

The Strategic Stalemate -- Where it Stands at Present,  
and What Form it May Take in the Foreseeable Future

We have at present a sort of stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of Russia and America, essentially based on America's and Russia's ability to destroy each other to any desired degree. Both Russia and America have apparently learned by now how to make powerful "dirty" hydrogen bombs - bombs of the fission-fusion-fission type. Such bombs could be transported today by jet bombers to almost any point of the earth.

The American Strategic Air Force operates from bases inside America and also from bases maintained by America on foreign soil. All these bases are vulnerable and could be knocked out by a single sudden attack. For this reason America has been forced to adopt as her defense policy, the principle of "instant counterblow". If warning is received, that foreign planes have crossed, what America regards as her air defense perimeter, American jet bombers carrying hydrogen bombs of a "dirty" or "clean" variety are supposed to take off. They are not supposed to continue their flight into Russian territory unless subsequent information appears to confirm that an attack against American bases, or American cities, is impending.

Such a stalemate would have to be regarded as inherently unstable, if it were possible for either of these two nations to cripple in one single sudden attack, the ability of the other nation to strike back. This is not the case at present, but there are elements of this kind of instability contained in the present form of the stalemate.

Maintaining the present form of stalemate is an exceedingly costly operation and a drain on the economic resources of both Russia and America. We might soon be going through a transition period in which America might be forced to keep about one-third of its bombers loaded with hydrogen bombs in the air, which would further greatly increase the cost involved. There might be a further transition period in which America would partially rely on submarines capable of firing intermediate range rockets equipped with hydrogen bombs. Also, for a while America might partially

rely on low-flying pilotless bombers, which would be launched from dispersed bases, and which could be effective

for a period of years - until Russia develops appropriate counter measures.

Because I propose to discuss here mainly policies which would be desirable from the long-term point of view, I shall disregard, in my discussion, all these transitional phases of the rapidly changing stalemate and focus my attention on what might be called the second stage of the stalemate, towards which both Russia and America are moving at present.

In this second stage of the stalemate, solid-fuel-long-range-rockets will be available in large numbers to both Russia and America. Both Russia and America will have available "clean" hydrogen bombs, of high power, of a type that can be produced in adequate quantities, <sup>and</sup> that is compact, as well as light enough, to be carried by long-range rockets.

At this second stage of the stalemate there will be no need for America to have bases on foreign soil. The second stage of the atomic stalemate, is characterized by solid-fuel-long-range-rockets which could be launched from bases inside of America and inside of Russia -- bases which can be made invulnerable to an aerial attack. <sup>In this stage, of these two</sup> ~~neither~~ nations needs to fear that a sudden attack on her bases might appreciably diminish her ability to strike a counter-blow. Therefore, this stage of the stalemate will not be inherently unstable, and should there occur through accident, or some mistake in judgment, an unfortunate incident, there would be no need <sup>for either</sup> to respond with "instant/ <sup>counter-</sup>blow".

The elements of technological instability which are contained in the present -- the first-stage of the stalemate, may thus be absent in the second stage of the stalemate.

When the second stage of the stalemate is approaching, then America and Russia/ <sup>should be able</sup> to agree to limit the number of powerful hydrogen bombs in their stockpiles, and they also/ <sup>should be able to</sup> agree to eliminate from their stockpiles the "dirty" hydrogen bombs, the fission-fusion-fission bombs. The number of "clean" hydrogen

however,  
bombs they may both wish to retain might/be fairly large -- just  
how large may depend on factors other than purely military.

In saying all this, I have tacitly assumed, and I had better make this assumption explicit, that neither America or Russia are in the process of successfully developing an effective defense against long-range rockets, that would permit them to destroy such rockets in flight. Further below, I shall discuss in detail why it would be important for America and Russia to agree to refrain from entering this third phase of the arms race/aimed at the development of such a defense.  
which would be

Present  
Is the Basic Premise of the American Military Policy Valid?

I propose to discuss now, whether or not the premise upon which the present American military policy is based may be valid in the second stage of the atomic stalemate, i.e., when powerful "clean" hydrogen bombs and solid-fuel-long-range rockets may be available in adequate quantities both to Russia and America. I shall try to show, that irrespective of whether or not the basic premise of the policy <sup>may</sup> be valid today, it could not be valid in the second stage of the stalemate.

What is the present American military policy, and what is the premise upon which it is based?

If there is an armed conflict in any area of the world, and if America and Russia intervene militarily on opposite sides, then America proposes to use atomic bombs in combat. America may <sup>also</sup> use atomic bombs to a depth <sup>perhaps</sup> of several hundred miles behind the pre-war boundary, for the purpose of disrupting communications and destroying supply and air bases. Most of those who advocate this military policy believe, that even though there will be a strategic stalemate in which both America and Russia will have large stockpiles of "clean" hydrogen bombs, these stockpiles will somehow neutralize each other, because neither side could possibly use hydrogen bombs of high power against the territory of the other without provoking an all-out atomic war that neither of them want. Therefore, so the military experts argue, the course of the war and its outcome will remain unaffected by the existence of these bombs.

I shall try to show later why this premise is invalid, but for the moment, I propose to let it stand for the sake of argument. I shall also accept, again merely for the sake of argument, <sup>the thesis</sup> that a local war, which is fought with atomic bombs, may remain localized. On the basis of these premises, we may now raise <sup>the</sup> question: How will a localized atomic war ever end if Russia and America fight on opposite sides?

We saw in the case of the Korean War, in which no atomic bombs were used, how difficult it was to end the war, long after

it became clear that the war will end with the restoration of the status quo (except, of course, for the extensive destruction which has been wrought in both North and South Korea). If atomic bombs are used on both sides, the war might still end with the restoration of the status quo, but only in the unlikely case that both Russia and America are equally well supplied with atomic bombs. Otherwise, either America or Russia may have to yield ultimately and the area will <sup>then</sup> be conquered by one of them, but probably not until it has been devastated to the point where only a few scattered buildings remain standing and only a small fraction of the population surviving. Clearly, only after the area is devastated could America or Russia withdraw from the fight without conceding victory to the other, or at least without conceding <sup>a</sup> victory that is worth having.

The architects of the present American Military Policy, which centers on American preparedness for fighting a localized atomic war, were not primarily concerned with the possibility that America proper might be invaded by a Russian Army. They were primarily concerned about America's ability to live up to her moral, or legal, commitments to protect certain remote areas against military invasion. Just how likely is it that, in the prevailing circumstances, America may be called upon <sup>at a future date</sup> to live up to some such commitment? ¶ It seems to me that given enough time, for the people everywhere in the world to understand what fate would be in store for them if they were "protected" in the manner described above, people everywhere may demand from the governments that America be relieved of any obligation to "protect" them.

¶ Still America may come to the defense of an invaded area, even if her doing so may be unwelcome to the people who live in that area and because of this possibility, as well as for other reasons, it is imperative to examine the validity of the premise upon which <sup>present</sup> the American Military Policy is based.

I shall leave out of consideration, as extremely unlikely, a conceivable <sup>wanton</sup> invasion of America proper by Russian troops, and

I shall only discuss what may happen if war breaks out in an area in which both America and Russia have so-called "vital interests" to protect.

In the atomic stalemate, / any commitment that Russia or America may assume for protecting such areas will turn out -- when the chips are down -- to be, of necessity, a limited commitment. America may be willing to pay a certain price to keep/Russian supported invasion out of such an area, and Russia may be willing to pay a certain price to keep an American supported invasion out of it. Clearly, to the limited extent to which America may be willing to pay a price, she may<sup>also</sup>/exact a price from Russia and vice versa, and this price may have a deterrent effect.

Keeping this concept of reciprocal limited prices in mind, we may now ask the following pertinent question: What may actually happen in the second stage of the<sup>atomic</sup>/stalemate, if there is an armed conflict in an area in which both America and Russia have a vital interest causing them to intervene on opposite sides?

According to the present American Military policy, America may be prepared to fight a local war with atomic weapons within the area and perhaps within a zone of several hundred miles beyond the pre-war boundary of the area. It is by no means clear, however, why Russia must necessarily accept to battle on these terms. Why should Russia not instead -- at least in some of the foreseeable contingencies -- follow an entirely different tack?

Let us assume -- to take a concrete example -- that Turkey feels menaced by the growing power of the Arab states and that Turkish troops invade Syria. Under Paragraph 51 of the United Nations Charter, which allows for collective defense in case of an armed attack against a member of the UN, Russia would be within her legal rights to take armed action against Turkey, but in accordance with the pattern established in the post-war years, she might<sup>perhaps</sup>/prefer to let an army of volunteers invade Turkey. If the Turkish armies are in danger of being defeated, America might -- disregarding the letter of the law -- intervene in order to save her ally from being militarily defeated.

Let me then further assume that America would either <sup>plan to</sup> supply the Turkish Army with atomic weapons or that American troops would actually land in Turkey and <sup>begin to the</sup> fight the Russian volunteers with atomic weapons. Assuming American superiority in atomic weapons, these <sup>could</sup> be used not only in combat on the Turkish side of the pre-war boundary, but also beyond the pre-war boundary in a zone of perhaps a few hundred miles depth within Russia proper, for the disruption of communications and for the destruction of supply and air bases.

With such a turn of the war impending, it might be logical for Russia to send a note to America, advising her that if America were to fight with atomic weapons, or if she were to supply such weapons to Turkey, Russia would demolish one of ten American cities listed in the note. These cities might be of a size <sup>ranging</sup> from one-half million to one million inhabitants; Russia might assure the United States that upon deciding which <sup>one</sup> of the ten cities she is going to demolish, she would give the selected city four weeks' warning in order to permit an orderly evacuation of the city and to enable the American Government to provide for the housing and feeding of the refugees. Russia might further make it clear in her note that she would be willing to tolerate America's demolishing one of her <sup>own</sup> cities -- a city of equal size -- that America may select, but would <sup>also</sup> expect four weeks' warning.

To this the Secretary of State might, of course, reply with a note threatening, that America would demolish two cities in Russia for each city which Russia might demolish in America.

Russia might, however, answer such a <sup>threat</sup> by speaking as follows: "The Russian Government has adopted the principle of tolerating the destruction of one of her cities for one American city which she may demolish. She is determined to adhere to this principle of one for one. Therefore, if America should demolish two Russian cities in exchange for the first American city <sup>demolished,</sup> Russia will <sup>then</sup> demolish one additional <sup>city,</sup> American/ If America should retaliate -- as she

threatens to -- by demolishing two further cities in Russia,  
Russia <sup>would</sup> / again demolish one American city for each of these  
two Russian cities, etc., etc. "

It would be quite obvious

that if America adheres to the principle of two  
for one, while Russia sticks to the principle of one for one,  
in time all American cities and all Russian cities would be  
demolished. Because the Russian government has no reason to  
assume that the American government has gone insane, or that if  
it were insane the American people would tolerate such a govern-  
ment to remain in office <sup>for long,</sup> she could <sup>safely</sup> / disregard the threat of two  
for one and could, if necessary, go through with her threat to  
demolish one American city.

I believe that this example demonstrates that in the second  
stage of the stalemate, Russia could invoke the clean hydrogen  
bombs of high power, threaten  
to use them, and conceivably actually use them without risking  
an all-out atomic war. Therefore, it <sup>would</sup> / not lie within the  
choice of America alone to decide whether a local <sup>conflict</sup> / may or may  
not be <sup>decided</sup> / by means <sup>of fighting with</sup> / small atomic bombs .

The assumption that

America's choice  
this lies in / is the basic premise of the present American Military  
Policy, and I have tried to show -- on hand of a perhaps not too  
realistic example -- that this premise <sup>will be certainly</sup> / invalid. in the second  
stage of the stalemate, towards which the world is rapidly moving.



## POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE ATOMIC STALEMATE

There may be some risk that during the present stage -- the first stage of the stalemate -- an all-out atomic war might break out as a result of an accident, or a serious error of judgment. It appears very unlikely, however, that such a war would break out as a result of a wanton attack by the American Strategic Air Force against Russia's cities, or by the Russian Strategic Air Force against America's cities. Therefore, in the immediate future, the greatest danger for the outbreak of an all-out atomic war lies in the possibility of a local conflict which leads to armed action, American and Russian military intervention on opposite sides, and the use of atomic weapons in such a war, arousing emotions which may make it impossible to localize the conflict.

From this point of view it would seem important for Russia and America to reach -- as soon as practicable -- a political settlement, which will make reasonably sure that there will not occur, in any of the foreseeable contingencies, an armed conflict in which America and Russia may intervene on opposite sides.

The closer we come to the second stage of the strategic stalemate, the less important become the controversial issues which have arisen in the post-war period between America and Russia. Most of these issues had some strategic relevance and were not negotiable in the post-war period because, had they been settled one way, the settlement would have increased America's chances to win the war, if war came; and had they been settled the other way, it would have increased Russia's chances. Clearly, the issue of who is to win the next war is not an issue on which a compromise is possible, and thus most of the issues had to remain unsettled.

There is a vicious circle operating in a power conflict of this type. For few of the conflicts which have strategic significance can be settled, and new such conflicts of this nature arise from time to time. Thus, conflicts which cannot be resolved, accumulate, and as time goes on, war appears to be more and more probable, and accordingly, the chances of settling conflicts get smaller and smaller.

Such a vicious circle operated in the power conflict between Sparta and Athens just prior to the Pelopponesian War.

In the strategic stalemate, particularly as we approach the second stage, none of these controversial issues have any longer a bearing on who is going to "win" the war. When Russia and America can destroy each other to any desired degree, the overriding issue becomes the stability of the stalemate, and on this issue, Russia's and America's interests coincide. This is the reason, why in the strategic stalemate, it becomes less important whether any one of the old controversial issues is settled one way, or whether it is settled the other way; what is important is only that it be settled one way or another.

What kind of political settlement between Russia and America would be needed to stabilize the strategic stalemate?

America and Russia may recognize a few areas as lying in each other's sphere of influence in the sense that <sup>either</sup> / America or Russia may be willing alone to assume the responsibility for preserving the peace within those areas.

In some other areas it might be possible to freeze the status quo by setting up a regional inter-governmental armed force, with the consent and approval of Russia and America, as well as the other major nations which are involved. Whether or not these inter-governmental armed forces should operate under the auspices of the United Nations is discussed below.

In any case the sole function of such regional armed forces would be to prevent any nation of the area from violating the territorial integrity of another nation, and it should not be the function of regional forces to prevent governmental changes in a country by internal revolution, as long as no military forces cross the country's frontier.

The regional inter-governmental armed forces should not be equipped with atomic weapons, but they could be highly mobile, and could be equipped with high firepower so that they might be militarily stronger than any one nation within the area, partic-

ularly if the arms level of the nations within the area is kept low.

In those areas where the status quo can be frozen in this manner, the nations of the area may thus be given the security which they need, so that it will not be necessary for them to divert a substantial fraction of their economic resources into military expenditures.

Would it be desirable to set up these regional armed forces under the sponsorship of the United Nations?

At the end of the last war, it was generally believed that -- as long as the great powers act in concert with each other -- the United Nations organization may be able to guarantee the security of the smaller nations and may make it unnecessary, as well as impossible, for them to go to war with each other. Attempts made in the past ten years to use the United Nations for purposes other than those for which it was designed, have weakened this organization, and it remains to be seen whether they have damaged it beyond repair. Only if it were possible to restore the United Nations to its original function would it be able to serve as an agency to which the organization of the regional inter-governmental armed forces might be entrusted.

There are other important areas of the world where it may not be possible to protect the status quo by maintaining an inter-governmental armed force, and perhaps one of the most important areas of this kind may be the Continent of Europe. It is almost self-evident that it would be impracticable to freeze by such means the status quo in Europe, in the absence of a political settlement which is satisfactory to America and Russia as well as the nations of Europe. But even if such a political

settlement may be achieved, the maintaining of an inter-governmental armed force in Europe would remain an inappropriate way of dealing with the problem of European security. I am returning to the problem of European security in one of the later sections of the present paper.

## THE CASE FOR ATOMIC DISARMAMENT

Russia has unilaterally stopped her bomb tests, and it is conceivable that America may follow suit once she has tested most of the bombs that she needs to test. It is also conceivable that America and Russia, when they have enough bombs stockpiled to destroy to any desired degree each other, as well as the rest of the civilized world -- might agree to freeze the size of their stockpiles. But clearly, from the point of view of the danger of an atomic war, not much would be accomplished by stopping the bomb tests or by freezing the stockpiles in this manner. If far-reaching atomic disarmament at an early date is a solution to the problem posed by the bombs -- and it is possible to doubt this -- then nothing short of destroying the stockpiles of bombs, as well as eliminating the means suitable for the delivery of such bombs, may be regarded as a measure adequate for eliminating the danger of an atomic war.

This is precisely what the Russian Government is proposing. The position of the Russian Government has on account of its great simplicity the virtue of being easily understandable and because of this it deserves, and will undoubtedly get, strong popular support. The existence of the bomb is inherently a menace to mankind, and the elimination of all bomb stockpiles, as well as all effective means for the delivery of bombs, is therefore a goal which all sane men <sup>must</sup> regard as desirable.

The present official Russian position is almost identical with the position taken by most Atomic Scientists in America in the months that followed the Second World War.

The objection which one hears most frequently advanced against this position is based on the doubt that major secret violations of an agreement providing for the elimination of the bombs might remain undetected. If one thinks in terms of a continuation of the cold war and of inspectors of a UN agency roaming up and down the countryside in Russia trying to discover bombs buried in the ground, then indeed one might be skeptical whether inspection can be relied upon to discover major secret violations.

There is no need, however, to take such an unimaginative approach to a problem of inspection; rather if one visualizes the political setting in which an arrangement providing for the elimination of bombs could be presumed to operate, it is reasonable to assume that Russia, as well as America, could find ways and means to convince each other that neither need to fear major secret violations of the agreement. I personally am rather convinced that such difficulty as may exist in detecting secret violations is not a valid objection to atomic disarmament. It must be admitted, however, that there has been so far no adequate public discussion of this issue in the United States and, as far as I know, there has been no public discussion whatsoever of this issue in the Soviet Union.

There may be other, more valid, objections to atomic disarmament at an early date, and I am inclined to take some of these much <sup>more</sup> seriously. If we were to rid the world of the bomb, we should be essentially back to where we were in the period between the two world wars, and it is difficult to see what would prevent -- except perhaps the memory of the bomb -- wars from occurring for exactly the same reason for which they have occurred in the past. Unless one were to assume that <sup>one</sup> not only rids the world of the bomb, but also of the knowledge how to make <sup>the</sup> bomb -- a major war would of necessity end up as an atomic war. ~~It~~ Even though I am inclined to take this argument very seriously, I personally should be reluctant to oppose getting rid of the bomb if America and Russia were willing to take this crucial step towards far-reaching disarmament at an early date. <sup>Rightly or wrongly,</sup> I should pin my hope on the possibility that if the world may go through another 25 years without a major war, in that period of time -- which after all represents a whole generation -- it might be possible to build up a world community that will make it unnecessary to resort to the threat of the use of force. <sup>or the threat of the use of force.</sup>

But ~~are~~ <sup>well as</sup> Russia as / America willing to rid the world of the bomb in the near future? I believe it should be possible by now to answer this question with a reasonable degree of assurance,

and if the answer is in the negative, then we should lose no time to see how it may be possible to make a virtue out of necessity.

HYDROGEN BOMBS OF HIGH POWER MAY REMAIN WITH US

FOR A LONG TIME TO COME

I shall now attempt to appraise the chances that an agreement, to rid the world of the bomb, might be reached, in the foreseeable future, by Russia and America.

In principle, almost everybody in America is in favor of disarmament -- scientists, the general public, the Administration, and Congress. I believe that at present the Administration might be divided on the issue of far-reaching disarmament which would include the elimination of the bomb. Sometimes I have the impression that there may be, within the Administration, powerful influences at work in favor of such far-reaching disarmament, and that these influences might include the President himself. But even if the Administration were <sup>now</sup> veering towards full-scale atomic disarmament, we must remember that the Administration is only one branch of the government; Congress is another branch. I might, of course, be wrong, but the way I assess the balance of forces, the outcome of the struggle inside the American Government is going to be won by those who -- while they might be in favor of some sort of disarmament -- would wish to stop short of the elimination of the bomb, as a major factor in the power balance.

I am basing this prediction on the record of the post-war period. <sup>Governments being what they are,</sup> it is quite understandable that at first, as long as Russia did not have the bomb,

considerations of expediency were given more weight than moral considerations, and <sup>that</sup> the American Government found it expedient to rely on the threat of "mass retaliation" in order to counter the desire for expansion which it imputed to Russia. For this reason, the fact that during these early years no progress was made in any of the disarmament negotiations affords no basis for concluding that atomic disarmament may not become acceptable to

America in the near future. <sup>R</sup> But since 1949, it was clear that Russia knows how to make atomic bombs, and since 1954, it was clear that she knows how to make hydrogen bombs of high power. Thus, at least since 1954, the American Government had a strong incentive for discussing with Russia in earnest ways and means for getting rid of the bombs. It is obvious that if these discussions were moving <sup>forward</sup> at all, the arms race was going ahead much faster.

Therefore, / I believe that more likely than not, the world will not rid <sup>itself</sup> of the bomb in the <sup>foreseeable</sup> future, and if this appraisal is correct, then we had better begin to think in earnest of how to live with the bomb.

Scientists are keenly aware of the need of stopping the arms race somewhere and the need to begin to reach <sup>some</sup> agreement with Russia on arms limitations. But I submit that the present stage of the stalemate is a precarious stage and that it is just about the worst point at which "to stop" the arms race. Having gotten the world in a mess by producing the <sup>most</sup> bombs / <sup>scientists</sup> thought -- in the past 12 years -- that the way to get the world out of this mess may lie in turning the clock back, by getting rid of the bomb. I submit that the time has now come to ask whether we were right and whether it might not perhaps be easier to get the world out of its present predicament not by attempting to turn the clock back -- which might be impossible -- but by doing just the opposite, i.e., by advancing the clock just as fast as we can.

As I stated above, such elements of inherent stability, which are contained in the first stage of the atomic stalemate, may be absent when the second <sup>of the atomic stalemate</sup> stage / is reached. It is within the setting of this second stage that I propose to discuss -- what <sup>one must</sup> / now regard as the overriding problem: What policy <sup>may</sup> / America or Russia adopt in order to render the atomic stalemate stable? <sup>R</sup> Since one may expect several years to pass between the first tentative formulation of <sup>probable</sup> a / policy and its public discussion, until such <sup>a</sup> / policy may be understood and / adopted by either the Russian or American Government, and since



we are now moving fairly rapidly towards the second stage of the atomic stalemate, it would seem reasonable to discuss the problem of <sup>the</sup> ~~stability~~ <sup>of the stalemate</sup> ~~on this occasion~~ <sup>not</sup> in the setting of the present stage of the stalemate, but in the setting of the approaching <sup>second</sup> stage.

In that setting the power conflict in which Russia and America found themselves caught in the post-war years, may have entirely disappeared. While America and Russia may each still desire to bring about certain changes in the present status quo, neither of them may be willing to make substantial economic sacrifices in order to bring about, forcibly, any of these changes. Therefore, they may both be content with modifying the status quo, where this is desirable, only with the approval and consent of both nations, as well as with the consent of the other major powers involved. <sup>setting of the second</sup> My main point is, that in the /stage of the stalemate, America's and Russia's real interests will closely coincide; these will consist in preserving the status quo, eliminate all risks of an atomic war, and maintain or achieve economic prosperity.

But if it be true that Russia and America will have nothing to fear from each other at this stage, there will still remain fear to be feared. Such fear must necessarily be engendered by the existence of large stockpiles of "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power, at least in the absence of a satisfactory philosophy as to how such bombs might be employed in any hypothetical -- and be it ever so unlikely -- eventuality.

Could this fear be removed by the adoption of a satisfactory rule of behavior by Russia or America?

HOW EITHER AMERICA OR RUSSIA COULD, BY UNILATERAL DECLARATION, ENSURE THE STABILITY OF THE SECOND STAGE OF THE STALEMATE

Let us examine now what would happen if either America or Russia were to adopt a satisfactory rule of <sup>behavior</sup> / and were to proclaim it by unilateral declaration. Let us assume, for instance, that Russia were to issue a proclamation of the following sort:

"There are certain areas in the world which Russia is committed to protect from armed action directed against the

the area. In the atomic stalemate, any such commitment must of necessity be a limited commitment, . Russia and America

are in a position . to destroy each other/and to any desired degree cannot be expected

Russia/to enter into a commitment that would involve her total destruction. Russia is in a position, however, to live

a limited and yet to extend up to /commitment/effective protection

because she is/willing to pay a

reasonable price in economic sacrifice, and is able to exact a similar price in economic sacrifice from America.

"Moreover, Russia can do this without resorting to atomic war, and she is renouncing such a war as a means of fulfilling her commitments. Russia will not use atomic or hydrogen bombs against soldiers in combat or as a means to crush

the civilian population by dropping bombs on non-evacuated cities. But she may use "clean" hydrogen bombs, if need be, for the purpose of demolishing American cities. Any such city singled out for destruction would be given four weeks' warning in to permit an orderly evacuation of the population and in order order/to allow the American Government to make provisions for the housing and feeding of the refugees.

"Accordingly, Russia is issuing a price list

and for each protection, she will specify area under her / ~~xxxxxxx~~ a minimum, as well as a maximum, price in terms of/number and size of the American cities to be demolished.

"Attached to the price list is a list of American cities divided into ten different categories, according to size, as represented by the number of inhabitants,



"Russia believes that this matter may be perfectly well handled by means of unilateral declarations, and sees no reason for ~~xx~~ proposing that America and Russia enter into an agreement in regard to it. However, for the sake of the stability of the stalemate -- which to maintain is as much to the interest of America as it is in the interest of Russia -- Russia proposes to reach an amicable understanding with America on the division of the Russian and American cities into equivalent size categories. This should ~~xxxx~~ be done to avoid the danger that a dispute may ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ arise over the size category to which a ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ city that is to be demolished belongs. Clearly, such dispute might ~~xx~~ endanger the stability of the atomic stalemate.

~~xxxx~~ "Russia knows that the American people would not <sup>particularly</sup> cherish losing any of their cities, she proposes, <sup>therefore,</sup> ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ a conflict arise that should/threaten to engulf an area protected by Russia, <sup>Russia</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ would name several American cities, from among which the cities singled out for destruction will be selected. In this manner the inhabitants of the several cities named by Russia will have an opportunity to <sup>known to their government what they think of</sup> make ~~xx~~ the merits of American <sup>getting involved</sup> ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ in the ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ conflict that <sup>has arisen.</sup> ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ~~xx~~

"Russia is not prepared to divert an appreciable fraction of her national income into arms expenditure, <sup>and she</sup> ~~xxxx~~ is, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ greatly reducing her army, navy, and air force. Russia may, therefore, not be in a position to defend an area she is committed to protect, by fighting a war in the <sup>ordinary</sup> ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ sense of the ~~xxxxxx~~ term. <sup>that</sup> Accordingly, all/Russia may commit herself to do is to exact from America a reasonable price for which Russia, ~~xxxx~~ in turn, ~~xxxx~~ is willing to pay an equal price.

"In these circumstances, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ America could -- if indeed she were willing to pay the specified price -- conquer (or have an ally of hers conquer) <sup>some</sup> ~~xxx~~ specific area under Russian protection. America and <sup>then</sup> Russia would/both lose an equal number of cities, ~~xxx~~ America would derive no benefit from having demolished cities in Russia <sup>and</sup> ~~xxxx~~ ~~xx~~ therefore, America would have to balance - the gain of the conquest of <sup>a given</sup> ~~xxx~~ area ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~,

against the loss which she would incur, by having a certain number of her cities demolished. Russia does not believe that America has an interest in any of the areas listed by Russia, which is sufficiently great to justify <sup>her</sup> taking the loss of even one city, of half a million inhabitants, for the sake of gaining possession (or having an ally of hers gain possession) ~~of any~~ of the areas <sup>which is under Russian protection.</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ For this reason, Russia believes that the price list proclaimed by her affords ~~xxxxxxx~~ adequate protection to all the areas listed."

~~xxxxxxx~~ <sup>If</sup> Russia were to issue a proclamation of this sort, it would be greatly to America's interest to adopt the same philosophy concerning the potential use of her "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power. Evidently, if both America and Russia adopt this philosophy, the stalemate will be <sup>at least</sup> stable / in the sense that no initial disturbance would lead to a chain of ever-increasing destruction. Moreover, it would be <sup>very</sup> ~~extremely~~ unlikely that any city would ever be actually demolished, if this philosophy were adopted.

Quite similarly, if America were to issue a proclamation of this sort, it would be in the interest of Russia to embrace the same philosophy.

It is my contention that in the second stage of the atomic stalemate -- even in the absence of any <sup>verifiable</sup> limitation on the number of bombs <sup>available to</sup> that America and Russia ~~may stockpile, that could be verified with reasonable assurance~~ -- the stalemate <sup>could</sup> ~~would~~ be stable.

Americans might want to know what assurance they would have that Russia would not be tempted to resort to the dropping of hydrogen bombs on cities that have not been evacuated, in deviation from her <sup>But, just</sup> proclaimed intentions. / ~~what~~ what interest would Russia have to do such a thing? Leaving aside the condemnation of the whole world, which she would incur, and leaving out of consideration the possibility of American retaliation in kind, Russia may be assumed to be aware of the following fact: If Russia were to drop hydrogen bombs on a few American cities

without warning, demolishing the city as well as killing the inhabitants, she would thereby not create as much trouble for the American Government as if she were to demolish the same cities without killing the inhabitants. Just imagine the position facing the American Government if a few large cities were demolished, and the Government would have to house and feed millions of refugees. Why should the Russian Government oblige the American Government by sparing her ~~the coping with~~ <sup>the coping with</sup> ~~the coping with~~ such a calamity?

It is conceivable that were the Russian Government to issue the kind of proclamation I described, the American Government, because of the ~~some~~ <sup>somewhat</sup> ~~emotional~~ <sup>American</sup> emotional/attitude towards property, would revise ~~her~~ <sup>its</sup> position on atomic disarmament and prefer to reach an agreement with Russia on ridding the world of the bombs.

Russia may or may not have a similar emotional attitude towards property, and might or might not also prefer to rid the world of the bomb, ~~rather than render the stalemate stable by adopting the philosophy here described. It is sure, it would not~~ ~~know~~. All I can say with reasonable assurance is that the choice lies between ridding the world of the bomb and rendering the atomic stalemate stable. ~~The "rule of conduct" here presented would render the stalemate stable, and at the same time, eliminate atomic war as a means of resolving conflicts.~~ ~~It also~~ ~~suffers from a serious~~ ~~defect -- it is unprecedented; so, of course, is the atomic stalemate. And if I were asked to propose a rule of conduct which would not suffer from this defect and yet solve the problem that the bomb poses to the world~~ ~~I should have to reply: "I regret I am~~ ~~unable to oblige."~~

~~The rule of conduct here proposed~~ <sup>It also</sup> ~~suffers from a serious~~ ~~defect -- it is unprecedented; so, of course, is the atomic stalemate. And if I were asked to propose a rule of conduct which would not suffer from this defect and yet solve the problem that the bomb poses to the world~~ ~~I should have to reply: "I regret I am~~ ~~unable to oblige."~~

A proposal that is unprecedented is not easy to accept, and a rule of conduct must be politically acceptable if it is to be adopted by the Government. But fortunately, measures that may not be acceptable to the people today, may become acceptable to them tomorrow, when they ~~may~~ have had enough time to see the necessity of these measures.

The thought that cities might be demolished is, of course,

hard to take. And it will not be easy to explain to the public, and possibly even harder to explain to statesmen, that <sup>actually</sup> /no cities need to be demolished if the rule of conduct here proposed were adopted. The stability of a mechanical system which is subjected to certain constraints, is determined by the conceivable motions which are permitted by these constraints, But if the system is <sup>fairly</sup> / stable, it remains at rest and the conceivable motions do not actually take place. This is, of course, something that the physicists learn in the freshman course; But will <sup>they</sup> / be able to explain to statesmen, that in a stable stalemate, cities might be conceivably demolished, but no city ~~xxxxx~~ <sup>need</sup> be actually demolished?

Let me now, for ~~xxxxxx~~ <sup>xxxxxx</sup> the sake of argument at least, assume that the atomic stalemate has been rendered stable by the adoption of <sup>some</sup> /appropriate rules of conduct, and then try to visualize the kind of a world we should have.

Clearly, it shouldn't take long until Russia and America would discover, that ~~xxxxx~~ <sup>even though</sup> they ~~xxxxx~~ <sup>may</sup> remain free to maintain an air force, an army, and a navy, these would not add appreciably to their security, ~~xxx~~ <sup>while</sup> they would add appreciably to their <sup>then</sup> military expenditure. Before long, America and Russia could/be expected to reduce these forces, ~~xxxx~~ <sup>And</sup> /if the second stage of the stalemate continues in existence for an appreciable period of time, the arms expenditure of these two nations should fall to a small fraction of its present level.

Let us now compare for a moment such a stable form of the atomic stalemate with the situation ~~xxxxx~~ <sup>that</sup> would prevail in the world if America and Russia had agreed to rid the world of the bomb at an early date.

It is my contention that unless, in addition to doing away with the bomb, the world somehow also did away with the knowledge of how to make the bomb <sup>then if there</sup> /~~xx~~ should ~~xxxxxx~~ be another war, ~~xxxxxx~~ <sup>xxxxxx</sup> it ~~xxxx~~ would be fought, after a comparatively short period of conventional warfare. with atomic bombs.

In the absence of general principles universally acceptable to all nations, it is not possible to adjudicate conflicts between nations, and it is not even possible to put forth reasoned arguments that may appeal uniformly to the sense of justice of the people of all nations. ~~xxxxxxx~~ Suppose we got rid of the bomb, what would then prevent nations from attempting once more to settle conflicts by resorting to arms, except perhaps the memory of the bomb? Would the memory of the bomb be strong enough and just how long could this memory be kept alive?

It is true that the great powers, if they act in concert with each other, might use something like the machinery of the United Nations organization for preventing the smaller powers from disturbing the peace. But the United Nations organization cannot keep the peace among the great powers. For the time being ~~xxxxxxx~~ at least ~~xxxxxxx~~ Russia and America could perhaps protect their possessions without having to ~~xxxxxxx~~ use ~~xxxxxxx~~ arms. But England and France just recently resorted to the use of force ~~xxxxxxx~~ against Egypt ~~xxxxxxx~~ in order to protect what they regarded as their vital interests. Is it not likely that if the bomb is abolished, armed conflicts may continue to occur between nations, that such armed conflicts may threaten to change the power of balances adversely, either from the point of view of Russia or from the point of view of America, and that these two nations might then be drawn into the conflict? If this should happen, before long atomic bombs would reappear on the scene and at that point ~~xxx~~, all hell might break loose.

In this century the United States entered the war twice against Germany, not in order to make the world safe for democracy, nor in order to establish the Four Freedoms in the world, as some might choose to believe, but mainly ~~xxxxxxx~~ for the ~~xxx~~ purpose of preventing a German victory. The United States was forced to enter the war for this reason, since a German victory would have produced a major shift in the power balances, ~~xxxx~~ that ~~xxxx~~ would have threatened America's security. Indeed, had Germany won either the First or the Second World War, ~~xxxx~~ she ~~xxxx~~ might have become



militarily so strong as to be able to vanquish the United States --  
if no atomic bombs existed -- in the event of ~~another~~ <sup>another</sup> World War.

~~On the basis of a similar situation~~ <sup>Similarly,</sup> Russia was  
impelled to go to war with Finland just prior to the onset of  
the Second World War in order to improve her strategic position  
in the next war, the war with Germany.

If Russia and America are able to maintain the atomic stale-  
mate in a stable form, then neither of them ~~will~~ <sup>need</sup> to be con-  
cerned about their security or fight a preventive war again for  
the sake of their security. China might become a great indus-  
trial power; Germany might become economically far stronger than  
England or any other nation on the Continent of Europe; Japan  
might become a great industrial nation with an orientation of her  
trade towards China. -- none of this need to concern either  
Russia or America from the point of view of their security. In  
the setting of ~~the~~ <sup>a stable atomic</sup> stalemate, <sup>an increase in</sup> the so-called war potential  
of any nation or combination of nations, resulting from their  
industrialization, <sup>and</sup> <sup>perhaps</sup> accompanied by a conspicuous rise of their  
production of steel, coal, or oil, becomes irrelevant from the  
point of view of the security of Russia, America, and such other  
nations which in time might acquire a position similar to that  
of Russia and America in the setting of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~stalemate~~ stalemate.

Britain, The "n<sup>th</sup>" Power Problem, and the Security of the  
European Continent

We have so far not discussed the effect on the stalemate of nations other than Russia and America, which may have available "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power or may acquire such bombs in the <sup>foreseeable</sup> ~~xxxx~~ future. In polite diplomatic language, this problem is sometimes referred to as the "N<sup>th</sup>" power problem.

At the moment the only power falling in this category is Great Britain. In a recent white paper the British Government has indicated that in case of a major war in which Russia is involved, England would use hydrogen bombs against Russia -- presumably dropping them on Russian cities and killing millions of civilians, men, women, and children, even if Russia were willing to fight the war with conventional weapons. Since there is no reason why England should not expect Russia to retaliate in kind, the statement of the British white paper is tantamount to a threat of "murder and suicide". ~~xxxxxx entering into the ques~~

The threat of murder and suicide might or might not be believed, and such a threat can therefore not serve the purpose of stabilizing the stalemate. ~~xxxxxx the British Government may be regarded as suff~~  
~~xxxxxx that with the advent of the second~~  
~~xxxxxx case of the kind of Pax~~  
~~xxxxxx have been discussing, any nation threatening~~  
~~xxxxxx would automatically place itself in the position~~  
~~xxxxxx enemy of Russia and America.~~

This does not mean, however, that England would have to deprive herself of the protection which the possession of "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power and solid-fuel-long-range rockets might afford her. England might well retain the bomb as an instrument of power if she adopts the same rule of behavior concerning the hypothetical use of her bombs as Russia and America. England might well proclaim a price list and set a reasonable price on each of the territories, which she is committed to defend. It is true that the loss of a city of a half-million inhabitants would be a far greater loss <sup>to</sup> ~~xxx~~ Britain than, say, for Russia, but on the other hand, it is also true that <sup>being deprived of</sup> ~~xxxxxx~~ the possession of some of her colonies would be a far greater loss to Britain than

would be the gain that the acquisition of such a colony would represent for Russia -- and I am adopting here for the sake of argument, the manifestly absurd premise that some of the British colonies ~~are~~ <sup>may be seriously</sup> coveted by Russia.

Perhaps Britain, by threatening "murder and suicide" in the recent white paper, has rendered a service to the world; for by doing so, she drew attention to a danger that still lies in the future, but nevertheless may require watchfulness and early action on the part of the great powers. Britain did not threaten murder and suicide for the purpose of acquiring new possessions. She has used this threat only for the sake of preserving what she now possesses. But why shouldn't in the future some small nation, under a government more irresponsible than that of Britain and perhaps ruled by a dictator -- about whose mental sanity the world may have legitimate doubts -- use the threat of murder and suicide for the purpose of acquiring a coveted possession of some other nation?

I have discussed <sup>the probability</sup> above/that in some regions of the world the status quo may be preserved by maintaining an inter-governmental armed force equipped with conventional weapons. The nations located in such areas do not need atomic or hydrogen bombs for their security, and the great powers have means to bring, in such circumstances, pressures on such nations to renounce the possession of such bombs. ¶ But what about the nations of Europe, such as France or Germany? If any of these need ~~xxxxxxx~~ hydrogen bombs for their security, or if they have some other strong incentive for having such bombs available to them, it will be very difficult, and perhaps impossible, <sup>in the long run</sup> to prevent them from acquiring such bombs.

Prior to the onset of the atomic stalemate, both Russia and America had a vital and opposite interest in the distribution of military power on the Continent of Europe. This made it impossible to bring about in the post-war period, any changes in Europe with the consent and approval of both America and Russia. At the same time, the nations in Europe did not lack security,

for the map of Europe was frozen just because Russia and America had vital, and opposite, interests.

In the atomic stalemate, and particularly as the second stage of the stalemate approaches, America and Russia are going to be increasingly indifferent to any of the changes that might take place on the Continent of Europe. In this stage of the stalemate, there is no important reason why the United States should wish to maintain any military bases on foreign soil, and a military alliance with the nations of Western Europe would no longer add much to the security of the United States. The United States may continue to maintain an alliance with the nations of Western Europe, but she would increasingly regard these allies as expendable.)

Similarly, Russia may become increasingly indifferent to what happens in Europe.

At this point, it may become possible to bring about changes in Europe with the consent and approval of both Russia and America, as well as the nations directly involved. What might these changes be?

One of the hopeful signs in Europe at the present is the <sup>moving</sup> ~~xxxxx~~ of Western Europe towards a customs union. The present movement toward an economically united Western Europe would be probably severely disturbed if a united, disarmed, neutral Germany were created where France remained armed and an ally of the United States. The French military needs are closely tied to her African possessions, and it is conceivable, that if the Algerian War is brought to an end, most of the continent of Europe might become an area in which arms <sup>may be</sup> ~~xxx~~ maintained at a low level. If it were possible to accomplish this, Europe could reach an unprecedented level of prosperity very fast.

If a nation can divert 10% of its national income from military expenditure to the <sup>increasing</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ of its production capacity, this shift alone will <sup>result in</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ a 3% increase in the annual national <sup>product (and if</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ the population <sup>remains</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ stationary to a 3% increase in the standard of living).

Russia would greatly profit through a flourishing East-West trade from such an improvement in the economy of Europe, and it is conceivable that Russia and America, acting in concert with each other, would want to facilitate such a development in the foreseeable future.

But one must not disregard the political problems with which Europe may be faced in the not-too-distant future. Right now, the nations of Europe are all tired of war and at this time, people in Western Germany are more interested in increasing their prosperity than in the problem of unifying Germany. But human memory is short, and the time might come when unifying Germany may become the one over-riding political issue on which all Germans may unite. Furthermore, once Germany is unified, the problem of recovery of territories lost to Poland might <sup>similarly</sup> ~~become~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~similar~~ over-riding issue. Therefore, if it becomes possible to change the map of Europe with the consent and approval of Russia, as well as America, it would be very desirable to create, right from the start, a situation which is politically stable. Only in that case will it be possible to freeze the status quo without having to lean on <sup>force or the</sup> ~~a~~ threat of force.

Perhaps it might be possible to provide Poland with an adequate compensation to induce her to agree to the return of former German territories -- possibly according to some gradual but fixed schedule. If this could be done, then one of the valid reasons for maintaining Germany divided would disappear.

There would still remain a major difficulty. Russia can agree to the unification of Germany, only when she is ready to abandon her political friends in Eastern Germany, who could not be expected to retain political office, if Germany were reunited. True enough, the political party at present in power in Western Germany would presumably not remain in office either, if Germany were united. But whether Russia would, or should, regard the replacement of Adenauer's party by the German Social Democratic Party as a <sup>major</sup> ~~a~~ change for the better, is by no means clear.

Should a political settlement be obtainable on the Continent

of Europe that is satisfactory to all nations in that area, then the security of the nations which make up the Continent of Europe may perhaps not present a major problem. But if no fully satisfactory settlement can be achieved, then inter-European security might well represent<sup>a</sup> serious problem.

There are two different approaches to the solution of ~~the~~<sup>this</sup> problem. ~~of inter-European security.~~ Both of these approaches are based on the premise that in the second stage of the stalemate, neither Russia nor American can be expected to take<sup>any</sup> action at an appreciable cost to themselves, ~~in order to prevent~~<sup>for the sake of preventing</sup> changes in Europe, ~~which may~~<sup>which may</sup> come about, through one nation in Europe taking armed action against another nation in Europe.

One of <sup>the</sup> two possible approaches to the problem of freezing <sup>of the Continent of Europe</sup> the map/would consist in providing the nations <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ Europe -- or at least some of the nations of Europe -- with a limited number of "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power. The map of Europe could then be stabilized through exactly the same kind of mechanism through which Russia and America may protect -- in the second stage of the stalemate -- those areas of the world in which they have a vital interest.

Because in the second stage of the stalemate America and Russia may have only a very limited interest in the distribution of power in Europe, neither of them can be very well expected to protect any nation in Europe against any other nation in Europe that has "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power available and solid-fuel-long-range rockets which can hit either America or Russia.

It might very well be, of course, that the nations of Europe would prefer another approach to the problem of inter-European security and that they would want no hydrogen bombs available to any of the nations on the Continent of Europe. In this case, <sup>and Russia,</sup> America, <sup>each other, would</sup> acting in concert with ~~xxxxxxx~~ enter into a commitment to protect the nations on the Continent of Europe against each other. Clearly, no nation on the Continent of Europe ~~wkkk~~<sup>is</sup> going to accept the loss of ~~xxxxxxx~~ an appreciable fraction of her cities for the

sake of achieving any territorial ambitions that she may have.  
Russia, as well as America, could <sup>effectively</sup> threaten to do just that <sup>provided</sup> ~~that~~  
<sup>that</sup> /the offending nation is in no position to exact from America and  
Russia the same price.

If this approach to the problem of inter-European security  
were preferred by the nations of Europe, then Europe would become  
part of the security system based on a Pax Russo-Americana.





found if we<sup>only</sup>/remember that an agreement of this sort is not enforceable and that, therefore, it will remain in force only as long as America and Russia wish to keep it in force. It might, therefore, be best if the agreement were to provide that both America and Russia have the legal right openly to abrogate the agreement at any time if they, rightly or wrongly, suspect that major secret violations have remained undetected.

If one approaches the problem in this manner, then it may be seen that the pertinent question is not what kind of an inspection system the agreement should specify, but ~~what the pertinent question is~~ rather this: "By what means could America and Russia convince each other that there are no major secret violations of the agreement occurring?" (For clearly unless they both may accomplish this, one or the other of them will be forced to abrogate the agreement and neither of them would want this to happen).

If the question is posed in these terms, then one might perhaps arrive at the answer along the following lines:

Research and development work on a major scale, aimed at an effective defense against long-range-rockets, could not successfully be carried out either in America or in Russia without the enthusiastic cooperation of many thousands of scientists and engineers. Should any agency of either the Russian or American Government keep on with such research and development work in violation of the agreement, thousands of engineers and scientists would know about this violation.

Both the American and Russian Governments might obtain reasonable assurance that violations occurring would be detected, if it were possible to develop between individual Russian scientists and individual American scientists a relationship of mutual trust. This would have to come about by a deliberate effort on the part of their Governments, and might involve the creation of suitable inter-governmental/<sup>research</sup>institutions that would have to operate on a rather large scale.

The word "trust" denotes relationship between human beings.

Governments are not human beings; they cannot be expected to trust each other, and they rarely do. But scientists are human beings, and moreover they are drawn to each other by their passionate interest in their work. In the post-war years, as long as America's interests and Russia's interests were in conflict with each other, the relationship between American and Russian scientists was of necessity troubled also because both the Russian and American scientists found themselves in a conflict of loyalties. But as we now move into the second stage of the atomic stalemate, America's and Russia's interests begin more and more to coincide, and scientists, Russians as well as Americans, will be quick to perceive that in this stalemate the over-riding interest of America and Russia is to make the stalemate stable.

Let us try to visualize the President of the United States addressing the American people and speaking as follows: "America and Russia have just concluded an agreement for the purpose of stabilizing the atomic stalemate. To this end it is necessary for both America and Russia to refrain from developing a system that may provide for an effective defense against long-range-rockets in flight.

America hopes that Russia may be able to convince her, that no such work is being carried out any longer in Russia, and America has reserved the right legally to abrogate the agreement, unless Russia succeeds in convincing her of the absence of such secret violations. Until such time as America may openly abrogate the agreement, America is pledged to tolerate no ~~xxxxxx~~ violations of the agreement occurring in America.

It is my duty to see to it that America may honor this pledge. I am, therefore, appealing to any American scientist and engineer, to report such violations if they ~~xxxxxxx~~ discover that some ill-advised official of the American Government is bent on evading the provisions of the agreement, ~~xx~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Such violations may be reported to an inter-governmental control commission set up for the purpose, or preferably, directly to the Russian Government which, in turn, <sup>may</sup> ~~xxxx~~ inform the inter-governmental commission. America and Russia have jointly set up a fund out of which high rewards may be paid for

information leading to the discovery of a violation of the agreement. These rewards, because they are paid by an inter-governmental agency, would be free from U. S. income tax."

I have added the last lines for the benefit of those, who believe in the irresistible power of monetary inducements. I, myself, believe that in this case monetary inducements could do no harm, but that they would not be necessary.

The agencies of the American Government have trouble enough as it is to recruit the ablest among scientists and engineers for the research and the development work which is needed at present. What success would any of them have in ~~xxx~~ recruiting the engineers and scientists they ~~xxxxx~~ need if the recruitment is for a purpose which has been expressly disavowed by the President? And how would such an agency keep its illicit activities secret?

After the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles provided for the disarmament of Germany. This Treaty was imposed upon Germany, and ~~Germany~~ <sup>she</sup> did not consider it in her interests to adhere to its provisions. So, while Germany <sup>had</sup> signed the Treaty of Versailles, she never revoked the ~~xxx~~ Espionage Law of Imperial Germany, which thus remained on the statute books. German citizens who informed the inter-allied control commission of secret violations of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, could be sentenced to prison terms under the German Espionage Act, and they were in fact so sentenced.

A nation which indulges in this kind of inconsistency, indicates thereby that it has no intention of observing the agreement, providing for arms limitations. Should either Russia or America, having concluded an agreement, indulge in this type of inconsistency this would undoubtedly ~~xx~~ lead to a prompt abrogation of the agreement.

But barring such a possibility, can anyone seriously believe that American scientists would keep violations of the agreement, of which they learn, a secret? Once the world moves into the second stage of the stalemate, and it becomes clear what benefit the world might derive from a Pax Russo-Americana, American scientists, engineers, as well as the American public in general, would realize that maintaining the stalemate stable is just as imperative for America as it is for Russia. Who could seriously believe that in

these circumstances American scientists would break faith with their Russian colleagues, would fail to do what the President has asked them to do, and endanger the safety of the world by remaining silent when they ought to speak up?

Naturally, I can speak with much less assurance about the ~~xxxxx~~ attitudes of Russian scientists and engineers. I am convinced, though, that the great success which Russia had in developing atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and inter-continental ballistic missiles was due to the enthusiastic work of Russian engineers and scientists, who were convinced of the righteousness of Russia's cause. And I can't quite see any high official of the Russian Government appealing, in secret, to Russian scientists and engineers and asking them to do something, that the Russian Government had openly declared she would not do-particularly if the Russian Government has the right openly to abrogate the agreement.

However, there is no reason why I should speak here of what Russian scientists and engineers may or may not do. They can very well speak for themselves, and I believe they ~~may~~<sup>will</sup> speak for themselves, if the time should come for them to do so.

\*\*\* THE END \*\*\*

The Strategic Stalemate -- Where it Stands at Present,  
and What Form it May Take in the Foreseeable Future

We have <sup>kind</sup> at present a sort of stalemate <sup>exists</sup> between ~~the~~ strategic atomic striking forces of Russia and America, ~~essentially~~ based on ~~America's and Russia's~~ <sup>the</sup> ability <sup>of both nations</sup> to destroy each other to any desired degree. Both ~~Russia and America~~ have ~~apparently~~ learned ~~by now~~ how to make powerful, "dirty" hydrogen bombs ~~bombs~~ of the fission-fusion-fission type, <sup>light and compact enough to</sup> Such bombs could be transported ~~today~~ by jet bombers to almost any point of the earth.

The American Strategic Air Force operates from bases inside America and ~~also from~~ bases maintained by America ~~on~~ foreign soil, ~~All these bases are~~ vulnerable and <sup>much</sup> could be knocked out by a ~~single~~ sudden attack. <sup>To preserve its capacity for retaliation</sup> For this reason America has been forced to adopt ~~as her defense policy~~, the principle of "instant counterblow". If warning is received, that foreign planes <sup>may</sup> have crossed what America regards as her "air defense perimeter", American ~~jet~~ bombers carrying hydrogen bombs ~~of a~~ "dirty" or "clean" ~~variety~~ are supposed <sup>to</sup> take off. They are not supposed to continue their flight <sup>are</sup> into Russian territory <sup>toward</sup> unless subsequent information <sup>is</sup> appears to confirm <sup>the</sup> that an attack against American bases, or American cities, ~~is impending~~.

Such a stalemate would <sup>not be</sup> have to be regarded as <sup>became</sup> inherently unstable, if it were possible for either of these two nations to cripple <sup>by</sup> in one single <sup>a</sup> sudden attack, the ability of the other nation to strike back. This is not the case <sup>now</sup> at present, but ~~there are~~ <sup>potentially</sup> elements of this kind of instability <sup>is inherent</sup> contained in the present form of the stalemate.

Maintaining ~~the present~~ <sup>the present</sup> form of stalemate is an exceedingly costly operation and a drain on the economic resources of both ~~sides~~ <sup>for</sup> Russia and America. We might soon be going through a transition period in which America <sup>we may enter</sup> might be forced <sup>will find it necessary always</sup> to keep about <sup>perhaps</sup> one-third of its bombers loaded with hydrogen bombs, in the air, which <sup>and this</sup> would <sup>will</sup> further <sup>may</sup> greatly increase the cost involved. There might be a further transition period, in which America <sup>will</sup> would ~~partially~~ rely on submarines, capable of firing intermediate range rockets ~~equipped~~ with hydrogen <sup>warheads</sup> bombs. Also, for a while America ~~might~~ <sup>and</sup> partially

rely on low-flying pilotless bombers, which would be launched from dispersed bases, <sup>These weapons will</sup> and which could be effective

~~for a period of years -~~ until Russia develops appropriate counter measures.

Because I propose to discuss here mainly policies which would be desirable from the long-term point of view, I shall disregard, in my discussion, all these transitional phases of the rapidly changing stalemate and focus my attention on what might be called the second stage of the stalemate, towards which both Russia and America <sup>we now</sup> are moving at present.

In this second stage of the stalemate, solid-fuel long-range rockets will be available in large numbers to both Russia and America. Both Russia and America will have available <sup>possess</sup> "clean" <sup>sides high-power</sup> hydrogen bombs, of high power, ~~of a type that can be produced in adequate quantities, that is compact~~ <sup>and</sup> as well as light enough, to be carried by long-range rockets.

At this second stage of the stalemate there will be no need for America to have bases on foreign soil. <sup>more</sup> The second stage of <sup>since</sup> the atomic stalemate, <sup>is</sup> characterized by solid-fuel long-range rockets which could be launched from bases, inside of <sup>landed</sup> America and inside of Russia -- bases which can be made invulnerable to an aerial attack. <sup>In this stage, side of these two will</sup> neither nation needs to fear that a sudden attack on her bases might appreciably diminish her ability to strike a counter-blow. <sup>consequently, the</sup> Therefore, this stage of the stalemate will <sup>not</sup> be inherently unstable, and should there <sup>it</sup> occur through accident, or some mistake in judgment, an unfortunate incident, there would be no need <sup>for either</sup> to respond with "instant" <sup>counter-</sup> blow.

The elements of technological instability which are contained in the present <sup>of present</sup> the first-stage of the stalemate, may thus be absent in the second stage of the stalemate. <sup>disappear</sup>

When <sup>this</sup> the second stage of the stalemate is approaching, then America and Russia <sup>should be able</sup> to agree to limit the number of powerful hydrogen bombs in their stockpiles, and they also <sup>should be able to</sup> agree to eliminate <sup>altogether</sup> from their stockpiles the "dirty" hydrogen bombs, the fission-fusion-fission bombs. <sup>the</sup> The number of "clean" hydrogen

HALTING THE ARMS RACE: AT WHAT POINT  
AND HOW?

<sup>will</sup> however, bombs they may both wish to retain might be fairly large -- just how large may depend on factors other than purely military.

*all the above assumptions*  
In saying all this, I have tacitly assumed, and I had better make this assumption explicit, that neither America or Russia <sup>will succeed in</sup> are in the process of successfully developing an effective defense against long-range rockets, that would permit them to destroy such rockets in flight. Further below, I shall discuss in detail why it would be important for America and Russia to agree to refrain from entering this third phase of the arms race, which would be aimed at the development of such a defense.

Present

Is the Basic Premise of the American Military Policy Valid?

I propose to discuss now, whether or not the premises upon which the present American military policy is based, ~~may be~~ <sup>remain</sup> valid in the ~~second stage of the atomic stalemate,~~ <sup>above-described</sup> ~~i.e., when~~ powerful "clean" hydrogen bombs and solid-fuel-long-range rockets may be available in adequate quantities, both to Russia and America. I shall try to show, that, irrespective of whether or not ~~the basic premise of the policy,~~ <sup>these are</sup> ~~it could not~~ <sup>may</sup> be valid in the second stage of the stalemate. ~~it could not~~ <sup>then</sup>

What is the present American military policy, and what is the premise upon which it is based? ~~As I understand it, it is as follows:~~ <sup>As I understand it, it is as follows:</sup>

If there is an armed conflict in any area of the world, and if America and Russia intervene militarily on opposite sides, then America proposes to use atomic bombs in combat. ~~America may use atomic bombs~~ <sup>the field, and perhaps also</sup> to a depth of ~~several~~ <sup>perhaps</sup> hundred miles behind the pre-war boundary, for the purpose of disrupting communications and destroying supply and air bases. Most of those who advocate this military policy believe, that even though there will be a strategic stalemate in which both America and Russia will have large stockpiles of "clean" hydrogen bombs, ~~these stockpiles~~ <sup>will be available to both sides, these</sup> will somehow neutralize each other, because ~~neither side could~~ <sup>such bombs</sup> possibly use hydrogen bombs of high power against the territory of the ~~other~~ <sup>enemy</sup> without provoking an all-out atomic war, that neither side of them want. Therefore, so the military experts argue, the course of the war and its outcome will remain unaffected by the existence of these bombs. <sup>stocks</sup>

I shall try to show later why ~~this premise is~~ <sup>think</sup> invalid, but for the moment, I propose to let it stand for the sake of argument. I shall also accept, again merely for the sake of argument, ~~that a local war, which is fought with atomic bombs,~~ <sup>the thesis</sup> ~~may remain localized.~~ <sup>can</sup> On the basis of these premises, we may now raise <sup>the</sup> question: How will a localized atomic war ever end, if Russia and America fight on opposite sides? <sup>accepting</sup>

We saw in the case of the Korean War, in which no atomic bombs were used, how difficult it was to end the war, long after



it became clear that the war will end with the restoration of the status quo (except, of course, for the extensive destruction which has been wrought in both North and South Korea). If atomic bombs are used on both sides, the war might still end with the restoration of the status quo, but only in the unlikely case that both Russia and America are equally well supplied with atomic bombs. Otherwise, either America or Russia may have to yield ultimately and the area will be conquered by one of them, but probably not until it has been devastated to the point where only a few scattered buildings remain standing and only a small fraction of the population surviving. Clearly, only after the area is devastated, could America or Russia withdraw from the fight without conceding victory to the other, or at least, without conceding a victory that is worth having.

The architects of the present American Military Policy, which centers on American preparedness for fighting a localized atomic war, were not primarily concerned with the possibility that America might be invaded by a Russian Army; they were primarily concerned about America's ability to live up to her moral, or legal, commitments to protect certain remote areas against military invasion. Just how likely is it that, in the prevailing circumstances, America may be called upon to live up to some such commitment? It seems to me that given enough time, for the people everywhere in the world to understand what fate would be in store for them if they were "protected" in the manner described above, people everywhere may demand from the governments that America be relieved of any obligation to "protect" them.

Still America may come to the defense of an invaded area, even if her doing so may be unwelcome to the people who live in that area and because of this possibility, as well as for other reasons, it is imperative to examine the validity of the premise upon which the present American Military Policy is based.

I shall leave out of consideration, as extremely unlikely, a conceivable invasion of America proper by Russian troops, and

Let us envisage what can happen, if such a situation arises in the second stage of the stalemate, when each side has the means to destroy, at will, any target city in the enemy's

*means of H-bombs (missiles) launched from invulnerable bases.*

I shall only discuss what may happen if war breaks out in an area in which both America and Russia have so-called "vital interests" to protect.

*the concept of the form of commitment*

In the atomic stalemate, any commitment that Russia or America may assume for protecting such areas will turn out -- when the chips are down -- to be, of necessity, a limited commitment. America <sup>(or Russia)</sup> may be willing to pay a certain price to keep ~~Russian-supported~~ <sup>prevent</sup> invasion out of such an area, and Russia may be willing to pay a certain price to keep an American-supported invasion out of it. Clearly, to the limited extent to which America may be willing to pay a price, she may <sup>also</sup> exact a price from Russia, and vice versa, and this price may have a deterrent effect.

Keeping this concept of reciprocal limited prices in mind, we may <sup>let us</sup> now ask the following pertinent question: What may actually happen in the second stage of the <sup>atomic</sup> stalemate, if there is an armed conflict in an area in which both America and Russia have a vital interest, causing them to intervene on opposite sides?

*To discuss (Communist) aims and strategy*

According to the present American military policy, America <sup>will be intended, in this case, to</sup> may be prepared to fight a local war with atomic weapons, <sup>small</sup> within the area and perhaps <sup>also</sup> within a zone of several hundred miles beyond the pre-war boundary of the area. It is by no means clear, however, why Russia must necessarily accept to battle on these terms. Why should Russia not instead -- at least in some of the foreseeable contingencies -- follow an entirely different tack?

*Turkey and the Arab Republic get involved in a fight on the Syrian-Turkish border, and the Soviet Union interferes*

Let us assume -- to take a concrete example -- that Turkey <sup>Republic</sup> feels menaced by the growing power of the Arab states and that Turkish troops invade Syria. Under Paragraph 51 of the United Nations Charter, which allows for collective defense in case of an armed attack against a member of the UN, Russia would be within her <sup>legal</sup> rights to take armed action against Turkey, <sup>but</sup> in accordance with the pattern established in the post-war years, she might <sup>perhaps, with by dispatching</sup> prefer to let an army of "volunteers" invade Turkey. <sup>To assist the Arab Republic</sup> If the Turkish armies are in danger of being defeated, America might <sup>in turn, may</sup> disregard the letter of the law -- <sup>UN charter</sup> intervene in order to save her ally from being militarily defeated. —

~~Let me then further assume that America would either <sup>plan to</sup> supply <sup>by sending</sup> the Turkish Army with atomic weapons, or that American troops would <sup>begin to</sup> actually land in Turkey and <sup>the</sup> fight Russian volunteers with atomic weapons. Assuming American superiority in atomic weapons, these <sup>could</sup> be used not only in combat, on the Turkish side of the <sup>Russian-Dutch</sup> pre-war boundary, but also beyond the pre-war boundary, in a zone <sup>as well as</sup> of perhaps a few hundred miles <sup>deep</sup> depth within Russia proper, for the disruption of communications and for the destruction of supply and air bases. <sup>America's will hope to use this localized war</sup> <sup>superiority in nuclear weapons, while our cities will remain protected</sup> <sup>through</sup> <sup>from Russian</sup> <sup>missiles by</sup> <sup>the threat</sup> <sup>of retaliation</sup> <sup>then and</sup> <sup>Russia's</sup> <sup>illustrate</sup> <sup>to include</sup> <sup>an</sup> <sup>astrophysically</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>all-out</sup> <sup>nuclear</sup> <sup>war.</sup>~~

~~With such a turn of the war impending, it might be logical for Russia to send a note to America, advising her that if America were to <sup>advisory</sup> <sup>should assist in Turkey</sup> fight with atomic weapons, (or if she were to supply such weapons to Turkey), Russia would demolish one of ten American cities listed in the note. These cities might be of a size <sup>say, ranging between</sup> from one-half million to one million inhabitants. Russia might assure the United States that upon deciding which <sup>one</sup> of the ten cities she is going to demolish, she would give the selected city four weeks' warning in order to permit an orderly evacuation of the city, and to enable the American Government to provide for the housing and feeding of the refugees. <sup>For reasons to be made clear further below, Russia may also</sup> <sup>declare</sup> <sup>in retaliation,</sup> Russia might further make it clear that she would be willing to tolerate America's demolishing one of her <sup>own</sup> cities, <sup>also</sup> a city of equal size -- that America may select, but would expect four weeks' warning. In other words, Russia will "set a price" in terms of mutual destruction of cities, without "loss of life when America will have to pay if it wants to <sup>the status quo in the Near East</sup> <sup>changed in her favor</sup> <sup>the Mideast</sup> <sup>government may</sup> <sup>with the help of Turkey.</sup> <sup>due</sup> <sup>to this</sup> <sup>(or more)</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>to this</sup> <sup>may</sup> <sup>threat</sup> <sup>by speaking as</sup> <sup>follows:</sup> "The Russian Government has adopted the principle of tolerating the destruction of one of her cities for one American city which she may demolish. She is determined to adhere to this principle of "one for one". Therefore, if America should demolish two Russian cities in exchange for the first American city <sup>then</sup> demolished, Russia will demolish one additional city. American/ If America should retaliate -- as she~~

However, putting ourselves in the position of Russian military leadership, can we not imagine that, instead of accepting the fight in Turkey against odds, they may declare that if America insisted on protecting the Turkey, it should do so by force the status quo in the Near East, and we intend to use force for our purpose.

threatens to -- by demolishing <sup>more</sup> two further cities in Russia, Russia <sup>would</sup> / again demolish one American city for each of <sup>one</sup> these <sup>destroyed</sup> ~~two Russian cities~~, etc., etc. "

It would be quite obviously <sup>rule</sup> that if America adheres to the principle of two (or more) for one, while Russia sticks to the principle of <sup>one</sup> "one for one," <sup>ultimately</sup> in time all American cities and all Russian cities would be demolished. Because the Russian government has no reason to assume that the American government has gone insane, ~~or that if it were insane the American people would tolerate such a government to remain in office,~~ <sup>for long</sup> she could <sup>in both countries</sup> safely disregard the threat of two for one and could, if necessary, go through with her threat to demolish one American city.

One day of instability is enough

see comment

I believe that this example <sup>one side</sup> demonstrates that in the second stage of the stalemate, Russia could invoke the <sup>threat of the use of</sup> clean hydrogen bombs of high power, <sup>in order to ensure the maintenance of the</sup> to use them, and conceivably actually use them without <sup>even</sup> risking an all-out atomic war. Therefore, it <sup>would</sup> not lie within the <sup>unpleasantly</sup> choice of America alone to decide whether a local / <sup>conflict will</sup> may or may not be <sup>settled</sup> decided by means of small atomic bombs. <sup>In other words, this is the present American military doctrine will prove invalid, in the second stage of the nuclear stalemate.</sup> The assumption that America's choice this lies in/is the basic premise of the present American Military Policy, and I have tried to show -- on hand of a perhaps not too realistic example -- that this premise, <sup>will be certainly</sup> / invalid. in the second stage of the stalemate, towards which the world is rapidly moving.

status quo

present American military doctrine will prove invalid, in the second stage of the nuclear stalemate

~~There may be other ways <sup>in which the</sup> to use the <sup>destructive</sup> power of large <sup>may</sup> bombs, <sup>can be brought to bear on</sup> or <sup>not into a local conflict</sup> without <sup>without</sup> an all-out war; the one described above, however, <sup>it may appear</sup> <sup>at the first sight</sup> <sup>it may seem</sup>, <sup>appears to me</sup> to be the <sup>most</sup> most logically <sup>clearly</sup> <sup>and</sup> <sup>soundly</sup> <sup>clear</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>greatest</sup> <sup>threat</sup> <sup>against</sup> <sup>uncontrolled</sup> <sup>extension</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>exchange</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>nuclear</sup> <sup>blows</sup> is the only one I was have been able to <sup>cover</sup> <sup>marginally</sup> <sup>guarantee</sup> <sup>against</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>development</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>an</sup> <sup>all-out</sup> <sup>nuclear</sup> <sup>war</sup>~~

Further down, I <sup>will</sup> <sup>try</sup> <sup>to</sup> <sup>show</sup> <sup>how</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>principle</sup> can be extended, from <sup>its</sup> <sup>application</sup> in a local conflict, to a general system of world security, in the second stage of the nuclear stalemate.

## POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE ATOMIC STALEMATE

There may be some risk that during the present stage -- the first stage of the stalemate -- an all-out atomic war might break out as a result of an accident, or a serious error of judgment. It appears very unlikely, however, that such a war would break out as a result of a wanton attack by the American Strategic Air Force against Russia's cities, or by the Russian Strategic Air Force against America's cities. Therefore, in the immediate future, the greatest danger for the outbreak of an all-out atomic war lies in the possibility of a local conflict which leads to armed action, American and Russian military intervention on opposite sides, and the use of atomic weapons in such a war, arousing emotions which may make it impossible to localize the conflict.

From this point of view it would seem important for Russia and America to reach -- as soon as practicable -- a political settlement, which will make reasonably sure that there will not occur, in any of the foreseeable contingencies, an armed conflict in which America and Russia may intervene on opposite sides.

The closer we come to the second stage of the strategic stalemate, the less important <sup>will</sup> become the controversial issues which have arisen in the post-war period between America and Russia. Most of these issues had some strategic relevance and were not negotiable in the post-war period because, had they been settled one way, the settlement would have increased America's chances to win the war, if war came; and had they been settled the other way, it would have increased Russia's chances. Clearly, the issue of who is to win the next war is not an issue on which a compromise is possible, and thus most of the issues had to remain unsettled.

There is a vicious circle operating in a power conflict of this type. For few of the conflicts which have strategic significance can be settled, and new such conflicts of this nature arise from time to time. Thus, conflicts which cannot be resolved, accumulate, and as time goes on, war appears to be more and more probable, and accordingly, the chances of settling conflicts get smaller and smaller.

Such a vicious circle operated in the power conflict between Sparta and Athens just prior to the Pelopponesian War.

In the strategic stalemate, particularly as we approach the second stage, none of these controversial issues have any longer a bearing on who is going to "win" the war. When Russia and America can destroy each other to any desired degree, the overriding issue becomes the stability of the stalemate, and on this issue, Russia's and America's interests coincide. This is the reason, why in the strategic stalemate, it becomes less important whether any one of the old controversial issues is settled one way, or whether it is settled the other way; what is important is only that it be settled one way or another.

What kind of political settlement between Russia and America would be needed to stabilize the strategic stalemate?

America and Russia may recognize a few areas as lying in each other's sphere of influence in the sense that <sup>either</sup> / America or Russia may be willing alone to assume the responsibility for preserving the peace within those areas.

In some other areas it might be possible to freeze the status quo by setting up a regional inter-governmental armed force, with the consent and approval of Russia and America, as well as the other major nations which are involved. Whether or not these inter-governmental armed forces should operate under the auspices of the United Nations is discussed below.

In any case the sole function of such regional armed forces would be to prevent any nation of the area from violating the territorial integrity of another nation, and it should not be the function of regional forces to prevent governmental changes in a country by internal revolution, as long as no military forces cross the country's frontier.

The regional inter-governmental armed forces should not be equipped with atomic weapons, but they could be highly mobile, and could be equipped with high firepower so that they might be militarily stronger than any one nation within the area, partic-

ularly if the arms level of the nations within the area is kept low.

In those areas where the status quo can be frozen in this manner, the nations of the area may thus be given the security which they need, so that it will not be necessary for them to divert a substantial fraction of their economic resources into military expenditures.

Would it be desirable to set up these regional armed forces under the sponsorship of the United Nations?

At the end of the last war, it was generally believed that -- as long as the great powers act in concert with each other -- the United Nations organization may be able to guarantee the security of the smaller nations and may make it unnecessary, as well as impossible, for them to go to war with each other. Attempts made in the past ten years to use the United Nations for purposes other than those for which it was designed, have weakened this organization, and it remains to be seen whether they have damaged it beyond repair. Only if it were possible to restore the United Nations to its original function would it be able to serve as an agency to which the organization of the regional inter-governmental armed forces might be entrusted.

There are other important areas of the world where it may not be possible to protect the status quo by maintaining an inter-governmental armed force, and perhaps one of the most important areas of this kind may be the Continent of Europe. It is almost self-evident that it would be impracticable to freeze by such means the status quo in Europe, in the absence of a political settlement which is satisfactory to America and Russia as well as the nations of Europe. But even if such a political

settlement may be achieved, the maintaining of an inter-governmental armed force in Europe would remain an inappropriate way of dealing with the problem of European security. I am returning to the problem of European security in one of the later sections of the present paper.



## THE CASE FOR ATOMIC DISARMAMENT

Russia has unilaterally stopped her bomb tests, and it is conceivable that America may follow suit once she has tested most of the bombs that she needs to test. It is also conceivable that America and Russia, when they have enough bombs stockpiled to destroy to any desired degree each other, as well as the rest of the civilized world -- might agree to freeze the size of their stockpiles. But clearly, from the point of view of the danger of an atomic war, not much would be accomplished by stopping the bomb tests or by freezing the stockpiles in this manner. If far-reaching atomic disarmament at an early date is a solution to the problem posed by the bombs -- and it is possible to doubt this -- then nothing short of destroying the stockpiles of bombs, as well as eliminating the means suitable for the delivery of such bombs, may be regarded as a measure adequate for eliminating the danger of an atomic war.

This is precisely what the Russian Government is proposing. The position of the Russian Government has on account of its great simplicity the virtue of being easily understandable and because of this it deserves, and will undoubtedly get, strong popular support. The existence of the bomb is inherently a menace to mankind, and the elimination of all bomb stockpiles, as well as all effective means for the delivery of bombs, is therefore a goal which all sane men <sup>must</sup> regard as desirable.

The present official Russian position is almost identical with the position taken by most Atomic Scientists in America in the months that followed the Second World War.

The objection which one hears most frequently advanced against this position is based on the doubt that major secret violations of an agreement providing for the elimination of the bombs might remain undetected. If one thinks in terms of a continued ~~of the~~ cold war and of inspectors of a UN agency roaming up and down the countryside in Russia trying to discover bombs buried in the ground, then indeed one might be skeptical whether inspection can be relied upon to discover major secret violations.

There is no need, however, to take such an unimaginative approach to a problem of inspection; rather if one visualizes the political setting in which an arrangement providing for the elimination of bombs could be presumed to operate, it is reasonable to assume that Russia, as well as America, could find ways and means to convince each other that neither need to fear major secret violations of the agreement. I personally am rather convinced that such difficulty as may exist in detecting secret violations is not a valid objection to atomic disarmament. It must be admitted, however, that there has been so far no adequate public discussion of this issue in the United States and, as far as I know, there has been no public discussion whatsoever of this issue in the Soviet Union.

There may be other, more valid, objections to atomic disarmament at an early date, and I am inclined to take some of these much <sup>more</sup> seriously. If we were to rid the world of the bomb, we should be essentially back to where we were in the period between the two world wars, and it is difficult to see what would prevent -- except perhaps the memory of the bomb -- wars from occurring for exactly the same reason for which they have occurred in the past. Unless one were to assume that <sup>one</sup> not only rids the world of the bomb, but also of the knowledge how to make <sup>the</sup> bomb -- a major war would of necessity end up as an atomic war. ~~R~~ Even though I am inclined to take this argument very seriously, I personally should be reluctant to oppose getting rid of the bomb if America and Russia were willing to take this crucial step towards far-reaching disarmament at an early date. <sup>Rightly or wrongly,</sup> I should pin my hope on the possibility that if the world may go through another 25 years without a major war, in that period of time -- which after all represents a whole generation -- it might be possible to build up a world community that will make it unnecessary to resort to the threat of the use of force. or the threat of the use of force.

But <sup>are</sup> ~~are~~ Russia <sup>well as</sup> as America willing to rid the world of the bomb in the near future? I believe it should be possible by now to answer this question with a reasonable degree of assurance,

and if the answer is in the negative, then we should lose no time to see how it may be possible to make a virtue out of necessity.

HYDROGEN BOMBS OF HIGH POWER MAY REMAIN WITH US

FOR A LONG TIME TO COME

I shall now attempt to appraise the chances that an agreement, to rid the world of the bomb, might be reached, in the foreseeable future, by Russia and America.

In principle, almost everybody in America is in favor of disarmament -- scientists, the general public, the Administration, and Congress. I believe that at present the Administration might be divided on the issue of far-reaching disarmament which would include the elimination of the bomb. Sometimes I have the impression that there may be, within the Administration, powerful influences at work in favor of such far-reaching disarmament, and that these influences might include the President himself. But even if the Administration were <sup>now</sup> veering towards full-scale atomic disarmament, we must remember that the Administration is only one branch of the government; Congress is another branch. I might, of course, be wrong, but the way I assess the balance of forces, the outcome of the struggle inside the American Government is going to be won by those who -- while they might be in favor of some sort of disarmament -- would wish to stop short of the elimination of the bomb, as a major factor in the power balance.

I am basing this prediction on the record of the post-war period. Governments being what they are, it is quite understandable that at first, as long as Russia did not have the bomb, considerations of expediency were given more weight than moral considerations, and <sup>that</sup> the American Government found it expedient to rely on the threat of "mass retaliation" in order to counter the desire for expansion which it imputed to Russia. For this reason, the fact that during these early years no progress was made in any of the disarmament negotiations affords no basis for concluding that atomic disarmament may not become acceptable to

America in the near future. <sup>R</sup> But since 1949, it was clear that Russia knows how to make atomic bombs, and since 1954, it was clear that she knows how to make hydrogen bombs of high power. Thus, at least since 1954, the American Government had a strong incentive for discussing with Russia in earnest ways and means for getting rid of the bombs. It is obvious that if these discussions were moving <sup>forward</sup> at all, the arms race was going ahead much faster.

Therefore,  
/ I believe that more likely than not, the world will not rid <sup>itself</sup> of the bomb in the <sup>foreseeable</sup> future, and if this appraisal is correct, then we had better begin to think in earnest of how to live with the bomb.

Scientists are keenly aware of the need of stopping the arms race somewhere and the need to begin to reach <sup>some</sup> agreement with Russia on arms limitations. But I submit that the present stage of the stalemate is a precarious stage and that it is just about the worst point at which "to stop" the arms race. Having gotten the world in a mess by producing the <sup>most</sup> bomb / <sup>scientists</sup> thought -- in the past 12 years -- that the way to get the world out of this mess may lie in turning the clock back, by getting rid of the bomb. I submit that the time has now come to ask whether we were right and whether it might not perhaps be easier to get the world out of its present predicament not by attempting to turn the clock back -- which might be impossible -- but by doing just the opposite, i.e., by advancing the clock just as fast as we can.

As I stated above, such elements of inherent stability, which are contained in the first stage of the atomic stalemate, may be absent when the second <sup>of the atomic stalemate</sup> stage / is reached. It is within the setting of this second stage that I propose to discuss -- what <sup>one must</sup> / now regard as the overriding problem: What policy <sup>may</sup> / America or Russia adopt in order to render the atomic stalemate stable? <sup>R</sup> Since one may expect several years to pass between the first tentative formulation of <sup>probable</sup> a / policy and its public discussion, until such <sup>a</sup> / policy may be understood <sup>and</sup> / adopted by either the Russian or American Government, and since

we are now moving fairly rapidly towards the second stage of the atomic stalemate, it would seem reasonable to discuss the problem of <sup>the</sup> /stability/ <sup>of the stalemate not</sup> on this occasion /in the setting of the present stage of the stalemate, but in the setting of the approaching/ <sup>second</sup> stage.

In that setting the power conflict in which Russia and America found themselves caught in the post-war years, may have entirely disappeared. While America and Russia may each still desire to bring about certain changes in the present status quo, neither of them may be willing to make substantial economic sacrifices in order to bring about, forcibly, any of these changes. Therefore, they may both be content with modifying the status quo, where this is desirable, only with the approval and consent of both nations, as well as with the consent of the other major powers involved. <sup>My main point is, that in the</sup> <sup>setting of the second</sup> /stage of the stalemate, America's and Russia's real interests will closely coincide; these will consist in preserving the status quo, eliminate all risks of an atomic war, and maintain or achieve economic prosperity.

But if it be true that Russia and America will have nothing to fear from each other at this stage, there will still remain fear to be feared. Such fear must necessarily be engendered by the existence of large stockpiles of "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power, at least in the absence of a satisfactory philosophy as to how such bombs might be employed in any hypothetical -- and be it ever so unlikely -- eventuality.

Could this fear be removed by the adoption of a satisfactory rule of behavior by Russia or America?

HOW EITHER AMERICA OR RUSSIA COULD, BY UNILATERAL DECLARATION, ENSURE THE STABILITY OF THE SECOND STAGE OF THE STALEMATE

Let us examine now what would happen if either America or Russia were to adopt a satisfactory rule of <sup>behavior</sup> / and were to proclaim it by unilateral declaration. Let us assume, <sup>that once the stalemate is reached,</sup> for instance, <sup>the following</sup> that Russia were to issue a proclamation of the following sort:

"There are certain areas in the world which Russia is committed to protect from <sup>armed action directed against the</sup> <sup>invasion,</sup> the area. In the atomic stalemate, any such commitment must of necessity be a limited commitment, <sup>We know that,</sup> Russia and America are in a position to destroy each other, <sup>and Russia</sup> cannot be expected <sup>to enter into a</sup> commitment that would involve her total destruction. <sup>Russia,</sup> Russia is in a position, however, to live <sup>with only limited commitment if we are</sup> up to <sup>a limited</sup> / commitment / effective protection, <sup>because</sup> therefore also because she is willing to pay a reasonable price in economic sacrifice, and <sup>is able</sup> to exact a similar price <sup>in economic sacrifice</sup> from America.

"Moreover, Russia can do this without resorting to atomic war, and she is <sup>therefore renounces the</sup> renouncing such a war as a means of fulfilling her commitments. <sup>either</sup> Russia will not use atomic or hydrogen bombs, <sup>14</sup> against soldiers in combat, or as a means to crush <sup>Russia renounces the right to</sup> the civilian population by dropping bombs on non-evacuated cities. But she may use "clean" hydrogen bombs <sup>if need be</sup> for the purpose of demolishing American cities. Any such city <sup>after having</sup> singled out for destruction would be given four weeks' warning <sup>and</sup> in order to permit an orderly evacuation of the population and in order <sup>adequate</sup> to allow the American Government to make provisions for the housing and feeding of the refugees.

"Accordingly, <sup>we are</sup> Russia is issuing a "price list", <sup>listing all</sup> and for each protection, <sup>and</sup> she will specify <sup>xxxxxxx</sup> a minimum, as well as a maximum, <sup>for each of them,</sup> number and size of the price in terms of / American cities to be demolished, <sup>if it should be needed.</sup>

"Attached to the price list is a list of American cities divided into ten different categories, according to size, as represented by the number of inhabitants,

an attempt will be made to change the status of this area & free.



~~"Russia believes that this matter may be perfectly well handled by means of unilateral declarations, and sees no reason for ~~proposing~~ <sup>ing</sup> that America and Russia enter into an agreement in regard to it. However, for the sake of the stability of the stalemate -- which to maintain is as much to the interest of America as it is in the interest of Russia -- Russia proposes to reach an amicable understanding with America on the division of the Russian and American cities into equivalent size categories. This should ~~xxx~~ be done to avoid the danger that a dispute may ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ arise over the size category to which a ~~xxxxxxxx~~ city that is to be demolished belongs. Clearly, such dispute might ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ endanger the stability of the atomic stalemate.~~

~~xxxx~~ "Russia knows that the American people would not / particularly cherish losing any of their cities, she proposes, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ therefore, a conflict arise that should/threatensto engulf an area protected by Russia, ~~xxxxxxx~~ Russia would name / several American cities, from among which the cities singled out for destruction will be selected. In this manner the inhabitants of the several cities named by Russia will have an opportunity to make ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ known to their government what they think of the merits of American ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ getting involved in the ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ conflict that / ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ has arisen. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~

"Russia is <sup>not</sup> ~~prepared~~ <sup>to</sup> divert an appreciable fraction of her national income into arms expenditure, ~~xxxx~~ <sup>and she</sup> is ~~xxxxxxx~~ greatly reducing her army, navy, and air force. Russia may, therefore, not be in a position to defend an area she is committed to protect, by fighting a war in the ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ <sup>ordinary</sup> sense of the ~~term.~~ Accordingly, all <sup>that</sup> / Russia <sup>can</sup> commit herself to do is to exact from America a reasonable price / for which Russia, ~~xxxx~~ in turn, ~~xxxx~~ is willing to pay an equal price.

"In these circumstances, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ America could -- if indeed she were willing to pay the specified price -- conquer (or have an ally of hers conquer) ~~xxx~~ <sup>some</sup> specific area under Russian protection. America and Russia would <sup>then</sup> / both lose an equal number of cities, ~~xxx~~ <sup>Since</sup> / America <sup>will</sup> / would derive no benefit from having demolished cities in Russia / ~~xxx~~ <sup>and</sup> therefore, ~~she~~ America would have to balance <sup>pay for her</sup> ~~the~~ gain of the conquest of ~~xxx~~ <sup>a given</sup> area ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~,



*The loss of*

against the loss which she would incur, by having a certain number of her cities demolished. Russia does not believe that America has an interest in any of the areas listed by Russia, which is sufficiently great to justify <sup>her</sup> taking the loss of even one city of half a million inhabitants, for the sake of gaining possession (or having an ally of hers gain possession) ~~of any~~ of the areas ~~xxxxxxx~~ which is under Russian protection. For this reason, Russia believes that the price list proclaimed by her affords ~~xxxxxxx~~ adequate protection to all the areas listed."

~~xxxxxxx~~ <sup>If</sup> Russia were to issue a proclamation of this sort, it would be greatly to America's interest to adopt the same <sup>strategy</sup> philosophy concerning the potential use of her "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power. Evidently, <sup>the same</sup> if both America and Russia adopt this philosophy, the stalemate will be stable / in the sense that no initial disturbance would lead to a chain of ever-increasing destruction. Moreover, it would be <sup>very</sup> ~~exceedingly~~ unlikely that any city would ever be actually demolished, if this philosophy were adopted.

Quite similarly, if America were to issue a proclamation of this sort, it would be in the interest of Russia to embrace the same philosophy.

It is my contention that in the second stage of the atomic stalemate -- even in the absence of any <sup>verifiable</sup> limitation on the number of bombs <sup>available to</sup> that America and Russia ~~may stockpile, that could be verified, xxxxxxx~~ -- the stalemate <sup>could</sup> ~~would~~ be stable.

Americans might want to know what assurance they would have that Russia would not be tempted to resort to the dropping of hydrogen bombs on cities that have not been evacuated, in deviation from her <sup>But just</sup> proclaimed intentions. ~~what~~ what interest would Russia have to do such a thing? Leaving aside the condemnation of the whole world, which she would incur, and leaving out of consideration the possibility of American retaliation in kind, Russia may be assumed to be aware of the following fact: If Russia were to drop hydrogen bombs on a few American cities

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without warning, demolishing the city as well as killing the inhabitants, she would thereby not create as much trouble for the American Government as if she were to demolish the same cities without killing the inhabitants. Just imagine the position facing the American Government if a few large cities were demolished, and the Government would have to house and feed millions of refugees. Why should the Russian Government oblige the American Government by sparing her ~~the coping with the effects of~~ such a calamity?

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It is conceivable that were the Russian Government to issue the kind of proclamation I described, the American Government, because of the ~~proceeding~~ <sup>somewhat</sup> ~~emotional/attitude~~ <sup>American</sup> towards property, would revise ~~her~~ <sup>its</sup> position on atomic disarmament and prefer to reach an agreement with Russia on ridding the world of the bombs.

Russia may or may not have a similar emotional attitude towards property, and might or might not also prefer to rid the world of the bomb, ~~rather than render the stalemate stable by adopting the philosophy here described.~~

All I can say with reasonable assurance is that ~~The~~ choice lies between ridding the world of the bomb and rendering the atomic stalemate stable. ~~The "rule of conduct" here presented would render the stalemate stable, and at the same time, eliminate atomic war as a means of resolving conflicts.~~

"local"

~~The rule of conduct here~~ <sup>It also</sup> suffers from a serious defect -- ~~it is~~ <sup>is</sup> unprecedented; ~~so, of course,~~ <sup>but</sup> is the atomic stalemate. And ~~I~~ <sup>I</sup> if I were asked to propose a rule of conduct which would not suffer from this defect and yet ~~solve the problem that the bomb poses to the world,~~ <sup>"I cannot".</sup> I should have to reply: "I regret I am unable to oblige."

A proposal that is unprecedented is not easy to accept, and a rule of conduct must be politically acceptable if it is to be adopted by the Government. But fortunately, measures that may not be acceptable to the people today, may become acceptable to them tomorrow, when they ~~perhaps~~ <sup>perhaps</sup> have had enough time to see the necessity of these measures.

The thought that cities might be demolished is, of course,

hard to take. And it will not be easy to explain <sup>make</sup> to the public, <sup>the</sup> and possibly even harder to explain <sup>actually</sup> to statesmen, that <sup>no</sup> cities need to be demolished, if the rule of conduct here proposed were adopted. The stability of a mechanical system which is subjected to certain constraints, is determined by the conceivable motions ~~which are~~ permitted by these constraints, But if the system is <sup>fairly</sup> stable, it remains at rest and the conceivable motions do not actually take place. ~~This is, of course, something that the~~ physicists learn <sup>thus</sup> in the freshman course; But will <sup>they</sup> be able to explain to statesmen, that in a stable stalemate, cities might be conceivably demolished, but no city ~~xxxxx~~ <sup>need</sup> be actually demolished?

Let me now, for ~~xxxxxx~~ the sake of argument ~~at~~ least, assume that the atomic stalemate has been rendered stable by the adoption of <sup>some an</sup> appropriate rules of conduct, and then try to visualize the ~~kind of a world we should have.~~ <sup>which will result</sup> ~~Then,~~

Clearly, it shouldn't take long until Russia and America would discover, that ~~while they xxxxx~~ <sup>even though</sup> remain free to maintain an <sup>may</sup> air force, an army, and a navy, these would not add appreciably to their security, ~~xxx~~ <sup>while</sup> they would add appreciably to their <sup>then</sup> military expenditure. Before long, America and Russia could <sup>And</sup> be expected to reduce these forces, ~~xxx~~ if the second stage of the stalemate continues in existence for an appreciable period of time, the arms expenditure <sup>may</sup> of these two nations should fall to a small fraction of its <sup>then</sup> present level.

Let us now compare ~~for a moment~~ such a stable form of the atomic stalemate with the situation ~~xxxxx~~ <sup>that</sup> would prevail in the world if America and Russia had agreed to rid the world of the bomb at an early date.

It is my contention that ~~unless~~, in addition to doing away with the bomb, the world somehow also did away with the knowledge of how to make the bomb, <sup>then</sup> if there ~~xxxxx~~ should ~~xxxxx~~ be another war, ~~xxxxx~~ it ~~xxxxx~~ would be fought, after a comparatively short period of conventional warfare, with atomic bombs.

In the absence of general principles universally acceptable to all nations, it is not possible to adjudicate conflicts between nations, and it is not even possible to put forth reasoned arguments that may appeal uniformly to the sense of justice of the people of all nations. ~~xxxxxx~~ Suppose we got ~~rid of the bomb~~, <sup>what</sup> would then prevent nations from attempting ~~once more~~ <sup>again</sup> to settle conflicts by resorting to arms, ~~except perhaps the memory of the bomb?~~ Would the memory of the bomb be strong enough and just how long could this memory be kept alive? <sup>to prevent this?</sup>

It is true that the great powers, if they act in concert with each other, might use something like the machinery of the United Nations organization for preventing the smaller powers from disturbing the peace. But the United Nations organization cannot keep the peace among the great powers. For the time being, <sup>at least</sup> ~~xxxxxx~~ Russia and America could perhaps protect their possessions without having to ~~use~~ <sup>use</sup> arms. But England and France just recently resorted to the use of force <sup>against Egypt</sup> in order to protect what they regarded as their vital interests.

Is it not likely that if the bomb is abolished, armed conflicts <sup>will</sup> may continue to occur between nations; that such <sup>and</sup> armed conflicts may threaten to change the power of balances adversely, either from the point of view of Russia or from the point of view of America, and that these two nations might then be drawn into the <sup>of them</sup> conflict? If this should happen, before long atomic bombs would reappear on the scene and ~~at that point~~ <sup>one</sup> all hell might break loose.

In this century, the United States entered the war twice against Germany, not in order to make the world safe for democracy, nor in order to establish the Four Freedoms in the world, as some might choose to believe, but mainly <sup>do</sup> ~~xxxxxx~~ for the ~~sole~~ purpose of preventing a German victory. The United States was forced to enter the war for this reason, since a German victory would have produced a major shift in the power balances, ~~xxxx~~ <sup>was</sup> that ~~xxxx~~ would have threatened America's security. Indeed, had Germany won either the First or the Second World War, ~~xxxx~~ <sup>might</sup> she ~~xxxx~~ have become

~~militarily~~ so strong as to be able to vanquish the United States --  
if no atomic bombs existed, -- in the ~~event of~~ <sup>another</sup> ~~xxxxxx~~ World War.

~~xx~~ Similarly,  
~~xx~~ Russia was <sup>felt</sup>  
impelled to go to war with Finland just prior to the onset of  
the Second World War in order to improve her strategic position  
in the <sup>upcoming</sup> ~~next~~ war, the war with Germany.

If Russia and America are <sup>will be</sup> able to maintain the atomic stale-  
mate in a stable form, then neither of them <sup>will need</sup> ~~xxxxxxxx~~ to be con-  
cerned about their security, or ~~to~~ fight a preventive war <sup>again</sup> for  
the sake of their security. China might become a great indus-  
trial power; Germany might become economically far stronger than  
England, or any other nation on the <sup>m</sup> ~~Continent~~ of Europe; Japan  
might become a great industrial nation, with an orientation of her  
trade towards China. -- none of this need to concern either  
Russia or America from the point of view of their security. In  
the ~~setting of~~ <sup>a stable atomic</sup> ~~xxxxxxxx~~ stalemate, <sup>an increase in</sup> the so-called "war potential"  
of any nation, or combination of nations, resulting from their  
industrialization, <sup>and</sup> <sup>perhaps</sup> accompanied by a conspicuous rise of their  
production of steel, coal, or oil, becomes <sup>will</sup> irrelevant from the  
point of view of the security of Russia, America, and such other  
nations which in time might acquire a position similar to that  
of Russia and America in the setting of <sup>the</sup> ~~xxxxxxxx~~ stalemate.)

Britain, The "n<sup>th</sup>" Power Problem, and the Security of the European Continent

We have so far not discussed the effect on the stalemate of nations other than Russia and America, which may have available "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power or may acquire such bombs in the foreseeable future. In polite diplomatic language, this problem is sometimes referred to as the "N<sup>th</sup>" power problem.

At the moment the only power falling in this category is Great Britain. In a recent white paper the British Government has indicated that in case of a major war in which Russia is involved, England would use hydrogen bombs against Russia -- presumably dropping them on Russian cities and killing millions of civilians, men, women, and children, even if Russia were willing to fight the war with conventional weapons. Since there is no reason why England should not expect Russia to retaliate in kind, the statement of the British white paper is tantamount to a threat of "murder and suicide".

The threat of murder and suicide might or might not be believed, and such a threat can therefore not serve the purpose of stabilizing the stalemate. I venture to predict that with the advent of the second stage of the strategic stalemate and in case of the kind of Russian-American war that have been discussed, any nation threatening murder and suicide would automatically place itself in the position of a common enemy of Russia and America.

This does not mean, however, that England would have to deprive herself of the protection which the possession of "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power and solid-fuel-long-range rockets might afford her. England might well retain the bomb as an instrument of power if she adopts the same rule of behavior concerning the hypothetical use of her bombs as Russia and America. England might well proclaim a price list and set a reasonable price on each of the territories, which she is committed to defend. It is true that the loss of a city of a half-million inhabitants would be a far greater loss ~~xxx~~ to Britain than, say, for Russia, but on the other hand, it is also true that ~~xxxxxx~~ being deprived of some of her colonies would be a far greater loss to Britain than

would be the gain that the acquisition of such a colony would represent for Russia -- and I am adopting here for the sake of argument, the manifestly absurd premise that some of the British colonies ~~are~~ <sup>may be seriously</sup> coveted by Russia.

Perhaps Britain, by threatening "murder and suicide" in the recent white paper, has rendered a service to the world; for by doing so, she drew attention to a danger that still lies in the future, but nevertheless may require watchfulness and early action on the part of the great powers. Britain did not threaten murder and suicide for the purpose of acquiring new possessions. She has used this threat only for the sake of preserving what she now possesses. But why shouldn't in the future some small nation, under a government more irresponsible than that of Britain and perhaps ruled by a dictator -- about whose mental sanity the world may have legitimate doubts -- use the threat of murder and suicide for the purpose of acquiring a coveted possession of some other nation?

I have discussed <sup>the probability</sup> above/that in some regions of the world the status quo may be preserved by maintaining an inter-governmental armed force equipped with conventional weapons. The nations located in such areas do not need atomic or hydrogen bombs for their security, and the great powers have means to bring, in such circumstances, pressures on such nations to renounce the possession of such bombs. ¶ But what about the nations of Europe, such as France or Germany? If any of these need ~~atomic~~ hydrogen bombs for their security, or if they have some other strong incentive for having such bombs available to them, it will be very difficult, and perhaps impossible, <sup>in the long run</sup> to prevent them from acquiring such bombs.

Prior to the onset of the atomic stalemate, both Russia and America had a vital and opposite interest in the distribution of military power on the Continent of Europe. This made it impossible to bring about in the post-war period, any changes in Europe with the consent and approval of both America and Russia. At the same time, the nations in Europe did not lack security,

for the map of Europe was frozen just because Russia and America had vital, and opposite, interests.

In the atomic stalemate, and particularly as the second stage of the stalemate approaches, America and Russia are going to be increasingly indifferent to any of the changes that might take place on the Continent of Europe. In this stage of the stalemate, there is no important reason why the United States should wish to maintain any military bases on foreign soil, and a military alliance with the nations of Western Europe would no longer add much to the security of the United States. The United States may continue to maintain an alliance with the nations of Western Europe, but she would increasingly regard these allies as expendable.)

Similarly, Russia may become increasingly indifferent to what happens in Europe.

At this point, it may become possible to bring about changes in Europe with the consent and approval of both Russia and America, as well as the nations directly involved. What might these changes be?

One of the hopeful signs in Europe at the present is the <sup>moving</sup> ~~the~~ of Western Europe towards a customs union. The present movement toward an economically united Western Europe would be probably severely disturbed if a united, disarmed, neutral Germany were created where France remained armed and an ally of the United States. The French military needs are closely tied to her African possessions, and it is conceivable, that if the Algerian War is brought to an end, most of the continent of Europe might become an area in which arms <sup>may be</sup> ~~are~~ maintained at a low level. If it were possible to accomplish this, Europe could reach an unprecedented level of prosperity very fast.

If a nation can divert 10% of its national income from military expenditure to the <sup>increasing</sup> ~~the~~ of its production capacity, this shift alone will <sup>result in</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ a 3% increase in the annual national <sup>product (and if</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ the population <sup>remains</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ stationary to a 3% increase in the standard of living).



Russia would greatly profit through a flourishing East-West trade from such an improvement in the economy of Europe, and it is conceivable that Russia and America, acting in concert with each other, would want to facilitate such a development in the foreseeable future.

But one must not disregard the political problems with which Europe may be faced in the not-too-distant future. Right now, the nations of Europe are all tired of war and at this time, people in Western Germany are more interested in increasing their prosperity than in the problem of unifying Germany. But human memory is short, and the time might come when unifying Germany may become the one over-riding political issue on which all Germans may unite. Furthermore, once Germany is unified, the problem of recovery of territories lost to Poland might <sup>similarly</sup> ~~become~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~over-riding~~ issue. Therefore, if it becomes possible to change the map of Europe with the consent and approval of Russia, as well as America, it would be very desirable to create, right from the start, a situation which is politically stable. Only in that case will it be possible to freeze the status quo without having to lean on <sup>force or the</sup> ~~a~~ threat of force.

Perhaps it might be possible to provide Poland with an adequate compensation to induce her to agree to the return of former German territories -- possibly according to some gradual but fixed schedule. If this could be done, then one of the valid reasons for maintaining Germany divided would disappear.

There would still remain a major difficulty. Russia can agree to the unification of Germany, only when she is ready to abandon her political friends in Eastern Germany, who could not be expected to retain political office, if Germany were reunited. True enough, the political party at present in power in Western Germany would presumably not remain in office either, if Germany were united. But whether Russia would, or should, regard the replacement of Adenauer's party by the German Social Democratic Party as a <sup>major</sup> ~~a~~ change for the better, is by no means clear.

Should a political settlement be obtainable on the Continent

of Europe that is satisfactory to all nations in that area, then the security of the nations which make up the Continent of Europe may perhaps not present a major problem. But if no fully satisfactory settlement can be achieved, then inter-European security might well represent<sup>a</sup>/serious problem.

There are two different approaches to the solution of ~~the~~ <sup>this</sup> problem. ~~of inter-European security.~~ Both of these approaches are based on the premise that in the second stage of the stalemate, neither Russia nor American can be expected to take <sup>any</sup> action at an appreciable cost to themselves, ~~for the sake of preventing~~ <sup>for the sake of preventing</sup> changes in Europe, ~~which may~~ <sup>which may</sup> come about, through one nation in Europe taking armed action against another nation in Europe.

One of <sup>the</sup> two possible approaches to the problem of freezing <sup>of the Continent of Europe</sup> the map/would consist in providing the nations <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~ Europe -- or at least some of the nations of Europe -- with a limited number of "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power. The map of Europe could then be stabilized through exactly the same kind of mechanism through which Russia and America may protect -- in the second stage of the stalemate -- those areas of the world in which they have a vital interest.

Because in the second stage of the stalemate America and Russia may have only a very limited interest in the distribution of power in Europe, neither of them can be very well expected to protect any nation in Europe against any other nation in Europe that has "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power available and solid-fuel-long-range rockets which can hit either America or Russia.

It might very well be, of course, that the nations of Europe would prefer another approach to the problem of inter-European security and that they would want no hydrogen bombs available to any of the nations on the Continent of Europe. In this case, <sup>and Russia,</sup> America, <sup>each other, would</sup> acting in concert with ~~the~~ enter into a commitment to protect the nations on the Continent of Europe against each other. Clearly, no nation on the Continent of Europe ~~would~~ <sup>is</sup> going to accept the loss of ~~an~~ <sup>an</sup> appreciable fraction of her cities for the

sake of achieving any territorial ambitions that she may have.  
Russia, as well as America, could<sup>effectively</sup>/threaten to do just that <sup>provided</sup> ~~xx~~/  
<sup>that</sup>  
/the offending nation is in no position to exact from America and  
Russia the same price.

If this approach to the problem of inter-European security  
were preferred by the nations of Europe, then Europe would become  
part of the security system based on a Pax Russo-Americana.



is to only realize such  
found if we remember that an agreement of this sort is not enforceable and that, therefore, it will remain in force only as long as America and Russia wish to keep it in force. It might, therefore, be best if the agreement were to provide that both <sup>each side</sup> America and Russia have the legal right <sup>has</sup> openly to abrogate the agreement at any time <sup>whenever it suspects,</sup> if they, rightly or wrongly, suspect that major secret violations <sup>are taking place, have occurred,</sup> have remained undetected.

If one approaches the problem in this manner, then it may be seen that the pertinent question is <sup>will be</sup> not what kind of an inspection system <sup>1</sup> the agreement should specify, <sup>2</sup> but ~~what the~~ ~~pertinent question is~~ rather this: "By what means could America and Russia convince each other that there are no major secret violations of the agreement occurring?" (For clearly, unless they <sup>can do so</sup> both may accomplish this, one or the other of them will be forced to abrogate the agreement, <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ neither of them would want this to happen).

<sup>To find</sup> If the question is posed in these terms, then one might perhaps <sup>find</sup> arrive at the answer, along the following lines:

Research and development work on a major scale, aimed at an effective defense against long-range-rockets, could not successfully be carried out either in America or in Russia, without the enthusiastic cooperation of many thousands of scientists and engineers. Should any agency, of either the Russian or American Government, keep on with such research and development work, in violation of the agreement, thousands of engineers and scientists would know about this violation.

Both the American and Russian Governments might obtain reasonable assurance that violations occurring would be detected, if it were possible to develop between individual Russian scientists and individual American scientists, a relationship of mutual trust. This would have to come about by a deliberate effort on the part of their Governments, and might <sup>call for</sup> involve the creation of <sup>research</sup> suitable inter-governmental/institutions that would have to operate on a rather large scale.

The word "trust" denotes relationship between human beings.

Governments ~~are not human beings; they~~ cannot be expected to trust each other, and they rarely do. But scientists are human beings, and moreover, they are drawn to each other by their passionate interest in their work. In the post-war years, as long as America's ~~interests~~ and Russia's interests were in conflict, ~~with each other, the relationship between American and Russian scientists was of necessity troubled, also because both the~~ Russian and American scientists found themselves in a conflict of loyalties. But as we ~~now~~ move into the second stage of the atomic stalemate, America's and Russia's interests begin more and more to coincide, and scientists, Russians as well as Americans, will be quick to perceive that in this stalemate, the <sup>common,</sup> over-riding interest of America and Russia is to make the stalemate stable.

Let us try to visualize <sup>Imagine</sup> the President of the United States addressing the American people and speaking as follows: "America and Russia have just concluded an agreement for the purpose of stabilizing the atomic stalemate. To this end, it is necessary for both ~~America and Russia~~ <sup>sides</sup> to refrain from developing a system that may provide for an effective defense against long-range-rockets, in flight.

America <sup>we</sup> hopes that Russia <sup>will</sup> may be able to convince <sup>US</sup> her, that no such work is being carried out any longer in Russia, <sup>there</sup> and <sup>if not, we</sup> America has <sup>we</sup> reserved the right legally to abrogate the agreement, unless Russia <sup>to</sup> succeeds in convincing her of the absence of such secret violations. Until such time as America <sup>we have</sup> may openly abrogate <sup>it</sup> the agreement, <sup>we are</sup> America is pledged to tolerate no ~~xxxxxx~~ violations of the agreement occurring in America. <sup>similar was here,</sup>

It is my duty to see to it that America may honor this pledge. I ~~am~~, therefore, appealing to <sup>all</sup> any American scientist and engineers, to report such violations if they <sup>should</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~ discover that some ill-advised official of the American Government is bent on evading the provisions of the agreement, <sup>to</sup> ~~report this violation.~~ <sup>report this violation.</sup> Such violations may be reported to an inter-governmental control commission set up for the purpose, or preferably, directly to the Russian Government which, in turn, <sup>may</sup> ~~xxxx~~ inform the inter-governmental commission. America and Russia have jointly set up a fund out of which high rewards may be paid for

*cheap smarmers*  
information leading to the discovery of a violation of the agree-  
ment. These rewards, because they are paid by an inter-governmen-  
tal agency, would be free from U. S. income tax."

I have added the last lines for the benefit of those, who believe in the irresistible power of monetary inducements. I, myself, believe that in this case monetary inducements could do no harm, but that they would not be necessary.

The agencies of the American Government have trouble enough as it is to recruit the ablest among scientists and engineers for the research and the development work which is needed at present. What success would any of <sup>the Agencies</sup> them have in ~~xxx~~ recruiting the engineers and scientists they ~~xxxxx~~ need if the recruitment is for a purpose which has been expressly disavowed by the President? And how would such an agency keep its illicit activities secret?

After the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles provided for the disarmament of Germany. <sup>However,</sup> This Treaty was imposed upon ~~but~~ Germany, and ~~xxxxx~~ <sup>she</sup> did not consider it in her interests to adhere to its provisions. So, while Germany <sup>had</sup> signed the Treaty of Versailles, ~~she~~ <sup>she</sup> never ~~revoked~~ <sup>did not</sup> the ~~xxx~~ Espionage Law of Imperial Germany, <sup>so that</sup> which thus remained on the statute books. German citizens who informed the inter-allied control commission of ~~secret~~ <sup>secret</sup> violations of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, <sup>actually</sup> could be ~~and were~~ sentenced to prison terms under the German Espionage Act, and they were in fact so sentenced.

A nation which indulges in this kind of inconsistency, indicates thereby that it has no intention of observing the agreement, providing for arms limitations. Should either Russia or America, having concluded an agreement, indulge in this <sup>similar</sup> type of inconsistency, this would undoubtedly ~~xx~~ lead to ~~a~~ prompt abrogation of the agreement, <sup>by the other side.</sup>

But ~~if~~ barring such a possibility, can anyone seriously believe that American scientists would keep violations of the agreement, of which they learn, a secret? ~~once the world moves into~~ the second stage of the stalemate, <sup>when it will have</sup> and it becomes clear what benefit the world might derive from a Pax Russo-Americana, American scientists, and engineers, as well as <sup>stability of the</sup> the American public in general, would realize that maintaining the stalemate ~~stable~~ is just as imperative for America as it is for Russia. Who could seriously believe that in

these circumstances, American scientists would break faith with their Russian colleagues, would fail to do what the President has asked them to do, and <sup>to</sup> endanger the safety of the world, <sup>?</sup> by ~~remaining silent when they ought to speak up?~~

Naturally, I can speak with much less assurance about the ~~existing~~ attitudes of Russian scientists and engineers. I am convinced, though, that the great success which Russia <sup>has</sup> had in developing atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and inter-continental ballistic missiles, was due to the enthusiastic work of Russian engineers and scientists, ~~who were convinced of the righteousness of Russia's cause.~~ And I can't quite see any high official of the Russian Government appealing, in secret, to Russian scientists and engineers, ~~and asking them~~ to do something, that the Russian Government had openly declared ~~she would not do~~ <sup>should not be done</sup> particularly if ~~the Russian Government~~ <sup>reserves</sup> has the right ~~openly~~ to abrogate the agreement.

However, there is no reason why I should speak here of what Russian scientists and engineers may or may not do. They can very well speak for themselves, and I believe they <sup>will</sup> ~~may~~ speak for themselves, <sup>when</sup> if the time should come ~~for them~~ to do so.

\*\*\* THE END \*\*\*