

# THE NEW REPUBLIC

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## The Miscasting of McCone

*A number of highly-placed public servants in Washington who have a professional concern with intelligence and security matters were jarred by the President's unexpected nomination – within a few hours after Congress had adjourned – of John A. McCone to succeed Allen Dulles as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was felt that the bounds of prudence had been crossed – not because Mr. McCone is a Republican (the selection of Republican William Foster to head the disarmament agency was excellent), but because the Republican is John McCone, and because the job is CIA. Mr. Kennedy's nominee has been described as a "man of stature." He is that – a well-to-do engineer and industrialist, a tough administrator, a big donor to the Republican Party, a friend of Richard Nixon, a prominent Roman Catholic layman and confidante of ultra-conservative Cardinal McIntyre (Mr. McCone represented the US at the 17th anniversary of Pope Pius XII's coronation in 1956). He is also familiar with Washington bureaucracy, having served as Undersecretary of the Air Force, then as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from June, 1958, until his resignation was accepted by the new President in January. As successor to the controversial Admiral Strauss, Mr. McCone had made his peace with disgruntled Democrats on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in part by giving them information theretofore denied them. But what brought him most attention was his campaign to force a resumption of nuclear testing by the US. In retrospect, the method by which he pursued this aim casts some doubt on the reliability of his judgment. Thus, he said on July 25, 1960, that the test moratorium was a "greater disadvantage" to this country than to the USSR. That must be taken as an indication of his capacity for reliable estimates,*

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**THE NEW REPUBLIC** *A Journal of Opinion* Volume 145 Number 15 Issue 2449 October 9, 1961  
Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, 1244 19th St., N.W.,  
Washington 6, D. C. Phone: FEderal 8-2494. Single copy 25c. Yearly subscription, \$8.00; Foreign, \$9.00, Armed Forces  
personnel or students, \$5.00. Advertising rates upon request. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at  
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## The Miscasting of McCone

and of the kind of information on which he might base his reports to the President. For if the test ban was a "greater disadvantage" to the US in 1960, one is hard put to explain why it was the Russians who broke the moratorium in '61. The simplest explanation is that Mr. McCone favors "evidence" that supports his preconception - a human weakness, but dangerous in a CIA Director. Furthermore, not only did he frequently imply publicly (no evidence was offered) that the Soviets were testing secretly during the period of the moratorium, he is also credited (privately) by one colleague with laboring diligently behind the scenes for nearly three years to undermine the nuclear test ban negotiations altogether.

In his scholarly book, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, Harry Howe Ransom writes that the head of the CIA "must be a rare combination of administrative expert, imaginative scholar, courageous master spy, and a person of keen political sensitivity to the political ideals of the American Republic . . . a master judge and politician, but not a political partisan, and should be possessed of an inner integrity and common law sense." He concludes that "given CIA's vital contemporary importance to national security, the qualities required in a Director, and the agency's immunity from popular surveillance and control, the same care that goes into the choice of a Chief Justice of the United States should always attend the choice of a Director of Central Intelligence." How well does Mr. McCone meet this exacting standard? Not as well as Allen Dulles. Where self-effacement, balanced judgment, fine discrimination are prime requisites, Mr. McCone brings an impulsive temperament, an arrogant manner toward subordinates, a dogmatic rather than skeptical cast of mind. Great ambition and drive can be valuable, but in a Director of CIA they portend an expansion of the Agency's domain rather than, as had been hoped, a judicious cutting back of its activities. All this would seem enough to disqualify him, but in addition he is an amateur, not a "courageous master spy," without any previous experience in the operations he is expected to command. Even this handicap, however, might not be fatal were it not for his lacking a rudimentary sense of the ambiguities, the causes, of upheavals that are rocking every continent and with which CIA must contend. He is the kind of man who hates Communism not because it has betrayed the revolution, but because he assumes it is the revolution. That is a flaw beyond correction.

If confirmed, Mr. McCone will also become Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Board. His duties here go beyond the collecting of information: he is its filter. Through his sifting of events, the President is counseled on what may or may not happen, what should or should



# Political Settlement in Europe

by Leo Szilard

In his address to the United Nations on September 26, President Kennedy said that "if anyone doubts the extent to which our presence is desired by the people of West Berlin, we are ready to have this question submitted to a free vote. . . ." One may agree with the President that if the Berlin issue is going to be settled by an uneasy compromise – which may be regarded as just, but only because it is equally bad for all concerned – the people of West Berlin would want American troops to remain in the city. But if they were offered, as an alternative, a satisfactory political settlement, that both East and West would want to maintain in force, and that would make their city a livable place – then the people of West Berlin would prefer to cast their vote for it. If the continued presence of American troops in West Berlin is going to be necessary, in order to safeguard a novel precarious solution, then the Berlin issue will have remained unresolved.

Because I, personally, am convinced that the Berlin issue cannot be resolved in a satisfactory manner except within the framework of a general political settlement in Europe, I propose to examine here what such a settlement may involve. To this end it is necessary to recognize that, *in regard to Europe*, the true long-term goal of the United States and of the Soviet Union is exactly the same; this goal is to have Europe as stable as possible.

It is necessary to recognize too that there are difficulties inherent in the German problem with which one would have to cope, even if the Soviet Union were willing to accept any reasonable proposal which the United States might choose to put forward. In order to analyze these difficulties I shall adopt – for the sake of argument – the premise that East Germany, as well as

West Germany, would be recognized as a sovereign state, and that there would be set up some sort of a federation between them.

At the outset this federation might be a very loose one, and we may assume that its governing body would be barred from taking action on substantive issues, except with 50 percent, or more, of the East German votes, as well as 50 percent or more, of the West German votes.

From this point on, the development may then go in either of two directions, depending on whether –

(a) the federation would be kept a very loose one and would represent an attempt to perpetuate the division of Germany, or;

(b) the federation would be permitted to become, step-by-step, more tightly knit, leading to a truly united Germany in the predictable future.

Let us now examine the dangers to Europe inherent in each of these two, "opposite," solutions of the German problem.

(a) If it became apparent that the loose federation of the two German states merely serves the purpose of perpetuating the division of Germany, then, more likely than not, the unification of Germany would soon emerge as a political objective upon which all Germans may unite. If East Germany, as well as West Germany, were both set up as sovereign states (with both of them, perhaps, admitted to membership in the United Nations), then an armed uprising in East Germany against the established government could well seriously endanger the peace of Europe. In case of such an armed uprising, Soviet troops might cross the border of East Germany in support of the established government, West German troops might intervene in support of the insurgents, and the ensuing international conflict might lead to an all-out war.

If there is a political settlement in Europe which promotes the industrial development of East Germany and which is conducive to a political liberalization in East Germany, then, within a few years, the established East German Government may be able to count on the support of a substantial minority, even though perhaps not a majority, of the population of East Germany. When that time comes, there would then be no further need to station Soviet troops on East German territory. Until then, however, the stationing of Soviet troops on East German territory, at the request of and in agreement with the established East German Government,

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might be the only safe way for the securing of the peace in that region of the world.

(b) If the federation were to lead to a truly united Germany within the predictable future then, more likely than not, the recovery of the territories lost to Poland would emerge as a political objective on which all Germans may unite.

These days one may hear in West Germany that the recovery of these territories is a major political objective, but that it must not be accomplished by the use of force. This is a rather peculiar qualification, as long as there is no way of accomplishing the return of these

territories – except through the use of force. What may be meant is that there will be no need for the use of force, because the threat of force may suffice.

Guaranteeing the Oder-Neisse line by the United States would be almost meaningless, as long as America has to rely on NATO, of which Germany is an integral part. Nor would either Britain or France be likely to render military assistance to Poland against Germany, even if they were legally obliged to do so.

As long as Russia remains in possession of atomic and hydrogen bombs, and Germany has no such bombs, Russia might be in a position to protect Poland. But this

## *On the Point of Honor*

In a recent column Mr. George Sokolsky says that the American people must either be "ready and willing to get into nuclear war" or else be "(1) isolated or (2) conquered or (3) reduced to an ignoble status." On the same day the *New York Times*, still hopeful of peace, urged a "course of decency and honor." On the previous day James Reston was able to report that President Kennedy's aim for Berlin was simply "the genuine preservation of its freedom and the preservation of the honor of the United States." The Vice President, Lyndon Johnson, has pledged "our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."

One seldom hears of private affairs of honor these days, but the honor of nations is legion. As a matter of fact, the sense of national honor reached its modern ascendance just about the time in history that private dueling was on the way out. It even supplied an argument against the duel. Thus a tract against dueling in 1792 recommends another "noble theater . . . for the display of generous valour . . . I mean the defense of our country, when attacked by an insidious and ambitious foe."

Honor originally meant fame, especially the reputation for courage and sheer physical prowess. But in the Socratic and Christian tradition honor came to mean the love of virtue for its own sake. The original sense of honor implied ambition. Christianity preached against worldly fame and ambition. A compromise was in order: honor became the reputation of virtue. The code of honor gradually became entirely defensive. By the end of the 18th Century one might possibly defend one's reputation by force, but never compel someone else to defend his. Thus Mr. Sokolsky's sense of honor is more primitive, and that of the *Times* more civilized.

Honor is a promise to govern oneself in some agreed way. It is self-imposed virtue. One under-

takes to make *oneself* behave in a certain way. Honor can be shared only with those who share the particular ideals to which it is devoted. Clearly the Vice President's pledge is addressed to the West Berliners, not to the Russians. The words from the Declaration of Independence are "we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."

Honor is a particular kind of pledge, distinguished by the particular kind of security it offers. That security is life itself. One offers to die rather than abridge one's promise. The strong emotion that is thus attached to an ideal is curiously the reverse of most emotions. Instead of longing to possess or embrace something, this emotion thrives on the possibility of losing everything. Pacifists who compare the deliberately programmed Berlin crisis to a game of "chicken" on the highways are actually suggesting that there is something pathological about honor. But men of all persuasions must concede that honor deeply stirs the blood. The proof in history is that men have given their lives for so many conflicting ideals. The atom bomb has made "I'd rather be Red than dead" a peculiarly contemporary sentiment. But the opposite sentiment, "I'd rather be dead than Red" – or black or white – is as old as civilization.

A poor gentleman is well known to be more sensitive to honor than a rich gentlemen, who can afford to be free with his reputation. Thus pride compensates for riches, and riches for pride. In international affairs, similarly, the sense of honor can compensate for real strength. Hence we hear most of honor in connection with Berlin, where our physical position is all but untenable. Honor flourishes on narrow grounds. The nicer the principles for which one pledges one's life, the higher the tension of the commitment.

ALEXANDER WELSH



would no longer be the case if Germany were to become a major atomic power.

The political aspirations of a united Germany for the recovery of territories lost to Poland would not need, however, to lead to trouble, if there were no atomic bombs or hydrogen bombs under German control, or if the economic integration of Western Europe were accompanied by far-reaching political integration. If there were far-reaching political integration in Western Europe, then the rest of the European nations might be able politically to restrain Germany from pursuing political aspirations that are not shared by the other Western European nations. Moreover, if peace in Europe were maintained for another generation, then the political set of values of the Germans might undergo a substantial change and the recovery of the territories lost to Poland might then no longer loom as large as it does at present.

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Assuming that at the outset a confederation would be set up between East Germany and West Germany, it could be, step by step, transformed into a closely-knit federation, as the obstacles which stand in the way of unification of Germany disappear one by one – provided that the Soviet Union were to go along with such a development. I have posed myself the question: Under what conditions may we expect the Soviet Union to do so?

It is not likely that such a settlement could be obtained by protracted horse-trading between the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather, such horse-trading may be expected to follow the course of least resistance and to end up with a compromise that takes the United States and the Soviet Union off the hook, but leaves the people of Berlin in the lurch. For, if – in the absence of a genuine political accommodation – free communication between East Berlin and West Berlin is not established on an enduring basis and if the people living in West Berlin have no free access to adjacent East German territory, so that they can at least spend their weekends outside of the city, West Berlin is going to wither away.

The United States has certain privileges in West Berlin, by right of conquest, and if she keeps on insisting on these rights she may well get her pound of flesh – at the cost of West Berlin bleeding to death.

In the face of the difficulties inherent in the German problem, it is *not possible* to devise a political settlement today which will *guarantee* a peaceful evolution in Europe. The best one can do in this regard is to leave the door open for such an evolution. I am attempting to outline here a political settlement which might accomplish this, in the form of the following “package”:

(1) *Both East Germany and West Germany shall be recognized as sovereign states and there shall be no*

*limitation placed upon their freedom to federate with each other, with the following exceptions: East Germany and West Germany may not merge their defense and foreign policy, as long as, directly or indirectly, West Germany remains allied with the United States and East Germany remains allied with the Soviet Union. Further, private property in the West German state must not be nationalized except through the action of the administration (or the action of the representatives) of the West German state and property publicly owned or controlled, in East Germany must not be returned to private ownership, except through the action of the administration (or the action of the representatives) of the East German state.*

The Soviet Union may be expected to be concerned that a united Germany might be formed which is militarily allied with the West. She ought to be given assurances that if Germany is unified, she will be neutral, and perhaps demilitarized as well. Accordingly, since at present West Germany is an integral part of NATO, as long as the United States wishes to maintain NATO and West Germany is willing to remain in it, there can be no merger of the two German states, with regard to defense and foreign policy.

The Soviet Union may be expected to be concerned about the return to private ownership of the property at present owned and controlled by the East German state and she may need to have assurances that the socialist economy of East Germany would not be dismantled after East Germany becomes part of a federated Germany. The treaty setting up a federation between the West German state and the East German state should therefore contain a provision that would offer guarantees in this regard.

It would be desirable, of course, to go beyond such a “paper guarantee.” If labor and industry in West Germany were to understand the nature of this problem and were then to reach the conclusion that they would be willing to have state ownership of the means of production endure in East Germany, this would offer a much more reliable assurance to the Soviet Union than any “paper guarantee.”

(2) *Both East Germany and West Germany shall become members of the United Nations.*

(3) *The Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France shall recognize the Oder-Neisse line, as the legal boundary of Poland.*

(4) *East Germany shall shift its capital from East Berlin to, say, Leipzig or Dresden and both East Berlin and West Berlin shall be set up as a free city – with free communications between them. These two cities shall each have the same neutral status as Austria, except that if the majority of each of these two cities should vote in a plebiscite, held under the supervision of the United Nations, for merging both free cities with*



*East Germany, such a merger shall take place. The first such plebiscite shall be held in 10 years, and thereafter, at the request of East Germany, such a plebiscite shall be held every 10 years.*

The free cities of East and West Berlin could form a loose federation and we may assume that – to start with – the governing body of this federation would be barred from taking action on any substantive issues except with 50 percent or more of the votes of the representatives of West Berlin and 50 percent, or more, of the votes of the representatives of East Berlin. In spite of such a limitation, this governing body could adopt a number of measures which could improve the living conditions in Berlin and raise the *status* of the entire city.

About three years ago I spent several months in West Berlin. There was no telephone communication between East Berlin and West Berlin at that time. People could freely cross over from one half of the city to the other, but taxicabs could not cross the dividing line. There was good theater both in East Berlin and in West Berlin, and people crossed the line in order to go to the theater. It was very difficult, however, to find out in West Berlin what was playing in the theaters of East Berlin, because the West Berlin papers did not carry this information, and there were no posters on display. I imagine the situation in East Berlin was quite similar.

Once the two Berlins cease to be pawns in the Cold War, Berlin could again become a great cultural center; its theaters and concert halls might once more attract visitors from all over the world, as they did for a short period of time between the two World Wars.

The issue of stationing foreign troops in the free cities need not arise – just as it has never arisen in the case of Austria – if there is a political settlement which both the Soviet Union and the United States would wish to keep in force.

If the loose federation between East Germany and West Germany gradually evolves into a unified Germany, then at some point along the road, the inhabitants of the free cities of East Berlin and West Berlin might prefer that the two cities be merged into one city and be part of East Germany. It seems advisable to leave the door open for such a development.

(5) *The two free cities shall each be permitted to build, if they desire to do so, two elevated highways, one connecting the city with West Germany and the other with Poland. Traffic in East Germany shall cross these highways through underpasses. As long as the two free cities remain in existence, East Germany shall yield sovereignty on these highways to the corresponding free city, but East Germany shall retain sovereignty in the underpasses and in the air above the highways.*

Since the two free cities are located within East German territory, there is a possible conflict between free access to them and the sovereignty of the East German state. The desire to reduce the likelihood of such a conflict, might induce the two free cities to build such elevated highways.

(6) *Migration from East Germany to West Germany or vice versa shall be free – within limits – and be based upon an agreed upon quota for each category of emigrant. Until such time as East Germany and West Germany agree upon the quotas, there shall be set a flat quota of three percent, for each category of emigrants. In order to enable East Germany to exercise adequate control over the entry of persons, from East Germany into East Berlin, the relevant railroad junctions located in East Berlin shall be shifted to adjacent East German territory.*

Migration from East Germany to West Germany in the last few years represented a steady flow of somewhat less than one percent of the population of East Germany per year. A migration of this magnitude could be regarded as almost normal if it were not for the fact that it was uneven; a very large fraction of doctors and other professionals were leaving East Germany.

Unique to this migration of doctors, in comparison to migration, say, from the continent of Europe to England or from New York to California, was the fact that West Germany did not set a limit on the number of doctors and other professionals she was willing to accept. If migration from East Germany to West Germany were evenly distributed over all categories of people, a quota perhaps as high as three percent could be tolerated.

If there is an adequate political settlement, the easiest way to control migration is through the cooperation of the two German states. If there were a satisfactory agreement on the regulation of migration, then there would be no need for East Germany to control the entry of persons into East Berlin from East Germany.

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In the absence of an agreement on migration, East Germany might have to exercise such a control. But if East Berlin is no longer the capital of East Germany, the number of East Germans who have to go to East Berlin on business would be greatly reduced, and it would become possible for East Germany to exercise adequate control – provided that the relevant railway junctions which are now located in East Berlin are shifted to adjacent East German territory.

(7) *East Germany, West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia shall not produce atomic weapons or means specifically suitable for the delivery of such weapons.*

(8) *The Soviet Union, the United States, England and France shall not transfer atomic weapons or means specifically suitable for the delivery of such weapons to East German, West German, Polish or Czechoslovakian control.*

(9) *Atomic weapons originating in the United States, as well as the corresponding means for their delivery, shall not be stationed on the continent of Europe, except under the physical control of American military units operating under direct American command. Similarly, atomic weapons originating in the Soviet Union, as well as the corresponding means for their delivery, shall not be stationed on the continent of Europe – outside the territory of the Soviet Union – except under*

*the direct physical control of Soviet military units under Soviet command.*

The Soviet Union may be expected to be concerned about Germany becoming an atomic power by the back door, so to speak, through her participation in NATO and a package of this sort would be much more attractive for the USSR, if it gave assurances in this regard.

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Whether a package of this sort may be acceptable to Washington I would not know, and if I knew I would not be free to say.

Shifting of the capital of East Germany from Berlin to some other East German city might be hard for Russia to accept. Yet there is no other way to arrive at an enduring political settlement that would reliably detach West Berlin from West Germany.

Whether the Russians could be convinced that what I have proposed here ought to be acceptable to them, I would not venture to predict. I can, however, say, with a fair degree of assurance, that if the Soviet Union were to offer such a package, then she could accept President Kennedy's challenge and demand that the people of West Berlin be given a free choice between it and some precarious compromise that would need to be safeguarded by the continued presence of American troops in Berlin.

## The Bowles Affair

by Richard Robbins

### I. AN OLD FRIEND REAPPEARS

When Henry Fairington telephoned to invite me to lunch I could not repress a feeling of surprise. I should have supposed myself inured to the unexpected. I have encountered, after all, during many years at the bar in New York, again in the maze of academic power that is Harvard Yard, and now in the higher bureaucracy in Washington, a succession of events so extraordinary they would seem fictional were they not, in some curious way, true. Still, Henry Fairington, after so many years. . . I knew he wanted something of me. But what?

Straightaway he came to the point. He had a way of doing that, coming at you abruptly, his brilliant eyes

ruthless and at the same time rather gentle. He had got his chance of course during the war. Surprisingly, he had taken it. And to the chagrin of those who did not take him at his word, he moved steadily up the ladder of power. At the top rung now, an Undersecretary in a well-known Department, he held the reins of power with authority. And yet was I wrong to see in him a certain flawed quality, a loss of nerve when the "chips" were down. Whereas I, an Assistant Secretary in Works and Services, a man of less prestige but of greater discernment, came off as a sounder judge of men and their intentions. In the last analysis I could, one might say, pull it off. Henry Fairington, for all his brilliance, could not. Suddenly I saw, in one of those moments of insight that come to men accustomed to the thrust and parry of power, that Fairington needed me more than I needed him. I waited, saying nothing. His demarche, I

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September 17, 1961

Political Settlement in Europe

By Leo Szilard

I doubt that it is possible to resolve the so-called Berlin crisis in a satisfactory manner, except perhaps within the framework of a general political settlement in Europe.

If we want to arrive at such a settlement, we must first of all recognize that, in regard to Europe, the true long-term goal of the United States and the Soviet Union is exactly the same. This goal is to have Europe as stable as possible. Secondly, it is necessary to recognize that there are difficulties which are inherent in the German problem and that one would have to cope with these difficulties even if the Soviet Union were willing to accept any reasonable proposal that America might wish to put forward.

In the face of the difficulties inherent in the German problem, as well as the present political instability in France, it is, at this time, not possible to devise a political settlement for Europe that would offer ironclad guarantees for the enduring stability of Europe. There is no reason to believe, however, that we would be better off in this regard if we were to postpone the settlement, rather, there is reason to believe that further procrastination would create additional difficulties.

In order to analyze the difficulties which are inherent in the German problem, <sup>I shall</sup> ~~we~~ start out with discussing two opposite solutions



of this problem, without regard, at first, as to what solutions may or may not be acceptable to the Soviet Union. For the purposes of this discussion, I propose to adopt the premise that East Germany, as well as West Germany, would be recognized as a sovereign state, and that there would be set up some sort of a federation between them. To start with, this federation might be a very loose one and we may assume that its governing body would be barred from taking action on substantive issues, except with 50 percent, or more, of the East Germany votes, as well as 50 percent, or more, of the West German votes.

From this starting point on, the development may then go in either of two directions, depending on whether --

(a) the federation would be kept a very loose one and would represent an attempt to perpetuate the division of Germany, or

(b) the federation would be permitted to become, step-by-step, more tightly knit and to lead to a truly united Germany, in the predictable future.

Let us now examine the dangers to the stability of Europe inherent in each of these two "opposite" solutions of the German problem.

(a) If it became apparent that the loose federation of the two German states merely serves the purpose of perpetuating the division of Germany, then, more likely than not, the unification of Germany would soon emerge as a political goal upon which all Germans may unite. If East Germany, as well as West Germany, were both set up as a sovereign state, with both of them, perhaps, admitted to



membership in the United Nations, then an armed uprising in East Germany against the established government could seriously endanger the peace of Europe. In case of such an armed uprising, Soviet troops might cross the border of East Germany in support of the established government, West German troops might intervene in support of the insurgents, and the ensuing international conflict might lead to an all-out war.

(b) If the federation were to lead to a truly united Germany in the near future, more likely than not, the recovery of the territories lost to Poland would emerge as a political objective on which all Germans may unite.

Guaranteeing the Oder-Neisse Line by America would be almost meaningless, as long as America has to rely on NATO, of which Germany is an integral part. And in a generally disarmed world, America would be in no position to render military assistance to Poland against Germany, even if she were inclined to do so.

Unless the economic integration of Western Germany were accompanied by far-reaching political integration, neither Britain nor France would be able politically to restrain Germany, nor would they be likely to render military assistance to Poland against Germany, even if they were legally obliged to do so.

As long as Russia remains in possession of atomic and hydrogen bombs, while Germany has no such bombs, she might be in a position to protect Poland. But if Germany became a major atomic power, or if there were general disarmament, then Russia might no longer be in



a position to protect Poland.

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In the face of these difficulties, inherent in the German problem, it is not possible to devise a political settlement which would guarantee a peaceful evolution in Europe. The best we can do is to devise a settlement that will leave the door open for such an evolution.

Assuming that one would start out with the setting up of a confederation, or a loose federation, between East Germany and West Germany, I have asked myself under what conditions we may expect the Soviet Union to go along with a gradual transformation of such a confederation, so that, as the obstacles standing in the way of the unification of Germany disappear, one by one, the confederation may evolve, step-by-step, towards a unified Germany. The package described below is devised with this end in view.

A package of this sort may become acceptable both to the Soviet Union and the United States, if we ever reach the point where the goal of making Europe politically as stable as possible, as well as the welfare of the people of Berlin and Germany, become the overriding considerations.

I doubt, however, that such a package may be arrived at as the result of protracted horsetrading between the governments involved. Intergovernmental negotiations are likely to start out with two wholly inadequate proposals, one by the West and one by the Soviet Union. It is likely that the subsequent negotiations would follow the course of least resistance and end up with a "compromise" that



takes the United States and the Soviet Union off the hook, but leaves the people of Berlin in the lurch. For if there is no real accommodation arrived at on the German issue, if free communication between East Berlin and West Berlin is not established, on an enduring basis, and if the people living in West Berlin have no free access to adjacent East German territory, so that they can spend their weekends outside of the city, West Berlin will rapidly wither away. The United States has certain privileges in West Berlin, by right of conquest, and if she keeps on insisting on these rights she may well get her pound of flesh -- at the cost of West Berlin bleeding to death.

The Package

(1) Both East Germany and West Germany shall be recognized as sovereign states and there shall be no limitation placed upon their freedom to federate with each other, with the following exceptions: East Germany and West Germany may not merge their defense and foreign policy, as long as West Germany directly or indirectly remains militarily allied <sup>with</sup> ~~to~~ the United States or East Germany remains allied with the Soviet Union. Further, private property in the West German state must not be nationalized except through the action of the administration (or the action of the representatives) of the West German state and property publicly owned, or publicly controlled, in East Germany must not be returned to private ownership, except through the action of the administration (or the action of the representatives) of the East German state.

The Soviet Union may be expected to be concerned that a united



Germany might be formed which is militarily allied with the West. She ought to be given assurances that if Germany is unified, it will be neutral, and perhaps demilitarized, as well as neutral. Accordingly, since at present West Germany is an integral part of NATO, as long as the United States wishes to maintain NATO and West Germany is willing to remain in it, there can be no merger of the two German states, with regard to defense and foreign policy.

The Soviet Union may be expected to be concerned about the return to private ownership of the property at present owned and controlled by the East German state and she ought to be given assurances that the socialist economy of East Germany would not be dismantled after East Germany becomes part of a federated Germany. The treaty setting up a federation between the West German state and the East German state should contain a provision that would offer guarantees in this regard.

It would be desirable, of course, to go beyond such a "paper guarantee". If labor and industry in West Germany were made to understand the nature of this problem and were then to reach the conclusion that they would be willing to have state ownership of the means of production endure in East Germany, this would offer much better assurances in this regard, than any "paper guarantee" could offer.

There are a number of arguments why both industry and labor in West Germany ought to look with favor upon maintaining East Germany as a socialist sector within a unified Germany, while West Germany would continue to operate on the basis of a free market economy. It



is conceivable that they would be responsive to these arguments.

(2) Both East Germany and West Germany shall become members of the United Nations.

(3) The Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France shall recognize the Oder-Neisse Line, as the legal boundary of Poland.

(4) East Germany shall shift its capital from East Berlin to, say, Leipzig or Dresden and both East Berlin and West Berlin shall be set up as a free city -- with free communications between them.

These two cities shall each have the same neutral status as Austria, except that if the majority of each of these two cities should vote in a plebiscite, held under the supervision of the United Nations, for merging both free cities with East Germany, such a merger shall take place. The first such plebiscite shall be held in 10 years and as long as the free cities remain in existence such a plebiscite shall be held every 10 years, at the request of East Germany.

The free cities of East and West Berlin could form a loose federation and we may assume that -- to start with -- the governing body of this federation would be barred from taking action on any substantive issues except with 50%, or more, of the votes of the representatives of East Berlin, and 50%, or more, of the votes of the representatives of West Berlin. In spite of such a limitation this governing body could adopt a number of measures, which could improve the living conditions in Berlin and greatly raise the status of the city of Berlin.

About three years ago I spent several months in West Berlin. There was no telephone communication between East Berlin and West



Berlin at that time. People could freely cross over from one half of the city to the other, but taxicabs could not cross the dividing line. There was good theater both in East Berlin and West Berlin, and people crossed the line in order to go to the theater. It was very difficult, however, to find out in West Berlin what was playing in the theaters of East Berlin, because the West Berlin papers did not carry this information and there were no posters on display. I imagine the situation in East Berlin was quite similar.

Once the two Berlins cease to be pawns in the cold war, Berlin could again become a great cultural center; its theaters and concert halls might once more attract visitors from all over the world, as they did for a short period of time between the two world wars.

The status of both East Berlin and West Berlin could be very similar to the "neutral" status of Austria. The issue of stationing foreign troops in the free cities need not arise -- just as it has never arisen in the case of Austria -- if there is a political settlement which both the Soviet Union and the United States would manifestly wish to keep in force.

If the loose federation between East Germany and West Germany gradually evolves into a unified Germany, then at some point along the road, the inhabitants of the free cities of East Berlin and West Berlin might prefer that the two cities be merged into one city and be part of East Germany. It seems advisable to leave the door open for such a development to take place.



(5) The two free cities shall each be permitted to build, if they desire to do so, two elevated highways, one connecting the city with West Germany and the other with Poland. Traffic in East Germany shall cross these highways through underpasses. As long as the two free cities remain in existence, East Germany shall yield sovereignty on these highways to the corresponding free city, but East Germany shall retain sovereignty in the underpasses and in the air above the highways.

Since the two free cities are located within East German territory, there is a possible conflict between free access to them and the sovereignty of the East German state. The desire to reduce the likelihood of such a conflict, might induce the two free cities to build such elevated highways.

(6) Migration from East Germany to West Germany or vice versa shall be free -- within limits -- and be based upon an agreed upon quota, for each category of emigrant. Until such time as East Germany and West Germany agree upon the quotas, there shall be set a flat quota of 3% per year, for each category of emigrants. In order to enable East Germany to exercise adequate control over the entry of persons, from East Germany into East Berlin, the relevant railroad junctions located in East Berlin shall be shifted to adjacent East German territory.

Migration from East Germany to West Germany in the last few years represented a steady flow of somewhat less than 1% of the population of East Germany per year. A migration of this magnitude could be regarded as almost normal and it would be well within tolerable limits if it were not for the fact that it was uneven; a very large fraction



of doctors and other professionals were leaving East Germany.

Unique about this migration, in comparison to migration, say from the continent of Europe to England, was the fact that West Germany did not set a limit on the number of doctors and other professionals she was willing to accept. If after the war, England had permitted doctors coming from Germany to settle in England, half of the German doctors might have gone to England. Another relevant fact is, of course, that men moving from East Germany to West Germany do not encounter any language or cultural barrier.

If migration from East Germany to West Germany were evenly distributed over all categories of people, a quota above 1%, perhaps as high as 3%, could be tolerated. If there is an adequate political settlement, the easiest way to control migration is through the cooperation of the two German states. The number of doctors who migrate from East Germany to West Germany each year, could be best controlled if West Germany were to set a limit on the number of doctors that she would accept each year. If there were a satisfactory agreement between East Germany and West Germany on the regulation of migration in general, then there would be no need for East Germany to control the entry of persons into East Berlin from East Germany.

In the absence of an agreement on migration, East Germany might have to exercise such a control. But if East Berlin is no longer the capital of East Germany, the number of East Germans who have to go to East Berlin on business, would be greatly reduced and it would become possible for East Germany to exercise adequate control, provided



that the relevant railway junctions which are now located in East Berlin are shifted to adjacent East German territory.

(7) East Germany, West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia shall not transfer atomic weapons or means specifically suitable for the delivery of such weapons.

(8) The Soviet Union, the United States, England and France shall not transfer atomic weapons or means specifically suitable for the delivery of such weapons to East German, West German, Polish or Czechoslovakian control.

(9) Atomic weapons originating in the United States, as well as the corresponding means for their delivery, shall not be stationed on the continent of Europe, except under the physical control of American military units operating under direct American command. Similarly, atomic weapons originating in the Soviet Union, as well as the corresponding means for their delivery, shall not be stationed on the continent of Europe -- outside the territory of the Soviet Union -- except under the direct physical control of Soviet military units, under direct Soviet command.

The Soviet Union may be expected to be concerned about Germany becoming an atomic power, so to speak, through the back door, through her participation in NATO. If it gave assurances in this regard, a package of this sort would be much more acceptable to the Soviet Union, than it would be otherwise.



Postscript

The political settlement outlined above would not eliminate the political instability arising from Germany's aspirations for the recovery of the territories lost to Poland. These days one may frequently hear in Germany that the recovery of these territories is a major political objective, but that it must not be accomplished by the use of force. This, of course, is a meaningless qualification as long as there is no way of accomplishing the return of these territories, except through the use of force.

Germany's political aspirations for the recovery of the territories lost to Poland would perhaps evaporate if there were a far-reaching political integration in Western Europe, which would include Western Germany. Moreover, Western Germany could then be politically restrained by the other Western European nations. The economic integration, at present in progress in Western Europe, may be a step in the right direction, but it could not keep Western Germany from taking independent action in the field of foreign policy.

The chances of having far-reaching political integration in Western Europe cannot be appraised, at the present time, with a reasonable assurance. At the time of this writing France has not yet solved her colonial problems. Moreover, no one can tell today whether if DeGaulle were to die, the French army might not take over and establish a Fascist regime. This might happen, of course, even while DeGaulle is alive. If such a change were to take place in France, it might lead to a Fascist Franco-German alliance or the old enmity



between Germany and France might flare up again and substantially block any further integration of Western Europe.

Even if the political situation were stabilized in France, it would not appear likely that in the predictable future far-reaching political integration in Europe could be achieved, through the creation of super national agencies, and the step-by-step delegation of sovereign rights by the individual Western nations to such agencies. But, if the parliamentary form of democracy is re-established in France and if it remains in force in Germany, progress towards political integration of Western Europe could perhaps be accomplished through a novel approach to this problem:

There could be introduced a limited representation in the parliament of each nation, in Western Europe, of the other Western European nations. In each case such "foreign representation" in the parliament could start out very low, say at a few percent of the seats, and increase step-by-step until it reaches perhaps 20% or 25% of the seats.

Such a limited "foreign representation", in each of the parliaments, would appropriately reflect the actually existing interdependence of the nations of Western Europe. It would not affect the overall voting strength of the extreme left parties in these parliaments. It would, however, decrease the influence of the extreme right wing parties, because the representatives of such parties of two neighboring nations would not be likely to vote on the same side of the ex-



plosive controversial issues.

If political integration went along with economic integration, then the nations in Western Europe might be able politically to restrain each other from pushing their individual national aspirations to the point where they would clash and endanger <sup>the</sup> peace.

The End