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CAN WE GET OFF THE ROAD TO WAR ?

by Leo Szilard

INTRODUCTION

During the first World War Karinthy, a Hungarian writer, told on one occasion that he had been sitting at his desk wondering about the causes of wars and trying to write an essay about this topic when there were loud noises coming from the nursery. He opened the door and found his children engaged in a free for all. "John," he said sternly to the oldest, "who started this fight?" "It started," said John, "when Paul hit me back".

For a number of years now we have had an opportunity to observe how we as a nation respond to the action of the Russians and how the Russians respond to our responses and to me it seems that war is inevitable unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present. There is not very much that individual Americans can do in order to influence the Russian Government; it follows that they would have to bring about a change in the attitude in the American Government which in turn might bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian Government.

The only people who can understand what is going on and who might be able to say what course the United States ought to follow in the next years in order to get off the road to war are those who are capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective. In all probability they are in the minority. Still this minority might be able to change the course of events if they could unite on a set of political objectives. I shall try to outline further below a set of political objectives on which, in my opinion, this minority might be able likely to agree.

My Stay in Washington

You cannot get very far discussing the merits of such political objectives before someone will ask you, "Can the Russians be trusted?" This question of trust has kept coming up at the Pugwash meetings also and it was mostly the Russians who raised it. On one such occasion I said to our ^{Russian} ~~American~~ colleagues, "If you mean that you expect the American people to trust your government, then there is something I must say to you. The American people do not trust their own government; how can you expect them to trust someone else's government."

Gradually our Russian colleagues who attended the Pugwash meetings came to understand better the real issues which are involved and they stopped raising the issue of "trust". The last time it came up, if my memory is correct, was one evening at the meeting held in Baden near Vienna when, with the exception of our Russian colleagues, everybody had gone to Vienna to the opera and I was left alone at dinner with the Russians. On that occasion I sat next to B, an outstanding mathematician and physicist, who speaks English fluently. Whatever I said to him was said for his benefit only, but whenever I said something that ~~he~~ thought the others ought to hear also he interrupted the general conversation in order to translate what I had said to him. At one point I said that I had never met Khrushchev, but somehow I had the feeling that I knew him, that I believed Khrushchev understood what Russia's real interests were and I trusted him to pursue these interests effectively while trying to keep the risk of war at a minimum. "But", I continued, "I do not know who is going to succeed him and his successor I neither know nor trust."

At this point B interrupted me and while he translated what I had said I looked at the Russians who were sitting around the table. They sat there with mournful faces in silence: manifestly they did not know who would succeed Khrushchev either and they didn't trust him either.

"Can Russia be trusted to keep an agreement?" He who poses the question in this form implies that he believes some of the other great powers involved could be trusted to keep an agreement in force, even if they no longer regarded it to be in their interest to do so -- and the facts recorded by history do not sustain such a belief.

If Russia enters into an agreement, providing for far reaching disarmament, she will do so because she considers disarmament to be in her interest and she can be trusted to keep such an agreement in force as long as she ^{continues to} believes disarmament to be in her interest. The only question which is open to debate is whether we may expect the future leadership of the Soviet Union to be as intelligent and realistic as their present leadership and to see with equal clarity that far reaching disarmament serves Russia's best interests.

Entering into an agreement with Russia which provides for far reaching disarmament, involves to this extent a certain amount of trust and there can be no other basis for such trust than the general set of values prevailing in Russia. One may make, of course, a distinction between the Russian government and the Russian people in this regard just as one may make such a distinction between the American government and the American people, still ~~neither~~ neither the American government nor the Russian government operates in a vacuum, and the members of both governments are largely guided by the same set of values which prevail in their countries.

In order to gain insight into the set of values which prevails in Russia, an American would have to establish close personal contact with Russians. He cannot gain this insight merely by reviewing the historical events of the post war years or by reading Pravda. Those "Russian experts" who talk and write

about Russia without ever having had direct personal contacts with Russians in Russia remind me of those clinicians, rapidly increasing in numbers these days, who order elaborate laboratory tests and diagnose the disease without ever looking at the patient.

My first look at the Russians and my first glimpse into their set of values came five years ago at the first Pugwash conference which was held at Pugwash, Nova Scotia. It was scheduled to last three days and we were supposed to conclude $\frac{1}{2}$ it by issuing a public statement expressing the concensus of the participants on the problem of peace. On the very first day of the conference, I met Topchiev, at that time General Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., by chance early in the morning at breakfast and I asked him whether the Russians really felt that we must come up with a statement at the end of the conference. It was a foregone conclusion that drafting such a statement would be a time consuming and frustrating affair, but Topchiev said that, indeed we must come up with a statement. I told him that I was afraid that this would be his view but there would be no need for the conference to waste time on the drafting of a statement because I had prepared a statement ahead of time before I left Chicago. This was the first of the Pugwash meetings, the Russians were exceedingly suspicious of the American participants, and to all appearances, Topchiev suspected that $\frac{1}{2}$ was about to put something over on him and his Russian colleagues. He asked me at once to show him the statement I had drafted. I said that my statement was so simple that there was no need to write it down and that the whole statement can be summed up in two sentences. The first sentence reads "We do not believe in capitalism", and this would be signed by the Americans because the American participants are familiar with the drawbacks

of capitalism. The second sentence reads 'We do not believe in communism' and this should be signed by all the Russians because by now the Russians should know something about the drawbacks of communism." The broad grin with which Topchiev responded gave me the first glimpse into the set of values of our Russian colleagues.

When Khrushchev was in New York a year ago last October on a visit to the United Nations, I asked to see him and was told by the Soviet Ambassador that they could schedule no more than 15 minutes for me. This was not what I wanted; I had prepared a long memorandum, listing the questions to which I had wanted to get Khrushchev's reaction, on the assumption that I might have several hours with Khrushchev and I had promised a Russian translation of this memorandum. I told the Ambassador, however, that I would take 15 minutes, if I couldn't get more. The next morning the Ambassador called and asked if I could come over right away to the New York headquarters of the United Nations delegation to see the Chairman. I asked how much time I would have, and was again told that they couldn't schedule more than 15 Minutes for me.

I started the conversation by handing Khrushchev a little present -- a ~~S~~hick Injecto Razor. I told him that this was not an expensive razor, but it was a very good one; that I wanted him to try it out and if he liked it I would keep him supplied with blades -- as long as there was no war. Khrushchev replied that if there is war he would stop shaving.

First I asked Khrushchev whether he would like to read through the memorandum I had prepared, even though we would have no time to discuss more than just a small portion of it. He read the memorandum, and I raised one by one the issues which I believed to be the most important. When the 15 minutes were up I asked the Ambassador whether we should terminate the conference. The Ambassador said, "It seems that the Chairman would like to go on".

Thereafter I stopped every 15 minutes and each time the Ambassador gave the same reply. We had started at 11 o'clock in the morning and by one o'clock I had raised all the issues which were covered by the memorandum.

The question came up why so few Americans in responsible positions were wholeheartedly in favor of disarmament. I said that many Americans expressed doubts whether it would be possible to provide for adequate inspection, but that the problem of inspection was not the main stumbling block and solving the problem of inspection would not by itself convince many Americans that disarmament was a desirable goal. Disarmament would not by itself guarantee peace and even with an inspection going full blast armies equipped with machine guns could spring up so to speak overnight. It was not easy to see how one would secure peace in a disarmed world.

At this point Khrushchev picked out a passage from my memorandum which read as follows:

"Clearly, a world police force, under the central command of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union in the present circumstances, and it might be acceptable to the United States in the circumstances that might prevail a few years hence."

Khrushchev said that this sentence showed him that I understood where the difficulties would come and added that in his opinion these difficulties could be removed by reorganization of the Secretariat of the United Nations along the lines he had suggested. I said that I was not certain whether the reorganization he proposed would be workable from an administration point of view and that for the moment I would like to stick to the narrow question of how armed forces, operating under United Nations auspices, might be set up in order to make them acceptable both to the Soviet Union and to America. Khrushchev encouraged me to say what I had

in mind and I said the following: If there is disarmament there might be a number of disturbed regions in the world where there would be a need for a United Nations police force. There might be three such regions and there might be even six. Instead of thinking in terms of setting up a world police force operating under a central command, perhaps we ought to think in terms of setting up a number of regional police forces, one for each troubled region. Each such regional force would then be controlled by a slate of, ~~say~~, five nations (drawn from outside of the region) and they would appoint the commander-in-chief of their regional force. All such ~~reg~~ regional forces would operate under United Nations' auspices inasmuch as the slate of the five nations, in charge of a given region, would need to have the approval of the majority of the Security Council, with the five permanent members of the Security Council concurring. Clearly, the selection of these slates would require negotiations among the great powers. America might agree not to veto a slate favored by Russia for a certain region provided that Russia agrees not to veto a slate favored by America for a certain other region.

I stressed that it would be much easier for Americans to accept general disarmament if America could free herself from her commitments militarily to protect regions which are geographically remote from America, by turning over this responsibility~~k~~ to police forces operating under United Nations auspices. Prior to the advent of the atomic bomb, America's military sphere of influence did not extend to remote regions of the world and the same was true also for Russia. In an armed world America~~s~~ and Russia can extend their sphere of military influence to any part of the world but ^{if} there is general disarmament, then once more Russia's and America's sphere of influence will shrink and, as far as direct military influence goes, it will be limited to areas lying in their own geographical proximity.

In a disarmed world Russia would be in no position to protect Cuba against a possible American military intervention, nor would American be in a position to protect, say, Turkey or South Korea against a possible Russian or Chinese military intervention.

But America¹ and Russia could retain some influence over regions which are geographically removed from both of them if there were set up in such regions regional police forces under the United Nations and they had influence on the selection of the slate of nations in control of the various regional forces.

Khrushchev said that this is precisely what he would be afraid of and that he would fear that the nations in a region where such a regional force operates would come under the control of the nations who controlled the regional police force.

I did not want to belabor this point very much further because what ¹ was trying to do was to find out what Khrushchev regarded to be the crucial issues and there would have been no point in trying to go further on this occasion to argue in favor of a specific solution of one of these issues.

I told K^hhrushchev that since America has at present military commitments to defend areas which are in Russia's geographical proximity, I did not see how disarmament could be politically acceptable to America except if there were a political settlement which would permit America to free herself from these commitments without too much loss of prestige and without sacrificing the security of the other nations who are involved. I then tried to illustrate this point by discussing the Berlin issue, in this ¹context., and found that Khrushchev was fully aware of this aspect of the disarmament problem.

Concerning the problem of inspection I said to Khrushchev that I assumed that Russia would put no limitations on the numbers of inspectors operating in Russian territory if disarmament were an accomplished fact, but that I personally was not

so sure that foreign inspectors, even if admitted in unlimited numbers, could discover every rocket or bomb that the Russian Government might want to hide. I therefore wondered whether the Soviet Union would be willing to try to create conditions in which a Russian citizen would feel that ~~he~~ ^{she} is fulfilling a patriotic duty if he reported a violation of a disarmament agreement to the International Control Commission so that the world could then rely on Russian citizen's reporting Russian violations, rather than being forced to rely upon foreign inspectors. The same question had been raised a few days earlier by a colleague of mine at a luncheon given by Cyrus Eaton which I had attended, and Khrushchev's answer was in the affirmative. I told Khrushchev that ~~I~~ ^{she} was present at this luncheon and that I had heard his answer, but that I was not sure that he fully understood at that time the implications of his answer. I told Khrushchev that if he, fully realizing the implications, were to give an affirmative answer, this is something that people ought to know about because it could have a marked effect on the attitude of many Americans towards the problem of disarmament. Khrushchev replied that he though he fully understood the implications of the question but that if ~~he~~ ^{she} I had any doubt about it I could sit down and spell out what I have in mind in detail, and if I wrote what he, Khrushchev, thought I would write he would have no hesitation to sign the document right then and there. Important though this issue was, I did not think that I ought to spend any more time on the specific point and therefore I merely said that we might find some better way for him to make his views known on this subject.

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ON BEING HUMAN

At one o'clock I said to Khrushchev that I didn't want to take up any more of his time but still wanted to show him how to insert new blades into the razor which I had brought and how to clean the razor after use. This done, Khrushchev

said that he felt that he, too, would like to do something for me and how would I feel if he were to send me a case of vodka. I said that I wondered if I couldn't have something better than vodka. "What do you have in mind," said Khrushchev, and I said, "Borjum." A few days earlier when Khrushchev delivered one of his long speeches before the United Nations, he had a glass of mineral water in front of him from which he drank from time to time and once he pointed to it and said, "Borjum, excellent Russian mineral water." When I said, "Borjum", Khrushchev beamed. "We have two kinds of mineral water in Russia," he said, "they are both excellent and I shall send you samples of both."

The next day I was back in my room in the hospital when the door opened and in came a young man from the Russian Delegation accompanied by a porter carrying a large case of Russian mineral water of two varieties.

The story I am telling here is not quite as pointless as it might seem. People are not going to solve the problem posed by the bomb just by being nice to each other. Still discussions of this problem between Americans and Russians are likely to be more productive if the American who conducts such conversations with a Russian indicates at the very outset that he is aware of the fact that his Russian counterpart is a human being also, who has much the same needs as he has, and might be beset by the same difficulties as he is. I, for one, have found in my conversations with Russians that all one needs to do is somehow tacitly to establish at the outset that there are important basic premises on which we all agree. Having done so it is thereafter possible to engage in reasoned arguments based on these common premises. If there is disagreement one must then go back and examine whether the disagreement is due to some faulty reasoning or whether it is due to some basic assumptions on which we differ.

There is a school of thought which holds that there is no use talking to the Russians and that the only thing to which they respond is power. This tenet has been expounded in one of his major foreign policy speeches by Dean Acheson when he was Secretary of State. He compared Russia with a river. "There is no use arguing with a river" so he said, "all you can do is to build a dam and by doing so you may keep it under control." It might well be true that there would be no use for Dean Acheson to argue with his Russian counterpart. He might well be among those Americans who are constitutionally unable to communicate with Russians of Khrushchev's type. I, personally, found it ~~ix~~ easy to communicate with just by being myself and the conversations which I had with him helped me to gain certain insight. I cannot know for certain to what extent I was able to get across to him some of the thinking that I believed to be true, but the last speech which he read on the American soil just a few days after the conversation which we had included the following passage:

"The Soviet Union will not agree to disarmament so long as there is no assurance that the international armed forces, the creation of which is anticipated in solving the problems of disarmament, will be in reliable hands and will not be utilized to inflict damage upon a state or group of states. We do not request any privilege for ourselves. But we shall never consent to privileges being granted to other groups of states."

"The Soviet Union will not agree to disarmament so long as" --

I wonder if Khrushchev would have put it quite that way if ~~ix~~ it hadn't been for our conversation.

There are many Americans who do not find it easy to communicate with Khrushchev or other Russians of a similar type ~~ix~~ just by being themselves. But they could be given a few clues in this regard by those who have no such difficulty in communicating. Because I believed this to be true, following my conversation with Khrushchev, I

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sought an opportunity to see Kennedy after he was elected and before he took office. I did not expect that there would be any difficulty in arranging for such an interview, but found that I had been mistaken and I did not get to see the president elect. The Vienna meeting has shown that Kennedy and Khrushchev have serious difficulties in communicating with each other and unless someone is able to get across to Kennedy how to talk to Khrushchev, or to Khrushchev how to talk to Kennedy, this failure of communications is likely to persist.

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Two months after my conversation with Khrushchev I checked out of the hospital in New York where I had been confined for over a year, took a taxi to the airport and flew to Moscow to attend the Pugwash Conference. I was accompanied by my wife who was also my doctor and I stayed in Moscow several weeks beyond the end of the Conference. I stayed on in Moscow in order to engage in private conversations with our Russian colleagues, because I knew from experience that only in private conversations is it possible to get anything across to them or to discover what they really believe to be true.

None of our Russian colleagues brought up the issue of bomb tests, even though two years earlier some of them had been passionately interested in this issue. I found, however, an undiminished interest in the kind of far-reaching disarmament which would result in substantial savings. On one occasion I had tea with Fedorov, the General Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with no one present except my interpreter. I had met Fedorov before and I always got along well with him. On this particular occasion, he spoke to me as follows:

You must really believe me when I tell you that we want general disarmament. You have seen all this construction work going on in Moscow; it has been going on for many years; still we are not able to catch up with the housing

shortage. If we had disarmament, we could not only solve this problem, but many of our other economic problems as well. Also, we could develop other nations on an unprecedented scale. So far, we are building only one hydro-electric dam in Africa -- the Aswan Dam in Egypt; if we had disarmament, we could, and we would, build twenty such dams in Africa.

I have no doubt whatever that Federov meant what he said.

When I got around to discussing the problem of inspection with Russian colleagues, I discovered that those of my colleagues of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR who had been scheduled to attend the 6th Pugwash Conference, had received a detailed report of the conversation which I had with Khrushchev in New York. In this report, Khrushchev was quoted as having said to me that the ~~Soviet~~ Soviet Union would give serious consideration to the possibility of creating conditions where, in a disarmed state, the world could rely on Soviet citizens reporting violations of a disarmament agreement to the International Control Commission. As a result of this report, the door was opened to a serious discussion of this topic. I told my Russian colleagues that creating conditions in which the Soviet citizen would feel that he is doing his patriotic duty if he reports a secret violation of the disarmament agreement to an International Control Commission, would pose an exceedingly difficult task to the Government of the Soviet Union, and that I was not certain whether they would succeed in accomplishing this task.

Today, if a taxicab driver in Moscow picks up a foreigner at his hotel, then after he delivers him at his destination in Moscow, he is supposed to call the police and make a report. Today, we find ourselves in an arms race with Russia, and admittedly, many things may be possible in a disarmed world which may not be possible today, but still we would be assuming a degree of flexibility on the part of the

Soviet Government which few other governments possess, if we were to assume that the Soviet Government would be able to progress within a few years to where a Russian citizen may be made to feel that he is fulfilling a patriotic duty if he reports a violation of a disarmament agreement to an International Control Commission. The most reassuring conversation that I had in this regard was with Peter Kapitza, whom I knew well from the time when he lived in England. He believed that the Soviet Government was capable of great flexibility, provided there was a strong motivation for this flexibility. Kapitza thought ~~that~~ that the Soviet Government has demonstrated such flexibility. on a number of occasions when the issue was to achieve what the Government really wanted, and the Soviet Government -- so Kapitza thought -- really wanted general disarmament.

My contacts in Moscow were not restricted, however, to my colleagues in the Academy which is fortunate because one needs to understand the Russian attitude towards disarmament within the general framework of the set of values ~~prevailing~~ prevailing in Russia.

I had two long interviews ~~xx~~ with the director of a Russian Government publishing house and his staff. Someone told him that I was in Moscow and asked them whether they would want to publish a Russian translation of my little book, "The Voice of the Dolphins". Because I was regarded as a distinguished visitor, the director of the publishing house felt duty-bound to explain to me en extenso why they couldn't be reasonably expected to publish a translation ~~of~~ of my book. This took two longer sessions during which I faced, ~~also~~ with my interpreter, the director and seven of his staff members who had all read the book. Even though it was a foregone ~~xx~~ conclusion that they would not publish the whole thing they wanted to find out why I had said in the book what I had said.

When it was all over I told them that at long last ^I understood the basic difference between the Soviet Society and American Society: In America the author gives trouble to the publisher -- in Russia the publisher gives trouble to the author.

During the first session we had some of the discussion revolved around the issue of disarmament, and they wanted to know whether I thought that disarmament could be accomplished in the near future. They were genuinely interested and concerned and I told them frankly that ^I did not see how disarmament could be accomplished without concurrent political settlement. I added that I could visualize without too much difficulty a political settlement in Europe but that I had difficulties visualizing such a settlement in the Far East. I told them that any constructive policies which the Administration might want to adopt with respect to China would be likely to run into difficulties in Congress and I explained to them that Congress had a rather emotional attitude towards this issue.

At the end of the second session, when I was about to leave, the conversation returned to what I would do about it when I got back to America. "I really don't know," I said to them, "Probably, I ought to pray to God every night that He shall make a big earthquake and Formosa shall sink into the Pacific Ocean." "Would it not be simpler for God," one of them asked, "to enlighten the American Congress?" "I rather believe," I said, "it would be easier for God to make a big earthquake."

My visit to Moscow was the first one I ever made and a month's time is not very much even if you make a serious effort to learn as much as you can. Still this visit has convinced me that the idea of peace, and disarmament as a means to peace, is

generally cherished by most intellectuals in Russia.

I have no hard and fast evidence to prove that this is correct. The closest to what may be regarded as evidence is perhaps the fact that Russian economists go to a lot of trouble these days to convince Americans that general and complete disarmament could be accomplished without throwing the American economy into a tailspin. This appears to be the party line, and it is a far cry from the previous party line which asserted that America is opposed to disarmament because, under the American economic system, a major depression would be unavoidable if America were to disarm.

If I say that Russia would very much want to have disarmament and would be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it, I may be asked to explain why, Russia's negotiations on ~~x~~ disarmament -- much like America's own negotiations on this subject -- are mainly guided by the public relations aspect, rather than the substantive aspect of this issue. I may be asked to explain also why the Soviet Government has not enlisted the help of Soviet scientists in studies of the subject of disarmament any more than has the American Government. My answer is, that the Soviet Government, while it wants disarmament, does not believe that America comes anywhere near to accepting disarmament -- no matter what concessions Russia may be willing to make on the issue of inspection.

To the Russians, America's position on disarmament appears to come very close to being fraudulent.

On the surface, America is formally committed to general and complete disarmament, but if you look below the surface, the picture changes.

John J. McCloy, who up ~~ix~~ until recently was head of the Disarmament Agency in the State Department, said just the other day on television that America wants disarmament, but that a disarmed world is acceptable to America only if there is set

up an international armed force so strong that no single nation could stand up to it. If a disarmed world means that atomic bombs are eliminated, then what matters mostly in case of war is what used to be called the "war potential" of the nations involved, which is mainly determined by their industrial strength. It follows that it would be physically impossible to set up an international army so strong that neither Russia nor America could stand up to it, except, of course, if that international army is made to be the sole possessor of atomic bombs. This, on the other hand, would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and it would also be unacceptable to the United States. Therefore, what John J. McCloy said is tantamount to saying that America is willing to have disarmament but only under conditions which she, herself, would not accept.

These days, I am frequently asked by disarmament enthusiasts whether progress towards disarmament in America is blocked by the industrial military complex of which Eisenhower spoke in his last speech in office. It is quite possible that a time might come when we will have to worry about the vested interests which are opposed to disarmament and win them over by offering them adequate compensation for the losses which they would suffer if disarmament became a reality. But right now, to my mind, progress towards disarmament is impelled not because so many people are opposed to it, but rather because so few people are wholeheartedly in favor of it.

In the course of last year, Richard Barnett moved to Washington to join the U.S. Disarmament Agency. Before he came to Washington, he had written a book "Who Wants Disarmament?", and when he got to Washington, I told him that in a few months time I would like to discuss with him the possibility of changing the title of his book for the next edition. Recently, he reminded me of this, and asked me what title I had in mind when I made this remark. "How would you feel" I said "about ~~the~~ a title like 'Who the Hell Wants Disarmament?'" Being an official of the

Government, he would not comment, of course, but he did not manage to suppress a smile.

Why are so few people in Washington wholeheartedly in favor of disarmament? I believe the answer is that substantial economic savings to which disarmament would lead, which is the main motivation for disarmament for the Soviet Union, does not provide a strong motivation for America and in the absence of this motivation, fear of the unknown becomes the predominant factor.

The fact of the matter is that disarmament will not automatically guarantee peace. To ask how the peace would be secured in a disarmed world is a legitimate question, and it is not surprising that responsible Americans would want to know the answer to it before committing themselves to general and complete disarmament.

1.) policies that will reduce the danger that a war may break out in the next few years that neither Russia nor America want.

2.) policies that will make it possible to arrange for the cessation of hostilities before there is an all-out catastrophe, in case such a war should break out.

FOREIGN POLICIES

In order to minimize the danger that such a war may break out the Government ought to resolve to stop fighting meaningless battles in the cold war. Nothing is gained by winning such battles and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed.

Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among nations. The first director of this agency was an American, and his term expired last year. Since, next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, America could have proposed that the next director of the agency be a Russian, and since America had the votes she was able to win one more victory in a meaningless battle of the cold war.

similar conference in Russia, the State Department refused him permission to attend the New York conference. Sedov said, in that case, he would just go to New York and spend a few days shopping and sightseeing and was thereupon told by the State Department that he was forbidden to go to New York as long as the conference which he must not attend remained in session.

Pinpricks of this sort are not going to lead to war, but they are not conducive to making peace either.

War might break out as the result of commitments which the United States has made in the post war years and which led the United States to hold positions which are difficult to defend militarily, morally, or legally. Some of these positions ought to be liquidated at once. Concerning the others we ought to set a ^{more distant} date for their liquidation, but set a date, nevertheless.

During the Korean war President Truman sent the 7th Fleet into the Straits of Formosa, as a strictly temporary measure. The Fleet was sent there impartially to prevent hostilities between the Peoples' Republic of China and the Nationalist Chinese Government of Formosa. President Truman's assurance that the Fleet would be withdrawn after the Korean War was repudiated by the next Administration and thereafter the role assigned to the 7th Fleet was no longer impartial. Its role became to protect Formosa against the Peoples' Republic of China. We have no similar clear commitment to protect Quemoy and Matsu, which are close to the mainland, but whenever these islands come under attack we intimate that we are not going to yield to force and when they are not under attack we conveniently forget about them. It is doubtful whether these islands would be militarily defensible if the Peoples' Republic of China should decide to take them by force, and whether we have any legal or moral right to defend them.

The occupation of these islands by Chang Kai Chek might provide

I am rather firmly convinced that until such time as America and Russia reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world, it will be impossible for them to conduct a serious negotiation on far-reaching disarmament. In the absence of any major progress towards an agreement on disarmament the government ought to adopt

the Peoples' Republic of China with a strong motivation for trying to develop a strategic atomic striking force, and China is in a difficult economic position and how much this would affect a decision to develop strategic striking forces in a major way might well depend on how strongly they are provoked to do so. I have little doubt that those in responsible position in the Administration know at this point that we ought to induce Chang Kai Chek to withdraw from these islands, but for one reason or another, they are dragging their feet.

In the post war years Korea and Viet Nam were divided by the stroke of a pen and we have assumed a leading role both in South Korea and South Viet Nam. We seem to have adopted a philosophy that by preventing South Korea and South Viet Nam from uniting with their northern counterparts we are preventing the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Whether it is possible to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia by holding this kind of Maginot Line remains to be seen.

If we were able to establish in South Korea and in South Viet Nam a certain minimum degree of freedom and if we were able to develop these countries economically there could be, perhaps, no moral objection to prolonging our intervention indefinitely, even though by doing so we may be preventing the unification of these countries. But if the ^{economies} northern halves of these countries are developed by the communists much more rapidly and if they are not appreciably less free than the southern part, then we have no moral right indefinitely to prolong intervention. I believe we ought to set a date by which we must either establish that we are capable of benefitting these countries, or else we must terminate our intervention soon thereafter.

During the years when we had a considerable stockpile of bombs, and a strategic air force capable of delivering these bombs and Russia had none of this, we used to threaten that in case of a Russian invasion of Western Europe, we would drop our bombs on Russia's cities. Many people believe that this threat has deterred Russia from overrunning Europe. It is difficult to see how an attack against Russia's cities would be justifiable from a moral point of view. Such an attack would kill millions of civilians, men, women and children, and it would kill them in retaliation for an action on the part of the Soviet Government, over which these people had no control. But even if we assume for the sake of argument that the threat was believable enough to deter Russia from carrying out the intentions which many people imparted to her, the same threat would not be believable today. Today, if we were to destroy Russia's cities, Russia could retaliate by destroying our cities, and therefore the threat of bombing Russia's cities in case of war would be a threat of murder and suicide.

Centering on Foy Kohler in the Department of State and on Paul Nitze in the Department of Defense there has emerged a school of thought which holds that if we shift the threat from a strategic strike against Russia's cities, to a strategic strike against the long-range rocket bases and strategic air bases of Russia, we can continue to operate with a threat which is believable. The thinking within this school runs as follows:

"In the course of 1961 we have revised our estimates of the strength of Russia's atomic striking forces on the basis of the U-2 flights, and intelligence reports. The location of most of Russia's bases is known to us. Since these bases have not been hardened, they could be destroyed if attacked by bombs and we have at present the capability of destroying these bases by making a massive attack against them. We presumably could not destroy all of Russia's bases in a single attack, and Russia might be able to strike a counterblow and inflict some damage on us, but this damage would be within the limits that we could tolerate and in certain circumstances we would be prepared to tolerate it.

We have no intention to start a preventive war and to resort - in peacetime - to a surprise attack against Russia's bases. But, if there should be a war in Europe which involves conventional forces on a major scale, we would be in a position to threaten a massive atomic attack against Russia's long-range rocket bases and strategic air bases. We believe that such an attack would cripple Russia's bases to the point where we could tolerate the damage which a Russian counterattack could inflict on our cities. Moreover, the Russians would not be likely to retaliate by attacking our cities with bombs. They would be more likely to speak to us as follows:

"We have enough rockets left to destroy a large number of American cities, but we know that if we did this, America may retaliate by destroying all of our cities. Therefore, we propose to hold our fire and to negotiate peace. We concede that the power balance has now shifted in America's favor and we are now willing to yield on a number of issues on which we took an inflexible stand prior to the outbreak of hostilities." "

If this were a likely course of events America could continue to think of war as an operation which might lead to victory. The fact of the matter is that it is not a likely course of events.

Those who urge that America build up her strategic striking forces to the level where it can threaten a massive strike against Russian bases and that she maintain them at that level as long as possible, believe that by doing so we can deter Russia from risking war in Europe and adopting an intransigent position on Berlin and other related issues. Most of these people will concede that the superiority which we must have in order to make this threat believable cannot be maintained indefinitely and could be maintained for five years at most. Many of them will also concede that if Russia were not deterred and if it came to a war in Europe, faced with uncertainty of how much damage Russian counterattack might cause, the President of the United States would not be likely to authorize

such an attack against Russia's bases. What these people want to do is to
india -

tain a threat that the Russians may believe even though they themselves do not believe that we would carry out this threat.

In order to maintain the threat we would have to build a very large number of long range solid fuel rockets, (Minutemen), and a large number of submarines capable of launching intermediate range solid fuel rockets (Polaris). Also for a while at least, we will have to keep on testing bombs in order to develop bombs which are light enough to be carried by these rockets but have a greater explosive power than the bombs which they carry at present.

If we do this the Russians will, of course, respond by dispersing their bases, by developing solid fuel long range rockets, which can be launched from hardened bases or which can be mounted on trucks that can be moved around along the highways, and they may make an effort to develop anti-missile missiles. To do all this may well be a major burden on their economy, but we would give them no choice but to assume the burden. We, too, would have to try and develop anti-missile missiles and if the Russians succeed in building such missiles we would have to produce decoys in large quantities in order to neutralize their anti-missile missiles.

The only thing that can halt this kind of an arms race is either an explicit or a tacit agreement on arms limitations. But we will not be in a position to make Russia an acceptable offer on arms limitations until the Government squarely faces the issue whether we want to build up and maintain for a period of from three to five years a strategic striking force which threatens Russia's long range rocket bases and strategic air bases. Only if we abandon this objective will the Government be in a position to propose to the Russians limitations on the strategic striking forces which they might conceivably accept.

In the present circumstances we cannot the possibility that a war might break out that neither Russia or America wants and it is therefore necessary for America to adopt certain restraints which she would impose on herself

in case of such a war and to proclaim these in peace time in such a fashion that in case of such a war and to proclaim ~~these~~ these in peace time in such a fashion that

Russia should understand the nature and purpose of these restraints. Only if such restraints are adopted ahead of time could they in fact be carried out if war should break out and only if such restraints are observed in the case of war would it be possible to avoid a rapid escalation and to gain enough time to be able to arrange for a cessation of hostilities, before there is an all out atomic catastrophe.

Soon after the war, when Russia did not as yet have any atomic bombs, she proposed that the bomb be outlawed. This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs, either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases, or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently, Sulzberger of the New York Times discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of such unilateral pledges, renouncing the use of the bomb. Khrushchev said, on this occasion, that if there were a war, even if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force must no longer be victory. The objective must only be to make a conquest difficult and expensive.

If force is used than an all-out war, which neither side wants, can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory or anything approaching victory. If either side uses force for the purpose of settling the controversial issue on his own terms the war is likely to escalate and end up in an all-out catastrophe, even if only conventional weapons were used at the outset of the war.

Recently, the United Nations Assembly vetoed with a more than two-thirds majority, 55 against 20, to outlaw the use of atomic bombs in war. The use of atomic bombs in warfare was declared by the Assembly to be a crime and a violation

of the United Nations Charter.

Since the machinery of the United Nations was set up for the purpose of maintaining peace among the smaller nations, assuming the cooperation of the great powers to this end, attempts to regard a two-thirds vote of the Assembly as legally binding must necessarily fail. Still the United States must not fly in the face of world opinion and simply disregard the vote of the General Assembly, when a two-thirds vote of the Assembly expresses the legitimate concern of the great majority of the nations that the use of atomic bombs in warfare might lead to a world catastrophe. Rather, out of respect for world opinion and in its own interest, the United States ought to go as far toward complying with it, as valid considerations for her own security would permit.

How far should the United States be expected to go in complying with world opinion at the present time?

Western Europe is not inferior to Russia ~~if~~ either in manpower or in economic resources and it would be possible for Western Europe to build up -- say within five years -- conventional forces to the point where the West could renounce the use of atomic bombs in case of war, except in retaliation if atomic bombs were used against her. It is uncertain, however, whether Western Europe would actually divert economic resources to the production of arms in a sufficient degree to build up its conventional forces to the required level, and in any case at the present time these conventional forces are inferior to those of Russia's. For these reasons the Administration is at the present time unwilling to renounce the use of atomic bombs in case of a war in Europe in which conventional forces are involved in a major war.

If we reject, however, the notion that America may resort in such a case to a massive attack of her strategic striking forces against the long range rocket bases and strategic air bases of Russia as indeed we should, then there is no reason why America should not adopt the following policy:

America shall not use her strategic striking forces for an attack against
America shall not use her strategic striking forces for an attack against

either Russian ~~the~~ bases or Russian cities except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs or if there is an unprovoked attack against the cities or bases of one of America's allies. Further, if in the case of war in Europe America should use atomic bombs against troops in combat she should do so only on our own side of the boundary which existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities. America would impose such a restraint on her conduct of the war as long as Russia imposed a similar restraint on her conduct of war.

Manifestly, this type of use of atomic bombs would be a defensive operation and incidentally, it would be a very effective defensive operation, either on the part of Russia or on the part of America, as long as the restraints remain in effect on both sides.

Such a restraint would be no less clear than the more general renouncing of the bomb, but it would represent a pledge much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge and it would substantially reduce the danger of an all-out war.

When I discussed this issue in Germany three years ago, people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder-Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs, I do not know to what extent West German cities ~~might be destroyed by American bombs, I do~~ could be spared by a judicious tactical use of atomic bombs by American forces, but I do know that ~~if~~ if America were to use bombs beyond the prewar boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

In any case, I am not advocating that if war should break out in Europe, America should use atomic bombs against troops in combat on our side of the pre-war boundary. All I am saying is that we shall be resolved and make it known in advance that we would not use atomic bombs beyond the pre-war boundary as long as Russia doesn't use bombs on our side of the boundary. If force is resorted to escalation can be avoided only if the purpose of the use of force is to make a

conquest difficult, and with luck to prevent it. It would not be possible to fight a limited war and keep it limited if the purpose were to settle the issues involved in our own favor.

As long as there is no agreement providing for arms control, and Russia remains in possession of large stockpiles of bombs, America has no choice but to maintain a strategic atomic striking force. However, it should maintain such a force only as protection against America or her allies being attacked with bombs. The number of bombs retained for this purpose need not be very large, and more important than the number of bombs retained is the invulnerability of the bases from which they would be launched. If these bases are invulnerable, so that no single massive attack against them could substantially damage America's ability to retaliate, then America needs to retain only enough bombs to be able to destroy in retaliation a substantial number of Russia's cities, after giving due notice to permit their orderly evacuation.

It must be made clear, however, that if America adopts the policy here advocated, she thereby renounces the threat of strategic bombing as a general deterrent because she could then make this threat only in case Russia would drop bombs, and drop them on our side of the prewar boundary.

I, personally, do not believe that America would lose much by giving up the threat of strategic bombing, because the deterrent effect of such a threat is negligible unless the threat is believable.

If America were to threaten to drop bombs on a large number of Russian cities in case of war, knowing fullwell that Russia would retaliate by dropping bombs on a large number of American cities, such a threat would be tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide. The threat of merder and suicide would be a believable threat, in the context of the so-called Berlin Crisis, nor would it be a believable threat in the context of any other similar conflict in which America's rights and interests may be at stake, but not America's ~~existence~~ ^{existence} as a nation.

If an increasing number of nations are building major strategic striking forces there might develop a highly unstable situation in which a war that might break out would escalate and could lead to an all-out catastrophe. It could therefore, be very desirable to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons to other nations. In the long run, this can be done only by creating conditions in which these other nations have no strong incentive to build their own nuclear striking force and can be gotten to agree to refrain from building such striking forces. In the meantime, it would be very important for America and Russia to enter into an agreement not to supply any nation with bombs, or means for the delivery of bombs. Such an agreement cannot be obtained if America is going to provide NATO with atomic bombs or the the means for delivery of such bombs. Therefore, at this juncture, America should resolve that atomic bombs and the means suitable for their delivery, which are supplied by her and which are stationed in Europe, shall remain the the hands of the American military units which are under American command, rather than be placed under the control of NATO. As long as America is committed to defend Western Europe, there is no valid argument for turning over bombs to the control of other Western European nations.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the United States government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of balancing any such pressure by bringing domestic political counterpressure to bear on the government.

America should stand firm in opposing the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs by Germany as well as the production of means suitable for their delivery.

As time goes on there might develop a politically integrated Europe and if there is no disarmament it seems likely that Europe would be in a position to develop a strategic atomic striking force. It is not clear, however, that in such a situation Europe would desire or welcome any military protection that the United States might be capable of extending to her. The question of whether

the United States ought to give atomic weapons to apolitically integrated Europe, which it might not be committed to defend, is an issue which is so remote that there is no need for us to concern ourselves with it at the present time.

1 (B) MILITARY POLICIES

Unless the Government adopts a clear military policy which does not provoke an all out arms race, there will be such an arms race and it will be possible to arrive either tacitly or overtly to an agreement providing for arms limitations. Because our current military posture cannot fail but to provoke such an arms race it ought to be replaced as soon as possible by a clear policy which safeguards our security without provoking a all out arms race.

APPENDIX

INHERENT LIMITATIONS

In my own view, it may well be possible to find a satisfactory solution to this problem, but before we begin to look for such solutions, we had better recognize their inherent limitations.

In 1945, those who drafted the United Nations Charter reported as their job to devise some machinery for the purpose of securing the peace that would work as long as the great powers would cooperate to this end. They were fully aware of the fact that in the world as it exists today, it would not be possible to set up a machinery which would work in a conflict that involves great powers on opposite sides or be capable of coercing a great power such as, for instance, America or the Soviet Union. Giving the permanent members of the Security Council the right

to veto was an expression of this limitation, and it is important to understand that it is an expression of a limitation rather than the cause of it.

Attempts to use the machinery of the United Nations for purposes other than those for which it was intended has obscured this basic fact and it might be well to remember that if the People's Republic of China had been seated as one of the permanent members of the Security Council at the time of the Korean War, troops fighting under the flag of the United Nations would not have crossed the 38th Parallel into North Korea, and the United Nations would not have been embroiled in a war against the People's Republic of China -- a war which it was not able to win.

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you are not... where... stand...

3 May 1962

CAN WE GET OFF THE ROAD TO WAR ?

by Leo Szilard

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INTRODUCTION

During the first World War, Karinthy, a Hungarian writer, told on one occasion that he had been sitting at his desk wondering about the causes of wars and trying to write an essay ^{on} about this topic, when ~~there were~~ ^{he was interrupted by} loud noises coming from the nursery. He opened the door and found his children engaged in a free for all. "John," he said sternly to the ^{his} eldest, "who started this fight?" "It started," said John, "when Paul hit me back".

For a number of years now we have had an opportunity to observe how ~~we~~, as a nation respond to the action of the Russians and how the Russians respond to our responses and ^{I believe} ~~to me it seems~~ that war is inevitable unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present. There is not very much that individual Americans can do in order to influence the Russian Government; it follows that they would have to bring about a change in the attitude in the American Government which in turn might bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian Government.

The only ^{at present} ~~people who~~ can understand what is going on, and ^{we may be} ~~who might be~~ able to say what course the United States ought to follow in the next ^{few} years in order to get off the road to war, are those ^{people} who are capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective. ^{they are} ~~in all probability, they are~~ in the minority. Still this minority might ^{perhaps} ~~be able to~~ change the course of events if they could unite on a set of political objectives. I shall try to outline ^{further} ~~below~~ a set of political objectives on which, in my opinion, ^{such a} ~~this~~ minority ^{could} ~~might~~ be able ^{later on} ~~to agree~~.

of this you write on... an upward income of 1-40 dollars in political... a million...

might be likely to agree... later on... would be able to...

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My Stay in Washington

 You cannot get very far discussing the merits of such political objectives before someone will ask you, "Can the Russians be trusted?" This question of trust has kept coming up at the Pugwash meetings also and ^{at first} it was mostly the Russians who raised it. On one such occasion I said to our ^{Russian} American colleagues, "If you mean, that you expect the American people to trust your government, then there is something I must say to you. The American people do not trust their own government; how can you expect them to trust someone else's government."

Gradually our Russian colleagues who attended the Pugwash meetings came to understand better the real issues which are involved and they stopped raising the issue of "trust". The last time it came up, if my memory is correct, was one evening at the ^{the Pugwash conference} meeting held in Baden near Vienna when, with the exception of our Russian colleagues, everybody had gone to Vienna to the opera and I was left alone at dinner with the Russians. On that occasion I sat next to B, an outstanding mathematician and physicist, who speaks English fluently. Whatever I said to him was said for his benefit only, but whenever I said something that ~~he~~ thought the others ought to hear also he interrupted the general conversation in order to translate what I had said to him. At one point I said that I had never met Khrushchev, but somehow I had the feeling that I knew him, that I believed Khrushchev understood what Russia's real interests were and I trusted him to pursue these interests effectively, while trying to keep the risk of war at a minimum. "But", I continued, "I do not know who is going to succeed him and his successor I neither know nor trust."

At this point B interrupted me and while he translated what I had said I looked at the Russians who were sitting around the table. They sat there with mournful faces, in silence: manifestly they did not know who would succeed Khrushchev either and they didn't trust him either.

"Can Russia be trusted to keep an agreement?" He who poses the question in this form implies that he believes some of the other great powers involved could be trusted to keep an agreement in force, even if they no longer regarded it to be in their interest to do so ~~and~~ ^{and} the facts recorded by history do not sustain such a belief.

If Russia enters into an agreement, providing for far reaching disarmament, she will do so because she considers disarmament to be in her interest and she can be trusted to keep such an agreement in force, ^{continues to} as long as she ~~believes~~ ^{believes} disarmament to be in her interest. The only question which is open to ~~debate~~ ^{doubt} is whether we may expect the future leadership of the Soviet Union to be as intelligent and realistic as their present leadership and to see with equal clarity that far reaching disarmament serves Russia's best interests.

Entering into an agreement with Russia, which provides for far reaching disarmament, involves, to this extent, a certain amount of trust and there can be no other basis for such trust that the general set of values prevailing in Russia. One may make, of course, a distinction between the Russian government and the Russian people in this regard, just as one may make such a distinction between the American government and the American people, still ~~neither~~ neither the American government nor the Russian government operates in a vacuum, and the members of both governments are ^{by and} largely guided by the ~~same~~ ^{same} set of values which prevail in their countries.

In order to gain insight into the set of values which prevails in Russia, an American would have to establish close personal contact with Russians. He cannot gain this insight merely by reviewing the historical events of the post war years or by reading Pravda. Those "Russian experts" who talk and write

about Russia, without ever having had direct personal contacts with Russians in Russia, remind me of those clinicians, rapidly increasing in numbers these days, who order elaborate ~~laboratory~~ ^{clinical} tests and ~~diagnose the disease~~ ^{then proceed to}, without ever looking at the patient.

My first look at the Russians and my first glimpse into their set of values came five years ago at the first Pugwash conference which was held at Pugwash, Nova Scotia. It was scheduled to last three days and we were supposed to conclude ~~it~~ ^{it} by issuing a public statement, expressing the concensus of the participants on the problem of ~~peace~~ ^{war}. On the very first day of the conference, I met Topchiev, at that time General Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., by chance early in the morning at breakfast and I asked him whether the Russians really felt that we must come up with a statement at the ~~end~~ ^{conclusion} of the conference. It was a foregone conclusion that drafting such a statement would be a time consuming and frustrating affair, but Topchiev said that, ~~indeed~~ we must come up with a statement. I told him that I ~~was~~ ^{had been} afraid that this would be his view but there would be no need for the conference to waste ~~time~~ ^{its} on ~~the~~ ^{the} drafting of a ~~statement~~ ^{statement} because I had ~~prepared~~ ^{already} a statement ~~ahead of time~~ before I left Chicago. This was the first of the Pugwash meetings, the Russians were exceedingly suspicious of the American participants, and to all appearances, Topchiev suspected that ~~I~~ ^I was about to put something ~~over~~ on him and his Russian colleagues. ~~He~~ ^{Topchiev} asked me ~~at once~~ to show him the statement I had drafted. I said that my statement was so simple that there was ~~no need~~ ^{even} to write it down and that the whole statement ~~can~~ ^{could} be summed up in two sentences. The first sentence ~~reads~~ ^{would} "We do not believe in capitalism", and this would be signed ~~by~~ ^{all} the Americans because the American participants are familiar with the drawbacks

of capitalism. The second sentence ^{would} reads 'We do not believe in communism' and this should be signed by ~~all~~ the Russians because by now the Russians should know something ^{gone in answer} about the drawbacks of communism." The broad grin ^{ing} which Topchiev ~~responded~~ gave me the first ^{afforded} glimpse into the set of values of our Russian colleagues.

When Khrushchev was in New York a year ago last October, on a visit to the United Nations, I asked to see him and was told by the Soviet Ambassador that they could schedule ~~no~~ more than 15 minutes for me. This was not what I ^{had} wanted; I had prepared a long memorandum, listing the questions to which I had wanted to get Khrushchev's reaction, ^{and} on the assumption that I might have several hours with Khrushchev and I had ^{promised} a Russian translation of this memorandum. I told the Ambassador, however, that I would take 15 minutes, if I couldn't get more. The next morning the Ambassador called and asked if I could come over right away to the New York headquarters of the ^{Subjects} ~~United Nations~~ delegation to see the Chairman. I asked how much time I would have, and was again told that they couldn't schedule more than 15 Minutes for me.

I started the conversation by handing Khrushchev a little present -- a Schick Injecto Razor. I told him that this was not an expensive razor, but it was a very good one; ^{I found this} that I wanted him to try it out and ^{that} if he liked it I would keep him supplied with blades -- as long as there was no war. Khrushchev replied that if there is war he would stop shaving.

^{Next} First I asked Khrushchev whether he would like to read through the memorandum I had prepared, even though we would have no time to discuss more than just a small portion of it. He ^{read the memo} read the memorandum, and I raised one by one the issues which I believed to be the most important. ^{When} When the 15 minutes were up I asked the Ambassador whether we should terminate the conference. ^{and he} The Ambassador said, "It seems that the Chairman would like to go on".

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Thereafter I stopped every 15 minutes and each time the Ambassador gave the same ~~reply~~ ^{answer}. We had started at 11 o'clock in the morning and by one o'clock ~~I had raised~~ ^{we covered} all the issues which were ~~covered~~ ^{listed in my} by the memorandum.

The question came up why ~~so few~~ ^{Have there} Americans in responsible positions ~~were~~ ^{who} ~~wholeheartedly~~ ^{were} in favor of disarmament. I said that many Americans ~~expressed~~ ^{had} doubts whether it would be possible to provide for adequate inspection, but that the problem of inspection was not the main stumbling block and solving ~~the~~ ^{this} problem of inspection would not by itself convince many Americans that disarmament was a desirable goal. Disarmament would not by itself guarantee peace and even with ~~an~~ inspection going full blast armies equipped with machine guns could spring up so to speak overnight. It was not easy to see how one would secure ~~the~~ ^{the} peace in a disarmed world.

At this point Khrushchev picked out a passage from my memorandum which read as follows:

"Clearly, a world police force, under the central command of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union in the present circumstances, and it might ^{not} be acceptable to the United States in the circumstances that might prevail a few years hence."

Khrushchev said that this ~~sentence~~ ^{passage} showed him that I understood ~~where~~ ^{me} the ~~difficulties would come~~ ^{nature of the} and added that in his opinion these difficulties could be ~~removed by reorganization~~ ^{overcome reorganising} of the Secretariat of the United Nations along the lines he had suggested. I said that I was not certain whether the reorganization he ~~proposed~~ ^{had} would be workable from an administration point of view and ~~that for the moment~~ ^{we} ~~me~~ ^{should perhaps} I would like to stick to the narrow ^{or} question of how armed forces, operating under United Nations auspices, ~~might~~ ^{would have to be} be set up in order to make them acceptable both to the Soviet Union and to America. Khrushchev encouraged me to say what I had

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in mind and I said the following: If there is disarmament, there might be a number of disturbed regions in the world where there would be a need for a United Nations police force. There might be three such regions and there might be even six. Instead of thinking in terms of setting up a world police force operating under a central command, perhaps we ought to think in terms of setting up a number of regional police forces, one for each troubled region. Each such regional force would then be controlled by a ^{different} slate of, ~~xx~~ say, five nations, ^{those nations would be} (drawn from outside of the region) ^{such slate would} and they would appoint the commander-in-chief of their regional force. All such ~~xx~~ regional forces would operate under United Nations' auspices inasmuch as the slate of the five nations, in charge of a given region, would need to have ^{be} the approval ^{approved by} of the majority of the Security Council, with the ^{course. make it} five permanent members of the Security Council ~~concurring~~. Clearly, the selection of these slates would require negotiations among the great powers, ^{just} America might agree not to veto a slate ^{of the world} favored by Russia for a certain region provided that Russia agrees not to veto a slate favored by America for a certain other region.

I ^{said} stressed that it would be much easier for Americans to accept general disarmament if America could ^{sanction} free herself from her commitments militarily to protect regions which are geographically remote from America, ~~by turning over this responsibility to police forces operating under United Nations auspices~~. Prior to the advent of the atomic bomb, America's military sphere of influence did not extend to remote regions of the world and the same was true also for Russia. In an armed world America ~~xx~~ and Russia ~~can~~ ^{more able to} extend their sphere of military influence to any part of the world but ^{if} there is general disarmament, then once more Russia's and America's sphere of influence ^{would have to} will shrink and, as far as direct military influence goes, ^{it may be} it will be limited to areas lying in their own geographical proximity.

In a disarmed world Russia would be in no position to protect Cuba against a possible American military intervention, nor would American be in a position to protect, say, Turkey or South Korea against a possible Russian or Chinese military intervention.

But American and Russia could retain ~~some~~ ^{influence} influence over regions which are geographically ~~removed~~ ^{separate} from both of them if there were set up in such regions, regional police forces under the United Nations ~~and they had influence on~~ ^{inspired} and they had influence on the selection of the slate of nations in control of the various ~~regional forces.~~ ^{regions}

Khrushchev said that this is precisely what he would be afraid of and that ~~he would fear that~~ the nations in a region where such a regional force operates would come under the control of the nations who controlled the regional police force.

I did not want to belabor this point very much further because what ⁺ was trying to do was to find out what ^{issues} Khrushchev regarded ~~to be~~ ^{as} the crucial ^{ones} issues and there would have been no point in trying to go further on this occasion to argue in favor of a specific solution of ~~one~~ ^{one} of these issues.

I told Khrushchev that since America has at present military commitments to defend areas which are in Russia's geographical proximity, I did not see how disarmament could be politically acceptable to America except if there were a political settlement which would permit America to free herself from these commitments without too much loss of prestige and without sacrificing the security of the other nations who are involved. I then tried to illustrate this point by discussing the Berlin issue, in this ~~context~~, and found that Khrushchev was fully aware of this aspect of the disarmament ~~problem~~.

Concerning the problem of inspection ~~I said to Khrushchev that I assumed~~ that Russia would put no limitations on the numbers of inspectors operating in Russian territory if disarmament were an accomplished fact, but ^{that} that I personally was not


so sure that foreign inspectors, even if admitted in unlimited numbers, could discover ~~every~~ rocket or bomb that the Russian Government ^{would} ~~might want~~ to hide. I therefore wondered whether the Soviet ^{govt} ~~Union~~ would be willing to ~~try~~ to create conditions in which a Russian citizen would feel that ~~he~~ is fulfilling a patriotic duty if he reported a violation of a disarmament agreement to ^{an} ~~the~~ International Control Commission ^{if this could be done} so that the world could then rely on Russian citizen's reporting Russian violations, rather than being forced to rely upon foreign inspectors. ^(warning issued on Russia) The same question ^{was addressed to K} had been ~~raised~~ a few days earlier, by a colleague of mine at a luncheon given by Cyrus Eaton which I ~~had~~ attended, and Khrushchev's answer ^{was heard} ~~was~~ in the affirmative. I told Khrushchev that I ^{had been} ~~was~~ present at this luncheon and that I ~~had~~ heard his answer, but that I was not sure that he fully understood at that time the implications of his answer. I told Khrushchev ^{further} that if ~~he~~ ^{he}, fully realizing the implications, ^{he} were to give an affirmative answer, this is something that people ought to know about, because it could have a marked effect on the attitude of many Americans towards the problem of disarmament. Khrushchev replied that he thought ^{he} fully understood the implications ~~of the question~~ but that if ~~he~~ I had any doubt about it I could ^{take a piece of paper} sit down and spell out what I have in mind in detail, and if I wrote ^{down} what he, Khrushchev, thought I would write ^{down} ~~he would have no~~ ^{not} ~~hesitation~~ ^{at} to sign the document right then and there. Important though this issue was, I did not think that I ought to spend any more time on the ~~the~~ specific point and therefore I merely said that we might find some better way for him to make his views known on this subject.

It was by this time and date

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APPENDIX

ON BEING HUMAN


 ~~At one o'clock~~ I said to Khrushchev that I didn't want to take up any more of his time but still wanted to show him how to insert new blades into the razor which I had brought and how to clean the razor after use. This done, Khrushchev

omit

said that he felt that he, too, would like to do something for me and how would I feel if he were to send me a case of vodka. I said that I wondered if I couldn't have something better than vodka. "What do you have in mind," said Khrushchev, and I said, "Borjum." A few days earlier when Khrushchev delivered one of his long speeches before the United Nations, he had a glass of mineral water in front of him from which he drank from time to time and ~~once~~ ^{several times} he pointed to it and said, "Borjum, excellent Russian mineral water." When I said, "Borjum", Khrushchev beamed. "We have two kinds of mineral water in Russia," he said, "they are both excellent and ~~we~~ ^{we} shall send you samples of both."

The next day I was back in my room in the hospital when the door opened and in came a young man from the Russian Delegation accompanied by a porter carrying a large case of Russian mineral water of two varieties, ^{with the compliments of the chairman.}

The story I am telling ^{you} here is not quite as pointless as it might seem. People are not going to solve the problem posed by the bomb just by being nice to each other. Still discussions of this problem between Americans and Russians are likely to be more productive if the American who conducts such conversations with a Russian indicates at the very outset that he is aware ~~of~~ of the fact that his Russian counterpart is a human being also, who has much the same needs as he has, and might be beset by the same difficulties as he is. I, for one, have found in my conversations with Russians that all one needs to do is somehow tacitly to establish at the outset that there are important basic premisses on which we ~~all~~ agree. Having done so it is thereafter possible to engage in reasoned arguments based on these common premises. If there is disagreement one must then go back and examine whether the disagreement is due to some faulty reasoning or whether it is due to some basic assumptions on which we differ.



~~in America~~

There is a school of thought which holds that there is no use talking to the Russians and that the only thing to which they respond is power. This tenet has been expounded in one of ~~his~~ his major foreign policy speeches by Dean Acheson when he was Secretary of State. He compared Russia with a river. "There is no use arguing with a river" so he said, "all you can do is to build a dam and by doing so you may keep it under control." It might well be true that there would be no use for Dean Acheson to argue with his Russian counterparts. He might well be among those Americans who are constitutionally unable to communicate with Russians ~~of Khrushchev's type.~~ ^{potentially with Russians} I, personally, found it ~~no~~ easy to communicate with ^(K.) just by being myself and the conversations which I had with him helped me to gain certain insight. I cannot know for certain to what extent I was able to get across to him ~~some~~ ^{any} of the ~~things~~ ^{things} that I believed to be true, but the last speech which he ~~read~~ ^{gave} on the American soil, just a few days after ~~the~~ ^{any} conversation which we had included the following passage:


"The Soviet Union will not agree to disarmament so long as there is no assurance that the international armed forces, (the creation of which is anticipated in solving the problems of disarmament,) will be in reliable hands and will not be utilized to inflict damage upon a state or group of states. We do not request any privilege for ourselves. But we shall never consent to privileges being granted to other groups of states."

"The Soviet Union will not agree to disarmament so long as" --

I wonder if Khrushchev would have put it quite that way if ~~the~~ it hadn't been for our conversation, ^{a few days earlier.}

There are many Americans who ~~do not find it easy~~ ^{are not able} to communicate with Khrushchev ^{and} or other Russians of a similar type ~~just~~ just by being themselves. But they could be given a few clues in this regard by those who have no ~~such~~ difficulty in communicating. Because I believed this to be true, following my conversation with Khrushchev, I

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APPENDIX

sought an opportunity to see Kennedy after he was elected and before he took office. I did not expect that there would be any difficulty in arranging for such an interview, but found that I had been mistaken and I did not get to see the president elect. The Vienna meeting has shown that Kennedy and Khrushchev have serious difficulties in communicating with each other and unless someone is able to get across to Kennedy how to talk to Khrushchev, or to Khrushchev how to talk to Kennedy, this failure of communications is likely to persist.

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sought an opportunity to see Kennedy after he was elected and before he took office. I had ~~no reason to believe~~ ^{did not expect} that there would be any difficulty in arranging for ~~me to see him,~~ ^{such an interview} but found to my regret that I had been mistaken and I did not get to see the president elect. The Vienna meeting ~~has~~ ^{seems} shown that Kennedy and Khrushchev have ~~difficulty in communicating~~ ^{difficulty} with each other and unless someone is able to get across to Kennedy how to talk to Khrushchev, or to Khrushchev how to talk to Kennedy, this failure of communications is likely to persist.

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Two months after my conversation with Khrushchev I checked out of the hospital in New York where I had been confined for over a year, took a taxi to the airport and flew to Moskow to attend the ^{of the} Pugwash Conference. I was accompanied by my wife who ^{is} ~~was~~ also my doctor and I stayed in Moskow several weeks beyond the end of the Conference. I stayed on in Moskow in order to engage in private conversations with our Russian colleagues, because I knew from experience that only in private conversations is it possible to get anything across to them or to discover what they really believe to be true.

None of our Russian colleagues brought up the issue of bomb tests, even though two years earlier some of them had been passionately interested in this issue. I found, however, an undiminished interest in the kind of far-reaching disarmament which would result in substantial savings. On one occasion I had tea with Fedorov, the General Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with no one present except my interpreter. I had met Fedorov before and I always got along well with him. On this particular occasion, he spoke to me as follows:

You must really believe me when I tell you that we want general disarmament. You have seen all this construction work going on in Moskow; it has been going on for many years; still we are not able to catch up with the housing

shortage. If we had disarmament, we could not only solve this problem, but many of our other economic problems as well. Also, we could develop other nations on an unprecedented scale. So far, we are building only one hydro-electric dam in Africa -- the Aswan Dam in Egypt; if we had disarmament, we could, and we would, build twenty such dams in Africa.

I have no doubt whatever that Federov meant what he said.

When I got around to discussing the problem of inspection with ^{an} Russian colleagues, I discovered that those of my colleagues of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR who had been scheduled to attend the 6th Pugwash Conference, had received a detailed report of the conversation which I had with Khrushchev in New York. In this report, Khrushchev was quoted as having said to me that the

~~Soviet~~ ^{State} Soviet Union would give serious consideration to the possibility of creating conditions where, in a disarmed state, ~~the world~~ ^{world would} could rely on Soviet citizens reporting violations of a disarmament agreement to the International

Control Commission. ^{an} As a result of this report, the door was opened to ~~a~~ ^{for me} serious discussion of this topic. ~~I~~ ^{It} told my Russian colleagues that creating

conditions in which ~~the~~ ^a Soviet citizen would feel that he is doing his patriotic duty if he reports a secret violation of the disarmament agreement to an

International Control Commission, would ~~pose an exceedingly difficult task to the~~ ^{it is not necessary} Government of the Soviet Union, and that I was not certain whether they would succeed ^{it is not possible} in accomplishing this task.

Today, if a taxicab driver in Moscow picks up a foreigner at his hotel, then, after he delivers him at his destination in Moscow, he is supposed to call the police and make a report. ^{It is true that} Today, we find ourselves in an arms race with Russia, and admittedly, many things ^{might} be possible in a disarmed world which ^{would} may not be possible today, but still ~~we would be assuming~~ ^{the subject would have to have} a degree of flexibility on the part of the

~~Soviet Government~~ which few other governments possess, if ~~we were to assume that~~ ^{it} the Soviet Government would be able to progress within a few years to ^{the point} where a Russian citizen ^{can} ~~may be made to~~ ^{may} feel that he is fulfilling a patriotic duty if he reports a violation of a disarmament agreement to an International Control Commission. ^{I had a rather} ~~The most~~ reassuring conversation that I ~~had~~ in this regard ~~was~~ with Peter Kapitza, whom I knew well from the time when he lived in England. He believed ^{is} that the Soviet Government ~~was~~ ^{is} capable of great flexibility, provided there ~~was~~ ^{is} a strong ^{motivation} ~~for this flexibility.~~ Kapitza ~~thought~~ ^{said} ~~that~~ that the Soviet Government has demonstrated such flexibility on a number of occasions when ~~the issue was to~~ ^{it} ~~achieve~~ ^{something that} ~~what~~ the Government really wanted, and the Soviet Government -- so Kapitza thought -- really wanted general disarmament.

My contacts in Moscow were not restricted, ~~however,~~ ^{and this was} to my colleagues in the Academy ~~which is~~ ^{know something} fortunate because one needs to understand the Russian attitude ^{generally} towards disarmament within the general framework of the set of values ~~prevailing~~ ^{prevailing} in Russia.

I had two long ^{with} interviews ~~with~~ the director of a Russian Government publishing house and his staff. Someone told ~~him~~ ^{them} that I was in Moscow and asked them whether they would want to publish ~~a Russian translation of~~ my little book, "The Voice of the Dolphins". Because I was regarded as a distinguished visitor, the director of the publishing house felt duty-bound to explain to me en extenso why ^{it would be unreasonable for them that they} they couldn't be reasonably expected to publish ~~a translation of~~ my book. This took two ~~longer~~ ^{longer} sessions during which I faced, ~~also~~ ^{with} my interpreter, the director and seven of his staff ~~members~~ ^{members} who had all read the book. ^{It seems that} Even though it was a foregone ~~at~~ ^{that it} conclusion that they would not publish ~~the whole thing~~ they wanted to find out why I had said in the book what I had said.

When it was all over I told them that at long last ⁺ understood the basic difference between ~~the~~ Soviet Society and American Society: In America the author gives trouble to the publisher -- in Russia the publisher gives trouble to the author.

During the first session, we had ^{part} some of ^{an} the discussion ^{centered on} revolved around the issue of disarmament, and they wanted to know whether I thought that disarmament could be accomplished in the near future. They were genuinely interested and concerned and I told them ~~frankly~~ ^{frankly} that I did not see how disarmament could be accomplished without ^{a)} concurrent political settlement. I added that I could visualize without too much difficulty a political settlement in Europe but that I had difficulties visualizing such a settlement in the Far East. I told them that any constructive policies, which the Administration might want to adopt with respect to China, would be likely to run into difficulties in Congress and I explained to them that Congress had a ^{somewhat} rather emotional attitude towards this issue.

At the end of the second session, when I was about to leave, the conversation returned to ^{disarmament and they asked me if there was something that} what I ~~could~~ ^{could} do about it when I got back to America. "I really don't know," I said to them, ^{what I could do. Perhaps} "Probably, I ought to pray to God, every night ^{pray to God} that He shall make a big earthquake and Formosa shall sink into the Pacific Ocean." "Would it not be simpler for God," one of them asked, "to enlighten the American Congress?" "I rather believe," I said, "it would be easier for God to make a big earthquake."

My visit to Moscow was the first one I ever made and a month's time is not very much even if you make a serious effort to learn as much as you can. Still this visit has convinced me that the idea of peace, and ^{disarmament} as a means to peace, is

~~upmost~~ in the minds of most people with whom generally cherished by most intellectuals in Russia.

I have no hard and fast evidence to prove ~~that this is correct~~. The closest ^{to what may be regarded as evidence} is perhaps the fact that Russian economists go to a lot of trouble these days to convince Americans that general and complete disarmament could be accomplished without throwing the American economy into a tailspin. This appears to be the party line, and it is a far cry from the previous party line, which asserted that America is opposed to disarmament because, under the American economic system, a major depression would be unavoidable if America were to disarm.

as I do -
If I say that Russia would very much want to have disarmament and would be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it, I may be asked to explain why, ^{from} Russia's negotiations on ~~x~~ disarmament -- much like America's own negotiations on this subject -- are mainly guided by the public relations aspect, rather than the substantive aspect of this issue. I may be asked to explain also why the Soviet Government has not enlisted the help of Soviet ^{and scholars} scientists in ^{serious} studies of the subject of disarmament any more than has the American Government. My answer is, that the Soviet Government, while it wants disarmament, does not believe that America comes anywhere near to accepting disarmament -- no matter what concessions Russia ^{would} be willing to make on the issue of inspection.

To the Russians, America's position on disarmament appears to come very close to being fraudulent.

On the surface, America is formally committed to general and complete disarmament, but if you look below the surface, the picture changes.

John J. McCloy, who up ~~to~~ until recently was head of the Disarmament Agency in the State Department, said just the other day on television that America wants disarmament, but that a disarmed world is acceptable to America only if there is set

up an international armed force so strong that no single nation could stand up to it.

~~If a disarmed world means that atomic bombs are eliminated, then what matters mostly~~
~~in case of war is what used to be called the "war potential" of the nations involved,~~
~~which is mainly determined by their industrial strength. It follows that it would~~
 be physically impossible to set up an international army so strong that neither
 Russia nor America could stand up to it, except, of course, if that international
 army is made to be the sole possessor of ~~atomic bombs~~. This, on the other hand,
 would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and it would also be unacceptable to the
 United States. Therefore, what John J. McCloy ~~said~~ ^{says} is tantamount to saying that
 America is willing to have disarmament, but only under conditions which she, herself,
 would not accept.

These days, I am frequently asked by disarmament enthusiasts whether progress
 towards disarmament in America is blocked by the industrial military complex of which
~~Eisenhower~~ ^{President} spoke in his last speech in office. It is quite possible that a time
 might come when we will have to worry about the vested interests which are opposed
 to disarmament and ~~win them over~~ ^{will have to} by offering them adequate compensation for the
 losses which they would suffer if disarmament became a reality. But right now, to
 my mind, progress towards disarmament is ~~impelled~~ ^{impeded} not because so many people are
~~opposed to it, but rather because so few people are wholeheartedly in favor of it.~~
^{strongly}

In the course of last year, Richard Barnett ^{from Harvard} moved ~~to Washington to join the~~
~~U.S. Disarmament Agency.~~ ^{in Washington} Before he came to Washington, he had written a book
 "Who Wants Disarmament?", and when he ~~got~~ ^{came} to Washington, I told him that ~~in a few~~
~~months time I would like to discuss with him the possibility of changing the~~
~~title of his book for the next edition.~~ ^{a new title for} Recently, he reminded me of this, and asked
 me what title I had in mind when I made this remark. "How would you feel" I said
 "about ~~the~~ ^{such} a title like 'Who the Hell Wants Disarmament?' Being an official of the

Government, he would not comment, of course, but he did not ^{quite} manage to ~~supress~~ ^{plus} a smile.

Why are ^{plus} so few people in Washington ^{subv are} wholeheartedly in favor of disarmament? I believe the answer is that substantial economic savings to which disarmament would lead, (which is the main motivation for disarmament for the Soviet Union) does not provide a strong motivation for America and in the absence of this motivation, fear of the unknown becomes the predominant factor.

The fact of the matter is that disarmament will not automatically guarantee peace. To ask how the peace would be secured in a disarmed world is a legitimate question, and it is not surprising that responsible Americans would want to know the answer to it before committing themselves to general and complete disarmament.

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Within some

A nation located in such a region, ^{and} improvised with machine guns, could spring up, so to speak, overnight and ^(and it could) attack one of the ~~the~~ neighboring nations. How could, in a disarmed world, the peace be secured in the disturbed regions of the world?

T.W.

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LONG EXPOSE

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(Page 19)

THE IMPENDING SUMMER STUDY

~~How useful such a purely American study would be, I do not know.~~ What I believe is needed at this point is to arrange through ~~the~~ private initiative, but with the blessing of the American and Soviet Governments, for nongovernmental discussions among a carefully chosen group of Americans and Russians, ~~which will be~~ focused on the issue of how to secure peace in a disarmed world.

Such a study would ~~then~~ extend over a period of three or four months, would be conducted on a full-time basis and the Russian and American participants would work jointly part of the time in Moscow and part of the time in Washington on the problems involved. The aim of the study would be to produce a working paper that would list ~~some of the different ways in which peace could be secured~~ a number of different ways in which peace might be secured in a disarmed world and to examine in each particular case in what circumstances each particular solution might be likely to fail. By proceeding in this manner, none of the solutions could be labeled as an American or a Russian proposal, and being free from this stigma the proposals would be more likely to receive sympathetic consideration on the part of the governments involved.

It may well be possible to find a

~~I believe that this problem is capable of a satisfactory solution, but there exists inherent limitations which need to be recognized at the outset. To abolish war and to have an enduring peace in a livable world, is in my opinion, an attainable objective. "Just peace is not an attainable objective, and if we stubbornly persist in asking for peace with justice, we may not get either peace or justice.~~

In the meantime ... who should be the ...

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I am rather firmly convinced that until such time as America and Russia reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world, it will be impossible for them to conduct a serious negotiation on far-reaching disarmament. In the absence of any major progress towards an agreement on disarmament the government ought to adopt



Split

ad. int.

A.) It would go post

B.) It won't go at all

It won't be very post
content in the meantime

1.) policies that will reduce the danger that a war may break out in the next few years that neither Russia nor America want.

2.) policies that will make it possible to arrange for the cessation of hostilities before there is an all-out catastrophe, in case such a war should break out.

FOREIGN POLICIES

In order to minimize the danger that such a war may break out the Government ought to resolve to stop fighting meaningless battles in the cold war. Nothing is gained by winning such battles and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed.

Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among nations. The first director of this agency was an American, and his term expired last year. Since, next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, America could have proposed that the next director of the agency be a Russian, and since America had the votes she was able to win one more victory in a meaningless battle of the cold war.

~~All~~ ^{What} this "victory" accomplished was to reduce the chances of finding some useful function for this agency, because the Russians resent being ~~pushed~~ ^{in it} around in this agency and there is no way for us to force them to play ball.

~~I believe that it would be important for the government to reach a major policy decision, and for the President to issue an executive order against fighting ~~meaningless~~ meaningless battles in the cold war.~~

We have a cultural exchange program with the Russians but their State Department and our State Department are playing a game of "if you hit our scientists, we shall hit your scientists." Accordingly, our State Department imposes senseless travel restrictions on our Russian colleagues who visit this country. These travel restrictions are not aimed at the safe-guarding of any secrets, but are merely a way of hitting back at travel restrictions which the Soviet government occasionally imposes on American scientists who travel about in Russia.

I met B, ~~a distinguished Russian mathematician and physicist in New York~~ ^{in New York} on his way ~~back~~ ^{from} from one of the high energy conferences in Rochester. ~~He told me on that occasion that Silas Eaton invited him to visit him in Cleveland, but that he could not go because time was short and he would have had to fly to Cleveland, because the State Department took the position that while the normal route of planes which fly from Rochester to Cleveland do not fly over any territory which Russians must not enter, depending on weather conditions, the planes sometimes detour and on that occasion they might fly over ~~any~~ forbidden territory. On this basis the State Department declined to give B permission to fly from Rochester to Cleveland.~~

When Prof. ~~B~~ ^{Edwards} recently visited Washington he asked for permission ~~on his way~~ ^{on his way home} home to spend a few ~~or~~ days in New York and attend a conference on rockets which was in progress at that time in New York. Because no American ~~was~~ ^{had been} invited to s

similar conference in Russia, the State Department refused him permission to attend the New York conference. Sedov said, ^{that} in that case, he would just go to New York and spend a few days shopping and sightseeing and was thereupon told by the State Department that he was forbidden to go to New York as long as the conference which he must not attend remained in session.

Pinpricks of this sort are not going to lead to war, but they are not conducive to ~~the maintenance of a straightening~~ ^{making} peace either. *of*

War might break out as the result of commitments which the United States has made in the post war years and which led the United States to hold positions which are difficult to defend militarily, morally, or legally. Some of these positions ought to be liquidated at once. Concerning ^{some of} the others we ought to set a ^{more distant} date for their liquidation, but set a date, nevertheless.


During the Korean war President Truman sent the 7th Fleet into the Straits of Formosa, as a strictly temporary measure. The Fleet was sent there impartially ^{to} prevent hostilities between the Peoples' Republic of China and the "ationalist Chinese Government ~~of~~ Formosa. President Truman's assurance that the Fleet would be withdrawn after the Korean War was ~~repudiated~~ ^{not honored} by the next Administration and thereafter the role assigned to the 7th Fleet was no longer impartial. Its role became ^{rather} to protect Formosa against the Peoples' Republic of China. ^{honored has} We have no similar clear commitment to protect ^{Holland} Quemoy and Matsu, which are close to the mainland, but whenever these islands come under attack we ^{say} intimate that we are not goint to yield to force and when they are not under attack we conveniently forget about them. It is doubtful whether these island would be militarily defensible if the Peoples' Republic of China ~~should~~ ^{would} decide to take them by force, and whether we have ~~any~~ ^{any} legal or moral right to defend them.

The ^{continued} occupation of these islands by Chang Kai Chek might provide

the Peoples' Republic of China with a strong motivation for trying to develop a strategic atomic striking force. ~~and~~ China is in a difficult economic position and how much ~~this would affect a decision to develop strategic striking forces in a major way,~~ ^{from these difficulties} ~~might well depend on how strongly they~~ ^{are being} ~~are provoked to do so.~~ ^{defer her from the Chinese} I have little doubt that those in responsible position in the Administration know at this point that we ought to induce Chang Kai Chek to withdraw from these islands, but for one reason or another, they are dragging their feet.

In the post war years Korea and Viet Nam were divided by the stroke of a pen and we have assumed a ^{major} ~~leading~~ role both in South Korea and South Viet Nam. We seem to have adopted ^{all} a philosophy that by preventing South Korea and South Viet Nam from uniting with their northern counterparts we are preventing the spread o communism in Southeast Asia. Whether it is possible to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia by ^{building} ~~holding~~ this kind of Maginot Line ~~remains~~ to be seen.

If we were able to establish in South Korea and in Sout Viet Nam a certain ^{standard} ~~degree~~ of freedom and if we were able to develop these countries economically there could be, perhaps, no moral objection to prolonging our intervention indefinitely, even though by doing so we may be preventing the unification of these countries. But if the ^{economies of the} northern ~~half~~ halves of these countries are developed by the communists much more rapidly and if ^{the northern halves} they are not appreciably less free than the southern ^{halves} part, then we have no moral right indefinitely to prolong ^{our} intervention. I believe we ought to set a date by which we must either establish that we are capable of benefitting these countries, or else we must terminate our intervention soon thereafter.



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MILITARY POLICIES

Unless the Government adopts a clear military policy which does not provoke an all out arms race, there will be such an arms race and it will be possible to arrive either ^{overtly or} ~~tacitly or overtly~~ ^{at an understanding with Russia} ~~to an agreement providing for arms limitations. Because our current military posture cannot fail but to provoke such an arms race, it ought to be replaced as soon as possible by a clear policy which safeguards our security, without provoking a all out arms race.~~

our current military posture

During the years when we had a considerable stockpile of bombs, and a strategic air force capable of delivering these bombs and Russia had none of this, we used to threaten that in case of a Russian invasion of Western Europe, we would drop our bombs on Russia's cities. ^{Some} ~~Many~~ people believe that this threat has deterred Russia from overrunning Europe. It is difficult to see how an attack against Russia's cities would be justifiable from a moral point of view. Such an attack would kill millions of civilians, men, women and children, and it would kill them in retaliation for an action on the part of the Soviet Government, over which these people ^{have} ~~had~~ no control. But even if we assume for the sake of argument that ^{in the 1950's} the threat was believable enough to deter Russia from carrying out the intentions which ^{some} ~~many~~ people ^{imputed} ~~imparted~~ to her, the same threat would not be believable today. Today, if we were to destroy Russia's cities, Russia could retaliate by destroying our cities, and therefore the threat of bombing Russia's cities in case of war would be a threat of murder and suicide.

Centering on Foy Kohler in the Department of State and on Paul Nitze in the Department of Defense there has emerged a school of thought ^{which} holds that if we shift the threat from a strategic strike against Russia's cities, to a strategic strike against the long-range rocket bases and strategic air bases of Russia, we can continue to operate with a threat which is believable. The thinking ^{of} ~~within~~ this school ^{can be best illustrated by quoting} runs as follows: ^{of this school} ~~of this school~~ ^{an imaginary spokesman}

"In the course of 1961 we have revised our estimates of the strength of Russia's atomic striking forces on the basis of the U-2 flights, and intelligence reports. The location of most of Russia's bases is known to us. Since these bases have not been hardened, they could be destroyed if attacked by bombs and we have at present the capability of destroying these bases by making a massive attack against them. We presumably could not destroy all of Russia's basis in a single attack, and Russia might be able to strike a counterblow and inflict some damage on us, but this damage would be within the limits that we could tolerate and in certain circumstances we would be prepared to ^{accept} ~~tolerate~~ it.

~~We have no intention to start a preventive war and to resort - in peace -~~

// We have no intention to start a preventive war and to resort - in peace-time - to a surprise attack against Russia's bases. But, if there should be a war in Europe which involves conventional forces on a major scale, we ~~would~~ ^{want to} be in a position to threaten a massive atomic attack against Russia's long-range roaket bases and strategic air bases. We believe that such an attack would cripple Russia's bases to the point where we could tolerate the damage which a Russian counterattack could inflict on our cities. Moreover, the Russians would not be likely to retaliate by attacking our cities with bombs. They would be more likely to speak to us as follows:

"We have enough rockets left to destroy a large number of American cities, but we know that if we did this, America may retaliate by destroying all of our cities. Therefore, we propose to hold our fire and to negotiate peace. We concede that the power balance has now shifted in America's favor and we are now willing to yield on a number of issues on which we took an inflexible stand prior to the outbreak of hostilities." "

If this were a likely course of events America could continue to think of war as an operation which might lead to victory. ~~The fact of the matter is~~ ^{she handle it,} that ~~it~~ ^{this} is not a likely course of events.

Those who urge that America build up her strategic striking forces to the level where it can threaten a massive strike against Russian bases and that she maintain them at that level, as long as possible, ~~believe that by doing so we~~ ^{do so because they} can deter Russia from risking war in Europe and adopting an intransigent position on Berlin and other related issues. Most of these people will concede ~~that the~~ ^{however} superiority which we must have in order to make this threat believable cannot be maintained indefinitely and could be maintained for five years at ~~most~~ ^{the}. Many of them will also concede that if Russia were not deterred and if it came to a war in Europe, ~~faced with uncertainty of how much damage~~ ^{then} Russian counterattack might cause, the President of the United States would not be likely to authorize such an attack against Russia's bases. What these people want to do is to main-

tain a threat that the Russians ^{would} ~~may~~ believe even though they themselves do not believe that we would carry out this threat.

In order to maintain ^{a believable} ~~the~~ threat we would have to build a very large number of long range solid fuel rockets, (Minutemen), and a large number of submarines capable of launching intermediate range solid fuel rockets (Polaris). Also for a while at least, we ^{would} ~~will~~ have to keep on testing bombs in order to develop bombs which are light enough to be carried by these rockets but have a greater explosive power than the bombs which they carry at present.

If we do ^{all} this the Russians will, of course, respond by dispersing their bases, by developing solid fuel long range rockets, which can be launched from hardened bases or which can be mounted on trucks that can be moved around along the highways, and they ^I may make an effort to develop anti-missile missiles. To do all this may well be a major burden on their economy, but we would give them no choice but to assume ^{that} ~~the~~ burden. We, too, would have to try and develop anti-missile missiles and if the Russians succeed in building such missiles we would have to produce decoys in large quantities in order to neutralize their anti-missile missiles.

The only thing that can halt this kind of an arms race is either an explicit or a tacit agreement on arms limitations. But we will not be in a position to make Russia an acceptable offer on arms limitations, until the Government squarely faces the issue whether we want to build up and maintain for a period of from three to five years a strategic striking force which threatens Russia's long range rocket bases and strategic air bases. Only if we abandon this objective will the Government be in a position to propose to the Russians limitations on the strategic striking forces which they might conceivably accept.

In the present ^{*} ~~circumstances~~ ^{*} ~~we~~ ^{*} ~~cannot~~ ^{rule out} the possibility that a war might break out that neither Russia or America wants and it is therefore necessary for America to adopt certain restraints which she would impose on herself in case of such a war, ^{These restraints should need to be proclaimed} ~~and to proclaim~~ these in peace time in such a fashion that

Russia should understand the nature and purpose of these restraints. Only if such restraints are adopted ahead of time, could they in fact be ~~carried out~~ ^{observed} if war should break out. ^A and only if such restraints are observed in the case of war would it be possible to avoid a rapid escalation and to gain enough time to be able to arrange for a cessation of hostilities, before there is an all out atomic catastrophe.

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Soon after the war, when Russia did not as yet have any atomic bombs, she proposed that the bomb be outlawed. This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs, either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases, or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently, Sulzberger of the New York Times discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of such unilateral pledges, renouncing the use of the bomb. Khrushchev said, on this occasion, that if there were a war, even if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force must no longer be victory. The objective must only be to make a conquest difficult and expensive.

If force is used than an all-out war, which neither side wants, can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory or anything approaching victory. If either side uses force for the purpose of settling the controversial issue on his ^{own} ~~own~~ terms, ^{then} the war is likely to escalate and end up in an all-out catastrophe, even if only conventional weapons were used at the outset of the war.

Recently, the United Nations Assembly vetoed with a more than two-thirds majority, 55 against 20, to outlaw the use of atomic bombs in war. The use of atomic bombs in warfare was declared by the Assembly to be a crime and a violation

of the United Nations Charter.

Since the machinery of the United Nations was set up for the purpose of maintaining peace among the smaller nations, assuming the cooperation of the great powers to this end, attempts to regard a two-thirds vote of the Assembly as ~~legally~~ *the great powers* binding must necessarily fail. Still the United States must not fly in the face of world opinion and simply disregard the vote of the General Assembly, when a two-thirds vote of the Assembly expresses the legitimate concern of the great majority of the nations that the use of atomic bombs in warfare might lead to a world catastrophe. Rather, out of respect for world opinion and in its ~~own~~ *own* interest, the United States ought to go as far toward complying with it, as valid considerations for her own security would permit.

How far should the United States be expected to go *in this direction* ~~in complying with world opinion~~ at the present time?

Western Europe is not inferior to Russia ~~if~~ either in manpower or in economic resources and it would be possible for Western Europe to build up -- say within five years -- conventional forces to the point where the West could renounce the use of atomic bombs in case of war, except in retaliation, if atomic bombs were used against ~~her~~ *it*. It is uncertain, however, whether Western Europe would actually divert economic resources to the production of arms in a sufficient degree to build up its conventional forces to the required level, and in any case at the present time these conventional forces are inferior to those of Russia's. For these reasons the ~~administration~~ *government* is at the present time unwilling to renounce the use of atomic bombs in case of a war in Europe, in which conventional forces are involved in a major ~~war~~ *way*.

If we reject, however, the notion that America may resort in such a case to a ~~passive~~ *massive* attack of her strategic striking forces against the long range rocket bases and strategic air bases of Russia as indeed we should, then there is no reason why America should not adopt the following policy:

America shall not use her strategic striking forces for an attack against ~~either Russian bases or Russian cities etc~~

either Russian ~~bases~~ ^{bases} or Russian cities except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs or if there is an unprovoked attack against the cities or bases of one of America's allies. Further, if in the case of war in Europe America should use atomic bombs against troops in combat she ^{would} ~~should~~ do so only on our own side of the boundary which existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities. America would im-POSE SUCH A RESTRAINT ON HER CONDUCT OF THE WAR AS LONG AS RUSSIA IMPOSED A SIMILAR restraint on her conduct of war.

Manifestly, this type of use of atomic bombs would be a defensive operation and incidentally, it ~~could~~ ^{would} be a very effective defensive operation, either on the part of Russia or on the part of America, as long as the restraints remain in effect on both sides.

~~These uses~~ Such a restraint would be no less clear than the more general ^{pledge} renouncing ^{all} of the bomb, but it would ~~represent~~ ^{be} a pledge much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge, ^{In my view} and it would substantially reduce the danger of an all-out war, ^{if a war broke out that neither side had wanted.}

When I discussed this issue in Germany three years ago, people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder-Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs, I do not know to what extent West German cities ~~might be destroyed by American bombs, I do~~ ^{could be spared by a judicious tactical use of} atomic bombs by American forces, but I do know that ~~if~~ ^I if America were to use bombs beyond the prewar boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

In any case, I am not advocating that if war should break out in Europe, America should use atomic bombs against ~~troops in combat~~ ^{troops in combat} ^{on} our side of the pre-war boundary. []] All I am saying is that we shall be resolved and make it known in advance that we would not use atomic bombs beyond the pre-war boundary as long as Russia ^{doesn't} ~~doesn't~~ use bombs on our side of ^{that} the boundary. ^{What we need to keep in mind, above all that} If force is resorted to, escalation can be avoided only if the purpose of the use of force is to make a

conquest difficult, and with luck to prevent it. It would not be possible to fight a limited war and keep it limited if the purpose were to settle the issues involved in our own favor.

As long as there is no agreement providing for arms control, and Russia remains in possession of large stockpiles of bombs, America has no choice but to maintain a strategic atomic striking force. However, it should maintain such a force only as protection against America or her allies being attacked with bombs. The number of bombs retained for this purpose need not be very large, and more important than the number of bombs retained is the invulnerability of the bases from which they would be launched. If these bases are invulnerable, so that no single massive attack against them could substantially damage America's ability to retaliate, then America needs to retain only enough bombs to be able to destroy, in retaliation, a substantial number of Russia's cities, after giving due notice to permit their orderly evacuation.

Also in such circumstances, we should not be any realistic about what we include and target. It can be done

It must be made clear, however, that if America adopts the policy here advocated, she thereby renounces the threat of strategic bombing as a general deterrent, because she could then make this threat only in case Russia would drop bombs, and drop them on our side of the prewar boundary.

I, personally, do not believe that America would lose much by giving up the threat of strategic bombing, because the deterrent effect of such a threat is negligible unless the threat is believable.

If America were to threaten to drop bombs on a large number of Russian cities in case of war, knowing full well that Russia would retaliate by dropping bombs on a large number of American cities, such a threat would be tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide. The threat of murder and suicide would be a believable threat, in the context of the so-called Berlin Crisis, nor would it be a believable threat in the context of any other similar conflict in which America's rights and interests may be at stake, but not America's ^{national} existence as a nation.

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If an increasing number of nations are building major strategic striking forces there might develop a highly unstable situation in which a war that might break out would escalate and ~~could~~ lead to an all-out catastrophe. It ~~could~~ therefore, be very desirable to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons to other nations. In the long run, this can be done only by creating conditions in which these other nations have no strong incentive to build their own nuclear striking force and can be gotten to agree to refrain from building such striking forces. In the meantime, it would be very important for America and Russia to enter into an agreement not to supply any nation with bombs, or means ^{suitable} for the delivery of bombs. Such an agreement ~~cannot~~ ^{could not} be obtained if America ~~is going~~ ^{were} to provide NATO with atomic bombs or the the means for delivery of such bombs. Therefore, at this juncture, America should resolve that atomic bombs and the means suitable for their delivery, which are supplied by her and which are stationed in Europe, shall remain ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ the hands of ~~the~~ American military units which are under ^{direct} American command, rather than ~~be~~ placed under the control of NATO. As long as America is committed to defend Western Europe, there is no valid argument for turning over bombs to the control of other Western European nations.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the United States government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of balancing any such pressure by bringing domestic political counterpressure to bear on the government.

America should stand firm in opposing the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs by Germany as well as the production of means suitable for their delivery.

As time goes on there might develop a politically integrated Europe and if there is no disarmament it seems likely that Europe would be in a position to develop a strategic atomic striking force. It is not clear, however, that in such a situation Europe would desire or welcome any military protection that the United States might be capable of extending to her. The question of whether

the United States ought to give atomic weapons to a politically integrated Europe, which it might not be committed to defend, is an issue which is so remote that there is no need for us to concern ourselves with it at the present time.

This is recap.

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Roosevelt story

response