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1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois  
December 21, 1949

Mr. Dean Rusk  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Rusk:

Having returned to Chicago and having obtained expressions of opinion from all those who participated in our discussion in New York, I wish to say that all those who participated are very grateful to you for the opportunity which you gave them to express their views, and they appreciate the time that you made available for this purpose.

In all frankness, I should however add that the conversation left the group unsatisfied. While I personally am inclined to believe that for the most part you were playing the Devil's advocate, the others say that they do not see why you should have done so and that they do not believe that you did -- at least insofar as the major issues were concerned. However that may be, the fact is that as a result of this conversation the concern of the group about our present foreign policy is increased rather than decreased, and the concern of each individual in the group is the more increased the more he is inclined to take at its face value what you said about our policy. I feel that in fairness to you I ought to advise you of this reaction of the group.

In the following I am listing for your convenience the names of the participants:

Professor Hans Bethe, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York

Professor Hugh C. Wolfe, Cooper Union, New York City;  
Chairman of the Federation of American Scientists

Professor Harrison Brown, University of Chicago; Executive  
Director of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists

Professor Joe Mayer, Associate Director of the Institute of  
Nuclear Studies of the University of Chicago

Finally on my own behalf I wish to say that I greatly appreciate your kindness in having arranged the interview on such short notice to suit the convenience of our group.

Very sincerely yours,

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Leo Szilard

P.S. Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I just received from France and which might perhaps interest you. L.S.



DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 27, 1949

Dear Dr. Szilard:

Thank you very much for your letter of December 21. I think there may have been some misunderstanding about the "terms of reference" of our conversation. I did not take part in it on the theory that I was to set forth United States policy in any detail on any of the matters which you wished to discuss but on the contrary I did seek to ascertain as much as possible about the views of the members of the group. The result was that each side expected more from the other than was produced.

Naturally the group would have liked more from me about United States policy and I certainly wanted a great deal more about just what it was the group was proposing about specific points of policy. I was not even sure whether there was a group and, if so, what the group opinion was. I got the impression that there was very considerable anxiety about the state of our relations with Russia, which is entirely understandable, but I must confess that I got very little feel of just what the proposed "agreements" were supposed to be about. My questions and possible brusqueness were a part of an effort to stimulate details and not just merely to irritate.

In any event, I should be glad to have any further views which the members of the group might wish to forward in extension of those expressed in our meeting.

Sincerely yours,

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Dr. Leo Szilard,  
The University of Chicago,  
1155 East 57th Street,  
Chicago 37, Illinois.

December 30, 1949

Mr. Dean Rusk  
Deputy Under Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Rusk:

Professor Szilard will want me to express his thanks for your kind letter of December 27th which has been received during his absence from the city. On the assumption he would be interested to have your letter before his return, I am forwarding it to Professor Szilard today.

Sincerely yours,

Norene Mann (Mrs.)  
Secretary to  
Professor Leo Szilard

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS  
INSTITUTE OF RADIOBIOLOGY AND BIOPHYSICS

1155 East 57th St.  
Chicago 37, Ill.

December 31, 1949

Mr. Dean Rusk,  
Deputy Under Secretary of State,  
Washington,  
D.C.

Dear Mr. Rusk:

Many thanks for your letter of December 27th. Let me say in order to avoid any misunderstanding on this point, that we did not go into the conference with you expecting you to set forth United States Policy, and that I personally regretted that this question was raised -- in response to your challenge -- by Joe Mayer.

Let me also assure you that there was not the slightest feeling of irritation among us in response to your method of questioning -- a method frequently employed for the purpose of clarifying issues in discussions among scientists. It was perhaps unfortunate that while you spent two and a half hours with us, we thought at the outset that we had only half as much time at our disposal, and therefore we did not think we had enough time for an orderly presentation of the views of each of us.

Since you write that you got very little feel of just what the proposed "agreements" are supposed to be about, I am enclosing for your convenience a copy of the article which I left with you when we parted. It should answer your question, at least as far as my own person is concerned. I should add that while this article goes into details concerning the proposed agreement, what is important in it are not these details which might be controversial, but rather the basic philosophy through which one is led to some agreement of this type. It is this basic philosophy which appears to find general acceptance among my colleagues, and I believe it represents a consensus that has been reached even though it has so far not been clearly formulated. This consensus does not, of course, extend to those who believe that if Russia were physically in the position to invade Western Europe, she would do so even at the cost of a world war. But even those of my colleagues who take that view agree with the rest of us that we are faced with the choice of either making peace or taking defensive measures far more drastic and far more costly than those which are at present envisaged.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Dean Rusk  
Deputy Under Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

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IN THIS COLLECTION

Dear Mr. Rusk:

I wish to thank you for your kind letter of December 27, 1949.

I understand that you have also written to the other members of the group, and I take it that in the meantime you have received an answer from some of them. *P* Today I am writing to you <sup>about another even though</sup> ~~of a different~~ matter.

*P* Early in 1948, a few weeks before the Communists took over in Czechoslovakia, the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists made an attempt to bring about <sup>an East-West conference</sup> ~~an exchange of view between Russian and American~~ scientists.

*I 4/5* *V* On behalf of the Emergency Committee, Harrison Brown had two interviews with Gromiko in New York. He explained to Gromiko that the Emergency Committee proposed to invite scientists from America, England, and France on the one hand, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia on the other hand to a conference which the Emergency Committee proposed to hold in Jamaica. The purpose of the conference was to have an exchange of view among scientists on the control of atomic energy with special emphasis on the political prerequisites of the establishment of such a control. At the first interview, Gromiko received this proposal very coolly and indicated that he would have to contact Moscow and that there might be no answer of any kind. A short while later, he wrote Dr. Brown asking him to come to see him and after a short formal conversation in which he said that Russian scientists had declined the invitation, he started a conversation which had no relevance to the subject and which he kept on for about an hour. This was so much in contrast with the cool reception at the first interview, that Harrison Brown became convinced that Gromiko personally had recommended to Moscow that <sup>Gromiko</sup> after the first conference having made further inquiries about the Emergency

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The plan was to invite scientists, American, English, and French, on the one hand, Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslavian on the other hand, in order to discuss ~~the~~ international control of atomic energy. It was not the technical aspects of this problem which we proposed to discuss, but rather the question what kind of an overall settlement could provide the framework in which international control of atomic energy could be expected successfully to operate. We proposed to hold the conference in Jamaica, ~~to~~ <sup>have</sup> a comparatively small group of scientists attending, and to ~~consider~~ <sup>have</sup> the discussions off the record.

We did not propose to obtain the approval of the State Department for this conference, ~~but~~ <sup>but</sup> rather to inform the State Department of our intention to issue ~~such~~ <sup>an</sup> invitation ~~for~~ such a conference and to keep the State Department informed of every step that was to be taken. *It is my understanding that this was in fact done.*

On behalf of the Emergency Committee, Harrison Brown had two interviews with Gromiko in New York. On the occasion of the first interview, he was accompanied by Beardsey Rommel; on the occasion of the second interview, he was accompanied by Fowler Hamilton. On other occasions, Gromiko was accompanied by Skobelczyn.

*P* At the first interview, Gromiko received our proposition very coolly and indicated that he would have to contact Moscow and that if we don't hear anything further from him, we might assume that our proposition had been turned down. To our surprise, very shortly afterwards, Dr. Brown received a ~~letter~~ <sup>telegram</sup> from Gromiko asking him to come to see him ~~again~~. Gromiko received Dr. Brown and Fowler Hamilton in his study and proceeded to deliver a very short formal speech explaining that in view of the fact that we wanted to discuss political questions rather than scientific ones, the Russian scientists decided against attending this meeting. Having

*thought*

delivered this formal speech ~~in~~ which Dr. Brown ~~had the impression~~  
 Gromyko ~~might have~~ *had perhaps* recorded, there ensued a long drawn out  
 conversation about nothing in particular which Gromyko kept  
 on for over an hour ~~later~~, at which time Dr. Brown ~~was~~ *and*  
~~said~~ *ended it by saying* that he did not want to take any more of his time. The  
 circumstances of this second meeting gave Dr. Brown the impression  
 that after the first meeting, Gromyko *perhaps had* ~~might have~~ made inquiries  
 and ~~may have~~ *had* concluded that such a meeting would be desirable,  
 that he so recommended to Moscow, and that Moscow turned him down.  
 Dr. Brown had the impression that ~~he~~ *promised to* ~~wanted~~ to convey without  
 saying it in so many words that he personally regretted that  
 nothing came of the proposal.

*Stohm*

I have recently discussed with Harrison Brown, ~~and~~ Joe Mayer,  
 and Professor Einstein, ~~of~~ <sup>all</sup> of them trustees of the Emergency  
 Committee of Atomic Scientists, ~~with~~ *the* possibility of  
 advising Gromyko that the Emergency Committee is preparing to  
 renew the invitation to such a conference, *if the Russians would*

In view of the changes that took place since early 1948, *going*  
 we would this time propose to invite only Russian and American  
 scientists. *of Furthermore* ~~we~~ would advise the FBI that we shall be glad to *accept*  
 extend facilities to a limited number of agents which they *want*  
 to send, and a similar courtesy would be extended to the Russian  
 government. ~~The Emergency Committee would, however, take care~~  
~~of the expenses of the scientists, American and Russian, only.~~

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Those of us who do not rule out the possibility of reaching an  
 overall settlement with Russia are inclined to *regard* ~~see~~ the main value  
~~of~~ *the fact* that nothing *is* said by the participants is  
 in any way binding for the governments and therefore *a* much freer  
 interchange of views is possible at such a conference than at a  
 meeting of government representatives.

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~~We~~ would not consider ~~the~~ likely that the Russians will  
accept, but ~~we~~ *do* feel that if they don't, no harm has been done *in*  
~~since~~ the fact that such an invitation has been issued will not  
~~be~~ made public unless the Russians accept ~~the~~ invitation. *No*  
formal action ~~can~~ *will* be taken until there has been a meeting of the  
trustees of the Emergency Committee to ~~outline~~ *authorize* such action, and  
Harrison Brown, who is executive vice-chairman of the Committee  
will advise you of any step that he might ~~take~~ *take* on behalf of  
the Emergency Committee. We shall consider ~~letters~~ *all* written to  
you ~~on~~ this matter as official notification to the State Department  
and ~~we~~ *shall* will therefore appreciate ~~if~~ *acknowledgments of* the ~~xxx~~ receipt of ~~the~~ *such*  
letter ~~dealing with this issue were acknowledged.~~

Sincerely yours,



THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

49 WEST 49th STREET, NEW YORK 20

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

TELEPHONE:  
COLUMBUS 5-8100

August 26, 1957

Dear Professor Szilard:

This will simply acknowledge and thank you for your letter of August 16, which will be held for Mr. Rusk's return from extended foreign travel toward the end of September.

Sincerely yours,

*Barbara Hunt*

Secretary to  
Mr. Dean Rusk

Professor Leo Szilard  
The Enrico Fermi Institute  
for Nuclear Studies  
The University of Chicago  
Chicago 37, Illinois

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH  
AND HUMAN SERVICES  
PROFESSOR JESSE GREEN

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John Wesley  
Institute  
Kostoff

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

11 WEST 5TH STREET, NEW YORK 20  
THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

September 23, 1957

Mr. Dean Rusk  
President, The Rockefeller Foundation  
49 West 49th Street  
New York 20, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Rusk:

I had a letter from your office saying that you will return at the end of this month, and that the letter which I sent you will then be submitted to you.

I am about to leave for Europe and I have therefore asked Dr. Morton Grodzins, the Chairman of our Department of Political Science, to keep you informed of what has occurred since I wrote you -- on the assumption that you might be interested in the topic of my last communication.

It seems that the Russian scientists have taken rather vigorous action in the wake of the Pugwash meeting. From material received by Eugene Rabinowitch, which Dr. Grodzins may communicate to you, it would appear that the Russians are urging having another meeting soon. The odds are that they are now going to run with the ball and we might not be able to keep pace with them. At this point, I do not yet know whether the Russians may be willing to agree to the kind of meetings that I am proposing; i.e. meetings devoted to the clarification of our own thinking rather than to the drafting of proclamations. Both kind of meetings might do some good, but no meeting can serve both purposes and serve them well.

With best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard