

L. Szilard

*By top reading from  
with cuts.*

*april*  
March 10, 1947

I was probably asked to write this article because I am suspected of being a member of a conspiracy which produced the atomic bomb.

Mass murders have always commanded the attention of the public, and atomic scientists are no exception to this rule.

As far as I can see, I am not particularly qualified to speak about the problem of peace.

I am a scientist and science, which has created the bomb and confronted the world with a problem, has no solution to offer to this problem.

Yet a scientist may perhaps be permitted to speak on the problem of peace, not because he knows more about it than other people do, but ~~rather~~ because no one seems to know very much about it.

Some of us physicists tend to take a rather gloomy view of the present world situation.

We know that Nagasaki-type bombs could be produced in large quantities, and we know that the United States would be in a very dangerous position if ~~many~~ stockpiles of such bombs were available to an enemy at the outbreak of the war.

Moreover, when we think of a war that may come perhaps ten or fifteen years from now, we do not think of it in terms of Nagasaki bombs.

Nagasaki bombs destroy cities by the blast which they cause.

But ten or fifteen years from now giant bombs which disperse radioactive substances in the air may be set off far away from our cities.

If such giant bombs were used against us, the buildings of our cities would remain undamaged, but the people inside of the cities would not remain alive.

The traditional aim of foreign policy is to prolong the peace, i.e., to lengthen the interval between two wars.

We physicists find it difficult to get enthusiastic about such an objective.

The outlines of a war which may be fought with these weapons of the future are now becoming more and more clearly visible from our vantage point, and if we accepted the view that the world has to go through another war before it arrives at a state of peace, we would probably pray for an early rather than a late war.

Clearly foreign policies which may prolong the peace can not furnish the solution to our problem.

Collective security might very well have solved the problem which faced the world in 1919.

Under conditions different from those which prevail today, perhaps it could have been made to work, assuming American participation.

But the ills of 1947 cannot be cured with the remedies of 1919.

With the United States and Russia far outranking in military power all other nations, there is no combination of nations which could restrain ~~from illegal action~~ <sup>by force</sup> either of these two giants.

Moreover, between the Russian Government and the Government of the United States there has arisen a rather peculiar relationship.

Because of the possibility that they might be at war with each other at some future time, these two governments consider it their duty to put their countries into the position of winning that war if war should come.

Stated in these terms, their problem is not capable of a solution satisfactory to both parties.

Russia and the United States are thus caught in a vicious circle and the more they allow their national policies to be guided by considerations of maximum relative military strength, the more rigidly their course will be determined and the less freedom of action they will retain for working towards the establishment of peace.

No balance of power in the original meaning of the term is possible in such a situation.

Moreover, there has arisen between the Russian government and the government of the United States, a rather peculiar relationship.

Because of the possibility that they might be at war with each other at some future time, these two governments consider it their duty to put their ~~countries~~ <sup>countries</sup> into the position of winning that war if war should come.

Stated in these terms, the problem is not capable of a solution which is satisfactory to both parties and Russia and the United States are thus caught in a vicious circle of never-ending difficulties.

This peculiar relationship between them became apparent sometime between Yalta and Potsdam.

Just what caused the change in their relationship is difficult to say.

Perhaps there was no particular cause other than the fact that these two countries have lost their common enemy before they had reached an agreement on a post-war settlement.

Russia's desire to push her frontiers in northern Europe as far as possible can be understood on the basis of strategic considerations. ~~We observe that she~~

We observe that she wishes to dominate politically Rumania and Albania which are strategically important to her.

The United States wants to have friendly governments in Greece and Turkey.

Obviously, friendly governments in these countries would secure access to the Black Sea for the American and British fleets and would, in case of war, enable us to carry the war to the Russian ports there.

Any economic aid that Russia may get would in some measure increase her ability to fight a war, and we know that when Russia was on the point of obtaining a loan of several hundred million dollars from the Swedish government, the newspapers reported that the United States ambassador protested to the Swedish government against granting such a loan. ~~The only economic aid which Russia was able~~

The only economic aid which Russia was able to secure was a total of 250 million dollars of relief granted by UNRRA which went to the Ukraine and Byelorussia. This <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ less than the amount of relief which Italy obtained.

All this does not mean, of course, that either the United States or Russia want war.

It merely means that they want to win the war if there is one.

But as long as Russia and the United States will allow their policies to be guided mainly by such considerations, their course will be rigidly determined, and they will retain little freedom of action for working toward the establishment of peace.

How does atomic energy and the bomb fit into this picture?

Atomic bombs may be the only weapon by means of which Russia ~~can~~ <sup>could</sup> carry the war to the territory of the United States if there should be a war.

Clearly, this is good and sufficient reason for the United States to try and eliminate atomic bombs from national armaments.

But can we see <sup>clearly</sup> clearly for what specific reason Russia should be expected to concur particularly if the methods of control involve measures which are difficult for her to accept?

In order to have effective control of atomic energy, the United States proposed to set up an atomic development authority in charge of mining, refining and manufacturing of uranium and other dangerous materials all over the world.

It is a good proposal and it is difficult to see how control could be made effective on lesser terms.

But, thinking in terms of a possible war, it is easy enough to understand why Russia hesitates to agree to this proposal.

Clearly, large scale operations of such an agency on ~~the~~ Russian territory would give the United States and other nations access to information of strategic importance to which they have no access at present such as the details of the road and the railroad systems and the location of various industries.

What are the reasons which might, nevertheless, move Russia to agree to some form of an effective method of control?

For one, <sup>thing</sup> such an agreement would greatly reduce the mounting tension in the world and improve our chances of avoiding war.

In this sense at least it will serve the interests of Russia as well as the interests of the United States, ~~to reach an agreement on the issue of atomic bombs.~~

Moreover, as long as the United States has a stock pile of atomic bombs and Russia has none, Russia can not be certain that she will not be attacked and that the United States will not wage a preventive war perhaps on the very issue of the control of atomic energy.

Today it is difficult for us to imagine that the United States should ever take such action.

Having ratified the United Nations charter, we can not legally go to war except in the case of an armed attack or on the basis of a unanimous vote in the security council.

The mere refusal of Russia to enter into an agreement on the control of atomic energy could hardly be construed as an armed attack.

From the legal point-of-view, Russia would be within her right if she built up a stock pile of atomic bombs and planes and rockets suitable for their delivery.

She would only be doing what we are doing ourselves.

As matters stand at the moment, Russia has no atomic bombs. Feeling in this respect secure, we find it easy to see all this very clearly and, therefore, we recognize that such a preventive war against Russia could not be justified from a moral point-of-view.

But ~~can~~ we predict how we shall react as the day approaches on which Russia will have a stock pile of bombs and airplanes and rockets suitable for their delivery at a moment's notice?

Can we visualize what kind of a life we shall be leading when we have to fear for our lives and the lives of our children, when the cities in which we live as well as all the other cities of the United States will appear to be in danger of being burned and smashed without warning?

I do not venture to predict how we would react in such a situation, but I would not vouch for anyone whom I know, not for any of my friends nor even for myself--in such circumstances, I would not vouch for anyone to give moral considerations the weight which we give them at present and which they deserve.

The most ardent advocates of international cooperation might then turn into the most ardent advocates of preventive war.

As long as we have bombs and Russia has none, she can not be certain that we are not going to attack her.

~~At present the United States does not~~ *At present the United States does not*  
~~propose to eliminate atomic bombs from national armaments by setting up an~~ *call*  
*international agency (in control of atomic activities)* and ~~we offer~~ *she* as the main inducement to the Russians to discard *propose*  
*our own* such bombs ~~ourselves~~ at an early date and thus to relieve Russia from the fear of being ~~suddenly~~ attacked.

Perhaps we will succeed in reaching an agreement on this basis and perhaps we won't, but it is a very narrow basis on which we negotiate.

Russia and the United States are caught in a vicious circle at present, and it is not likely that this circle can be broken by negotiating on the issue of atomic energy as if it were an isolated issue.

If these negotiations should fail, we will be confronted with a choice between waging a preventive war or going back where we left off before Yalta and starting negotiations from scratch.

Clearly, it will not be easy for us to go back and make a fresh start.

But there is an old Hungarian proverb which says that he who has buttoned his coat ~~with~~ the wrong way must unbutton it in order to set it right.

Is it possible to break this vicious circle?

*in which the world is caught  
the U.S. has the bomb*

And if it is broken is it possible to go further and to reach the state of permanent peace without going through another world war?

Most of us physicists believe that nothing short of a miracle will bring about such a peaceful solution.

But a miracle was once defined by Enrico Fermi as an event which has a probability of less than ten per cent.

This is just Fermi's way of saying that there is a general tendency to underestimate the probability of unlikely events.

And if we have one chance in ten of finding the right road and moving along it fast enough to escape the approaching catastrophe, then I say let us focus our attention on this narrow margin of hope, for another choice we do not have.

*short  
to very  
end*

LIMITED WORLD GOVERNMENT

It is easy to agree that permanent peace cannot be established without a world government.

But agreement on this point does not indicate along what path that ultimate goal can be approached, and not only approached but also reached in time to escape another world war.

Since our desire for security is the main reason for wishing to set up a world government, it may seem logical to propose that we set up at once a limited world government, which would deal only with the problem of security and the settlement of conflicts between nations, but would have practically unlimited authority within that narrow scope.

Logical though this may seem, I wonder whether such a frontal attack on the problem of security is a promising approach; I am inclined to doubt that it is possible to achieve security by pursuing security.

HOW FAR CAN FOREIGN POLICIES SUCCEED?

*On the basis of the present*

*at best*

~~After difficult negotiations and many vicissitudes we might perhaps arrive in the next years at an agreement providing for general disarmament and for the control of atomic energy along the lines of the *Acheson* ~~Millenthal~~ Report.~~

This would mean that we set up an Atomic Development Authority which is in charge

of mining and manufacturing fissionable materials all over the world.

But if this Authority lives up to its obligations to promote the peacetime uses of atomic energy, ten or fifteen years from now a number of atomic energy power plants will be in operation ~~in various parts of the world~~ -- many of them on the territory of Russia.

What should be the distribution of these power plants between the various nations?

Should they be distributed according to economic needs?

Or should they be distributed on the basis of military considerations?

Is it possible to safeguard plants which are located on the territory of one of the major nations against seizure by the government of that nation?

And if this cannot be done effectively, shall the United States exert her influence to keep the absolute number of these plants as low as possible while their distribution may be fixed by some sort of a quota agreement?

I believe the longer one thinks about the problems which would arise from such a situation, the more difficulties one will discover.

As long as considerations of relative military strength will remain the predominant considerations it will not be possible to resolve these difficulties.

Clearly, as far as the United States and Russia are concerned, any agreement in this field would have to be regarded more as a voluntary arrangement than an enforceable obligation.

Perhaps there will be an armed force under the United Nations in the foreseeable future which could compel the observance of obligations of this sort by most of the smaller nations, but in the absence of atomic bombs such an armed force will certainly not be strong enough to coerce the United States, nor is it likely to be strong enough to coerce Russia.

Under such circumstances the question of incentives becomes the predominant question.

The United States has obviously strong incentives for maintaining an arrangement that will eliminate atomic bombs from national armaments, [for atomic bombs may be the only weapon by means of which Russia could carry war to the territory of the United States if there should be war between these two nations.]

Therefore the question of what incentives Russia will have for wishing to keep such an arrangement in force and what incentives she will have for wishing to abrogate it becomes the controlling factor. The problem is to find conditions under which the incentives will be overwhelmingly in favor of continued cooperation rather than abrogation, *for all the major nations.*

It seems to me that this requirement could be satisfied only within the framework of an organized world community.

Only within such a framework could we hope to maintain arrangements between nations long enough to give the world a chance to work out the ultimate solution of the problem of peace.

Perhaps if the United States were to take the lead and if she were willing to mobilize her great material resources for this purpose, such a world community might become a reality fast enough to enable us to pass without a major accident through the transition period.

A world community of this sort would require the setting up of a number of world agencies and perhaps also some special agency to coordinate their activities.

What should be the function of these agencies?

What should be their scope and scale of operation?

Groping in the dark I have made an attempt to outline the functions of at least a few of such agencies.

These and other such agencies taken together might form the skeleton of a structure which may be capable of transforming within one or two generations into a genuine world government.

In the meantime, each of these agencies would have its functions clearly defined by its charter, and all of these charters together would become the world law as soon as they are ratified by the United States, England and Russia, as well as a certain number of other nations.

The more clearly the operation of these agencies is defined by their charter, the less need there will be for more or less arbitrary political decisions later.

Countries which have political systems as different as the United States, England and Russia, cannot be expected to delegate in the foreseeable future vast law-making powers to any international body; it is easier for them to agree on what the laws should be than to agree on how the laws should be made.



The agencies which I have contemplated would operate on a budget of about twenty billion dollars per year.

They might move, in the next twenty years, in amounts of two to four billion dollars per year farm products from the United States to densely populated industrial countries which are unsuitable for agriculture such as, for instance, England, Germany, Belgium, etc.

They might undertake the building up of a vast consumers goods industry in a number of countries including Russia.

They might lessen the economic insecurity of nations exposed to the repercussions of booms and depressions that hit the United States.

They might do this by purchasing large quantities of raw materials from these nations *at times* when importation of these materials into this country is at a low ebb *see* during depressions and by selling these materials from stock to importers in the United States during booms.

They might tend to stabilize economic conditions in the United States by keeping the export of the United States at a high level during depressions and at somewhat lower levels during boom periods.

They might provide for the supervision of general disarmament and for effective control of atomic energy installations all over the world.

They might provide for redistribution of strategic raw materials and other scarce raw materials which might otherwise be monopolized by certain nations, but they need not go quite as far in this respect as in the case of uranium and thorium.

They might enforce peace by maintaining an armed force strong enough to be able to restrain from illegal action most of the nations but not strong enough to coerce the United States or Russia.

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All these functions so far mentioned relate to the redistribution of goods and services, and to security, but there is need for agencies which would serve a different purpose.

The value of such agencies ought to be judged by asking how they would affect our lives, and by affecting our lives, affect our loyalties.

For unless we can bring about a rapid shift in our present pattern of loyalties,

a stable world community will not become a reality fast enough.

In America a man born in the state of New York may go to study at Harvard in Massachusetts and may, if he chooses to do so, settle in California.

Few men born in New York state will actually do this, but the fact that all of them are free to do so, if they so desire, makes them look upon other states as potential places of study and potential places of residence, rather than potential battlefields.

Can we bring about a similar situation in the world without opening the door to large-scale migration and can we by doing so materially change the present pattern of loyalties?

Many of the men who influence public opinion by speaking or writing come from a small class of people -- the class of people who have had the advantages of higher education.

Their attitudes and their loyalties will, in the long run, affect the set of values accepted throughout the whole community.

An agency in charge of student migration may be given the right to place say up to twenty percent of "foreign" students into the colleges of any one country and to pay for their tuition and living expenses.

Moreover, twenty per cent of the "foreign" students who graduate in any one country may be given the right to settle in that country, if they choose to do so.

In the United States we have at present an inflated student body of about two million college students.

According to this scheme about four hundred thousand might be "foreigners."

Since students spend an average of four years in college this means that every year one hundred thousand "foreign" students would enter the United States and out of these every year about twenty thousand might decide to stay permanently in the United States.

This is well within the limits set by the immigration laws, but new legislation would be required in some other countries before they can participate on equal terms.

If such a scheme were in operation, the total numbers of persons involved in this migration would be small, but every high school student, all over the world would look upon the United States and other major countries as potential place of study.

Only a small fraction of the "foreign" students graduating in the United States might finally decide to stay here for good; most of them would not make up their minds about this until they actually graduate and see what positions are open to them.

But in the meantime all those who study here in the United States would look upon this country as their home -- at least potentially.

Assuming that every one of these "foreign" students received in the United States an allowance of \$2000 per year all of them together would cost less than a billion dollars per year, and this amount would come out of the general contributions of the United States towards the budget of the world agencies.

Similarly American students in England and Russia would receive yearly allowances paid from the English and the Russian contributions.

Many American students might be induced to study under this scheme abroad where they can study free rather than at home where no one takes care of their living expenses and tuition.

Another agency might be given the task of giving access to "information" to everyone everywhere in the world.

This agency might be given jurisdiction over one page of every newspaper in the world.

The agency could either function as the "editor" of that page or it could suitably assign the pages under its jurisdiction to other newspapers.

Thus for instance, a page in the Chicago Tribune might be assigned to the London Times, and a page in the London Times to the Chicago Tribune.

A page in the New York Times might be assigned to Pravda, and a page in Pravda to the New York Times.

It is difficult to forecast at the present time who would oppose such a scheme more vigorously, the "publisher" of Pravda or the publisher of the New York Times.

Some of these agencies would be more acceptable to the Russians than others, but a world community cannot be built by reaching agreements piecemeal and the whole pattern of agencies, properly balanced, will have to form a single package, which provides for at least the first steps towards a universal bill of rights.

Just when and in what circumstances such a package might be acceptable to Russia is a crucial question which requires careful consideration, and something more will be said about this later.

### LIMITATIONS

The obstacles to plans of this sort are obviously great but they can be kept within the realms of political possibilities if we clearly recognize the limitations which we have to accept.

We cannot give to such agencies the responsibility of maintaining full employment throughout the world because the United States is internally split on the methods which might be acceptable to her for achieving this end.

We must not expect to cope in the next twenty-five years with raising the standard of living everywhere in the world, for the high birth rate of India and China makes it impossible to attack this problem on a world-wide scale by purely economic methods.

And finally, in view of the present pattern of loyalties it does not seem advisable to delegate to such agencies the right of opening the door for large-scale migration by removing immigration barriers.

### THE ISSUE

There are a number of international agencies in existence today but the most important ones, i.e., those arising out of the Bretton Woods agreement contain little that is adaptable to the <sup>problems</sup> ~~problems~~ confronting Russia.

It might be possible to create new agencies and to increase the scale of operation of the old ones.

But to me it seems very likely that if progress were attempted on such a piecemeal basis and without having put the problem before the American people such an attempt would be defeated.

To me it seems that the hope of smuggling 140 million people of this country through the gates of Paradise while most of them happen to look the other way is a futile hope and that only a full understanding of what is being attempted would have some chance of success, small though that chance may be.

The problem which faces the world today can be solved only by the initiative of the American people.

And it can be solved by them only if they understand their own position in the world, and if they give their government a clear mandate to take the leadership for the creation of a world community.

The first step in this direction is to put the problem squarely before the people

and to put the emphasis where it belongs.

The American people ~~are~~ <sup>will be</sup> faced with a crucial decision.

This decision is not so much what amount of national sovereignty we are willing to give up.

Undoubtedly more and more sovereignty will have to be given up as time goes on, but the main issue is not the issue of sovereignty.

The main issue is whether we are willing to base our national policy on those higher loyalties which exist in the hearts and minds of the individuals who form the population of this country but which do not find as yet expression in our national policy.

The main issue is whether we are willing to assume our full share of responsibility in the creation of a world community.

If we are willing to do this we should be willing to mobilize our material resources for this purpose on an adequate scale.

We should think of our contributions for the next twenty years as amounts reaching up to ten per cent of our average national income, i.e., about fifteen billion dollars per year.

Fifteen billion dollars, if spent for this purpose, would of course, mean a surplus export of approximately the same amount.

This could easily double and treble the rate at which industrialization proceeds in the world outside of the United States.

We are quite willing to spend at present about ten per cent of our national income for the Army and Navy.

Unless we are very fortunate, we may have to continue to spend in one form or another such sums for defense for the next five or ten years and our contribution towards building up a world community would then be an additional burden on our economy.

But even so once reconversion to peacetime production is completed we could assume such a burden without any reduction in our standard of living, for at this particular juncture we have a unique opportunity.

Sixty per cent of our manpower was tied up in war production up to a short while ago.

Assuming that we could maintain a high level of employment, we could expect an enormous increase in our standard of living.

We could take on our share of the burden and still have an appreciable increase in our standard of living, and, moreover, a somewhat better chance of actually maintaining a high level of employment.

It would be difficult for us to have an export surplus of fifteen billion dollars in boom years, and this should not be expected from us.

Our export surplus in boom years could be kept smaller, say to 10 billion dollars, and only as we move toward a depression would it reach the peak of 15 billion dollars.

The question of financing the contribution of the United States would be up to our Government.

It might, for instance, decide to rely on taxes during the boom and on the issuing of "Peace Bonds" during the depression.

In the next twenty years during which this scheme would operate we may expect an increase in the public debt but there is no reason why the total increase during this long period should be larger than the public debt incurred within a few years during the war within a much shorter period.

Let us not attempt to maintain the illusion that the rest of the world can repay us at any time in the form of material goods.

The productive capacity of this country is enormous.

If a high level of employment can be maintained our standard of living will rise rapidly and the working hours will fall rapidly to the point where the problem of disposing of leisure may come into the foreground of public attention.

There will be no need and no occasion, unless time should go into reverse, for our asking or receiving repayment in goods.

This does not mean that the countries who may receive help in the next ten, fifteen or twenty years shall receive gifts without assuming obligations.

These countries ought to have precisely the same obligations as the United States to contribute to the development of the world up to ten per cent of their national income.

Their actual contributions ought to be determined by objective needs and on the basis of available resources.

However, on this basis most of these countries will probably be free from any but rather small contributions for a number of years.

Gradually, more and more of them will be able to take their share of the burden, and twenty years from now the productive capacity of Russia may very well be drawn upon in the early phases of the industrialization of China and India.

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There is little reason for expecting any of the countries who would receive help to display gratitude.

Nor is there much reason for looking upon our own contribution as anything but evidence that at last we have made up our minds to do our duty by the world,

Raising the standard of living in certain countries or throughout the world in general will not in itself make the world more peaceful.

A higher standard of living does not automatically promote or favor higher loyalties.

But such higher loyalties will be developed if the world agencies affect the life of the individual, and by affecting his life, affect his loyalties.

And above all, the very fact that the people of this country have voluntarily assumed their share of responsibility would be regarded everywhere as a token of our facing not towards war but towards peace.

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Within such a framework Russia might receive on the basis of objective needs and available resources perhaps five billion dollars per year.

No sane person can ~~believe~~ <sup>go on believing</sup> that we are solely concerned about winning the next war if we are spending a substantial fraction of our national income for the welfare of those countries who would most likely be our enemies in case of war.

In such circumstances we might even maintain a considerable military establishment and continue to spend billions of dollars for defense and yet find that other nations consider such action on our part as foolish and extravagant behavior rather than a threat to their security.

All this presupposes, of course, that we are really making the building up of a world community the cornerstone of our national policy and that the world can count on the continuity of such a policy.

This probably cannot be achieved without amending the Constitution.

The Constitution was twice amended in this century over the issue of prohibition, and if we were willing to go out of our way for the sake of being permitted to drink or for the sake of preventing others from drinking, maybe we shall be willing to go out of our way for the sake of remaining alive.

The suggestion that this country should commit herself to contributions up to ten per cent of her national income sounds perhaps Utopian.

Perhaps it will be asked why not be satisfied with making progress as fast as we can?

Why not propose large-scale loans which the United States might make to other nations directly or through the medium of international agencies?

To me it seems that this more modest objective would be neither adequate for the purpose nor would it be very much easier to achieve.

Certainly we could make loans to other nations on a large scale and actually receive repayment in goods if we were willing to make this possible by our tariff policy.

But we are not willing to do this either.

The point I am trying to make is this: that nothing much can be achieved now or in the very near future until such time as the people of this country understand what is at stake.

As far as the bomb is concerned, the people have not been told the whole story, nor have they fully understood what they have been told.

What we need in this country now is a crusade for an organized world community -- a crusade that will give a mandate to the Government to take the leadership.

*We must not expect too much from the oldest Congress. But this country is a democracy. There will be elections in '48 and again in '52. ~~There are no more of our own fate.~~*

The issue before us <sup>will be</sup> is not a partisan issue.

Atomic bombs are not precision instruments, they will not discriminate between Republicans and Democrats.

Most elections are pretty close and a rather small <sup>fraction</sup> portion of the voters who are willing to disregard other issues and ~~to~~ cast their vote solely on the issue of establishing peace by creating a world community, could decisively influence the nominations and elections in many of the states.

~~This country is a democracy and we are the masters of our own fate.~~

Today, if the Government were to approach Russia, she would hardly be willing to go along and do all that needs to be done.

But imagine that a crusade should really get under way here in America.

<sup>probably</sup> Clearly, there will be a fight -- <sup>probably</sup> a very big fight.

Other nations will sit up and take notice.

*This country is a democracy and we are the masters of our own fate*



And if at last the fight should be won and a President who has seen the light should approach the other nations with the backing of the people and Congress, then I believe we would have a very different situation, and <sup>Japan</sup> Russia might go along.

Because there will be a fight we can win something that has roots and permanence.

Because there will be a fight the American people will look and listen.

And when the people of this country at last understand their own position in the world, they might be willing to do what is necessary *to do*

Obviously the odds are heavily against us but we may have one chance in ten of reaching safely the haven of permanent peace; and maybe God will work a Miracle -- if we don't make to too difficult for Him.

L. Szilard

*Blaming the  
app. March 10, 1947*

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Some of us physicists tend to take a rather gloomy view of the present world situation.

We know that Nagasaki-type bombs could be produced in large quantities, and we know that the United States would be in a very dangerous position if large stockpiles of such bombs were available to an enemy at the outbreak of the war.

Moreover, when we think of a war that may come perhaps ten or fifteen years from now, we do not think of it in terms of Nagasaki bombs. *at all*

Nagasaki bombs <sup>*the buildings of a*</sup> destroy cities by the blast which they cause.

But ten or fifteen years from now giant bombs which disperse radioactive substances in the air may be set off far away from our cities.

If such giant bombs were used against us, the buildings of our cities would remain undamaged, but the people inside of the cities would not remain alive.

The traditional aim of foreign policy is to prolong the peace, i.e., to lengthen the interval between two wars.

We physicists find it difficult to get enthusiastic about such an objective.

The outlines of a war which may be fought with these weapons of the future are now becoming more and more clearly visible from our vantage point, and if we accepted the view that the world has to go through another war before it arrives at a state of permanent peace, we would probably pray for an early rather than a late war.

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But the ills of 1947 cannot be cured with the remedies of 1919.

With the United States and Russia far outranking in military power all other nations, there is no combination of nations which could restrain ~~from illegal action~~ <sup>by force</sup> either of these two giants.

Moreover, between the Russian Government and the Government of the United States there has arisen a rather peculiar relationship.

Because of the possibility that they might be at war with each other at some future time, these two governments consider it their duty to put their countries into the position of winning that war if war should come.

Stated in these terms, their problem is not capable of a solution satisfactory to both parties.

Russia and the United States are thus caught in a vicious circle and the more they allow their national policies to be guided by considerations of maximum relative military strength, the more rigidly their course will be determined and the less freedom of action they will retain for working towards the establishment of peace.

No balance of power in the original meaning of the term is possible in such a situation.

~~Moreover,~~ there has arisen between the Russian government and the government of the United States, a rather peculiar relationship.

Because of the possibility that they might be at war with each other at some future time, these two governments consider it their duty to put their <sup>nations</sup> countries into the position of winning that war if war should come.

Stated in these terms, the problem is not capable of a solution which is satisfactory to both parties and Russia and the United States are thus caught in a vicious circle of never-ending difficulties.

This peculiar relationship ~~between them~~ became apparent sometime between Yalta and Potsdam.

Just what caused the change in their relationship is difficult to say.

Perhaps there was no particular cause other than the fact that these two countries ~~have~~ lost their common enemy before they ~~had~~ reached an agreement on <sup>the</sup> post-war settlement.

Russia's desire to push her frontiers in northern Europe as far <sup>West</sup> as possible can be understood on the basis of strategic considerations. ~~We observe that she~~

We observe <sup>that she</sup> that she wishes to dominate politically Rumania and Albania which are strategically important <sup>to her.</sup> ~~to her.~~

The United States wants to have friendly governments in Greece and Turkey.

Obviously, friendly governments in these countries would secure access to the Black Sea for the American and British fleets and would, in case of war, enable us to carry the war to <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ Russian ports there. <sup>on the shores of the B.S.</sup>

Any economic aid that Russia may get would in some measure increase her ability to fight a war, and we <sup>know</sup> that when Russia was on the point of obtaining a loan <sup>of</sup> several hundred million dollars <sup>from the Swedish government,</sup> ~~the newspapers reported~~ that the United States ambassador protested to the Swedish government against <sup>the</sup> granting of such a loan. ~~The only economic aid which Russia was able~~

The only economic aid which Russia was able to secure <sup>with our approval</sup> was a total of 250 million dollars of relief granted by UNRRA, <sup>this aid</sup> which went to the Ukraine and Byelorussia. <sup>and it is</sup> ~~this was~~ less than the amount of relief which Italy <sup>was able to obtain.</sup> obtained.

All this does not mean, of course, that either the United States or Russia want war.

It merely means that they want to win the war if there is one.

But as long as Russia and the United States will allow their policies to be guided mainly by such considerations, their course will be rigidly determined, and they will retain little freedom of action for working toward the establishment of peace.

How does atomic energy and the bomb fit into this picture?

Atomic bombs may be the only <sup>weapon</sup> by means of which Russia <sup>could</sup> ~~can~~ carry the war to the territory of the United States if there should be a war.

Clearly, this is good and sufficient reason for the United States to try and eliminate atomic bombs from <sup>all</sup> national armaments.

But can we see <sup>equally</sup> clearly for what specific reasons Russia should be expected to concur particularly if the methods of control involve measures ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> are difficult for her to accept?

*(all over the world)*

In order to have effective control of atomic energy, the United States proposes to set up an Atomic Development Authority <sup>and to put it</sup> in charge of mining, refining and manufacturing <sup>the</sup> of uranium and other dangerous materials ~~all over the world.~~

W ⑥ It is a good proposal and it is difficult to see how control could be made effective on lesser terms.

11 But, <sup>keeping in mind the possibility of war</sup> ~~thinking in terms of a possible war~~, it is easy enough to understand why Russia hesitates to agree to <sup>such a</sup> ~~this~~ proposal.

~~On the~~ Large scale operations of such an agency on ~~the~~ Russian territory would give the United States and other nations access to information of strategic importance to which they have no access at present // such as the details of the road and the railroad systems and the location of various industries *inside of Russia.*

What are the reasons which might, nevertheless, move Russia to agree to some ~~form of an~~ effective method of control <sup>on the basis of the present</sup> ~~negotiations?~~ <sup>thing</sup>

For one, such an agreement would greatly reduce the mounting tension in the world and improve our chances of avoiding war.

In this sense at least it <sup>would</sup> ~~will~~ serve the interests of Russia as well as the interests of the United States, ~~to reach an agreement on the issue of atomic bombs.~~

W Resources Moreover, as long as the United States has a stock pile of atomic bombs and Russia has none, Russia can not be certain that she will not be attacked and that the United States will not wage a preventive war perhaps on the very issue of ~~the~~ <sup>[the</sup> control of atomic energy.

Today it is difficult for us to imagine that ~~the United States~~ <sup>this country</sup> should ever take such action. *but how about R*

Having ratified the United Nations charter, we can not legally go to war except in the case of an armed attack or on the basis of a unanimous vote in the security council <sup>of which Russia is a member.</sup>

The mere refusal of Russia to enter into an agreement on the control of atomic energy could hardly be construed as an armed attack.

From the legal point-of-view, Russia would be within her right if she built up a stock pile of atomic bombs and planes and rockets suitable for their delivery.

She would only be doing what we are doing ourselves.

As matters stand at the moment, Russia has no atomic bombs. // Feeling in this respect secure, we find it easy to see all this very clearly and, therefore, we recognize that such a preventive war against Russia could not be justified from a moral point-of-view.

But can we predict how we shall react as the day approaches on which Russia will have a stock pile of bombs and airplanes and rockets suitable for their delivery at a moment's notice?

Can we visualize what kind of a life we shall be leading when we <sup>shall</sup> have to fear for our lives and the lives of our children, when the cities <sup>in</sup> in which we live as well as all the other cities <sup>of</sup> of the United States will appear to be in danger of being burned and smashed without warning?

I do not venture to predict how we would react in such a situation, but I would not vouch for anyone <sup>whom I know</sup> whom I know, not for any of my friends nor even for myself--in such <sup>a situation</sup> circumstances, I would not vouch for anyone to give moral considerations the weight which we give them at present and which they deserve.

The most ardent advocates of international cooperation might then turn into the most ardent advocates of <sup>a</sup> preventive war.

As long as we have bombs and Russia has none, she can not be certain that we are not going to attack her.

<sup>at present</sup> We propose to eliminate atomic bombs from <sup>all</sup> national armaments by setting up an international <sup>central</sup> agency and we offer <sup>our own</sup> (as the main inducement) to ~~the~~ Russia ~~to~~ discard ~~such~~ bombs ~~ourselves~~ at an early date and thus to <sup>relieve</sup> ~~relieve~~ Russia from the <sup>danger of</sup> ~~fear of~~ being ~~suddenly~~ attacked.

Perhaps we will succeed in reaching an agreement on this basis and perhaps we won't, but it is a very narrow basis on which we negotiate.

Russia and the United States are caught in a vicious circle at present, and it is not likely that this circle can be broken by negotiating on the issue of atomic energy as if it were an isolated issue.

If these negotiations should <sup>finally</sup> fail, we will be confronted with a choice <sup>between</sup> of waging a preventive war <sup>or</sup> going back where we left off before Yalta <sup>and starting</sup> negotiations <sup>on a different basis</sup> ~~on a different basis~~.

Clearly, it <sup>would</sup> ~~will~~ not be easy for us to go back and make a fresh start.

But there is an old Hungarian proverb which says that he who has buttoned his coat ~~the~~ the wrong way must unbutton it in order to set it right.

Is it possible to break ~~out of~~ this vicious circle? ~~in which we have and~~

And ~~if it is broken~~ is it possible to go further and to reach ~~the~~ state of permanent peace without going through another world war?

Most of us physicists believe that nothing short of a miracle will bring about such a peaceful solution.

But a miracle was once defined by Enrico Fermi as an event which has a probability of less than ten per cent. *of occurring.*

This is just Fermi's way of saying that there is a general tendency to underestimate the probability of unlikely events.

And if we have one chance in ten of finding the right road and moving along it fast enough to escape the approaching catastrophe, then I say let us focus our attention on this narrow margin of hope, for another choice we do not have.

LIMITED WORLD GOVERNMENT

It is easy to agree that permanent peace cannot be established without a world government.

But agreement on this point does not indicate along what path that ultimate goal can be approached, and not only approached but also reached in time to escape another world war.

Since our desire for security is the main reason for wishing to set up a world government, it may seem logical to propose that we set up at once a limited world government, *A limited world gov't.* which would deal only with the problem of security and the settlement of conflicts between nations, but would have practically unlimited authority within that narrow scope.

Logical though this may seem, I wonder whether such a frontal attack on the problem of security is a promising approach; I am inclined to doubt that it is possible to achieve security by pursuing security.

HOW FAR CAN FOREIGN POLICIES SUCCEED?

*On the basis of the present negotiations at best*  
After difficult negotiations and many vicissitudes we might perhaps arrive in the next years at *some* an agreement providing for general disarmament and for the control of atomic energy along the lines of the *Adler Report* ~~Villontal~~ Report.

This would mean that we set up an Atomic Development Authority which is in charge

*the* of mining and manufacturing *of* fissionable materials all over the world.

But if this Authority lives up to its obligations to promote the peacetime uses of atomic energy, ten or fifteen years from now a number of atomic energy power plants will be in operation in various parts of the world -- many of them on the territory of Russia.

What should be the distribution of these power plants between the various nations?

Should they be distributed according to economic needs?

Or should they be distributed on the basis of military considerations?

Is it possible to safeguard plants which are located on the territory of one of the major nations against seizure by the government of that nation?

And if this cannot be done effectively, shall the United States exert her influence to keep the absolute number of these plants as low as possible while their distribution may be fixed by some sort of a quota agreement?

I believe the longer ~~one~~ <sup>you</sup> thinks about the problems which would arise from such a situation, the more difficulties ~~one~~ <sup>you</sup> will discover.

As long as considerations of relative military strength will remain the predominant considerations it will not be possible to resolve these difficulties.

Clearly, as far as the United States and Russia are concerned, any agreement in this field ~~would~~ <sup>will</sup> have to be regarded more as a voluntary arrangement than an enforceable obligation.

Perhaps there will be an armed force under the United Nations in the foreseeable future which could compel the observance of obligations of this sort by most of the ~~smaller~~ <sup>B</sup> nations, but in the absence of atomic bombs such an armed force will certainly not be strong enough to coerce the United States, nor is it likely to be strong enough to coerce Russia.

Under such circumstances the question of incentives becomes the predominant question.

The United States has obviously strong incentives for maintaining an arrangement that will eliminate atomic bombs from ~~national~~ <sup>all</sup> armaments. for atomic bombs may be the only weapon by means of which Russia could carry war to the territory of the United States if there should be war between these two nations.



Therefore the question of what incentives Russia will have for wishing to keep such an arrangement in force and what incentives she will have for wishing to abrogate it becomes the controlling factor. The problem is to find conditions under which the incentives will be overwhelmingly in favor of continued cooperation rather than abrogation.

It seems to me that this requirement could be satisfied only within the framework of an organized world community.

Only within such a framework could we hope to maintain arrangements between nations long enough to give the world a chance to work out the ultimate solution of the problem of peace.

Perhaps if the United States were to take the lead and if she were willing to mobilize her great material resources for this purpose, such a world community might become a reality fast enough to enable us to pass without a major accident through the transition period.

A world community of this sort would require the setting up of a number of world agencies and perhaps also some special agency to coordinate their activities.

What should be the function of these agencies?

What should be their scope and scale of operation?

Groping in the dark I have made an attempt to outline the functions of at least a few of such agencies.

These and other ~~such~~ agencies taken together might form the skeleton of a structure which may be capable of transforming within one or two generations into a genuine world government.

In the meantime, each of these agencies would have its functions clearly defined by its charter, and all of these charters <sup>taken</sup> together would <sup>represent</sup> ~~become~~ the world law as soon as they are ratified by the United States, England and Russia, as well as a certain number of other nations.

The more clearly the operation of these agencies is defined by their charter, the less need there will be for more or less arbitrary political decisions later.

Countries which have political systems as different as the United States, England and Russia, cannot be expected to delegate in the foreseeable future vast law-making powers to any international body; it is easier for them to agree on what the laws should be than to agree on how the laws should be made.

The agencies which I have contemplated would operate on a budget of about twenty billion dollars per year.

They might move, in the next twenty years, in amounts of two to four billion dollars per year farm products from the United States to densely populated industrial countries which are unsuitable for agriculture, <sup>of production</sup> such as, for instance, England, Germany, Belgium, <sup>and</sup> ~~the~~

They might undertake the building up of a vast consumers goods industry in a number of countries including Russia.

They might lessen the economic insecurity of nations <sup>which are</sup> exposed to the repercussions of booms and depressions that hit the United States.

They might do this by purchasing large quantities of raw materials from these nations when importation of these materials into this country is at a low ebb <sup>i.e.</sup> during depressions and by selling these materials from stock to importers in the United States during booms.

They might tend to stabilize economic conditions in the United States by keeping the export of the United States at a high level during depressions and at somewhat lower levels during boom periods.

They might provide for the supervision of general disarmament and for <sup>the</sup> effective control of atomic energy installations all over the world.

They might provide for redistribution of strategic raw materials and other scarce raw materials which might [otherwise] be monopolized by certain nations, but they need not go quite as far in this respect as in the case of uranium and thorium.

They might enforce peace by maintaining an armed force strong enough to be able to restrain from illegal action most of the nations but not strong enough to coerce the United States or Russia.

All these functions so far mentioned relate to the redistribution of goods and services, and to security, but there is need for agencies which would serve a different purpose.

The value of such agencies ought to be judged by asking how they would affect our lives, and by affecting our lives, affect our loyalties.

For unless we can bring about a rapid shift in our present pattern of loyalties,

a stable world community will not become a reality fast enough.

In America a man born in the state of New York may go to study at Harvard in Massachusetts and may, if he chooses to do so, settle in California.

Few men born in <sup>the State of</sup> New York ~~state~~ will actually do this, but the fact that all of them are free to do so, if they so desire, makes them <sup>to</sup> look upon other states as potential places of study and potential places of residence, rather than potential battlefields.

Can we bring about a similar situation in the world without opening the door to large-scale migration and can we by doing so materially change the present pattern of loyalties?

Many of the men who influence public opinion by speaking or writing come from a small class of people -- the class of <sup>college graduates</sup> ~~people who have had the advantages of higher education.~~

Their attitudes and their loyalties will, in the long run, affect the set of values accepted throughout the whole community.

An agency in charge of student migration <sup>might</sup> ~~may~~ be given the right to place say up to twenty percent of "foreign" students into the colleges of any one country and <sup>could</sup> ~~to~~ pay for their tuition and living expenses.

<sup>might</sup> ~~may~~ Moreover, twenty per cent of the "foreign" students who graduate in any one country ~~may~~ be given the right to settle in that country, if they choose to do so.

In the United States we have at present an inflated student body of about two million college students.

According to this scheme about four hundred thousand might be "foreigners."

Since students spend an average of four years in college this means that every year one hundred thousand "foreign" students would enter the United States and out of these every year about twenty thousand might decide to stay permanently in <sup>this country</sup> ~~the United States.~~

This is well within the limits set by the immigration laws, but new legislation would be required in some other countries before they can participate on equal terms.

If such a scheme were in operation, the total numbers of persons involved in this migration would be small, but every high school student, all over the world would look upon the United States and other major countries as potential place of study.

Only a small fraction of the "foreign" students graduating in the United States might finally decide to stay here for good; most of them would not make up their minds about this until they actually graduate and see what positions are open to them.

But in the meantime all those who study here in the United States would look upon this country as their home -- at least potentially.

Assuming that every one of these "foreign" students received in the United States an allowance of \$2000 per year, all of them together would cost less than a billion dollars per year, and this amount would come out of the general contributions of the United States towards the budget of the world agencies.

Similarly American students in England and Russia would receive yearly allowances paid ~~from~~ <sup>out of</sup> the English and the Russian contributions.

Many American students might be induced to study under this scheme abroad where they can study free rather than at home where no one takes care of their living expenses and tuition.

Another agency might be given the task of giving access to "information" to everyone everywhere in the world.

This agency might be given jurisdiction over one page of every newspaper, ~~in the world.~~

The agency could either function as the "editor" of that page or it could suitably assign the pages under its jurisdiction to other newspapers.

Thus for instance, a page in the Chicago Tribune might be assigned to the London Times, and a page in the London Times to the Chicago Tribune.

A page in the New York Times might be assigned to Pravda, and a page in Pravda to the New York Times.

It is difficult to forecast at the present time who would oppose such a scheme more vigorously, the "publisher" of Pravda or the publisher of the New York Times.

Some of these agencies would be more acceptable to the Russians than others, but a world community cannot be built by reaching agreements piecemeal and the whole pattern of agencies, properly balanced, will have to form a single package, which provides for at least the first steps towards a universal bill of rights.

Just when and in what circumstances such a package might be acceptable to Russia is a crucial question which requires careful consideration, ~~and~~ <sup>S</sup> something more will be said about this later.

LIMITATIONS

The obstacles to plans of this sort are obviously great but <sup>such plans</sup> ~~they~~ can be kept within the realms of political possibilities if we clearly recognize the limitations which we have to accept. <sup>for the present</sup>

We cannot give to such agencies the responsibility of maintaining full employment throughout the world because the United States is internally split on the methods which might be acceptable to her for achieving this end.

We must not expect to cope in the next twenty-~~five~~ years with raising the standard of living everywhere in the world, for the high birth rate of India and China makes it impossible to attack this problem on a world-wide scale by purely economic methods.

And finally, in view of the present pattern of loyalties it does not seem advisable to delegate to such agencies the right of opening the door for large-scale migration by removing immigration barriers.

THE ISSUE

2 There are a number of international agencies in existence today <sup>and</sup> ~~but the most im-~~ portant ones, i.e., those arising out of the Bretton Woods agreement contain little that is adaptable to the problems confronting Russia.

It might be possible to create new agencies and to increase the scale of operation of the old ones.

But to me it seems very likely that if progress were attempted on such a piecemeal basis and without having put the problem before the American people such an attempt would be defeated.

To me it seems that the hope of smuggling 140 million people of this country through the gates of Paradise while most of them happen to look the other way is a futile hope <sup>and that</sup> only a full understanding of what is being attempted would have some chance of success, small though that chance may be.

The problem which faces the world today can be solved only by the initiative of the American people.

And it can be solved by them only if they understand their own position in the world and ~~if they~~ give their government a clear mandate to take the leadership for the creation of a world community.

The first step in this direction is to put the problem squarely before the <sup>American</sup> people

and to put the emphasis where it belongs.

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The American people <sup>will soon be</sup> ~~are~~ faced with a crucial decision.

This decision is not so much what amount of national sovereignty we are willing to give up.

Undoubtedly more and more sovereignty will have to be given up as time goes on, but the main issue is not the issue of sovereignty.

The main issue is, whether we are willing to base our national policy on those higher loyalties which exist in the hearts and minds of the individuals who form the population of this country but which do not find as yet expression in our national policy.

The main issue is whether we are willing to assume our full share of responsibility in the creation of a world community.

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If we are willing to do this we should be willing to mobilize our material resources for this purpose on an adequate scale.

We should think of our contribution for the next twenty years as amounts reaching up to ten per cent of our average national income, i.e., <sup>up to about</sup> ~~about~~ fifteen billion dollars per year.

Fifteen billion dollars, if spent for this purpose, would of course, mean a surplus export of approximately the same amount.

This could easily double and treble the rate at which industrialization proceeds in the world outside of the United States.

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We are quite willing to spend at present about ten per cent of our national income for the Army and Navy.

Unless we are very fortunate, we may have to continue to spend in one form or another such sums for defense for the next five or ten years and our contribution towards building up a world community would then be an additional burden on our economy.

But even so once reconversion to peacetime production is completed we could assume such a burden without any reduction in our standard of living, for at this particular juncture we have a unique opportunity.

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Sixty per cent of our manpower was tied up in war production up to a short while ago.

Assuming that we could maintain a high level of employment, we could expect an enormous <sup>in</sup> increase in our standard of living.

We could take on our share of the burden and still have an appreciable increase in our standard of living, and, moreover, a somewhat better chance of actually maintaining a high level of employment.

*obviously*  
It would be difficult for us to have an export surplus of fifteen billion dollars in boom years, and this should not be expected from us.

*But*  
Our export surplus in boom years could be kept smaller, say to 10 billion dollars, and only as we move toward a depression ~~would it reach the peak of 15 billion dollars.~~ *might reach the point it have to*

The question of financing the contribution of the United States would be up to our Government.

It might, for instance, decide to rely on taxes during the boom and on the issuing of "Peace Bonds" during the depression.

*hope to accept all*  
In the next twenty years during which this scheme would operate we ~~may expect an~~ *might* increase in the public debt, but there is no reason why the total increase during this long period should be larger than the public debt incurred within a few years during the war within a much shorter period.

Let us not attempt to maintain the illusion that the rest of the world can repay us at any time in the form of material goods.

The productive capacity of this country is enormous.

If a high level of employment can be maintained our standard of living will rise rapidly and the working hours will fall rapidly to the point where the problem of disposing of leisure may come into the foreground of public attention.

There will be no need and no occasion, unless time should go into reverse, for our asking or receiving repayment in goods.

This does not mean that the countries who may receive help in the next ten, fifteen or twenty years shall receive gifts without assuming obligations.

*Handwritten: these obligations*  
These countries ought to have precisely the same obligations as the United States <sup>to</sup> contribute to the development of the world up to ten per cent of their national income.

Their actual contributions ought to be determined by objective needs and on the basis of available resources.

*However*  
However, on this basis most of these countries will probably be free from any but rather small contributions for a number of years.

Gradually, more and more of them will be able to take their share of the burden, and twenty years from now the productive capacity of Russia may very well be drawn upon in the early phases of the industrialization of China and India.

There is little reason for expecting any of the countries who would receive help to display gratitude.

Nor is there much reason for looking upon our own contribution as anything but evidence that at last we have made up our minds to do our duty by the world,

Raising the standard of living in certain countries or throughout the world in general will not in itself make the world more peaceful.

A higher standard of living does not automatically promote or favor higher loyalties.

But such higher loyalties will be developed if the world agencies affect the life of the individual, and by affecting his life, affect his loyalties.

And above all, the very fact that the people of this country have voluntarily assumed their share of responsibility would be regarded everywhere as a token of our facing not towards war but towards peace.

Within such a framework Russia might receive on the basis of objective needs and available resources perhaps five billion dollars per year.

No sane person can believe that we are solely concerned about winning the next war if we are spending a substantial fraction of our national income for the welfare of those countries who would most likely be our enemies in case of war.

In such circumstances we might even maintain a considerable military establishment and continue to spend billions of dollars for defense and yet find that other nations consider such action on our part as foolish and extravagant behavior rather than a threat to their security.

All this presupposes, of course, that we are really <sup>going to</sup> making the building up of a world community the cornerstone of our national policy and that the world can count on the continuity of such a policy.

This probably cannot be achieved without amending the Constitution.

The Constitution was twice amended in this century over the issue of prohibition, and if we were willing to go out of our way for the sake of being permitted to drink or for the sake of preventing others from drinking, maybe we shall be willing to go out of our way for the sake of remaining alive.

5/11/2



Gradually, more and more of them will be able to free their minds of the burden  
and twenty years from now the productive capacity of a few very well be drawn upon  
in the early phase of the industrial revolution of China.

There is little reason to suppose that of the countries who would receive help  
to display gratitude.  
Nor is there such reason for feeling that we are in a position to do anything but  
evidence here at least as far as the world is concerned.  
Maintain the status quo, and we are in a position to do anything but the world in  
general will not be in a position to do anything but the world in  
a higher state of civilization than we are in at present.  
but and it is not to be expected that it will be any more than a life

*can not*  
We ~~should~~ look for our  
salvation to the 80th Congress  
But this country is a democracy.  
We are the masters of our  
destiny. There will be  
elections in 48 and again  
in 52. -

17

The suggestion that this country should commit herself to contributions up to ten per cent of her national income sounds perhaps Utopian.

Perhaps ~~it~~ <sup>you</sup> will ~~be~~ asked why not be satisfied with making progress as fast as we can?

Why not propose large-scale loans which the United States might make to other nations directly or through the medium of international agencies?

To me it seems that this more modest objective would be neither adequate for the purpose nor would it be very much easier to achieve.

Certainly we could make loans to other nations on a large scale and actually receive repayment in goods if we were willing to make this possible by our tariff policy.

But we are not willing to do this either.

The point I am trying to make is this: that nothing much can be achieved now or in the very near future until such time as the people of this country understand what is at stake.

As far as the bomb is concerned, the people have not been told the whole story, nor have they fully understood what they have been told.

What we need in this country now is a crusade for an organized world community -- ~~this country is a democracy. We are the masters of our~~ ~~crusade that will give a mandate to the Government to take the leadership.~~

~~There will be elections in '48 and again in '52.~~

The issue before us ~~is~~ <sup>will be</sup> not a partisan issue.

Atomic bombs are not precision instruments, they ~~will~~ <sup>can</sup> not discriminate between Republicans and Democrats.

Most elections are pretty close and a rather small portion of the voters who are willing to disregard all other issues and to cast their vote solely on the issue of establishing peace by creating a world community, could decisively influence the nominations and elections in many of the states.

Today, if the Government were to approach Russia, she would hardly be willing to go along and do all that needs to be done.

But imagine that a crusade should really get under way here in America.

Clearly, there will be a fight -- ~~probably~~ <sup>possibly</sup> a very big fight.

Other nations will sit up and take notice.

And if at last the fight should be won and a President who has seen the light should approach the other nations with the backing of the people and Congress, then I believe we would have a very different situation, and Russia might go along.

Because there will be a fight we can win something that has roots and permanence.

Because there will be a fight the American people will look and listen.

And when the people of this country at last understand their own position in the world, they might be willing to do what is necessary *to do*

*← this here*

Obviously the odds are heavily against us but we may have one chance in ten of reaching safely the haven of permanent peace; and maybe God will work a Miracle -- if we don't make it too difficult for Him.

16 pages

about 3/4 min / page  
~ 5 min 56 sec

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Because there will be a light we are going to give her roots and permanence.  
Because there will be a light the American people will look and listen.  
And when the people of this country see the American people in their own position in the

world, they might be willing to do what is necessary.  
Obviously the only way to get the light is to have the chance to see it.  
If we don't have the light, we won't have the chance to see it -- if  
we don't have the light, we won't have the chance to see it.

Handwritten signature or scribble in blue ink, possibly reading "L. H. ...".

10 copies

Handwritten notes at the bottom left, including "10 copies" and other illegible text.