealistic levels of mobilization reserves for a long-lasting global war. We should have been putting our resources more into strategic mobility for our conventional forces (air and sea lift), and into information systems (intelligence, inspection, and open sources). Thus, while verifiable agreements on force levels will help to rectify the conventional imbalance, the West still needs to put more emphasis, and at once, on conventional deterrent power *in being*, which includes men, weapons, and equipment, particularly the air transport so necessary for strategic mobility.

It should be further remarked that the achievement of both conventional and unconventional deterrent stability between the two blocs does not end our problems. Pending the development of substantial U. N. forces, every effort must be made to maintain the bi-polarity of the military world. It should be apparent that both nuclear retaliatory stability and conventional defensive stability would decrease appreciably as the number of major independent power centers increased beyond two. Many believe that the world situation would be almost uncontrollable if the number of truly independent nuclear military power centers were to rise to three or four.

Two methods of maintaining military bi-polarity may be suggested. The first involves measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. A test ban would be helpful in this connection, but the proposed cut-off of nuclear production would be more effective. The second approach is collective control by alliances, where members of the alliance share control of the production, possession, and use of the nuclear weapons. This method is not yet recognized as a genuine arms control measure, but I think it could be developed into an effective way to prevent unrestrained national nuclear arms competition.

Finally, I wish to comment briefly on the role of arms information systems in the establishment of stability. To achieve military stability, both sides

must have all the information that can be gained from agreed inspection sources, from open sources, and from intelligence sources. Of course, the West is faced with a vastly greater paucity of information than are the Communists. Now that Russia is reaching nuclear retaliatory parity with the West, we in turn must achieve parity of conventional forces and parity in information. In allocating priorities, we must put arms information on an equal footing with armed deterrents.

By way of a slight disgression, I might observe that it has long been obvious that overflight over Russia is vital to our security. For a number of years we have been able to overfly the U.S.S.R. at very slight military risk. I mean that the military vulnerability of our overflight systems has been small. The political vulnerability, however, has been extremely high. Some of you may recall the Russian protests in 1955 and again in 1958 because certain balloons allegedly flew over the U.S.S.R. carrying reconnaissance equipment. More recently. their outcry over the U-2 successfully shot down this overflight program —politically. The U-2 program was shot down politically, not militarily.

The last technological opportunity that we have to gain this vital information from overflights is the reconnaissance satellite. From a political standpoint, this satellite is inherently less vulnerable than either aircraft or balloons. It does, however, have a certain political vulnerability, and you may have noticed in your morning papers today that the Soviet Union has started out after it. Their first major move—we have been predicting it for years—has come in their new disarmament proposal (June 2, 1960). They want the Midas and similar satellites declared illegal in the very first phase of disarmament. This, I think, is the beginning of a major political offensive to shoot these satellite systems down politically.

Some understanding must be reached with the Russians about the essentiality of arms information for military stability. Uncertainty about military facts tends to increase tensions, fears, and the risk of miscalculation and accidents. Uncertainty lessens stability.

I have tried this morning to outline a three-part program for achieving sensible world security arrangements. To sum up:

The first stage envisions the stabilization of national arms by means of stabilized nuclear retaliatory deterrents, plus a corresponding stabilizing of conventional defensive deterrents. This military stability requires broad availability of arms information. It also requires that certain unilateral military measures be taken by each side, such as the maintenance of relatively invulnerable second generation rockets.

The second stage would see the build-up of U. N. enforcement power under law. Although this build-up may be started while military stabilization is being worked out, we should not expect the U. N. to have appreciable power at an early year.

The third stage would involve major reductions of national armaments under comprehensive controls, to a level at which no nation or group of nations could successfully oppose the U. N.'s strengthened authority to enforce world peace.

ADDRESS: LEO CHERNE

"THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT"

MR. ROBERT W. DOWLING, *President, City Investing Company, presiding*

MR. DOWLING: *I have the privilege of saying something about our speakers, and Mr. Leo Cherne will speak to us first. His subject is "The Economic Consequences of Disarmament." It is a subject which is extremely challenging.*

May I say Mr. Cherne is particularly qualified to talk to us. He is the Director of the great Research Institute of America, with 30,000 members. He has been the consultant of governments around the world. He's a New Yorker, I'm proud to say, and a man of many distinctions.

Among other things, he is famous for his humanities. As you probably know, the International Rescue Committee has been sponsored and dominated and made great by Mr. Cherne's efforts in Berlin to Vietnam, to Africa. His services to mankind are incalculable.

He has been rewarded, of course, in certain ways of satisfaction to himself and also by many degrees from universities. He has served as assistant to presidents. He also has found time to be a sculptor of distinction, and the persons he has chosen to sculp are very interesting. Among them are Albert Schweitzer, Sibelius, Abraham Lincoln, Sigmund Freud, Ralph Bunche and Boris Pasternak.

This is just an example, but it shows you the people he enjoyed, and he is the kind of person that we enjoy.

MR. CHERNE: Thank you, Mr. Dowling, for an introduction that makes the assignment I face all the more difficult for me, and particularly your easy conviction that I'm peculiarly qualified to discuss the subject I've undertaken to shed some little light on.

I suspect, in fact, that I'm at least in one way particularly unqualified, and because I honestly do believe so, I want to convey the reason for that conviction, so that you can assess my observations with the knowledge of the particular passions and prejudices which guide my thinking.

I had a most helpful conversation earlier this week with our host, the gentleman whose energy and thoughtfulness brought this conference into being, Mr. Slick. My only regret, in fact, was that the occasion did not also include our hostess, Mrs. Lasker. But in any event, the luncheon conveyed to me the wisdom of Mr. Slick's suggestion that I put aside my own doubts concerning the feasibility of very substantial disarmament and apply myself to the undertaking of anticipating what, in fact, would be the economic consequences assuming a state of substantial disarmament.

Now, this has been difficult for me because it so happens my own background includes almost total lack of enthusiasm for a variety of recent phe-

nomena, such as summit negotiations, exchanges of heads of state, discussions of concessions concerning Berlin or Central Europe. Nor have I been intrigued with the promise of what came to be known as peaceful co-existence. And you deserve to know, consequently, that these views of mine are prejudiced, as I express them to you.

I am, frankly, personally somewhat happier today than I think I would have been had the summit meeting been concluded. I'm happier, not because I am pleased that the possibility of peace had receded. My objection to the Soviet-defined characteristics of peaceful co-existence flows precisely from my conviction that they are incapable of producing, to use President Eisenhower's phrase, "peace with safety and justice."

And my prejudices lead me to the conviction that, oddly enough, we may have moved closer toward that possibility as a result of the events in recent weeks rather than away from it. In any event, I can assure you of an antidote to whatever pessimism creeps through my remarks, because following me will be a genuinely distinguished authority who will discuss what, in my opinion, is the only possible basis for substantial disarmament, the existence of a rule of law.

Having stated the prejudices, now for the problem. Is it a problem? What are the economic consequences of substantial disarmament? First of all, in my opinion, the problem is fundamentally a political and not an economic one. The problem involves political decisions. The economic consequences will be the result of the political decisions. National or international needs are of such magnitude and so clearly recognized that a most graceful and incredibly rewarding transition is indeed possible.

I would like to share these observations with you, observations which serve to buttress my conviction that the fact of disarmament will not by itself produce economic difficulty.

First, disarmament will not be instantaneous. I know of no proposal that has been advanced here or that has been seriously discussed anywhere else, —other than the one advanced by the Soviet Union some months ago and withdrawn in some substantial measure since—which involved sudden, complete, total, instantaneous disarmament; and incidentally, even the Soviet Union did not propose quite that drastic a transition.

Secondly, genuine enforceable disarmament is expensive. It requires government, and government costs money. It requires money in rather different ways, but not automatically less expensive ways.

Third, substantial disarmament five years ago might well have caused us a greater degree of economic difficulty than substantial disarmament would today. The reasons are these: Had there been that development five years ago, it would have found us substantially less aware nationally and consequently substantially less able in a free society to enact the proposals relevant to the acute needs of the less developed areas. Sophisticated members of our community five years ago were as aware then as they are now of the agony of an India; but the community was not. Today the community is far more aware than it was.

Also, five years ago we were unaware of the challenge of space, an awesomely expensive challenge and one that I gather would not end were the race

for arms terminated. Five years ago, a much higher proportion of our gross national product was devoted to arms than is the case today. Quite unconsciously, we have been reducing the proportion of gross national product devoted to arms during each of the recent years, by the simple process of maintaining a ceiling on arms expenditure while the economy itself grew.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, five years ago, the United States was the unequaled, unsurpassable master of the world. We've learned within these last five years, that we are not quite that, that the race is rather open, the challenge great and our lead not quite so startling.

The temptation is great to outline in some detail the domestic and overseas needs which, if recognized, can absorb all or more than, or a substantial part of present arms expenditure. To do so, imposes on your time and adds to what is already your present knowledge. I'll just outline what are to me some of the more rewarding aspects, since the emphasis, if possible, is on rewards.

Our nation faces the continuing prospect of the blighted and increasingly strangled city. We are not improving. In fact, we are sliding down hill. The need is enormous, the action almost nonexistent, the plan declining, and the cost almost beyond calculation.

Secondly, we will have an urgent need for transportation and roadway communications for a population of 200 million. I would estimate this as the approximate population at the time we can visualize substantial, reliably enforced disarmament. Our transportation and roadway system is not quite adequate to a present population of 177 million.

Our educational plant is unequal to our present needs, wholly unequipped for our future needs, without capacity whatever for our overseas needs; in short, it is not up to the total obligations which fall on us presently, and will increase in a disarmed world.

Adequate capital investment overseas is needed for a world largely starting from scratch and now, as has been so well stated here, for our neighborhood. The need is urgent for the solution of fluctuations of raw material prices, which are so devastating to those one-crop or one-mineral countries in which no amount of present economic aid can equal the loss resulting from one season's drop in a commodity price.

We enjoy the present comfortable illusion that we are assisting them, when in fact, we are butchering them by purchasing their output more cheaply and repaying a portion of it in economic aid.

The hunger for talent overseas is huge: skills essential to make the capital investment overseas useful; a hunger for talents we are in no position to satisfy today, we are in no position to educate today, we are not today producing. In fact, if we are to produce it, extensive investment and substantial overhauling of our present means of creating that talent will be required.

There is, and will increasingly be, the need for the supranational arrangements for capital flow adequate to the hunger of the less developed corners of the world. In my judgment, it is to the particular interest of the United States that we hasten every effort toward such supranational arrangements, for two reasons.

First of all, an international agency is often less subject to blackmail by a demanding country than a nation in a competitive power struggle. An international agency is capable of adopting the banker's attitude. In my view, equally important, should be our effort to involve the Soviet Union in such supranational activity.

A reduction of arms appropriations translates quickly into budgetary surplus or moves rapidly towards the reduction of taxation. We will face difficulties. We might face real difficulties. The first one, budgetary surplus alone would be sharply deflationary, in my view. The second one, reduction of taxation, while particularly welcome and stimulating to industry and individuals alike, will not instantly produce the capital flow, the increases in consumer consumption, such as was produced in the gentle transition that took place after World War II, when a potentially far more radical change was cushioned by the existence of years of war hunger in the economy and among the economies.

The same kind of wisdom, thought, planning and anticipation that is involved in the act of disarmament itself is indispensable. Automatic action cannot be relied on to produce the comfortable transition. But the problems of planning and decision are simple in contrast to those involved in achieving safe and enforced disarmament.

I have withheld until last my strongest reason for being quite certain that disarmament in any degree and of whatever character, will not induce economic difficulties, even should our wisdom and planning fail.

The reason is: disarmament will not produce peace. It will hopefully lessen the danger of the resolution of the conflict by externally imposed violence. On other levels, all other levels, and this has been emphasized by virtually every speaker on this platform, on all other levels it is my judgment that disarmament will be followed by an intensification of the other areas of continuing warfare between the two worlds.

There can be no controversy concerning this fact. The Soviet Union has made its meaning of peaceful co-existence quite clear. And the other levels are expensive, so much so that we are largely not participating in them today. They are being fought by one of the antagonists, the Soviet Union. By engaging in the warfare of arms build-up we hide from ourselves the fact that we are not a party to the economic warfare which exists. With arms reduction the fact of Soviet economic warfare will be much more evident.

Economic warfare is painfully expensive. Political warfare is painfully expensive. Psychological warfare is vast and for us, thus far, virtually untouched. And the entire range of activities involved in ambiguous warfare or in countering ambiguous warfare are both beyond our present contemplation, present participation, and consequently beyond our present estimation in cost, duration and extent.

I realize in these last observations I have reflected the prejudices which I conveyed when I first began, because I regard disarmament, no matter how substantial, tolerable if two facts exist: enforcement of that disarmament by whatever security arrangements seem adequate to that purpose and I prefer those arrangements which are based upon law. And secondly, recognition that whether by our choice or not, warfare on other levels of contact or competition continues with the Soviet Union. For me, therefore, peace alone can never be

our purpose and consequently, the consequences of disarmament alone can never be our question.

A sentimental, unsophisticated search for peace, in my view, leaves open and peaceful societies peculiarly vulnerable to public manipulation by the hopeful and the hopeless, the pacifist, the frightened, the misguided and the small handful of those seeking consciously to weaken or destroy us. Peace for us must always emphasize the accompanying requirements of freedom, safety, justice for ourselves and all other peoples. These involve extensive effort.

When we reach the conclusion, as we often do, and I think correctly, that the Soviet Union does not seek war, most of us invariably immediately add that the Soviet Union does however seek other things. There are those who sometimes lose sight of this evident fact. In the context of my remarks I cannot lose sight of that fact, nor of the observation which led Lenin to say "when the time comes to hang the capitalists, they will rush to sell us the rope."

If we do, and if disarmament is uncritically considered the introduction of peace, then I must reverse everything which I have previously said; and also add, that in that context disarmament will be economic disaster. It cannot help but be so, if we have lost touch so completely with the realities of the world in which we live and the requirements of ourselves and our neighbors in that world.

I felt that I had to tell Mr. Slick in our conversation that in this sense I was an odd choice to discuss the consequences of disarmament. I am fundamentally an advocate of the cold war. Mr. Slick said, "permanently?" I said that I hoped not. These deliberations, I think, help significantly to do two things: estimate the length of time that is involved between now and that interval, and help bring us closer to it. There is this great contribution; but I hope with a companion discipline—an understanding of the obligation and the need to plan the effort which will be involved at that happy point.

ADDRESS: DR. ARTHUR LARSON

"BUILDING THE LAW STRUCTURE OF PEACE"

MR. DOWLING: *The second speaker of the evening who is to speak to us on a very important and fundamental subject, "Building the Law Structure of Peace," is Dr. Arthur Larson, Director of the World Rule of Law Center at Duke University.*

Dr. Larson comes from South Dakota. He is a graduate of the University of South Dakota and recipient of a long series of extraordinary honors. He was a Rhodes Scholar. He practised law for a while, but when World War II came he went to Washington for important assignments as counsel to various divisions of OPA. He was an administrator of foreign economic sections of government admministration work; professor of law at Cornell; Dean of Law at the University of Pittsburgh; Under Secretary of Labor, and Director of the U.S. Information Agency. I had the pleasure of serving under him.

He is now a Special Assistant to the President. He is an author of many books on law, on administration, one on Workmen's Compensation that's a classic, and his latest published volume is entitled, "What We are For." I am for Arthur Larson.

DR. LARSON: My title, "The Law Structure of Peace," is designed to connote this idea; peace isn't something that we invoke. It isn't a brooding presence in the sky that we call upon on patriotic occasions in the hope that it will descend and put everything right. It is something that has to be built. I think this concept is in line with the theme of this conference.

We have to get out in the hot sun and work. The work has to be done on economic fronts, psychological fronts, and on cultural fronts (such as Mr. Dowling is effectively engaged in), and on many other fronts. And one of these structures that has to be built is the law structure of peace.

Ever since I got into this new venture, about a year and a half ago, I have heard this remark more often than any other. People say to me, "I think this international rule of law idea is the most wonderful thing I ever heard of. I'm all for it. But just exactly what is it?"

A lot of this vagueness will disappear if we simply ask ourselves, "What are the components, what are the building blocks of a legal system?" and then methodically set out to create these components on the international scene. The international rule of law movement simply means attempting to bring about a world in which resort to law in the settlement of disputes and the conduct of international affairs is as habitual as it is on the domestic scene.

What are the ingredients of a dispute-settling legal system? It seems to me that there are four. First, you've got to have a body of law to apply, that is accessible, up-to-date, and capable of dealing with the kind of problems it has to handle. Second, you have to have the machinery of law—again up-to-date, efficient, convenient, and designed for the kind of world that we live in. And third, you've got to have acceptance of the law and the machinery by the people affected. It isn't much good to have the substance of law and the machinery if nobody will use them. Finally, you have to have compliance with the decisions of the tribunals once they are handed down.

It seems to me that our job is to set out and see how we can construct this kind of system on a global basis.

In doing this I think we should try to do two things at once. First, we have to set out a series of actions that we can take now, immediately; but at the same time, we have to have the ultimate design in mind, so that the actions we take now will prove to be steps toward a sensible and even inspiring ultimate design.

Let's take these four elements, one by one, and see what we can do about them.

When we look at the body of law, we discover that there are, according to the Statute of the International Court, three main sources of international law. These are customary international law—the practice of nations (which is in a very rough way somewhat the counterpart of the common law that the Anglo-American community largely lives by). Second, we have treaty law,

which is an increasingly important source of international law, perhaps the most important in modern times. Third, a very interesting source, which hasn't been used as much as it might be, which is: "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." As we look at these three major sources of law, we discover that the problems in relation to them are somewhat different. As to the first one, customary law, there is a large body of law already built up. Some people say, is there such a thing as international law? I'd like to lead them into the international law collection of a large law library, with the walls completely lined with books on international law. If there isn't any international law, one wonders what is in all those books.

But even that is a small fraction of the customary international law that could be found, if we could do the research necessary to dig out all these sources, diplomatic correspondence, records of incidents and customs and so forth.

I'm deliberately starting with what I suppose is the most unglamorous of all the activities that one would recommend, that is, to go out and find the law that we've got, and publish it and index it and cross-reference it, and make it usable.

This may be a far cry from visionary dreams of a world living under law. But how can you live under law if you can't find out what it is? This is an example of the kind of down-to-earth work that has to be done to build a world that lives under law.

But even if we had at our fingertips all the world's law that now exists, this wouldn't be enough.

We need a new kind of international and world law. It's got to perform a function somewhat different from anything it has had to do before, and in relation to a lot of different people. One of the principal problems is that most of the countries of the world, especially the newer countries, don't think of international law in the classical sense as their law. Many of them think of it as kind of holdover from the days of imperialism.

It was largely the handiwork of Western Christendom. Therefore, at every stage, we have to keep in mind the necessity of finding sources of law, and creating new kinds of international law that are inherently acceptable to the people that are going to have to be guided by it and bound by it if it is going to be effective.

These second two sources of law have this advantage: they have their acceptability by every country built into them. The source which I mentioned, "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," has this advantage.

Although there is a little difference of opinion among scholars on this, I think generally it is recognized that this clause means that if you can dig into the legal traditions of the major legal systems of the world and their great principles, and find a common element, not about international law necessarily, but a common principle of law that may have been developed by an internal domestic situation, this common element becomes raised to the status of binding international law.

If this is true, you see what an enormous treasure house of new principles of law, flexible and rich, might be opened up by this procedure. But, of course,

the big catch is that there is a colossal amount of work to be done by scholars, by research organizations, by associations and others, if we are going to go to all of the legal systems of the world, dig down into them, find these principles, compare them, and smooth out semantic difficulties and deceptive similarities of words.

You can't expect a practicing lawyer who has a case before an international tribunal to do this job on the spot. It's then too late for that. This is a job that should be done in advance by scholars, research institutes, governments and foundations.

Let me just give you two or three illustrations of what might be some of the possibilities of this promising source of enriched international law.

The first project we launched at the Research Center about a year and a half ago was the illegal propaganda subject. It was partly the quite natural result of USIA experiences, and I think possibly the outgrowth of an extraordinary conversation I had with the late Premier Nuri Said of Iraq.

I came into Baghdad one day and went into the Premier's office. No sooner was I inside the door than Nuri barked out, "I want some jamming equipment." I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, you know that in America we believe in freedom of communication." He said, "That's all right for you idealists. I have to have some jamming equipment."

He said, "Let me tell you what happened a couple of weeks ago. Nasser broadcast a news story repeatedly, that I, Nuri, had gone over into the Holy Mosque across the river, one of the four greatest holy places of Islam, and personally murdered the four holiest men of Iraq, and their blood was now flowing in the corridors."

"Well," he said, "there is murder, there is bloodshed, there is rioting, everything is breaking loose. I've got to have some jamming equipment."

I got to thinking, if we are going to talk of a world of law, is this sort of thing legal? We know if you pick up a rock and throw it across a boundary with intent to kill, it is illegal. If you throw a bomb across with intent to kill, it is illegal. Is it any less illegal to send an electronic impulse across a boundary with intent to kill?

So, we started a project on this, among other things using the general principles of law approach. The first thing I did was to hire an Egyptian lawyer, and we're briefing the general principles of Islamic law, Soviet law and other systems of law. Some of the general principles involved turn out to be quite universal. One of the obvious ones is that the use of words to cause injury is an offense in every legal system. The incitement to commit a crime is an offense in itself, and so on.

And so you don't have to go to Egypt to say, "We are telling you on the basis of international law (that you had no part in creating) that you can't do this." We can go to them and say, "Under the deepest principles of Islamic law this is illegal and we are only reminding you of what your own legal principles have always been."

We have another project going, called the Sovereignty Under the Law Project. As you approach this problem of world rule of law, you have to face up at once to the problem of intense nationalism and to the question of ex-

travagant assertions of the absoluteness of sovereignty. So we have launched an investigation into the question of whether it is really true that under the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations the sovereign of any particular country is above the law and the ultimate source of law.

A preliminary investigation of these legal systems seems to indicate that the opposite is the case and that under most legal systems of the world, with the possible exception of the Soviet, the sovereign traditionally is not above the law but under the law. This is not so surprising when you reflect that most legal systems are religious or quasi-religious in origin. So it would be unthinkable, for example, for an Islamic sovereign to stand up and say, "I am above the law of Islam."

The illustration that probably is most familiar to all of us on this, although we probably never thought of its legal implications, is the story of King Ahab and Naboth's vineyard. All King Ahab wanted was Naboth's vineyard, which was contiguous to his palace, and as kings go, he was very reasonable. He even offered to pay for it. But Naboth the commoner stood up to the king, invoked the Jewish law of inheritance, and said, "The Lord forbid it me that I should sell the inheritance of my fathers unto thee."

What did Ahab say? Did he pull himself up in his regal might and say, "I am the king around here, I make the laws around here?" He did not. He went home, turned his face to the wall and would eat no bread. (1 Kings 21.)

That was the end of the matter so far as the king was concerned. Of course, then Jezebel came in. That's a different story. She worked out a trick to evade the law of Israel. The appalling punishments visited upon Jezebel, the searing wrath of Jehovah, leave no doubt where that legal tradition stands on the question of sovereignty under the law.

You can trace this same sort of thing practically through every legal system in the world, the Hindu Dharma, the Law of the Stool in Ashanti tribal law, or almost any legal system. We have our own fine traditions in the story of the confrontation of Lord Coke and King James I.

King James called in Chief Justice Coke and in effect, said "I hear you have been going around lately saying the king is under the law." He followed up by saying, "which it were treason to affirm"—a gentle hint on how the conversation should go from that point on.

Lord Coke stood up, cited Bracton and said, "The King ought to be under no man but under God and under the law." And that's the way it was, and that's the way it has been ever since.

A study like this, although I don't pretend to exaggerate its importance, will serve a useful function, to remind most of the people of the world that it would be quite consistent with their legal traditions, and would involve no loss of face for them, to admit the existence of some kind of superior law.

You could multiply illustrations of this kind of general principles that seem to be common to all the civilized nations of the world. We've got about seven or eight of these under tentative study, and the amount of agreement and consensus among major legal systems on the important principles of law is quite promising.

I know some people say: "How can you possibly have a world of law

when all the people of the world have such different ideas of law?" Research does not bear this out. We get this sort of idea, sometimes, I think, because we read Margaret Meade or Ruth Benedict, and we hear about all these picturesque funny little local customs in the South Pacific, and we think, how can these "foreigners" possibly understand our conception of law.

Well, these picturesque domestic relations or ritualistic rules are not particularly important, translated on the international scene. What is important are the great principles such as the rule that men must keep their bargains and the circumstances under which they get out of their bargains, in which there is an astonishing degree of similarity around the world, including the Soviet Civil Code and the other great principles that lie at the root of preserving peace.

The third source of law, treaties, is a place where a great deal of work can also be done by research centers in figuring out what kind of treaties can be made, and at the diplomatic level by actually stepping up the volume of activity in blanketing as much as possible of modern fields of possible conflict with binding treaties, in areas such as atomic energy law, and space law, and the protection of international investment.

If we could get a reliable framework of law in the different underdeveloped countries of the world, we might release a Niagara of private investment that would make economic aid look like cigarette money.

In a situation such as Antarctica, where we have got off to a pretty good start with a treaty for a regime in Antarctica, and in any number of other areas, the careful working out of treaty relations with the Soviet Union and others can gradually blanket the troublesome areas.

The Law of the Sea Conference last summer was very fruitful. Although they didn't settle the width of territorial waters, they did settle almost everything else. By that sort of energetic research and diplomatic activity, we can build up and strengthen the body of law which takes the form of treaties.

The clarification and codification of law through the activities of the International Law Commission of the UN is a very promising source. There are some obvious things that could be done to strengthen that body. Just for a start, they might make the International Law Commission membership a full time job. They are on part time now. They don't give them a dime, even for a personal assistant—nothing to help them out with the mass of work that they are supposed to handle.

These are some of the things that could be done now toward building up the body of world law to the point where it is both capable of handling the kind of disputes that are relevant to peace and that occur in today's world, and are acceptable to the people that have to live by them.

As to the machinery of law, the second building block of a world legal system, we immediately encounter the International Court of Justice, which is the judicial branch of the United Nations. It is a splendid court, with 15 of the finest international lawyers in the world. It has a magnificent setting in the Peace Palace of the Hague. The only thing it hasn't got is business. It has been deciding cases at the rate of one and a half per year since it was founded.

Obviously, something is wrong. One of the things that is wrong may be some of the cumbersomeness and inconvenience of the structure of the court itself. We've got one Supreme Court of the world and nothing else. It is as if you had to run to the Supreme Court in Washington every time you had a dented fender or a back alimony claim.

I think that one of the most useful things that research and scholarship can do at this point, backed up by governmental action in due time, will be to devise a more flexible, a more convenient, a more streamlined and simplified international judicial structure.

A magnificent blueprint of what we ought to aim for has been set forth in Clark and Sohn's "World Peace through World Law," and I don't think I could aspire to improve upon that blueprint.

One contribution I would like to make would be to suggest that on our way to something like that, we ought to be on the watch for things that we can do now to make it more possible to bring about the UN charter revisions that will be necessary to create this diversified improved judicial structure.

So we've got a project in process which sets itself this deliberate task. Let us take the existing UN charter, the existing court statute, which are in quite sweeping terms, and let's wring out of them, in every way we can, much of this diversified world legal, conciliation, judicial and arbitral structure, without waiting for the day when we can succeed in getting appropriate UN charter revision. It is surprising how much you can get.

For example, in the International Court Statute it says the Court can travel any place it pleases. So immediately, you've got the possibility of traveling courts, riding circuit all over the world. The Court doesn't have to stay in the Hague.

It says in another section that the Court may sit in smaller chambers, with as little as three members, or five. Well, you put these things together, with the Court subdividing itself according to certain patterns, perhaps regional, going off into different parts of the world, and you can practically get the effect of the regional court system that has been proposed by so many people, which would eventually increase its availability and convenience all over the world.

There is another section that says that the court has complete power to appoint any person or any group to make fact-findings and give expert opinions. This is enough legal authority to create a complete hierarchy of quasi-judicial administrative masters of chancery, or hearing examiners, of the kind so familiar on the domestic front, which dispose of the vast majority of cases of litigation that actually occur. Most controversies don't ever get to court. They go through various administrative stages. If the point is reached where a fact-finder in one of these agencies finds the facts against you and makes a recommendation of the law against you, you retire from the field nine times out of ten, and that settles the case.

You could get this whole diversified structure right out of the present court statute and UN charter.

There are possibilities like this, then, not as a complete end in themselves. Let me stress that. But if we could go on starting today, to diversify and en-

rich the facilities of the Court, and if people got used to this kind of court structure, it would be much easier sometime hence to bring about the kind of clean-cut UN charter revision that would give effect to the kind of improved structure that we all want to see.

This structure should include not just a court, but arbitration tribunals which handle cases that are not strictly legal, or not strictly suitable for judicial handling. It should include also mediation and conciliation tribunals for cases that are quasi-political, so that there is a tribunal for every size and kind of case.

That doesn't mean that every dispute can be settled in court. Some disputes are political and will always be, but even where the disputes are political, it is a great help, as it is in labor law, to have such things as conciliation and mediation tribunals.

The third ingredient is acceptance of world law and world legal machinery. Here we encounter at once the problem in the United States of acceptance of the World Court's jurisdiction with no crippling reservations. Other countries have the same problem, some of them more acutely than we do. About half of the countries of the world have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in advance, several of them with rather severe restrictions and reservations, including ourselves.

By now the controversy about the so-called Connally Amendment or self-judging clause is so well known that I don't intend to dwell on it. But I would like to toss out for your ammunition the next time you have an argument with a friend on this, one much-neglected argument.

The argument is all about six words. We say we accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court, and we go on to say, "but not over disputes that are essentially domestic." That's right, too. It says that in the UN charter anyway. Then we go on to say, "as determined by the United States of America," and that's the catch.

It isn't very widely realized that there was a case decided about three years ago, the *Case of Certain Norwegian Loans,* which has completely turned the tables on us, so far as this provision is concerned. Apparently this clause was put in by some rather earnest guardians of the national self-interest, on the theory that if any situation came up in which we appeared in the role of defendant, this at least would be some sort of an out. We could simply say, "this is domestic in our opinion," and the other fellow is thrown out of court.

Then, along in 1957, comes the *Norwegian Loans* case. The story is this: Norway had floated a bond issue in France, a rather large one. Then Norway went off the gold standard, although the bonds were, by their terms, payable in gold. Norway refused to pay in gold and this resulted in severe loss to thrifty Frenchmen.

France brought suit in the International Court demanding payment in gold. France had a self-judging clause. Norway did not. The holding of the Court was that Norway could invoke against France France's own self-judging reservation on the principle of reciprocity. The result: severe financial loss to thousands of thrifty Frenchmen. The cause: a supposedly protective provision put in by the guardians of French self-interest. The sequel: France repealed her self-judging clause last year.

Now, this hasn't sunk in to the consciousness of the American public or of the American bar, or of the American Senate. When it does, I think the entire controversy is going to take a somewhat different turn.

It reminds me of the famous lines of Robert Frost:

> "Before I built a wall, I'd ask to know
> What I was walling out or walling in."

We thought we were walling the other fellow out of court but we walled ourselves out of court.

Now, it is the other fellow who only has to say the magic formula, "we think this is domestic," on anything at all, and we are out of court. Yet we're the people that have 27 billion dollars in direct private investment in other countries. We're the people who have 700,000 tourists abroad at any given time, and 500,000 people living abroad, always in danger of personal injury and property damage, that should normally be vindicated by legal action.

We are the ones that have 20 times as much to lose as the other fellows.

It is no exaggeration to say that we have, by our own act, by this supposedly protective provision, abolished absolutely and without exception all recourse of a legal character in the International Court of Justice under its general jurisdiction, for any kind of claim, under any circumstances, against any nation in the world.

We could ground the argument on the Connally Amendment exclusively on the most narrow kind of cold-blooded self-interest, and the case would be completely one-sided. There are many other arguments and you are familiar with them all.

It makes us look foolish in the eyes of the world. We talk about leadership and world rule of law, and here we are the only major country in the world with this kind of provision. France has abandoned hers. India has abandoned hers. Britain has abandoned hers. We're left with a handful of minor countries, like the Union of South Africa and Liberia, in this particular corner. Yet we are trying to take the leadership in world rule of law.

This isn't going to save the world in itself or bring about world rule of law in itself. But failure to take this first step makes it extremely difficult to go on to other steps that we must take.

There are other ways in which international rule of law acceptance will come about. This is only one. I would like to mention one other because it is becoming of increasing importance. That is the so-called compromissory clause, a clause in which in a particular treaty any disputes of interpretation under this treaty must be referred to an impartial tribunal, frequently the International Court, and the parties will be bound by the decision of the impartial tribunal.

There are hundreds of treaties already with this sort of clause in them—all our recent commercial treaties. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation as a matter of routine include this clause, without any Connally Amendment attached.

This is one way, treaty by treaty, for spreading the normal use of judicial settlement of disputes, even with such countries as the Soviet Union, if we could begin to get this type of clause into our treaties with the Soviet Union.

I would like to mention one possibility, just a hypothesis, about the possibility of bringing the Soviet Union within an orbit of international rule of law. People often say, "This is all very well for countries like England, the United States, Norway, Denmark and so forth, but how about the Communists?" One has to have a hypothesis, and mine is this for what it is worth, even though it may be a long shot.

I can see the possibility of Communists eventually being gradually drawn within an orbit of law, according to this possible set of assumptions. Assumption number one: That the Soviet Union really wants a workable disarmament treaty. I think this is not altogether unrealistic in view of economic pressures and others.

Assumption number two: That we are now wise enough to realize that a disarmament treaty will be workable only if it has built into it a dispute settling mechanism that is impartial in character. This would stand a little argument, but I'll simply defend it by saying one thing. Practically all of our treaties with the Soviet Union have been followed by a welter of recriminations, disputes, and claims of bad faith which are almost exclusively the result of so-called differences of interpretation.

The Soviet Union will never admit that it has broken a treaty. In fact, you can't find any more beautiful rich prose on the sanctity of treaties than the passage on the subject written by Andre Vishinsky. They "interpret" them, they don't break them.

We ought to learn from experience. If we go into more treaties with the Soviet Union, without profiting from this lesson we have had, we are asking for trouble. The ink will hardly be dry on the treaty before arguments will start about interpretation. The treaty is bound to be complex. It is bound to name all sorts of para-military goods and personnel, and borderline plans about which disputes will arise. If there is no quick and quiet way of settling these disputes, by something other than a three-for-three commission that is going to split on political lines, I'm afraid that everybody ought to realize in advance that the treaty is going to break down. It is quite possible we'd be worse off than if we had never written a treaty at all. The whole process of disarmament and world peace would actually be set back.

Let us assume then that we are wise enough to realize all this. We are then driven to the fact that the desire for workable disarmament will mean that we will incorporate into a disarmament treaty a compromissory clause with some kind of reference to an impartial tribunal for the settlement of disputes.

If this works with one treaty, there is no reason why it shouldn't be used in other treaties. So at least there is a hypothetical possibility that little by little, dispute settling under law even vis-a-vis Communist countries might gradually come to pass over a period of time.

Finally, the fourth building block is compliance. I want to treat this very briefly. Many people worry about this more than any other feature of international law. Yet it is quite conceivable that in our scale of priorities this may be the least worrisome of all. It is a fact of history that in all the decisions of the World Court there is only one about which any question of disobedience has even arisen.

In hundreds of arbitrations, there are only a very small handful in which the question of disobedience has arisen, and in thousands of other miscellaneous international decisions, again the number of cases of disobedience is very small.

I don't want to draw too much from this. I know there are many explanations for it. But it does seem to indicate this much: that if in relation to a particular category of disputes, you can bring nations to the point where they accept the body of law and the machinery of law to the point where they will carry a case through the tribunal, then they are "in so deep" that it becomes unthinkable for them to back out and to disobey the decision rendered.

That's why I say the priority is to get the law built up, get the system of decision built up, make it acceptable, and most of the time compliance will probably follow. That doesn't mean that we should neglect to strengthen the measures of compliance of all kinds, including the economic, diplomatic and domestic law enforcement. There are many extremely effective kinds of non-force enforcement.

Just let me give you one example. Under the Civil Aviation Convention, if any party to the International Aviation Convention is in violation of a decision of the International Court or an arbitral tribunal, all the countries of the world that are parties to that convention must bar the planes of the offender from their boundaries. You can't ask for anything more than this in the way of enforcement power. It is the death sentence on international civil aviation of the offender.

With a little ingenuity and thought and diplomatic work, you can build up an imposing array of enforcement possibilities, even before you get to the point of a world political authority and strengthened international police force.

Of course, we should build up the international police force in every way possible, as it becomes possible to do so.

These, then, are the four building blocks, the four component parts, every one of which can be worked on starting right today. They are being worked on in many places. In order to get on with the kind of work that we are contemplating here, it has to be undertaken on a large scale.

For this reason, I'm anxious to see this conference look seriously at the proposals for more systematic organization of research and public education, not just in this field, but in all the other fields. I would like to see a high level commission answerable to the President and then perhaps two large branches underneath. One would be the research end which could stimulate research activities in all these fields including law, and send the results up to this commission where they could take effect in the form of action. Another perhaps even larger group, would represent all the voluntary organizations, educational organizations, and other groups, with the vast job of public education that should be carried out systematically and effectively.

This is one conceivable pattern of the kind of immediate action that could be taken to carry into effect both the immediate and the long-range goals. Indeed, there is no reason in the world why it can't also be organized eventually on a global basis.

We are starting to do that in the American Bar Association. We have just authorized a half million dollar budget which our Peace through Law Com-

mittee has got. We are going to hold meetings on four continents, culminating in a great global meeting of lawyers from all over the world, to light the fires of international rule of law in every country in the world, in the hope that this kind of program that I've been outlining to you will get under way, not just in our own country, but in every country in the world.

ADDRESS: C. MAXWELL STANLEY

"POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO PEACE"

DR. HOLCOMBE: *The next speaker is well known to you in certain of his roles, and he has several. Many of you know him as a former president of United World Federalists, and as the author of a book on the general subject with which we are about to deal.*

However, he is much more than an agitator, and an author, because he is a business man.

In this case, he is an international business man, which is a special qualification. His engineering company not only operates in this country, but has recently extended its operations into West Africa, and thereby given its head unusual opportunity to observe the international scene.

I will introduce him without further ado, Mr. Max Stanley.

MR. STANLEY: My role this morning is not to give you the answers, but rather, on behalf of Tom Slick and others of us who have worked with him in organizing this conference to suggest areas which may be most fruitful of discussion, and objectives we hope will be reached by this conference. We sincerely hope to have some creative and forward looking thinking.

Yet, as we approach the subject of a strategy for peace, there are so many aspects, so many alternate approaches which some person or group has suggested. So unless we keep ourselves reasonably confined to the pertinent, we're apt to dissipate our efforts on discussion that will not advance us towards the fundamental objective of this conference. We wish to discuss the strategy of peace, and not to bog down on the tactics of the cold war. We recognize the relationships between these subjects, but will attempt to keep our eyes on the longer range objective.

Unlike the three previous speakers, Mr. Leghorn, Dr. Wiesner, and Dr. Szilard, I'm not going to take off on my discussion from the present, although I'm sure many would say that is the only realistic start toward a peace strategy. There is much to support this contention and I do not wish to put myself in disagreement with the comments of the other speakers.

But, it is also realistic, if we're to have a strategy which is long range, to start by looking at overall objectives. From this we may work back to see what is needed in a comprehensive strategy, and also what steps should be taken now.

On a long range basis, the minimum requirements for a secure peace with freedom, in this age of ICBM's and hydrogen warheads, are nothing less than these:

The abolition of war as an instrument for settlement of differences between nations;

The establishment of effective safeguards which securely protect nations;

The provision of suitable means for peaceful settlement of the differences which are bound to arise among nations.

In seeking such a peace, we're not looking for a Utopia. We're not expecting a world in which there will be no conflict of ideologies, nor of economics, nor of social development. We are stating minimum requirements to preserve peace, in the sense that there is not alone absence of war, but protection from aggression both direct or indirect. This is a long-range objective to which we can all subscribe. Nothing less than these three objectives is adequate.

We seek such goals in the face of many obstacles. We face the opposition of the Soviet Union. We confront the apathy of much of the world towards these goals, for most of the world is far more concerned with economic development, than with the resolution of the problems of peace.

And we face indifference, and some actual opposition, here in the United States, both from private citizens and from elements of our Government.

What are the present aims and the long-range policy of the United States? I'm not sure that we know, although it's generally understood that we seek peace, justice and freedom.

In a speech on Feb. 18, 1960 to the National Press Club, Secretary of State Herter, after dealing first with national security, arms control and similar immediate problems, said:

"That beyond the initial stages of disarmament and a stable military environment, there should be a second stage in which our objects should be twofold.

"First, to create certain universally accepted rules of law, which, if followed, would prevent all nations from attacking other nations. Such rules of law should be backed by a world court and by an effective means of enforcement, that is, by international armed force.

"Second, to reduce national armed forces, under safeguarded and verified arrangements to the point where no single nation or group of nations could effectively oppose this enforcement of international law by international machinery."

Such, perhaps, is the aspiration of U. S. foreign policy. But its precepts deal only with day-to-day and immediate problems. It is really shocking, to hear from Dr. Wiesner, that twenty people, working full time on the problems related to arms control, would be a great gain over the present efforts.

Because we have established neither precepts nor general agreement on the long-range policy of this country, we are constantly out-maneuvered in the cold war by propaganda and by politics.

For instance, this morning's paper carries new proposals on disarmament offered by the Soviet Union. I doubt if we know our answer to them. Seldom in recent years have we been ready to answer such proposals. Very rarely have we been in a position to make one ourselves. Seldom have we led in the battle for the hearts and the minds of peoples of the world.

Moreover, in the absence of an agreed, long-range program, we have great difficulty in intelligently taking first steps. We do not know which first steps are good and will really fit the overall objectives we are seeking.

Lacking long-range plans, our State Department becomes obsessed with the short-range. We fail to give the overall problem of waging peace the emphasis, manpower and financial support needed to make progress.

Now this conference has been convened for two purposes. First, there is a belief among its organizers that the United States does need a strategy for peace—a long-range and comprehensive program—in order effectively to lead the world towards a secure peace with freedom. Secondly, there is the belief that a group of private citizens, such as we have here today, can make a worthwhile contribution in developing such a strategy for peace.

Now, any strategy for peace needs several elements. I wish to touch upon seven:

The first is the role of armaments.

The second is disarmament.

The third is world law.

The fourth is supranational organization.

The fifth is economic development.

The sixth is settlement of political issues.

The seventh is leadership.

I hope to offer under each of these topics a few questions and subjects which we may well consider in our deliberations.

First, the role of arms. A military posture of strength has been a fundamental and an accepted part of our foreign policy since about 1949 or 1950, when we realized that all was not peace and harmony in the postwar world. Its avowed purpose has been to deter communist expansion and prevent war.

So long as we have a world of anarchy, in which nations have supreme and sovereign power, armaments are inevitable. We've had them for centuries.

I do not suggest that we can abandon our dependence upon armament in the context of the world situation today. Nor can we find a simple and easy path away from them. Nevertheless, as I look at the present armament situation, I confess to concern over several matters.

Do we have a military system which is adequate to accomplish its assigned missions? As this topic involves technical competence and classified information which most of us do not possess, we can not resolve it here.

How great is the hazard of accidental or inadvertent release of the weapons we have in the world today?

Does the military influence too greatly the decisions on foreign policy taken by this nation?

More fundamentally is it politically and morally wise to place such primary dependence for peace on arms?

A long-range strategy for peace must recognize the conditions of today, which require military strength on our part.

But we must take care not to become obsessed with military power, nor to over value the security it offers. The present possibility of nuclear war, accidental or inadvertent, is too real to allow complacency. And it becomes more frightening as nuclear weapons are spread to other nations and as ICBM's become operational.

The soundest approach we can take here is to recognize the importance of military might in the world today and turn then to the means of controlling, limiting and eliminating arms and to the steps required to make them unnecessary.

We need to use well the time bought by our armaments, to advance the programs and institutions which must one day make them obsolete.

My second point is disarmament. Now, disarmament is a term that means many things to many people. If we are to develop a strategy for peace, we have to cut through a lot of the misconceptions, or at least different conceptions of the meaning of the word "disarmament."

It is applied all the way from unilateral and complete disarmament—which I think is irresponsible—to limited arms reduction. There are many steps between these extremes. Also wrapped up with the subject of disarmament are other related topics, such as: the cessation of nuclear tests, protection against surprise attack, and control of outer space.

If we are to place an element of disarmament in our strategy for peace, we have some decisions to make.

What kind and amount of arms control and disarmament is necessary, both in the ultimate and in the immediate?

What are the timing and conditions to be associated with steps towards such disarmament?

What methods of inspection and control are necessary?

What are the hazards of arms limitation as compared to the hazards involved with complete disarmament?

What is required in the way of a world peace force or other means of enforcement of disarmament and prevention of aggression?

What safeguards are required to protect national integrity?

What is the relationship of disarmament to world law?

The third element for a strategy of peace is world law, for which a host of our national leaders have called. A rule of law on this planet is the only real alternative to the present international anarchy which now results, inevitably, from unbridled nationalism.

There are several concepts of world law. These include international law

in the classical concept which lawyers have practiced over the years. There is also the extension of world law which can come with greater use of the International Court of Justice, and with the provision of better means for settlement of international disputes. Such a program is being sponsored by an American Bar Association Committee.

There is legislative law, enacted, interpreted and enforced by a supranational body of some type. This is now proposed by some in the limited field related to control of armaments and prevention of aggression.

There is also the concept of law involved in a world super-state—a world government with comprehensive powers dealing with many international affairs beyond armament control and aggression.

If world law is to be a part of an overall peace program, we must decide how much world law we need. Or perhaps we should state it slightly differently—how little must we have? Shall it be applied against nations or individuals or both? Can world law function adequately in the armed world? Is disarmament safe without a degree of world law?

One serious problem related to disarmament is our inability to link together law and disarmament. Must not they be linked as we think toward our ultimate objectives?

A fourth element is supranational organization. As we progress towards a secure peace, we will require more, not less, supranational organization. Such bodies must possess the power to function independently of nations on matters related to the control and enforcement of disarmament, the prevention of aggression and the functioning of world law. This will require us to recapture the national sovereignty we have lost in a world of anarchy and delegate it to supranational agencies and organizations.

Three ways have been suggested by which these supranational organizations may be provided. One of these is the revision and strengthening of the United Nations giving to it adequate authority and power to perform the functions that are delegated to it. Another is the creation of a supranational agency by treaty for a specific task such as arms control or disarmament. Another process is the creation of ad hoc organizations such as United Nations Emergency Force.

If we are to develop a comprehensive strategy of peace, we must accept the role of supranational organizations. We need to determine the nature of the organizations required not only in the ultimate, but for various phases along the way. We need to consider the power and authority to be delegated to them, and perhaps more important, the safeguards, the checks and balances to be imposed. We must decide the preferred method of creating such organizations.

As we study supranational organizations, we will encounter the problem of representation. This necessitates a look at such United Nations procedures as the veto and the "one nation—one vote" arrangement in the General Assembly.

Economic development is the fifth element to be considered in our strategy for peace. Its importance has been emphasized to me by several recent trips to Africa, where I have observed firsthand the difficulties under which

new countries labor as they seek to develop economically and maintain freedom. Our United States policy has recognized this element in our Mutual Security and other foreign aid programs. Nevertheless, bitter controversy rages over the propriety, the size and the effectiveness of such programs. Before economic aid can be considered a valuable tool in our strategy for peace, greater unity of approach is needed, based on critical examination.

A good starting point for such an examination is to define the legitimate self-interest of the United States in world economic development as it affects the U. S. economy.

Then we may examine the importance of world economic development in creating world unity and world opinion which will strengthen our quest for secure peace. If the quest for peace is a long one—as I believe it to be—a most important prerequisite to success is a greater unity among not only the western world but also the neutral nations of the world. Such unity of world opinion can become a major factor in compelling agreement between opposing positions.

Another area for study is the relative emphasis to be given the military and the economic portions of our programs. A surprisingly small portion of our $4,000,000,000 a year foreign aid program is directed to real economic development. Nearly three-fourths of it is for direct military expenditures for our allies and for the support of their economies.

We need a look at the proper role of private enterprise in overseas economic development. Being a free enterpriser myself, I am convinced that free enterprise can do much in these areas. Our government would do well to find ways of encouraging and stimulating such activities.

I add, parenthetically, that it is virtually impossible to sell such concepts as free enterprise and democracy to the peoples of Africa or Asia by words and by speeches. But they can be sold by demonstration. Therefore, we must search for better ways to allow our free enterprise system to function overseas.

Another area of study is the relative value of unilateral and United Nations programs.

Finally, there are two other problems in the economic sphere which require attention. One of these, mentioned yesterday by Tom Slick, is the use of economic incentives, the carrot, if you will, appealing to self-interest which can encourage action toward disarmament and world law. We also need to examine the effect of disarmament upon the U. S. economy. This is desirable to offset opposition to a comprehensive strategy for peace, arising from fear of the effect of disarmament upon the economy.

My sixth point concerns the resolution of some of the difficult world political issues. Such issues include the divided nations—Germany, Korea, Viet Nam, the very troublesome Red China problem, the volatile situation in the Near East, and liberation of Soviet satellite nations. Often it is contended that such problems must be resolved before progress can be made toward peace.

Which of these issues are resolvable in the context of the present military power struggle?

Which of these problems, if resolvable, will really advance us towards a secure peace?

Conversely, which of the issues are incapable of resolution, until we find a measure of world law, of disarmament, of withdrawal from powerful military postures?

And how can such issues be linked to the achievement of a secure peace?

The seventh, and final element, I propose is leadership. The best plan in the world is of little value unless advanced by strong, effective and patient leadership. To me, the most discouraging aspect of our national approach to the problems of peace is the inadequate emphasis and leadership we have provided except in the military field. We have spoken loftily of our desire for peace, justice, democracy, law, freedom and prosperity for the world. But we have not bridged the gap between such high aspirations and the immediate controversies and conflicts with the Communists.

It is quite impossible to give leadership toward an overall objective upon which we are not agreed with respect to major details and elements.

It is quite impossible to develop supporting world opinion, when our activities are centered primarily on the day-to-day operation—putting out the brush fires, and dealing with imminent crises.

This Conference is held, because its sponsors believe that for this country to give vigorous leadership, we must have a long-range plan. As Mr. Bowie mentioned, we are a nation dedicated to short-range and immediate issues. Securing peace in the world is not a short-range issue. It is a long time one. How long, I'll not predict.

Difficult as it is in a democracy, we must find the way to develop an overall strategy for peace, meeting this long-range need.

Public debate is required on the issues to crystallize public opinion and create bipartisan support. Such a strategy, once adopted, will do much to assure adequate and balanced emphasis on all aspects of peace.

Isn't it absurd, when we spend forty billion dollars a year on a defense institution to have less than twenty people working to find methods of arms controls. A nation of our prosperity is capable of supporting research, study and planning at both government and private levels, adequate to make successful a strategy for peace. We can afford the education required to inform our people.

Enlightened leadership should use all available avenues of approach. This means not only summitry, not only conventional diplomacy, not only the United Nations, not only private contacts, but rather the effective use of all such approaches.

We address ourselves to a great and challenging task: to put the United States in the vanguard on the world's quest for secure peace with freedom. The difficulty of this task is matched only by its urgency.

The time is here to give peace planning the importance it deserves. Continued reliance on the relatively negative policies of containment, deterrents, and retaliation, is not enough. We need a dynamic and positive program, which leads towards the goals desired by the peoples of the world.

War is obsolete and must be abolished. Risks are involved in such a program, but are there not untold risks in our present situation?

It is time we put our experts to work to find paths to peace, not obstacles. We must weigh intelligently the relative hazards and make courageous decisions to undertake the calculated risks involved in an advance towards peace. Nothing less than such an approach measures up to the moral and spiritual forces which made our country great.

We need to speak out for the fundamental aims and hopes of man everywhere, because they coincide with those of this nation:

Independence—we are the most prosperous revolutionists in the world.

Economic gain—we have had great experience in bringing prosperity and plenty to the large population.

Peace—we have had the unique experience in this country of bringing through federation, internal peace and order over a significant span of time.

Within the concepts which have made this nation great, we will find the spiritual and moral forces needed to give vitality and purpose to our strategy for peace.

Such a strategy for peace can provide goals and inspiration not only for our own citizens, but for all the peoples of the world. With it we can wage peace with intensified vigor and with increased effectiveness.

REPORT OF DISCUSSION GROUP A

ROGER HILSMAN, *Chairman*
MICHAEL AMRINE, *Rapporteur*

Our group did not feel prepared to state definitive propositions or vote upon resolutions.

The following statements found wide adherence in this group:

* * * *

Planning and achieving progress toward security through arms control must often be related to planning for security through arms. Armament and disarmament are not two widely separated areas, but may often be usefully dealt with as two parts of the same area.

* * * *

A government agency or office should be established to work specifically on arms control and toward disarmament.

* * * *

Its purpose should be to provide information and proposals on these matters, and it should be enabled to coordinate available information and be informed of and encourage public and private research, scholarships, and planning on arms control.

* * * *

A private organization should be formed to study, to plan and to make proposals in this area. Its program might include:

A. Further conferences.

B. Special study groups.

C. Private communications to decision-makers.

D. Clearing-house functions, the collection of data, and research where needed.

E. Publication information measures.

F. Political action.

The principal areas for positive action toward peace are:

Economic aid	Political programs
Technical aid	Information programs

Comprehensive peace programs must include far more than arms control or even complete disarmament.

* * * *

A small number of nuclear weapons in national possession by the great powers may be a positive stabilizing influence in an interim period before further disarmament.

Accidental war is a genuine hazard; technical accidents may occur by themselves or in relation to political incidents.

* * * *

Modern arms races may or may not lead to war, but they remain hazardous, with incalculable possibility of incalculable catastrophe to civilization.

* * * *

Cultural Exchange: The 40,000 foreign students in this country represent a medium through which we could reach tomorrow's leaders of those countries.

* * * *

Complete disarmament, except for security forces, is an ultimate goal.

* * * *

A world security system, under a true system of law, resting upon the support of a world community, is an ultimate goal.

* * * *

Today there is a technology of arms control. Planners must have access to a wide range of new information, and must have channels through which they may understand new alternatives and limitations.

* * * *

Lack of a real U. S. "Second Strike Capability" is dangerous to peace.

* * * *

Given a reasonable political climate, arms control is technically feasible.

For the foreseeable future, we cannot expect peace in the traditional sense, as the term was used before World War II. We must be increasingly competitive with the Communist ideas and capabilities in many other areas than arms.

In trying to achieve *acceptance* of a disarmament-peace plan certain thoughts should be held in mind:

1. that a specific *plan* that appears comprehensive, specific, and practical, and in all respects feasible, should help *sell* itself;

2. that an imagination-capturing "big" plan might be accepted more quickly and thereby solve intermediate problems more easily than a limited plan;

3. that a *"reward"* system properly organized with a definite *commitment* of a large proportion of disarmament savings, not only for underdeveloped nations but for necessary undertakings in all countries would be a great incentive for acceptance of a peace plan.

In "selling" a disarmament-peace program, if the Russians cannot voluntarily be sold, there is the possibility of setting up an interim *"free world" peace enforcement agency*, UN affiliated, and open to later Russian joining, which might have the same results as the Atoms for Peace Program in inducing Russian acceptance.

REPORT OF DISCUSSION GROUP B

PROFESSSOR ROBERT G. NEUMANN, *Chairman*
GEORGE A. BEEBE, *Rapporteur*

The following brief summary is designed to stress major statements bearing on the group's assigned task of discussing a strategy for peace. The Chairman obtained group consensus on three basic objectives for the discussion:

I. To review the political setting bearing on international tension;

II. To discuss the problems of arms control and reduction, comparing and contrasting current Soviet proposals and U. S. plans;

III. To explore the possibilities of world order through world law.

I. One approach to which the group gave some attention was the feasibility of developing a scale of definition of the goal of peace.

Maximum

1. Rule of world law based on democratic principles.
2. Absence of armed force and the capacity to wage armed conflict ("vacuum of arms").
3. Elimination of threat of disastrous military conflict through arms control plus cooperative measures for eliminating sources of tension (e.g., East/West cooperation to help underdeveloped areas).
4. Minimizing threat of disastrous military conflict arising from inadvertence or surprise attack through open skies inspection or the like, but accepting continuing competition between East and West in economic and non-military.

Minimum

5. Acceptance of existing situation with unilateral endeavors to achieve equilibrium through balanced deterrent force, with unilateral efforts to eliminate sources of tension by such things as aid to underdeveloped areas.

Discussion should attempt to agree on minimum goals on this scale essential to our security and Soviet security.

A second proposal around which discussion of Topic I tended to cluster was "elimination of the danger of war but with the essential factors of economic and ideological competition retained."

Considerable time went to a discussion of political tensions and the thesis that in the cold war complex, manipulation of tension systems was going on on both sides. The usual observations about the distinction between governments and peoples in major powers came out. Also, the discussion tended to

focus on the price U. S. nationals were willing to pay in securing a reduction of armaments or the elimination of nuclear war per se.

Considerable time was given to speculations about Soviet motivations with a general agreement that the battle for men's minds had become a dominant factor in the public policy of both cold war blocs. The group put aside exploration of U. S. national goals as not feasible for them to consider in connection with its basic assignment. There was cautious optimism about the evidence that social forces in the Soviet Union were leading to more sophisticated formulas on which to negotiate disarmament and test bans.

One certain point of agreement that was repeatedly stressed was the need for more intensive study of the operation of inspection and control systems and the development of a more definitive and defensible U. S. plan of action.

It was suggested in the course of the discussion on the political setting that it was not clear that disarmament was indicated as a goal, and it was in fact possible for some to consider a continuation of policies established early in the present Administration as a true strategy for peace.

II. It was necessary to interrupt the general discussion for a relatively intensive background review of the current status of negotiations in Geneva and of the Soviet's proposal released June 2, 1960.

Several in the group believed that the Soviet proposal could not be considered seriously, particularly because the Soviet society insisted on remaining a closed society. Others were more optimistic and noted the new dynamic of the Soviet position and stressed that the group could discuss the apparent disagreements in the USSR and US positions and point to the lack of agreement in policy in the government and in the U. S. public.

It was suggested that the best focus for discussion would be the group's interest in substantial reduction of the chance for nuclear war. This revived the call for public and private research in the U. S. and the suggestion that some governmental agency to study peace ought seriously to be advocated.

The group did not clarify the question of whether it accepted the present U. S. control thesis. It was urged by some that the Soviet proposals be met squarely and that negotiation be entered into seriously in "good faith" and maintained for as long as possible.

It was also suggested that the cold war canvas was too small for purposes of painting the whole picture. The world is to be more complex with more technology and with more sources of tension, and a group discussing strategy for peace must find ways of establishing formulas for living in such a world that make it possible for mankind to survive.

No one favored total unilateral disarmament.

In a detailed consideration of the psychological phenomena of the "gap" problem, there was a consideration of the possibility that weapon systems might need to be built up under certain circumstances. When a genuine crisis develops fear may trigger the present system. We need discussion on both sides of the cold war that might lead to weapon systems with less of an accident danger.

We need to discuss the abandonment of the more provocative aspects of the present weapon system and discussion might be entered into with the

Soviet because of the mutual advantages in developing a less accident-prone system. The problem might be approached by unilateral effort or by a joint effort.

On this point the group adopted its first proposal to the Conference. The following statement was endorsed unanimously:

"We recommend that our government add to its present efforts in the field of reduction and control of armaments the greater dimension of developing our position with reference to comprehensive proposals for the major reduction of armaments.

"Such studies should be adequately financed and conducted with urgency and continuity by government and also by private and intergovernmental instrumentalities.

"It is essential that technical studies of disarmament be accompanied with serious analysis of their integral relationship to concrete levels of world community and the role of international organization. Special attention should be given to the overall values we desire to conserve."

Half of the group also endorsed a further proposal:

"That the United States mount a large research effort to develop a comprehensive plan for a major reduction of armaments."

Discussion then shifted to two proposals directed to the United Nations. The first of these, adopted unanimously by the group, was:

"RESOLVED, that this Conference call upon the United States Government to recommend the establishment of a corps of (qualified advisers) experts recruited by the Secretary General of the UN for the purpose of studying and assessing the methods and techniques of arms control.

"Such a corps of experts, within the office of the Secretary General, could advise the Secretary General on the technical aspects of various proposals and would permit the Secretary General, should he feel it appropriate, to initiate proposals for study by all interested governments; it would also permit him to promulgate standards and principles which might be useful in guiding individual nations in their subsequent formulation of national arms control proposals.

"We further urge the United States to join with other nations in the financial support of an operation of significant size, and to encourage its own nationals to engaged in such work."

Three members dissented from the resolution passed by the group that stated:

"It is the sense of the group that it might contribute to the chances of developing a fair, workable, and safeguarded plan for regulation of armaments if, in addition to proposals made by the principal negotiating powers, a group of nations not permanent members of the UN Security Council, selected for their political impartiality and having access to adequate technical information, were encouraged to develop proposals for general consideration."

III. In discussing the last agenda item, the question was raised whether

the pursuit of world legal order should not also include consideration of the economic development of under-developed countries. Time did not permit this exploration.

The group found it most productive to tie its brief discussion of this topic into a spectrum that related to the question of the implementation of its first proposal. It was pointed out that disarmament and the development of world legal order were so intertwined that no serious study of the one could be done without the other question involved. The spectrum used for this discussion is supplied because it lends itself to further development in future discussions of this topic.

The possible choices should be considered as:

1. UNEF non-fighting–stand by (note the difficulties in getting even this).

2. Free world military force (possible de facto combination of our alliance structure).

3. Token universal force of contributed elements.

4. Serious great power contributed forces for punishing third parties–but not great powers. (This is Article 42 of the UN Charter concept with the veto.)

5. Supranational contributed international forces, but significant forces retained by great powers.

6. World force with monopoly of force, implying world government, end of present conflicts and ambitions, end of historical process as we have known it so far. (Range from contributed to individually recruited, from internationalizing nuclear weapons to reducing all forces to police levels.)

It was clear that there were other stages possible in this range and one discussant called for the development of some kind of international riot control force, using sophisticated and subtle new weapons that were not destructive but only inhibiting.

One place to begin might be a renewed effort to find resources to support the UNEF. It was in the context of the discussion of this range of possibilities which might phase-in some kind of world legal order that the group broke up, reaffirming its position in support of the first proposal it adopted.

REPORT OF DISCUSSION GROUP C

DR. MAX F. MILLIKAN, *Chairman*
PROFESSOR GERARD J. MANGONE, *Rapporteur*

1. An agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for total disarmament at this time involves too many risks for United States security. The United States needs to construct its own nuclear forces so they will constitute a reliable, reasonable deterrent, clearly indicating that the force is designed essentially not as a first-strike force but as an invulnerable second-strike force. It was felt that if the Soviet Union followed a similar policy, nuclear armaments could be stabilized at a moderate level. Simultaneously, the United States should work on the problem of arms control, such as proclaiming its interest in Soviet Union proposals and its willingness to sit down at conferences and plan disarmament with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile it should give intensive study to the more effective implementation of machinery for the non-violent settlement of conflicts and to plans for an international peace force under the United Nations.

2. Because the whole future of disarmament hinges upon the evolution of Chinese capabilities and attitudes, it is essential that the United States take all possible steps to increase its knowledge and understanding of, and contact with the Chinese society. In particular, serious consideration must be given to the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and a liberalization of policy with respect to travel in and exchange with China.

3. For the long run, the United States should take all possible measures to influence the evolution of underdeveloped societies toward prosperous economies and responsible governments. This means not only a high level of economic aid and technical assistance, but also an increased effort at educational and cultural interchange.

4. Renewed efforts should be made to develop the international machinery of the United States in the peaceful settlement of disputes within the framework of the existing Charter and careful study should be made of revisions of the Charter with a view toward widening its function in the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. A greatly expanded national research effort on the strategy for peace is needed, but some felt that emphasis should be placed on a large new research institution, while others felt that the efforts of a variety of existing institutions should be reinforced and expanded. In any case, it was agreed that the United States government should immediately establish a focal agency or commission at the highest level charged with responsibility for research in this area.

6. This conference has produced a significant intellectual exchange on vital issues of international peace and the conference ought to be followed by another meeting within a year. For the succeeding conference papers should be prepared by a continuing study group and discussions should then be devoted to the formulation of more concrete recommendations on a strategy for peace.

REPORT OF DISCUSSION GROUP D

C. MAXWELL STANLEY, *Chairman*
PROFESSOR ROBERT HEFNER, *Rapporteur*

The two day discussions of Group D brought either unanimous or near unanimous agreement on the following:

Soviet Objectives:

There are ideological differences between the U. S. and U. S. S. R. which are not negotiable in the foreseeable future.

This fact must be considered in all approaches to strategy for peace.

U. S. Objectives:

We indorse as long-range goals the following statements by Mr. Herter:

> "*First,* to create certain universally accepted rules of law which, if followed, would prevent all nations from attacking other nations. Such rules of law should be backed by a world court and by effective means of enforcement—that is, by international armed force.
>
> "*Second,* to reduce national armed forces, under safe-guarded and verified arrangements, to the point where no single nation or group of nations could effectively oppose this enforcement of international law by international machinery."

One objective of the United States is to close the economic, social and political gap in the world.

Another objective of the United States is an international climate in which government by consent can flourish.

Arms Control:

We look upon arms control measures as an essential means of enhancing national security and international peace. Their efficacy must be measured in terms of the degree to which they contribute to these goals. From this view, arms control and armament are not contradictory, but rather complementary aspects of a responsible national security policy.

We are impressed by the need for basic research and planning in the entire arms control field—including the military, political, diplomatic, legal, economic and technological facets of the problem. An accelerated effort in this field is needed if the United States is to provide the leadership commensurate with its world responsibilities.

In light of this tremendous need, we strongly urge the establishment of a permanent agency, responsible directly to the President, charged with research into and planning of all aspects of arms control policy, including American policy toward international regulation and reduction of armaments.

In addition, we urge universities, foundations, research centers and other private institutions to contribute to a fuller understanding of national security

and arms control. Such endeavors will raise the level of public understanding of these crucial issues and will contribute to a more effective national policy.

United Nations Study:

It is recommended that the United States seek to establish a United Nations group to study the technical problems of arms control.

Disarmament Subcommittee:

We commend the Disarmament Subcommittee of the U. S. Senate for its high-level work during the past four years. We hope that the Senate will continue to devote substantial attention to this crucial issue.

World Law:

Having already endorsed the stated objective of the United States Government to work for a rule of world law, we wish to emphasize the need for active steps to develop and implement a working system of world law, without which permanent and just peace cannot be achieved.

To this end, we support and encourage efforts by all groups, private and governmental, domestic and international, to develop and codify a common basis of law for international application, the necessary machinery to permit its effective use, and the disposition by all peoples to abide by the rule of law in settlement of disputes.

International Court of Justice:

We recommend that the United States file a new Declaration accepting the obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in which, while we still reserve from the Court's jurisdiction matters that are essentially domestic, we recognize the Court's right to decide questions of interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction. This means omitting the present "Connally Amendment," under which we now reserve the right to determine for ourselves, in cases in which we are involved, whether the International Court has jurisdiction over a case as international rather than domestic.

The reasons for this recommendation are:

1. Under the reciprocity principle established in the *Norwegian Loans Case*, any other nation can defeat any valid claim brought by the United States, on behalf of itself or one of its citizens or corporations, by invoking our own self-judging clause against us and declaring the matter domestic. This is severely damaging to our own self-interest, particularly since, in view of the large amount of American investment, travel, residence and other interests abroad, we will normally have far more occasion to ask the Court's aid as plaintiffs than to meet the claims of others as defendants.

2. The Connally Reservation is probably incompatible with the Statute of the Court, to which we are signatories and by which we are legally bound, since this Statute plainly states that questions of jurisdiction shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

3. The Connally Reservation violates the universal elementary principle of law and common sense that no man shall be the judge in his own cause.

4. The lack of faith in the Court implied by this Reservation has damaged the Court's effectiveness, restricted its use, led other countries to adopt similar reservations, and discredited our attempts to give leadership to the broader program of strengthening the peaceful and orderly settlement of disputes under law.

5. A new Declaration, free of this Reservation—while it must not in itself be expected to work any miracles in bringing a rule of law in international affairs—would be one of the most tangible and constructive first steps toward such a rule of law that are now within the power of the United States to take.

It is also recommended that associations, educational institutions, foundations and other private organizations join in a concerted effort to help educate the American people in the presently somewhat unfamiliar facts, law and historical record bearing on this question, so that when the question comes to decision, that decision will be made on a firm basis of public understanding of the true facts and issues.

Underdeveloped Areas:

The United States has a great responsibility to assist the peoples in the underdeveloped areas. This would be true even if there were no Communist challenge in the world. We believe that foreign economic aid and other forms of assistance should help the recipients to develop their society in freedom, dignity and self-respect. It is all too clear that one of the main elements of Soviet strategy is to employ aid and trade as instruments of their political objective of winning the minds of men. This fact adds a new dimension to our foreign aid program which we cannot afford to ignore.

At the same time our government should not overlook opportunities to cooperate with other nations, including the Soviet Union, in multilateral aid programs which honor the basic rights of the peoples who are assisted.

We urge the Executive and Legislative branches of our government to develop and implement a comprehensive and adequate strategy for our program toward the less developed areas of the world. Only a program commensurate with our resources is worthy of our position of leadership in the world.

Final Recommendations as adopted on June 5, 1960, developed from consideration of the reports from the four discussion groups.

FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Adopted June 5, 1960

I.

We look upon arms control measures as an essential means of enhancing national security and international peace. Their efficacy must be measured in terms of the degree to which they contribute to these goals. From this view, arms control and armament are not contradictory, but rather complementary aspects of a responsible national security policy.

We are impressed by the need for basic research and planning in the entire arms control field—including the military, political, diplomatic, legal, economic and technological facets of the problem. This research should devote equal attention to the short-range problem of next steps toward arms control and the long-range problem of the kind of world peace system toward which the United States should be working. The research should emphasize the relation of short-run tactics to ultimate objectives. An accelerated effort in this field is needed if the United States is to provide the leadership commensurate with its world responsibilities.

In the light of this tremendous need, we strongly urge the establishment of a permanent staff at a high level, charged with research and analysis of all aspects of the arms control problem, including American policy toward international regulation and reduction of armaments.

II.

This Conference calls upon the United States Government to recommend to the United Nations the establishment of a corps of experts recruited by the Secretary General for the purpose of studying and assessing the methods and techniques of arms control.

Such a corps of experts, within the office of the Secretary General, could advise the Secretary General on the technical aspects of various proposals and would permit the Secretary General, should he feel it appropriate, to initiate proposals for study by all interested governments; it would also permit him to promulgate standards and principles which might be useful in guiding individula nations in their subsequent formulation of national arms control proposals.

We further urge the United States to join with other nations in the financial support of an operation of significant size, and to encourage its own nationals to engage in such work.

III.

We endorse the stated objective of the United States Government to work for the universal rule of law and wish to emphasize the need for more active steps to develop and implement a working system of international law, without which a permanent and just peace cannot be achieved. We recognize that a primary condition for such progress is the repeal of the national, self-judging reservations to the optional clause of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

To this end, we support and encourage efforts by all groups, private and governmental, to study the conditions upon which commonly accepted principles of law for international application might be developed.

IV.

Many universities, foundations, research centers and other private institutions are already planning expanded effort in research relating to the strategy of peace. These efforts deserve support and extension.

There is need not only for more continuity in these efforts but also for more coordination among private groups and between them and the government.

The current Conference which included among its functions a first step in communication among private groups has produced a significant intellectual exchange on the vital issues. As a further step the Conference should be followed by another meeting within a year which should include on its agenda discussion of proposals for a continuing organization to relate private activities to each other and to the government.

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Aley Allan, Staff Counsel
Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.
New York, N. Y.

Michael Amrine
American Psychological Association
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Robert C. Angell, Chairman
Executive Committee, The Center for
Research on Conflict Resolution
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

George S. Armstrong, President
George S. Armstrong & Co., Inc.
New York, N. Y.

Herbert Barchoff, President
Eastern Rolling Mills, Inc.
New York, N. Y.

George A. Beebe, Director
Institute for International Order
New York, N. Y.

Haughton Bell, Vice Pres. & Gen. Counsel
Mutual of New York
New York, N. Y.

Emile Benoit
Graduate School of Business,
Columbia University
New York, N. Y.

Edward L. Bernays
New York, N. Y.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Mass.

Robert R. Bowie, Director
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Mrs. William W. Bray
Cincinnati, Ohio

Courtney C. Brown, Dean
Graduate School of Business,
Columbia University
New York, N. Y.

Arthur E. Burns, Dean of the
Graduate Council
The George Washington University
Washington, D. C.

John F. Chapman
Harvard Business Review
Boston, Mass.

Leo Cherne, Executive Director
Research Institute of America
New York, N. Y.

John Cogley
Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions
The Fund for the Republic, Inc.
Santa Barbara, Calif.

Gen. J. Lawton Collins
Vice Chairman of the Board
Pfizer International, Inc.
Washington, D. C.

Rev. E. A. Conway, S.J.
The Creighton University
Omaha, Nebraska

R. J. Coveney, Vice President
Arthur D. Little, Inc.
New York, N. Y.

Myron M. Cowen
Washington, D. C.

Thomas J. Craven
Washington, D. C.

Capt. Ed. D. Davis
Department of Social Sciences
U. S. Military Academy
West Point, N. Y.

James E. Dougherty
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pa.

Robert W. Dowling, President
City Investing Co.
New York, N. Y.

Gen. William H. Draper, Jr.
Draper, Gaither & Anderson
Palo Alto, Calif.

Mel Dubin, President
Slant/Fin Radiator Corp.
Richmond Hill, New York

Vernon Eagle, Executive Director
New World Foundation
New York, N. Y.

Lawrence S. Finkelstein, Vice Pres.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
New York, N. Y.

Professor Roger Fisher
Law School of Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

William R. Frye
United Nations Correspondent
Christian Science Monitor
United Nations, N. Y.

Lt. Gen. James Gavin, President
Arthur D. Little, Inc.
Cambridge, Mass.

Melvin J. Gordon, President
Manchester Hosiery Mills
Manchester, New Hampshire

Mrs. Margaret Grant, General Secy.
Council on World Tensions
New York, N. Y.

Ernest S. Griffith, Dean
School of International Service
The American University
Washington, D. C.

Robert W. Hartley, Vice President
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D. C.

Professor Robert Hefner
The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Charles M. Herzfeld, President
Catholic Association for International Peace
Silver Spring, Maryland

J. W. Hickman, Associate Editor
General Electric Defense Quarterly
General Electric Co.
Schenectady, N. Y.

Roger Hilsman
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University
Washington, D. C.

Charles Hitch
Head, Economics Division
The RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California

Miss Nancy Hoepli
The Twentieth Century Fund
New York, N. Y.

Dr. Arthur N. Holcombe, Chairman
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
Cambridge, Mass.

Herman Kahn
Physics Division
The RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, Cal.

Amrom H. Katz
The RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, Cal.

Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.
National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D. C.

Professor Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
The Law School
The University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

Professor Stephen D. Kertesz
Chairman of the Committee on International Relations
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

Professor John Andrews King, Jr.
Secretary, International Legal Studies
Law School of Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Fred Korth, President
Continental National Bank
Fort Worth, Texas

Howard G. Kurtz
Handy Associates, Inc.
New York, N. Y.

Dr. Arthur Larson, Director
The World Rule of Law Center
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina

Mrs. Albert D. Lasker
New York, N. Y.

Ernest W. Lefever
Consultant to the International Affairs Program of the Ford Foundation
Washington, D. C.

Richard S. Leghorn, President
ITEK Corporation
Waltham, Mass.

David D. Lloyd, Director
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