

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS
OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR

July 16, 1958

Professor Leo Szilard
c/o Mr. Robert Livingston
National Institutes of Health
Bethesda 14, Maryland

Dear Mr. Szilard:

Morton Grodzins placed in my hands your letters and drafts concerning a suggested visit to Moscow for the purpose of informal discussions with Russian scientists, which might lead to more formal discussions later on. Grodzins indicated also that you had received assurance that if the University made application to the William C. Whitney Foundation it would make a grant of \$5,000 for this purpose.

I have just returned from vacation. To get a bit more information I have talked also with Larry Kimpton, with Warren Johnson who had been in communication with you, and with Chauncy Harris. I can summarize briefly the situation as I see it.

Although Johnson, Harris, and I have considerable doubts about the effectiveness of discussions outside the regular diplomatic channels, all of us have real respect for your ability as an individual to get difficult issues considered. The three of us feel that if you alone, or you together with one or two colleagues, made such a visit "under your own steam," so to speak, something good might come of it. I fear, and I think most of the others agree with me, that if you, or you and others, make the visit under the auspices of the University there would be opportunity for Russian political figures (propaganda experts of considerable ingenuity) to introduce and make public use of other facets, facets certainly different from those upon which you have some hope of making an impression. For such reasons I believe it would be unwise to make such a visit under the auspices or sponsorship of the University.

I am willing to ask the William C. Whitney Foundation for the grant of \$5,000 which, as I understand it, Mr. Milton Rose has assured you would be forthcoming or at least favorably considered if the University makes application. In making application I would make it clear that the University would be pleased to act as the responsible disbursing agent for the fund but could not assume responsibility for the conference and would not permit the use of its name in connection with it.

I do not see why the Foundation should not be willing to make the grant without assumption of official responsibility by the University for the conference reports, etc. However, you might possibly prefer not to make the trip under such restrictions. For this reason I am sending

Professor Leo Szilard

-2-

you this letter before we make any move at all. I shall not take any further action until I hear from you.

I hope all goes well in your program at the National Institutes of Health.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "R. W. Harrison".

R. W. Harrison
Vice President and
Dean of Faculties

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Dr. Alan T. Waterman
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National Science Foundation
1520 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Executive Officer Mr. David Z. Beckler
Executive Officer
President's Science Advisory Committee
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

April 6, 1958.

FROM: Richard Lohorn, Leo Szilard and Jerome Wiesner.

TO: Academician Topchiov.

We propose that there shall be held a meeting in Moscow in which ten to fifteen American scientists, of the kind to be described later, would participate, and about an equal number of Russian scientists of approximately the same sort. This meeting might last two weeks and it should take place at the earliest time that will suit those who are to participate and, if possible, not later than July of this year.

About one third of the American group might be scientists who are familiar with the technology of modern weapons and who, by virtue of their relationship to the United States government, are in a position to communicate their own thinking to the government, but who are not, themselves, officials of the United States government. About three or four of the Americans may be mathematicians or theoretical physicists or theoretical chemists.

The topic of the proposed discussions at Moscow might be circumscribed as follows:

"There exists, in the present state of the atomic arms race, a serious danger that an atomic war might break out which neither America nor the Soviet Union wants. What are the circumstances which might lead to the outbreak of such a war, and how could these circumstances be modified in order to diminish, and later on to eliminate completely, this danger?"

At the meeting in Moscow we would propose to discuss, as frankly as we have discussed in Quebec, controversial issues, including the difficulties which stand in the way for America to accept certain proposals which have been made by the government of the Soviet Union and for the Soviet Union to accept certain proposals that have been put forward by the American government. Sometimes these difficulties

come from apprehensions of one government, of which the other government is not fully aware. The proposed discussion at Moscow should enable both the American participants and the Russian participants to think about ways that may enable us to get around such difficulties.

After the conclusion of the conference, the participants may be able to explain to their own governments their, perhaps greatly improved, understanding of the difficulties which stand in the way of an agreement between the two governments and which relate to the question of controlled arms reduction, as well as certain other problems which are intimately related to this question. Our reasons for believing that the informal talks between American and Russian scientists, which we propose, might be fruitful are essentially as follows:

Our talks at Quebec have convinced us that among Russian, as well as among American, scientists, there are many who are not only men of good will, but who are also able to explore dispassionately controversial issues. Such men should be able to clarify, in their own minds, what the difficulties are that are impeding the progress towards reaching an understanding between America and Russia even in areas where these two nations have a strong common interest.

This fact appears to be of importance because, perhaps as a result of the successful launching of the "Sputnik" by scientists in the Soviet Union, there has developed, in the course of the last five months, a novel situation in the United States resulting in a greatly enhanced contact between scientists who are not employed by the government and government officials who are responsible for formulating United States policies.

Several months ago, President Eisenhower appointed Dr. J. R. Killian, Jr., as his special assistant for science and technology, and he is heading up a committee, "The President's Science Advisory Committee". With his own staff and advisors he exerts a considerable influence on the formation of the United States policy in the field of military security. Dr. Killian has succeeded in assembling,

in his committee, a number of outstanding scientists.

The members of the committee possess a high degree of intelligence and knowledge; above all they are men of good will. Therefore, the participation of some of these men in the proposed Moscow meeting would appear to be highly desirable. We feel, however, that one ought not to invite to the proposed Moscow meeting too many men who are members of "The President's Science Advisory Committee", in order to preserve the private character of the proposed meeting.

The American participants in the proposed meeting would want to prepare, in advance of the meeting, memoranda which may be helpful in focussing the discussion on what they believe to be the relevant topics. Some of these American documents will be concerned with problems which they believe to represent valid apprehensions of the Soviet Union. Among these problems are the following:

1. American airplanes and rocket bases on foreign soil.
2. A reunited and rearmed Germany.
3. Distribution of atomic weapons to America's allies.

We suggest that, similarly, our colleagues in the Soviet Union, who are to participate in the proposed meeting, may prepare documents on topics which are concerned with those apprehensions of the American government which they may recognize as valid.

In addition, both the American and Russian participants might prepare documents which relate to topics that represent apprehensions of both America and the Soviet Union, such as the danger of an accidental outbreak of an atomic war, and the risks involved in the possession of atomic weapons by nations other than America and the Soviet Union and Britain.

We believe that the invitations to the proposed Moscow meeting should not come from us, but rather that certain Americans be invited individually by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. However, we are prepared to say who, among American

scientists, could be particularly useful - in our opinion - at the proposed meeting. We are also prepared to offer our good offices in exploring who, among those whom we regard as desirable participants of the meeting, is likely to be able to attend the meeting. We propose to keep in touch with each other on the subject of the selection of American participants, and one of us may keep in touch with Academician Topchiev in order to keep him informed on who, among the proposed American participants, may be available at the date set for the meeting.

.....
Richard S. Leghorn
IT&K Corporation,
700 Commonwealth Ave.,
Boston, Mass.

.....
Leo Sillard
The Enrico Fermi Institute
for Nuclear Studies,
The University of Chicago,
Chicago 37, Illinois.

.....
Jerome B. Wiesner
The Research Laboratory
for Electronics,
The Massachusetts Institute
of Technology,
Cambridge, Mass.

June 11, 1958

Rem S. Krassilnikov
Third Secretary of the Embassy of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Krassilnikov:

I am writing to you because I should very much like to have your advice in a matter that has come up yesterday.

In Quebec, I had discussed tentatively with Academician Topchiev whether it might do some good if the Academy were to invite Edward Teller for a two-week visit to Russia. As you may know, Teller has taken a strong stand in public against any kind of arms limitation. He has recently become Director of the Livermore Laboratory, one of the two atomic weapons laboratories; the other being Los Alamos.

I thought at the time when I discussed this matter with Academician Topchiev that, if Teller were given the opportunity to talk alone with those of the Russian physicists whose work he values and whom he personally respects, he might discover that his conclusions are based on premises which are not entirely correct. It would ~~not~~ be too much to expect that, as a result of such a visit, Teller should change his publicly expressed opinion; but I would expect that the recognition that he was operating on the basis of a grossly over-simplified picture of Russian motivations, might cause him to be less certain of his conclusions.

I told Academician Topchiev that I would talk to Teller and write to him (Topchiev) whether I believe that an invitation ought to be issued to Teller.

2-Rem S. Krassilnikov

I should perhaps make it clear at this point that, while I am disagreeing with Teller on the issue of arms limitation and, also, rather profoundly on the reasons behind the historic events of the postwar years, he is an old personal friend of mine. I saw him only rarely during the past few years, but yesterday I had dinner with him. My main purpose on this occasion was to discover whether an invitation to visit Russia might do any good.

I learned, however, incidentally a fact of which I had no previous knowledge: I had, on previous occasions, the impression that Teller's public discussions of the bomb test issue had something emotional about them, but I could not see any reason for his emotions. Yesterday, I learned the following facts: Teller's mother, who is 76 years old, has been trying for some time to leave Hungary and she could have obtained a passport to do so except that she does not want to leave without her daughter Edward Teller's sister who is 52 years old and a widow, the Nazis having killed her husband. In spite of all efforts, which apparently have now been going on for 5 years, the daughter was not able to obtain permission to leave Hungary.

These facts make it easier for me to understand the emotions which manifested themselves in some of Teller's public statements, as well as the emotions he had displayed in private conversations.

Under the circumstances, I am abandoning for the present the thought of suggesting that Teller visit Russia and, instead, I want to explore what I could do in order to eliminate the emotional strain from the situation, by obtaining permission for Teller's mother and sister to leave Hungary.

3-Ren S. Krassilnikov

I expect to remain in Washington until the middle of July and, perhaps, I could call upon the Hungarian Ambassador and explain to him my reasons why (both from the point of view of charity and from a point of view of improving Russian-American relations) it would appear advisable to permit these two old ladies to leave Hungary. Since I don't know the Hungarian Ambassador, however, I do not want to call on him without proper introduction, lest he misunderstand my motives in taking action in this matter. Also, it would probably be more advisable that the introduction come from someone connected with the Russian Government rather than someone connected with the American Government.

I am not sure that this course of action is the best one that one might take and perhaps you can think of a better approach.

I also thought that I might take up the matter with Academician Topchiev but I hesitate to write to Topchiev about this, since this is not a matter in which the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is directly concerned.

If there is any advise you think you might be able to offer in this matter, please write me in care of Dr. Robert B. Livingston, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda 14, Maryland, U.S.A.

I am enclosing a memorandum giving the personal data of Teller's mother and sister, for your information.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

ILONA TELLER (76) - mother of Dr. Edward Teller.

MRS. EMMA KIRZ (52) - sister of Dr. Edward Teller.

Last known address: Deak Ference utca 21
Budapest V, Hungary

PROFESSOR J. ROTBLAT

Physics Department,
The Medical College of
St. Bartholomew's Hospital,
Charterhouse Square,
LONDON, E.C.1.

16th June, 1958.

Dear Szilard,

You have received, or soon will receive, from Betty Royon, a copy of the verbatim transcript of the Lac Beauport meeting. This is a very bulky document in three volumes, and not very suitable as an official document of the Conference.

The Continuing Pugwash Committee, which met in London last week, agreed that it would be useful to have an edited version of the proceedings, which could be circulated to the scientists attending the Austrian Conference in September. They felt that the single volume entitled "Documents of the Second Pugwash Conference", which was sent to you some weeks ago, might form a good basis for such an official document, provided it was suitably amended. I was asked to write to all members of the Pugwash Conference and ask them to let me have the corrections to the documents they wish to make.

In order to carry out this task in time for the September Conference, it is necessary to have the amended version as soon as possible. I would, therefore, be grateful if you could ensure that any corrections to this document reach me not later than the 18th July.

I am looking forward to seeing you in Kitzbühel.

Yours sincerely,



Professor Leo Szilard,
University of Chicago,
1155 East 57th Street,
Chicago 37,
ILLINOIS, U.S.A.

Mr. Shoykht
West Tisbury
Maso.
Hill Top Farm
Mrs Corie Gregory
New Folland
Two Mrs West

4-4655
Flecker-4-7754

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2-3

168
12 30

Mr. Milton Rose
20 Broad Street
N.Y.C.
William C. Whitney
found.

4000

George Brown
27 Court Lane
Dialwich S.E. 22.
Telephone Forest Hill 4715

Mr. John Miller

930 - 10
330 pm 11 Exet.

15

415 pm Smith
FARLEY

315
17th - Penna

AM. 915 - 285

1244
19th

June 18 1958

Colonel Richard Leghorn
President ITEK Corporation
Commonwealth Avenue 700
Boston 15. Massachusetts USA.

copies:

Professor L. Szilard
Professor D. Wizner

J. Wiesner

Dear D-r Leghorn,

I received your letter and a signed copy of the Memorandum. Upon my return to Moscow from Canada I informed my colleagues in the USSR Academy of Sciences about the Second Pugwash meeting of Scientists, which in my opinion was fruitful and also of your proposal to hold a private conference of soviet and american scientists in Moscow in July to discuss the possible ways to eliminate dangers of an atomic war as well as the actions that might be taken in this connection by the scientists of USSR and USA.

My colleagues met this proposal with interest and expressed a hope that such a Conference will contribute towards eliminating the threat to humanity of a devastating atomic war and towards establishment of mutual understanding and trust between our countries.

The problems put forward in your memorandum arouse no objections on our part and can be included into the number of problems to be discussed at this Conference. We would appreciate your letting us know before the beginning of the Conference, if your time permits, other considerations and proposals on your part referring to the topic of the

discussions.

The Academy of Sciences will invite to this Conference american scientists as its guests in the USSR for 2-3 weeks. The Conference could begin on July 28 if it is convenient for you.

We would like to have particulars on your american colleagues in order to be able to extend invitations and help with getting visas in time. We have no objections against senator Hemphry's participation in the Conference as observer, if he wishes so.

We convey our friendly greetings to your wife on behalf of myself and Mr.Pavlichenko.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

(A.V.Topchiev)

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION

(47)

TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = International Letter Telegram

1958 JUN 19 10 46 PM

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

TELEGRAM=CD MOSCOU VIA RCA 19 2001=

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 PROFESSOR LEO SZILARD UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO=

(DEPT ENRICO FERMI INSTITUTE FOR NUCLEAR
 STUDIES)= 5630 SOUTH ELLIS CHGO=

LEGHORN INFORMED ABOUT OUR CONSENT HOLD PROPOSED MEETING
 IN MOSCOW STARTING JULY 28 DETAILS BZ AIRMAIL=

TOPCHIEV=

Preliminary Moscow List

June 23, 1958

I <u>Accepted</u>	II <u>Invitations Extended</u> or <u>*To Be Extended</u>	III <u>Further Consideration</u>	IV <u>Unavailable or Declined</u>
1. Lloyd Berkner ?	*E. H. Land (1) Polaroid	Hashino Carnegie Inst. (1)	Bacher
2. Feynman Cal. Tech.	*Louis Ridenour (1) Lockheed	Higgenbotham	Bethe
3. J. B. Wiesner	Lewis Alvarez <i>Systems Div</i>	J. H. Doolittle (2)	Purcell
4. Leo Szilard	Weisskopf (1) MIT	Fred Seitz Illinois	Bode
5. R. S. Leghorn	Panovsky Stanford	H. J. Mueller (2) Indiana	Fisk
6. Harold Urey	*Al Hill (1) Inst. for Defense Analysis	Linus Pauling (1)	
7. Hansen Brown	Ed MacMillan	W. Selove Pa.	
8. Lee DuBridge Cal. Tech.	Detlev Bronk (1) Natl. Aca. Sci.	Primm Bell Labs.	
9. T. F. Walkowicz	Herb York ARPA	Phillip Morse	
10. <i>u. u. k. Kroy</i>	<i>Al W. Wohlberg, (Jack Morse)</i>	Hayworth Brookhaven (2)	
<i>Rabinowitz</i>	<i>Capt.</i>	Wigner Zacharias (1)	
	<i>Feld</i>	Barbans	
		<i>(Martin Deutsch)</i>	

Capital: Na #3/20
2424

Lawrence Weiler

Ex 3-3300
Ext 2406

June 23, 1958

Rem S. Krassilnikov
Third Secretary of the Embassy of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Krassilnikov:

Several things have happened since I wrote you on June 11th and some of these may have an effect on the advice that you might want to give me.

It now appears that I might spend two weeks in Moscow starting July 28th, on the invitation of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. Thus, I would be in a position to take up the matter about which I wrote you with the Hungarian Ambassador in Moscow rather than the Hungarian Ambassador in Washington. Would this appear to you to be a good plan? And if so, how should I go about it?

Further there occurred in Hungary some, most regrettable, political executions which raise the question in my mind of whether any useful purpose would be served by my taking action along the lines indicated in the letter which I wrote you on June 11.

If you feel you can give any advice in this matter, I shall appreciate hearing from you.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

June 11, 1958

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Third Secretary of the Embassy of
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Ottawa, Canada

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With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

ILONA TELLER (76) - mother of Dr. Edward Teller.
MRS. EMMA KIRZ (52) - sister of Dr. Edward Teller.
Last known address: Deak Ference utca 21
Budapest V, Hungary

MEMORANDUM OF RESEARCH PROJECT: "STABILITY IN THE ATOMIC STALEMATE"

The bomb poses a problem to the world for which there is no precedent in history. There are two possible approaches to this problem and both of these deserve a careful analysis.

One of these two approaches is based on the assumption that the problem posed by the bomb can be solved by getting rid of the bomb. This could be done only if the great powers agreed not only to cease bomb tests and cease the manufacturing of further bombs, but also to give up the bombs which they have stockpiles, together with the means which are suitable for the delivery of such bombs. Only if both Russia and America agreed to give up the bomb and with it their ability to exert pressure due to the implied threat which their possession of the bomb represents would it be possible to rid the world of the bomb. Assuming that Russia and America would want to rid the world of the bomb, would they be able to do this? What are the difficulties which might make this difficult or impossible, and how could these difficulties be overcome?

~~These are questions which~~ Scientists drawn from different nations including Russia and America should be able to discuss dispassionately all aspects of these questions with a greater chance of success than almost any other kind of group drawn from one nation or from several nations.

One can see another approach to the problem posed by the bomb, if one assumes that both Russia and America, and perhaps other nations as well, will retain for another ten years and perhaps throughout the entire foreseeable future substantial stockpiles of bombs, both small atomic bombs and clean or dirty hydrogen bombs of great power. Within the foreseeable future, perhaps five or ten years from now, Russia will be in the position to destroy America to any desired degree and America may be in a position to destroy Russia to any desired degree. These capabilities of America and Russia will presumably be based on solid fuel long-range rockets, capable of carrying clean hydrogen bombs of high power. Both America and Russia may be able to launch such rockets from bases lying within their own territory, and both will be in a position to make these bases invulnerable to attack. Thus, 5 or 10 years from now -- in contrast to the present transition phase of the stalemate -- neither America nor Russia will need to fear the power

to strike a counter blow

INSERT

Looking ahead to the time when the atomic stalemate will take on the form described above, one must now ask the following questions.

In a stalemate based on solid fuel long-range rockets, what kind of policies need America and Russia adopt in order to render the stalemate stable so that out of the stalemate there shall arise no all-out atomic war that neither America nor Russia want? To what extent could the stalemate be stabilized by policies that America or Russia may unilaterally adopt? And to what extent is it necessary for America and Russia to reach agreements specifically stabilizing the stalemate? Clearly these ^{are} questions which are capable of being analyzed. ~~and by~~ A group of scientists, particularly if they are drawn from more than one nation, should be expected to be able to carry out a dispassionate and many sided analysis of these questions.

We are at present going through a transition phase of the atomic stalemate -- en route to the final stage, which will be based on solid fuel long-range rockets. Once it has been determined what the long-range policies may be that America and Russia need to adopt in the final stage of the stalemate for the sake of rendering the stalemate stable, it becomes necessary to ask the following question.

There are measures which either Russia or America may adopt in the present transitional phase of the stalemate, which will make it very difficult and perhaps impossible later on for either of them to adopt the long-range policies that the stability of the stalemate may require. Thus, it becomes imperative to ask what are the short range measures which America and Russia might take in the near future that must be avoided from the point of view of America's long range policy and to what extent is it necessary for Russia and America to enter into an agreement with each other in the near future in order to enable both America and Russia to avoid taking any of these short-range measures, which will be detrimental from the long-range point of view?

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DR LEO SZILARD

NATL INST OF HEALTH BETHESDA MD

WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED YOUR REQUEST AND DISCUSSED

IT WITH MR RUSK IN MEXICO. REGRETFULLY CONCLUDE THAT

ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION SHOULD NOT ASSIST THIS AND

SIMILAR PROJECTS. WILL BE GLAD TO DISCUSS REASONS IF YOU

WISH SOMETIME WHEN YOU AND RUSK ARE IN NEW YORK

WARREN WEAVER.

210PME

[Handwritten signature]

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

file copy

July 3, 1958

Warren C. Johnson, Dean
Physical Sciences Division
Eckhart Hall
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Warren:

When I talked with you on the telephone a few days ago, I understood there would be no difficulty in opening an expense account ~~for me~~, to which would be credited checks made payable to the University of Chicago, representing private contributions earmarked for covering the expenses of a "Study Relating to the World Security Problems Raised by the Bomb."

The attached ^{Memo} ~~sheet~~ gives you a description of the Study which is in progress and for which funds are being solicited by me.

Mr. Michael Straight, whom I have informed about the projected study, advised me that The William C. Whitney Foundation might be able to make available Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000) for the purpose of the proposed "Study." Accordingly, a letter requesting a grant for this purpose need now be written by the University of Chicago to The William C. Whitney Foundation, addressed to the attention of Mr. Milton Rose.

2-Warren C. Johnson, Dean

July 3, 1958

I am sending to Mr. Rose directly a copy of this letter and the enclosures so that he will have all the information which he may need to take action on this matter at an early date, as soon as he receives your "request."

I should greatly appreciate your sending me a copy of your letter to Mr. Rose for my files.

With kind regards.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Encs.

MEMORANDUM

July 3, 1953

From: Leo Szilard
To: Warren C. Johnson
Dean of the Physical Sciences Division
The University of Chicago
Re: Study Relating to the World Security Problems Raised
by the Bomb

During the past six months, I have given considerable attention to a study relating to the world security problems raised by the bomb. This study has proceeded through informal conversations. These were limited to a circle of American scientists and served primarily the purpose of clarifying the minds of the participants on the issues involved.

The scope of the problems encompassed in this study may be circumscribed as follows:

Five, or at most ten, years from now there should be a stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of Russia and America, based on solid fuel, long-range rockets carrying "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power. Moreover, these long-range rockets would be launched from highly dispersed bases lying inside the territories of America and Russia proper. These bases could, and presumably would, be made invulnerable to attack. Therefore, in this stage of the stalemate, while Russia and America may be capable of destroying each other to any desired degree, yet neither

of these two countries would need to fear that a sudden atomic attack, by the other, might appreciably diminish its own power to strike a counterblow. This fear is one of the elements responsible for the inherent instability which characterizes the present, transitional phase of the "stalemate". With this fear eliminated, the current American emphasis on the need to be prepared for an instant counterblow may disappear also.

What kind of long-term policies with respect to the bomb may Russia and America have to pursue -- in this "final" setting -- in order to render the atomic stalemate stable, so that no local, political or military disturbances might set off an all-out atomic war which neither Russia nor America wants?

Some of those engaged in this study are centering their attention on the problem of "stability" in this "final" setting of the stalemate.

At present, however, the technological development has not yet brought about this "final" stage. Rather, we find ourselves in a transitional phase in which the character of the stalemate is still rapidly changing. In this transitional phase, both America and Russia are forced to operate with short-term policies with respect to the bomb, and they might be tempted to adopt policies which would make it more

difficult for them (if not impossible) later on to adopt an adequate long-term policy capable of rendering the stalemate stable.

Some of us engaged in this study are trying to determine what these "undesirable" short-term policies are likely to be and what kind of an understanding between Russia and America it would take to avoid their adoption by either of them.

This study is devoted to a dispassionate analysis of the problems of world security that are raised by the bomb and it could be carried out up to a certain point, through informal discussions among American scientists, without the participation of Russian scientists.

It is not sufficient, however, to determine merely what policies would be desirable from a point of view of rendering the atomic stalemate stable; it is also necessary to consider whether any particular policy that would appear desirable ~~and~~ would also be politically acceptable to Russia as well as to America. Therefore, after a certain degree of clarification of the issues has been accomplished in our own minds, it becomes necessary to widen the circle of the informal discussions to include also Russian scientists, who are in a better position to appraise what may be politically

acceptable to Russia than we are.

In April of this year while I attended an international conference of scientists at Lac Beauport, Quebec, Canada, I was led to conclude that the participation of Russian scientists in these informal discussions could be best arranged through ^{the} sponsorship of such informal discussions by the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. For the time being such informal conversations between American and Russian scientists could be best carried out in Russia, where we would have access to a fairly wide circle of Russian scientists.

The attached letter written by Academician A.V. Topchiev, General Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, to Colonel Richard S. Leghorn -- with copies to Professor Jerome Wiesner and myself -- affords a unique opportunity to extend the circle of informal discussions to Russian scientists. The events leading up to the receipt of this letter from Academician Topchiev are described in the attached memorandum of July 2, 1958.

Since April, when I discussed this topic with Academician Topchiev, my own thinking has moved even further in the direction of stressing the need to keep the discussions between American and Russian scientists as informal as possible. For this reason, I think that perhaps we ought to explore whether the meeting that the Academy of Sciences of the

is willing to
Soviet Union ~~will~~ sponsor might not be further loosened up and rendered more diffuse by having first a preparatory discussion of a few American scientists with a few Russian scientists, held under the sponsorship of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. On that occasion, we might then decide on the best way of holding informal discussions between Russian and American scientists on a more or less continuous basis.

Formal meetings aimed at ~~getting~~ *overcoming* a consensus of ~~the~~ the participants or any other meetings which are not strictly private in character would fall outside the scope of this study.

It is estimated that we shall need for secretarial services, travel expenses of the American participants in this study, long-distance calls, and other similar expenses, a total of perhaps \$35,000 in the next twelve months. Of this, about \$20,000 might be spent on expenses connected with the informal discussions held between American and Russian scientists under the sponsorship of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, and this sum might have to be spent in the course of the next three months.

L.Sz.

THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, R. I., CHAIRMAN
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DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

July 3, 1958

Dr. Leo Szilard
c/o Robert B. Livingston
National Institutes of Health
Bethesda 14, Maryland

Dear Dr. Szilard:


Thank you for bringing to my attention the letters you received from Academician Topchiev, General Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. I note that he says the Soviet Academy of Sciences will have no objections to my participation in a conference in Moscow this year. I appreciate your initiative in bringing this possibility to Academician Topchiev's attention, and also his friendly response.

Unfortunately this Congress is going to remain in session longer than we had originally anticipated. That fact, as well as commitments which are now unavoidable for me following the adjournment of Congress will make it impossible for me to participate as an observer in your projected meeting in Moscow. I hope you will express my regrets to Academician Topchiev.

If your conference is held, I wish you every success and look forward to meeting with you and any other participants upon your return to the States.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,


Hubert H. Humphrey

Copy to: Mr. Michael
Straight

July 4, 1958

William C. Whitney Foundation
Attention: Mr. Milton Rose
20 Broad Street
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Rose:

Mr. Michael Straight told me that he had informed you that I and my associates are setting up a study relating to the "World Security Problems Raised by the Bomb." The University of Chicago will write you and ask for a grant of Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000) for the purposes of this study.

Enclosed you will find a letter which I addressed in this matter to Warren C. Johnson, Dean of Physical Sciences Division, University of Chicago, who told me over the telephone that the University of Chicago is prepared to receive checks made payable to her and credit them to an account which my associates as well as I may draw for expenses connected with the proposed study.

One particular phase of the proposed study is described, in some detail, in the enclosed memorandum dated June 28, 1958.

If you should have any query in connection with this matter, I should appreciate your calling me over the telephone. You may reach me during office hours in care of Robert B. Livingston - telephone: OLiver 6-4000, Ext. 3501, in Bethesda, Maryland. My mailing address is in care of Robert B. Livingston, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda 14, Maryland.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

3 *Thermopast*

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS
THE DIVISION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Office of the Dean

July 8, 1958

Dr. Leo Szilard
Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies
Faculty Exchange

Dear Leo:

Your letter and accompanying documents of July 3 have been received. As much as I sympathize with the objectives of your program, I regret that the University is in no position to contribute to it in any manner as far as arrangements are concerned.

If you are anxious to carry through with the program, I would suggest that arrangements be made with the William C. Whitney Foundation as sponsor.

I hope that you will be able to secure a responsible body to represent you and your group. At the present time the University of Chicago is not prepared to do so.

Sincerely,

Warren

Warren C. Johnson, Dean
Division of the Physical Sciences

Signed in Dean Johnson's
absence.

high. museum
filed

July 10, 1958

Professor Walter Whitman
Department of Chemical Engineering
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Whitman:

Enclosed I am sending you a description of the study in which we are engaged. Attached to it is Leghorn's telegram to Topchiev, Topchiev's letter to Leghorn (with copies to Jerome Wiesner and myself) and the memorandum dated July 2, 1958, which I have addressed to Warren C. Johnson and which describes the events that led up to the receipt of Topchiev's letter.

I should be grateful if you would inquire whether MIT would be willing to assume the financial responsibility for this study by setting up an account from which the expenses of the participants could be defrayed. I am soliciting funds for the purpose of this study from foundations and private individuals. If MIT is willing to assume financial responsibility for this study, then the grants would be made payable to MIT. In that case, you, yourself, would have to okay vouchers which the participants in this study might submit to MIT for reimbursement of their expenses. I estimate that within the next 12 months, there might be perhaps 50 such expense vouchers submitted.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

NIGHT LETTER

A. V. TOPCHIEV
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR
LENINSKI PROSPECT
MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.

CONCERNING DATES SUGGESTED IN LEGHORN'S TELEGRAM, PROPOSE
PAVLICHENKO TELEPHONE ME TOMORROW, MONDAY, OR TUESDAY AT
5 P.M., MOSCOW TIME, AT THE KENWOOD COUNTRY CLUB, BETHESDA,
MARYLAND, TELEPHONE OLIVER 4-4655 STOP ALTERNATIVELY,
KINDLY CABLE ME CARE OF LIVINGSTON, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH, BETHESDA, MARYLAND ON WHAT DAY OF THE WEEK I MAY
CALL PAVLICHENKO AT 5 P.M., MOSCOW TIME STOP REGARDS

LEO SZILARD

Charge to:

~~MR. X DAVIS~~
~~1510 X WINDHURST LANE~~
~~SILVER SPRING X MARYLAND~~
Lockwood 4-7916
Daniel R. Davies
7/13/58

NIGHT LETTER

**A. V. TOPCHIEV
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR
LENINSKI PROSPECT
MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.**

**CONCERNING DATES SUGGESTED IN LEGHORN'S TELEGRAM, PROPOSE
PAVLICHENKO TELEPHONE ME TOMORROW, MONDAY, OR TUESDAY AT
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HEALTH, BETHESDA, MARYLAND ON WHAT DAY OF THE WEEK I MAY
CALL PAVLICHENKO AT 5 P.M., MOSCOW TIME STOP REGARDS**

LEO SZILARD

Charge to:

**~~Mrs. Daniel R. Davies~~
~~X310XWinchamXlane~~
~~XSilverXSpringXMaryland~~
Lockwood 4-7916
Daniel R. Davies
7/13/58**

True copy

NIGHT LETTER

CONFIRMATION COPY

July 9, 1958

A. V. TOPCHIEV
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE SOVIET UNION
LENINSKI PROSPECT
MOSCOW, USSR

WE ARE VERY GRATIFIED BY YOUR LETTER OF JUNE EIGHTEENTH
STOP WE PROPOSE THAT THE FULL-SCALE DISCUSSIONS OUTLINED
IN YOUR LETTER START IN MOSCOW IN THE SECOND HALF OF
SEPTEMBER IF THAT IS CONVENIENT TO YOU STOP WE PROPOSE
FURTHER THAT A PREPARATORY DISCUSSION BE HELD IN MOSCOW
AT AN EARLY DATE, ATTENDED BY WALTER WHITMAN, LEO SZILARD,
MYSELF AND, IF POSSIBLE, JEROME WIESNER STOP THE PURPOSE
OF THIS PREPARATORY DISCUSSION IS TO DISCOVER THE MOST
PRODUCTIVE TOPICS ON WHICH THE FULL-SCALE DISCUSSIONS MAY
CONCENTRATE AND TO PERMIT A BETTER PREPARATION OF THE
FULL-SCALE DISCUSSIONS STOP WE PROPOSE THAT THE
PREPARATORY DISCUSSION BEGIN ON AUGUST EIGHTEENTH IF THIS
IS CONVENIENT TO YOU STOP AS AN ALTERNATIVE DATE, WE
SUGGEST JULY TWENTY-EIGHTH STOP LETTER FOLLOWS STOP
BEST REGARDS

LEGHORN

Charge to:
Lockwood 4-7916
Daniel R. Davies
7/9/58

Richard S. Leghorn
ITEK Corporation
700 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, Mass.

THE BUDGET

The Rains Came

A federal red-ink splash "of the order of \$10 billion," said President Eisenhower at his press conference last week, lies ahead in the newborn fiscal year of 1959. It was a rueful admission for a President who had pledged himself to balanced budgets as an essential goal, and who half a year ago submitted an optimistic 1959 budget showing a \$500 million surplus.

One big reason for the dizzying switch from surplus to massive deficit had nothing to do with either cold war or recession; it was the further bloating of already swollen farm programs. As of January, the Agriculture Department was planning to spend a whacking \$5 billion for the fiscal year, largely in efforts to cope with surpluses that are encouraged by high price supports (TIME, Aug. 19). But abundant spring rainfall brought lush crop prospects, notably in the long-parched Great Plains, and the department's outgo estimate mushroomed to \$6 billion—more than twice the combined outlays of the State, Justice, Interior, Commerce and Labor departments. In a rational world, good crop weather ought to count as a national blessing, but under the archaic, surplus-spawning price-support laws, it only serves to boost the already scandalous cost of subsidized farming by another billion dollars.

Is there any prospect of a balanced budget in fiscal 1960, beginning a year from now? In reply to this press-conference question, the President said that he expected the deficit to "diminish" in 1960, but that it would take an "awful shrinkage" to bring \$10 billion down to zero. In short: no.

THE ADMINISTRATION

The New Influence

So smoothly and quietly as to be barely detectable, the U.S., over the past three or four months, has considerably modified its policy on willingness to try for a workable agreement with Russia on ending nuclear weapons tests. U.S. policymakers were solidly committed to one disarmament package: tests could not be stopped unless nuclear-weapons production was simultaneously stopped and conventional arms were cut down. But last week a U.S. scientific delegation sat down peaceably with a Russian scientific delegation in Geneva to discuss the feasibility of nuclear test inspection systems (see FOREIGN NEWS). Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had ringed the meeting with the warning that the results would not bind the U.S. on any next steps, but the mere fact of the session was important evidence of an important new influence at work in the U.S. Government.

The new influence: Dr. James Rhyne Killian Jr., 53, for nine years president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, since November the President's special assistant for science and technology. Al-

most daily, he pops in and out of the President's office or on and off the President's private telephone line. More and more, the President holds off proposals with a "Let's see what Jim thinks about this." Among the most meaningful scribbles on official memorandums is "Killian has no objections." At a recent press conference, the President, asked whether the U.S. ought to get a Cabinet-level department of science, said he thought not, but that "one of my appointments today is with the advisory committee under Dr. Killian, and if I thought there was any need for [such a department], I should refer it to him at once for a study, a complete study."

Balanced Panels. Much of Jim Killian's influence derives from the need that the President and the nation had for such



U.P.I.

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER KILLIAN
Into a high-level ear.

a man when he went to Washington last fall. The Communists had put up Sputnik I, and the editorialists were crying for a "Science Czar." Dr. Killian got the headlines, if not the specific job. He added to his influence at once with a shot of his old M.I.T. organizational energy. He expanded membership of the President's Science Advisory Committee from twelve to 17, recruited scores of scientists coast to coast to set up 20 or so panels to study space programs, scientific education, missiles, translations of Russian documents, anything relevant to science. Before long he had generally set off a ferment of excited scientific mind-rubbing.

The scientific community did not miss the point that Killian bolstered the Washington standing of many of Physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer's friends and followers, who had had some trouble finding a high-level ear since Oppenheimer's security clearance was suspended in 1953. Yet Killian carefully balanced the politics of his panelists, then strongly warned them

never, never to let political viewpoints influence scientific judgments.

New Argument. But in his own key strategic role of scientific pipeline to the President, Jim Killian could obviously impose no such tight rule on himself. "He tries to provide scientific facts," a friend says, "but he also has to explain the implications of a technical fact." And when he stepped into the argument about nuclear tests, Killian moved into policy at the heart of U.S. security.

At the President's invitation, Killian mustered up a panel of scientists to study what was actually a defense question: Would it be militarily safe for the U.S., given international inspection, to try for an agreement to stop nuclear tests? After six to seven weeks, the Killian panel answered the question: yes. Killian agreed that small underground test blasts probably could not be detected and high-altitude test blasts possibly could not be detected, as the Atomic Energy Commission's Lewis Strauss and Physicist Edward Teller had warned. But Killian moved the whole debate to a new stage when his technical evidence led, despite these drawbacks, to the conclusion that it would still be relatively safe for the U.S. to have a try at an agreement to stop tests, with mutual inspection.

One immediate result: the President and Secretary of State Dulles decided to try the diplomatic gambit of technical talks with the U.S.S.R. at Geneva.

Wary Doubters. Thus far, Killian has generally stayed out of the headlines, and he has declined, as a member of the President's staff, to testify before Congress. He is one of the hardest officials in Washington for reporters to see. But his opponents are beginning to get his range. Some top-ranking Pentagon civilians—as well as the military—believe that ending nuclear tests would hinder the development of new strategic deterrent weapons—the Navy's Polaris, the Air Force's Minuteman, and others. Also they believe that test stoppage would, at a critical time, stop the research needed to develop such vital defensive weapons as the Air Force and Army's anti-missile missiles to protect U.S. cities, the Navy's antisubmarine nuclear depth charges.

Some AEC experts believe that the Russians' ability to conceal certain high-altitude and subterranean tests would give them a chance for a risky amount of covert progress in weapons development. Some State Department officials present cogent doubts about the principle of committing the U.S. to a hand-tying agreement not to test future nuclear weapons that might turn out to be necessary to survival.

But the doubters of the new Killian influence inside the Eisenhower Administration have learned to be sure of their arguments before they speak, because, as never before, their doubts are likely to be banished by harsh experience. Killian's independent agency has 1) intelligence facts and figures at its fingertips, and 2) the President's ear.

against the Alabama N.A.A.C.P. Offense: refusing to obey a court order to hand over membership lists as evidence in the state government's still pending suit to bar the N.A.A.C.P. from operating in Alabama. Turning over the lists, protested the N.A.A.C.P., would expose members to harassment.

Last week the Supreme Court unanimously struck down the Alabama contempt conviction as a violation of the constitutional rights of N.A.A.C.P. members. Said the opinion, written by Justice John Marshall Harlan: "Freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association."

More important to the N.A.A.C.P. than the \$100,000 was the decision's firmness in blocking, not just in Alabama but in all Southern states, all attempts to enfeeble the N.A.A.C.P. by forcing it to hand over its membership rolls.

The Supreme Court also refused to review U.S. District Judge Harry J. Lemley's order granting the Little Rock school board permission to suspend racial integration at beleaguered Central High School until 1961 (TIME, June 30). In its haste to get a final ruling before Central High reopens in September, the N.A.A.C.P. had carried its case straight to Washington without waiting for a Court of Appeals decision. Supreme Court policy, seldom breached, is to refrain from reviewing lower-court decisions until the Court of Appeals has its say. But recognizing the "vital importance of the time element," the Supreme Court urged the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (St. Louis) to "act upon the applications for a stay or the appeal in ample time to permit arrangements to be made for the next school year."

LABOR

Jimmy Rides Again

Undaunted by explosive revelations of the McClellan committee investigations, unscathed by three recent court trials and small-bore insurgency in his organization, unabashed by proven connections with gangsters both in and out of his heavily muscled union, Teamster Boss James Riddle Hoffa bounced confidently into Washington last week and, with one single stroke of his fist, made the whole U.S. labor movement sit up and take notice.

Hoffa's fisty proposal: a conference, to be held next month, of leaders of some 50 transportation unions, whose membership runs to 3.5 million. His aim: confederation of transport workers who cover not only trucking, but also the waterfront, the air, the railroads and even the underground. Such a powerhouse group, if organized in the Hoffa manner, would be a serious threat to George Meany's A.F.L.-C.I.O., and would create a union monop-

oly that could conceivably pull the switch on the U.S. economy at the whim of James Riddle Hoffa.

"Any Time, Joe." Jimmy announced the plan after meeting with two strongmen in the transport business: Joe Curran, 52, lantern-jawed, battle-scarred boss of the seamen's National Maritime Union (membership: 40,000), and Captain (tugboat) William Bradley, 55, paunchy president of the evil-smelling International Longshoremen's Association (membership: 52,000), which was thrown out of the A.F.L. five years ago. The three men kicked off the master plan by signing a "conference" pact for the purpose of "discussing and settling jurisdictional disputes, matters of mutual concern and matters affecting progress and stability in the transportation industry." Among those who will be invited to attend the August meeting: Red-Lining Harry Bridges, boss of the West Coast's International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Un-



Forde

TEAMSTER BOSS HOFFA
The king was in the powerhouse.

ion, Paul Hall, president of Joe Curran's rival outfit, the Seafarers' Union, New York subway union's Mike Quill.

Appearing at a press conference with Hoffa and Bradley, Joe Curran, a strong-willed adversary of A.F.L.-C.I.O. President Meany, and a member of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Ethical Practices Committee that recommended the ousting of Hoffa and his teamsters last September, allowed blandly that the new pact "has no bearing whatsoever on the feelings of one member of a union for another. Anyway, lately I don't know what the A.F.L.-C.I.O. constitution provides. And I don't care."

"The Teamsters," said Hoffa jubilantly, "attach sufficient importance to this [conference] that the cost will be underwritten by them if necessary." Grinned Jimmy: "Any time you're in trouble, Joe, we've got the money." Replied Curran: "Any time you're in trouble, Jimmy . . ."

Stuffed Pockets. The fact is that Jimmy can take care of his own troubles. Acquitted fortnight ago by a Manhattan federal court of charges that he conspired to tap the telephones of his fellow Teamster executives, Tough Guy Hoffa is gaining new strength day by day. Teamster membership is up (to more than 1,500,000), and Hoffa is setting up deals right and left with A.F.L.-C.I.O. unions, such as the brewery workers, butchers and carpenters, the effect of which is to undermine the strength of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. He even has in mind calling a new Teamster convention so that he can divest himself of the three court-appointed monitors who are presiding over the promised Teamster cleanup, which is still in the promise stage.

His pockets thus stuffed with pacts, promises and big dreams, Hoffa, by his actions last week, made all the more prophetic the words of the McClellan committee report of 1958: Extraordinary power, "now lodged in the hands of a man such as Hoffa, [is] tragic for the Teamsters Union and dangerous for the country at large." And for James Riddle Hoffa, this was only the beginning.

POLITICAL NOTES

A Feud in the Desert

The political climate in Utah (pop. 860,000) rarely erupts in thunderstorms visible beyond the border. But for three years, chain lightning has crackled between snow-capped Senior Senator Arthur V. Watkins and volcanic ex-Governor J. (for Joseph) Bracken Lee. Watkins cannot forgive Lee a long record of sheer perversity—outspoken criticism of President Eisenhower, opposition to federal income tax, foreign aid, federal aid to education and Arthur V. Watkins. Lee cannot forgive Watkins for having openly supported a Republican candidate in 1956 who beat Lee out in his bid for an unprecedented third term. After his defeat Bracken Lee holed up in private life as national director of For America, an over-stuffed lobby group as far to the right in its principles as Lee. This week, to the surprise of no one, Lee, 58, announced he is gunning for 71-year-old Arthur Watkins' seat.

With the inborn shrewdness of the feud-er, Bracken Lee has carefully selected his ground. He will run as an Independent, out of reach of disapproving Republicans at the state convention and the primary election, but accessible to Democrats of a mind to stop Watkins by stepping across the party boundary at primary time to vote for Watkins' competition. Both parties, said Lee impartially in announcing his independent candidacy, "stand for and support the same policy of high tax, waste and giveaway programs."

To get an exact measure of the effect of Maverick Lee's intervention, Utahans will have to wait until the November general election. Even admirers of the Lee brand of political intransigence give him only an outside chance at best of beating Arthur Watkins.

TWENTY-FIVE CENTS


JULY 14, 1958

HEREDITY
Life's Hidden Mechanism

TIME

THE WSMAGAZINE

ARTZYBASHEFF



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GEORGE W. BEADLE

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(REG. U.S. PAT. OFF.)

VOL. LXXII NO. 2

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
THE BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES
16 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

July 15, 1958
Special Delivery

Dr. Leo Szilard
c/o Dr. Robert B. Livingston
National Institutes of Health
Bethesda 14, Maryland

Dear Dr. Szilard:

The Executive Committee of the Council of the American Academy has considered your proposal and is favorably inclined. Only one member of the Executive Committee felt really dubious about it, and he stated emphatically that he was all in favor of such studies in principle, but was pessimistic about what might be accomplished by meetings among technical experts at this time.


He felt that he would like to know a little more specifically just what kind of problems you expect to tackle in this joint study with the Russians. He also asked whether the purposes of this study overlap with those of the present meeting of technical experts in Geneva (my answer to him on this was that I thought the overlapping would be very slight). However, I should explain that this member of the Executive Committee did not wish to be considered as voting against having the Academy sponsor the proposal.

It is now proposed that, if the Academy approves the project, it should be set up under a separate committee which might be called "A Special Committee on World Security Problems Raised by Modern Weapons Developments"; you may be able to improve on this phrasing. It is proposed that, as with the Committee on Technical Problems on Arms Limitation", ^{there} ~~it~~ should be both a general supervisory committee of the Academy and an operating subcommittee to carry out the details of the project. President Mather proposes tentatively that the membership of the former be: John T. Edsall (Chairman), Saville R. Davis, Leo Szilard, Walter Whitman and Jerome Wiesner; and that the membership of the latter be Leo Szilard (Chairman), Richard Leghorn, Walter Whitman and Jerome Wiesner.

I cannot speak officially about this, but I think that we can give you a definite answer by Thursday as to whether we can go ahead, and my own view is that this answer will be favorable. However, President Mather is away just now and Mr. Burhoe is away until Thursday. Hence we have been a little delayed in reaching a decision. I am writing this letter now so that if you have any further comments you can let me know by telephone or telegram before the Academy takes final action.

Best wishes,

Yours sincerely,


John T. Edsall

JTE/llw
c.c. Ralph Burhoe

Dear Academician Topchiev:

Since we received your letter of June 18th, Colonel Leghorn, Professor Wiesner, and I were in daily communication with each other as well as a number of other people who are involved. // We found that some of those whose participation in the Moscow meeting would be very useful would not be able to attend a meeting starting July 28th, ~~and, therefore,~~ ^{I therefore} it seemed to us the best thing to have at least a preliminary discussion on July 28th among some American scientists and some Russian scientists, who could also participate later on in the full meeting. We believe that the full meeting could be much more fruitful if we succeed in the preliminary discussion to discover what would be the most ~~use~~ useful topics to discuss at the full meeting. Both Russian and American participants in the meeting could then come to the meeting better prepared than it would otherwise be possible.

This would not mean, however, that in the preliminary discussion we should set up an agenda, since it would be important that a full meeting should also represent an informal discussion among Russian and American scientists, and any participant should be free to discuss any topic that he thinks is relevant from a point of view of the main purpose of these discussions.

We had hoped that Lloyd Buckner would be able to participate in the preliminary discussions as well as the full meeting, but his wife was involved in a serious

automobile accident and he had to cancel his projected trip to Moscow. Walt Whitman, who was Secretary General of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held in Geneva in 1955, has agreed to participate in the preliminary discussions, even though he is just recovering from major ~~xxx~~ surgery. The position of Jerome Wiesner would, of course, be very important, but there is some danger that he might get involved in some of the official meetings held between representatives of the American Government and the Government of the Soviet Union, and if he does get involved in those, then he could not participate in our private discussions.

If we can have these preliminary discussions starting July 28th, we might postpone setting a date for the full meeting until then. However, it would be very useful for us to know now which time periods might be convenient from the point of view of the Russian participants. Could we have the full meeting in Moscow at the time of the Geneva meeting early in September, or would many participants in our private meeting have to go to the Geneva meeting? If they do have to go to the Geneva meeting, then the full meeting would have to start either around the 15th of August or else after the K meeting, say about September 20th. If the Russian participants do not have to go to the Geneva meeting, then we could have our meeting in Moscow, perhaps starting on August 28th. We would then have to do without a few

Americans who go to the Geneva meeting and this I would regret because this means that we would lose Alvin Weinberg, Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, whose participation would be very desirable.

I find that in setting the date for the full meeting we must consider ~~an~~ many points of view. This might be difficult to do by correspondence and, therefore, we might send a cable to you within a few days suggesting that your aide, Mr. P , call me over the telephone, either at my office (Telephone: OLiver 6-4000, extension 3501, Washington, D.C.) or else at the Kenwood Country Club where I live (Telephone: OLiver 4-4655). I am told that it is eight hours later in Moscow than in Bethesda, Maryland, so if Mr. P were to call me between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Moscow time, he would have to call me at home at OLiver 4-4655. But if he calls me between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening, Moscow time, then he would reach me at the office since the time in Washington would then be between 10 and 11 o'clock in the morning.

This year, as you may know, there will be elections to Congress in America, and I have gained the impression ~~from~~ ~~that~~ that the State Department would be very unhappy if major political figures, like Governor Stevenson or Senator Humphrey, were to sit in as observers at the full meeting. I ~~am~~ was,

therefore, relieved when Senator Humphrey informed me that he would not be able to visit Moscow in the next few months. He is not coming up for re-election this year, but he is going to campaign in support of other Democrats. Attached you will find a letter which I received from Senator Humphrey. Governor Stevenson, I understand, has changed his schedule and he will visit Moscow earlier than he had originally planned. Thus, his visit to Moscow will not coincide with our meeting. This way we shall automatically avoid any complications that might have otherwise arisen.

A. V. Topchiev
Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union
Leninski Prospect
Moscow, USSR

Very grateful for your letter of June 18th. Because of need of thorough preparation for the full-scale discussion proposed in your letter, we suggest that these discussions be held in Moscow at some date at your convenience as early as possible but not sooner than the termination of the Geneva meeting on Peacetime Application of Atomic Energy which is

. We suggest also that the preparatory discussion be held in Moscow which Leo Szilard, Walter Whitman, myself and, if possible, Jerome Wiesner would attend. We would prefer this preparatory discussion to start on August 18 but, if this is inconvenient to you, then we would suggest July 28th. This preparatory discussion could last as long as necessary to discover the most productive topics for the full-scale discussion to be held later. Letter follows.

Richard S. Leghorn

a

We thought it would be advisable to let the State Department have two weeks time to make up their minds whether they had any violent objections for American and Russian ~~scientists~~ scientists to have the kind of informal discussions in Moscow which we have proposed. I took the position that I look upon the proposed discussions not as a one-shot operation but, rather, as part of a continuous ~~a~~ study of the world security problem which could not be productive unless Russian scientists participated in the informal and frank discussions. For this reason, our study must from here on be carried out unaffected by temporary setbacks which might be experienced in ~~these~~ the negotiations carried out between the two Governments through their official experts.

We made use of this two-week waiting period also for soliciting private contributions to cover the travel expenses of the American participants in the projected Moscow meeting. We found that some of the American scientists whose participation would be very desirable were not able to change their schedules so that they could be free to attend the meeting on July 28th and because we were anxious not to lose any time, we thought that perhaps they could have, beginning July 28th and for as long as necessary, a preliminary discussion in Moscow with a few American scientists and a few Russian scientists from among those who would participate in the full meetings to be held later. Such a preliminary discussion, we think, might be very fruitful because it would ~~help~~ help us to discover what would be the most useful topics to discuss ~~at~~ at the full meeting. As a result of this,

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both American and Russian participants could come to the full meeting better prepared than it would otherwise be possible. This does not mean, however, that the preliminary discussions would set up a rigid agenda. Quite to the contrary, it seems necessary that all participants should feel free to discuss any topic that they believe to be relevant.

Col. Leghorn sent you a cable yesterday which you will have received by the time this letter reaches you.

Concerning the ~~time~~ timing of the full meeting, we are somewhat in doubt about the following point. The earliest time when this meeting could be held would appear to be August 28 to September 12. ~~By~~ But this period of time would coincide with the Geneva Conference. If the Russian participants of the Moscow meeting do not plan to attend the Geneva Conference then this might be a good timing for the Moscow meeting, even though we would lose some American scientists, such as Alvin Weinberg, Director of the Oak Ridge Laboratory, ~~who~~ who would ^a be very/desirable participant and who must attend the Geneva Conference.

If you decide that the conflict with the Geneva meeting must be avoided, then the best time for the Moscow meeting would be immediately after the meeting in Austria which, I believe, ends September 20th.

A third alternative would be to hold the Moscow discussions simultaneously with the Austrian meeting and to start it immediately after the end of the Geneva Conference. As far as we are concerned, this would be perfectly acceptable timing, but we do not know

whether the Russian participants at the Moscow discussions would also want to attend the meeting in Austria.



THE COMMITTEE FOR
WORLD DEVELOPMENT AND WORLD DISARMAMENT

United Nations Plaza at 46th Street

New York 17, N. Y.

MUrray Hill 2-8830

July 16, 1958

Mr. Leo Szilard
c/o Robert Livingston
National Institutes of Health
Bethesda, Maryland

Dear Leo,

The talk with Richard Leghorn was most interesting and in the course of the discussion, the admirable concept behind your project for a meeting of scientists in Moscow, became more clear to me.

I appreciated especially, that the plan is concerned only with the participation of scientists. My suggestion, (made at first in jest) that observers, such as myself, from organizations concerned with public opinion, also attend, seems inappropriate. I now hope, that at some future time, a similiar conference for such groups, or individuals, can be planned.

Since speaking with Leghorn, I received a call from Michael Kahn of the Reynolds Foundation who is most interested in your project. He asked if it were possible for our Committee to receive funds donated to your project and act as a clearing house for the work. This arrangement seems quite satisfactory to us. However, as I told Mr. Kahn, the possibility of donations which can only be given to educational institutions might have to be eliminated. Nevertheless I believe those of us who intend to donate would find a means of doing so in any case.

The current crisis in the Middle East may have caused a postponement in your plans. Some changes may be necessary in our scheduled vacation in Mexico, beginning next week. I would be interested to hear your latest news, if possible before next Tuesday.

Cordially,



Mrs. Josephine Pomerance



THE COMMITTEE FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENT AND WORLD DISARMAMENT

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(An organization founded in 1915 by Jane Addams and others)

Mrs. Parnenave

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A. V. Topchiev
Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union
Leninski Prospect
Moscow, USSR

~~We are~~ gratified by ~~to make~~
~~Very grateful for~~ your letter of June 18th. ~~Because of~~

~~need of thorough preparation for the full-scale discussion~~

~~proposed in your letter,~~ We suggest that ~~these~~ ^{the full scale} discussions be

~~started~~ ^{in second half of September}
~~held in Moscow at some date at your convenience as early as~~
~~if this is convenient to you.~~ ^{and last two or three weeks as per suggested}

~~possible but not sooner than the termination of the Geneva~~

~~meeting on Peacetime Application of Atomic Energy which is~~

~~looking as long as necessary~~
~~but as long as necessary to~~
We suggest also that ^{further} ~~the~~ preparatory
discussion be held in Moscow, ^{with} which Leo Szilard, Walter Whitman,

myself and, if possible, Jerome Wiesner would attend. We would

~~prefer~~ ^{suggest that} this preparatory discussion ^{and last} to start on August 18 ^{and last as long as} but, ^{or} ~~if~~

~~if this is inconvenient to you,~~ ^{not convenient} then we would suggest ^{preparatory discussion to start} July 28th.

~~This preparatory discussion could last as long as necessary to~~
~~discover the most productive topics for the full-scale discussion~~
^{is to} ~~and permit better preparation~~ ^{as an alternative date for preparatory discussion}

~~to be held later~~ Letter follows.

Richard S. Leghorn

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RE 78656.

Mrs. ~~Tischer~~ 1244 N 19th St.

July 4th

Jerry Pirel

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1701

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CAPTAIN MORSE A.E.C.
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6 - ~~9372~~ ^{Lewis} Hoskins
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Bernie Feld }

6⁰⁴ 930

Em 2-4000

3761 Johnson

Paul Walkowitz

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30 Rockefeller Plaza

Kerth Flemin Room 5600

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NY 20

(15) Aug

Kistlakowsky

Pres. Ed.

of Sam H. Reed
& Charlie Noise



July 28

July 18

Walt Whitman

Sec. Gen of the Int. Conf
on the peaceful uses
of the atom in Geneva 55

Dr. Lee Subridge

Calif.

NY camore 5-6841


Hot Springs - Virginia

THE HOMESTEAD - VIRG

~~Walt Whitman~~

JH PAM

9:20 PM



Dr. Louis Ridenour
Director of Research
Lockheed Corporation
Missiles Systems Division
Palo Alto, California

Dr. H. J. Muller
Department of Zoology
The University of Indiana
Bloomington, Indiana

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Mr. Eugene Rabinowitch
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Victor Spitzin

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Moscow, USSR
J.T. ALADIEV

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Assistant General Scientific Secretary
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~~Bolskaya Kaluzskaja 14~~
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Third Secretary of the Embassy of the
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