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BERLIN

Erich Fromm
Carl Landauer
H. Stuart Hughes
Stewart Meacham
Nathan Glazer
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Even if we do not go to war over Berlin -- even if we are "lucky" -- a great damage will have been done. After a brief period early this year when it appeared that we might begin educating ourselves for a new assessment of the international situation, for abandoning the chauvinistic vision of an American Century and accepting a multipolar world, in short, for genuine negotiation, the old pattern has re-asserted itself. We are off the wagon. Once

again we have confirmed to our own people that the proper response to any Soviet move is to assume its bad faith and aggressive intent, and to move our hands to our holsters. Once again we have taught them that there is nothing to negotiate, that change will be for the worse, that either we stand pat or we are done for. Once again, by our frantic response to a heckler's suggestion that we may be a "tired runner," we have shown the rest of the world that we very much fear it may be so.

In the world that is building beyond our borders, men are making crucial choices. Most of these men will be able to recognize the difference between health and despair, and they will not mistake our current intransigence for the former. We can only hope that they do not take us at our word and indentify the values for which we claim to stand with our present behavior, because belligerence, rigidity, rationalization, and defeatism show through the fabric of American response, as well as idealism and courage. We can only try to tell the world that this response has no intrinsic relationship to liberal humanism and democracy (over the dissenting voices of some liberal humanists!) and at the same time try at home to revive the waning tendencies within our society for compromise, fairness, and open debate, and hope to amplify the voice of reason wherever it appears. In the interests of the former we are expanding our circulation with this issue to include a large number of Europeans, and, in the interests of the latter, a large number of Americans, whom we believe to share our concern and to be capable of contributing to the avoidance of both war and the domestic sabotage of hope which has become the alter ego of war. We invite their correspondence on these matters.

In this issue Erich Fromm, who has just returned from a trip back to Germany, writes of its remilitarization and the historic forces this represents to the Eastern bloc. Carl Landauer, of the University of California, suggests nineteen points which must be weighed into the formulation of policy. H. Stuart Hughes of Harvard points out the grounds which exist for compromise, and Stewart Meacham of the American Friends

Service Committee illuminates the connections between the several crises which have recently come to a head, and makes some striking recommendations concerning the application of our energies. Nathan Glazer's letter to Norman Thomas concerning a proposed statement to be issued by SANE suggest some further considerations for Berlin policy, and the letter from Professor Ralf Dahrendorf of the University of Tübingen offers a West German perspective of perhaps unrepresentative detachment. There are disagreements among these six contributors -- the question of the viability of the Mansfield proposal, the actual importance of ultimate reunification of Germany to the Germans and the role this hope, even if it exists in strength, should play in our policy. But more important, certain patterns of our policy and its formation begin to come clear in these discussions, and we hope to follow this issue shortly with another devoted to these patterns, their roots and consequences. To talk of such patterns is not muckraking; no man calls his autobiography muckraking. It is to bring us -- including those of us now perpetuating them -- to a fresh view of them, in the light of which a new course and a new courage may yet be possible.

RH

FACTS AND FICTIONS ABOUT BERLIN

There is talk about war by the end of this year if the Russians are going ahead with their plans for Berlin.

What is the explanation which is given for this terrifying view? The Soviet Union, so it is said, wants to incorporate West Berlin into the Communist orbit; as a first step they want to change the occupation status, and then, once the West has agreed to this change, they will slowly take over West Berlin. It is our moral and political obligation not to abandon the inhabitants of West Berlin, even at the risk of war.

It is amazing how far this picture is from the truth. What are the facts? 1) The Russians want to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany. 2) This would give the East Germans the right to control the access to West Berlin. 3) Khrushchev has declared repeatedly that he is willing to give all guarantees for the independence of West Berlin, whether it be a continued four-power occupation, or/and UN occupation or an occupation by neutrals. He is also willing to guarantee the free access to Berlin in a new treaty.

The substantial question is whether West Berlin remains a part of the Western World. There is no reason to believe that Khrushchev's proposals would not guarantee that. First of all, the freedom of West Berlin is not militarily guaranteed by the presence of Western troops there, but symbolically, the idea being that an attack on Berlin is automatically an attack against the West. This same situation would exist if there is continued four-power occupation, or in a different way if Berlin is a UN ward. Realistically, the security of West Berlin lies in the willingness of the Soviet Union to respect West Berlin as part of the Western World. A new East-West agreement about the independence of West Berlin will only create a new and more lasting basis for Berlin's freedom. If the proposal of free city status for West Berlin involved detaching it from West Germany, it would be less defensible unless the East Germans could be brought to similarly give up East Berlin. But it does not involve this at all. It must be remembered that according to the legal arrangements after the war, West Berlin is not part of the West German Republic and hence that a status of a free city would not actually alter the present status as long as the

freedom of the city is properly guaranteed.

We argue that the Soviet Union has no right to abrogate a legal situation by which we as well as the Russians, British, and French have a right to occupy Berlin based on the right of conquest. Technically, this argument is correct; substantially it is not. We do not want to permit the Russians to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany, but in the meantime, although we have not concluded a formal peace treaty with West Germany, we have made West Germany one of our main allies, encouraging her to rearm, against the spirit of the post-war agreements and against the continuous protests of the Russians. Furthermore, we have not recognized the de facto boundaries of Poland and the Soviet Union.

The administration and the press are engaged in the game of "chicken" because they are sure Khrushchev can have no legitimate reason to want to settle the Berlin question. He is only testing our courage. Or, as some more sophisticated commentators claim, he is merely responding to political pressures within the Soviet bloc. The dangerous thing in all this talk is how it allows us to close our eyes to the legitimate complaints he has had and real dangers in the German situation we have helped to create. What is this situation?

At the end of the Second World War, it was agreed that Germany was not to have a strong army. The Germans themselves seemed to agree to this. Adenauer spoke out firmly against the idea of a strong German military force, and the social democrats, the strongest opposition party, were violently opposed to rearmament and "Atomtod" (atom-death). There were also big popular demonstrations against atomic armament in several German cities.

Now, not too many years later, the situation has been completely reversed. Germany is already the strongest military power in Europe, with the exception of Russia. Her generals (all of whom served under Hitler) insist that Germany needs atomic weapons for her self-defense; the Social Democrats, especially since Willy Brandt took over the leadership of the party, are hardly less ardent promoters of German military might than the Adenauer party. Dissenters and pacifists hardly dare speak out in West Germany any longer; the political atmosphere is oppressive.

In this situation an old dynamism is at work, to which the Russians are very sensitive, and which we are foolish to gloss over. It was not Hitler who caused World War II, but an alliance between industry and the military, the same alliance which had been the driving force behind World War I. Hitler's program was not essentially different from that of the industry-army coalition of the First World War, and it was supported by the same groups. Neither the industrialists nor the generals liked Hitler, but he seemed to be the only man who could try again where the Kaiser had failed. His mad racism was the necessary price to pay for his services. Again, as in the First World War, the German élite made a severe mistake in the choice of their leader. The parallel between Ludendorff and Hitler is, indeed, striking. Both were gifted yet hysterical half-mad nationalists, with unbridled imagination; both failed to recognize the point at which there was no longer any possibility of winning the war. The only difference was that Hitler chose a "Götterdämmerung" ending for Germany, while Ludendorff ultimately surrendered.

The Germans lost, and once more the industrialists and the military disappeared in the background. The occupation by the Western allies and the Russians did not lead to a fundamental social and political change. The Nazis were considered the true culprits, rather than the people who had hired them. While in 1918, in spite of the clamor for it, one had not hanged the Kaiser, one did hang his successors, the top

leaders of Nazism. This act, however, can be likened to exorcising the devil, the logic being that since the Nazis had been responsible for the war, and since they had been thoroughly destroyed, Germany now under her new leadership was a democratic, peaceful state. When after 1947 the tension with the Soviet Union increased, the West was more and more prone to urge the old enemy to rearm and thus to prove by implication that Hitler had not been so wrong in his thesis that it was Germany's function to save the "Christian culture of the West" from the "barbaric hordes of Bolshevism."

The new Germany has not only the industrial and military potential for a new aggressive role, but also the nationalistic potential which can be used for aggressive plans. First, the German government has never recognized the Oder-Neisse line as a final border. While the wisdom and justice of the decision to give undisputably German parts of Eastern Germany to Russia and Poland and to deport millions of Germans from these territories can be seriously questioned, this decision is a fact, concurred in by the Western allies even though not in a formal peace treaty.

Actually, the results of this step were much less harmful, economically and socially, than one might have feared. These provinces were among the poorest of Germany, and their population which emigrated to Western Germany has been so successfully absorbed into the booming German economy that probably only a few would want to return to their homeland now even if they could. This, however, does not alter the fact that they clamor for the "stolen territories," and that no German political party dares to curb this clamor (and not even that of the former Sudetendeutsche who shout for the return of their land, actually stolen by Hitler from Czechoslovakia).

This nationalistic feeling is kept alive, and it can be fanned to great intensity any day a German government would want to do so. Its potential is not less than that of Danzig, the Corridor, Austria, and the Sudetenland on which Hitler built his war preparations. While the German government could show its peaceful intentions by recognizing the Oder-Neisse line, the statement that Germany will not try to recover her former territory by force is a meaningless phrase (in the style of many of Hitler's declarations) since it is obvious that they could recover these territories in no other way than by force.

The German development is particularly ominous if one examines the trend of events in the last five years. This trend is not toward democratization and peace, but toward a new ascendancy of the military and of nationalism. The Bundeswehr has already shed many of the democratic trimmings that were meant to demonstrate its difference from the old Prussian militaristic spirit. The generals have already taken the unconstitutional step of demanding publicly atomic arms for the defense of the country; they are also demanding an increased German navy, they are negotiating with France for bases in Spain, etc. etc.

Many former Nazis are still in high government positions (Dr. Globke, a high civil servant under Hitler, and author of the most important commentary on Hitler's racial laws, is chief of Adenauer's chancellery office). It is characteristic that one of the main attacks against Willy Brandt, the Social Democratic opponent of Adenauer, is made with the argument that he emigrated from Germany under Hitler, and thus was not a loyal patriot.

Germany is gaining a new ascendancy in Western Europe; this time not by war, but by her economic superiority in a unified Western European economic bloc. Such a Germany dominating France, Holland, Belgium, and perhaps Italy would be much stronger than

she ever was before. It is not surprising that the Russians are suspicious of this development and feel threatened by it. It is surprising that Great Britain and the United States seem to have no suspicions; in both countries the fear of Russia has eliminated the fear of a new powerful Germany which could turn against the West just as well as against the East.

It is time that we look at the political problem involved in the West Berlin question rather than at the technical-legal problem of sticking to our "rights of conquest" of fifteen years ago. It is quite clear, as Walter Lippmann described it in his report (April 1961) of his recent interviews with Khrushchev, that "in Mr. Khrushchev's mind the future of Germany is the key question," and for two reasons: 1) because of the danger of Germany's atomic armament; 2) because of the need for a "peace treaty defining the frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia and stabilizing the existence of the East German state." Quite regardless of the question of the moral justification for the existing borders and of the question whether we could have handled things better when the war ended, the existing power structure is a fact, and Khrushchev, like any other leader of a powerful nation, could not keep his political position if he surrendered any of Stalin's post-war gains. But just because the vast majority of the East German population is against the Communist régime (like the majority of some other satellite states), Eastern Europe is the Achilles' heel of the Soviet system, and Khrushchev understandably wants to stabilize it as much as possible. What he asks is in fact the Western de facto recognition of Eastern Germany in exchange for his guarantee of the independence of West Berlin.

This is a minimal demand, given the existing situation. At one time, at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva and later at Khrushchev's visit in Washington, we seem to have been willing to make certain symbolic concessions: troop reductions, stopping of the anti-communist propaganda emanating from West Berlin, etc. Khrushchev returned from Camp David with glowing reports of his successful meeting with Eisenhower. In his subsequent travels through Asia he expressed his opinions so boldly about Eisenhower's good faith and peaceful intentions that he shocked the communist world. Stewart Meacham has reported that an East European diplomat said to him, "Nowhere in Marxist literature could a theoretical justification be found for some of the things Khrushchev said." But Eisenhower reverted to the peace-through-strength line in his trip to the Middle East and Asia, damning the Reds everywhere he went. Then, in a speech by Mr. Dillon, we suddenly declared that all concessions were off. Khrushchev answered with a tough speech in Baku, and after we added another blow to his political prestige by the maladroit handling of the U-2 incident, he torpedoed the Paris Summit Conference. Yet two days later in a Berlin speech, he did not demand a time limit for the solution of the Berlin question.

This brings us to our peculiar attitude with regard to the time limit. When Khrushchev at first spoke of six months during which the question of the peace treaty must be settled, we declared that we refused to negotiate under pressure. When he then withdrew the time limit, we did not make any constructive counter-proposals but continued to take the position that we could not permit any change in the existing situation. What is Khrushchev supposed to do? Wait indefinitely while we go ahead with Germany's rearmament in spite of the constant protest of the Russians against it?

A number of misleading arguments are brought into the picture: one, that a Russian peace treaty with East Germany prevents final German unification. What is our concern with German unification? In the first place, German unification took place for the first time only ninety years ago under Bismarck, who intentionally left out Austria from the German Reich. If the unification of the two Germans is our

concern, why not the unification of all Germans, as Hitler demanded? The fact is: 1) that the existing borders can be changed only by war; 2) that Adenauer knows very well that one cannot unite the two Germanys; and 3) that he needs the slogan in order to generate nationalistic sentiment in support of German rearmament and the forthright renewed striving to win a dominant role in Western Europe. We complain about Khrushchev's wish to stabilize the East German situation with a peace treaty when we have permitted West Germany to rearm and to exercise an influence on our policy which goes far beyond Khrushchev's plans for East Germany. The danger of war is too great to indulge in the type of thinking which does not try to understand the opponent's position. If we do understand it then the solution is simple enough. First, we must make counter-proposals to the Soviet Union about the Berlin status, along the line of de facto recognition of East German control organs (which have been recognized for years with regard to all civilian traffic) in exchange for a new treaty by which the Soviet Union guarantees the independence of West Berlin, free access, and four-power and/or UN occupation. The next step would be to discuss a solution along the lines of the Rapacki proposal. Such a solution can be found if we stick to the political reality that 1) the Russians cannot relinquish any piece of their present sphere of interest; 2) we cannot and are decided not to relinquish West Berlin. The fact is that these positions are perfectly reconcilable in a new treaty, although not one, I am afraid, such as Senator Mansfield has proposed, which expects East Germany to give up East Berlin and allow it to become a part of a "Free City" of Berlin. As has been said, such a free city is essentially a part of the Western bloc, and its security depends upon its being taken as such. This would amount to an obvious unilateral gain for the West.

One condition for a solution within the realm of possibility is that we free ourselves from the West German influence which seems to be ready to risk war for the sake of the political aims of the Adenauer government. On the other hand, the question arises whether the East German government will abide by the guarantees the Soviet government will give us about West Berlin. I think there is little to worry about. East Germany is not only economically and militarily much weaker than West Germany, but what is more important, its government maintains itself against the will of most of East Germany's citizens and only by the support of the Soviet Union. It follows that East Germany cannot dare now, nor in the foreseeable future, to act against the Soviet Union's wishes, much as the corrupt Ulbricht régime might resent the Soviet influence. But it can be said that the unmodified Stalinist régime of Ulbricht is strengthened by the very fact of the Cold War. If and when East Germany's existence is more secure, there is a much better chance for the opposition elements in East Germany to fight for the replacement of the Ulbricht bureaucracy by one which is closer to the new course of Poland or the Khrushchev régime in the Soviet Union.

Erich Fromm

NINETEEN POINTS ON BERLIN

In dealing with the Berlin question, American foreign policy obviously has to manoeuvre in difficult waters. We must carefully examine any proposed solution for hidden traps or for the seeds of future troubles, but we must not be guided by fear illusions which would make us assume without proof that any change in arrangements will necessarily work out to our disadvantage, because thereby we would lose too much manoeuvring space, and the position in which we are now is too hazardous for us just to entrench ourselves. Among the considerations which should govern our

policy, the following suggest themselves:

1. The United States is irrevocably committed to protect the freedom of the West-Berliners, with all means at its disposal. The United States has no specific commitment to bring about the unification of Germany. It is true that the United States is obliged by its basic creed to aid the German people in attaining self-determination, which in this case includes national unity, but there is no obligation to pursue this policy without regard to circumstances and to competing aims, especially the maintenance of peace.
2. The freedom of West Berlin can be effectively protected only by negotiation with the USSR, leading to an agreement. West Berlin cannot be protected by armed force, since undoubtedly the first reaction of the Communists to the use of force by the West would be the occupation of West Berlin, which could be effected within hours. Whether Berlin could then ever be liberated, and how much would be left to liberate, is anybody's guess.
3. If, in the attempt to break a communist stranglehold on West Berlin, the West confines itself to the use of conventional weapons, it will be defeated, because the USSR has far more divisions ready for combat. This illustrates the correctness of the Kennedy policy to make the United States stronger in conventional forces, but it would be futile to hope that this program can be carried out so quickly as to make it effective in the Berlin crisis. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the West would have to face the question of whether to accept defeat or to use nuclear weapons. The use of merely tactical nuclear weapons would in all probability soon lead to strategic nuclear war. The effects of the latter, when inaugurated first by the West, upon the international reputation of the United States are obvious, and it is unnecessary to discuss the other implications of such a decision.
4. Although conceivably it might be preferable to fight a losing war with conventional weapons rather than not to fight at all, if in the latter event we would appear to be voluntarily reneging on our promise to Berlin, it is obviously imperative for American policy to avoid, or try to avoid, the choice between defeat in a conventional war and the use of nuclear weapons.
5. In negotiations with the USSR about Berlin, it is unlikely that the present status of West Berlin, characterized by a retention of sovereignty over the city territory by the three Western victor powers, can be maintained. Our aim in negotiations should be to obtain the maximum of safeguards for the freedom of the "free city" of West Berlin which Khrushchev has offered to create.
6. Even if the present status of Berlin could be preserved for a time, it is doubtful whether this would be a gain for the West. To be sure, the West's presence in Berlin by conqueror's right has the advantage of giving the Western commanders great powers -- greater ones than they could obtain by a treaty on Berlin -- but the whole Western position in Berlin is precarious because the communists can make it untenable by actions no more drastic than the stoppage of trucks or trains or canal boats. The political disadvantages which the communists would incur by such measures are not likely to be very great because their argument that the occupation rights of the Western powers in Berlin are obsolete is not sufficiently unconvincing -- though legally invalid -- to be decidedly rejected within the community of nations. Under these circumstances, the Berlin situation is a heavy mortgage on American foreign policy. If the present status could be replaced by a protective treaty which the USSR could only violate by taking upon herself the odium of being faithless to her word -- at a time when she is very much interested in acquiring a

reputation for keeping treaties -- this would be a definite improvement, provided of course that this treaty were really to guarantee the freedom of West Berlin.

7. If Khrushchev carries out his threat of transferring control of the access routes to West Berlin to the East German republic by concluding a peace treaty, it is entirely possible that no immediate attempt will be made to cut off the transport of civilian goods and persons to and from West Berlin. The communists, however, will use their physical control of the access routes to bring pressure to bear upon the West Berlin city government for political purposes, and they will not for long tolerate Western military traffic unless the right to maintain such traffic is bought from them (or their Russian masters) by the Allies. Although in all probability it would still be possible to negotiate with the communists after the transfer of control, the chances are that the bargaining position of the West will then have deteriorated. Therefore it seems the part of wisdom to negotiate now, not only as a matter of form but with a real intention to reach agreement, and if this proves impossible, to bring the matter before the United Nations as a threat to peace.

8. The present status of Berlin fulfills two functions, which should be clearly distinguished. On the one hand, as long as it lasts, it protects the freedom of the West Berliners. On the other hand, it serves as a symbol of the temporary character of Germany's division. An occupation regime is by its very nature something transitory; since no final settlement on Germany can be made without a final settlement on Berlin, the absence of a settlement on Berlin serves as evidence or at least as a symbol of the non-permanence of the present boundary line along the Elbe and Saale. This symbolic significance of the present status of Berlin is reinforced by the impossibility of achieving an acceptable change in any other way than by a treaty to which the East German republic is at least informally a party; such a change would therefore involve at least de facto recognition of that state and would make it necessary for the Western powers to treat the Elbe-Saale line, and the East German regime, as a part of the legal order of the world.

9. In determining whether to maintain or abandon the symbols of our intention to unify Germany, it is first necessary to dispose of some false arguments which might soothe our consciences but are apt to cause justified resentment among our German friends. It has sometimes been argued that the West Germans themselves are not very much interested in unification. This is essentially untrue. There are probably some German businessmen who fear that West German prosperity might be impaired by a merger with East Germany, in view of the latter's lower standard of living, and there may be some politicians who fear that Adenauer's majority may be endangered if East Germany, which perhaps will vote Social Democratic to a higher degree than the West (and, again, it might not), could send representatives to the Bundestag; but the average German man or woman wants unification and is willing to pay a price for it, not simply because national unity has always been a traditional goal of the German people, but primarily because the East German regime is oppressive, and among the people of East Germany are the parents, brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts of the West Germans.

10. The second false argument against unification of Germany as an American goal is the contention that it would mean a danger to European peace, especially with regard to the Oder-Neisse line. Unification or no unification, no German government, now or in the foreseeable future, would be in a position to attack Poland or anybody else against the will of the United States. Moreover, in no foreseeable future could a German government win the support of its own people for a warlike policy, nationalistic speeches notwithstanding. Least of all is there any danger that the

Germans might renew the "Rapallo" policy of reaching an understanding with Russia against the West; although it is obviously impossible to say what may happen half a century from now -- and useless to try to forestall the conceivable dangers of so distant a future by present-day policies -- the fear of Russia and the hatred of the Soviet Union as a state looms so large in the minds of the Germans as to make a pro-Russian, anti-West policy unthinkable within the lifespan of the present generation. German unification remains a postulate following from our own principles and therefore a goal for which we must strive within the limits of practicability -- but not necessarily with the means which our German allies wish us to employ.

11. The great majority of the Germans, government and opposition alike, want us to continue the policy of not recognizing the East German republic and to refuse our consent to any change in the present status of West Berlin, in order to preserve these symbols of the temporary character of the division of Germany. The policy of non-recognition in cases in which boundary lines or governmental systems were established against the will of the people has been applied by us sometimes in the past as an expression of our protest. It was probably the right decision at the time to apply this strategy in the German case, but the usefulness of a policy of not recognizing realities is subject to erosion with the lapse of time. The symbol of a policy which cannot be implemented within the period for which it makes sense to plan action becomes an empty shell.

12. Refusal of legal recognition can serve a policy based on the expectation of spontaneous upheavals against the existing order, with the implication that these revolts might lead to desirable changes and should therefore not be impeded, but, if possible, supported; in fact, any such policy will be understood by discontented subjects of the regime which has been denied recognition as a tacit promise of support in the event of an insurrection. We have failed to give support to the East German upheaval of 1953 as well as to the Hungarian upheaval of 1956, because in either case our intervention would in all probability have led to nuclear war. We are clearly not interested in further upheavals of the same kind which can merely mean a bloodletting of anti-communist groups and cause resentment against the United States because of disappointed hopes for assistance. Under these circumstances the policy of non-recognition no longer serves a good purpose. The East German regime is without foundation in public opinion, it is more oppressive than the government of the USSR and other satellites, it is in every sense undesirable -- but it is a reality which it is useless to ignore.

13. The Russians seem to be greatly interested in our legal recognition of the present order in Eastern Europe, and their Berlin policy seems to have for at least one motive to induce us to extend such recognition to their East German satellite. Whether this is the controlling motive of the Soviet policy on Berlin can only be found out by negotiation. If the Russians are willing to guarantee the free existence of West Berlin, including rights of unobstructed access and egress and of protection, in return for recognition, such a deal would appear to be an acceptable solution. It will cause temporary resentment in West Germany, but neither from the German nor from the American point of view is a better solution in sight. To minimize the resentment, we should carefully dissociate ourselves from the false arguments against unification.

14. Although it is understandable that our German allies wish us to maintain non-recognition and the occupation status of West Berlin as symbols of the temporary character of the Elbe-Saale line, their wishes in this matter should not be given controlling weight within the Western alliance, because these wishes are based on illusions and influenced by the passions of a bitter election campaign. The

mentality of present-day West Germany is by no means belligerent, nor is there much willingness to accept even the risk of war in pursuit of any national goal; the horror of war is deeply ingrained in the minds of the living generation of Germans -- which is no wonder. In opposing concessions to the USSR, and especially recognition of East Germany, the West Germans follow the line of the least mental resistance. Feeling that their own role in world politics is no longer decisive, they expect the most powerful partner in the Western alliance, the United States, to perform the miracle of not yielding an inch to the Russians and not moving a millimeter closer to the brink of war. The few political leaders who are not themselves captives of this wishful thinking do not dare to destroy the public's illusions since the reaction would be politically unfortunate for the author.

15. In order to assure the safety of West Berlin, the Russians and the East German communists would have to do more than merely promise non-interference with West Berlin's self-government and with traffic to Berlin. West Berlin can be economically strangled and thereby made politically subservient by other means, for instance by the cutting off of electric power which comes largely from the Eastern Zone, or by restrictions on West Berlin's mechanical industries in the name of industrial demilitarization. All these loopholes will have to be carefully plugged if the West is to sign a new Berlin agreement. The presence of Western troops is important to repress possible communist insurrections, but their present strength may not be needed if West Berlin's own police force is sufficiently strengthened; whether Russian token troops can be safely admitted, and whether neutral troops might offer an acceptable alternative to US, French, and British troops depends on details of the respective arrangements. To keep the door open to refugees would of course be highly desirable. The merger of East and West Berlin will not be obtainable, and its desirability from the Western point of view is not quite beyond question: although it would be an excellent thing to liberate the people of Eastern Berlin from their communist rulers, it would be easier for the communists to isolate a unified Berlin from their zone than to do the same with the Western part of the city when the Eastern part is their capital. The demand for a unified Berlin, however, may perhaps serve the West as a bargaining point, because undoubtedly the Russians have committed a gross violation of agreements by permitting the East Germans to include East Berlin in the East German republic, whereas the Western powers have always refused to fulfill the West German desire for including West Berlin in the Federal Republic.

16.

If there will ever be a unification of Germany, this new arrangement will of course supersede any treaty on Berlin. In this sense an agreement on Berlin may well be labeled an interim agreement, but it must not be "interim" in any other sense, i.e. it must not have an earlier expiration date; otherwise the West may be forced to buy the freedom of West Berlin over and over again. It would be highly desirable to make all dissensions about the interpretation of a Berlin agreement subject to judicial decision, either by the International Court of Justice or by an impartial arbitration board, but the attitude of the USSR toward arbitration of international disputes leaves little hope that this can be achieved.

17. The USSR keeps harping on the dangers to world peace resulting from West German rearmament; although to some extent at least this insistence is a political stratagem, it is conceivable that fear of the German strength is a genuine motive in the Russian attitude toward the problems of Germany and Berlin. If so, a renewal of American pledges to prevent German aggression against any state may facilitate agreement and will not arouse any substantial opposition in West Germany. A pledge to prevent atomic rearmament of the West German army would cause some resentment in official German circles but would be supported by a substantial portion of German public

opinion. Perhaps such pledges might prove to be a help in circumventing the question of a formal peace treaty, which would raise a number of difficult points hardly capable of settlement in the context of present conditions.

18. Even if Khrushchev is willing to give guarantees for the safety of West Berlin in return for a recognition of existing East European boundaries and regimes and American pledges against German aggression, the difficulties in spelling out the guarantees may still prevent agreement. In this event, and all the more so if willingness to negotiate an agreement is lacking on the Russian side, the United States should bring the Berlin problem before the United Nations, as a threat to peace. The present state of the United Nations, it is true, detracts from their capability of handling such complex disputes as the Berlin issue, but the risks involved in an appeal to the United Nations are still not as great as those of any alternative, including abstention from any action. The USSR might try to block an appeal by reference to Article 107 of the Charter, which states that nothing in the Charter "shall invalidate or preclude action in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action." It is not likely, however, that more than a small minority of member nations, outside of the Communist bloc, will feel that a threat to peace arising from dissensions among the victor powers comes under the scope of this article which has the clear purpose of exempting the relations between victors and vanquished from the operation of the Charter. In the Security Council, of course, the Soviet Union can prevent any decision by its veto, but Articles 11 and 35 make it possible to bring the Berlin issue before the General Assembly.

The appeal to the United Nations is of course not a method by which an acceptable solution of the Berlin problem can be obtained with certainty. But if the Western case is well prepared, if its presentation follows an attempt of the West to obtain the necessary guarantees through a genuine give-and-take, the chances are that the appeal will make it harder for the communists to apply the pressure with which they are threatening the West, and that thereby it may lead to an acceptable agreement.

19. The reluctance seriously to seek accommodation with the Russians on the Berlin issue has visibly increased in the United States since the Cuba debacle and the crisis in Laos. Many Americans feel that there must be an end to concessions, otherwise Khrushchev will always count on our fear of nuclear war and will push us back more and more. Whatever the merits of this argument, it cannot justify a policy of not trying to avoid a conflict in which we cannot win, especially when on the other hand there seem to be chances of a viable compromise. We cannot win in a conflict over Berlin because we are not sufficiently strong in conventional weapons, and to be compelled to initiate a nuclear war, aside from the horrors of that decision and the uncertainty of the outcome, would in itself be a political defeat. We have no right to relieve our emotions by rushing into more disasters. That would be true even if the recent set-backs had left us in as bad a position as the pessimists think; it is all the more true for the reason that the experience of recent years resembles a see-saw battle between communism and democracy rather than an unbroken chain of communist victories, and that we have wide fields open on which to strive for success over communism.

Carl Landauer

THE GROUNDS FOR COMPROMISE

A reading of the newspapers over the past few weeks unmistakably suggests that the American Administration and press are making a conscious effort to build up a war scare. The occasion is Berlin -- but the Berlin problem itself is only a part, indeed a minor part, of the whole context of events. The specific issues involved are totally incommensurate with the fuss that is being made about them. What Kennedy seems to be doing is exploiting the Berlin question to drum up anti-Soviet feeling and harden the American national posture.

This is an ominous response for many reasons, but particularly because, with the steady build-up of nationalist intransigence over Berlin, a number of important aspects of the problem are being neglected or forgotten. I should like to list these in an effort to suggest that there exist wide grounds for compromise of which the American public is almost totally unaware:

1. Khrushchev's deadline for the settlement of the Berlin question arises from a genuine fear that the West Germans will be equipped with nuclear arms. One has only to travel in Russia -- as I did last summer -- to realize that the memory of the German invasion and devastation is still very fresh and that the thought of a Germany armed with nuclear weapons is intolerable to Russians of all levels (as, I gather, it is to Czechs and Poles also).
2. The central problem for the West is not one of maintaining a prestige position vis à vis Communism. It is one of honoring our pledge -- in personal and human terms, rather than in terms of power politics -- to protect the lives and liberties of two million West Berliners.
3. Khrushchev is perfectly correct in contending that the present situation of Berlin is an anomaly which needs to be regularized. We share with the Soviet Union an interest in so regularizing it. More broadly, two things are in the interest of both parties: a) a neutralized and demilitarized Germany, and b) a Europe which has been stabilized by the recognition of all status quo situations.

I fully recognize that such a statement implies the abandonment of two "positions" that are currently dear to American policy-makers, that is, West German membership in NATO and a vague assurance to the people of the satellite states that we will do something about liberating them in the future. Both of these positions, I think, are meaningless and out of date: a Germany driving towards nuclear armament is more a threat than a protection to the other Western nations; the only realistic way in which to further the cause of liberty in the satellite states is to encourage a reduction of tension and terror in that area by decreasing the danger of war.

4. Hence there are two concessions that we could make in the course of negotiations that would cost us nothing: a) the diplomatic recognition of the East German government; b) an undertaking not to give nuclear weapons to the West Germans.

5. The final aim of negotiation might well be an understanding along the following lines: a) the establishment of a free city of Berlin, garrisoned by United Nations troops and including both West and East Berlin, as suggested by Senator Mansfield; b) an arrangement with the Soviet Union whereby West Germany's departure from NATO would be balanced by East Germany's departure from the Warsaw Pact, and the two countries would be encouraged to begin

negotiations for some kind of loose federation entirely independent of either Soviet or American supervision; c) an effort to broaden the agreement reached on Central Europe to include an undertaking on the part of both the United States and the Soviet Union that each would cooperate with the other in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to further powers, the Soviet Union to be responsible for its ideological allies (more particularly China) and we to be responsible for ours.

H. Stuart Hughes

BERLIN, GENEVA, AND CHINA: A REASSESSMENT WITH PROPOSALS

The new international crisis is different from most of those we have experienced since World War II in that now all of the old issues plus one or two new ones seem to be converging and demanding attention at the same time. The admission of China to the United Nations, the banning of nuclear tests, the security of West Berlin, the status of East Germany, and the arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons, - these issues plus the over-riding issue raised by Khrushchev's demand for acceptance of the troika principle in the UN structure and administration are all involved in the present crisis.

It is wise to ask why these issues have become crucial at the same time. For the first time they all must be faced together. What links them now which has not linked them in the same way before?

In my opinion the answer is China. The United Nations no longer can avoid discussing China's claims to the UN seat. China can no longer be ignored when disarmament is discussed. China will soon become a nuclear power. China must be consulted and considered.

We should not assume that the interests of the United States and of the USSR are opposite to each other where China is concerned. They may well be quite close together at some points.

These are facts to remember:

1. The Soviet Union has made a sharp about-face on the issue of a nuclear test ban. Two and a half years ago she was willing to call a halt to testing although the U.S. was far ahead in the number and types of weapons tests. Russia has used every diplomatic device of bargain and maneuver to get us to join her in freezing a testing status quo which apparently was more to our advantage than to her, militarily speaking.

Today, at least, we seem to be ready to enter into a test ban agreement. Strangely Russia seems to have lost interest. She raises the troika issue. She demands that the test ban be discussed along with the other disarmament issues. Obviously the ban she once wanted, she no longer wants, at least not for now.

2. China wants a place in the front rank among nations. She undoubtedly equates an independent nuclear arms capacity with front rank status. During the two and a half years of the de facto ban on tests, China

has been moving as rapidly as possible toward testing her own weapons. It is reasonable to believe that by now she must be very close to being able to test.

3. China is not only an ally to the USSR. She is also a rival. There have been numerous indications in the last two years that the rivalry aspects of their relationship has been coming more and more to the fore, presenting Khrushchev with troublesome issues of communist bloc control which heretofore he was able to take for granted.
4. Despite China's growing power within the communist bloc, Khrushchev appeared to have won a notable victory at the November 1960 meeting of the 81 communist parties. The statement of conclusions of the conference affirmed the Khrushchev position on peace and co-existence which China has openly opposed in the recent past.

I think that Khrushchev launched his campaign for a ban on testing largely because of China. He wanted to keep her from getting weapons of her own. The easiest way to do it - indeed the only way - would have been to have outlawed such weapons. The try for a ban on tests was a first step in a process which he hoped would keep China from becoming a nuclear power.

Now, however, it probably is too late for him to head China off. Not only is China 2½ years closer to testing weapons of her own, but she also seems to be about to have her claims to UN membership seriously considered. This means that she may soon be in a position to take her place at the table where test bans and disarmament are discussed. China's acquiescence to the statement of the 81 communist parties supporting Khrushchev probably does not signify a defeat but a deal. In exchange for her assent Khrushchev probably had to guarantee that there would be no major business affecting China's interests transacted at the UN until China can be present. The insistences which Khrushchev now is making that the test control machinery be placed under the troika rule, and that the test ban talks be carried over into the general disarmament negotiations, probably are window dressing. He is dragging his feet and will continue to drag them until China has her bomb and her UN seat.

This is not the course that Khrushchev would have chosen but he is a realist. When conditions change he accepts them and makes the most of them. But having to give in to China on the test ban issue raises other problems of a most difficult sort for Russia. Particularly it has repercussions in Germany.

To stall on a test ban agreement strengthens the hand of West Germany in her desire for nuclear armed missiles. For West Germany to get these weapons would multiply Khrushchev's problems in East Europe enormously. The satellite states, particularly East Germany and Czechoslovakia, would demand the right to have them too. China would support such demands. Nuclear weapons are the equalizers of modern military power. They make big men out of little men and vice versa. Khrushchev cannot long guarantee the international conduct of the Eastern European countries if there is a general acceleration of the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of other nations including his satellite states.

Thus present events are carrying Khrushchev into very dangerous waters. Because of China he is forced to allow a deterioration of the test ban sector which creates new problems for him with respect to Germany. To forestall West German rearmament is not merely a matter of his not wanting to come within range of West German

missiles. Undoubtedly that is a part of it. But it is also a matter of maintaining control over East Germany, which he could not do if West German nuclear armament leads to East Germany having them too, which it probably will.

The only possible solution for Khrushchev is to persuade the United States to agree to a demilitarized zone in Central Europe that would include at least both East and West Germany and possibly other countries as well. The details are less important than the accomplishment of the main aim, the demilitarization of Germany. By such an agreement Khrushchev could hope to stabilize his Western frontier, reduce the strain on his East European alliances, and be free to deal confidently with the problem which China poses for him not only in Asia but in other parts of the world as well.

Of course, Khrushchev cannot come out in the open and explain his predicament to the United States in the terms set forth here. Instead he must bluster and pretend. China must not be allowed to charge that she is being slyly double-crossed.

It is in our interest to cooperate with Khrushchev in those areas where our interests coincide. To do so we must exercise care at the following points:

1. We must not offer solutions that are irrelevant to the real problem. New proposals about techniques for inspection of tests, about the UN's role in disarmament, or about the conditions of access to Berlin will accomplish very little. These are not the key issues. They are only incidentally related to the question of China and the question of the demilitarization of Germany.
2. We must not lose our perspective when Khrushchev does not follow a neat, consistent, orderly course. He is involved in a highly complicated maneuver. If it works his place in history is secure. If it fails, he may go into the discard. Our willingness to work with him must be based on a hard-headed understanding of our interests rather than on an appraisal of Khrushchev's diplomatic manners.
3. We must get clear that Berlin is not merely an escape hatch for defectors from communism. It is also Khrushchev's panic button. When he feels panic over Germany he presses the Berlin button. When he presses it we jump. Khrushchev panics at the thought of Germany having nuclear armed missiles. We jump when he threatens to force us out of our hopelessly exposed Berlin salient. When he presses the button he is really asking us to help him keep Germany under control. Until control of Germany has been accomplished Khrushchev does not want us out of Berlin and it would create a far worse crisis than we now face if we threatened to leave. Not to understand this is to misread the situation entirely. He needs our help and is convinced that we need his.

All of which means that there can be no real solution that does not deal realistically with these requirements:

1. China's relationship to the UN must be settled.
2. The danger of a nuclear armed Germany, united or divided, must be removed.

3. We must not give up on the nuclear test ban, but should recognize that the key to further progress is not more advanced inspection technology but more astute political sophistication.

Concretely, our best opportunity lies along the following lines:

1. We should get China into the United Nations as quickly as possible. This may not be as easy as we think. She certainly will not come in on a two-China basis, and she probably won't come in so long as we are underwriting Chiang's control of Formosa. The best we can hope for is a UN control commission or trusteeship for Formosa on which China has minority representation. In any event the Formosans must have a protected opportunity to vote Chiang out of power.
2. We should offer to negotiate all of the unresolved issues involving the German boundaries and the status of East Germany. It is as much in our interest as in Russia's to halt the present trend toward a nuclear-armed Germany. We should revive the basic principles of the discarded Rapacki plan and come out for a demilitarized zone in Central Europe which would include at least East and West Germany, and possibly other countries as well.
3. If we take these two steps we shall be in a strong position to make positive use of continued adherence to the nuclear test ban, and to extend it to include all potential nuclear powers so as to assure an end to the threat of a proliferation of nuclear arms.

Stewart Meacham

New York

Dear Mr. Thomas:

I have a number of serious points to raise about the proposed statement on Germany, and I appreciate this opportunity to comment.

First, I think it is a mistake to link the problem of Berlin so closely to the problem of reunited Germany. The issue that creates the threat of war today is Berlin, and the Russian plans in connection with it, not any demand on the part of East or West Germans for reunification. The great power of Germany in Europe may be a long-range threat to peace and Russia's sense of security, and this threat can only be increased by a reunification of the two parts of Germany, since the Communist position in East Germany is so terribly weak. Consequently if we are serious about making a proposal the Russians may accept, this emphasis on reunification is an error. Terence Prittie, in a recent issue of The New Republic has argued, to my mind very forcefully, that these two issues should be separated, and as SANE goes beyond a narrow concern with nuclear arms policies it would be best for it to deal directly with the immediate threats, particularly since there is so much argument about the larger question of reuniting Germany.

Second, I am in complete agreement with the idea of the internationalization and demilitarization of Berlin, as suggested in the second part of the statement, but there are two weaknesses in the proposal. The first is that of giving power to

elected representatives of East and West Berlin. The Russians can never accept such a proposal, just as they could not possibly accept free elections in East Germany, or even the joint meeting of the freely-elected representatives of a West Germany or West Berlin with the representatives, no matter how elected, of an East Germany or East Berlin, for in both cases the representatives of the West must greatly outnumber the representatives of the East, owing to the distribution of population. Such a new arrangement for West Berlin would only increase the size of the boil which is such an annoyance to East Germany and Russia, namely an anti-Communist and free city serving as an escape route for a considerable part of the disaffected population of East Germany. On the other hand, if Berlin were to be governed by the UN directly or by a UN body, Russia might feel that, with the increasing strength of Eastern and neutralist groups in that body, it would gain something as well as lose something. This is quite a gamble, and I doubt that Russia would accept it, but it has much more chance than proposing that Berlin be governed by elected representatives of its strongly anti-Communist populace.

Third, what of course would make the continuance of a free Berlin palatable to the Russians would be the demilitarization of West Germany. But the loss of the military power of Germany to the West would have to be balanced by more than the demilitarization of an East Germany that has only two-fifths of the population and much less industrial strength. I consequently find the notion of a first-stage demilitarization of West Germany and East Germany something that is too unfair to the West to get much acceptance there. The Rapacki proposal, which balances against West Germany not only East Germany but also Poland and Czechoslovakia is obviously preferable. And since the military power of all these states (except for Czechoslovakia) must by now seem a questionable gain to the Russians, they might well accept such an extensive area of neutrality.

To sum up: to make a proposal that the Russians might accept and that might solve the problem, I think we would have to stop talking about the reunification of Germany, which practically can only mean prying East Germany away from the Eastern bloc; agree to the internationalization of Berlin, under conditions which involved so many countries (the UN) so openly that there was a chance its freedoms would be preserved; and offer the demilitarization of West Germany, matched by a suitable swatch of Eastern countries.

This speaks to the statement itself. I would like additionally to raise the question whether such a lengthy and detailed statement is the best thing to publish. Might it not be better instead of offering such detailed proposals to criticize the peculiar stand that temporary agreements, made hastily and without thought and very detrimental to us, must be maintained, that America must stand on a policy sixteen years old, and not very good to begin with, as if it is incapable of offering anything new that will help secure the peace of the world and advance freedom in it? Why should we not be willing to see the UN, which has, no matter how painfully, saved the Congo from anarchy and foreign domination, undertake the task of also "neutralizing" Berlin? Cannot our policies be more imaginative and more flexible than the simple reiteration of the ancient policies of Acheson and Dulles? I think it is possible to come up with something that the Russians see as a gain and that we see as a gain, and that is in reality a gain for peace without giving up the people of West Berlin to a dictatorship.

Nathan Glazer

University of Tubingen

Dear Mr. Hagan:

It may be useful, for purposes of re-orientation, to separate what I want to call the "Berlin question" from the present "Berlin crisis." The "Berlin question" is the more basic one concerning the status of Berlin in relation to the German Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic, and the wartime Allies. The present "Berlin crisis," although undoubtedly one aspect of the "Berlin question," concerns primarily the modalities of settling this question as well as certain peripheral matters such as access to Berlin, political organizations in the two parts of Berlin, etc. While there can be little doubt that the "Berlin question" is a result of the war and, more specifically, of Allied decisions at Yalta and Potsdam, I would claim that the present "Berlin crisis" has very little to do with these historical events. Its time as well as substance are, rather, the direct result of the ill-advised immobilisme of West German and US policies in Berlin in the last few years.

The attempt to retain the status quo is always a very weak response to the challenge of reality. Realities change, and in so far as the status quo is conceived as an unchanging state of affairs it becomes outdated very soon. What was best for Berlin in 1946 and 1954 is not necessarily best in 1961. West German and US politicians have been slow to appreciate this fact; they have insisted on an unimaginative policy of defense of the status quo -- a policy which inevitably leads to a situation in which only very radical changes are possible. The refusal to adapt to changing conditions never pays, and it certainly has not paid in the case of Berlin.

Which conditions have changed in the last few years so as to make an adaptation of the status of Berlin necessary? There are, it seems to me, at least three sets of such conditions. Progressing from the global to the specific, they are: 1) certain shifts in the balance of power as between East and West, on the whole amounting to a strengthening of the Soviet Union. These form the most general horizon of any actual crisis. They are aggravated by recent events, in particular by the Cuban fiasco. 2) After twelve years it is quite undeniable that there are two German states, and that they are here to stay for some time. To deny the existence of the German Democratic Republic (and to forbid this very name, as is done in the Federal Republic) may be necessary for certain purposes of international law, but is most dangerous in the formulation of policies. It is simply no longer reasonable to describe East Germany as an unstable satellite of the Soviet Union on the brink of internal revolution. Some kind of arrangement with the German Democratic Republic would therefore seem inevitable. 3) Berlin itself is clearly no longer one city. It not only has its own East-West problem, but its two parts have become increasingly associated with the two German states. Several administrative bodies of the East German government have their seat in East Berlin; the corresponding is true of West Berlin. Both East and West use "their" part of Berlin as bases for systematic attempts to study the opponent -- or, as it is often called, espionage. While both East and West Berlin display marked differences from East and West German society respectively, the similarities outweigh these differences. Thus, Berlin is de facto no longer that "fifth zone of occupation" with its own distinct character which it may have been intended to be.

Under these conditions, the "status quo" of a city administered by the Four Powers, and separated from either Germany, can be no more than a legal fiction of doubtful political quality. Under these conditions, it might have been better to devise new solutions for Berlin than to concentrate on ever new means to defend what is no longer there. A decade, or even three or four years ago, such new solutions would,

moreover, have been much less painful for those who are above all concerned, the Berliners, than they are bound to be today.

As far as new solutions are concerned, only those can today be called both realistic and bearable which tend toward some kind of "Free City" solution. Obviously, Premier Khrushchev and Senator Mansfield have rather different ideas about what a Free City means. Equally obviously, though, both mean by this expression what has to be the basis of any new solution of the "Berlin question": that some of the ties of Berlin with the two parts of Germany are severed, that the unity of Berlin is re-established on a more permanent basis, that Berlin as a whole ceases to belong either to the West or to the East. It is very shortsighted to argue that a solution along these lines means disaster, and has to be avoided at all cost. Instead of wasting valuable thought and energy on the attempt to reason for the status quo, we could do with some thought on the subject of imaginative detailed provisions for a new Berlin Statute which guarantees the Berliners what is rather more important than their belonging to the German Federal or Democratic Republic: political freedom and security.

Thus our next problem is that of defining such detailed provisions. As for myself, however, I have not given enough serious thought to the subject to be able to go any further.

Ralf Dahrendorf

POSTSCRIPT

Earlier in these pages I've commented on the impression which Carl Friedrich's book Foreign Policy in the Making made on me in 1938 with its discussion of the ways in which, during the Weimar period, movements for a detente between France and Germany were never synchronized, so that when Briand was in power in France, German nationalists could prevent any rapprochement, and vice versa. More recently, in Richard Storry's History of Modern Japan, I've seen similar dramas play themselves out both in Sino-Japanese relations prior to the Manchurian incident of 1931 and in Japanese-American relations. The Japanese, like the Nazis, made use on behalf of expansionist militarism of a device -- strategic assassination -- that has been little used in this country, despite the high mortality rate of our Presidents. Instead, at least so far, we have gone in for character assassination: as an element in intra-service rivalry and the search for hegemony by the SAC, Oppenheimer was forced out of influence. And Harold Stassen received, when he was working for disarmament, the even graver death sentence of ridicule -- he was made to appear foolish and Quixotic. (Incidentally, I have been struck in the ranks of the Peace Movement with a number of those whom a former colleague, a "First Amendment case," refers to as "ghosts"; people put out of political and often professional life by the House and Senate Committees; these people understandably fear to contaminate any movement by taking part in it, and they're sometimes doubly wary of jeopardizing their security so that they live in the shadows; most of them have long since broken with the Communist Party and its fronts, but not wanting to denounce friends, they have not been politically immunized and in spite of themselves are looked upon as Typhoid Mary's.)

If one looks at the history of these big power relations, what is striking is the importance of taking the offensive in domestic politics. A political movement,

once halted by developments in the opposite country on which it depends, takes a long time to regather its forces. A country with a strong elite such as Great Britain can weather a blitz although even there, as the case of the Zinoviev letter shows the departure from the gold standard in 1931, bureaucratic and elite defenses against the blitz are not perfect. But in a more massified and democratic country, the bulkheads against a political blitz are much less strong. Thus the defenses against an indiscriminate and jingo anti-communism in this country could not stand up against a combination of the Hiss case, the "loss" of China, and the Korean War. No doubt the North Koreans who thought this was the time to stop Syngman Rhee and perhaps unify the country had no idea of the impact of their action on American domestic politics, and Stalin -- isolationist that he was -- probably had no idea either. But the Korean War put McCarthy and later Eisenhower in power, and its legacy still crops up in the illusions Hans Morgenthau describes in Commentary which make it quite likely that Asia will be our Algeria. (I'm not suggesting that only Asian developments and not the Berlin blockade or the destruction of Czechoslovakia played a part in this momentum -- I am using shorthand for large events.)

When President Eisenhower came to office but not to power, he let the two Dulles brothers and Admiral Radford and Vice President Nixon and assorted generals and admirals talk big about what they would do to roll back Communism. But whenever it came to a pinch he did nothing. He was good at that, for he was a man of peace abroad and at home. But even the Republicans, who claim to like little government, got tired of it. Why did they? Was it because life went more harshly with them during the prosperous years of Eisenhower? Was it because they didn't agree with the budget-balancing small government philosophy?

Certainly they liked Ike. Yet if one asks such questions one faces the possibility that the Republicans had lost faith in America and began to believe what their campaign propaganda sometimes said, namely that the Communists were winning and that a stand must be made against them. Now it seems to me that the Communists have not done so wonderfully well in the last ten years. True, the Communists gained North Vietnam in 1954. We have probably managed by a great effort to give them Laos, though they would have been content with a neutralist government, and indeed reacted rather slowly to our upset of that government (as Morgenthau points out). Our actions and inactions have strengthened them in the dubious asset of Cuba, which is indeed as much a minor liability for them as it is a minor menace to us! But they have also suffered many reverses: Yugoslavia has remained free, Indonesia -- perhaps to its own surprise -- neutralist, Iraq and the United Arab Republic hostile and mistrustful. The Russians suffered a defeat in the Congo -- not so wise a defeat to administer on our part, since it may end by destroying the United Nations. The Hungarian uprising and its bloody suppression lost the Communists many devoted supporters in the Western countries. The bloc suffers from evident internal strains and tensions.

Why then is there this overwhelming feeling in the country -- reported by Samuel Lubell and other pollers -- that the United States is being pushed around, that our power is being rapidly eroded, that the Communists are winning hegemony all over the world? On a rational level it is true that we no longer have our way in the United Nations and in the world. We can no longer simply bluster and threaten as we could with the atomic monopoly. It is also true that in Latin America and Africa and Asia the old colonial ways are eroding, but this is not necessarily a boon to the Communists or a blow to this country. Moreover, few Americans never did really want a monopoly of power or imagine running the world from Washington. Arguably, Khrushchev is right when he tells us that the Russians and Americans could sit down and make a

deal and divide the world. We are still immensely rich and strong -- so much so that we set the models by which the Russians and a number of other countries judge themselves, judge their development and progress, and indeed the very idea of development and progress.

No, the realistic factors are there, but the defeatism about America has deeper roots. Mussolini was admired because he made the trains run on time. Americans don't consciously admire the Russians and the Chinese because they make people run on time (or so they say). But I think this is a latent attraction of an authoritarian system. Businessmen who go to the Soviet Union are impressed in spite of themselves. They see an authority that appears purposive. If machines and organization break down, it isn't because labor discipline is low so much as because things are just getting organized. Every time a train or plane is late in this country; every time sloppy work is done or people goof off; every time orders are sabotaged and not obeyed; every time one feels guilty about one's own indolence or that of one's children; every time the President urges government departments to release people for the long Fourth of July weekend -- on all such occasions, which go against the grain of our traditional American morality, many people must have a feeling of sin or guilt which is intensified by the contrast with the energetic, hardworking, and dynamic Communists.

The elite in this country has long had these feelings of diessuetude and decay. They go back to the vogue of Spengler in the 1920's and of Henry and Brooks Adams, to the still not entirely liquidated wound of the Great Depression, and to the misgivings about affluence that have become endemic among some of the well-educated during the Eisenhower years. But according to Lubell's polls the public at large only began to feel this way with Sputnik, while the Russian man in space and the "failure" in Cuba have greatly intensified this feeling.

Thus the Eisenhower who brought peace in Korea became toward the end of his reign an embarrassment even to his friends. None of the Republicans now struggling for the succession is remotely like him in his ability to do nothing -- an important quality in a general or a president -- neither Nixon nor Rockefeller nor Goldwater. The Republicans have so very little confidence in free enterprise that they need the symbol of an authoritarian state, busy with "defense" to make them feel warm in the world of the Cold War. They thus become as ideological and unbusinesslike as any liberal democrat; or, to put the matter in its most drastic form: the Republicans help push us towards national socialism. But one theme of these comments is that the Russians cooperate in this process. Partly as a result of their defeat in the Congo, which no doubt weakened Khrushchev among the more bellicose members of his own bloc, the Russians have chosen this time to attack the United Nations and to insist on a veto in the test ban negotiations at Geneva. This latter action has brought to an end the slight momentum gained by the scientists and pacific if not pacifist groups in this country -- ground we gained since the destruction of the summit over the U-2 last May. The Soviet leaders have done what people in "the other country" are always able to do, namely to pull out the rug from under their actual or tactical friends in the other country. This has been a characteristic of Soviet isolationism from the very beginning; as Erich Fromm describes in his new book May Man Prevail, Stalin ruthlessly sacrificed German and Chinese communists to his own paranoid suspicions, fears, and misjudgements. Khrushchev is far less crazy and less of an isolationist than Stalin, but his contempt for the "peace forces" in the West cannot be much less than Stalin's. Very likely, just as Stalin believed he could make a deal with Hitler and didn't need the counterweight of the German Communists to oppose Hitler, so it would seem that Khrushchev believes he can make a deal with Kennedy or American big businessmen who

in his view control Kennedy, without having to worry about maintaining the American strength of those very small forces who oppose the jingo spirit of the country at large.

And, as I've written earlier in these pages, it's extremely likely that Khrushchev underrates that spirit and doesn't know where to tread cautiously to avoid strengthening it, for his view of the power elite would not allow him to see the extent to which the leaders of America are pushed from behind. He is not likely to have read Seymour M. Lipset's analysis of the political maneuverings in the American South just on the eve of the Civil War when the Southern leaders suddenly pulled back from the brink, only to find that their followers were pushing them on, so that they themselves could no longer withdraw after the fait accompli of the firing on Sumter and the other measures of assuring that there would be war. (And, as in the pre-Civil War period, the belief grew on both sides that there would still be a compromise, as there had been the Missouri compromise and other compromises, when in fact there was no more buffer material for a compromise left nor were there uncommitted and politically powerful forces on either side; so in this situation too both parties believe there is room for a compromise if each stands firm, for instance over Berlin or over disarmament, whereas in fact there may not be room.

Khrushchev is running a very big country where naturally many things are amiss, where naturally too he has rivals, and where he has suddenly to know about all obscure parts of the world, whether Mali one day or Peru the next, West New Guinea or Kenya; or even little Albania can make trouble, and East Germany a great deal of trouble. How is he to have time to read the letters in the American press attacking the tractors for prisoners exchange as an index of the wild, murderous ferocity of feeling in this country against Communism, or to read Lenore Marshall's notes on her own encounters with the word "Communist" in this issue of the Newsletter? Where is the Lincoln Steffens to tell this old-fashioned politician that "public opinion" in the United States often controls the "leaders" and that it might be a good idea to accept the terms of a treaty -- any treaty -- that might just possibly help the anti-war party in this country regather its momentum? As a man of bluster, shrewd and unreflective, who will tell him such things? What in his experience of life could prepare him for this?

Strangely enough as it may seem, on our side the situation is hardly better. Taking over the presidency, even from the Senate, is like moving suddenly from a Piper Cub into a huge jet airplane. And precisely because President Eisenhower kept the jet on the ground, in spite of periodic efforts of his subordinates and critics to make it air-borne, the new President waged his campaign on this very issue and took to the country his hope that the plane would get moving again. Thus indeed, as the Republicans charge Kennedy aligned himself with those forces in the country which felt defeatist about peaceful coexistence with the Communist countries. But as I've already said the Republicans themselves felt defeatist; as soon as the election was over they came into Kennedy's camp on this very score.

Kennedy and his advisers had assumed, with all-American optimism, that all that was needed to fly the jet was will-power and brains. It hardly occurred to them that the jet would fly them -- and be shot at from the outside to distract their efforts to take domestic control. The Americans like motion anyway, and the great possibility that the plane will crash troubles them to change now from metaphor to reality as little as the possibility -- pointed out by Donald Michael and a good many others when the airlines began to plan for jets in the early fifties -- that jet planes for most of domestic travel in this country were neither needed nor safe nor even in the long run profitable.

To turn again to metaphor, I need hardly expound the sorts of details that harry and distract the pilot of the jet, who in addition to everything else must worry about the mayoralty election in New York, the Catholic votes in the House on the parochial school bill, the powers of the FCC and the FPC, and a thousand other issues - issues this writer seems to spend nearly full time in following, reading the Press which doesn't contain the half of it! To regain control of the plane and to gain leverage for domestic programs as well as maneuverability in foreign affairs, the President has decided that he needs a victory over the Communists -- a showy and brave victory. Yet, because of the power of the enemy country to undo its friends (for whatever reasons) in this country, he may have more defeats -- whether in South Vietnam or in Latin America or wherever -- and then will be tempted to a rashness like that of the Cuban invasion, only much more so. (It is said that the President wanted to go in again after the Cuban invasion and was trying to muster support for this from the Republicans and from the press; he is said to have been restrained, although only barely, by Stevenson and Bowles, Rusk and Fulbright, and a number of the White House staff.) A good many thought during the campaign that Kennedy's impatient jingo talk was only campaign talk. Far from it: I thought at the time and I think now that he is as much driven by internal pressures to master events as by the external pressures I have sought to sketch. He is very American in his belief that problems are inherently soluble. Thus he does not appear to share the general defeatism. And yet in a way he does, else perhaps he would not feel quite so pressed to put American power to the test so often and so dangerously. Like Eisenhower, he is aware of the dangers in nuclear war; like Nixon and other Republicans, aware of the personal and political momentum of the offensive. The American electoral system, with the fear that the Democrats would be beaten in the House in 1962 if he took a different course, is one of the pressures on him, analogous in its relentlessness to the hyena-like frenzy of the reporters at his TV press conferences, whose questions, like so many missiles, he cannot handle with either the safety or the risk of Eisenhower's benevolent ignorance.

Margaret Halsey speaks wisely in The New Republic of the "revolution of nonexpectations," the sacrifice of illusions that she wishes the President would make when he calls on others for material or personal sacrifice of a different sort. Hans Morgenthau makes a similar appeal. So does Walter Lippmann periodically. All of these sagacious people and many others see the President as the only figure in the whole country who can stop the rush toward war, by using his resources to educate the people, to bring the jet plane safely down, and hopefully to take off again in a more suitable craft -- temporarily at least sacrificing his great popularity in the process though in the long run, going down in history as the savior of the world.

Yet the President is not a reflective man. He is very intelligent, knowledgeable, and often witty, but there is a certain vulgarity and lack of compassion in his press conferences -- stimulated to be sure by the occasion -- as I feel more strongly when I listen to the press conferences than when I read them. Take for an example his reply at his news conference on June 28 to the question as to how he feels in retrospect about summit meetings and whether he foresees more of them in the future: "... I think the meeting in Vienna was useful too -- certainly to me in meeting my responsibilities, and perhaps it was also to Mr. Khrushchev, because, as I've said from the beginning, these issues which we're now talking about are extremely serious issues which involve the wellbeing of a great many people besides even the people of the United States, and decisions have to be made on the basis of the best information we can get, and they involve also the peace of the world, and therefore if those decisions can be made more educated by such a meeting it was useful. Now there are no plans to have any further meetings that I know of." It's hard for me to put my finger on what in this and many other statements at this conference troubled me; the peace of the world perhaps is an afterthought to the wellbeing of the United States,

and the readiness of the statement that there were no plans for any further meetings -- which hardly fits with the seriousness of the previous remarks. I'm speaking here of rhetoric and style rather than of substance though of course these are intertwined.

The more radical among us feel (as I obviously don't) that it doesn't make sense to worry about the President and what he is like, and whether he can be brought to see the light -- and, far more important, to show it -- before it is too late; they have written him off. They would like to start gathering a small, indeed infinitesimal, group of forces on the Left that cannot hope to take control of the jet or indeed survive its crash, but that might at least prepare another flight plan. Certainly the absence of an alternative flight plan has been a factor in the President's wild thrashing -- in his choice of a moon shot as a symbol of national prowess, which if not entirely popular is at least not opposed by any strong vested interests (compare the science fiction satire Gravy Planet, in which advertising agencies fight for the rights to the planet Venus). My own inclination has been to look to other countries for the restraining hand that is so absent in our own. Mr. Khrushchev's speeches are indeed among the very few antagonistic views that our major media published in whole or part -- ordinarily under headlines or with commentary so distracting as to prevent any possible education from that source (for Khrushchev, despite his cynicism or often on account of it, says many true things which he can see; for instance the dangers of West German nuclear armament, which very few Americans appreciate). Since 1945 I have hoped that the British would restrain us, and they sometimes have, as when Admiral Radford and Nixon wanted to go into Indo-China in 1954 and Eisenhower was prevailed upon to go on doing nothing. But the English now over Berlin seem to be suffering from charges that they are "soft on Communism", as if an international sort of McCarthyism had done its work on them, and they seem to feel that they have to stand up and be manly even at the risk of total destruction. So, too, I have hoped for the growth of a strong bloc of neutral nations, able to warn both sides and to mediate between them and to look to a strong and resourceful United Nations as a potential locale for these efforts.

And yet how is one to restrain the momentum of a war party within a nation state, when it can count on the periodic cooperation of its opposite numbers in another nation state? Moreover, one nation almost never judges correctly when another nation will fight, no matter how much the other nation tries to brandish that it will on this occasion really fight. In that sense almost all wars are wars by miscalculation. Small causes have tremendous consequences. In principle, as Erich Fromm says in his new book, there are no substantial conflicts of interest in the old-fashioned sense between the United States and the USSR. But if people in this country come to feel that America is doomed, that it has lost the magic and that the other side is winning and knows where it is going, wholly desperate and irrational actions may be the result. In the press and in popular speech, conservatives are almost always given the label "staunch" or "solid" or "forthright," as when the backers of the Pillion Resolution were described in this way in a recent story in The New York Times; and yet these men are neither conservative nor staunch, despite their hold on bits and tatters of nineteenth-century ideals and ideologies, but desperate and cornered men who give the Communists much too much credit and see them as endlessly winning. This view itself, as so often helps bring about the very thing they fear.

There are many real things to fear in the world today, but in my opinion the streamlined, undeviating success of Communism isn't one of them. We hope to have another issue of this Newsletter devoted at least in part to civil defense; here I only want to point out that the groups supporting civil defense include both those who have despaired of any pacific settlement and hope to salvage what they can (even

again at the risk of bringing on what they fear) and others who see in an active civil defense program a way to mobilize the domestic population, in other words to make us more military and less civil, less defensive and more offensive. As against those Americans who want to "fight Communism" by joining the John Birch Society and looking for Communists in every schoolroom or library, the advocates of civil defense at least see the enemy as overseas and they want to arouse a spirit of resistance in our own population, not to bring on war, but to get the other side to back down. That is, they too have the assumption that the Communists have been winning -- which is not how the latter invariably see it -- and that we must start winning. They too suffer from a defeatist view of what is happening in the world.

One of the sources of that view, of course, is the previous gross underestimation of Communism that goes back to the days of the Bolsheviks and the belief that with a little intervention by us and by other Allied powers, they would quickly fold. It is always expected that the Communists rule only through terror and military force. When this illusion is dispelled, people jump to the opposite conclusion and assume that the Communists rule without any difficulty, that their system is efficient, and that we can win only by copying it.

That we seek to copy it with respect to guerilla war is well understood. But that we copy the Communists by plebiscites is less well understood. True, we don't have plebiscites in the population at large, save where we have referenda on such matters as fluoridation or school bond issues. But in the House of Representatives and in many State Assemblies, we do have what amounts to plebiscites when any issue involving the Cold War comes up. Only a small fraction of the membership of the Democratic Study Group could afford the enormous political risk of voting against the appropriation for the House Un-American Activities Committee, and only one member (Frank Kowalski of Connecticut) took his political life in his hands and voted against sanctions vis à vis Cuba. What we see at work in these plebiscites (as in the comparable plebiscites in Southern state houses whenever the race issue comes up) is the enormous political momentum of chauvinistic nationalism in a democratic society. There are hardly any "safe districts" where a man can safely ride out one of these storms -- James Roosevelt comes from such a district (with many Jewish voters) in Los Angeles and of course has a name that is no handicap among the Democratic voters of that district, and perhaps there are a few comparable districts in New York City and elsewhere. But on the whole a Congressman who opposes the nationalist position knows that his district can be invaded in the way that McCarthy invaded Maryland to defeat Senator Tydings in 1950. Paradoxically, there are in effect no districts left: there is only a national ideological market where slogans rule and against which there is no district so remote, hardly any ethnic group so deviant, as to provide a local bulwark of protection -- certainly "states rights", the great dogma of conservative Democrats and conservative Republicans alike, is no protection. And no less paradoxically, the overweighting of the rural and small town interests in our legislatures supports the nationalist cause, for it is in these strata -- whether in Japan or in Germany or in France -- that the facts of international life penetrate with the most difficulty, and where, once parochial isolationism has ended, a no less parochial and even more dangerous internationalism takes its place. Thus the country districts that once protected a Borah or a Hiram Johnson in the Senate no longer provide protection. What we see then is a national scene in which what I have been loosely calling the war party has an irreducible minimum of votes, located on the one hand in small town and traditionally conservative locales and on the other hand in working class and particularly Catholic urban districts as well as in the lords of the media and among many intellectuals. There is no district that doesn't have a sizeable faction of potential voters in this camp, to be mobilized against a William Meyer or a Byron Johnson who flatly

opposes them. The proportion of anti-nationalists, decimated by the history of the last quarter century, is ever so much smaller, and as I have said is vulnerable to every breath that blows from the enemy camp.. To the extent that we have representative and constitutional government, there is still some protection, just as the very inefficiencies and dilatoriness of government under Eisenhower provided some protection.

"When Mr. Fulbright rose to speak this afternoon the Senate floor was largely abandoned. Those present were eager to get on with other work and in no mood to listen. Mr. Fulbright read a few paragraphs and inserted the rest in the record." This is from Russell Baker's story in The New York Times of June 30 on Senator Fulbright's speech in which he said: "Cuba, Laos, the Soviet cosmonaut -- none of these by itself is a threat to our national security, or to the long-term success of our policies. But by exaggerating their significance and reacting to them injudiciously, we disfigure our national style and undermine our policies"; and he continued to describe eloquently, and with judicious restraint, many of the things people like ourselves have been talking about. No doubt the Senate is no longer a forum for debates but does most of its work in committees. Yet its treatment of Senator Fulbright has a plebiscitary quality, analogous to those overwhelming votes in the House of Representatives of whose virtual unanimity we should be ashamed.

David Riesman (7/3/61)

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