

1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois  
December 14, 1950

Mr. William L. Laurence  
Editorial Offices  
New York Times  
New York

Dear Mr. Laurence:

The enclosed manuscript might perhaps interest you. It will appear in the December issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

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To the Editor  
New York Times

According to the Times of March 2nd, David E. Lilienthal, speaking in New York on March 1, took issue with NBC's University of Chicago Roundtable conference of last Sunday, in which Hans Bethe, Harrison Bethe, Frederick Seitz and the undersigned participated. He is not the only one to criticize attempts to discuss the implications of the hydrogen bomb. Since no hydrogen bombs exist at this date, any discussion of them must of necessity be speculative. To us it seems that it is not the first hydrogen bomb that we produced, but rather the last one, on which we have to focus public attention, and therefore the possibility of rigging hydrogen bombs so as to produce large quantities of radio activity appears to us to be the most dangerous aspect of the whole.

It was pointed out to us, both before and after the broadcast, by various people, that by discussing this aspect of the hydrogen bomb we are going to scare people. Some object to this on the grounds that we are going to scare the American people into making dangerous concessions to Russia, and others object to it on the grounds that we are scaring the American people into a preventive war. Our critics disagree on whether we are scaring people into war or into peace.

We should mention in this connection also the Russian reaction to the present public discussion of the hydrogen bomb, which is to the effect that this discussion is a put up job, with the sole purpose of scaring Russia into making concessions to the U.S.

We are in no position to judge how much truth the American public can take, but we are inclined to believe that they could stand a lot more information than they are being given in the issue with which we are concerned. In this connection, we wish to draw attention to an article written by Prof. E. Teller of Los Alamos, which appeared with the permission of the AEC in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists on. It might be that if Prof. Teller were free to write on this subject today he would want to qualify some of his statements.

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contained in this article. ~~To us it seems that~~ *super based on super bombs* the type of radio activity,  
which Dr. Teller discussed in his article has its difficulties and is subject  
to certain limitations, but it is doubtful that the knowledge that we <sup>possess</sup> today  
permits any one to set definite limitations on the possibilities of this kind  
of warfare.

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Letter to the Editor

The recent testimony of Secretary Wilson before Congress touches upon issues which are vital to the United States and the rest of the world. It is not likely that any all-out atomic catastrophe will befall the world as the result of a sudden mass attack by Russia against the United States or vice versa coming, so to speak, out of the clear political sky. But while the shouting war stopped last fall, no attempt has so far been made to reach an over-all political settlement. By ~~ever-all~~ political settlement,

I mean an understanding that is extended to all areas of the world and which will make sure that if there is an outbreak of war in any of the areas not fully controlled by either the United States or Russia, neither Russia nor the United States may militarily inter-

vene if it should prove impossible for them to prevent the outbreak of that war by joint intervention -- or even better an understanding that there will be joint action to prevent the outbreak of that war today. If not today, then in the near future such a war might

break out in a number of the "gray areas" of the world, and if the United States intervenes, she almost certainly, according to the present trend in military planning, will try to fight the war by using atomic bombs as a tactical weapon. The odds are that Russia

in the absence of a settlement

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
*only*

*could*

*and Russia in opposite sides then*  
*use*  
*in the absence of a settlement*

would do exactly the same. The danger that a war fought with atomic weapons will rather rapidly blossom out into a full-scale atomic war can in no way be eliminated, but this danger will be greatly enhanced if, at the time such a war breaks out, the Russian strategical air-force can knock out our power to retaliate or, for that matter, if the American strategical air-force can knock out Russia's power to retaliate. <sup>of course</sup> Many of those to whom I have voiced <sup>my</sup> this concern <sup>on the vulnerability of our S. A. Force to a sudden attack</sup> in the past six months, and who are in a better position to <sup>judge this issue</sup> form an expert opinion than I am, <sup>seem to me</sup> share this concern. <sup>a few</sup> Others have tried to reassure me but <sup>were</sup> are prevented from doing so by the limitations imposed upon them by military secrecy. Perhaps it is true <sup>to-day</sup> that we are in a <sup>rather</sup> position to defend our aircraft carriers and overseas bases against a <sup>than I think we are</sup> sudden aerial attack, but I have learned that optimistic estimates relating to <sup>the capability</sup> of warding off attacks which are based on secret information <sup>are</sup> <sup>best</sup> best disregarded, <sup>but</sup> for even if these arguments are true today, <sup>they are not</sup> they are not likely to be correct tomorrow. <sup>Under these circumstances,</sup> no matter how much I would like to agree with Secretary Wilson on the technical points which he discussed, I feel that I must side with his opponents who believe that preparation of the strategic airforce ought to be considerably increased beyond the budget proposed by the administration. <sup>Therefore I believe</sup> It seems to me that for <sup>that</sup> the next few years only <sup>by</sup> a great increase in the number of bases within the territory of the continental United States and long-range fast bombers that can refuel in air would be, strictly speaking, <sup>that</sup> the most important military contribution that the United States could make toward stabilizing the atomic stalemate <sup>in the absence</sup> as long as there is no political settlement, and perhaps even if there is a political

must



settlement. ~~Equal in importance to this might be perhaps a technical understanding with Russia aimed at avoiding the danger of an all-out atomic war triggered by a Russian or an American city through an accident or through the unauthorized action of a local command, or looking ahead a few years into the future by a provocative attack of a fourth nation against Russia and our American cities for the purpose of triggering a chain of events that will end with the total destruction of both Russia and the United States.~~

*provoked by an attack on*  
*from a human error, deliberate*  
*or men war*  
*resulting*  
*mutual*

But the fact that one may disagree with Secretary Wilson ~~upon~~ *may be wrong* on an important *Republican Party* military issue of this kind must not blind us to his great qualities and the fact that he might be the one man to whom the ~~nation~~ *Republican Party* ought to turn if President Eisenhower's health does not permit him to serve as President for another term. ~~It is more likely than not that in the next four years the issue of mass survival will be decided and that the outcome will depend on the kind of administration that the American people put into office.~~ *next few years there may be for* For the first time ~~there is now~~ *since the war* an opportunity to negotiate with Russia a settlement that may prevent the outbreak of war anywhere, and make reasonably certain that if some minor war should break out in a remote area of the world that is imperfectly controlled, Russia and the United States will not militarily intervene on the opposing side. The reason why such a settlement, which was not possible hitherto, ~~has~~ *is* now become *why* possible is ~~the~~ *done by* the very existence of ~~this~~ *a* strategic stalemate. Because Russia and the United States today can, in case of war, destroy each other to any desired degree, most of the controversial issues that were not negotiable hitherto have lost their importance for both the United States and Russia. ~~Hitherto~~ Hitherto if any of these

issues had been settled in America's favor, the chances of winning the war would have been shifted in America's favor or in Russia's favor, and since the issue of who is going to win the war, if war comes, cannot be <sup>the</sup> subject of compromise, neither of these issues were negotiable. Today the outcome of the war does not depend in the slightest on how any one of these issues is settled, and therefore it is not vital <sup>for</sup> ~~if~~ America or for Russia whether these issues are settled one way or another. The only thing that is vital to them is that all of these issues should be settled somehow. Only then can we be sure that the local war that might break out over them, even if both we and Russia try to prevent the outbreak of such a war, will not lead to American and Russian intervention and use of atomic bombs in tactical warfare and atomic catastrophe. The most important single issue is to put into office an administration in the United States that the American people can respect and that the Russian government will respect. Only then would it be possible to reach an American and Russian settlement that would insure peace. We cannot hope to put into office an administration that is not likely to commit blunders. There is no such thing as perfection. In looking over the list of candidates who might conceivably be nominated and elected for President either on the democratic ticket or the republican ticket, it is clear that the next administration in Washington will commit just as many blunders if not more as did the present administration. The issue is not how many blunders we are going to make, but rather whether we are going to blunder into war or blunder into peace. Assuming that President Eisenhower does not serve again, there is no one man under whose administration we are more likely to blunder

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*Without But to do so Johnson R and the US would no longer*

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*And only from an honest and true respect of the people for prevent or blunders, if such level moves,*

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The most important thing  
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Assuming that President Eisenhower does not serve again, there is  
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with than we are now.

and we are more likely to blunder into war or blunder into peace.

vertical handwritten notes on the left margin, including the word "blunders" and other illegible text.

vertical handwritten notes on the right margin, including the name "Ch. E. Wilson" and other illegible text.

into peace than under Charles E. Wilson. ~~And what is more,~~ <sup>I</sup> if  
 he were nominated on the Republican ticket and the American people  
 had a chance to have a good look at him, I believe they would be  
 very quick to perceive his qualities and give him their enthusias-  
 tic support. The people have in this respect a very fine and sure  
 instinct, <sup>a</sup> surer than the ~~politicians~~ <sup>men</sup> who control the nominations.  
 Their hearts went out to Willkie; their hearts went out to Eisen-  
 hower, and their hearts would go to to Charles E. Wilson. ~~He~~ <sup>He</sup> may  
 have said as often the wrong thing at the wrong time as did another  
~~member~~ <sup>member</sup> of Eisenhower's cabinet but there is one big difference.  
 Charles E. Wilson said the wrong thing at the wrong time <sup>but</sup> because  
 he is no politician and not because he is a bad politician. One  
 of the reasons why Eisenhower is so much liked, is because people  
 sense that he is no politician. They would like Charles E. Wilson  
 for exactly the same reason. <sup>and why he is so effective</sup> No politician ~~has any hope of solv-~~  
<sup>and he would be effective</sup> ~~can it~~  
 ing the difficult problem which faces the Russian and the American  
 governments in the next four years. Only a man of Wilson's stature  
 and with the human warmth that is part and parcel of <sup>his</sup> ~~this~~ stature  
 can hope to strike the right tone and to evoke the right response.

D R A F T

Letter to the Editor

The recent testimony of Secretary Wilson before Congress touches upon issues which are vital to the United States and the rest of the world. It is not likely that any all-out atomic catastrophe will befall the world as the result of a sudden mass attack by Russia against the United States or vice versa coming, so to speak, out of the clear political sky. But while the shouting war stopped last fall, no attempt has so far been made to reach an over-all political settlement. By over-all political settlement, I mean an understanding that is extended to all areas of the world and which will make sure that if there is an outbreak of war in any of the areas not fully controlled by either the United States or Russia, neither Russia nor the United States may militarily intervene if it should prove impossible for them to prevent the outbreak of that war by joint intervention -- or even better an understanding that there will be joint action to prevent the outbreak of that war/ today. If not today, then in the near future such a war might break out in a number of the gray areas of the world, and if the United States intervenes, she almost certainly, according to the present trend in military planning, will try to fight the war by using atomic bombs as a tactical weapon. The odds are that Russia

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Therefore, I believe that the most important military contribution that the United States can make towards stabilizing the atomic stalemate would at present consist in greatly increasing the number of bases <sup>base</sup> within the territory of the continental U.S., to improve the defense of these bases, and to increase the number of ~~long-range bombers~~ inter-continental bombers/ that could use <sup>them</sup> ~~these bases~~. This ~~means~~ undoubtedly means considerable increase in the appropriation of the American strategic airforce beyond the amounts proposed by the Administration even though the increase need not necessarily be earmarked for added production of B-52 bombers. <sup>P</sup> This, of course, is not the only measure that <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>may be</sup> needed to increase the stability of the strategic stalemate. A technical understanding with Russia . . . . .

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by the time) appeared  
~~later when it may have been in print, and I personally was in~~  
~~favor that the Council make no statement, therefore opposed~~  
~~to the motion~~

~~I found that I was not able to reach any of those~~  
~~who were involved in the day to day decisions. The way the~~  
~~Council is meant to operate it might, with luck, prevent the~~  
~~outbreak of a conflagration. But the Council can be of little~~  
~~help in extinguishing a fire once the house has been set on~~  
~~fire. When I found that there was nothing I personally or~~  
~~the Council could do that would be effective during the acute~~  
~~phase of the Cuban crisis I left Washington on November October~~  
~~24 for Geneva--a vantage point from which I was able to~~  
~~appraise events much better than I could have done had I~~  
~~remained in Washington.~~ *use advised in* *is not a* *about*

*Inst II*

*The flames are*  
*or for that matter I personally*  
*that*  
When, on October 22 the President proclaimed a partial blockade of Cuba, he took a risk that a Russian ship would run the blockade of Cuba and be sunk by an American warship. This would, of course, have been an act of war and from here on there could have been a step by step escalation. Since neither America nor Russia want an all-out atomic war *presumably* it is obvious that both nations would have tried to put an end to *such a* *about* the escalation at some point *now* short of an atomic war. Nevertheless I believed then and I believe in retrospect

that when the President proclaimed the partial blockade of Cuba he took a chance of *about* one in ten of involving the United States in a major war *of uncertain outcome*.

*It has been*  
You may have heard it often said that today when a war can easily escalate into an all-out atomic war, neither America nor Russia is going to risk war. The Cuban crisis has shown that this thesis is not correct. ~~Some people argued during~~

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If this assertion were valid then there would be no need to look any further in order to explain why the President was willing to risk war over the issue of Russian rockets in Cuba. The assertion is not valid, however. Nor would it be correct to say, as some people argued during the crisis, that we ~~were impelled~~ <sup>had</sup> to risk war <sup>over the issue of</sup> in the Cuban crisis because the Russian rockets stationed in Cuba would have endangered our security because <sup>because</sup> a surprise attack <sup>manifest</sup> against our rocket and strategic air bases <sup>from Cuba</sup> could have <sup>knocked out</sup> destroyed our capacity to strike a ~~substantial~~ counterblow. The rockets in Cuba would not have given Russia <sup>Why did the Russians transport rockets to Cuba?</sup> such a <sup>first stroke against</sup> ~~base~~ <sup>base's</sup> capability. Neither our Government nor the Russian Government have ~~made~~ <sup>been able</sup> any attempt <sup>at</sup> to explain what Russia hoped to gain by transporting rockets to Cuba. <sup>manifestly</sup> These rockets were not transported <sup>there</sup> to Cuba in order to defend Cuba, as the Russians claim, <sup>and</sup> ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> government <sup>many people in America believe</sup> permitted the impression to prevail that the Russians tried to sneak these rockets into Cuba, <sup>with some</sup> sinister intentions, perhaps to blackmail ~~us~~ <sup>us</sup> though it is far from clear how these rockets could have been used for such a purpose.

The January issue of the Post

insert II, page 2

During the early phase of the Cuban crisis, I was not able to reach <sup>in Washington</sup> any of those who were involved in the hour <sup>by</sup> hour decisions and I <sup>finally concluded</sup> found that there was nothing <sup>the Council or for that matter</sup> that I personally ~~or the Council~~ could do that ~~could~~ might influence the course of events.

<sup>ordinarily</sup> ~~ordinarily~~ The Council ~~can~~ <sup>should be</sup> maintain contact with a number of men in the Administration and in Congress and ordinarily it may <sup>perhaps attempt to</sup> ~~at times succeed in~~ keeping such men from losing sight of the goals <sup>of</sup> which we as a nation ought <sup>be</sup> to pursue in the heat of the battle of <sup>the</sup> day to day <sup>decisions</sup> discussions. But in times <sup>like the Cuban crisis</sup>, when <sup>decisions</sup> ~~discussions~~ are taken on an hour to hour basis, there is <sup>little</sup> less inclination on anyone's part to stop to consider what the long-term consequences of <sup>any of</sup> these decisions might be ~~and~~.

Insert I, page 2

In these circumstances it would have been almost impossible for the Council to make a <sup>constructive</sup> contribution to the <sup>resolution</sup> of the Cuban crisis by releasing statements to the press during the <sup>acute</sup> phase of crisis.

The Council could, of course, have raised its voice in protest but the Council is not <sup>meant</sup> ~~set up~~ to operate through the issuing of protests after the ~~danger~~ damage <sup>is</sup> has been done.

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(The writer of the following letter was instrumental in persuading the United States Government in 1939 to take up the development of atomic energy. He is now a professor at the University of Chicago.)

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

In 1913, one year before the First World War, H. G. Wells wrote a book, "The World Set Free." In this book he describes the discovery of artificial radioactivity and puts it in the year 1933, the very year in which it was discovered. This is followed, in the book, by the development of atomic energy for peacetime uses and atomic bombs. The world war in which the cities of many nations are destroyed by these bombs Wells puts in the year 1956. After the devastation of a large part of the world an attempt is made to set up a world government which very nearly fails but in the end, somehow, miraculously succeeds.

It seems that all of these predictions--even the dates--may prove to be correct; for now it would appear that 1956 is the year most likely to see the advent of atomic war.

It would take much imagination and resourcefulness--no less perhaps than went into the development of the bomb itself--to devise a settlement that would resolve the power conflict between Russia and the United States and would not only postpone the next war, but create a situation in which war would not be likely to occur again. But up until now the public discussion of these issues has moved at a level of political thinking at which no solution is possible at all. So far neither the Government nor anyone else has presented even the principles on which an adequate settlement could be based.

If we have no concept of a real solution, almost any course of action can be argued, for and against, endlessly and inconclusively. Some military leaders seem to advocate that we take armed action in the Pacific while it is still possible to keep Russia, through the threat of "massive retaliation," from intervening on a large scale. If we accept the premise that it is not too late for a preventive war and if we are willing to devastate China to such an extent that recovery may take one or two generations, then there may be nothing much wrong with the reasoning of these men, except that they leave God out of their equations.

According to press reports, Admiral Radford suggested in September that Chiang Kai-shek be permitted to bomb the mainland of China in defense of Quemoy Island and that the United States agree to intervene in the support of this action if necessary. At that time President Eisenhower vetoed this proposal. In doing so the President followed his instinct, and his instinct is to strive for peace.

It is generally known that the President ardently desires to keep the country out of war. He believes that a satisfactory general agreement could probably be drafted that the Russians would be likely to accept. But he does not know how to make sure that the Russians would keep such an agreement, and he is therefore unable to steer a clear course which offers a chance of leading to peace. With many of his advisers in favor of taking calculated risks and having an early showdown, how long can the President be expected to hold out?

The day on which we bomb the Chinese mainland--say in defense of Quemoy or Matsu--is likely to turn out to be the first day of the Third World War. Those who think that the course of such a war can be predicted in any way are, I believe, sadly mistaken. The war might very well end with the devastation of Russia and perhaps also of the United States, to the point where organized government in these two countries would cease to exist.

At the time of this writing it appears quite possible that we may have a reprieve. But such a reprieve can be only a short one. For we have now advanced close to the point of no return, and one of our next groping steps--unguided by a clear concept of the road to peace--could very well carry us beyond that point. This result to me seems indeed unavoidable unless the men within our Government who are shaping our policies will soon begin to see clearly some course of action that may lead us out of the present impasse.

To remove the instability inherent in the power conflict between Russia and the United States will take a far-reaching agreement that will settle all major outstanding issues. Such an agreement, if it offers Russia, ourselves and several other nations strong continuing incentives for keeping it in operation, can create a setting in which the chance of war may be regarded as remote. Only in such a setting is it possible to dispose of the controversial issues which loom so large today. No progress can be made toward this goal piecemeal.

To outline such an agreement in some detail will require the kind of imagination and resourcefulness that cannot be expected from the Government. In our political system the intellectual leadership needed here can arise only through private initiative.

Our only remaining hope is, I believe, that under the sponsorship of universities, research foundations, and, above all, committees of citizens set up for the purpose, it may be possible to gather at this late hour several groups of highly qualified men who will think through the problems that are involved. Some of these groups might perhaps succeed in outlining for us in some detail, within the next few months, the kind of international arrangements that we could trust.

The problem lies not so much in working out all the details as in finding the right principles from which the details would follow more or less automatically. The details can wait, but reaching a meeting of minds on the basic principles cannot. Only groups of like-minded men who can agree at the outset on basic premises can hope to come up with something really constructive that may catch--as it must--the imagination of the public, Congress and the Administration.

I am fairly confident that with the right kind of sponsorship to provide the necessary moral and financial support the men needed to carry out this work could be found. We have great resources in men of ability, devotion and--yes, even courage; and such men would make themselves available in response to the proper invitation.

Will sponsorship, however, be forthcoming soon enough and on a sufficient scale? True, we are now faced with a clear and present danger, and it is in such times that patriots may rise to the challenge. But will there be men willing to assume responsibility when nobody in particular has assigned them such responsibility? This, of course, I cannot say.

I am certain of one thing only. Unless we find the right answers soon war will come; and maybe in the final analysis it will come because there was too much patriotism in the United States and there were too few patriots.

Leo Szilard.

New York, Feb. 2, 1955.

New York Times  
February 6, 1955

LETTERS TO THE TIMES

ACTION TO PREVENT WAR

Sponsorship of Qualified Group to Formulate Agreements Proposed

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Preventive War Theory

If we have no concept of a real solution, almost any course of action can be argued, for and against, endlessly and inconclusively. Some military leaders seem to advocate that we take armed action in the Pacific while it is still possible to keep Russia, through the threat of "massive retaliation," from intervening on a large scale. If we accept the premise that it is not too late for a preventive war and if we are willing to devastate China to such an extent that recovery may take one or two generations, then there may be nothing much wrong with the reasoning of these men, except that they leave God out of their equations.

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the support of this action if necessary. At that time President Eisenhower vetoed this proposal. In doing so the President followed his instinct, and his instinct is to strive for peace.

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### Course of Devastation

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### Initiating Leadership

To outline such an agreement in some detail will require the kind of imagination and resourcefulness that cannot be expected from the Government. In our political system the intellectual leadership needed here can arise only through private initiative.

Our only remaining hope is, I believe, that under the sponsorship of universities, research foundations, and, above all, committees of citizens set up for the purpose, it may be possible to gather at this late hour several groups of highly qualified men who will think through the problems that are involved. Some of these groups might perhaps succeed in outlining for us in some detail, within the next few months, the kind of international arrangements that we could trust.

The problem lies not so much in working out all the details as in finding the right principles from which the details would follow more or less automatically. The details can wait, but reaching a meeting of minds on the basic principles cannot. Only groups of like-minded men who can agree at the outset on basic promises can hope to come up with something really constructive that may catch -- as it must -- the imagination of the public, Congress and the Administration.

I am fairly confident that with the right kind of sponsorship to provide the necessary moral and financial support the men needed to carry out this work can be found. We have great resources in men of ability, devotion and -- yes, even courage; and such men would make themselves available in response to the proper invitation.

Will sponsorship, however, be forthcoming soon enough and on a sufficient scale? True, we are now faced with a clear and present danger, and it is in such times that patriots may rise to the challenge. But will there be men willing to assume responsibility when nobody in particular has assigned them such responsibility? This, of course, I cannot say.

I am certain of one thing only. Unless we find the right answers soon war will come; and maybe in the final analysis it will come because there was too much patriotism in the United States and too few patriots.

Leo Szilard

New York, Feb. 2, 1955

Ben Sherwood  
Phila., Pa.

TO THE EDITOR, NEW YORK TIMES

March 6, 1955

A careful study of your excellent editorial "The GARZA Incident," March 4th, clearly establishes the significant similarities in it to those in the far greater crisis in the Formosa Straits. The citation of a few pertinent passages from this editorial will suffice: "Not at peace and yet, since 1949, not in a state of active war, Egypt and Israel have been at sword's points during almost all this period ... Egypt has consistently refused to make a permanent settlement with Israel or to recognize the obvious fact that Israel is there to stay and that the sooner normal relations are established between Israel and her neighbors the better it will be for all of them."

A substitution in the above quotation of 1953 for 1949 and the United States and Red China respectively for Egypt and Israel is about all that is required to accurately describe the present situation in the Formosa Straits. "Not at peace and yet not in a state of active war" has a familiar and ominous ring, but <sup>Can we avoid</sup> how long the latter state? Mr. Dulles says our only purpose is peace but how can Red China be at peace so long as any major power supports Chiang Kai-shek as the proper representative of China in the United Nations or elsewhere? Acceptance of defeat without a struggle is not one of the historical characteristics of sovereign states. The treaty recently signed between the United States and Chiang and our continuous support of him in the United Nations presents Mao Tse-tung with no alternative to war just as non-recognition of Israel by her neighbors prevents her from being at peace.

We must support Chiang, in the opinion of some, in order to prevent deflection of his own troops and to hold the "loyalties" of the uncommitted in Asia; Mao must eliminate Chiang as the "pretender" and gain recognition

for his regime in order to survive. It was to avoid this tragic dilemma that some of the most perceptive minds in the nation opposed the Dulles-Chiang treaty in the first place and later the Congressional Resolution granting the President in advance the power to make war in defense of this treaty. This was the main import though not so specifically stated, I believe, of the splendid letters appearing recently in your columns <sup>by</sup> Messrs. John Gange, Leland M. Goodrich, Everett Case, Derk Bodde and many others.

In times past it was thought to be the function of diplomacy to avoid the reduction of the areas <sup>of</sup> negotiation unnecessarily, to permit whenever possible the saving of face, to avoid ultimatums unless in contemplation of war. This ancient and useful practice seems to have been either abandoned altogether or certainly greatly neglected by both our State Department and the Foreign Office of Red China in negotiations centered about the Formosa Straits. The Dulles-Chiang Treaty may yet, unless materially modified and expertly administered, become in the words of the brilliant <sup>When describing another situation more than a hundred years ago</sup> if unscrupulous Talleraud: "Worse than a crime, it was a blunder."

So the President, and probably soon, will again have to choose between peace and war. While most hope and trust he will again choose peace, as he has twice within the recent past, it is becoming increasingly evident that a fundamental change in the conduct of international relations is imperative if World War III is to be avoided. No one man, even one so obviously devoted to peace as is President Eisenhower, can continue indefinitely from crisis to crises, to bail the world out of war. Ordinary diplomacy, while useful in the assist, is not equal to the put out. This is the task of the "first team." The establishment and maintenance of peace, for the present and until conditions permit of the full use of the United Nations, is the responsibility of the top leaders of the great powers. This is

*With a number of people I believe the states had tried only to find a way to avoid the crisis - call on them for return and a new course.*

provided for in Article 106 Charter of the United Nations. This would be true even if it were not <sup>so provided</sup> provided for in the U. N. Charter because of the fact that no other nation except these: The U. S., Great Britain, China, France, India and USSR, can now challenge peace and no other enforce it. This means that each of these leaders accepts this world responsibility when he accepts national office. And the opinion of mankind will not much longer permit any one of them to evade it or delegate it to others, however worthy. This means that top level conferences must be held not only in "crisis" cases but regularly in order to avoid the development of these cases in the first instance. The President of the United States has a unique opportunity to assume world leadership by calling such a conference now and exceptional qualities for successfully directing its deliberations.

*John B. Hester*  
High B. Hester  
Brig. General U. S. Army (Rtd)  
Hester, N.C.

*my permanent address ->*

Dear Leo. Our problem is to convince Eisenhower that high level conferences are necessary to avoid war. Dulles and his advisors have convinced him that Red China and Russia are ready to topple of their own weight, therefore no negotiations are needed. It is that simple. The fact that they are wrong in itself makes no difference.

I have written Foyenick, forwarded our letter and discussed the problem in confidence

(Over)

With a number of people called the Water  
last night only to find you were still away.  
Call me when you return and I will come up -  
Hugh

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even if it were not provided for in the U.N. Charter because of the fact that  
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My permanent address  
← Hester, N.C.  
Brig. General U. S. Army (Retd)  
Hugh B. Hester  
Hugh B. Hester

Dear Sir - Our problem is to convince them -  
to know that this is not a conference or necessary  
to avoid war. It is a matter of life and death  
and we are confident that the U.S. and Russia  
are ready to take part of their own weight  
therefore no negotiations are needed. It is that  
simple. The fact that they are necessary  
in itself makes no difference.  
I have written "Agreement" forwarded by me  
later and discussed the problem in conference  
(over)

## FIRST PROGRESS REPORT

Enclosed is a Letter to the Editor which appeared in The New York Times, Sunday, February 6th. It evoked a very strong response and I was more or less forced to follow-through and to try to set up a project. The plan for this project is described in the enclosed memorandum dated May 1, 1955.

I have tentatively asked a few people whether they would be willing to make themselves available on a full-time basis for the work of the commission. The replies are fairly encouraging with favorable tentative answers running about 50%.

It seemed desirable to establish contact with the United States Government at an early date concerning this project. Initially Charles Bolte spoke to William Caldwell in Stassen's office and Professor Philip E. Jacob of the University of Pennsylvania wrote to Robert Mattison. Subsequently C. D. Jackson wrote to Stassen. Also, I saw John Ohly in the FOA. As the upshot of all these contacts it is now established that I shall keep in contact with Stassen's office through Robert Mattison who will head up Stassen's staff after June 30th when Stassen will act as Special Advisor to the President on Disarmament. I have seen Mr. Mattison and asked him to maintain contact with the State Department with respect to our project through Robert S. Bowie, Chief of the Policy Planning Staff to whom I have spoken about the project. I plan to channel all information through Mr. Mattison thereafter.

I still have to establish contact with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and next week I plan to see Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of the Staff of the Committee.

Subsequently the next step will be to discuss the composition of the board with David Bruce, Thomas Finnletter, John J. McCloy, Paul G. Hoffman, Will Clayton,

May 6, 1955

Howard C. Petersen, Chester Bowles, General Robert Cutler, John Cowles and General George Olmstead. I know only about half of these men personally, the other half I have not met and shall have to approach through mutual friends.

What is desired in the first instance is a nucleus of three to five men who will assume the initial responsibility of helping to set up the Commission and obtain the funds needed for the Commission's operation.

May 18, 1955

PROPOSAL FOR AN INQUIRY

A sequel to the attached Letter to the New York Times which appeared on Sunday, February 6, 1955.

A Letter to the Editor, which I sent to the New York Times and which appeared on Sunday, February 6, centered around the following passage:

"To remove the instability inherent in the power conflict between Russia and the United States will take a far-reaching agreement that will settle all major outstanding issues. Such an agreement, if it offers Russia, ourselves and several other nations strong continuing incentives for keeping it in operation, can create a setting in which the chance of war may be regarded as remote. Only in such a setting is it possible to dispose of the controversial issues which loom so large today. No progress can be made toward this goal piecemeal.

"To outline such an agreement in some detail will require the kind of imagination and resourcefulness that cannot be expected from the Government. In our political system the intellectual leadership needed here can arise only through private initiative."

The Commission:

The response which this "Letter" evoked has induced me to try now to set up a group consisting of perhaps five men who will conduct an inquiry into the question outlined above. They will work full-time over a period of between six months to one year. They will try to think through the problems involved and will also explore what adequate measures appear most likely to be acceptable to the Soviet Union, America and the other nations principally involved.

We shall refer to this group here as the Commission. What kind of a group should it be?

Clearly, the conclusions of the Commission must be consistent with enlightened self-interest from the point of view of America, the Soviet Union and the other nations involved. But it is not likely that any group which attempts to think through the problem of resolving the present power conflict on the basis on enlightened self-interest will succeed in coming up with the right answers.

The right answers cannot be found by a straight application of logical reasoning and, in order to find them, one must have ideas. We do not know just how ideas come about, but somehow or other, enlightened self-interest does not seem to be very conducive to their generation. Somehow, enlightened self-interest lacks in appeal to the imagination of Man.

Bertrand Russell, in his book, Icarus, discusses how the "fixed price" came into existence in England. Up to that time, it took protracted negotiations to buy a pair of shoes in a shop. The shopkeeper started out by asking a price which was way too high, and the customer offered a price which was way too low. After long negotiations, the pair of shoes changed hands at a reasonable price - if one does not count the time invested by customer and shopkeeper in the negotiations of the price. The first shopkeepers to introduce the fixed price were - according to Russell - Quakers, who felt that it was wrong to ask for a higher price than the merchandise was worth. The customers saved time by buying in these Quaker shops, and preferred to buy in them, with the result that the Quakers became prosperous. Russell stresses the fact that any merchant guided by enlightened self-interest could have arrived at the same conclusion which the Quakers reached on the basis of a moral argument, but the fact remains that enlightened self-interest did not produce the "idea" which was required.

Ideas of greater depth are needed if we are to find the right answer to the problem that confronts the world today. To come up with these ideas is a task that requires qualities of the heart as well as qualities of the intellect. The members of the Commission must have these qualities, for it will be a task of the Commission to generate ideas and to explore their feasibility.

The members of the Commission must possess imagination, foresight, wisdom, common sense, critical ability and above all, they must have faith in the possibility of finding solutions to the problems which are involved. They will not be experts. It is impossible to have the required knowledge and skills all assembled in the Commission, and therefore the Commission will have to call on experts. They may have to spend much of their time in consultation with experts and yet the experts must not run the show.

Since the problem at hand is not an American problem, the Commission will not be an American group from the point of view of its mandate. The members will be selected on the basis of their personal qualifications, and Americans may serve on the Commission as well as non-Americans.

#### An American Panel

Clearly, the conclusions reached by the Commission will be of real value only if they are acceptable to America and the Soviet Union as well as to the other nations involved. In America this means that these conclusions must be acceptable not only to the Administration but also to the Congress and to the people.

It is proposed to set up a panel of individuals in America from among distinguished private individuals and from among members of

Congress. Those who accept membership on this panel undertake to follow -- as individuals -- the work of the commission and to evaluate its conclusions from the point of view of enlightened American self-interest. They would, of course, remain free to do as much for any other study group which might concern themselves with the same overall issue but might adopt different approaches and come up with different conclusions.

The Commission will keep close contact with the members of this panel, keep them currently informed of their thinking, the difficulties which they discover and their reasons for favoring certain types of measures and rejecting others. In this manner the Commission will try to make certain that their thinking and conclusions are acceptable from the point of view of America's real interests.

#### A Panel in the Soviet Union

It is proposed to ask at an early date either the government of the Soviet Union or preferably perhaps the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to designate a panel of individuals who could follow the Commission's work and evaluate their conclusions from the point of view of the enlightened self-interest of the Soviet Union. Presumably, this panel would be composed of Government employees yet it might fulfill, in many respects, much the same role as would the panel of private individuals in America.

#### Other Panels if Time Permits

It would be very desirable to have similar panels also in England, in China and in France, if it should prove practicable to have them.

#### Procedure for the Commission

The work of the Commission might be -- initially at least -- scheduled to extend over a period of about 8 months. It is proposed

that the Commission operate as follows:

(a) They will devote perhaps 12 weeks to the clarification of their own minds on what they themselves would consider to be a desirable and adequate arrangement. During this period they will arrive at tentative conclusions after consultations with experts who might be expected to make a contribution.

(b) Having accomplished this, the Commission will discuss their tentative conclusions with individual members of the American panel, the panel of the Soviet Union and panels in other countries, if such panels have been established elsewhere. They would also wish to discuss their thoughts with men who have direct governmental responsibilities in the Soviet Union, in Britain, in the United States and if time and circumstances permit, also in China and France.

The Commission would want to find out through such discussions how these men -- or individuals -- look upon the specific measures favored by the Commission. Some of these measures would adversely affect vested interest wielding political influence, and these discussions should enable the Commission to assess the practical difficulties which such measures are likely to encounter.

It is assumed that this phase of the work of the Commission would take about 12 weeks.

(c) Subsequent to these discussions, the Commission would then reconsider their tentative conclusions.

This phase of the work might take 8 weeks.

#### Expected Results

The Commission's work should result in a working paper that would set forth the approaches which, in their determination, are most likely

to avoid insurmountable difficulties. Such a working paper could be useful to the governments involved when they may wish to abandon the current practice of negotiating piece-meal and are ready to negotiate an over-all settlement. It might also help to crystallize ideas on the issues of peace and disarmament by pointing up the specific routes along which the nations might move towards this goal with a reasonable chance of success.

Individual members of the American panel if they are convinced of the validity of some of the conclusions reached by the commission, could bring these to the attention -- each depending on the opportunities available to him -- of the Administration, or members of the Congress, or the Public.

#### Financing

Since the task of the commission is to conduct an inquiry, the funds for its work could be administered under a grant by some American university and private contributions would be tax exempt.

Should the government of the Soviet Union wish to contribute to such a grant, there ought to be no objection to accepting half of the funds needed, provided that the other half comes from proper American sources.

7 Oct 1956

F-49

Letter to the New York Times

Sir:

Because these days the ~~armament~~ statesmen of the great powers cannot help but be aware of the menace of the bomb, they present us from time to time with bold proposals aimed at making the peace more secure. They may propose to stop further bomb tests, to abolish conscription, ~~or~~ to have mutual aerial inspection of ground installation in order to prevent a surprise attack, or even general disarmament. But whatever they suggest they do not work for the one thing that can make any of the other suggestions possible; i.e. an adequate political settlement among the great powers that would be kept in force because it would be in the interests of the great powers to keep <sup>it</sup> in force. Such a settlement would serve its purpose if it made it reasonably certain that in case of a conflict between nations -- other than the great powers themselves -- if resort to arms cannot be prevented, the great power will at least not militarily intervene on opposite sides. Until we have such a settlement the bombs will remain an ever increasing menace. I am so keenly aware of the nature of this menace and I believe so strongly that today it persists only because of criminal negligence on the part of the lead-

5 Oct 1975  
F-44

Letter to the New York Times

~~The most~~ ~~wholly~~

Sir:

~~is~~ a conflict between

two nations, other than

the great powers themselves,

~~that~~ is the most ~~wholly~~

~~can~~ can easily bridge

an all out at. ~~can~~ ~~by~~ ~~not~~

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~~that~~ ~~they~~ ~~will~~ ~~not~~

~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~case~~ ~~of~~ ~~a~~ ~~conflict~~ ~~between~~ ~~nations~~ ~~other~~ ~~than~~ ~~the~~ ~~great~~ ~~powers~~ ~~themselves~~

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ment the bombs will remain an ever increasing menace. I am so keenly

aware of the nature of this menace and I believe so strongly that today

it persists only because of criminal negligence on the part of the lead-

ing statesmen of the great power that I cannot trust myself to write about the bomb -- and write about it I must -- in a serious vein without letting a trace of bitterness creep into my script. This will explain to the reader why I am going to say what I am saying in the way I do.

The last important announcement on the bomb emanating from authoritative sources in Washington told us that our efforts towards humanizing the bomb have been crowned with success. Our editorial writers, whose ability to elucidate such oracles is rarely impeded by any knowledge of the atomic energy field, have promptly explained to us the meaning of this announcement: It seems we have discovered the "secret" of how to make bombs that either omit ingredients that are transformed into radioactive dust or bombs that can be exploded very high above the ground without impairing their ability to reduce a city to ashes, so that in either case the bomb can destroy a city without spraying the suburbs and the surrounding countryside with a lethal amount of radioactive dust.

This, if the editorial writers are correct, is undoubtedly good news for our potential adversaries in warfare. I am, of course,

wholly in sympathy with those of our fellow citizens who now wish to pray to God that someone may sneak the "secret" to Russia so that in case of the dreaded war, even though our cities may be reduced to ashes, those of us who live in the suburbs or the countryside may survive. For their benefit I can say ~~that~~ on good authority that by praying to God in such a manner they would not lay themselves open to prosecution by the Department of Justice. I must, however, warn any would-be traitor who might imagine himself performing God's work. ~~that~~ God does not need the service of any traitor. God can work miracles. God can work a miracle and make the Russians discover the secret all on their own. Of if he were a revengeful God to whom it would be pleasing to have the Sodom and Gomorrah of our cities perish (go up in flames and be reduced to ashes), while the innocent people in our suburbs and our countryside escape unscathed, he could work an even greater miracle and keep the Russians from discovering the "secret" on their own. Having exhausted the subject and perhaps also the reader, I now turn to a different subject.

If a satisfactory way of maintaining a controlled fusion reaction can be found, it will in the long run provide the world with a virtually unlimited source of power. More and more of my eminent colleagues demand these days that the cloak of secrecy be withdrawn from this field in order to promote this development. Our authorities are opposed to this for the following reason. In a fusion reactor there will be a copious emission of neutrons which can be used by manufacturing a fissionable isotope of uranium from ordinary thorium. Countries like the United States and Russia have, of course, much better methods for producing fissionable materials, and moreover within the near future will have in stock all that they can possibly want to possess for military purposes. There are other countries, however, who might have difficulty in obtaining an adequate supply of uranium and in emulating the example of Russia and America, and it is conceivable that they might be able to acquire bombs sooner if they are taught how to operate a fusion reactor. One might argue, it is bad enough that Russia and America have the bombs; why take the risk -- however small it may be -- that countries who can neither manufacture fissionable material from uranium

nor buy bombs from either Russia or America may one day be able to make bombs by using a fusion reactor.

A future state of affairs in which many countries have stock piles of atomic bombs is not exactly pleasant to contemplate, and if we are unwilling to work for a political solution of this problem, it is understandable that we wish to delay the advent of such a future. But keeping the fusion reactor under a cloak of secrecy would seem to be not wholly adequate because we cannot control what information in this field the Russian government is going to release. Repeatedly in the recent past they have made announcements in this field which is, of course, in violation of our secrecy rules. Therefore, if our authorities are seriously concerned in keeping this field under wraps, they ought without any further delay approach the Russian government and propose a full exchange of information on the fusion reactor in return for their promise not to abandon secrecy in this field by unilateral action.

I realize, of course, that the course of action that I propose here is fraught with danger, for should the Russians perchance be ahead of us in this field and should they learn of this fact as a result of

an exchange of information, could we trust the Russians to keep secret the fact that we can learn more from them than they can learn from us?

It seems that somehow things have become more difficult. The difficulty comes, it seems to me, from the fact that scientists and engineers do their job too well and statesmen do not do theirs nearly well enough. The world is faced with a political problem which the statesmen are reluctant to tackle and by egging on our scientists and engineers they are barking up the wrong tree. Maybe there is a shortage of scientists and engineers in America as well as in the rest of the world but, my God, what a shortage of real statesmen.

ACTION TO PREVENT WAR

## Sponsorship of Qualified Group to Formulate Agreements Proposed

(The writer of the following letter was instrumental in persuading the United States Government in 1939 to take up the development of atomic energy. He is now a professor at the University of Chicago.)

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

In 1913, one year before the First World War, H. G. Wells wrote a book, "The World Set Free." In this book he describes the discovery of artificial radioactivity and puts it in the year 1933, the very year in which it was discovered. This is followed, in the book, by the development of atomic energy for peacetime uses and atomic bombs. The world war in which the cities of many nations are destroyed by these bombs Wells puts in the year 1956. After the devastation of a large part of the world an attempt is made to set up a world government which very nearly fails but in the end, somehow, miraculously succeeds.

It seems that all of these predictions--even the dates--may prove to be correct; for now it would appear that 1956 is the year most likely to see the advent of atomic war.

It would take much imagination and resourcefulness--no less perhaps than went into the development of the bomb itself--to devise a settlement that would resolve the power conflict between Russia and the United States and would not only postpone the next war, but create a situation in which war would not be likely to occur again. But up until now the public discussion of these issues has moved at a level of political thinking at which no solution is possible at all. So far neither the Government nor anyone else has presented even the principles on which an adequate settlement could be based.

## Preventive War Theory

If we have no concept of a real solution, almost any course of action can be argued, for and against, endlessly and inconclusively. Some military leaders seem to advocate that we take armed action in the Pacific while it is still possible to keep Russia, through the threat of "massive retaliation," from intervening on a large scale. If we accept the premise that it is not too late for a preventive war and if we are willing to devastate China to such an extent that recovery may take one or two generations, then there may be nothing much wrong with the reasoning of these men, except that they leave God out of their equations.

According to press reports, Admiral Radford suggested in September that Chiang Kai-shek be permitted to bomb the mainland of China in defense of Quemoy Island and that the United States agree to intervene in the support of this action if necessary. At that time President Eisenhower vetoed this proposal. In doing so the President followed his instinct, and his instinct is to strive for peace.

It is generally known that the President ardently desires to keep the country out of war. He believes that a satisfactory general agreement could probably be drafted that the Russians would be likely to accept. But he does not know how to make sure that the Russians would keep such an agreement, and he is therefore unable to steer a clear course which offers a chance of leading to peace. With many of his advisers in favor of taking calculated risks and having an early showdown, how long can the President be expected to hold out?

## Course of Devastation

The day on which we bomb the Chinese mainland--say in defense of Quemoy or Matsu--is likely to turn out to be the first day of the Third World War. Those who think that the course of such a war can be predicted in any way are, I believe, sadly mistaken. The war might very well end with the devastation of Russia and perhaps also of the United States, to the point where organized government in these two countries would cease to exist.

At the time of this writing it appears quite possible that we may have a reprieve. But such a reprieve can be only a short one. For we have now advanced close to the point of no return, and one of our next groping steps--unguided by a clear concept of the road to peace--could very well carry us beyond that point. This result to me seems indeed unavoidable unless the men within our Government who are shaping our policies will soon begin to see clearly some course of action that may lead us out of the present impasse.

To remove the instability inherent in the power conflict between Russia and the United States will take a far-reaching agreement that will settle all major outstanding issues. Such an agreement, if it offers Russia, ourselves and several other nations strong continuing incentives for keeping it in operation, can create a setting in which the chance of war may be regarded as remote. Only in such a setting is it possible to dispose of the controversial issues which loom so large today. No progress can be made toward this goal piecemeal.

## Initiating Leadership

To outline such an agreement in some detail will require the kind of imagination and resourcefulness that cannot be expected from the Government. In our political system the intellectual leadership needed here can arise only through private initiative.

Our only remaining hope is, I believe, that under the sponsorship of universities, research foundations, and, above all, committees of citizens set up for the purpose, it may be possible to gather at this late hour several groups of highly qualified men who will think through the problems that are involved. Some of these groups might perhaps succeed in outlining for us in some detail, within the next few months, the kind of international arrangements that we could trust.

The problem lies not so much in working out all the details as in finding the right principles from which the details would follow more or less automatically. The details can wait, but reaching a meeting of minds on the basic principles cannot. Only groups of like-minded men who can agree at the outset on basic premises can hope to come up with something really constructive that may catch--as it must--the imagination of the public, Congress and the Administration.

I am fairly confident that with the right kind of sponsorship to provide the necessary moral and financial support the men needed to carry out this work could be found. We have great resources in men of ability, devotion and--yes, even courage; and such men would make themselves available in response to the proper invitation.

Will sponsorship, however, be forthcoming soon enough and on a sufficient scale? True, we are now faced with a clear and present danger, and it is in such times that patriots may rise to the challenge. But will there be men willing to assume responsibility when nobody in particular has assigned them such responsibility? This, of course, I cannot say.

I am certain of one thing only. Unless we find the right answers soon war will come; and maybe in the final analysis it will come because there was too much patriotism in the United States and too few patriots.

Leo Szilard.

New York, Feb. 2, 1955.

August 1, 1957

The New York Times Company  
Times Square  
New York 36, New York

Gentlemen:

Professor Leo Szilard, at the address indicated on this letterhead, would like to have two copies of the July 23rd issue of the New York Times - Late City edition.

I enclose 20¢ in stamps to cover costs and mailing and hope this is sufficient. If not, please advise.

With thanks for your attention to this request,

Very truly yours,

Norene Mann (Mrs.)  
Secretary to  
Professor Szilard

Encl.

Transcribed from tape made by Kay from Braun magnetic recorder, direct  
Raymond [unclear] apparently not sent from Braun magnetic recorder, direct [unclear]  
[unclear]  
Letter to the Times, August 8, 1957 \$5

On July 22nd Mr. Dulles gave a speech in which he defined American aspirations concerning international control of atomic bombs. For onee his statements were exceptionally clear. To those who would like to see the world get rid of atomic bombs Mr. Dulles explained that it is too late to do this. A few years ago these same people were told that it is too early. It is too late now, so Mr. Dulles says, because we and Russia both have large stockpiles of atomic bombs. Even if we and Russia could reach an agreement, how could we on eliminating atomic bombs, how could we convince each other that no substantial quantities of bombs have remained hidden? I believe that this argument is not valid. Those who believe this think of inspections in a far too narrow, ~~term~~ purely technical term. ~~It is true that this might be the only kind of inspection that is possible in the midst of a cold war when the cold war is at its height (correction) It is true that in the absence of a political settlement at a time when the cold war rages this might be the only kind of inspection which is practical. The situation would be very different, however, if Russia and America ever reached an agreement which they wanted to keep in force because it is in their interest to keep in in force. Then the issue is no longer what kind of \* inspection terms have been written inot the agreement, but rather in what way can Russia convince America and can America convince Russia that there are no bombs in substantial quantities that have remained hidden. This of course could be accomplished in more than one way. I don't, however, want to belabor this point. Because even though~~

6-2

is not  
it ~~may-be~~ true-at least not in the only setting that is worth  
discussing, that we could not convince Russia and that Russia  
couldn't convince us that all substantial quantities of her  
bombs have remained hidden may be a valid argument, not on  
the issue ~~of/inspection~~ <sup>whether it</sup> is possible to get rid of the bombs  
but rather on the issue whether it is desirable to get rid of  
the bombs, or to be more precise whether in the situation which  
exists it would be either in the interests of Russia <sup>of</sup> the  
interest of America ~~nowxxx~~ or the interests of both to get  
rid of the bombs. (corr.) Whether it is in the interest of  
both America and Russia to get rid of the bombs. If it is not  
in their interest to do so then clearly we must shift the  
emphasis of our discussion ~~for~~ <sup>from</sup> an objective which we do not  
both want to an objective which we certainly both want. We  
~~should no longer speak very much~~ Instead of discussing  
how to get rid of the bomb we ought to begin to discuss how  
to live with the bomb. ~~Unless we begin to do this rather soon~~  
We are <sup>now</sup> ~~not~~ rapidly moving towards a stalemate between the  
strategic striking <sup>atomic</sup> forces of Russia and America. Unless we  
begin to discuss rather soon how to live with the bomb ~~this~~  
stalemate will remain unstable. Sooner or later a political  
disturbance will trigger a war that may end up as an all out  
atomic war. The situation towards which we are moving is wholly  
unprecedented in history, for when this stalemate is fully  
developed we shall be able to destroy Russia to any desired  
degree and Russia will be able to destroy us to any desired  
degree. Neither of us will be able by one single, sudden  
blow, or even through repeated blows, to destroy the power  
of the other to retaliate.


To cope with this situation we will have to adopt an entirely unprecedented attitude and take unprecedented measures. And our greatest peril may arise from the fact that statesmen--just like other people--are most reluctant to think any unprecedented thoughts and even more reluctant to take any unprecedented measures. From this point of view one may welcome--and I do so welcome--President Eisenhower's initial proposal of establishing a mutual ~~area~~<sup>aerial</sup> of survey which, in addition to ground inspection, would give us and would give Russia one to three-day advance notice of an impending large-scale attack by the strategic ~~air~~ airforce of the other. Having said this I have however said all that can be said in favor of this proposal <sup>and</sup> even though this is not very little it is also not very much.

[One area] however in which this proposal is pushed in the London negotiations at present almost exclusively at the cost of other conceivable proposals that could be made indicates an attitude which is likely to frustrate any progress that otherwise might have been made.

In the ~~negotiations~~<sup>works</sup> which we conducted in the past 12 years <sup>on</sup> other nations the international control of atomic bombs pursued from time to time different long-range objectives. At no time did we make any progress towards any of these long-range objectives. ~~One of the reasons for this failure consisted~~

The reason that ~~we~~<sup>such</sup> failures were so consistent because we always pursued in each negotiation a dual objective. On the one hand <sup>we</sup> we wanted to make progress towards the long-term objective.

On the other hand we wanted to gain a short-term advantage or to retain a short-term advantage that we possessed. This was so in the first of these negotiations which revolved around the Baruch Plan. And this is so <sup>in</sup> of the negotiations that are conducted at present in London. Let us first of all examine what mutual <sup>aerial</sup> areas of inspection would accomplish in fact and what it would not, assuming that Russia were willing to accede to our demands. As I said, such mutual <sup>aerial</sup> area inspection --at least as long as it is maintained and, as we shall see this is an important qualification--could give our strategic airforce a one-to three day warning of an impending large-scale attack. This is very important and if we could be sure that a surprise attack is not possible ~~we could accomplish considerable saving in our~~ <sup>test</sup> ~~stragic arms~~ our strategic airforce could get by with a much smaller expenditure than it will otherwise. But if you look at this issue not from a narrow technical point of view but rather from a somewhat broader point of view we must ~~xxx~~ say that the greatest danger with which we are faced in the next fifteen years is in our <sup>small-out-</sup> ~~our~~ <sup>atomic</sup> ~~atomic~~ war.



At first <sup>that such</sup> a war might start with ~~an-all-out-atomic-attack~~ ~~against-our-cities~~ a sudden atomic attack by the Russian strategic airforce against our cities is conceivable but hardly likely. The ~~xx~~ real danger which we are facing at present is rather different. A war might start in a remote area of the world between two smaller nations which are not under

In the absence

full control of either Russia or America. In that sense  
of the political settlement between America and Russia it  
it may easily happen that America and Russia will intervene  
militarily on the opposite sides. If they fight such a local  
war by using atomic bombs in combat in the tactical area  
what starts out as a local war might easily end up as an  
all-out atomic war. So we have to fear Russian a surprise  
attack ~~of~~ by the Russian strategic airforce against our cities  
surely far more than peacetime must we fear such  
an attack if Russia and America are entangled into a war  
in some remote area of the world and are ~~entangled-is-entangled~~  
in the only desire to keep that war limited. We must therefore  
ask if we really want to appraise the value of a mutual  
~~area~~ <sup>aerial</sup> survey for which we are ~~not~~ <sup>now</sup> so pressing, just how  
likely is it ~~xxx~~ that if Russia and America fight in a war  
on the opposite sides they will be able and willing to maintain  
the mutual ~~area~~ <sup>aerial</sup> inspection of each others' territory throughout  
~~xxxxx~~ such a war. Of course it would be only reasonable ~~to~~  
that they should maintain this survey just when the danger  
of a surprise attack is greatest. But what I am asking is:  
How likely are they to be reasonable when they are fighting  
a war on the opposite sides? Having thus raised the issue  
of the extent to which mutual ~~area~~ <sup>aerial</sup> survey might offer us  
protection against a surprise attack during a military entangle-  
ment we may <sup>now</sup> ask just what advantages does our offer present

When Russia  
we may  
desire

to Russia even if we hopefully assume the <sup>aerial</sup> ~~area~~ survey will  
 in  
 cover all the ~~relevant~~ territories/which ~~are-under-the-control~~  
 of Russia, America and their allies ~~might-conceivably~~ maintain  
 air bases or might conceivably maintain air bases.

Just what reason has Russia to fear in peacetime a sudden,  
 massive attack by the strategic airforce of America ~~against~~  
 her cities. I am acquainted with a large number of Americans  
 but I ~~knew~~ <sup>wor</sup> don't know anyone among them who would such a  
<sup>wanted</sup> attack by America against the cities of Russia consider  
 conceivable. I believe that the Russians <sup>[who are]</sup> usually are quite  
 well aware of the realities of the situation do not think  
 that we offer them much when we offer them security against  
 a surprise attack in peacetime. What makes matters worse  
 is ~~xxx~~ that/our proposal <sup>by expecting accepty</sup> --if-it-were-accepted-by-Russia--  
 Russia would lose an important advantage which she now has  
 over us. ~~We~~ <sup>W</sup> can destroy Russia with ~~xxxxx~~ such missiles if  
 we know the location of the major targets in Russia with  
 sufficient accuracy. It is, I believe, quite obvious that  
 we do not know the location of Russian targets with sufficient  
 accuracy to use ~~in-the~~ intercontinental ballistic missiles  
 against them. It is equally obvious that <sup>the</sup> Russians are at an  
 advantage in this respect at present. <sup>1</sup> They would be ~~be~~ willing  
 to forego this advantage if we offer them something in return.  
 But what do we offer them in return? <sup>or to be more</sup>  
<sup>precise,</sup> if we do offer them something in return is it  
 enough? The answer to this depends on what emphasis the Russian  
 government may place on approaching long-term desirable objectives  
 or retaining temporary advantages.

Because I believe that ~~accepting~~<sup>erial</sup> mutual inspections covering essentially the whole world, would be an unprecedented measure that would break the ice and would make it much easier to take other unprecedented measures that may really make sense I fervently hope that the Russians will go along with the basic idea of President Eisenhower's proposal of mutual ~~area~~<sup>erial</sup> surveys. We can expect them to do so, however, only if we believe that the world will show far more wisdom than the government of the United States has shown in the past 12 years in its international negotiations and a much greater willingness to forego a temporary advantage than we have ever shown. Perhaps they will since after all miracles do happen. ~~But~~<sup>while</sup> ~~through~~ we may be free to hope for miracles we certainly have no right to expect them.

It is not without some hesitation that I have written this letter. I am speaking here in part about military matters and I am not a military expert. But of one thing I am sure: until the government begins discussing the issues in the terms in which I have discussed them in this letter the American public will remain confused. Such confusion may safeguard the government from suffering defeat in the propaganda war and it might even enable her to gain a victory in this war in case of such a breakdown (correction) insert: if there is a breakdown in the London negotiations.

In the past twelve years American government has won many victories in the propaganda war, on occasions where discussions of disarmament and control of atomic bombs broke down. I believe we had quite enough of victories

12

of this kind. Being popular cannot very well be the main aim of our major policies and moreover ~~we-might-be-more popular~~ if we were less concerned about being popular and more concerned about being right we might be more popular. In the past twelve years the government had won a propaganda victory repeatedly when negotiations on the control of atomic bombs broke down. I submit that *we have had enough* victories of this sort, <sup>and</sup> that the time has come when we must begin to make some progress towards desirable long-range objectives. This we cannot accomplish if we continue to pursue a dual purpose in our negotiations with more emphasis on short-term advantages than on progress towards long-term objectives.

August 26, 1957

Letter to the Editors  
New York Times  
Times Square  
New York City 36, N.Y.

Gentlemen:

Attached you will find a <sup>u</sup>letter to the Editors. <sup>//</sup>  
I should greatly appreciate your advising me whether you plan  
to print this letter, and if so, giving me the date of the  
issue in which the letter will appear, when the date is set.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

m  
Encl.

August 26, 1957

Letter to the New York Times

by Leo Szilard

The Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies  
The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois

I am writing these lines with some hesitation, for fear that what I am going to say may seem a criticism of our Department of State on matters of major policy. In fact, I disagree far less with the policies of the State Department on major issues currently, than I did at any previous time in the course of the last ten years.

Travel of Americans to China I do not regard as a problem of first importance. This then made it possible for me to read with mild amusement, rather than serious amazement, Governor Herter's letter, warning a group of young Americans, visiting Moscow, to stay out of China. Had I attended the Youth Festival and been under twenty-one years of age, I should probably have responded to this letter in exactly the same manner as did my young countrymen in Moscow.

But when the State Department recently announced that permission would be given to twenty-four American newspaper reporters to go to China for a period of six months, I was seriously amazed. Did the State Department really assume that the Chinese would give visas to these twenty-four men in the circumstances?

Because I do not regard myself as an expert in foreign relations, I consulted on this point one of the ablest of our younger men in our Political Science Department, Professor Morton A. Kaplan. I told him that I believed that no visas would be given to these men, and that I believed this simply on the ground that I, myself, should refuse these visas if I were in the shoes of the Chinese. Clearly, the simplest way of predicting what someone else will do, is first of all to ask ourselves what we would do in their place, and secondly to ask if there are any reasons why they should act differently from the way we would.

Dr. Kaplan thought that the visas would be issued because this would be in the enlightened self-interest of the Chinese. I wonder whether the State Department also believed this, and if they did, why they believed it. Since when has enlightened self-interest been more than just one of the factors -- and rarely an important one -- to account for governmental behavior? Is the attitude which we are taking towards China determined by our enlightened self-interest? Are we justified to expect that the policies of foreign governments are invariably more cunningly devised and guided by more wisdom than are our own?

But perhaps it is not too late, and the State Department can still retain control over visits of Americans to China. Clearly, if the Chinese are going to refuse visas to all Americans whose passports are validated for travel in China, then the Department can still retrieve the situation. All they have then to do is to validate for travel in China every passport they issue, with the exception of those issued to newspaper reporters whom they would like to go there. Their passports must continue to carry the stamp: "This passport is not valid for travel to those portions of China, under Communist control."

I cannot help wondering how much longer the governments of the Great Powers can afford to conduct their foreign policies on this pre-atomic level.

4/28/58?

The Editor  
The New York Times  
Times Square  
New York 36, New York

Sir:

The public discussion of whether or not we should continue bomb tests has been confusing to the public and it will remain confusing as long as those who oppose the tests as well as those who favor them fail to state the real reasons for so doing. Let me, therefore, try to set straight - as well as I can - the real reasons behind the argument which may be involved. Russia and America might be able to agree in the foreseeable future on stopping bomb tests, and when both of them have bombs stockpiled to destroy each other - if need be - to any desired degree, they might perhaps agree to stop manufacturing further bombs. But will they be able to agree to get rid of the stockpiles themselves?

Clearly, if reaching disarmament at an early date is a solution of the problem the bomb poses to the world - and it is by no means sure that it is - then nothing short of getting rid of the bomb and eliminating the means suitable for the delivery of the bombs may be regarded as an adequate measure.

Depending on whether one believes that this crucial step of getting rid of the bomb cannot be taken by both America and Russia at an early date, or whether one believes that it ~~cannot~~, one may come to opposite conclusions with respect to stopping bomb tests.

Those who believe the solution lies in getting rid of the bombs at an early date are inclined to urge the stopping of the bomb tests because they regard this as a first step in the right direction. I think in terms of a succession of steps that Russia and America may make in agreement with each other, and that lies on the straight path to general disarmament. Of these steps, the step of stopping tests

would be the easiest to take and once it is taken that there are no secret violations. This is a real reason for urging that America agree with Russia on the stopping of tests and in most cases they emphasize the fact that bomb tests may contaminate the atmosphere with radio active products for the sake of the political expediency of this argument rather than for its intrinsic merit. Most of those who urge America to continue the tests are mainly motivated by wanting to keep America ahead in the arms race. They stress the possibility that there might be a conflict centering around an area in the proximity of Russia, that they might be resolved to arms in such a conflict, and that America and Russia might militarily intervene on opposite sides. In such a situation, Russia would have overwhelming superiority in military units armed with conventional weapons. This superiority of Russia could highly be overcome if the United States has superiority in atomic weapons which could be used in such a war against troops in combat and perhaps up to a few hundred miles beyond the prewar boundary for the purpose of disrupting communication lines and destroying supply and air bases. I further believe that America might have superiority at present in small atomic bombs which are suitable for such use and that America might retain this superiority at least for many years to come if it continues to test and develop further small atomic weapons.

I, personally, have serious doubts regarding the validity of the premises upon which this kind of reasoning is implicitly based and I believe that both America and Russia want to continue the testing of bombs for entirely different reasons. At present there is a sort of stalemate between that of the striking forces of America and Russia which is essentially based on Russia and America both having available dirty hydrogen bombs of high power in adequate quantities and their ability to deliver, if need be, such bombs by means of jet bombers which operate from air bases inside of Russia, inside of America, as well as from any place maintained by America on foreign soil; because in the absence of political

sentiment between America and Russia, they would make reasonably sure that America and Russia would not intervene militarily on opposite sides in conflicts in which nations resolve to arms and also because of certain technological facts which characterize the present stage of the stalemate and introduce certain elements of instability into the stalemate. The present stage of the stalemate cannot be regarded as truly stable and it might lead to an all-out atomic war which neither Russia or America wants. In these circumstances, the presence of dirty hydrogen bombs of high power represents a serious danger, not only to America and Russia but to the whole world. Clearly, if we cannot get rid of the bomb, we must live with the bomb, and thus the solution of the problem that the bomb poses to the world can lie only in making the stalemate truly stable. In such a stalemate, the controversial issues which arose between Russia and America after the war may quickly lose their importance and become negotiable. In such a stalemate Russia and America find themselves in the same predicament. It is of overwhelming importance to both of them that the stalemate which they cannot escape be made stable. It is my intention that this can be accomplished if America and Russia cooperate to this end and that it can be accomplished in no other way.

The existence of large quantities of dirty hydrogen bombs of high power leads to the temptation of attempting to stabilize a stalemate on the basis of a threat of murder and suicide. But such threats because they are not sufficiently believable introduce an element of instability. For this reason it would be important for Russia as well as for America to be in a position to replace the dirty hydrogen bombs of high power with similar clean hydrogen bombs.

The American Government has announced that it can now make hydrogen bombs which are 96% clean, and it would, therefore, appear unnecessary to continue bomb tests for the sake of increasing the degree of cleanliness of such bombs any further. The Government, however, did not say that it can now make clean hydrogen bombs of high power which are sufficiently compact and light to be carried

by solid fuel long-range rockets which are going to replace jet bombers in the foreseeable future. I, therefore, assume that it would be necessary to continue the tests in order to develop such clean bombs, and if this is indeed the case, America ought to continue the testing of bombs for this purpose.

Russia and America must halt - by agreement - the arms race at some point, but this does not mean that they need to freeze the present stage - presumably the worst possible stage - of the stalemate. Those who like I believe that if we cannot turn the clock backward, we must advance it - as fast as we can - and who are, therefore, inclined to urge that both we and Russia replace the dirty bombs by clean ones and the jet bombers with their vulnerable air bases by solid fuel long-range rockets which could be launched from invulnerable bases would be guilty of an inconsistency unless we were also to demand that if we continue the testing of hydrogen bombs of high power for the purpose of developing the bomb which is compact and light enough to be carried by such long range rockets we make available to Russia such information as she might need in order to replace her dirty hydrogen bombs with clean ones.



in which the United States <sup>is at present involved here</sup> might be superior and <sup>(at least)</sup> might remain superior for a number of years to come.

I, personally, have serious doubts regarding the validity of the premises upon which this argument is based and, for this reason, <sup>I do not share the view that it</sup> I do not feel strongly one way or the other <sup>would be important to</sup> concerning the continuation of tests of small bombs. <sup>(the testing of)</sup> ~~But what~~ <sup>would</sup> ~~But~~ <sup>I believe it might be</sup> ~~about testing hydrogen bombs of high power for the purpose~~ <sup>continue</sup> ~~of developing a bomb which is reasonably "clean" and also~~ <sup>very important to continue now</sup> compact and light enough to be carried by long-range ballistic missiles. <sup>my reasons are as follows:</sup> Right now we have something of a stalemate between the atomic striking power of Russia and America in which either of these nations could destroy the other to almost any desired degree, and in which neither of them could, by striking one <sup>sudden</sup> certain blow, prevent the other from carrying out a crippling counter-blow. In the present <sup>phase</sup> ~~face~~ of the atomic strategic stalemate, the United States has to rely mainly on the strategic air force operating from bases in the United States and from bases maintained by America on foreign soil. Such bases are vulnerable to a <sup>surprise</sup> ~~surprise~~ attack from the air. In the present <sup>phase</sup> ~~face~~ of the stalemate, we might have an all-out atomic war ~~with~~ which neither Russia nor America wants, <sup>and a war</sup> and which might arise more or less accidentally, or from a serious error in judgement. <sup>It is</sup> ~~Even more~~ <sup>But</sup> likely, that <sup>It might also</sup> ~~such an all-out atomic war might arise~~ if there <sup>is</sup> ~~were~~ to be a conflict, <sup>perhaps</sup> in some remote area, in which America and Russia <sup>and</sup> ~~militarily~~ intervene on opposite sides, <sup>and</sup> resort to the use of atomic weapons, <sup>with the result that the war that started as a</sup> ~~with the result that the war that started as a~~ <sup>local war might end as an all-out atomic war that neither side</sup> ~~local war might end as an all-out atomic war that neither side~~ <sup>had wanted.</sup> ~~had wanted.~~ <sup>The situation that are assumed get out of control</sup>

It may be assumed that at present both Russia and America <sup>is an state all out atomic war</sup>

*any sort and light enough to be carried by long range rockets*  
~~of type which they~~

*both* are stockpiling ~~xxxxx~~ "dirty" hydrogen bombs of high power which ~~may be produced in quantity and which could be carried by long-range ballistic missiles.~~ *necessary* In case of war, these ~~stockpiles~~ *handls*

represent a danger, not only to America and Russia, but to the whole world. From this point of view it would be important that both Russia and America be in the position of replacing the "dirty" hydrogen bombs of high power, which they are stockpiling,

with "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power. I have no reason to believe that they ~~are~~ *would be* in a position to do so ~~at present.~~ *if they do not continue* It ~~to develop to carry~~ *The development of such bombs* has been officially announced that America now knows how to make hydrogen bombs of high power that are 96% ~~pure~~ *clean* and, ~~in these~~

~~circumstances~~ there would not be much point in continuing the development of the "clean" bombs ~~for the purpose of increasing~~ *for the purpose of going* ~~their purity.~~ *the degree of cleanness above 96%* The official announcement, however, has not stated that America now knows how to make ~~pure~~ *clean* hydrogen bombs of high power of a type that could be produced in adequate quantities and that would be compact and light enough to be carried by solid fuel long-range rockets, nor is there any evidence that Russia knows how to make such bombs. *I am therefore inclined to believe that the* ~~I am inclined to believe that the~~ importance of exchanging the "dirty"/bombs for "clean" hydrogen bombs which under the assumption stated above would require the

continuation of bomb tests ~~conceivably bomb tests limited to this purpose alone~~ and I am inclined to believe that the advantage of being able to ~~rid the world of~~ *annant from* "dirty" hydrogen bombs of high power far outweighs the disadvantage of continuing ~~the tests for this purpose.~~ *What is important at this*

~~It is regrettable that unnecessary~~ *secretary* ~~secretary makes it difficult for the intelligent citizen to be~~ *rather than to the extent they increase their*

~~secretary makes it difficult for the intelligent citizen to be~~ *rather than to the extent they increase their*

~~secretary makes it difficult for the intelligent citizen to be~~ *rather than to the extent they increase their*

~~secretary makes it difficult for the intelligent citizen to be~~ *rather than to the extent they increase their*

*the*  
*clean*  
*the point*  
*needed.*  
*for the purpose of going*  
*the degree of cleanness above 96%*  
*I am therefore inclined to believe that the*  
*to believe that both are of R*  
*to clean*  
*in order*  
*to help*  
*the point*  
*where they*  
*conclude*

~~sufficiently sure of the assumptions that I have made above to be able to take a really strong political stand in favour of the continued testing of bombs for the purpose here discussed.~~

There are only two satisfactory solutions to the problem which the bomb poses for the world. Either we must get rid of the bomb, or else ~~xxxxxxx~~ - acting in concert with Russia - we must ~~do all that is necessary~~ <sup>find a way</sup> in order to render the stalemate between the atomic striking forces of Russia and America truly stable. ~~At this time no-one can say with any degree of assurance that Russia and America xxxxxxx will be able to agree to rid the world of the bomb. Because of this uncertainty it is now imperative to give our attention to the problem of how the stalemate may be rendered stable.~~ Obviously both Russia and America are, in this respect, in the same predicament. <sup>xxxx</sup> Such conflicts between America and Russia, which might retain some relevance in the atomic stalemate, are insignificant in comparison to the common interests which Russia and America have in making the stalemate stable. Apart from arriving at political settlements which will reduce the chances that Russia and America may militarily intervene on opposite sides in the case that there is a resort to arms leading to a local war, certain technological ~~aspects~~ <sup>aspects</sup> of the atomic stalemate may importantly affect the stability of the stalemate. The character of the stalemate is rapidly shifting and within the foreseeable future the stalemate may be based, not on the strategic air forces of Russia and America, but on solid fuel ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ long-range rockets which could be launched from dispersed bases inside America and inside Russia. Such bases could be made invulnerable to surprise attack ~~and~~ <sup>could then</sup> ~~then it would be possible for~~ America to abandon its present policy

based on the need of an instant counter-blow, and by abandoning this policy, eliminate an element which tends to render the present face of the stalemate inherently unstable. *I* believe that in the stage of the stalemate which may be based on solid fuel, <sup>comparable as carrying death loads off high power</sup> long-range rockets-towards which both we and Russia are rapidly moving, - it might be possible for either Russia or America to ~~adopt certain policies~~ <sup>shatter lose the stalemate</sup> by unilaterally proclaiming certain restraints, which they may impose upon themselves, concerning the potential use of <sup>such</sup> powerful hydrogen bombs in certain hypothetical eventualities. ~~to render the stalemate stable, because~~ <sup>restraints</sup> once such a ~~policy~~ <sup>restraint</sup> has been proclaimed by one nation - it would be in the interests of all other nations to <sup>adopt</sup> develop the same <sup>restraints</sup> policies. ~~This is true, however, only if both America and Russia have stockpiles of "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power. If they have no such bombs available and have adequate quantities of only of "dirty" hydrogen bombs of high power, they may have to resort in certain contingencies to the threat of using these "dirty" bombs against each other. Since the other can retaliate in kind, this threat amounts to a threat of murder and suicide. Because it is difficult to believe that any of the major powers would actually resort to murder and suicide, such a threat is difficult to take seriously, whether or not it is meant seriously. Because of such legitimate doubts, the threat of murder and suicide cannot form the basis of a stable stalemate. Space does not permit me to discuss why the situation might be much more favorable, from the point of view of the stabilizing of the stalemate, if both America and Russia have "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power at their disposal. I should add, however, that those who, like I, are willing to support the continuation of bomb tests on the basis of~~

the point of view here described, would be guilty of an inconsistency unless they were to go one step further and also demand that, if we continue the testing of hydrogen bombs of high power - as we presumably ought to - we should currently supply Russia with such information that she may need in order to replace her "dirty" hydrogen bombs of high power with "clean" bombs of high power.

Richard M. Bissel }  
And Meyer }  
D. W. Wambrun }  
Robert Amery }

supply Russia with such information that she may need in order  
to replace her "dirty" hydrogen bombs of high power with "clean"  
bombs of high power.

321

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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THE ENRICO FERMI INSTITUTE  
FOR NUCLEAR STUDIES

(1100)

New York 23, 1959.

The Editor  
New York Times  
New York, N.Y.

Sir:

All those who understand the real issue that is involved, may be expected to applaud the decision taken this week by Yale and Harvard Universities, as well as Oberlin College, to renounce the use of the Federal Student Loan Fund, which makes the granting of a loan to <sup>a</sup>the student dependent on the student's signing a loyalty affidavit. Personally I propose to join in this applause.

Having duly applauded, however, I feel impelled to say the following:

The New York Times reported on November 20th that John F. Morse, administrator of the Federal Student Loan Fund, has expressed concern that other colleges might similarly withdraw from the program and said:

"Wealthy institutions may well provide these benefits from other sources, but there are a number of institutions which, if they were to take the stand Harvard, Yale and others have taken, would literally force students out of college."

It seems to me that the less wealthy institutions could make up for what they lack in wealth by displaying a little resourcefulness and thus they may have their cake and eat it too.

Let us suppose that a college has available from the Federal Student Loan Fund a sum of \$100,000 a year. We almost certainly overestimate the number of students, who may be ineligible for such a loan because of the loyalty affidavit required, if we assume they amount to 10 % of the students in need of a loan. Thus, the Board of Trustees of the college could remedy the situation simply by setting up a Private Student Loan Fund in the amount, say, of \$15,000 per year and by specifying that the only students eligible are those who are barred from a federal loan because of the requirement of a loyalty affidavit.

# STUDENT LOAN AID HELD ENDANGERED

Needy Will Suffer if More  
Schools Quit Plan Because  
of Oath, Official Says

WASHINGTON, Nov. 19 (UPI)—The administrator of the Federal student-loan fund said tonight that needy students would suffer if more colleges dropped out of the program because of the loyalty-oath requirement.

John F. Morse, the administrator, said this could lead to the "destruction of a magnificent program."

He voiced sympathy with reasons given by some institutions for withdrawing. However, he said, he wished they had "seen fit to stay in the program to work through channels our Government provides for the amendment of objectionable legislation."

"This act was passed for the benefit of needy students," Mr. Morse said, "not for the benefit of institutions."

"Wealthy institutions may well provide these benefits from other sources, but there are a number of institutions which, if they were to take the stand Harvard, Yale and others have taken, would literally force students out of college."

A bill to repeal the oath requirement, which has drawn objections from many college officials, was brought up in the Senate this year. It failed to pass.

## Glennan Joins Protest

Support for a repeal move came from T. Keith Glennan, director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He said he was not opposed to the oath, but felt it should not be a condition for obtaining a loan.

The Office of Education reported that twelve colleges and universities had pulled out of the program because of the loyalty affidavit. Three—Bryn Mawr, Haverford and Swarthmore—refused from the outset to join because of it.

The general antipathy toward the oath was marked this week when Yale and Harvard Universities and Oberlin College withdrew.

Others that dropped out this year are Amherst, Antioch, Bennington, Goucher, Grinnell, Reed, Sarah Lawrence, St. John's of Maryland and Wilmington of Ohio.

The loan fund was set up under the National Defense Act of 1958 to spur education to meet the Russian challenge in the space age. It provides that a student applicant must swear that he does not believe in, support or belong to any organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the Government by force.

The office said that 1,370 institutions were participating in the program, representing 2,170,000 students.

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
What I am proposing here might seem eminently reasonable, yet our colleges or universities are hardly going to embrace any such proposal; for while the course of action taken by Harvard, Yale and Oberlin is eminently dignified, the course of action outlined above would not qualify even as "respectable".

In public life in general, and in academic circles in particular, the supreme need today is "the need to appear respectable", and this may well represent ~~today~~ a far greater impediment than legal requirements involving loyalty affidavits. The stifling effect of the "need to appear respectable" is manifestly great, but the mechanism through which it operates, is only dimly understood.

In order to be respectable a man must be predictable. Anyone is free to think whatever he wants to think. But a man who thinks, and also draws practical consequences from the conclusions to which he is led by his thinking, is not predictable. This might perhaps be the reason why those who are suspected of thinking can not hope fully to qualify as respectable. Also a man who takes a strong stand on some major controversial issue may become too predictable, and by becoming a controversial figure cease to qualify as respectable.

All major issues of our times, <sup>all the issues that</sup> ~~that~~ really matter, are of necessity controversial issues. The American scene being a noisy one, no sweet Voice of Reason has a chance to be heard above the general din. If an issue is important enough to fight for, one can, of course, always start a fight, and if there is <sup>there</sup> ~~a fight going on~~ <sup>then</sup> ~~the American~~ <sup>Public</sup> will sit up and listen. But he who gets involved in a fight will cease to be regarded as respectable.

I am not certain that my diagnosis is correct and I certainly have no remedy to offer but I am reasonably certain that "the need to be respectable" has something to do with the almost total failure of our universities to exert intellectual leadership with respect to the major issues of our times.



Leo Szilard

*How*  
April 8, 1960

Whether in the so-called atomic stalemate America and Russia may succeed in avoiding the war which neither of them want, will depend on a number of factors which are involved. It seems certain, however, that the stability of the stalemate would be enhanced if the great powers were to reach an understanding on the necessity of freezing the map for an extended period of time. It might be somewhat difficult to freeze the map as it stands at present, because it includes a number of arbitrary arrangements which were meant to be temporary, and perhaps it would be easier to freeze the map after certain readjustments have been made.

Those readjustments which may at present be negotiable are of necessity rather modest ones, but they might represent a first step in the right direction. Let us take the Berlin issue, for instance. Russia once proposed ~~as the first step towards uniting Germany~~ that there be established a loose federation between the West German State and the East German State. I suppose this would mean the setting up of a federal Council with an equal number of delegates from West Germany and East Germany. Presumably, the delegates from East Germany would represent the Government of the East German State, whereas the delegates from the West German State might either represent the Government of the West German State, or else they might be elected, by the Bundestag perhaps, or directly by the citizens of West Germany. Presumably, the ground rules of the Council would provide that it could take action only with the concurrence of 75% of the delegates. This rule would ensure that action taken by the Council had the support of the majority of the delegates of both the West German State and the East German State.

There are enough issues on which the interests of West Germany and East Germany

coincide to keep such a federal Council busy and effective for many years to come - in spite of the severe restrictions imposed by the ground rules.

We may assume that, if such a loose federation between the two German States were established, there would be no bar to the migration of Germans within the federation. In order to keep migration to West Germany within tolerable limits, the Government of East Germany would have to eliminate ~~some of~~ those restrictions which have in the past caused their people to flee to West Germany. Even so, there would probably be some migration to West Germany, at least initially, because the standard of living there is higher. In the case of a major economic recession in West Germany, however, migration would probably be reversed.

If ~~we are to~~ accept the thesis - as I believe we should - that, at some future time, such a federal Council may be set up as a first step towards unifying Germany, then it would appear reasonable to propose that we resolve the current Berlin crisis along the following lines.

Let East Germany shift its capital from East Berlin to Dresden, and West Germany shift its capital from Bonn to Munich. Let us then set up East Berlin and West Berlin, each as a free city with a government of its own and, in addition, establish a Council of Berlin, in which half of the delegates would represent East Berlin and the other half, West Berlin.

If such an arrangement were adopted, we would have made a constructive use of the current Berlin crisis, because the arrangement would enable us to

find out how this type of federation would actually work, and Berlin might set the pattern for a subsequent federation of the East German State and the West German State.

About two years ago, I spent several months in West Berlin. There was no telephone communication between East Berlin and West Berlin at that time. People could freely cross over from one half of the city to the other, but taxicabs could not cross the dividing line. There was good theatre both in East Berlin and West Berlin, and people crossed the line in order to go to the theatre. It was very difficult, however, to find out in West Berlin what was playing in the theatres of East Berlin, because the West Berlin papers did not carry this information and there were no posters on display. I imagine the situation in East Berlin was quite similar.

Once the two Berlins cease to be pawns in the cold war, Berlin could again become a great cultural centre; its theatres and concert halls might once more attract visitors from all over the world, as they did for a short time between the two world wars. The Council of the two free cities, even though they could take action only with the concurrence of 75% of the delegates, should be able to adopt a number of non-political measures which would enhance the welfare of the people of Berlin and would make both East Berlin and West Berlin a far more attractive place to live than they are today.

If the current Berlin crisis were resolved along these lines, then when Germany is ultimately united, it might end up having Munich as its capital

4.

rather than Berlin. This might be just as well, however, for the thought of Berlin as capital of Germany is something of a nightmare to those who find it difficult to forget the past.

Leo Szilard  
The Enrico Fermi Institute  
for Nuclear Studies  
The University of Chicago  
Chicago 37, Illinois

23-E

PINTO PINTO

### Plan for Germany

#### Federal Council of the East-West Delegates Is Proposed

*The writer of the following letter is the renowned physicist, now Professor at the University of Chicago in the Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies.*

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES: Whether in the so-called atomic stalemate America and Russia may succeed in avoiding the war which neither wants will depend on a number of factors ~~which are involved.~~

It seems certain, however, that the stability of the stalemate would be enhanced if the great powers were to reach an understanding on the necessity of freezing the map for an extended period of time. It might be somewhat difficult to freeze the map as it stands at present, because it includes a number of arbitrary arrangements which were meant to be temporary. Perhaps it would be easier to freeze the map after certain readjustments have been made.

~~Those readjustments, which may at present be negotiable, are of necessity rather modest ones, but they might represent a first step in the right direction.~~ Let us take the Berlin issue, for instance. Russia once proposed that there be established a loose federation between the West German state and the East German state.

#### Delegates of East and West

I suppose this would mean the setting up of a federal council with an equal number of delegates from West Germany and East Germany. Presumably, the delegates from East Germany would represent the Government of the East German state, whereas the delegates from the West German state might either represent the Government of the West German state, or else they might be elected, by the Bundestag perhaps, or directly by the citizens of West Germany. Presumably, the ground rules of the council would provide that it could take action only with the concurrence of 75 per cent of the delegates.

This rule would insure that action taken by the council had the support of the majority of the delegates of both the West German state and the East German state.

There are enough issues on which the interests of West Germany and East Germany coincide to keep such a federal council busy and effective for many years to come—in spite of the severe restrictions imposed by the ground rules.

We may assume that if such a loose federation between the two German states were established, there would be no bar to the migration of Germans within the federation. In order to avoid migration

24-E

PINTO PINTO

If such an arrangement were adopted, we would have made a constructive use of the current Berlin crisis, because the arrangement would enable us to find out how this type of federation would actually work. Berlin might set the pattern for a subsequent federation of the East German state and the West German state.

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Once the two Berlins cease to be pawns in the cold war, Berlin could again become a great cultural center; its theatres and concert halls might once more attract visitors from all over the world, as they did for a short time between the two world wars.

The council of the two free cities, even though they could take action only with the concurrence of 75 per cent of the delegates, should be able to adopt a number of nonpolitical measures which would enhance the welfare of the people of Berlin and would make both East Berlin and West Berlin a far more attractive place to live than they are today.

If the current Berlin crisis were resolved along these lines, then when Germany is ultimately united it might end up having Munich as its capital rather than Berlin. This might be just as well, however, for the thought of Berlin as capital of Germany is something of a nightmare to those who find it difficult to forget the past. LEO SZILARD.

New York, April 8, 1960.

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If we accept the thesis—as I believe we should—that at some future time such a federal council may be set up as a first step toward unifying Germany, then it would appear reasonable to propose that we resolve the current Berlin crisis along the following lines:

#### Shift of Capitals

Let East Germany shift its capital from East Berlin to Dresden, and West Germany shift its capital from Bonn to Munich. Let us then set up East Berlin and West Berlin, each as a free city with a government of its own and, in addition, establish a Council of Berlin, in which half of the delegates would represent East Berlin and the other half West Berlin.

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LEO SZILARD.

New York, April 8, 1960.

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IN THIS FILE

### Plan for Germany

#### Federal Council of Delegates From East and West Proposed

*The writer of the following letter is the renowned physicist, now Professor at the University of Chicago in the Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies.*

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

Whether in the so-called atomic stalemate America and Russia may succeed in avoiding the war which neither wants will depend on a number of factors.

It seems certain, however, that the stability of the stalemate would be enhanced if the great powers were to reach an understanding on the necessity of freezing the map for an extended period of time. It might be somewhat difficult to freeze the map as it stands at present, because it includes a number of arbitrary arrangements which were meant to be temporary. Perhaps it would be easier to freeze the map after certain readjustments have been made. Let us take the Berlin issue, for instance. Russia once proposed that there be established a loose federation between the West German state and the East German state.

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The New York Times,  
Editorial Offices,  
"Letters to the Editor",  
229 West 43rd. Street,  
New York, N.Y.

May 6th, 1960.

Gentlemen:

Attached is a communication submitted to you as a "letter to the Editor". Its length appears to be 865 words. I should appreciate your printing it if it can be printed unchanged and in full length.

I should be very grateful if you would call me over the telephone at ext. 133 at Memorial Hospital, TRafalgar 9 - 3000, any time between 8 a.m. and 10 p.m. and let me know whether you are able to print this communication in the near future.

Yours very truly,

Leo Szilard.

Enclosure:

## Resents Spy Plane Lie

To the N. Y. Herald Tribune:

Indignation, such as I have rarely experienced before, impels me to write this letter.

It has been common knowledge for some time that we possess fast planes which could overfly Russia and would have a good chance of escaping without being shot down. By taking aerial photographs such planes could supply us with information about the location of military and industrial installations which we could not otherwise easily obtain.

The location of our own military and industrial installations are, of course, not secret. Therefore, I could well understand the point of view of those Air Force officers who advocated that we should map Russia by means of such high-flying planes—pending the orbiting of satellites which could do the job and do it better. If one may take photographs from a satellite why not also from a plane flying ten miles above the ground? Just how high above the ground does the sovereignty of a nation end? Perhaps it should not be regarded as illegal for an unarmed plane to cross a foreign country at a great height, while it should certainly be permissible to shoot it down.

To me it seemed that political considerations are more important in this case than either legal or military considerations and several years ago, when the issue first came up in private conversations, I pleaded the need of taking them fully into account.

Knowing the persistent tendency of Washington to give more weight to military than to political considerations I have, lately, assumed that such aerial surveys of Russia are being carried out perhaps as a standard operational practice.

Sunday's papers revealed that the plane which was shot down by Russia a few days ago was deep inside of Russia taking aerial photographs. When the Russians first announced that they had shot down an American plane, our government—instead of either "conceding" or keeping silent—countered with an elaborate lie. The government said that the plane was on a flight for the National Aeronautical and Space Agency gathering weather data; that presumably the pilot who had reported trouble with his oxygen supply blacked out and the plane crossed the Russian frontier under the guidance of the automatic pilot. A list of the equipment carried by the plane was published; it did not include photographic cameras. It was further stated that all other planes of the same type have been grounded in order to have their oxygen supply equipment checked.

Even though I had imagined that such planes are used for photographic reconnaissance flights over Russia I was taken in by this cock-and-bull story and I resent being lied to by my own government.

The statement released by the State Department today (Sunday) says that the flight was not authorized by Washington. I do not know whether this is



Dr. Szilard

a lie or whether this is the truth, but I do hope that it is a lie. For, if today an unarmed plane may make an unauthorized flight across Russia for the purpose of taking aerial photographs, then tomorrow perhaps a plane carrying an atomic bomb may make an unauthorized flight for the purpose of dropping its bomb on a Russian city.

The Atomic Energy Commission ruled that J. Robert Oppenheimer was not worthy of being a consultant to the government on the ground that many years ago he had knowingly said something that was not true to a government official. What about government officials who fabricate a "tissue of lies" on a politically important issue, calculated to mislead the people, the Congress and our allies?

It seems to me that those who share in the responsibility for the cock-and-bull stories released in connection with this plane incident ought to be asked to resign or ought to have the good sense of resigning if they are not asked to do so.

LEO SZILARD.

New York.

*(Dr. Szilard, nuclear physicist who helped develop the atomic bomb, is a professor at the Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies of the University of Chicago. This letter was written from his room in a New York hospital where he is seriously ill.)*

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IN THIS COLLECTION

May 30, 1961

Mr. Francis Brown  
Editor  
New York Times Book Review  
Editorial Offices  
New York Times  
New York City, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Brown:

I understand that you and Bill Epstein of the United Nations Secretariat had a conversation about my recently published book, "The Voice Of The Dolphins," which was published by Simon and Schuster (release date the end of April).

I take the liberty to enclose for your information a hard-cover copy. The book is now also available in paper back which sells for \$1.00. The paper back is also published by Simon and Schuster.

Yours very sincerely

LEO SZILARD

# The New York Times Book Review

TIMES SQUARE, NEW YORK 36, N. Y.


May 31, 1961

Mr. Leo Szilard  
The Enrico Fermi Institute  
The University of Chicago  
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Mr. Szilard:

Thank you for your letter, and thank you also for sending me a copy of your book, THE VOICE OF THE DOLPHINS. I am afraid I am going to disappoint you when I tell you that I don't believe we can review it in the Times. The reason is wholly one of space. We are confronted regularly with far more books than we can possibly review. It is no consolation to an author, I know, to be told that we can cover only approximately one-third of the books that come into the house, but that is the situation. I wish it were otherwise.

Sincerely,



Francis Brown  
Editor

js

June 6, 1960

The New York Times  
Editorial Offices  
Letters to the Editor  
229 West 43rd Street  
New York, New York

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is a communication sent to you for publication as a Letter to the Editor. I should greatly appreciate your advising me whether you would wish to print this letter promptly and without any change. Kindly call me over the telephone on Extension 133 at Memorial Hospital in New York, Trafalgar 9-3000, anytime between 8 a.m. and 10 p.m.

Yours very truly,

Leo Szilard

June 7, 1961

Mr. Francis Brown  
The New York Times  
Book Review  
Times Square  
New York 36, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Brown:

Many thanks for your very kind letter of May 31st. I regret that the Times may not be able to review my book.

Most of the first printing (2500 hard cover and 7500 paper back copies) was sold within a month of the publication date of April 30th. These sales were undoubtedly in part due to the Saturday Review which put my picture on the cover and had the lead ~~editorial~~ <sup>review</sup> about The Voice of The Dolphins. However the sales appear to be keeping up and seem to be accelerating for the time being. The book now goes into the second printing. It is being published also in England, France, Italy and Germany; the Germans are printing 50,000 paper back copies.

With best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

June 8th. 1960.

The New York Times,  
Editorial Offices,  
"Letters to the Editor",  
229 West 43rd. St.  
New York, N.Y.

For the attention of Miss Huger

Dear Miss Huger,

Attached I am sending you a revised text of the letter which I sent you on Monday. As you see I have somewhat moderated the language but there is no change in substance.

Mr. Desmond called me over the telephone yesterday and said that the meaning of the passage which I quoted was obscured by the remarks that Premier Krushchev made at a press conference held in Moscow. I have re-read the ~~text~~ of the press conference and find that those remarks of Krushchev which were pertinent were not directed to the question which was addressed to him.

I have discussed this matter with several of my colleagues and there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that the Times made a serious mistake in reporting.

I shall call Mr. Desmond over the telephone this morning and explain to him my position.

Whether or not you print my letter is up to you. However, if the letter is printed it would seem to be wisest either to print it without an editorial comment or to concede that a mistake was made.

I think it would be a mistake to print my letter with an editorial comment that would further confuse the issue by trying to explain away a mistake. If this is done, then I would have to insist on replying to the editorial comment which I would much rather not do.

The New York Times.

June 8th. 1960.

Would you be kind enough to let me know the final decision in this matter by telephoning me at ext. 133 at Memorial Hospital, TRafalgar 9 -3000. Clearly, there would be no point in printing my letter later than Sunday next.

Yours sincerely,

Leo Szilard.

REVISED TEXT

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Last Sunday, June 5th, I said to a distinguished Russian visitor, that the latest Russian disarmament proposal could be regarded as nothing but a hoax since it stipulates that controls be subject to the veto. He said that this was not so and that I was badly informed. To keep fully informed, I said to him proudly, I read the New York Times, and I showed him the News of the Week in Review, from the Sunday edition.

There it says in the first column on the first page in black on white, that Russia has made certain concessions, "but along with that went.... a stipulation that disarmament controls be subject to the veto." Clearly, a disarmament agreement where measures of control are subject to the veto would not be worth the paper it was written on.

The Russian colleague questioned the veracity of this report and he produced the text of the Russian Note printed in full in the June 3rd. issue of the New York Times.

The text of the Note says, "Except in specially provided cases, decisions of the Control Council on questions of substance shall be taken by a two-third majority and decisions on questions of procedure by simple majority".

Whatever this may mean, it is not a stipulation that controls be subject to the veto and I had to concede that I was wrong and he was right. I tried to convince him that nothing more sinister was involved than a serious mistake in reporting, but I am not certain that I succeeded.

June 7th. 1960.

Leo Szilard.  
The Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies  
The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

# The New York Times.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 12, 1963.

Prof. Szilard

Could you please

come for a day  
or two to

this project  
& lead the  
discussion

on peace  
issues & strat-

egy - 24 of the  
brightest students

from around the  
world. We

could pick  
you up at

the airport,  
handle expenses

contribute \$100  
to the Council,

would love to  
have Mrs.

Szilard with  
us too. July

1st to August 9.

Sir Robert Watson-Watt  
is coming out, so are  
Soviet, Asian, African representatives with  
special competence, at various times. Harold.

## 'WORLD COLLEGE' WILL OPEN ON L.I.

Six-Week Session to Begin  
at Brookville on July 1  
as an Experiment

25 NATIONS ASSISTING

Dr. Taylor to Head Faculty  
in Program Sponsored by  
New York Quakers

By GENE CURRIVAN

An experimental World College with an international faculty and student body will open this summer on Long Island under the direction of Dr. Harold Taylor, former president of Sarah Lawrence College.

It will be opened for a six-week session in cooperation with 25 member countries of the United Nations and under the sponsorship of the Friends World College Committee, a group of New York Quakers.

The announcement was made yesterday by Dr. Taylor at his home, 241 West 12th Street. The experiment will be the first of its kind in this country and if it is successful may lead to a permanent year-round college, probably at the graduate level, Dr. Taylor said. The former college president will be the only American member of the faculty, although others may participate on a visiting basis.

### Study in Seminars

The students, one from each participating country including the United States, will study under seminar and tutorial methods. All were selected for their interest in world affairs, cultures and ideas.

Their instructors will be experts in such fields as disarmament, colonialism, world history, national cultures, anthropology, comparative religion, international communication and contemporary world literature.

The sessions will be conducted from July 1 to Aug. 12 at Harrow Hill, near Brookville, L. I., on the former estate of Mr. and Mrs. Henry Ittleson Jr. Mr. Ittleson, a financier, donated the 10-acre property to the Quaker committee two years ago.

The project will be financed with an initial grant of \$20,000 by the Quaker committee. Further support from private sources and foundations is being sought.

### Whitney Estate Considered

Mrs. Margaret Snyder, who represented the committee, said preliminary plans had been made for establishing a permanent world college, probably next year. A site being considered, she said, is the Cornelius Whitney estate at Old Westbury, L. I.

The countries expected to be represented in the experimental college are Japan, Malaya, Indonesia, India, Great Britain, France, Poland, Rumania, the United Arab Republic, Israel, Mexico, Colombia, Paraguay, Brazil, Canada and the United States.

A student from the Soviet Union has accepted tentatively but a Soviet philosopher who was invited to join the faculty has declined, Dr. Taylor said.

The only American student is Michael Neff of Rock Island, Ill., a political science senior at the University of California, Berkeley.

"The curriculum," Dr. Taylor said, "will be developed by the students and faculty together, with research topics and areas chosen in the field of world affairs, and individual studies and seminars designed to deal with the problem of developing a world order free from war."

NYT 6-12-60

# Russia's Arms Plan

## It Is Said to Make No Stipulation That Controls Be Subject to Veto

The writer of the following letter is the renowned physicist, now Professor at the University of Chicago's Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

On Sunday, June 5, I said to a distinguished Russian visitor that the latest Russian disarmament proposal could be regarded as nothing but a hoax, since it stipulates that controls be subject to the veto. He said that this was not so and that I was badly informed. To keep fully informed, I read the News of the Week in Review, from the June 5 edition. There it says, in the first column on the first page in black on white, that Russia has made certain concessions, "but along with that disarmament controls are subject to the veto." Clearly, a disarmament agreement where measures of control are subject to the veto would not be worth the paper it was written on.

The Russian colleague questioned the veracity of this report and he produced the text of the Russian note printed in full in the June 3 issue of The New York Times. "Except in specially provided cases, decisions of the Control Council on questions of substance shall be taken by a two-third majority and by simple majority."

Whatever this may mean, it is not a stipulation that controls be subject to the veto and I had to concede that I was wrong and he was right. I tried to convince him that nothing more sinister was involved than a serious mistake in reporting. I succeeded. LEO SZILARD.

[Dr. Szilard has raised in this letter a fundamental question as to whether the Russians intend or do not intend to insist upon the veto over disarmament controls. Dr. Szilard was asked to give The Times the name of the "distinguished Russian visitor," but he refused to do so. The statement in The Times that the Russians intended to use the veto was based on the inclusion in the note of the phrase "except in specially provided cases" and on an answer given by Premier Khrushchev in his press conference on June 3. On that occasion Mr. Khrushchev was asked: "Do you think that the right to veto should also exist at the setting up of the international control organization and the establishing of the international police forces?" He did not make a direct reply, but spoke in general terms about Russia's insistence on the veto provisions included in the U. N. Charter. In the light of these ambiguities, The Times is trying to ascertain exactly what the Russian position is.—Editor, The Times.]

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL IN THIS COLLECTION

21 Monroe Place  
Brooklyn 1, N.Y.  
June 12, 1960

Editor  
The New York Times  
New York 36, N.Y.

Dear Sir:

Your reply to Dr. Szilard's letter today was profoundly disquieting. The Times is "trying to ascertain what the Russian position is," but in the meantime it is content to tell the public that the Russian position is "that disarmament controls be subject to the veto." Furthermore, The Times insinuates it is sinister to disclose a discrepancy between its news story and source documents; see how Dr. Szilard will not identify the Communist who brought this to his attention. Joe McCarthy never employed this non sequitur with more telling effect against a person of so much integrity.

It is time The Times took stock. There is a creeping disintegration of its editorial page which is disheartening.

Very truly yours,

*Joseph P. Flemming*

CC Dr. Leo Szilard  
Memorial Hospital

Mr. Norman Cousins  
Saturday Review

Assumption Confusion Was Reached on Passage in Proposal Denied

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES: Ernest A. Gross, a distinguished lawyer, has accused me of something worse than a crime; he has accused me of fallacious reasoning. Since he leveled this accusation against me in a letter published in your issue of June 19, he left me no choice but to answer in public.

Mr. Gross quotes a message from the recent Russian proposal for disarmament which reads: "Except in specially provided cases, decisions of the Control Council on questions of substance shall be taken by a two-thirds majority and decisions on questions of procedure by simple majority." He discusses this admittedly obscure passage at length and concludes that if it were accepted as it stands it might—for all practical purposes—give Russia the right to veto.

I fully agree with Mr. Gross that if the passage quoted were accepted without clarification, and such further qualifications as may be called for, it might give Russia the right to veto.

Correcting Report

Mr. Gross states that several fallacies would be involved were one to draw from this passage the opposite conclusion, and he assumes that I have, in fact, drawn the opposite conclusion. I have done nothing of the sort.

My letter concerned itself solely with correcting a report on the Russian disarmament proposal contained in the News of the Week section of The Times of June 5. This report said that Russia has made certain concessions, "but along with that went \* \* \* a stipulation that disarmament controls be subject to the veto."

Clearly, if the above quoted passage of the Russian proposal is presented paraphrased in this manner, then there would seem to be no need for any further clarification, nor would there seem to be any possibility of attaching qualifications which might make the proposal acceptable. I have taken—and I do take—exception to this kind of reporting.

Perhaps I should add that on the disarmament discussions the reports of The New York Times in general, and those of A. M. Rosenthal from Geneva in particular, have been excellent. If I have to give my general reaction to these discussions in a nutshell, I should say that we are getting the wrong answers because we are asking the wrong questions.

LEO SZILARD,

Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies, University of Chicago. New York, June 20, 1960.

June 19, 1960

Letters to The Times

Soviet Arms Proposal

Russia's Voting Procedure, It Is Anticipated, Will Block Progress

The writer of the following letter served as Assistant Secretary of State and as United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES: In a letter published in your issue of June 12, Dr. Leo Szilard rebukes The Times for expressing the view that the latest Soviet disarmament proposal contains "a stipulation that disarmament controls be subject to the veto."

Although this shorthand comment was obviously not intended literally, the essence of the point made by The Times is correct and Dr. Szilard's rebuke, based upon his discussion with an unnamed Russian visitor, is unjustified.

In addition to his conversation with his visitor, Dr. Szilard rests his case on the basis of the following excerpt from the Soviet proposal: "Except in specially provided cases, decisions of the Control Council on questions of substance shall be taken by a two-thirds majority and decisions on questions of procedure by simple majority."

Dr. Szilard concludes that, in his words, "Whatever this may mean, it is not a stipulation that controls be subject to the veto."

Ascertaining Position

In a comment published immediately following the letter the editor of The Times properly points out that the quoted Soviet proposal is at best ambiguous and that it is of decisive importance to ascertain exactly what the Soviet position is. Dr. Szilard seems to concede this ambiguity by his use of the phrase "whatever this may mean."

Beyond this, however, there are at least three defects in Dr. Szilard's conclusion.

The first of these is the assumption that the Control Council would be so organized that the Soviet Government, or its colleagues, would not be in a position to defeat deci-

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ly, if the above quoted passage of the Russian proposal is paraphrased in this manner, there would seem to be no need for any further clarification, nor would there seem to be any possibility of attaching qualifications to the proposal. I have taken exception to this kind of remark. Perhaps I should add that on the most important discussions the reports in the New York Times in general, those of A. M. Rosenthal in particular, have been excellent. If I have to give my general opinion on these discussions in a nutshell, I should say that we are asking the wrong answers because we are asking the wrong questions.

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Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies, University of Chicago, New York, June 20, 1960.

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Beyond this, however, there are at least three defects in Dr. Szilard's conclusion.

The first of these is the assumption that the Control Council would be so organized that the Soviet Government, or its colleagues, would not be in a position to defeat decisions of "substance" by blocking a two-thirds majority. This assumption is highly questionable, particularly in the light of the Soviet insistence upon so-called parity in the disarmament field, by which the Soviets mean that half the membership of bodies dealing with disarmament should be Soviet nominees.

Dr. Szilard's second fallacy rests upon the fact that in the event of a deadlock in the Control Council the matter in dispute would, under the United Nations Charter, be referred to the Security Council, which for this purpose, is in effect the court of last resort. And in the Security Council, as everyone knows, the Soviet Government does not only have the veto but has abused it with license.

#### Distinction Between Questions

Finally, the history of the United Nations in practice shows how unwise and impractical is the effort to distinguish between "questions of substance" on the one hand and "questions of procedure" on the other.

For example, in the Security Council the Soviets have insisted that the appointment by the Council of a commission of inquiry is a matter of "substance" and hence subject to the veto. It can reasonably be anticipated that if the Soviet disarmament proposal were accepted, any "question of procedure" to which the Soviet Government attached importance would, in its eyes, become for that reason alone a "question of substance," hence subject to the two-thirds rule.

ERNEST A. GROSS,

New York, June 17, 1960.

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IN THIS COLLECTION

Letter to the Editor

Mr. Ernest A. Gross, a distinguished lawyer, has accused me of something worse than a crime; he has accused me of fallacious reasoning. Since he levelled this accusation against me in a letter published in your issue of Sunday, June 19th, he left me no choice but to answer in public.

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Clearly, if the above quoted passage of the Russian proposal is presented paraphrased in this manner, then there would seem to be no need for any further clarification, nor would there seem to be any possibility of attaching qualifications which might make the proposal acceptable. I have taken - and I do take - exception to this kind of reporting.

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and ~~the reports~~ of A.M. Rosenthal from Geneva in particular, have been excellent.  
If I have to give my general reaction to these discussions in a nutshell, I should  
say that we are getting the wrong answers because we are asking the wrong questions.

June 20th. 1960.

Leo Szilard,  
Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies,  
University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

June 20th. 1960.

The New York Times,  
Editorial Offices,  
Letters to the Editor,  
229 West 43rd Street,  
New York, N.Y.

Gentlemen:

Attached I am enclosing a communication. I should be grateful if you could print it in your "Letters to the Editor" column on Sunday, June 26th. I shall take the liberty of calling you over the telephone to find out whether you will, in fact, print this letter.

You can reach me over the telephone at ext. 133 at Memorial Hospital, TRafalgar 9 - 3000.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard.

Enclosure:

July 10, 1960.

The New York Times,  
Editorial Offices,  
"Letters to the Editor",  
229 West 43rd Street,  
New York, N.Y.

Gentlemen,

Enclosed is a text submitted to you for your  
"letters to the editor" column. If you wish to print  
this piece, would you be good enough to call me by  
telephone at extension 133 at Memorial Hospital in  
New York, TRafalgar 9-3000.

Yours very truly,

Leo Szilard

Enclosure

July 10, 1960.

The New York Herald Tribune,  
Editorial Offices,  
"Letters to the Editor",  
230 West 41st Street,  
New York, N.Y.

Gentlemen,

Enclosed is a text submitted to you for your  
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Enclosure

July 10, 1960.

The Washington Post,  
Editorial Offices,  
"Letters to the Editor",  
1515 L Street, N.W.,  
Washington D.C. 5.

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Enclosure

## LETTER TO THE EDITOR

### Proposes Federal Compensation for American Property Expropriated by Cuba

The Government's current responses to the expropriation of American investments in Cuba bring to mind a story, told me by a colleague in Germany many years ago: "When famine hit the Rhineland and the poor peasants were starving, the Bishop of Cologne, whose granaries were full, would not let them have any of his grain. Thereupon rats invaded the granaries of the Bishop, ate up all his grain and then went after the Bishop himself. The Bishop fled across the Rhine, but the rats followed him and he was devoured by them." To my colleague this seemed to be a story with a satisfying ending because the evil Bishop got the punishment he deserved; somehow it did not occur to him to consider the poor peasants whom the Bishop's violent death still left starving.

The expropriation of American investments in Cuba - without financial compensation - may have grave consequences, inasmuch as it may discourage the investment of American capital in other under-developed countries. There is little doubt that if America is bent on hurting Cuba economically, she may succeed in doing so, but this will not provide a remedy.

The Government has apparently decided to take away Cuba's sugar quota. It could now set up an agency to take over this quota, purchase sugar on the world market at the prevailing low prices, sell this sugar on the domestic market at the fixed high price, and utilize the price difference to provide ~~a fund~~ compensation <sup>for</sup> American investments, expropriated abroad. This would provide a remedy without putting a burden on the taxpayer. Is there any other remedy?

America cannot militarily intervene in Cuba without flagrantly violating the Charter of the United Nations. Clearly, there is no

compelling reason in this instance for doing so, particularly since, as a military ally, Cuba would represent to Russia a potential liability rather than a potential asset.

In his last speech Krushchev set up a bogey of American military intervention in Cuba and then proceeded to knock it down. It seems to me that the State Department, much harrassed these days, got rattled and ~~instead of advising the President to say nothing, it approved a statement which conveys the impression that the United States might regard the conclusion of a military alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union as a valid reason for resorting to arms against Cuba.~~ *conveys to* *find a valid political* *might not be ruled out, after all*  
I believe that many people in South America, or for that matter, many people in the United States, might find the President's reply more disturbing than Krushchev's speech.

*Re 71234*

Leo Szilard

Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies.  
The University of Chicago, Chicago.

July 10, 1960.

*American military intervention in Cuba might not be a bogey, after all.*

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Leo Szilard

Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies.  
The University of Chicago, Chicago.

July 10, 1960.

have greeted the Belgians in their efforts to safeguard the lives and

\* \* \* \*

## Stevenson Was Here

LOS ANGELES.

Neither Adlai Stevenson's poor showing nor the most unStevensonian display of synthetic hoopla here at the Democratic National Convention should obscure the significance of his aloof candidacy or his continuing potential as an active politician.

Behind the latest in history's long series of well-engineered gallery-packing jobs stood a man who stands for something. He is a steady contributor to political standards and intelligent discussion to a greater degree than one would gather from the pointed brush-off he received when the successful Senator Kennedy appeared briefly in the convention hall. The nominee thanked his colleagues including Senators Johnson and Symington, but not Stevenson, for making his nomination unanimous.

Mr. Stevenson could not, of course, be as noble a being as his idolators insist. An honest and even sympathetic review of his public conduct and comments on national policy would find him something less than the embodiment of prescience and correctness so often claimed for him. Here, after all, is a complex man (the term becoming fashionable for describing Kennedy, Nixon or any one else with a mental competence above the ward-nursing level) who demonstrates human frailties while critics accuse him of speaking above the heads of the human herd.

But after one makes allowances for a certain amount of ineptness, for indiscretions in talking with a French reporter, for shortcomings in administrative skills while Governor of Illinois, for a self-conscious struggle to be both a political man and a non-political elder statesman, he remains an unusually articulate partisan, certainly a responsible one. And he has an articulate and responsible following, despite the army of zealots and puppets screaming for him in convention hall the other night.

Such a man has a place in the Democratic party and valid credentials as a participant in affairs of state. Like Gov. Rockefeller in the Republican party he represents a loyal faction whose efforts should not be written off simply because they are often marked more by criticism than conformity. Strangely, the facade of a tumultuous demonstration following the Stevenson nomination illumined a serious man and the more serious side of the business of selecting a President of the United States.

of an early starting time.

What the change will mean to city folk who still cling to the ancient practice of a leisurely dinner, an unhurried journey to the theater and perhaps even a change of clothes remains to be seen. Perhaps they, too, will find the idea of having the curtain rung down an hour earlier than has been the custom an attractive one.

In any case, the 7:30 opening will be strictly experimental when it begins on Sept. 7, with only the Wednesday night shows affected. That still leaves the old 8:40 traditionalists holding the upper hand. But, as a famous character remarks in a famous play, "How long, O Lord, how long?"

## Letters to the Editor

### Hurting Cuba No Remedy

To the N. Y. Herald Tribune:

The Government's current responses to the expropriation of American investments in Cuba bring to mind a story, told me by a colleague in Germany many years ago: "When famine hit the Rhineland and the poor peasants were starving, the Bishop of Cologne, whose granaries were full, would not let them have any of his grain. Thereupon rats invaded the granaries of the Bishop, ate up all his grain and then went after the Bishop himself. The Bishop fled across the Rhine, but the rats followed him and he was devoured by them." To my colleague this seemed to be a story with a satisfying ending because the evil Bishop got the punishment he deserved; somehow it did not occur to him to consider the poor peasants whom the Bishop's violent death still left starving.

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America cannot militarily intervene in Cuba without flagrantly violating the Charter of the United Nations. Clearly, there is no compelling reason in this instance for doing so, particularly since, as a military ally, Cuba would represent to Russia a potential liability rather than a potential asset.

In his last speech Khrushchev set up a bogey of American military intervention in Cuba and then proceeded to knock it down. It seems to me that the State Department, much harassed these days, got rattled and approved a statement which managed to convey the impression that American military inter-

vention in Cuba might not be a bogey at all. I believe that many people in South America, for that matter many people in the United States, might find the President's reply more disturbing than Khrushchev's speech.

New York. LEO SZILARD.

*(Dr. Szilard, one of the men who built the A-bomb, is a professor at Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies, the University of Chicago.)*

### Isolate the Misfits

To the N. Y. Herald Tribune:

I noticed the recent hub-bub about the man who not so long ago was put on parole after serving seventeen years in prison and then, within a few weeks, committed two homicides.

If the parole commission knew this man's record as it has been presented in the newspapers, I have to wonder what is wrong.

Whether you want to call them criminals or irresponsibles, there are some people who should be to some extent deprived of their liberty. Some should be confined permanently under maximum security conditions. Others may in time earn a certain amount of liberty and not be compelled to stay in institutions.

It is easy to talk about institutions, which cost a lot to build. Appropriate confinement of the unfit fraction of the population would include a routine of living which would make these individuals self-sustaining and the costs of the institutions amortized. This would be a lot cheaper than maintaining expensive police and court facilities to deal with the type of person I am talking about.

I am the kind of psychiatrist whose training includes not only academic but practical experience in dealing with some of the anti-social misfits. I never swallowed much of what has originated in undemonstrated theories proposed by certain psychiatrists and psychologists whose knowledge of biology as a whole was minimum.

GEORGE H. HYSLOP, M.D.  
New York.

### Slogan for Pedestrians

To the N. Y. Herald Tribune:

May I suggest the following slogan for the Pedestrian League of America (the president of which wrote a letter recently concerning Tom O'Hara's article on the woes of pedestrians): "Walkers of the world unite; you have nothing to lose but your lives."

KATHRYN SUTHERLIN,  
New York.

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL IN THIS COLLECTION

Not published

July 18, 1960.

The New York Times,  
Editorial Offices,  
"Letters to the Editor",  
229 West 43rd Street,  
New York, N.Y.

Gentlemen:

Attached is a communication submitted to you as a "letter to the Editor". I should appreciate your printing it if it can be printed unchanged and in full length.

I should be very grateful if you would call me over the telephone at Ext. 133 at Memorial Hospital, Trafalgar 9 - 3000, any time between 8 a.m. and 10 p.m. and let me know whether you are able to print this communication in the near future.

Yours very truly,

Leo Szilard

Enclosure

# BOUNTY HELD KEY TO CRISIS IN SUGAR

## Financial Experts Say That Juggling of Quotas Is an Impractical Method

By PAUL HEFFERNAN

So far as the crisis in Cuba is concerned, Uncle Sam is not playing the role of sugar plum fairy as effectively as he might.

This is the opinion of realists in the field of international financial relationships. The trouble, it is argued, is that Uncle Sam is finagling too much with the sugar quota and not enough with the sugar bounty.

Even though the Cuban sugar quota was cut 700,000 tons as Cuba confiscated more than \$800,000,000 of property owned by United States nationals, Uncle Sam is still committed to pay to the Castro Government a subsidy of about \$96,000,000 a year above the world price for the 2,400,000 tons of sugar remaining in the Cuban quota.

This means that the Castro grab of United States property stands to be rewarded, every ten years, by a handout from Uncle Sam that matches the amount of the expropriation. Alice in Wonderland rides again!

Uncle Sam is now striving to right matters by further juggling of the sugar quota. Only last month, 322,000 tons of the old Cuba sugar quota was switched to the Dominican Republic. Now Washington proposes to backtrack.

"Since total imports of sugar from the Dominican Republic in 1959 amounted only to about 84,000 tons," President Eisenhower reminded Congress last week, "the statutory allocation would give that country a large sugar bonus seriously embarrassing to the United States in the conduct of our foreign relations through the hemisphere."

But what if Uncle Sam and Cuba got on friendly terms again? Would the old Cuban quota be restored at the expense of the nations, which, like the Dominican Republic, now stand to enjoy a windfall at Castro's expense? Can such handouts, once bestowed, ever be graciously withdrawn? Is it only Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, head of the Dominican Republic, for whom the sugar bell is tolling?

### Reduce Bounty Not Quota

To the financial mind, the preferable treatment is simple. Let the bounty to Cuba be reduced, not the quota.

Cuba, it is true, would have her world market enlarged by 700,000 tons. But not at Uncle Sam's bounty price of 5 cents a pound; rather, at the world price of about 3 cents a pound.

United States taxpayers would be about \$96,000,000 a year better off by the move. And Cuba, her sugar market restored to the old size, could hardly make rational complaint about "economic aggression." If Castro can sell 700,000 tons of sugar to friendly Communist nations at 5 cents a pound, more length to his beard!

The \$96,000,000 windfall to United States taxpayers could be put to most appropriate use just now. Instead of the money being paid to the Castro Government to finance the expropriation of United States property—as the Cuban dictator has proposed—a good part of the money can be turned over to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to indemnify United States nationals for their losses.

Under the statutory limits governing the functioning of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, approved claims of \$1,000 or less would have to be paid in full before larger claims could be indemnified. With more than \$800,000,000 of United States property already seized by Cuba—most of it plants of large industrial corporations—it would take ten years or so for the repatriated sugar bounty fund to build up enough money to pay off the big companies.

Such a prospect, however, would be superior to that handed out by the Castro re-

Continued on Page 8, Column 5

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Can The Great Powers Observe The Charter Of The United Nations In All Contingencies?

In a letter to the editor which appeared in the July 18 issue of the New York Times, Theodore R. Groom states that it would be consistent with the best interests of the United States, and be worth the risks that it would involve, for the United States to declare that she would militarily intervene in Cuba, in case Russia were to use Cuba as a base for potential war-making upon the United States. Clearly, such a declaration would disclose the intent of committing - if need be - a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter.

At the time when the United Nations Charter was in the process of being drafted, those of us who were actively engaged in the development of the atomic bomb knew that we would have such bombs before the War was over and we thought that before long Russia would have such bombs also. We realized at that time, that in certain contingencies which could arise America might be compelled to violate some of the provisions of the Charter, whose drafters had been unaware of the existence of the bomb.

The Charter makes it illegal for the United States to take armed action, except in the case of an armed attack against the United States or another member of the United Nations, unless the Security Council votes in favor of such armed action with the five permanent members of the Council concurring. I personally do not believe that the establishment of a Russian base in Cuba would threaten American security any more than will the establishment of bases for the launching of long-range rockets inside of Russia which is currently

in progress. It is easy to conceive, however, of other <sup>courses of</sup> actions on which Russia could embark - without violating the United Nations Charter or other provisions of international law - and which might compel the United States to resort to armed action in violation of the Charter.

I think there are two conclusions which may be drawn from these considerations.

- (1) There is no assurance that international law can be observed by <sup>the</sup> Great Powers - either by those whom we choose to regard as peace-loving nations or by those whom we do not choose so to regard - until there <sup>is</sup> will be in operation law making machinery, capable of adjusting international law to the rapidly changing requirements;
- (2) <sup>One</sup> ~~We~~ cannot count on the observance of international law by the nations until these nations <sup>and among them the U.S.</sup> ~~will~~ make it a criminal offence to advocate the violation of international law.

In the meantime, as far as the Great Powers are concerned, political and military considerations may continue to ride roughshod over international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. We shall not be able to fool others about this being the case and it would be better for us not to attempt to fool ourselves either.

Far be it for me to deprecate the value of hypocrisy - "the <sup>limit</sup> homage which vice pays to virtue" - but there is a point beyond which one may not carry <sup>it</sup> ~~hypocrisy~~, without paying too high a price in creating confusion. To my mind, we have now reached this limit by our pretence that we ~~have observed and~~ are going to observe the United Nations Charter in all contingencies, and our demand that others do likewise.

Leo Szilard  
The Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies  
The University of Chicago, Chicago.

July 18, 1960.

October 3, 1962

The New York Times  
Editorial Offices  
Letters to the Editors Department  
Times Building  
229 West 43rd Street  
New York City, New York

Gentlemen:

Attached is a text which I am sending you in the hope that you may be able to print it in one of your forthcoming issues.

I shall take the liberty of calling you on the phone to inquire whether you can print it at an early date.

Very sincerely yours,

Allan Forbes, Jr.  
Vice-President and  
Acting National Director

AFjr/fn  
Enclosure

P.S.

Letter to the Editor:

A passage contained in Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech of September 21 appears to remove one of the major obstacles which has blocked the way to an agreement on controlled arms limitation. For this reason, it was noted with considerable interest in Washington by those who view with concern the present drift toward an all-out arms race. <sup>Do not!</sup> Gromyko's statement seems to have escaped, however, the notice of most ~~of the~~ <sup>not all</sup> editorial writers and newspaper columnists, and few people have become aware of its importance. The relevant passage of the statement reads as follows:

"Taking account of the stand of the Western powers, the Soviet Government agrees that in the process of destroying nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, at the first stage exception be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of global (intercontinental) missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air type which would remain at the disposal of the U.S.S.R. and the United States alone. Thus for a definite period the means of defense would remain in case someone, as certain Western representatives fear, ventures to violate the treaty, and conceal missiles or combat aircraft.

"The Soviet Government is introducing the appropriate amendments to its draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control which we are submitting for consideration by this session of the General Assembly of the United Nations."

It would appear desirable that the first stage of the agreement on arms limitation provide for far-reaching reductions in the atomic striking forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Because at the outset the United States would have a great superiority in both delivery vehicles and bombs, therefore, the inspection measures that Russia would accept during the first stage are likely to remain rather limited both in quality and in quantity. However, it would be necessary to verify through adequate measures of inspection that the provisions of the agreement are being carried out. Perhaps one could avoid being caught in this dilemma if the agreement were to specify the quantities of the various types of equipment which would be destroyed by America and of those

which would be destroyed by Russia, ~~specified~~ not in terms of percentages of the existing stockpiles but in terms of the numbers of the individual units of each type which would be destroyed by each of these two nations. Verification of compliance with the agreement would then not require inspection of any stockpiles of equipment, but only the witnessing by inspectors of the actual destruction of the specified quantities of equipment of the various types; this kind of inspection ought to be acceptable to Russia. In the absence of inspection of stockpiles, America would have to rely, however, on her estimates of Russian stockpiles and the accuracy of such estimates is necessarily limited. For this reason if, during the first stage, there is no inspection that would reliably uncover hidden stockpiles of equipment, America would want to retain an agreed number of intercontinental missiles at the end of the first stage, as a sort of "protective umbrella."

In private conversations with our Russian colleagues we had no difficulty in getting across to them these considerations, but Gromyko's statement is the first indication that the Soviet Government recognizes the necessity of accepting the principle which is involved.

If there is a cut-off in the production of delivery vehicles during the first stage, inspection of production facilities would be desirable but ~~it~~ might not be indispensable, provided the reduction of the stockpiles during the first stage is very rapid and the duration of the first stage is correspondingly short.

Washington, D. C.

~~October 9~~, 1962

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Leo SZILARAS  
Co-Chairman

~~FOR~~ THE COUNCIL FOR ABOLISHING WAR  
1500 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

Bernard T. Feld  
President

Allan Forbes, Jr.  
Vice President

William Daering  
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Washington 6, D. C.

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