

Waiting for "Company:"
Development on the Periphery of the Periphery
in the
Southern Highlands Province, Papua New Guinea

by
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May 1984

Submitted to the Temple University
Graduate Board in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy



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Title of Dissertation:

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GLOSSARY

I have included in this glossary terms which I have had occasion to use in the dissertation which are likely not to be familiar to most readers. These terms include words from the Kewa language, from Tok pisin or Neo-Melanesian, acronyms and a few English terms the usage or referent of which may be unknown to many outside of PNG.

The definitions or glosses offered below are my own. They benefit from reference to the work of Karl and Joice Franklin in Kewa (see Franklin et al. 1978, A Kewa Dictionary) and F. Mihalic in Tok Pisin or what he calls "Melanesian Pidgin" (see 1971, The Jacaranda Dictionary and Grammar of Melanesian Pidgin). I have presented a gloss or the full expansion of the acronyms listed here with the first usage of a term in the body of the dissertation. This listing is for reference upon encountering the terms again.

A note about Kewa orthography is necessary. Franklin et al. presents spellings which sometimes differ from those I've used here. Two differences arise out of his treatment of Kewa phonemics. In East Kewa (see Map 2, Chapter 1), some consonants are regularly prenasalized in word-internal contexts. In South and West Kewa the terms in use are the same, but the prenasalization is absent. Franklin has accounted for this feature of East Kewa in a phonetic rule, and does not include an "n" in the spelling. I have included it. For example, "mondo" listed below appears as "modo" in the Franklin Dictionary (1978:178). The Franklins have also distinguished phonemically in the Kewa two sounds associated with "a" in English:

- "a, as in butter: (a mid-central vowel occurring most often in unstressed position only);
- aa, as in father: (a low-central vowel, often reflecting the historical loss of an adjacent consonant;" (Franklin et al. 1978:19)

I have presented terms here as I transcribed them in the field, sometimes

differing in form in minor ways from Franklin. The linguistic differences were not a focus of my research and are not in any way crucial.

Entries are listed first, underlined. Non-English terms are identified as originating in either Kewa (K) or Tok Pisin (TP).

alamo, (K), a wild cane grass with an edible center. Often referred to as "long pitpit" (see pitpit below).

aralu, (K), a social group headed by a father, ara, and his children. The Franklins gloss the term as "family," but Muli informants specifically denied that a wife or mother were included in the reference of the term.

banis, (TP), literally "fence," but used in Muli to designate a fenced pasture, as in the "sipsip banis" to refer to the Department of Primary Industry Muli Sheep Project.

bisnis, (TP), business. The term is applied to activities involving commodity production and commodity circulation. It was also used on occasion to refer to the exchange activities of the precolonial days, drawing a parallel between the ability of a man to make a shell turn into a pig through a series of exchanges, and the ability now of converting goods into cash and cash into more cash.

birua, (TP), enemy.

buai, (TP), betel nut

DASF, Department of Agriculture, Stock, and Fisheries. Administrative predecessor to DPI.

didiman, (TP), agricultural extension officer.

dina, (TP), a loan.

DPI, Department of Primary Industry. Successor to DASF. The switch in name may have occurred prior to independence. I am not certain of the date.

European, an adjective applicable to anyone of white skin or the goods, customs, etc., associated with them. Australians, American, Britons, etc., are all "European."

giaman, (TP), "a lie," or "to lie." As an adjective used as a derisive term or term of belittlement.

H.L.S., Highlands Labour Scheme.

hangri, (TP), hungry. In the usage referred to in this work, hangri is

synonymous with taim hangri (TP), and rea (K). A period in which mature, big sweet potatoes are not available in gardens.

kago, (TP), cargo. Supplies, especially for a store.

kaikai, (TP), to eat or consume, as in kaikai mani, "consume money."

kampani, (TP), a company, large business enterprise. The definitive kampani in Muli's experience are plantations.

kandipi, (K), European person.

kaukau, (TP), the generic name for sweet potatoes.

kiap, (TP), initially referred to colonial patrol officers. The term has been extended to other administrative leaders. The Village Court Magistrate is often called the "village kiap" in Muli. The Ialibu District Manager is sometimes referred to as the "kiap," too.

kina, (TP), mother of pearl shell.

komiti, (TP), committee. Refers to members of Ward Committees established under colonial rule as a community advisory group to the Local Government Councilor. The committees rarely, if ever, functioned as such in Muli (see Chapter 2).

kopi, (TP), coffee.

kunai, (TP), sword grass which covers much of the deforested, ungardened areas of the Highlands.

kura, (K), a grass grown and dried for making women's grass skirts.

lain, (TP), clan; ancestral group; any level of sub-group of the clan. The English term "line" is used in the same fashion.

laki, (TP), "lucky," the name of a card game played in gambling.

les, (TP) as used here, "tired of," as in "I'm tired of eating sweet potatoes. Also means "lazy" in different use.

L.G.C., Local Government Council.

li, (K), literally "fruit," but used in Muli to refer to 10t coins, as well.

maa, (K), indigenous taro.

maapu, (K), garden.

masta, (K), master. A term of address or reference applicable to male Europeans, or Europeans as a whole. Contrasts with misis (Mrs.), applied to European women.

meri, (TP), woman.

mogo, (K), placenta.

mondo, (K), sweet potato. mondo maapu, (K), sweet potato garden.

nana repona kopi, (K), my coffee trees. Used to refer to a man's source of income, his business. In the cases cited here, the phrase was applied to a man's daughters.

nem, (TP), name. To achieve a nem is to become well-known, to achieve high status.

pandi, (K), a short edible grass common in Muli gardens and diets.

papa, (TP), father or caretaker, manager.

pipia, (TP), trash, rubbish. Pipia kaukau, (TP), small kaukau deemed suitable only for pigs' consumption under good kaukau supply conditions.

pitpit, (TP), generic term referring to edible grasses, and to wild cane grass covering ungardened areas. Sotpela pitpit, (TP), "short pitpit," is the equivalent of pandi. Longpela pitpit, (TP), "long pitpit," refers commonly to alamo (see above).

ples, (TP), village or home area, place.

P.M.V., Passenger Motor Vehicle. Pickup trucks and small buses used for transport services for pay.

P.N.G., Papua New Guinea.

poroman, (TP), partner or equal. In the contexts reported in this dissertation the term was being used to designate persons of equivalent age.

pyrethrum, varieties of chrysanthemum used in production of chemical insecticides. A cash-crop in some Highlands areas.

raani, (K), edible cloverlike green most common in Muli gardens.

raba, (TP), black rubber rings worn as wristlets and used sometimes in women's gambling circles to substitute for cash.

re, (K), base. reali, (K), base man or male owner. rewinya, (K), base woman or female owner.

rea, (K), hungry time. See hangri above.

rekere, (K), mother of pearl shell.

-repa/X-repa, (K), a suffix attached to a deceased male's name to refer to his living descendants. Patrilineal group. The term does not stand alone and is used to refer only to living persons under normal circumstances. The X-repa form which I've used here simply uses "X" as a placeholder.

romo, (K), poisonous substances.

ruru, (K), clan or line (see "lain" above). The term can be used to refer to a clan or its sub-clan.

samting nating, (TP), "something nothing," something of no concern.

sande, (TP), a system of savings circle in which payments are made by all members of a voluntary group to a single member of the group. Recipient status is rotated around the group so that each periodically receives a large lump sum.

satu, (TP), dice and a dice-game.

su, (K), ground or location. Su reali, (K), the owner of the ground.

susu, (TP), milk, breast or udder. Pik susu, (TP), a brood sow. Applied in Muli to European-breed pigs, as well.

tambu, (TP), taboo, in-law.

taim hangri, (TP), see hangri above.

wantok, (TP), literally "one talk" or "one who shares the same language," used loosely to refer to friends.

Yuropen, (TP), European (see European above).

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of peripheral formations of the world capitalist social formation which dominates the political economy of the world today. It presents an analysis of the integration of a Papua New Guinea Highlands clan group into the colonial and independent national political economy, and into the world capitalist system. The analysis is guided by the application of an analytical model derived from critical political economy. Ethnographic field research was conducted between June 1980 and May 1981 in the Central Highlands of Papua New Guinea among Muli Ekerepa, a Kewa-speaking clan group in the Ialibu District of the Southern Highlands Province.

The first section of this introduction will set the ethnographic context within which this study was conducted. This will be followed by a discussion of the theoretical framework and model guiding the study, historical materialist studies of the periphery. The third section of the introduction characterizes Muli Census Division and the Ialibu District within which it is located, the field site within which research was conducted. A summary of data collection techniques follows, discussing the sources of the data presented in the dissertation. Finally, an outline of the rest of the work is presented.

Papua New Guinea Peasants and Peripheral Economy

The first representatives of the world capitalist system entered the Central Highlands of Papua New Guinea fifty years ago, searching for gold and souls. Colonial administration followed, spreading its influence gradually. In 1952, colonialism came to Ialibu, and to the region which came to be known as the Kewabe.¹

By the time direct colonial influence reached Ialibu, the national economy of Papua New Guinea had been shaped into a peripheral or underdeveloped economic formation² in the world system. There is little doubt that PNG must be considered one of the less developed nations of the world, in the sense that its economic development on all of the standard measures places it low in the ranks of world nations. Morawetz (1977), in a review of world economic development between 1950 and 1975, reports PNG ranking forty-third among the seventy-seven developing nations surveyed, based on a measure of per capita gross national product (GNP). PNG's per capita GNP in 1975 was US\$412 (1974 dollars). This was equal to only 7.9% of the average GNP of the definitive developed nations, the nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).³ In dollar amounts, PNG's \$412 per capita GNP fell \$4,826 below the OECD average. Morawetz calculated the number of years it would take for each developing nation to close the gap to the OECD average, based on national economic growth rates (averaged over 15 years). PNG needs only 2,826 years to accomplish this feat.

Of greater importance to us, however, is the structure of PNG's economy and its place in the world economy. The World Bank (1978) has provided the following characterizations. It is clear that, as a

colony of Australia, PNG was developed as a peripheral area, as described by Amin (see Note 2). The colony's involvement with the world economy was dominated by its export agricultural production on expatriate and government controlled plantations. No market for internal supply was developed, relying instead on imports from parental Australia to meet expatriate needs. After the second world war, development of the Highlands was guided by governmental policies very much favoring expatriate activities, with periods of easy and cheap land alienation, favorable credit terms to enable purchase of the desired capital goods duty free, imports of those goods from Australian firms (and consequent failure to develop a manufacturing sector of the Papua and New Guinea economy), and the Highlands Labour Scheme as a means of obtaining a steady flow of cheap labor to the expatriate business concerns (World Bank 1978:40-41). A system of commodity production for export grew up next to, and intermixed with, a domestic economy in which commodities played little role, and for which there was consequently little commodity production. The flow of money associated with export production drew labor to plantations. It enticed the development of smallholder cash cropping for export. But it did not destroy the local bases of production, nor transform the social relations within which people produced.⁴

Ethnographic reports have documented well the absorption by PNG societies of the effects of colonial pacification and monetization without transformation of the structure of local social ties. Western money and goods have been incorporated into local subsistence consumption in the form of steel tools, processed foods, clothing, decorations, and other imported commodities (see e.g., Brown 1970; Meggitt 1971; Howlett 1973).

Western cash and commodities were also integrated into local systems of ceremonial exchange. Meggitt (1971:203-204) and A. Strathern (1976:280) present data from Enga and Mount Hagen, respectively, regarding the initial treatment of cash as equivalent to various locally-defined domains of valuables used as tokens in ceremonial exchange. Colonialist flooding of the Highlands with imported shells, and the resulting distortion of shell value by inflation, eventually forced redefinition of definitions of equivalent goods in ceremonial exchange. The Central Enga, for example, traded shells of lesser value to fringe groups, then dropped such shells from their exchange spheres, refusing to accept any but the most valuable of shells in return payments (mother of pearl), in addition to pigs and cash (Meggitt 1971). Such changes did not destroy the ceremonial systems. In fact, in some areas ceremonial exchange appeared to have been heightened and broadened by the wider geographical range allowed by pacification (A. Strathern 1971), by easing the demands of garden labor on men through the introduction of more efficient tools (Salisbury 1962), and by increasing the number of valuables in circulation (A. Strathern 1976 and references).

The addition of new sources of wealth increased the ability of big-men to attract followers and wield influence through redistribution of that wealth. Salisbury (1968) reports that among the Siane and Tolai this resulted in actually enlarging the effective political groups. New mechanisms for acquiring wealth, such as coffee production, were integrated into local activities and exploited side by side with traditional mechanisms for the traditional political end--to make presentations to friends and allies, whether pigs and shells or rice and tinned fish

(Brown 1972, 1974 cited in A. Strathern 1976:282). The heightening of ceremonial activity supported by the integration of cash and commodities had a feedback effect motivating further efforts to obtain cash and commodities for use in such traditional activities (Belshaw 1955:30-31). Precapitalist PNG societies absorbed all of these changes, but they were not internally restructured.

Colonial policy assured the maintenance of the clan-based Highlands gardening system, forming a "labor reserve" for plantation enclaves and a cost-efficient social insurance program for the laborers who came to work.⁵ The Highlands Labour Scheme, begun about 1950, brought Highland men to coastal plantations which were in need of labour. But it also took them back to the Highlands after their contracted period. Labor migration in PNG is primarily circular (see e.g., readings in May, ed. 1977). Harris has argued, based on data from the Southern Highlands Province (1972), that young men leave their home areas for the combined motives of increasing status through acquiring cash, and seeking excitement away from the village, where the end of warfare and the imposition of colonial labor demands resulted in a monotonous, unsatisfying life. But Harris notes, too, that the vast majority of young men return to their homes, intending to stay and to enter into bisnis ("business"--TP). This pattern of migration allows plantations to pay wages sufficient to maintain only a single person. Families remain in the home areas, producing their own subsistence, and providing the sanctuary to which a worker can return when sick, threatened, or simply tired of working.

Rural development policy aimed at minimal dislocation of indigenous producers, geographically or culturally. It encouraged the addition of commercial production to the precolonial system of production based in gardening for direct consumption (Howlett 1973). This policy has not produced the growing, integrated economy projected by the colonial officers responsible for implementing it. Rural producers actively followed the plan. Cash cropping is widespread, dominated in the Highlands by coffee production. Business was undertaken by "primitive capitalists" and "big men" (Epstein 1968; Finney 1973). But business has more often than not failed to become a self-reproducing, capital accumulating enterprise. Profits of business buy pigs (Strathern 1972a: 377) and support unpaid helpers in their exchange activities (Brown 1972:92). Businesses are dissolved when owners fall ill to sorcery performed by jealous clansmen (McKillop 1980:155-157). Wage labor opportunities in home regions are limited in most areas, and labor migration to plantations and towns away from the rural areas is widespread.

It is obvious that the Highlanders have taken to bisnis, especially cash-cropping, but, as noted by Salisbury (1970:237-238), bisnis remains supplementary in the minds of most Highlanders, and the provision of their own subsistence primary. Fisk (1962, 1966) reported the continuing dominance of the subsistence sector even though most individuals straddle the sectors, engaging as well in cash-cropping, and of the artificial means necessary to induce further development. In 1978, the World Bank (1978:4) estimated that 90% of PNG's arable land was under subsistence farming, and that 60-70% of

the population were subsistence farmers. It is clear that PNG has not developed into a nation of capitalists and proletarians. But the references above make clear, as well, that these subsistence farmers are not isolated from cash-producing activities. Rural Highlands agricultural producers have integrated commodity-production and commodity-consumption into their lives to varying degrees. While trading in commodities, however, rural producers rely primarily on their own production for direct consumption to meet most of their own material needs (hence the World Bank's label). It has become increasingly common to refer to these rural producers as "peasants"⁶ (see, e.g., Spoehr 1960; Meggitt 1971; Howlett 1973; Amarshi et al. 1979; Connell 1979):

Within the Papua New Guinea context, what is meant by the label "peasant" is the integration of agriculturally based family production units into the larger colonial, now independent national, PNG economy. The process of peasantization implied in the analyses using this term is constituted by the partial commoditization (and monetization) of daily life of the producers in question. In the process of absorbing the cash- and commodity-oriented activities introduced by the colonial administration, Highlands producers have developed a dependence on imported commodities (Meggitt 1971) and an "inescapable need for cash" (Howlett 1977:3).

Use of the term "peasants" has come to signal, as well, a shift in methodological treatment of rural agricultural producers. Howlett (1973) argues explicitly against the assumption that PNG Highlanders are in transition from being primitive agriculturalists to becoming full-fledged capitalists (and laborers). Her analysis of indigenous Goroka

coffee growers suggested that the mode of integrating these producers into the national economy could effectively prevent their continuing development. The ability of colonial government to dictate what commodities would be produced for export, and the existence of a class of expatriate capitalists who could prevent the rise of indigenous enterprises through competition, effectively limited these producers to the status of terminal peasants. Later analyses of PNG peasantries have moved more explicitly into analyses of the class relations within which the peasants produce. The attention of these analysts has focused, too, on what appears to be a growing differentiation between peasants.

Inequalities inherent in Highlands precapitalist systems are giving rise to a class of "big peasants" through the differential ability to exploit the new opportunities for wealth and power (Amarshi, Good, Mortimer 1979; Connell 1979; Donaldson and Good 1978). The big peasant class is thus far confined primarily to areas which have served as centers for foreign plantation activity (Fitzpatrick n.d.; A. Strathern 1982a), but in alliance with the urban state petty bourgeoisie, its power and dominance is growing. This alliance is deemed by Donaldson and Good to be "the heart of the political economy of independent Papua New Guinea" (1978:5). The growing inequality which has produced the big peasantry may even be producing a rural proletariat (Connell 1979; Howlett 1977). Howlett suggests that in rural areas such a class would not be immediately obvious due to the existing kinship and clan ties which prevail. Landless individuals would likely be living with and/or working for someone else in the rural clan area in order to maintain access to the means of subsistence. It remains to be seen how the process of rural

proletarianization carries forward. But most of rural PNG remains outside the immediate spheres of these big peasants. There exists an ongoing struggle to control the production of these not-so-big peasants in the regions far from plantation centers. It is in such a rural hinterland area that the research reported here was conducted.

Historical Materialism and Studies in the Periphery

In order to assess the process of socio-economic transformation or development of a rural Highlands mode of production into the articulated system to be described, we need to analyze how the capitalist system has engaged the Ialibu area, the social relations which have arisen, the responses of local people to these externally introduced changing conditions. I have found the methodological tools for such an analysis in the conceptual framework of historical materialism. I will elaborate below my understanding of those dimensions of this framework which are central to my research.

Historical materialist studies of development/underdevelopment, while varied (see Foster-Carter 1974, 1978:47-48 for brief overviews), manifest a basic methodological unity. Such studies place their emphases on totality (holism), history, and structure. Historical materialist studies of the phenomena labelled "development and underdevelopment" share as well the position that, in our current historical moment, during which these studies are being done, the object of study is the totality which has been created by the spread and dominance of capitalism, worldwide. Amin (1974b-1:2-3) has written that, apart from a few ethnographic preserves such as the Orinoco River area, all contemporary societies must be analyzed in their integration into the world system--a world system

which all agree is the capitalist world-economy (Melotti 1977:159; Wallerstein 1974a). Amin (1977:40) has elaborated and summarized a large literature declaring the existence of a world economy. He argues that the world is currently covered by a single human economic system consisting of capitalist formations characterized by:

- a. universal values of commodities, the supremacy of values of goods as determined internationally, not nationally;
- b. international mobility of capital investment and accumulation;
- c. nationally bounded mobility of labor.

Two groups of formations have arisen within this system, according to Amin, the mature, dominant "central" formations, and the immature, dependent "peripheral" formations. Arguments among historical materialists about the essential features of this world economic structure, have honed the methodological tools available to the microanalyst and ethnographer.

One mode of formulating this conceptualization takes its cue from the emphasis on "totality" noted above. Sweezy states clearly his position on a central issue in this division of historical materialists. He notes that until recently, it has been the received and accepted wisdom of the tradition that the central contradiction or principal location of the dynamic of the capitalist system was to be found in the struggle between the capitalist class and the proletariat in the highly developed nations. The future of capitalism was to be determined by the outcome of this struggle. However, writes Sweezy:

"Since the Second World War, ..., it has become increasingly clear that the principal contradiction in the system, at least in the present historical period, is not within the developed part but between the developed and underdeveloped parts" (1972:13).

The future of capitalism lies in the outcome of the struggles by the underdeveloped nations for national liberation, and escape from the dominance of the developed center of the world capitalist system.

Sweezy's position presents an analysis which views a transformation in the historical totality which is the capitalist world-economy as having transformed as well the essential internal nature of that totality. It is the totality, capitalism, which is the central concept here, and concentration on the capitalist mode of production, as distinct from the world system, would be an erroneous sidetrack.

Wallerstein, proponent of a position which shares this emphasis on the totality, capitalism, but which locates this center-periphery contradiction as the central contradiction since the sixteenth century (1974a), makes this latter implication more explicit. Wallerstein states (1974b:393-394) that he rejects the attempts by many to define the variety of modes of production which they believe exist in the periphery. Attacking Laclau (1971), Wallerstein suggests that Laclau's argument with Frank (1969a) revolves around the question of a unit of analysis. Laclau's position that feudalism coexisted with capitalism in Brazil is based on an explicit definition of "capitalist mode of production" as involving the engagement of capitalist owners of the means of production and landless wage laborers--and the coexistence in Brazil with such capitalist production of production processes involving

landholding direct producers under coercive non-capitalist production. Wallerstein, while not denying the distinction, suggests that the unit of analysis in question is neither capitalist-proletarian producing units nor Brazilian production, but the world-economy, the totality. The essential feature of the capitalist world economy is not the existence of the production relations described by Laclau, but rather a unified world division of labor and "production for sale in a market for which the object is to realize the maximum profit" (Wallerstein 1974b:398). Within this world system of commodity production for maximum profit, groups pursue their economic interests (i.e., maximize profits) while seeking to distort the market to their benefit (1974b:406). Shifts in advantage within the world economy (specifically in crises of overproduction and insufficient demand, or of short supply) produce shifts in the bargaining power of different groups and realignment of political possibilities (e.g., serfs may be able to extract better rent conditions from feudal landlords under conditions of population decline). Under such shifting conditions, it is possible that those nations currently peripheral or semi-peripheral within the world economy will find themselves with new conditions of advantage, exploitable so as to shift their position within the system (Wallerstein 1976). Wallerstein's position, then, leads us to peripheral studies which define conditions in the periphery as derived from the state of a peripheral society's economic situation--its comparative advantages, or lack thereof, in the capitalist world economy. It is the integration of a society into a world market exchange system which brings it under dominance of, and constitutes it as part of, world capitalism (see Wallerstein 1974a for

his analysis of the historical rise of this world-system). Frank, who attempts most explicitly in this sub-tradition to understand the capitalist periphery and its nature as part of the larger world system, shares with Wallerstein this emphasis on the capitalist system as a totality which dominates and constitutes both the developed and underdeveloped nations in its very functioning. Integration into the world market system as a peripheral subsidiary of a capitalist metropole provides the means of developing underdevelopment in the periphery. The surplus value created in peripheral production is appropriated by the metropole and lost to the periphery--thus preventing its own accumulation of capital, and consequent full development. As with Wallerstein, Frank views the entire world system as "capitalist," and finds the efforts by writers such as Laclau to establish the coexistence of feudalism and capitalism in Latin America as being guilty of the same dualistic errors he attacks in the development studies which he labels as "bourgeois" (1969b:223). The existence of an underdeveloped nation is not to be explained by such dualist explanations, as the lagging development out of feudalism, but rather as a product of a unified world system--capitalism. Its place is to be defined in terms of its place in the process of appropriation of surplus labor and in the metropole-satellite links from the center to the periphery of the world economy. Again, with Frank as well as with Wallerstein, the dominance of capitalism is simply the existence of capitalism in its world-economic market system. To be integrated into this system is to be capitalist, and studies of development and socio-economic change are to be guided by analysis of the penetration of this system of market exchange and the mechanisms allowing exploitation. or

appropriation of the surplus produced, through dominance of the exchange systems--monopolistic control of goods, usurious financial exchange, etc. (Frank 1969a:219-277).

The position of Frank and Wallerstein described here has been vehemently attacked by many Marxists on the grounds that the position defining capitalism as market system is anti-dialectical and mechanical, ignores the importance of class and of the concept of social relations of production in historical materialist theory, and ignores the basic importance of production to the analysis of a society's material base. The critique of the "Neo-Smithian" position in Marxism (as Brenner has labeled it--1977) has argued that the processes of growth of trade and commodity-production in and of themselves cannot account for the altering of dominant social relations and, in fact, must posit a capitalist rationality to those individuals who originally introduced it, implying that there existed precapitalist producers who had capitalist minds (without explaining the origins of this rationality) or that all humans are profit maximizers no matter what the relations of production within which they exist (this problem is only implicit in Frank's work in that he does not discuss the origins of capitalism per se; it is an explicit problem for Wallerstein who does attempt to account for those origins).

The Frank-Sweezy-Wallerstein position fails primarily because of its inattention to distinct modes of production co-existing within the capitalist dominated world system. Their narrowing of the analysis of the world situation to an analysis of "capitalism" and the shifting positions of center and periphery (as in Wallerstein 1976) or the hierarchical and universal metropole-satellite capitalist relations (as in

Frank 1969a,b) posits a singular structure of the world economy and eliminates our attention to the analyses of differing classes created in the various modes of production co-existing within the sphere reached by the commodity market system. By focusing on the spread of this exchange system, and ignoring the variety of social forms within which the commodities are produced, this position tends to posit the effects of commodity exchange as the dynamic, destructive force of capitalism, and ignores the human social relations within which the class struggle is fought over the conditions within which commodity exchange and commodity production are carried out (Anderson 1974a; Brenner 1976, 1977; Dobb 1964; Hilton 1978; Laclau 1971; Lukacs 1971:56; Melotti 1972:191, n.2, 1972:195,n.3; Sweezy et al. 1976).

Writers in this second tradition have come to emphasize the distinction between "social formation" and "mode of production." Thompson (1978), citing Engels, warns against presuming that Marx's analyses of the capitalist mode of production is an exhaustive analysis of capitalism (as does Amin 1974b:21). Marx is credited with providing the fundamental concepts, developed in his analyses of the capitalist mode of production (1967) and elsewhere, and Lenin (1975) and Baran and Sweezy (1966) with further developing the analysis of that mode of production following its historical transformations at the center of the world system, but as for the analyses of peripheral capitalism, the theory is only currently being developed, with "everything in this field still" to be done (Amin 1974b-1:20). The concept of "social formation" is of importance to these studies on the periphery of the world economy precisely because it is there, as contrasted with the center of the

system, in which a plurality and heterogeneity of modes of production exist within the integrated system (Anderson 1974b:22,n.6). It is the dominance of one of these modes of production within a social formation which is to be theorized, and specifically the dominance of the capitalist mode of production in our current situation.

The best attempts to conceptualize the world dominance of capitalism and the continued existence in peripheral societies of pre-capitalist modes of production is that elaborated in the work of Samir Amin (1974a, 1974b, 1976). Amin views the dominance of capital in a social formation as being situated in the processes of accumulation. If accumulation is the dominant function in exchange and circulation of commodities (a point on which these Marxist traditions agree, cf. Sweezy 1972:6), then the social formation is capitalist. By no means is this to be taken as maintaining that all production is carried out under capitalist social relations (i.e., capitalist and wage laborer). In fact, it is precisely that such is not the case which distinguishes peripheral and central capitalism. When capitalist social relations are the form in which production is carried out, accumulation is accomplished through economic mechanisms which have been analysed by Marx (1967 -- this is the process of accumulation at the center of the capitalist social formation, where capitalist relations of production are ubiquitous. At the periphery, however, capitalist social relations typically do not hold such a monopoly. Capitalist accumulation is accomplished by ever changing forms of ongoing primitive accumulation, these mechanisms being labeled "unequal exchange" by Amin (1974b-1:134). It is not, however, the economic mechanisms of unequal exchange

which create underdevelopment per se. The existence of unequal exchange is possible due only to the underlying processes of class formation in the periphery and the function of peripheral societies in the world capitalist order.

The function of peripheral societies in the world economy is a consequence of the rationale underlying the extension of the sphere of capitalism to these societies. Amin argues that this extension is "the work of 'central' capital, which strives in this way to find a solution to its own problems. The extension of capitalism is ... intended to bring about a rise in the rate of profit of central capital--that is what it is for" (Amin 1974b-1:169). Given this function for the extension of capital's sphere, Amin argues that peripheral societies function to provide cheap labor to a process of production for export to the world market system. The less the return to labor in this export-production process, the greater the importance of that process to center capital due to the super-profits derived. Thus, a society is peripheral to the degree that it is organized to provide cheap labor, and thereby super-profits, to a center capital. The organization of the provision of cheap labor to the export sector is not accomplished necessarily by economic mechanisms. The process of organizing has historically been carried out at the hands of the dominant pre-capitalist classes in the peripheral society, in such a fashion as to maintain their class position while deriving the benefits of relations with center-capitalists. Thus, it is common that pre-capitalist modes of production have been maintained in peripheral societies, serving precisely those functions discussed by Frank, as labor reserves, "shock absorbers," social security program, etc..

all functions helping to keep the cost of labor down in the export sector. The marginalization in this manner of the mass of the population "is the very condition underlying the integration of the minority within the world system" (Amin 1974a:13-15). Thus, in Amin's scheme, it is not unequal exchange which produces underdevelopment, but the specific set of class alliances which create the objective conditions for unequal exchange to take place. Capitalism is dominant in the periphery (1) as a mode of production in the export sector, but more importantly (2) in the alliance of non-capitalist classes with center capitalists at the expense of the producers they exploit through pre-capitalist modes of production. Amin writes:

"The phenomenon of underdevelopment is thus merely the result of the persistence of phenomena of the order of primitive accumulation for the benefit of the center, and our problem consists of studying the successive forms of these phenomena in relation to the transformations taking place at the center. Primitive accumulation is not something that belongs only to the prehistory of capital, it is something permanent, contemporary. This implies, therefore, that the false concepts of 'underdevelopment,' 'Third World' and so forth ought to be swept away and replaced by the concept of capitalist formations of the periphery" (1974b-1:22).

Amin's position required that we analyze underdeveloped nations and the so-called "backward" or "traditional" groups within them--the groups on the periphery of the periphery--as integral parts of capitalist formations of the periphery. His position, further, leads us to look for the mechanisms of the indissoluble unity underlying the apparent quality of many societies (Laclau 1971:31) not in economic mechanisms and economic advantages and disadvantages between nations, but in the processes shaping the class relationships tying the sectors to each other. But here Amin

is of little help to us. His analyses suggest a rationale for the maintenance of pre-capitalist modes of production within a peripheral capitalist formation, and he states the need to consider the non-economic instances of the integrated modes within a social formation (1976:24), but he makes only passing references throughout these works to "ideology" and "politics." We are told that precapitalist modes of production are integrated into the capitalist peripheral formation under the dominance of the capitalist mode of production. We are told, as well, that we can see the integration of these modes by mapping out the flow of surplus through the system (1976:23). But, given the noneconomic nature of the maintenance of pre-capitalist modes, we cannot theorize the dominance of capitalism solely on the basis of a measure of its ability to extract surplus-value to the benefit of central capital. How are we to attempt to conceptualize the dominance of the capitalist mode within the social formation? How are we to discuss the integration of precapitalist modes under this dominance?

The theory (or theories) of precapitalist modes of production have conceptualized a mode of production as being constituted by an economic base and a superstructure consisting of the noneconomic instances of society necessary to the existence of the mode as a viable structure. In any given mode, one instance is dominant (the economy always being determinant--this last a basic tenet of historical materialism). In the capitalist mode of production, the economic instance is both determinant and dominant, but in precapitalist modes of production some non-economic instance (which one being determined by the economic instance) is dominant, and that instance is said to penetrate the economic base--to be an

essential constituent of the economy of the society in which the mode of production in question exists (Terray 1972:97-103; Anderson 1974a:403-404). Stated somewhat differently, Godelier makes a similar point in claiming that the dominant structure in a society consisting of a single mode of production is that structure which functions as the relations of production--in precapitalist societies, he continues, some structure functioning as other than relations of production doubles in this capacity, and is thereby the dominant structure due to its economic function (1977, 1978). Given either mode of conceptualization, it is the specific nature of the non-economic dominance of the mode of production which is said to distinguish pre-capitalist modes of production (Anderson 1974a:402-403). Within the anthropological literature on precapitalist modes of production, the tendency has been to treat the problems of defining single modes of production, or single societies as having one mode of production characterizing them (there are exceptions to this generalization, of course--notably Dupre and Rey 1973; Meillassoux 1971). Within this vein, it has been demonstrated that an important aspect of theorizing a pre-capitalist mode of production is the treatment of the reproduction of that mode (studies with this emphasis capturing the dynamic quality of Marx's analyses of Capital), and in moving to this consideration, distinguishing the conditions of reproduction (or existence) of that mode of production from the characterization of that mode itself (see, e.g., Meillassoux 1972; Bonte 1973). The capitalist mode of production, once its preconditions have been established through primitive accumulation, (Marx 1967) reproduces its conditions of existence through its normal functioning (the end result of a cycle of capital being a

somewhat richer bourgeoisie still owning the means of production and the proletariat still without the ownership of means of production, and back on the market to sell its labor). This reproduction of its own conditions of existence is not a characteristic of precapitalist modes of production (for instance, the production of sweet potatoes in the Papua New Guinea Highlands does not reproduce access to land--the maintenance of clan or subclan ties does so instead).

It is in the analysis of the conditions of reproduction of the precapitalist modes of production that we find the domination of capital (or better stated, of the capitalist class) over these modes in peripheral capitalist social formations.

We find capital (or better stated, the capitalist class) dominating precapitalist modes of production in the periphery through its control of those conditions of reproduction of precapitalist modes of production. These conditions tend to be non-economic in precapitalist modes of production, as outlined above. Bernstein (1979) has provided us an important contribution to the theoretical consideration of capitalist dominance, however, which reminds us that economic conditions may be necessary to the reproduction of a precapitalist mode of production which has been integrated into the world capitalist social formation. Bernstein's concern is to outline a theoretical framework for the study of African peasants. In his presentation, he notes that peasants are typically involved in commodity production to some degree, under modern conditions. Given this fact, capital can attempt to gain or increase its direct control over the production of the peasantry through processes Bernstein has labeled the "simple reproduction squeeze." He writes:

"By the simple reproduction 'squeeze' we refer to those effects of commodity relations on the economy of peasant households that can be summarized in terms of increasing costs of production/decreasing returns to labour. The pressures which result in the 'squeeze' on simple reproduction include those arising from the exhaustion of both land and labour given the techniques of cultivation employed, from rural 'development' schemes which encourage or impose more expensive means of production (improved seeds, tools, more extensive use of fertilisers, insecticides, pesticides, etc.) with no assurance that there will be increased returns to labour commensurate with the costs incurred, and from deteriorating terms of exchange for peasant produced commodities" (1979:427).

In the analysis of the integration of PNG peasants into the world capitalist system, we shall see that capital has dominated the conditions of reproduction of the precapitalist mode of production through both economic and non-economic means.


Muli Census Division, Field Site

Muli Census Division lies within the Ialibu District, along the eastern border of the Southern Highlands Province. Ialibu District encompasses 450 square miles, stretching approximately 35 miles from its northeastern border with the Western Highlands Province to its southwestern corner bordering the Kagua District at the Iaro River. The Ialibu District is divided into two administrative sub-districts, Imbong'gu and Kewabe, named for the cultural-linguistic groups residing within them. The Imbong'gu Sub-District is the geographically larger of the two, holding 60% of the area.


Two dormant volcanoes dominate the landscape of the entire District. Mt. Giluwe rises to a height of 14,000 A.S.L. Mt. Ialibu stands 11,000 A.S.L.

Between and to the south of these two mountains stretches a large, flat basin in which is located Ialibu Station, site of the former colonial administrative center and patrol post (founded in 1952), and current District Center. Altitude at Ialibu Station has been measured at 6740' A.S.L. The basin stretches away at between 6200'-6500' A.S.L. The Ialibu Basin is covered with kunai ("sword grass"--TP) and pitpit ("wild cane grass"--TP). In its lower places, the ground is marshy. North of Ialibu Basin, the Imbong'gu Sub-District becomes more rugged and timbercovered. It is territory broken into valleys by the erosion of creeks flowing away from Mt. Giluwe. Altitude rises in this region to as much as 8000' A.S.L. (excluding the two mountains), into a cool, wet region virtually always covered in mist. The subdistrict then dips down into the Kaugel Valley, at 4500' A.S.L. In the words of a colonial patrol officer: "This valley fulfills the romantic's idea of a tropical country; hot humid climate, lush tropical rain forests, and an abundance of fruit and vegetables" (Sisley 1966). The Kaugel River forms the dividing line between the Ialibu District (and the Southern Highlands Province) and the Western Highlands Province. It served, too, in earlier times, to mark the Highlands border between the territories of Papua (in which Ialibu and the SHP are located) and New Guinea (in which the WHP is located).

Moving south and west from Ialibu Station, one is in the Kewabe Sub-District. Much of the sub-district lies within the Ialibu Basin. The Kewabe is bounded by rivers and a road--the Mendi-Hagen Road on the north, border with the Imbong'gu Sub-District, the Andawe River (and Pangia District) to the east, the Iaro River (and Kagua District) to the



MAP 1
SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS ETHNIC GROUPS



MAP 2

KEWA LANGUAGE AREA

(Franklin et al. 1978:4)

south and west, and the Mambu and Ankura Rivers to the west and north-west, bordering the Kagua and Mendi Districts. Southwest of the Ialibu Basin rises the Kaniara Ridge, behind which altitude falls quickly, and geography turns rougher, described by Sisley (1966) as "typical limestone country with rugged ridges, narrow valleys, underground streams and sinkholes."

The climate of the Ialibu District tends to be wet and cold. Average rainfall in the area is about 150"/year. Sisley (1966) reports rainfall on 266 days during 1966. During the typical day, a hot, intense sun shines through mid-day, then clouds roll in, seeming to hang up on Mt. Ialibu, and dump their contents in a burst. Temperature falls, making fires or heavy warm clothing a necessity (Sisley reports that the "record low" known to the patrol post in Ialibu was 39 degrees Fahrenheit, recorded in July 1965).

The Ialibu District is peopled by two linguistic groups. The Imbong'gu, subjects of a dissertation by Wormsley (1978), speak a language closely related to the Medlpa tongue of the Western Highlands Province. The Kewa are tied linguistically to a language group ranging south to Erave and west to Mendi (see Franklin et al. 1978 for description of this language group). Kewa is a language derived from a "proto-Engan" form, and analyzed as closely related to Mendi, Sau, Huli, Enga, Ipili and Wiru by Franklin. It is a member of the West-Central Family of the East New Guinea Highlands stock. It is spoken by upwards of 50,000 people in the Southern Highlands. Muli residents speak the East Kewa dialect of the language (Franklin et al. 1978). As we'll see in Chapter 2, the historical and geographic circumstances of portions of these groups has tended to

speed changes among the Imbong'gu more quickly than among the Kewabe, but the cultures of the Imbong'gu and Kewa appear to be virtually identical. Social ties have been shaped by linguistic boundaries in the past, such that patrol officers of the colonial administration could write that the Imbong'gu had close ties to the Hagen districts of the WHP, and little relationship to the Kewa (Hicks 1964) and that the Kewabe were most closely associates with the peoples of Kagua (Colton 1965).

Muli Census Division is located within the southwest corner of the Kewabe Sub-District. It shares a border with the Kagua District at the Iaro River ("Ialo" in local usage, which I shall follow from here).⁷ The Census Division occupies a high rounded ridge overlooking the river and the land sloping down to it--ranging, approximately, from 5500' - 6000' A.S.L. Muli is bisected by the Ialibu-Kague Road, "the third best road in the Southern Highlands" according to one expatriate road engineer. The center of the census division lies approximately 10 miles from Ialibu, a two and a half hour walk at a good pace, or a twenty minute ride by Passenger Motor Vehicle (PMV), on a good day.

Muli Census Division is the residence of about 650 persons, most of whom are affiliated with the clan group Muli Ekerepa. It is this group of Kewa speakers from whom we collected most of the data that is presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Muli Census Division also contains four government entities: the Muli Community School, serving children from all surrounding areas; the Ialibu Local Government Council Cattle Project, a small, run down affair during our stay; the SHP Department of Primary Industry Muli Sheep Project, an expanding experimental breeding program; and a new Muli

Health Centre, completed during our fieldwork, but only opened in 1981, staffed by British volunteers. The labor force of each of these projects lives in Muli in housing built at each project site.

Data Collection

The data collected in Papua New Guinea and analyzed in this dissertation were gathered in several ways. Principal among these was a combined participant-observation /informal interviewing activity. During our year in PNG, Brigitte Krause and I often sat with people in markets, attended various ceremonies, rode in PMVs (to the shock and surprise of area residents during the first few weeks of fieldwork--"masta, your company didn't give you a car?!"), gathered with onlookers around the gambling circles, purchased goods in local tradestores, participated in distributions of pork, shared sugar cane and kaukau (and pudding and a host of other imported goods), drank beer, and just generally "hung out" with people, especially the people of Muli Ekerepa. In these and other social contexts we participated, observed, and usually found much to question about, often turning conversations into informal interviews. We rarely hesitated to do so. Among the Kewabe Kewa, we never failed to receive lengthy answers, dutifully noted on tablet sheets and notebooks (one man refused to speak with me, although he initiated contacts until I got my notebook). We also answered lots of questions about our own home, families, living conditions. We showed photos. People used us to double-check information they had heard from other Europeans, much as we did with them. The questions and comments made by people while listening to our answers were valuable information.

Inevitably, under such informal social circumstances, our information tended to come from a small subset of people with whom we came into contact. We formed friendships with several people in Muli. We did not become as close with others. Our friends felt more free to approach us for casual conversation, to question and be questioned. They took it upon themselves to accompany us places, to be available for translation and explanation. They were, thus, more likely to be present when we posed our questions, when we wrote the responses. It is their actions and reactions which we could observe most naturally. It was these persons with whom we could travel without completely disrupting the flow of the activities we hoped to observe. The information gathered in these interactions was invaluable to us, and the principal source of insights we gained while in Muli. But it was clear that certain kinds of questions required data gathered more formally and on a broader scale. In the remainder of this section. I will describe the techniques used to gather such data.

Household Survey

One of our first activities after settling in Muli was to walk through the hamlets of the clan, accompanied by one of the persons who became our field assistant Philip Ame. Philip and several accompanying youths and children identified each area for us by name, watched me roughly sketch the locations of homes, and named the male affiliated with each house. This list of households provided the population list for our initial household survey. I decided, in order to get a quick overview of several topics, to have each household respond to the survey. The form used, plus the instructions provided to the surveyors, are

included below, pages 37 and 38. In order to obtain the data quickly, we engaged three young men to conduct the surveys. Each of them was fluent in English. One had completed high school, two years of pre-seminary, and was awaiting entrance to the University of Papua New Guinea. The others were a grade eight leaver (Form Two) and a grade six leaver. We had our assistants divide the list of households among themselves, sent them off to do a few surveys (after discussing at length how to do so, and my doing one with the local big man), then met to check their progress and performance. We discussed problem areas, then they went off to complete the task. I did not formally double check any of their interviews by follow-up. Observation and a variety of bits of feedback assured us that the process was going on steadily. Of the 120 households dubbed homes of Muli Ekerepa, 108 were inhabited. Others had been built by persons away at plantations, or who had left Muli for other areas.

The data from this survey was rough in many ways. I have relied on it only for generalizations of which I felt confident. Clan and village names were given in several versions by different individuals. For those from Muli, this is easily sorted out based on knowledge gained elsewhere. Tracing patterns of marriage for those originating or living elsewhere, for instance, would be difficult from these survey forms, due to the inconsistency with which locales and clans and subclans were named.

Another problem arising was the dimension of "time" in translating the questions to respondents. I had intended that the questions in the survey gather data about current practices only. I obviously did not make this clear enough to our assistants, as answers lumped past and present together (see Chapter 3).

Despite these drawbacks, and the obvious loss of information which could have been gathered if I had personally conducted all of the interviews, this survey did accomplish its purpose. We obtained some basic information about Muli rather quickly, and had a basis from which to select and approach persons for a variety of interviews.

Tradestore Survey

Between 16 October and 30 October 1980, six owners of tradestores currently in operation in Muli participated in a sales survey. A sample completed inventory sheet and sales tally sheet are attached on pages 39 and 40. At the beginning of this survey, I visited each store, presenting the owner with tally sheets and pencils. I also inventoried his or her holdings at that moment. The process of tallying sales was described, demonstrated, in Tok pisin and Kewa translation. Each store owner indicated understanding of the process. Each carried it out at least some of the time. Throughout the survey period, we asked about the process, observed its occurrence. At the end of the survey, I returned to each store, took the tally sheets, and re-inventoried stock. At this point, owners were paid for their participation.

Data about wholesale prices of goods, used in the analysis presented in Chapter 4, were obtained verbally from store owners, and by my own visit to the Namasu "box" store, source of wholesale stock for virtually all stores in the immediate area.

Sample Group

As the second half of our anticipated field period began, I felt the need for more intense data collection about various topics. I decided to pursue three surveys--consumption/activity, gardening, and money (see

below). I decided, too, that the surveys would be most informative if they were all conducted with the same subset of Muli households. Using index cards naming the male head of each household, I selected a random sample of twelve households, approximately 10% of the total population of households. Two of the initial twelve households selected I rejected and replaced randomly. These two were rejected in the interest of actually obtaining information. The first rejection was of a man who continually offered stories, then began by asking if I would match the gifts he allegedly received from Karl Franklin for similar stories. When I failed to meet his expectations, he failed to produce. My relationship with this man was such that I expected it to interfere with data collection. The second rejection was of a man who had borrowed money from me and who continually refused to repay, pleading poverty (despite purchases and gambling continuing). I feared that he would be unwilling to provide data in a "money" survey focused on his income and expenditures (or rather, that I could not trust the data he would surely have given). The sample resulting was not exactly randomly selected, but did approximate that state.

Consumption/Activity Survey

For two separate one-week periods, sample group households were asked each day to report what products were harvested from the household gardens, what was eaten by each member of the family, and the major activities of the day for the male and female heads of household. A sample of a completed survey form is included below on page 41. The survey was conducted by local, paid assistants. The male and female adults in each household were also paid for their participation. Assistants and households were matched to be as closely related as

possible, within the constraints of finding six Muli Ekerepa persons who could complete the forms in a legible fashion, and who seemed likely to do so accurately. Assistants were trained, and supervised by one of the three young men who had been serving as field assistant for the whole period of our research. Interviews were conducted once each day, as "end-of-day" sessions. Regarding food, the families were asked what they had eaten individually throughout the day, and how much of each item was eaten. The families were also asked what foods had been brought to the household that day, by whom, and how much. Quantities were reported in accord with well-known norms used at Muli market--standardized 10t piles of kaukau, greens, etc. We never gained access to a scale sensitive enough to establish a table for transforming these money quantities into approximately food bulk measures. The money-related data serves as a rough measure of such quantities within each food type.

"Activity" reports summarized the principal activity in which the male and female adults engaged during the day, assigned times in accord with local Tok pisin time categories. We have estimated these categories as: Moning Tru 6:30 - 8:00 a.m.; Moning 8:00 - 11:00 a.m.; Belo 11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.; Apinun 1:00 - 5:00 p.m.; Apinun Tru 5:00 - 7:00 p.m.; Nait 7:00 p.m. until sleep.

Garden Survey

With either the male or female head of each sample household (and translator, if necessary), I visited each active garden of the household. Quantities of crops were counted in each: mounds of kaukau, clumps of greens, stalks of sugar cane, number of trees, etc. More importantly, the process of gardening was discussed with each of these informants.

These conversations were most informative, and interesting, in their variety.

Money Survey

For twelve consecutive weeks, 8 February through 29 April 1981, I interviewed individually the twenty-four adults of the sample group each Sunday afternoon. I asked them to recall the instances of acquiring or spending money during the previous week, and to list the transactions for me, identifying the amount of money involved, how it was obtained and from whom, on what it was spent.

I anticipated reticence regarding such information, and hesitated to even attempt the survey. I was assured by our assistants that people would willingly participate, and that they would provide accurate data. Once committed to the survey, initially I attempted to protect the informant's privacy in reporting. This concern was shared neither by my informants nor the onlookers who often sat with us. People willingly responded. I am convinced of their honest attempts to recall to the best of their abilities the information required. What checks were available to me tended to bear out the testimony offered. There were discrepancies in the data, as will be noted in Chapter 4. This is inevitable in such recall data. Nonetheless, in the absence of any other sort of reliable income data, the survey data is invaluable.

Plantation Survey

Based on information given in the initial household survey, a list was collected of persons who had ever worked on a plantation. A team of field assistants surveyed these persons regarding each instance (or "trip") of such work: where and when, what product, how long, how much

money earned and how used, accompanied by whom, why left. Respondents were also asked these questions about any other work they had performed for wages. The Tok pisin questions used by field assistants to guide their interviews is included on page 42.

Other Sources of Data

In ethnographic field research, all is data. Conversations with government officials at the district, provincial, and national levels, and with missionaries, all yielded a variety of insights and information. Colonial patrol reports available through the Ialibu District Office obviously proved invaluable. The references in Chapter 3 give some small measure of my debt to the officers who wrote the reports, and to Senan Koa, then District Manager, Ialibu, who made them available to me. Publications by government offices provided information about cash-crops, extension work, national policy directives, research results. These sources of data were exploited as the occasions and opportunities arose, not so systematically as the surveys conducted in Muli.

Research and Language

When Brigitte Krause and I entered Muli, we were both competent speakers of English, nervous newcomers to Tok pisin, and totally unfamiliar with Kewa. Within a short time we felt fluent in Tok pisin. We never achieved that status or feeling in Kewa.

Many of the residents of Muli are speakers of Tok pisin, with a wide variety of competences. A few speak a fair amount of English. Three persons were very competent English speakers upon our arrival. These became our initial field assistants and translators. As our Tok pisin improved, far less translation was required, and we were less

reliant on these three young men for our information. With several Muli residents, we were required to communicate through translators for any but the most basic conversation for the duration of our research. After the first month in the field, our principal research language became and remained Tok pisin.

Things to Come

The Ialibu area was brought under colonial control more recently than most of PNG. While many areas of the Highlands were already growing coffee, the Ialibu Station patrol post, from which Administrative control was to be established, was only just being built. For reasons to be elaborated below (see Chapter 2), the earliest efforts to establish cash cropping in Ialibu failed. Widespread coffee planting in those portions of the Kewabe suitable for its growth have only taken place in the last ten years, and in some areas during the last five. This study presents an account of a historically specific attempt to draw a rural precapitalist socio-economic formation into the world system. This process has been accomplished primarily through colonial commoditizing of aspects of Muli life, and through a continuing struggle to involve Muli producers in commodity-production. I shall focus on this process, and on Muli's responses to the needs created by incorporating commodity consumption into its social life. I shall argue that the precapitalist mode of production present in Muli dominates the cash/commodity-producing activities in which the members of Muli Ekerepa engage.

Capital does dominate the economic formation of Ialibu. It does not control production in the area, however. Capital is dominant in its ability to appropriate the surplus-value created by Ialibu area

Interviewer _____ Date _____

VILLAGE NAME _____ Person Interviewed _____

MAN LIVING IN HOUSE: Name _____ Clan _____ Last Grade/School _____

Father of Man oA oD: Name _____ Clan _____ Village _____

Mother of Man oA oD: Name _____ Clan _____ Village _____

FIRST WIFE oA oD: Name _____ Clan _____ Village _____

Father of 1st wife oA oD: Name _____ Clan _____ Last Grade _____

Mother of 2nd wife oA oD: Name _____ Clan _____ Village _____

SECOND WIFE oA oD: Name _____ Clan _____ Village _____

Father of 2nd wife oA oD: Name _____ Clan _____ Last Grade _____

Mother of 2nd wife oA oD: Name _____ Clan _____ Village _____

**** For 3rd wife, or more, write information on other side of page. ****

W	1st CHILD	_____	oA	oD	oIn House	oPlant	oSch	oVill	oOther	oGrade
W	2nd CHILD	_____	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
W	3rd CHILD	_____	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
W	4th CHILD	_____	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
W	5th CHILD	_____	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
W	6th CHILD	_____	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
W	7th CHILD	_____	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
W	8th CHILD	_____	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
W	9th CHILD	_____	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
W	10th CHILD	_____	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o

**** For 11th child, or more, write information on other side of page. ****

(1) Does the man in the house speak oKewa oTok Pisin oEnglish oOther _____

(2) Does the wife (wives) speak oKewa oTok Pisin oEnglish oOther _____

(3) Does anyone in your family have a business? oYes oNo oFast oPlan
What kind of business? _____

(4) Do you grow in your gardens oKaukau oGreens oPitpit oWali oKai oLaro
oCoffee - How many trees? _____ oEurop./New Tag./Other _____

(5) What animals do you have? oPigs oCows oSheep oChicken oOther _____

(6) Do you or your wife sell in the market? oY oN oVeg oFlour oOther _____

(7) Do you or your wife buy on the market? oY oN oVeg oFlour oOther _____

(8) Do you buy at the tradestore? oY oN oRice oFish oCig oGris oTea oBeer
oEurop. Clothes oOther _____

(9) Do you eat rice and fish at least once a week? oYes oNo _____

(10) Did anyone in your family ever work on a plantation? oY oN oWho? _____
Did anyone work somewhere else for money? Where/Who? _____

(11) S.E.F. has a development plan. What do you think should change and
develop in your province and in your village? How could life be better?
***** write answers on other side of page *****

List all other people living in this house, not listed above.

NAMES	FATHER'S NAME	MOTHER'S NAME	OTHERS
-------	---------------	---------------	--------

SURVEY FORM REMINDERS

- I. If a person has both Christian and Kewa names, please list all names.
- II. Mark any wife who is now divorced from the man in the house.
- III. List of children:
 - (a) include sex of child (M for man, male; F for woman, female);
 - (b) under GRADE, include whether child is NOW in school or is a SCHOOL LEAVER;
 - (c) if a child is too young to be in school, please write "TY" next to child's sex;
 - (d) if one of the children has a separate house and will be on another form, please write this on this form too (example: on YANA's form write that RAYMOND has his own form too).
- IV. Questions on Survey:
 - (1) no change;
 - (2) be sure to include at least all wives now alive and with the man in the house, list their languages for each one;
 - (3) be sure to list with each business whether it is a past bisnis, a bisnis now, or a planned bisnis;
 - (4) no change;
 - (5) list only animals they have now. If someone had animals before for bisnis (example: cattle) but do not have them now, list these animals under question #3 (bisnis), not under question #5. Also, if someone has animals now that they think of as bisnis, list them under question #3 and question #5;
 - (6) be sure of answers here, especially about flour bancakas;
 - (7) same as question #6;
 - (8) no change;
 - (9) no change;
 - (10) be sure to ask both questions. The first specifically asks about plantation work. The second asks about any other work people have done for pay. This includes positions such as village magistrate, local government councilor, labor done when the Australians were in charge, work for the local gov't council or the district administration (if paid wages), office jobs, factory work, and all other jobs, whether now or in the past. You can write on the back of the form if you run out of room. This should be done for all persons in the house;
 - (11) Please be very careful not to give anyone any ideas about what to say here. Also, please ask separately about what they would like to see change in their villages and in the Southern Highlands Province. Give as many details about each person's answer as you can.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT 2:
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY, ASSISTANT INSTRUCTIONS

TRADESTORE MONDA

ITEMS	RETAIL INV/DATE	WHOL SALE PRICE/QU./CTS.	INVZ/DAYS
Cambridge - larze			
Cambridge -small	2 (40c)	K7/ctn. (25 pks)	13
Cambridge - van van			
Muruk	5 pouch (40c)	K5 20 pouch	
Stick tobacco	20-275 (54/ct)	K7.60 1 box about X.C.T.	
fish-larze	17cm (50c)	K19.50 49-	58
fish-small			
Heat			
Gris			
Mais			
Soap	15 bz (20c)	K4.00/2shcks 6 bar/stick	11
Kerosene			
Cheese-ooz			
Makit			
Fanta/Cola			
Rice	~10kg (100/ct)	K13.00 25kg.	25.5
Other MILO	1 ca (90c)	90 90+16	
Other			
Other			
Other			

DE: TUNYA

Man o neri i kisim i kam long garden tude? 42 to bag kaukau.

KAUKAU _____ 10 t piles/ nan-neri SUWA _____ 10 t piles/ nan-neri

KUMU _____ 10 t piles/ nan-neri TARO _____ 10 t piles/ nan-neri

OL ARAPELA SA TING Kaukau tase _____ 10 t piles/ nan-neri

_____ 10 t piles/ nan-neri

Olgeta memba bilong famili, ol i kaikai VANEM na HANAS tude?

MONINGTAIN Kaukau MAN 3 kaukaus MERI 7 kaukau PIKININI 4 kaukau

BELO MAN 1 stop nating MERI fanim kaukau PIKININI

APIYUN MAN kukim kaukau MERI kukim no PIKININI 2 kaukau
sealim

Ye bein bed long bedroom tude? Vanem kain? no bein HANAS? 206.

Ye bein kaikai long maket tude? Vanem kain? No HANAS? No

YE WOKIM VANEM TUDE?

MAN

MERI

MONINGTAIN TRU kecip igo lukim kukim kaukau na tea
fine na kukim tea mi bring wantain
uau cap.

MONING EM igo uok ; mi Sealim kaukau na no
long uok ; tea na mi pele triny na
kaikai

BELO EM kisim malolo mi wokim kaukau man
na mi wok igo lase!

APIYUN kisim sheeps ikam mi Kamout kaukau na
long plis mi Karim ikam

APIYUN TRU mi ikam karim mi ikam kukim kaukau
Story na wokim baret bilong pik na wokim Sig
na uokim lir uok mi na uokim

igo lukim garden mi kaikai na mi bai uok
na kan Slip long Slip long bed.
house.

PLANTESIN

Long namba wan tain yu bin i go long plantasin,

- (1) yu bin i go long wanem plantasin? Na wanem tain? (yia, mun)
- (2) Ol i wokim wanem kain sating long dispela plantasin? (kopi, lipiti)
- (3) Yu bin i wokim hamas tain long dispela plantasin?
- (4) Yu kisin hamas pe long dispela tain, na yu wokim wanem long dispela pe?
 Yu peim hamas long bain kaikai, o bain klos, o givin long papanama bilong yu, o neri bilong yu, o arapela manneri (na busat?), o long narapela sating?
- (5) Tain yu bin i go long dispela plantasin, yu bin i go wantain long busat? Na yu bin i slip wantain long busat?
- (6) Tain yu lusin dispela wok, yu go we?
- (7) Bilong wanem yu lusin dispela wok?

Behain tain yu askin olgeta dispela kwestin long namba 10 tain dispela man o neri i bin i go long plantasin, na behain long namba 11 tain. 10. i go i go, long olgeta tain i bin i go.
 OLESEM KWESTIN BILONG WOK LONG PLANTESIN I PAPER 10.

NARAPELA TAIN WOK

Olsem wok long PWD, o wok long kau banis, o wok long hausboi o kukboi, o draiva long ka, o katesist lang sibs, o wok long kampani, o wok long tisa o doktaboi, o wok long gayman, i go i go.....

Yu bin i wokim narapela kain wok sampela tain?
 Sapos em tok yes, yu askin namba wan tain yu wokim wanem kain wok?
 Yu wokim dispela we? Olsem wanem yu kisin dispela wok? Long wanem tain yu statin dispela wok? Hamas tain yu wokim long dispela?
 Yu kisin hamas pe? Yu wokim wanem long dispela pe? (Olsem kwestin long plantasin pe). Bilong wanem yu lusin dispela wok? Yu go we long tain yu lusin dispela wok?

En tasoi.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT 6:

PLANTATION MIGRATION SURVEY QUESTIONS

producers. This is accomplished through means of unequal exchange in the realm of commodity production and distribution. The low cost of hiring labor to produce, and of purchasing wholesale commodities from smallholding producers, allows capital to reap the reward of its investment, whether through the well-known mechanism dominant in central capitalism (wage-labor) or through the formal mechanisms of control more common in the periphery.⁸ But capital's refusal to smash the precapitalist system of production has left this system in real control and real domination of production in Ialibu society. Ialibu society has been commoditized to a low degree. The ability of capital (or government) to control Muli commodity-production is limited to date.

In brief, we shall see that the clan group Muli Ekerepa has actively engaged the world capitalist system of commodity production and distribution. Muli residents have participated in wage labor, cash-cropping, and business. Money has become a prevalent feature of everyday life, and is the key motivation for engaging in these cash economy activities. But Muli's requirements for cash are low. It is not necessary to participate regularly in wage labor, cash-cropping, or business to obtain the money required in local social life. Nor is it necessary to engage in these activities in order to maintain access to its means of production or subsistence. The mode of participation in commodity-related activities has been shaped by this low level of commoditization of Muli life. It has also been shaped by the system of relations which does control access to the means of subsistence and production--the system of affiliation with a clan group and its associated land. We shall see that the business, laboring and cash-cropping decisions of Muli are subordinate to decisions

involving maintenance of social relations in accord with the clan system-- that is, that "economic investment" is subordinate to "sociological investment" (Balandier 1973:131). We shall see that the pre-capitalist system in Muli has absorbed and adapted the opportunities presented by the intrusion of colonialism and world capitalism, and that the form of this absorption has thus far worked to preserve the principal social organization within the region, and the region's status as peripheral labor reserve in the national economy.

The locus of study, one clan area--Muli Census Division, shapes the contributions which can be made in this work. Neither Muli, nor Ialibu, is the seat of decision-making regarding national land and labor policies. Neither is the home of a major capital investing institution. We had only a limited view of the interactions of the big peasants and state petty bourgeoisie, a view from a distance. However, the strength of this locus of study lies in our contacts with the normal producers of this Highlands area, the ordinary men or the masses of whom other authors speak. For if the big peasants and state petty bourgeoisie be the heart of PNG political economy, the numerically dominant small-holding clan producers must surely be the liver (seat of Kewa emotions, Franklin et al. 1978:409). Living with and focusing on a clan area put us in the middle of the PNG peasant mode of production, in which commodity production, production for direct consumption, and production for non-commodity exchange are mixed. It is the integration of commodity-production into the precolonial precapitalist mode of production on which I will focus. Applying the theoretical framework outlined above. I will present a description and an analysis of the pattern of the

incorporation of commodity production into Muli social life. In doing so, I will contribute to our understanding of the processes creating and maintaining peripheral formations. I will discuss the mechanisms of primitive accumulation (that is, the means by which capital manages to appropriate surplus labor despite the absence of a proletariat class confronting it). The study will add to the literature on the political economic structure of the PNG Highlands and to the ethnographic literature on an area little reported. Muli Ekerepa hosted Karl and Joice Franklin, of the Summer Institute of Linguistics, in their linguistic studies of the East Kewa dialect, from 1958 to 1962. K. Franklin produced a few ethnographic articles based on that field research, which have been accumulated into Franklin et al. (1978), for the most part. This study addresses dimensions of analysis untouched by the Franklins. It complements work among Kewa groups further to the south, by John Leroy near Erave (1975, 1979a, 1979b), and by Lisette Josephides and Marc Schiltz south of Kagua in the Sugu Valley (Josephides 1983; Schiltz and Josephides 1980), this latter work carried out at the same time as my own research. The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:

Chapter 2 is a history of colonial development in the Ialibu District. A wealth of primary data was available in the patrol reports submitted by the colonial patrol officers after each administrative foray into the district. The history which can be reconstructed from these reports, supplemented by local informant statements, provides a reliable sequence of events and time framework for the activities and policies discussed. It also provides a record of development initiatives as seen from the perspective of the colonial administration. The

objective transformation of certain conditions affecting clan organization is discussed through this history--pacification, establishment of supra-local political and economic organizational structures, the forms of introduction of the world of commodity production and cash. The Chapter allows us, too, to see Muli in the context of its surrounding social environment. Muli is found in the Kewabe Sub-District. It can be contrasted in its development history with its partnering sub-district, Imbong'gu, primarily in the ways that the colonial administration initiated activities. The reactions of clansmen from both sub-districts are seen to be quite similar when presented with similar circumstances by the administration. This Chapter sets the context for a closer study of Muli's involvements in the cash economy.

Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the basic pre-capitalist mode of production used in Muli--its forces of production, focused upon the organization of the labor process, and its relations of production, the social relations within which production takes place. It is clear from the data that gardening is the principal labor process in Muli, on which all else depends. Sweet potato, or kaukau, is the dominant crop produced. The discussion in this Chapter is focused on the mode of kaukau production. After considering the actual work processes and production team involved in growing kaukau, the conditions for the establishment and reproduction of this labor process are elaborated. The basic production unit is a household. Discussion of reproduction of the household and access to its means of production and subsistence involves discussion of marriage, gender roles in production and in ownership, group organization in Muli, and the relationship of individuals to land.

The treatment here is necessarily a sketch of the logic of interrelationships of this system of production. It is presented to set the context within which the modes of producing introduced by the intrusion of capital have been integrated. The discussion is synthesized from analysis of present day activities and explanations. It is, as well, a reconstruction of the system which dominated Muli production in the recent pre-colonial era, remembered well by many of Muli's residents.⁹

Chapter 4 presents a summary and analysis of Muli's engagement with the cash economy and money. The discussion will focus on how Muli has attempted to address its needs for cash due to its incorporation of cash and commodities into local life. Muli's involvements with cash-cropping, market sales, livestock sales, transportation services, trade-stores, wage labor, gambling, and cash gift-giving are described. The manner in which the dominance of precapitalist social relations shapes these involvements is discussed.

Chapter 5 draws together the threads presented in the preceding three chapters. It includes a summary of the developing class situation of Muli and the structural effects of that situation on Muli's incorporation of commodity-production into its mode of producing. The significance of this study is discussed. Finally, prospects for the transformation of Muli's class situation in the immediate future are discussed.

A note about presentation is in order. Notes referred to in the text are found at the end of the chapter in which they are first mentioned. I have chosen, on occasion, to use non-English words and abbreviations in the text. In the first instance of use, I have provided an English gloss and an indication of the language from which the term is taken. "TP"

refers to Tok Pisin, also known as Neo-Melanesian or Pidgin English, the lingua franca most commonly used in the region of field work. "K" refers to Kewa, the name given by Karl Franklin and others to the vernacular of Muli. I have included a glossary of such terms, as well as of abbreviations which recur in the text.

References to money amounts occur throughout the text, and especially in Chapter 4. The national monetary unit of Papua New Guinea is the Kina. One Kina (K1) equals roughly US \$1.50. The Kina is worth 100 toea, the smallest monetary unit. One toea (1t) is worth roughly US 1.5¢. During the earliest colonial period, an Australian system of pounds and shillings constituted the money system. This changed to Australian dollars and cents prior to independence. Ialibu area speech still uses "paun" and "shilling." One paun equals two Kina. One shilling refers to one 10 toea coin. I have chosen to allow monetary amounts to stand each in their variety, with no further discussion of their US equivalents. The numbers are primarily of interest in Chapter 4, in relation to each other, not to an external standard of value. To give equivalents would be cumbersome for the reader.

Notes on Chapter 1

1 The first recorded expedition into the central highlands occurred in 1932-1933, when the brothers Leahy (James, Michael, and Daniel) and Patrol Officer J.L. Taylor explored from the east, up the Markham and Ramu Rivers. They penetrated, in 1934, to Mt. Giluwe and Mt. Ialibu area before moving on south, constituting the first Kewabe area (Ialibu Kewa) contact experiences. In 1936, Champion and Adamson, Patrol Officers of the Papuan Administration, also passed the Kewabe from the west, but skirted around it along the northern shoulders of the two great mountains before turning south to the coast. To the best of my knowledge, these were the only contacts between Europeans and Kewabe residents until the post-World War II patrols to be referred to in Chapter 3. A patrol post and government station was established in Ialibu in 1952, according to Administration records left there. (White 1972:107-108; Hughes 1977:57-58).

2 "Underdevelopment" is developed conceptually at length in the works of Andre Gunda Frank. See especially his early works (1969a, 1969b). "Peripheral formations" of world capitalism are best characterized by Samir Amin (see 1974b, 1976, 1977). See "Historical Materialism and Studies in the Periphery" below.

3 The Brandt Commission offered this capsule summary about the founding and makeup of the OECD:

"In 1947 the United States initiated the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe. It insisted that the European countries should cooperate in the allocation of US funds, and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established for this purpose: in 1960 it became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with the United States, Canada and eventually most western industrialized countries as members." (Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980:37)

4 Cf. Connell 1979:120; Cooper 1979:25,33; Rodman 1979:8 regarding maintenance of local modes of production in Melanesia after Western capitalist penetration of these societies.

5 Cooper (1979) has discussed the "labor reserve" and "social security" functions of other Melanesian pre-capitalist societies, when faced by the introduction of the capitalist mode of production in enclaves. Good man and Redclift (1982:22-23) make a similar point about rural peasants in eastern Europe. Amin (1977:66) argues similarly about sub-Saharan Africa.

6 Within historical materialist analyses there can be no accepted, ahistorical, general definition of "peasant" (Ennew, Hirst, Tribe 1977). There are certain features common to the societies we call "peasant." Peasant production is based in family labor on land to which it has claim. Peasant production is integrated into a complex economic structure, and is subordinate to some other strata in that structure. These common features do not provide a universally applicable, rigorous definition of the relations between peasant production units and other economic strata. We can accept the label into our analyses if, with Bernstein (1979) and Saul and Woods (1971), we clarify that we refer to a historically specific situation. "PNG peasants" must be located within their unique social formation.

7 The flapped /l/ and /r/ in Kewa seem to have given colonial administrators some trouble in transcriptions. Names which begin clearly with /l/ are written with /r/ in census lists, voter rolls. The dominant local river, too, suffers from this differing transcription. All maps of the area label the river bordering Muli Census Division as the "Iaro" river. Patrol reports do the same, with the exception of one early reporter. Sisley (1966) suggested that the Ialo feeds into the Iaro,

but labels the water between Muli and Kagua as the latter. In Muli, the river is known as "ipa yalo" or "River Ialo." I will preserve and follow local usage.

8 Re: formal domination of smallholders by capital see Amin (1977: 191; 1980:31-32, 157-158); Bernstein (1979); Cabral (1978); Emmanuel (1972).

9 This work focuses on analyzing the process of integration of a precapitalist mode of production into the world capitalist system, and aspects of the continuing struggle for domination of that mode, particularly through the commoditization of the reproduction of this PNG peasant mode of production. My analysis of Muli social life exemplifies that process. It is beyond the scope of this work to locate Muli's precapitalist mode of production within a comparative analysis of Highlands Papua New Guinea production systems. See Modjeska (1982) for such a comparison.

Chapter 2

Colonialism, Capital and the Kewabe

The first mention of "Muri"¹ in colonial patrol reports appears in the 1952-1953 reports from Mendi. Patrols were sent out from that center into the Ialibu area scouting for a site for an airstrip. Muli area residents remembered vividly their first contacts. "We could smell the Europeans from far away when they came." When the patrols came into view, they appeared to be Papua New Guineans (the national police) accompanied by light-colored ancestral spirits. When these "spirits" bargained for food, Ialibu Kewa realized that these, too, were men - "kandibi" (k) - named for their color, like a local clay.

On July 22, 1953, Patrol Officer A. L. Ford reports leading a patrol from Yarena to 'Muri' where he counted 115 people. The patrol traded for food, obtaining poor sweet potatoes, bananas, sugar cane, pitpit and greens. In return they gave paint, salt and beads. Corn seeds were distributed to locals. Ford noted that people in the patrolled area planted the same garden plots repeatedly. The patrol moved on (Ford 1953).

Between 29 August 1953 and 31 March 1954, the site for an airstrip was chosen. Three hundred ninety two acres of land were purchased at the foot of Mount Ialibu, and the airstrip was built. Ialibu area residents accepted red paint, salt, beads and shells for their land and labor, and were paid in goods at the equivalent of five shillings per acres. They refused to accept steel axes, as most men already owned them (Claridge 1954), obtained through inter-clan exchange (cf. Salisbury 1962).

Ialibu patrol reports on the earliest of contacts in Ialibu/Muli were

not available to me in the field. I have no European descriptions of the process of earliest pacification in the area. According to the people of Muli and neighboring clan groups, their relations with the European newcomers were immediately peaceful. Word had preceded their arrival. People knew that there were white men located in the direction of Mendi. They had heard stories, too, of white men stopping inter-group fighting in the region northeast of Ialibu, toward present day Mount Hagen. One Muli man reported having heard that Highlanders who had resisted these newcomers had been killed. He explained that this knowledge of their superior power preceded the arrival of the whites, and smoothed the way for their peaceful acceptance (this informant was approximately ten years old at the time). It was said, as well, that before the arrival on foot of Europeans, that an airplane flew over the area and dropped a bomb, which destroyed the buildings in Randelo, a hamlet of Muli, and killed a woman and her pigs. The power of this act was attributed to the whites.

Whatever the details of the earliest local colonial encounters, within a year a patrol officer could write of virtually complete pacification in the Ialibu area:

"After only 12 months contact in the Ialibu Basin we can record a change from open defiance and continuous inter-tribal fighting to a stage where the government is definitely respected and almost a cessation of fighting . . . Although fighting was rife when I first visited the area in May 1953, the people are now very quiet and outwardly happy with this new life of peaceful living" (Claridge 1954).

The same reporter noted the improvement of crops in the area and the expansion of the amount of land under gardening along the Ialo River. These changes were attributed to the administration's imposition of peace in an area in which life was no less punctuated by warfare than other

Highlands areas. Fighting was to continue to break out occasionally for several years, but on the whole, along the Ialo River, there reigned "a continual state of uneasy peace. These groups had virtually nothing more than fleeting contact with government, are still dubious--not very cooperative (Keogh 1954). In 1960, an officer could write of the area: "Serious fighting ceased in 1955" (Hiatt 1960). Pacification was the first stage of colonial-indigenous interrelations. During this time the entire area around Ialibu remained restricted for expatriate entry to administration officials only. Life in the settlements was altered primarily by an imposed peace - accepted quickly locally in large part because of local beliefs about the sources of power and the stories preceding the colonials about demonstrations of their power.

Demonstrations of superior power by the kiaps ("patrol officers" - TP) suggested to Kewabe residents that superior spiritual power supported these intruders. Among the Kewa, a man's success is attributed to spiritual assistance. A man's ancestral spirits could give him insights and information which would allow him, if he was capable, to prosper in the processes of exchange, warfare, etc. A man who prospered demonstrated thereby that 'spirits sit down at his back.' Belshaw (1954:77) has rightly claimed that punitive expeditions and enforcement of peace through administrative police powers were the primary factors ending warfare, not the influence of "Mission morality" or perception of the "advantages" seen to accrue from peaceful trade. These power demonstrations suggested to Muli and other Kewabe residents that the ancestral spirits of the Europeans were very effective characters. Men who demonstrate power, wisdom, effectiveness, will be more likely "cooperated with" than others not

so publically legitimated. The process of pacification in the Kewabe area was relatively rapid, in part due to administrative power demonstrated in the area and in the stories preceding its arrival, and in part due to local reactions to men of power shaped by pre-colonial beliefs.

Pacification did not immediately alter the mode of production prevalent in the Kewabe clan settlements. It did complete a transformation of importance, however. Prior to colonialism, in order to preserve its pre-capitalist family production units as viable units, a clan had to maintain its claim to land through its ability to hold that land militarily in the face of attack. After the arrival of administration and achievement of pacification, these clans were relieved of this function. Clans previously driven off their land were allowed to return to their homes. Moi and Rakili clans were recorded as reforming in Yarena between 1961 and 1962 (Hiatt 1961b). Other clans, "Mareba, . . . , Moga, Pauia, Riro, Wangai . . ." returned to other nearby Kewabe areas. Their ability to return underlines the existence of the transformed system by which clan-land relations would now be maintained. The previously classless Kewabe society now found itself dominated politically by a class of colonial administrators which served as arbitor and guarantor of these claims.

Giving Acephalic Society a Head

The process of pacification in the Kewabe was, of course, the beginning of the end for acephalic society. Until this point, Kewabe society "existed" as a set of distinct clans entering into and leaving political alliances, fighting, shifting clan-land boundaries as the outcomes of war determined. The "system" existed as an inter-village "moral community" (cf. Morauta

1974:26 re: the moral ties within acephalic Madang society) and a pattern of exchange relations² and political alliances. Upon the imposition of Administration peace, the system gained a head. During the period from 1952 (when Ialibu Station and Patrol Post were established) and 1964, the "head" remained busy establishing and maintaining its dominance, directing the creation of the infrastructure to be described below, and beginning to draw the local population into the larger developing colonial system. The relationship between the Administration and local clan members was one of political dominance-submission. Peace was established by direct force or show of strength, coupled with exchange (cf. Hughes 1978 re: the importance of the latter). It was maintained by quick Administration response to any reported outbreak of violence, patrols hurrying to the scene to arrest violators of the peace and to remove accused murderers from the scene before hostilities increased. Changes in the patterns of local life during this period were most often the result of direct edict by Administration patrol officers. The authority behind such directives derived from the Administration's own Native Regulations, described by Mair as a "simplified criminal code" which grew to be "the means of effecting such changes in village life as were considered desirable" (1970:67). These Regulations had been the principle tool of administration from early on in British New Guinea history, and remained available as a changing instrument until late in the 1960s.

In 1949, authority was given for a distinct political transformation of the colony through the Papua and New Guinea Act, establishing permanently the joint Administration of the two named territories under Australian control. The Act provided for the establishment of elected village councils.

The impetus to such a change did not come from the dominated villagers of the nation. It was instituted by the Australians as a method of administration of a colony. The intent of the provision in the Act was debated by the Australians for years, attempting to resolve the question of the legitimate functions of such village councils (see Mair 1970:82-88 for a summary of the debates). By the early 1960s, many of these questions had been decided. Structures had been tested by experience throughout PNG. Certain legislative functions had been granted councils, ". . . from 1959 Local Councils . . . were authorized to make rules covering such fields as village sanitation, road maintenance and school attendance." In 1963, the Local Government Ordinance explicitly declared Local Government Councils (LGCs) to be a part of territorial administration with a list of specific functions. A system of ward committees was authorized to advise councilors on a local level, with ward committee persons to be elected in a fashion similar to councilors. Mair (1970), from whom I've gleaned this summary of the progression of Local Government Councils, writes that the principle focus in establishing the system was to shift responsibility for a variety of services onto the shoulders of local people (not to ensure the rights of the dominated):

"The Australian conception of local government appears to be concerned much more with the acceptance of responsibilities than the claiming of rights. A Queensland authority, invited to make proposals for certain areas in the Territory, recommended compulsory registration of voters and compulsory voting as 'the only means by which local government responsibilities can be adequately sheeted home.' In New Guinea, the preliminary explanations of the council system emphasize the duty of taking responsibility for services previously provided out of taxation to which the indigenous population did not contribute; more sophisticated audiences might have asked why this duty was self-evident . . ." (1970:99-100).

In the Ialibu area, local government by elected council came only after these matters had been worked through nationally. The passage of the Local Government Ordinance of 1963 was the final push. In April and May of 1964, seventeen councilors were elected from Imbong'gu census division areas, and Ialibu Local Government Council was formed. A mildly humorous report on the Council, after five months of operation, indicates its "progress" in taking responsibility from the Administration in the eyes of its constituents, and comments on the nature of that responsibility.

"After only five months of Local Government participation, the (Imbong'gu) area is already developing a Council personality and an awareness of their common bond in the Council movement. This is evident from a rechanneling of the demands that were before directed at the administration. There is still the cry 'What can the Government do for us?' But, and this is especially true in the Northeastern section, a new chant is gaining in popularity: 'What can the Council do for us?' This is a question that the Council must answer with some positive assistance if it is to retain the present degree of support and interest" (Hicks 1964).

In a patrol conducted at the same time in the Kewabe Division, P. N. Colton (1965) found that the people of that area felt left behind. "There is a Council in Imbong'gu and a Council in Kagua. Why is there none here?" It took more than another year, but finally their cries were answered. In September and October 1965, the first Kewabe council elections were completed.

Establishment of the Local Government Council in Ialibu, and the extension of its constituency and membership to the Kewabe, added a new dimension to the objective political situation of the dominated colonial subjects. Within circumscribed boundaries, local residents now had a representative voice in policy making. The same was true of the national level of politics -- representatives were elected in 1964 to the National

House of Assembly to advise the Administration, a step toward self-government. The Kewabe had access to democratic influence on governmental policy. A new social role had been introduced, that of "representative of constituents." This state was not perceived in this manner by the electorate, however. Consciousness of the roles of Local Government Councilor and Member of the House of Assembly were shaped in accord with local knowledge of past practices. Local practice followed this theory, creating a social reality somewhat different from the European notion of the potential role.

During their first year with representation in the Ialibu LGC, the Kewabe were reported to have misconceived the role of councilor. Sisley (1965a) found people equating the new role with a known government role in the villages, that of Village Constable. The councilor was expected to settle disputes. People knew that he was also required to attend monthly meetings, but reportedly had no idea why. Regarding local understanding of the national government, Sisley continued in his report:

"Whereas their ideas on the Council are hazy, their knowledge of the House of Assembly is practically non-existent. A few know that there is such a thing and a few more remember the Elections as being something of importance but none know what the House does or when it sits. Their member . . . has not done anything to assist in this regard, as the only time he has visited them was before the election to solicit votes" (1965a).

An earlier report spoke of the understanding of the House of Assembly by the neighboring Imbong'gu, an understanding shared by the Kewabe:

"This is not to say that the people have no grasp of the importance of the House of Assembly. It is to say, however, that what grasp they do have is a belief in the power of their member over the Government, not as a power in Government" (Hicks 1964).

The Kewabe viewed Government as being something outside of themselves. something embodied by the expatriate colonial officers. Their own elected

representatives, at both the local and national levels, were sent to meet with "the government" in order to inform the Government of constituent problems, and to "pull" resources from Government to their local level.

A system of Ward Committees was established. These committees were to be constituted by members of the various sub-clans of the Councilor's resident area, again potentially bringing representation closer to the level of each individual. But the komiti ("Committee" - TP) members tended to assume for themselves the powers and role granted locally to a Councilor. Ward Committee members were used by local people to help to settle disputes. Sisley, on patrol, felt it necessary to remind 'komiti' how limited their role was to be:

"Some members of this committee system have inflated ideas of their position and imagine that they are just the bee's knees around their village. It was impressed on all that they are merely advisors of the Councilors and not as some were imagining Policemen and Judges" (1965a).

The Ward Committee system seems to have flourished and grown in its utility, despite these initial problems. D. A. Forbes wrote in mid-1968:

"As in the IMBONG'GU, the KEWABE councilors tend to play along with whatever is going, the men responsible for any constructive activities are the village committees who tend to push the people to gain some limelight in council or government projects" (Forbes 1968).

By the early 1970s, the komiti were applauded by the Ialibu Administration for having relieved Local Government Councilors of community leadership tasks. The komiti were "ensuring that road maintenance is done and other community projects" (Sadlo 1971). This same report noted the ineffectiveness of committee members in communicating council business to local people, however. The effectiveness of the ward committee system was in the willingness and ability of these local influential persons to shape the

community work activities of each clan in accord with LGC and Administration desires, and their ability to serve as mediators in local dispute settlement. In that these were reportedly "burdens" being lifted somewhat from LGC Councilors, we can conclude that these concrete local functions were also the roles being played by these elected officials. (In Ialibu, Ward Committee members were appointed by kiaps, according to local informants).

The system of elected representatives established in the mid-1960s with the creation of the Ialibu Local Government Council and the national House of Assembly looked to the Administration like a way to allow development of self-government through representative democracy. It was against the model of the various European democracies that they reviewed and commented upon the functioning of these PNG systems. In the eyes of the voters, however, the Administration had created a system to allow representatives to speak to the Government. In contrast to the Australian hope that the system would both bestow and foster a local sense of responsibility in shaping a new system of government, local people focused on the responsibilities that their representatives had to the clans they represented. No sense of "supra-clan" responsibilities in policy making are evident in the patrol reports available to us. The worth of a political representative was to be measured solely by the benefits accruing to his constituency during his term. This attitude prevailed, still, in 1981-- evident in speeches made by national representatives (continual references to projects brought into the Ialibu area, a complete lack of references to "policy" questions), as well as in comments by potential voters (e.g., a comment by one Muli resident that the recently elected Kewabe representative to

the newly formed Southern Highlands Provincial Parliament now owed free transportation to all his constituents on his privately owned trucks. "A member should make the people happy.").

Despite, or perhaps because of, this attitude that government exists apart from local populations, the constituents of the Ialibu LGC willingly entered into that bane of modern civilization -- paying of self-imposed taxes. Taxation has long been a colonial tool to force the monetarization of indigenous economy and the availability of labor to colonial projects. Such was not the case in Ialibu. Taxation was a responsibility and a privilege of the Local Government Council. It was introduced and carried out in Ialibu by the Administration as part of the instillation of the Council more than ten years after establishing a colonial presence. In the Kewabe, response was good to the first tax collection. Taxes were understood to be related to the Ialibu LGC, into which the people had enthusiastically entered only months before. Between December 13 and 22, 1965, a patrol led by Patrol Officer M. J. E. Anderson (1966) collected \$258.00 from half of the Kewabe Division, and expected to exceed the Division's allotted \$400 by the end of the tax collection. Tax rates differed within the Ialibu District - in 1967, an Imbong'gu male paid \$1.00, and Imbong'gu female 30¢. Kewabe males and females paid only 50¢ and 20¢ respectively, reflecting assessment by both the Administration and the Council that the Kewabe had less income generating opportunities than did the Imbong'gu. Throughout the next years of colonialism, tax collection went smoothly. This is not to say that there was no argument about taxation. Probert described local reactions throughout Ialibu in mid-1971, when he led a patrol to discuss tax increases for the region:

". . . At all twenty-six gatherings of people, great poverty and hardship were pleaded. When certain facts of life, figures, etc. were quoted back, there prevailed a degree of humour . . . As a rule the men could see the need for progress and the fact that it cost money to achieve this, but stated that the Council must wait until they had businesses, education and economic development before raising the Tax Rate. No arguments put forward by the writer appeared to register, that to get this development one must have money to start the progress and that everyone's small amount of Tax, accumulated into a large enough amount to make progress. They would listen and repeat the statement over again" (Probert 1972).

However, despite these signs of resistance, and despite rising taxes, Probert could write in 1973 that only two men in the whole Kewabe Division failed to appear or to pay taxes without good excuse -- and this at the rate of \$4.00 for males, 30¢ for females. Then came independence in 1975, and tax revolts in 1976 and ever since. The reasons given were the same throughout the region. People argued that they had been paying taxes for many years now, and that no projects had come into their area. Some paid begrudgingly, others not at all (re: Imbong'gu resistance, Bullock 1976, Koma 1976; re: Kewabe Diawo 1976).³ The tax situation degenerated steadily until, upon our arrival in the field in 1980, the Ialibu Local Government Council ran out of money. Tax revenues for 1980 were anticipated at K38,000. Only K17,000 was collected. People claimed that ILGC had mismanaged money and done insufficient good for the Ialibu District (Koa 1980). In July 1980, at its "monthly" meeting, the Ialibu LGC announced that it was unable to fund anything for the rest of the year due to its lack of funds. The Council proposed to plead for revenue to the newly formed SHP Parliament in the face of constituent failure to pay taxes. The Council then closed its year, awaiting new tax collections in 1981.

The imposition of self-government, elections, and taxation in 1964, was only a step in the road to independence. The Administration held

ultimate responsibility for the execution of government directives, the maintenance of order, the political and economic development of the territory. But momentum was building toward the inevitable. It is clear that independence was not a goal of the majority of the residents of the Kewabe region. Even before the possibility of independence became a part of patrol propoganda, people throughout the Ialibu area began to react against the idea.

"Students from the BIBLE MISSION school at KAUPENA are having an effect on their elders and it is becoming a case of 'the tail that wags the dog.' For example, at ORAE village the people expressed the opinion that they do not want independence and indicated that they were very much afraid of a coastal 'elite.' This comment is quite surprising considering that the patrol never initiated a discussion about 'independence' and that the comment originated from a group of very old clan leaders. It is of course doubtful whether the group understood the meaning of 'independence'"(Dickson 1968b).

In the face of the inevitability of independence, the Administration continued to assess local reaction to the idea. In 1974, just a year before the new status actually arrived, D. C. Ekins summarized the state of Ialibu area attitudes, writing that opposition to independence was being expressed in:

"the usual Southern Highlands conservative responses:

Fear that

1. All those of fair pigmentation will leave;
 2. They will begin fighting over land again;
 3. They do not have enough educated leaders;
 4. Inflation is affecting them;
 5. They do not have enough income and social development.
- It is felt that they will accept any sort of political change as long as it does not affect their present state of well being" (1974).

Despite their fears and arguments, independence did come to the Kewabe along with the rest of Papua New Guinea, on 16 September 1975. A member of one Kewabe clan summarized the colonial period to me:

"Independence came like lightning. We are the men who saw the first white spirits. The Europeans came and went quickly. Now we do not have enough money and other things. We like when the Europeans were, and wish they were still here. Independence came too soon.

I have summarized above the political integration of Ialibu into the colonial system. I will now return to the period immediately following first contact and pacification to trace the Administration's attempts to use its political authority to integrate the area into the national economy.

Infrastructural Development

With pacification came the need for a regional infrastructure which would enable efficient enforcement of administration control. The earliest goals set by patrol officers included the building of rest houses for patrols and clearing of paths from population center to population center. The first stage of human resource development was carried out in village indoctrination. Fowler described the content of initial indoctrination :

"As indicated in the diary, the people were addressed at each camp site on the aims and policy of the Administration - as can be imagined talk of self government would be incomprehensible to these people at this stage. What was stressed was the desire of the Administration to help the people, the rapid development of the people in other parts of the Highlands and the coast, and the necessity for these people to develop at a more rapid pace. Economically it was stressed that larger gardens should be constructed, and propaganda on the benefits-- both economic and educational-- of the Highlands Labour Scheme was delivered" (Fowler 1960).

In addition, patrol routine included passing out seeds in hopes that these would be used to grow European vegetables. These could then be sold in Ialibu Station to the small European population, providing small scale cash cropping incomes, or could be absorbed into local diets. After initial disinterest (Duggan 1959), the supply of introduced vegetables were

reportedly growing (Hiatt 1960).

On 19 July 1956, the area immediately surrounding Ialibu Station was de-restricted.⁴ By 30 June 1960, Muli, too, was in the de-restricted area (although neighboring Tiri, Munku, Remago remained restricted at this time).

Road building was set as the next major phase of infrastructural development after the establishment of Administration influence was well under way. With roadwork came a new mode of producing-- communal work under the supervision of an external authority, or wok komuniti ("community work" - TP). Clan groups were allocated pieces of road to build and to maintain under the guidance of patrol officers. Roads, of course, were viewed by the Administration as prerequisite to any future policy encouraging local economic development. Road-building, however, was seen as serving other social goals, as well. District Officer K. W. Dyer, writing from Mendi in response to an Ialibu patrol report, wrote:

"I do not agree with Mr. B. E. Jinks' (OIC, Ialibu) implication that road work does little to improve the native situation. On the contrary it gives the people something to do, working together and getting on with each other and also provides the people and the patrolling officer a wonderful opportunity to get to know and understand each other . . ." (Dyer, in Thomas 1961, Cover letter).

"Getting to know each other" was not a matter of choice, of course. If laborers failed to arrive for work, the patrol officer in charge and a detachment of police went to their residences and cajoled them, sometimes with verbal arguments:

"Departed for Kumbemi, with police detachment, at 1310 hours after receiving a report that about a dozen men had refused to come to work. The required men were sent for and after some time they presented themselves at the Rest House. After instructing them to appear next morning,

and being assured that they would, I returned to camp site" (Thomas 1961).

Sometimes argument was insufficient:

"Just prior to this patrol virtually all the males of MULI and IARENA were goaled under the Council Road Maintenance Rule. This probably had some bearing in the ready response given to the patrol regarding work of various kinds" (Tozer 1969c).

This same patrol officer commented in an earlier report that local people had no understanding of the reasons underlying Administration directives regarding roadwork, sanitation, etc. They "work from fear rather than any self motivation" (Tozer 1969a).

The principal road through the Kewabe Sub-district of today's Ialibu District is the Ialibu-Kagua road. The road passes directly through Muli Ekerepa land. This road had been cleared from Ialibu to Muli to the edge of the Ialo River by July 1960. The first Land Rover passed through Muli at this time, on its way from Lae to Kagua. The car cleared the last Ialibu section of "road" between Muli proper and the river with much pulling and pushing by Muli Ekerepa men. Into the middle 1960s, roadwork, like much administrative work, progressed much more rapidly in the neighboring Imbong'gu area, also administered out of the Ialibu Patrol Post. In 1964, a patrol officer could write that the Imbong'gu Census Division was "well covered by a network of roads linking every village of the Division" (Hicks 1964), while another officer wrote in contrast about the Kewabe Census Division, "Most of the area still can only be visited by foot" (Colton 1965). However, the work had progressed sufficiently throughout the District to allow the Administration to consider policy for economic development. Road construction was to continue for several years in Ialibu District. The last portion of the Ialibu-Kagua road under Ialibu

jurisdiction (ending at the Ialo River) was completely stoned for the first time in May 1967. The road from Muli to Yate was only "under construction" in 1968 (and the road remained, in 1981, a very difficult "four wheel" drive).

Administration Initiatives in Economic Development

As late as the end of the 1950s, the Administration expressed little hope for immediate gains in economic development in the Ialibu area. The Kewabe⁵ were described as "colourless" and unenthusiastic about bettering themselves (in contrast to the Imbong'gu--Hiatt 1961b). This characterization arose primarily out of the disinterest in European vegetables shown by the Kewabe. In response to this perceived apathy, one patrol officer was moved to write in 1958 that locally based economic progress in the Kewabe could only follow a period of plantation and factory labor. "They must venture as laborers to more developed areas and learn" (Lucas 1958). In a cover letter to this report, Assistant District Officer B. M. O'Neill (Mendi) offered a less disparaging, but no less pessimistic, prognosis stating that high altitude and lack of information about local soil characteristics blocked any Administration promotions in the area. He held out the hope that completion of a better road system would increase interest in sales of produce by reducing the difficulty of transport to markets in Ialibu.

The year 1960 marks a major turning point in local involvement with the Administration. It was during this year that the first labor recruits left the area. At the same time, the District Officer in Mendi announced the need for greater Administration involvement stimulating economic

development in the Ialibu area itself. Simultaneously, the Ialibu OIC was ordering his officers to scout out sites for cash-crop development. Economic development as a conscious local policy began.

From the time of the establishment of the Ialibu Patrol Post, a few Kewabe and Imbong'gu residents had been able to engage in wage labor. This was true for those living closest to the Ialibu Station, and the missions which sprung up in 1956. Not until the introduction of the Highlands Labour Scheme did the opportunity to enter wage labor become widely available in the region. Labor recruitment from the Central Highlands for working in coastal goldfields and plantations was formalized in the H.L.S. in 1950 (Bookfield 1972:99)⁶, before the Ialibu region had even been formally brought under Administration control. I've been unable to pin down an exact starting date for the H.L.S. in the Ialibu area. The earliest mention of the Scheme in the patrol documents held in Ialibu was found in a report written in May 1961. This report noted that since May 1960 thirty-five persons from the Kewabe Division had been recruited for the H.L.S. The 1961 patrol had collected names of further potential recruits (none from Muli). From this date forward, recruiting was steady. What is clear from subsequent patrol reports is how little control over local labor migration the Administration really had. A continuing concern for the prevention of over-recruitment from single villages was expressed, as was the wish that plantation recruiters from the Western Highlands would work more closely with the Administration for just such prevention (Hiatt 1961a). We will discuss "native" rationales for participation in labor migration in more detail below (Chapter 4). For now, it suffices to mention one patrol officer's explanation that H.L.S. and plantation

employment offered "an excellent opportunity to obtain money, to learn Pidgin English, and to see development in other areas . . ." (Sisley 1966). Wage labor, then, was made available to a wide group of Ialibu residents only from 1960 on, and interested persons had to be willing to leave their home areas for periods of two years, the normal contract term.

Gardening as a mode of commodity production formally had been introduced with the initial distributions of European seeds by the earliest patrols in the area. We've noted the reports of little enthusiasm on the part of the Kewabe dwellers. This early introduction of European vegetables can hardly be called an initiative toward local economic development. In effect, the early policy served two functions for the Administration: it created good will through the giving of gifts, and it created (or hoped to create) a supply of foods familiar to the Europeans living at Ialibu Station. Although local groups were labelled as "unenthusiastic" about these crops early on, it must be considered that enthusiasm would have had little audience -- a few patrols yearly or the missionaries and colonial officials living in Ialibu. In 1960, however, the Administration turned its attention to assessing the cash-cropping potential of the Ialibu area. K. W. Dyer, District Officer, Mendi, wrote to the Ialibu Patrol Post on 24 June 1960 announcing a new initiative in local development:

"My main concern is the fostering of interest and activities among the people now that they are becoming settled. Road development will in part meet this need, but it is becoming increasingly urgent that the Department of Agriculture in particular give some lead in what can be done in the agricultural sphere. I have requested the District Agricultural Officer to obtain and provide onion seed--one crop that I feel can be exploited in the Ialibu area--and will continue to press for at least some investigation and guidance in what economic prospects could be tried and exploited" (1960).

Onions were simply another in the line of European vegetables introduced to

the area. The early patrols had distributed seeds for beans, potatoes, cucumbers, corn and tomatoes (Hiatt 1960). By 1965, carrots, cabbage, and pumpkin, too, had joined the normal foodstuffs in local gardens. "These (European) crops are, however, grown more with the intention of sale rather than local consumption" (Sisley 1965). As an economic development initiative, the success of introducing European vegetables was limited. In 1968, R. C. Hunter described the sale of vegetables as the only source of income in the Ialibu area other than sale of labor to government or missions. Vegetables could be sold to patrols or at a weekly market in Ialibu. Hunter summarized, as well, the two dimensions limiting the growth of a large local vegetable industry - the size of the local market, and the pricing policies of local sellers:

"Market gardening cannot be increasing significantly unless - i) Ialibu station increases greatly in size or plantations are established in the area; ii) markets are found outside the Ialibu area. Ialibu station is always increasing in size and appears that it will continue to do so. Thus produce sold on the station will also increase, but no sudden increase can be expected. Unless the people are prepared to be more realistic in prices, there is no possibility of finding an outside market for their produce" (1968).

European vegetables were the only source of commodity-sales income in Ialibu in 1968 not because the Administration had tried nothing else, but rather because two major cash-cropping initiatives had been attempted, and had failed, between 1960 and 1968 -- coffee and pyrethrum.

Coffee was, by the end of the 1950s, well established as the primary commodity produced in the Highlands. Plantations existed in the nearby western Highlands. In the Ialibu area, at least by early 1960, people wondered when they, too, could engage in coffee production. R. A. Hiatt (1960) noted among the Kewate a growing appreciation of the value of the

monetary system and an interest in economic development (leading me to doubt very much the attribution of "colourlessness" and lack of enthusiasm mentioned earlier). In January, 1961, B. E. Jinks, OIC Ialibu, felt it necessary that a new patrol among the Imbong'gu inform persons near Ialibu that coffee might not be a successful crop at such altitudes, suggesting that the Kaugel Valley area along the Territorial border would be more suitable. Such cautions reflect the findings by the patrol he was instructing (Hiatt 1961a) that coffee seedlings had most likely already found their way into the Imbong'gu Division. Ialibu administrative response (in conjunction with higher authorities) was to respond to the enthusiasm being shown. The Imbong'gu patrol led by Hiatt (1961a) was instructed to pay special attention to prospects for economic development. In addition to the above mentioned caution, the patrol was to note the following points:

- "(1) areas for planting should be of a suitable size and should not be in dispute;
- (2) the people should be told that cash-cropping will return an income but will not create a fortune;
- (3) they must realize that crops must be carefully planted and tended and isolated trees must not be planted lest there be a spread of disease;
- (4) for the present planting should only be among groups easily accessible near the vehicular road to allow proper supervision and inspection. (Jinks 1961)."

This initial program showed caution on the part of the Administration, which hoped to maintain oversight and a semblance of control over the growth of Ialibu production of coffee (as well as suggesting other crops, tea and tobacco, to groups in places likely not to be good coffee-producing areas). The pressure by local people for coffee, and the reports of coffee spreading, uncontrolled, from Western Highlands plantations, suggests the limits

of the control maintained by the Administration, however. The economic interests of private plantations encouraged the proliferation of coffee growing -- as the plantations controlled processing and marketing facilities. It is apparent that villagers, too, considered coffee growing to be in their interests, seeing and hearing of the material wealth available to those in the Western Highlands who were already engaged in growing. The Administration, in the face of these pressures, hurried to respond.

Coffee was planted in experimental plots throughout the Imbong'gu area during Hiatt's early 1961 patrol. Hiatt wrote of the impetus this gave to other, previously uncompleted infrastructural work on the part of villagers:

"Experimental coffee plots were planted during the patrol and for the sake of regular supervision, plots were planted only at those villages easily accessible by roads. Those villages not possessing village road links to the trunk roads made known their disappointment to the patrol that they had missed out on a coffee plot. Similarly it was made known that the patrol was disappointed that instructions to build such inter-village roads had been avoided for the past three years. It was noted that on returning to IALIBU at the end of the patrol, intervillage roads between PONGAMA, KERO, KONGIMBUGL and BIMBINIE were well under way" (1961a).

Later the same year, coffee was planted in several Kewabe villages, as well. Three plots were planted in mid-1961 in Muli -- all three owned by "IAMA IAKI." Other areas not included were again instructed that roads had to be completed first (Hiatt 1961a).

After this initial planting, little comment is made about the coffee by subsequent patrols for a few years. The plants were left to grow, requiring as much as five years to bear fruit at these altitudes (Mambo 1980). In 1964, J. S. Hicks reported that the crop in the Kaugel area appeared to be growing well "in spite of the complete lack of assistance whatsoever, apart from that initially given in planting the crop." He

further claimed that the Kaugel area had the greatest agricultural potential in the Ialibu region, and perhaps in the entire Southern Highlands. He encouraged the Administration to lease land it had purchased in that area, noting that "The people of this area, . . ., are crying out for someone to show them the way" to good coffee business. Hicks' attitude to private development of public lands summarized the attitude expressed through the following several years in Ialibu patrol reports. Commenting on an application by Ron Neville to lease 3000 acres at Peregai, in the Imbong'gu Division, Hicks' wrote:

"The granting of such a lease will, of course, greatly assist Mr. Neville, but this is also true for the people of the area. The Administration has done nothing about its own land here, and it may well be to the advantage of all concerned if those willing to spend money and time in this region be given every opportunity to do so. It is pleasant to imagine that our social system is based on this sort of thing" (1964).

That expatriate capitalist investment was the sole road by which to "show the way" to economic development was to become the standing position of the Ialibu administration for several years to come (following national Administration policy -- cf. Hasluck, 1958, cited in Howlett 1973:257).

There is a break in the patrol report record of coffee growing in Ialibu in the middle 1960s. According to informants in Muli, coffee was growing well, at least in some plots. Then, in 1965, the didiman ("agricultural extension officer" - TP) came and said "lusim kopi" ('get rid of coffee' - TP) to plant pyrethrum. Muli was told to forget coffee, to remove it, and to clear land for a new experimental crop. Pyrethrum, the didiman told them, would pay a quick return, unlike coffee for which one had to wait so long (later patrol reports, summarizing the history of coffee in Ialibu, support this local claim - Hunter 1968; Williams 1970).⁷

Pyrethrum (varieties of chrysanthemum) could be grown, the flowers picked and dried, all within a span of a few months. The agricultural agents would buy the dried flowers to sell on the world market to producers of insecticide.

On February 11, 1965, an Agricultural Officer out of the Kagua Station met with Ialibu patrol officer P. N. Colton in Muli. Pieces of land in Muli, Yarena, and Padl (or 'Pale' in local pronunciation) were marked for growing pyrethrum" (Colton 1965). In June or July of that year, these Kewabe blocks were planted. The officer leading the patrol on this occasion commented "Pyrethrum offers these people their only chance of making money from cash crops (Gari 1965).

By the beginning of 1966, seven acres of pyrethrum had been planted in the Kewabe Division. Ninety acres had been planted by patrols through the Imbong'gu Division. Plans called for totals of 60 acres to be planted in the Kewabe, 270 in Imbong'gu. The plan was never fulfilled. The supply of splits was low. Planting was concentrated first in the Laiagam Sub-District of the Western Highlands (now Enga), with a plan to spread planting subsequently to Ialibu, and then on to the rest of the Southern Highlands (Marsh 1966). The first crop in the Ialibu area failed -- failure attributed to drought by the Administration (Sisley 1965b). A second crop was planted in September 1966, again by the Administration patrols, D. J. H. Kentish, Cadet Patrol Officer, reported that the crop was not doing well. "(Pyrethrum) does not appear to enjoy the same cultivation attention the sweet potato gardens get" (Kentish 1966a).

"(Imbong'gu pyrethrum) is both unweeded and undrained. The agricultural assistant advised the people of these two necessities for good production, but I fear the monetary incentive

is insufficient to produce the degree of cultivation that the sweet potato gardens enjoy At present, people do not regard Pyrethrum as a business. They often cynically exaggerate that the return is only enough to pay the council tax" (Kentish 1966b).⁸

The pyrethrum "experiment" ended in the Kewabe area in 1967--shortlived and unsuccessful. By all patrol reports and informant reports, the plan was well suited to local physical, geographical growing conditions. It was not well suited to local social and economic conditions. In late 1967, Williams wrote:

"The gardens in the Muli area have been pulled out and the splits sent to villages in the North Imbong'gu area. No complaints were forthcoming from the Muli area, so either they were happy to rid themselves of a means of earning money, or they were ashamed and afraid to admit it" (Williams 1967).⁹

To this point in Ialibu area history (circa 1968), Administration initiatives to bring economic development through the transformation of local gardeners into smallholding cash-croppers had failed to be effective. The first such initiative mentioned--Dyer's onions--receives no mention in later patrol reports or in our informants' tales of this period (onions do appear in a few Muli gardens). Marketing vegetables remained a very small part of local life, at best. The cash crops aimed at an international market, coffee and pyrethrum, failed to take hold. B. Williams summarized, speaking of the Kewabe Division:

"Unfortunately for the people of this area, economic development has resulted in the complete failure of one cash crop and through implementing this cash crop (pyrethrum), the failure of another (coffee).

Originally coffee was planted throughout the area and as a result of circumstance, some plots have been left standing. In 1965, just when the coffee was coming into production, the people were told to pull it out and plant pyrethrum, which subsequently failed . . ." (1970).

Writing of late 1967, L. R. Dickson added a further note regarding the

direction of Administration agricultural policy in the Ialibu area:

"At present it appears from agricultural experiments that tea and grazing show the greatest promise in the area. Coffee grows well but pyrethrum has failed as a cash crop. However, coffee growing is not encouraged due to agricultural policy. Diversification of cash crops obviously provides the safest long term agricultural policy in this country. Therefore I believe that it is advisable to send an agricultural technical advisor to Ialibu to experiment with other crops . . ." (1967).

The relative failure of the creation of smallholder cash-cropping in the Ialibu region during the 1960s seems to be related directly to the agricultural policy decisions made by the Administration. Dickson, quoted above, states that coffee grows well in the area. Hunter (1968) strongly suggested that coffee had not fared well in its early trials due to Administration inattention after trial plots were planted--he found badly overgrown plots still growing during the 1968 patrol. Rather than providing closer supervision and soliciting more widespread participation in coffee production, the Administration replaced coffee with pyrethrum. As we've seen, this crop failed to attract local interest because of an indigenous "labor cost--monetary benefit" analysis. The crop reportedly grew well in the area, like coffee.

While these trials were going on, the lack of coordination between government departments added to growing disenchantment and discouragement among local people:

"At the present time (1964) there are continual bands of Agricultural Field-Workers wandering around the area. The office at IALIBU is not informed of their movements or their proposed activities. Quite often these Field-Workers from Kagua make themselves unpopular with the people by not explaining their intentions fully. In the eyes of many, these Field-Workers are simply giving the people more work with no pay.

If the Department of Agriculture has any definite

plans for this area, we are unaware of them here. Surely if heads were put together something definite could be worked out for this area. This would be much better than the haphazard policy which is being followed at this present time" (Colton 1965).

This same officer noted a growing unwillingness among the Kewabe to be at the beck and call of the Administration. They could no longer be "talked into doing something" unless a real and immediate material gain could be foreseen. The men of the Kewabe, many of whom had seen or heard of the progress in Mount Hagen and the Imbong'gu area, complained that the Ialibu Administration was focusing all its attention on the latter and leaving the Kewabe in its state of "backwardness."

The Administration, in its turn, seems to have felt that the Kewabe people were not doing their part. Following Hiatt's early contrast between the Kewabe and the Imbong'gu, labelling the former "colourless" and "unenthusiastic" (Hiatt 1961b), the Kewabe were characterized as being "skeptical" (Creedy 1966), guilty of "chronic laziness" and having "the 'half-baked' ideas that emerge in all developing societies" (Dickson 1967), "lazy, lethargic, and unresponsive" (Barber 1967a). They were assumed to be either embarrassed by their failure to produce pyrethrum or unwilling to work when presented the opportunity to make money. They were "not keen on hard work" (Hunter 1968). However, these same writers also held in common the opinion expressed by the Kewabe--that the Administration was not working closely enough with the Kewabe people, and had led them into only failures. Creed suggests that these attitudes could be overcome overnight " . . . with overseas agricultural officers actually and I repeat actually camping out in their areas . . ." (1966). Barber, scathing in his characterization of the Kewabe, continued:

"Maybe this is due to the fact that they have seen no development within their own area. Coffee, peanuts, pyrethrum started with such a fanfare have failed either through neglect or altitude" (1967a).

The Kewabe were disappointed by the results of Administration attempts to initiate development, "beginning to feel a little left behind in development" (Hunter 1968).

In the face of these Administration characterizations of the Kewa of the Ialibu region, and of comments made in response to earlier reports on our fieldwork (Burkins 1981; Burkins and Krause 1982), I'd like to pause at this point to assure the reader that the Kewabe were by no means unique in their responses to Administration initiatives and in their less than successful results. Throughout the patrol reports from Ialibu, the generalized contrast is made between the "energetic, enthusiastic" Imbong'gu and the "lazy, lethargic" Kewabe. I wish to make clear that within those same reports there exists much evidence that the problems encountered by the Administration within the Kewabe were just as prevalent in the Imbong'gu region. The people of both the Kewabe and Imbong'gu had, by 1968, been bombarded with Administration propaganda regarding the likely road to development (about which, more below). According to patrol officers, the general consensus among the local populations was that economic development would come through expatriate investment in and management of plantations within the region (Hunter 1968 on Kewabe attitudes; Forbes 1963 on Imbong'gu). The Imbong'gu, like the Kewabe, were described as: unenthusiastic about roadwork, feeling that it was simply to the benefit of the Administration; unwilling to combine local capital to allow large scale investment locally, expecting a plantation "to be handed to them on a platter;" "passive" in their acceptance of the Administration, grateful

for such local improvements as Aid Posts, but unwilling to help establish and maintain them; demanding in their cries for compensation when an Administration action damaged local property (to the greater collective economic good) (Kentish 1966c; Forbes 1968; Brady 1974). What seems to account for the differing overall characterizations by the Ialibu patrol post, the more strongly negative judgements of the Kewabe, the sense of their greater "unwillingness" to help in their own development, is not any objective difference between the people of the areas. The difference resides in their objective relations to the Administration, its economic policy and its expectations for local development. Sisley provides us a look at these differences:

"Although the IMBONG'GU people live in a relatively cold and wet location they are by no means the worst off in the Southern Highlands. Their proximity to Mt. Hagen, their close ties with the Hagen-Tambul people and the future road link open up many avenues of development which once capitalised on will make the Ialibu area the leading Sub-District and will open the road for further advancements in the remainder of the Southern Highlands District" (1965b).

"Development" was expected to enter the Southern Highlands from the north-east, coming with the roads from Mount Hagen. Ialibu, the point of entry of the road into the Southern Highlands, would lead the way. The Imbong-gu, the entry point into the Ialibu Sub-District would, logically enough, lead the way for the rest of the Ialibu area. Their development would precede that of the Kewabe. The objective point of entry for the Hagen-Mendi road, the eventual extension of the Highlands Highway into the region, was through the Kaugel Valley. This area, of lower altitude and warmer climate than the rest of the Ialibu Sub-District, was and still is the best situated geographically and climatically for the sorts of projects

imagined by the Administration. The Kaugel Valley, indeed, attracted expatriate private investment, unlike the rest of the Sub-District. A tea plantation, major Administrative roadwork, and a large "Bible Mission" station all provided sources of labor and income, while simultaneously bringing visible change and continual encouragement into the area. Not surprisingly, Dickson found that the attitude to work among Kaugel Valley residents was better than in the rest of the Ialibu District (Dickson 1968).

The Administration expected development to begin earlier in the Imbong'gu than in the Kewabe. The Imbong'gu were closer to the visible changes ongoing around the center at Mount Hagen and were excited by the possibilities (Kentish wrote " . . . the people of Tona, Kuminge, Kume, Imi and Orae have decided Hagen orientation and impatient dissatisfaction with the present rate of economic development in their area"--1966b). Changes did, in fact, come to the Imbong'gu area in the form villagers hoped for--plantations. Meanwhile,

"In the KEWABE Census Division, the attitude towards economic development is hampered by the persistence that because of their location, they are the 'back door' of the Ialibu Sub-District" (Forbes 1968).

The best attitudes among villagers, then, were found among those who had the best objective situations or who had closest contact with changes already accomplished nearby. Kaugel attitudes were exemplary. Imbong'gu attitudes, in general, were enthusiastic (but did not produce immediate response to Administrative initiatives). Kewabe attitudes were, in contrast, "colourless", "lethargic." Ultimately, development differences between the areas lay in the hands of the Administration and private investors, however--not in different attitudes among local people. The Kewabe "had been disappointed by the failure of coffee and pyrethrum

plots but still wish to 'get going' on economic development" (Hunter 1968).

I've stated above that the people of the Ialibu area had been presented with Administration propaganda regarding the road to development. I return now to pick up that thread. In the middle of the 1960s, the Administration deemed the Ialibu area suitably settled to allow for private investment for development. Local people had been encouraged in smallholder schemes, but none had taken hold successfully. Throughout the patrol reports of the period, a concern is evident that local land be made available to private investors. Sisley put it strongly:

"The future of the Southern Highlands is at stake. The roads are being built into the District and land must be made available for potential settlers" (1967).

In the following year, Assistant District Commissioner Peter Barber wrote that the Administration wished to alienate 10,000 acres in the Ialibu area. He assigned Patrol Officer L. R. Dickson the principle responsibility for scouting the area for suitable sites and for convincing the owners of those sites to part with them (Barber 1967b). Dickson wrote of his efforts, clearly advocating Administration policy:

"Quite obviously no economic development can take place anywhere until large areas of land have been purchased by the Administration from the local people" (1967).

"It remains for the Administration to alienate large areas of land now so that private enterprise may step into an encouraging situation at a later stage. Then real development will occur as a natural thing" (1968a).

Dickson, in the latter report, went so far as to advocate that public projects (through the recently formed Ialibu Local Government Council), and individual private projects by local people, be discouraged. He feared that such projects were doomed from the start due to insufficient capital to carry off large scale projects. "Private enterprise," meaning

expatriate private capital, would lead the way.

Administrative enthusiasm for land alienations clearly affected local attitudes and expectations about development. As I've noted above, the people of both the Kewabe and the Imbong'gu came to accept the Administrative position, to expect that development would come:

" . . . mainly through non-natives in the form of privately owned plantations and businesses. For this reason, each village wants to sell land for economic development. However, when it comes to actually selling the land old disputes are brought up spoiling the sale" (Hunter 1968).

The difficulty in achieving local consensus regarding ownership hampered severely the ability of the Administration and locals to reach agreement in particular areas. In some places, however, consensus was clear and successful transactions carried out. Dickson enthusiastically described the local response when he purchased several hundred acres of land at Yate in the Kewabe:

"The local people from Yate expressed the opinion that despite dozens of previous patrols through the area, my patrol was the only one that had achieved anything worthwhile. This is indicative of current thought in the area and provides proof that these people will respond to positive constructive administration, despite their chronic laziness and the 'half-baked' ideas that emerge in all developing societies" (1967).

In addition to the Yate plot, land was purchased at several sites in the Imbong'gu and at Iombi and Muli in the Kewabe (Sisley 1966; Forbes 1968).

The Ialibu patrol officers felt that if land could be alienated and private enterprise brought into the region, development would advance quickly. Local people, too, came to believe this. The problem for Ialibu became apparent not long after this push to purchase land began--private investors were not interested in the Ialibu area. Hunter summarized the state of non-indigenous commercial ventures in the Kewabe in 1968:

"At present there are no private plantations in the (Kewabe) area, but land has been purchased for the purpose of leasing to private enterprise and if some of this is taken up it should provide new scope to indigenous development . . .

There are no areas of land in the Kewabe held by lease from the Administration or the crown. Applications for a number of leases by missions have been received . . .

No local people have approached the Administration requesting the lease of land . . .

There are no non-indigenous commercial establishments within the Kewabe area.

Adjacent to the Kewabe, on Ialibu Station, are two European-owned tradestores, servicing Ialibu Station and also supplying items for resale in village trade stores. A Mission-owned sawmill is also in operation in Ialibu, providing an outlet for a small number of labourers. Timber used by this sawmill, and the PWD one, is bought from Imbong'gu people, thus there is no income from this source for the Kewabes.

The above establishments provide only a limited outlet for Kewabe labor, as labourers also come from the Imbong'gu and other areas. The number employed is not liable to increase until some form of agricultural enterprise is undertaken" (1968).¹⁰

That summary was written in 1968. In 1972, Barber's cover letter to a B. Probert patrol report indicates dampened Administration hopes for expatriate investment and the need to convince local people to take the initiative:

"The general cry in this district for European business men to use alienated land is once again clear over the IATE land. While we shall endeavour to interest such investment it is most unlikely there will be any takers and it becomes necessary for the land to be developed using local resources if at all possible. The people will be advised accordingly yet again" (Barber 1972).

In 1973, B. Probert wrote that local people were still insistent that the land they had sold be used in some productive fashion. "A lot of suggestions and half promises have been forthcoming from various Departments but little real action." He mentioned a proposal to divide the land into

smaller plots, 100 to 120 acres each, to be leased as blocks to local people for enterprise. Probert called for action on this proposal. None came.

Colonial land policy in the Ialibu region paralleled government expectations for the area's development. During the years of pacification, the area was envisioned as providing a potential labor supply and a source of vegetable foods for the local expatriate market. Refugees of past clan wars were allowed to resettle their land. Peace and repopulation were the keys. As cash-cropping was introduced, it became clear that local ability to command land and capital was insufficient to spark rapid economic development in the area. The Administration turned its attention to land alienation in larger, economically viable blocks. But the investors never came. Local people were disappointed again. The promised kampani ("plantations" - TP) did not enter the area. By the early 1970s, policy makers were facing the reality of non-investment. They encouraged local investment of labor and capital for cash-cropping and animal husbandry. Land policy entailed the settlement of land disputes to enable individuals to use land to which they held clear title. Area patrol officers called for Administration support in settling land claims. Assistant District Officer D. C. Ekins wrote:

"The 400 plus land disputes in the Ialibu area are the main barrier to economic development, especially on an individual basis, and are the only real cause for concern about the possibility of impending unrest . . . The settlement of land disputes in the Ialibu area will be a Sisyphean task as new disputes are continually being raised, and it would be a start if the Lands Titles Commissioner, if there is such a person, could begin settling cases recorded for hearing by him as far back as 1963" (Ekins 1974).

In fact, the Lands Titles Commissioner, existent or not, never came to Ialibu to settle disputes. Eventually two blocks of land in the Kewabe

were leased by government units--one by the Ialibu Local Government Council, the other by the Department of Primary Industry. Both plots of land were leased in Muli.

The Ialibu Local Government Council leased land in Muli in order to establish a cattle project. The idea of raising cattle in Ialibu had been mentioned as early as 1964. Set-up for a project was even begun in Mambi, a Kewabe clan area along the Ialo River, in early 1965 (Colton 1965). No cows were brought into the area until 1967, however. In February of that year, seventeen animals arrived at Ialibu Station. They were held by the Administration, awaiting completion by area individuals of cattle blocks and improved, fenced pastures. Cattle was explicitly described as the "possible new avenue of cash income" in the face of the failure of pyrethrum in the region (Sisley 1966).

In 1968, a few projects were underway, with cattle delivered. Animals were sold to individuals to be raised on communally held land (a conscious choice of economic arrangement by the Administration after experience elsewhere with communal cattle ownership and with individualization of land holdings). In 1969, the Ialibu Local Government Council applied to lease an area of land in Muli. Where private investment had refused to come, local government stepped in, ostensibly to serve as model and hub of a new economic venture:

"Cattle is being introduced into the area with the council applying for a cattle lease over 100 acres of land at Muli. The rest of the alienated land will be broken into 5x60 acre blocks where individual cattle owners will be given a lease over the land. The council will use its area as an example of what should be done in a cattle project. Considerable interest is being shown in this venture" (Williams 1970).

It is not clear just who was interested. A report from the same period

told of local resistance to the council plan:

"I received the opinions of a number of people which give an idea of the attitude in the area towards economic development in general. The idea seemed to be 'We do not want cattle projects on this land. What we want is for a company to come and use it and we can sell timber, and food stuffs and provide labour and it won't affect our way of life, but it will provide enough money for us to pay our Council Tax.'" (Staples 1969).

The project pushed on, despite local sentiments. The Council banis ('fence' - TP) was established. In late 1973, there were five cows inside the Ialibu LGC fences. At least one individual project also had cows, in Muli (but not one of the lease blocks--the Muli project was located a couple of miles away at the Ialo River). After several months delay, 90 head of cattle entered the Ialibu area (by 1 July 1974) and 100 more were due to arrive shortly thereafter (Probert 1973a; Dorke 1974). In 1973, several local cattle projects were financed through the Papua New Guinea Development Bank, with Administration backing. This practice continued through the rest of the decade. The Ialibu office of the Department of Primary Industry (DPI) shows records of five projects so funded in the Kewabe region, the last receiving money in 1978. However, as early as 1974, it was clear that the "cattle industry" was not to develop in the businesslike fashion planned by the Administration and the Ialibu LGC. J. L. Brady reported that cattle were being treated by local people as the equivalent of pigs with the "traditional" economy. Cattle prices were highly inflated due to their use in ceremonial kills. Growers refused to kill their animals for sale at lower prices available through the government. The Administration hopes for a successful industry based on quick fattening of mature animals and rapid turnover went unfulfilled as locals held their animals for the high ceremonial prices (Brady 1974b). The record of cattle producing in Ialibu shows

that individuals applied for Development Bank loans, improved an area of pasture under DPI supervision (the Department was earlier named Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries--DASF), obtained cattle and supplies (as a draw against approved funding), made a few payments against the loan --invariably funded through any means except cattle sales, dispersed the cows in some fashion (a few sales, many cows reported as "fell into ditch --dead" at about the time of local pigkill ceremonies), used up borrowable resources, and made no further payments to the Bank. In 1980 (June 2), the PNG Development Bank placed a temporary ban on loans to small-holders for cattle or pig projects, until the "present arrears problem is improved on the existing projects." The ban still stood when we left the field a year later.

Meanwhile, the Ialibu Local Government Council project was fairing little better. Cows were brought to the project in the early 1970s. Money raised by cattle sales served as part of the general revenue available to the Ialibu LGC. I do not know how revenues flowed from cattle production through the 1970s. At a meeting of the Ialibu LGC on 17 July 1980, it was announced that the District had no funds available for local government (primarily due to the failure of local citizens to pay taxes). The Council agreed to begin paying its Cattle Project employees in cows, deciding that such payments would just carry them through until the next tax collection. The project was clearly running afoul of other Ialibu LGC financial considerations, but was not producing funds in any large quantity. It was also not serving as the hub of a local cattle industry. None of the proposed lease blocks had been put into use by private investors.

The Muli Cattle Project land unused by local investors was eventually

leased by another government agency. The Department of Primary Industry (DPI) decided to place a Sheep Project in the Southern Highlands and selected this land as the site. On March 15, 1977, the first 41 sheep arrived, transported from the central PNG sheep project in Goroka, Eastern Highlands. Since that time, there have been sheep at the project continuously. This project was not designed to stimulate local interest, however. DPI is continuing to study sheep rearing and breeding under Highlands conditions in hopes of establishing a wool industry at a later date. National DPI policy in 1980 was still to build stock rather than to sell off sheep as food supply to local buyers (Pusal 1980).

Kewabe residents alienated land in hopes of attracting expatriate investment and establishment of a kampani. Instead, they have obtained a cattle project which failed to stimulate local industry and a sheep project which was never intended to do so, both run by government, both located at Muli. Administration attempts to introduce animals into the local economy were not total failures. Cows are still purchased and raised occasionally. However, Kewabe cattlemen, like cattlemen elsewhere in PNG (cf. Grossman 1980), failed to respond to government initiative as petty capitalists.

The 1970s saw, in addition to this effort to introduce animal husbandry as commodity production, the return to policies and programs attempted earlier and abandoned. Coffee policy had changed. The attempt to encourage cash crop diversification by refusing to plant coffee in the Ialibu area was halted. Coffee again became the "best/only" hope for the Kewabe.

In 1970, a coffee nursery was established in Muli and a DASF (DPI) coffee expert was based there. During the next year, plantings were

concentrated in areas within walking distance from this site, but far from the Ialibu-Kagua road. Plantings were made primarily in two clan communities --Yate and Paibo. Once again, initial follow-up reports suggest that locals were not properly caring for the crop (Tozer 1969c; Wright 1970; Probert 1970a, 1970b; Ridgeway 1971). In mid-1971 the nursery was removed from Muli "because locals provided no help" (Sadlo 1971; but recall that the "locals" living closest to the nursery received no plantings).

In 1972, the Local Government Council distributed vegetable seeds free (carrots, cabbage, parsnips). Residents reacted well, and another distribution was budgeted for the next year (Probert 1972). Yet, December 1974, the state of vegetable sales as local industry remained as it had throughout the colonial period. J. Koma wrote:

"People complain that they have vegetables to sell but no nearby markets and no ready transport. When they do get to Ialibu or Kauapena markets, few buyers and goods taken home" (1974).

In response to this report, J. R. Bullock (1975) reported that Ialibu was soon to gain the services of the new "Government Vegetable Buying Service." Ialibu was envisioned as a center for potatoes in the region, with storage areas to be constructed. Other purchased vegetables would be transported by government to holding coolers in Mendi. No major marketing initiative has yet come of this.

DPI programs to spread the growth of coffee have occurred periodically in the Kewabe in the last ten years, with some small successes. These programs have been constituted by making available seedlings with little or no follow-up advice or supervision. Comment by patrol officers continued to note the inadequacy of such an approach, and to go unheeded.

"It is obviously necessary for DASF to supervise small

village plantings. It appears that quite often a villager plants his own seedlings incorrectly and when the crop fails to grow, blames the soil and shows no further interest in the crop" (Hazleton 1973).

During the 1970s, too, wage labor in the area was limited, and available primarily through government projects. In late 1973, a major grant of money from the Rural Improvement Programme allowed the Administration to employ large groups in improving the Ialibu-Kagua road. B. Probert noticed that progress in other local economic projects halted while this work was available, and predicted that there would be an upsurge of local private enterprise following the end of the road work.

As the colonial period approached its end, the Kewabe had been in contact with the colonial Administration a scant twenty-five years. In the eyes of the Administration, the Kewabe had travelled the road from defiance, through passivity and lethargy, fearful cooperation, to the point of understanding and joining in with Administration hopes for local economic development. Probert wrote of witnessing the transformation from being willing to work "because the kiap said so, not because they really understand what was planned" to being "ahead of the program" (1973b). Villagers now suggested routes for new roads, requested that they be built to facilitate development in difficult to reach places. Requests for seeds and guidance were frequent. Coffee blocks were being planted in several Kewabe communities.

Colonial development policy for Ialibu aimed at (1) provision of labor for existing plantations in other regions, and (2) stimulation of local economic growth through local export-oriented commodity production. The first goal was addressed through the Highlands Labour Scheme. Its effect locally was to bring money and Western goods into the local economy, and more importantly to introduce some area residents to the wealth of the

commoditized world, altering their aspirations and expectations.

The second goal was envisioned as occurring through establishing a "partnership" between expatriate and local producers, like the arrangement in Goroka. Expatriate plantations located in the midst of indigenous small-holding cash-croppers would make it economically feasible to develop transport and marketing services for export production. To this end, land was alienated and the local population was successfully indoctrinated regarding the envisioned role of expatriate kampani in local development. But the kampani never came. Indoctrination raised hopes and expectations regarding access to European goods, but the Administration failed to fulfill its promise.

In the meantime, local public works projects provided a small but continuing source of money and goods. Infrastructural development was carried out under a policy of forced labor. But the laborers did get paid initially in goods, and later in cash. Mission stores in the area, and growing access to other areas in which commodities were more readily available, prompted the local population to demand the shift to cash payments, as did the growing use of money as a token in ceremonial exchange.

The Administration attempted to stimulate smallholder commodity-production in the absence of a kampani (coffee, pyrethrum, and cattle), but ran afoul of international marketing agreements, indigenous assessment of labor cost in relation to material reward, and underdeveloped marketing systems, respectively. Commodity-production failed to take off.

Colonial commoditization of the indigenous social formation was both a mechanism and a side effect of attempts to achieve colonial administrative control of the area, to provide labor to expatriate plantations, and to

carry out a (failed) local development plan. With the failure of localized initiatives, and the relatively low returns to the villages from migrant labor (see Chapter 4 below), commoditization of local life remained (and remains) at a low level. But by the arrival of independence, Ialibu residents were firmly committed to the use of cash and commodities to meet some of their needs in the reproduction of their social life.

In the period from independence until the beginning of our fieldwork (1976-1980), there was little visible change in the external (to the clans of the Kewabe) interventions in the Kewabe. No outside private capital established itself within the Sub-District. Government extension programs concentrated primarily on re-establishing coffee as principal cash crop, while periodically attempting to encourage market vegetable production (cabbage and European potatoes, for example). Labor migration was even less controlled by government, but continued as a source of wage labor for those willing to leave their place. Road work under contract to the Department of Works and Supply was (and is) still the major source of wage labor within the region (but on a reduced level). Such work was limited to those living in clan areas bordering or crossed by the roads. Little economic change had been introduced by the PNG government within the Kewabe region.

I have outlined in this chapter some of the forces both encouraging and at the same time constraining or shaping the integration of Muli producers into the world economy. The outcome of these processes is that Muli residents feel a need for cash and commodities, and for finding roads of access to them. The roads suggested by government, principally migrant labor and cash-cropping, have had limited successes in bringing the desired access to Western goods and cash. But Muli's options have not been limited

to these activities. In Chapter 4, I will explore the range of mechanisms used or attempted by Muli residents in order to meet these needs. Before doing so, it is necessary to elaborate the precapitalist mode of production into which these commodity-production and cash-acquiring activities were introduced. I turn to this topic in the next chapter.

Notes on Chapter 2

1 See note 7 to Chapter 1 re: /r/, /l/problems.

2 The Ialibu Kewa area was tied to the large exchange network documented by Hughes (1973;1977) stretching from the coast of the Gulf Province, up the Kikori River, through Samberigi, into the Kewa area and beyond. From the south and southwest came pearlshells and oil, passed on to the north toward Tambul and Hagen, and to the east toward Pangia. In return came greenstone axes. In the 1930s, upon the first contacts with whites in the area, steel axes and a "spoon pendant" were seen (Hughes 1977:57-58).

3 It may be that the Australian kiaps, secure in their dominance and in their ideology that local persons had responsibility to pay, were better able to withstand the demands of locals than were the new national patrol officers after independence. If national officers, out of insecurity or ideology that demands cannot be refused without giving shame, could not strongly reject local arguments, the earlier acquiescence in taxation would easily break down, as has happened in the Ialibu area.

4 According to Mair (1970:38-41), after an initial flurry of entry into the Highlands in the early 1930s, the murders of missionaries and miners resulted in the entire area being closed to further penetration except by the Administration (in the mid 1930s). This state of affairs continued through World War II, and beyond. Entry into a large area of the Highlands, including the Ialibu area, was still restricted upon the passage of the Restricted Areas Ordinance of 1950.

5 Throughout the patrol reports of the Ialibu colonial administration, the people of the area are referred to as two groups named by the sub-district in which they live (and derived from European names for the languages they speak-the "Kewabe" and the "Imbong'gu." Muli Kewa-speakers now accept the label "Kewa" as a linguistic-cultural identity. Speaking of decoration styles, one Muli informant said "the Kewa's call us 'Lumbaya' or 'Mandi,' the Imbong'gu call us 'Kewa.'" We think of ourselves as 'Kewa,' but we can do both." Muli speakers refer to their language as the 'talk of the place' or 'tok ples' in pidgin, in Kewa anda agale.

6 The Highlands Labour Scheme brought the first large group of Highland laborers to the coastal districts in 1950, when 2445 came. In 1960, 7000 Highlanders made the commitment to work. In 1963, 14500 did so. (Griffin, Nelson, Firth 1979:114,117).

7 In 1966, R. T. Shand summarized the growing problem for world coffee-producing nations. Coffee production was far outdistancing projected demand. Coffee-producers and consumers drew up an International Coffee Agreement designed to limit marketing through export quotas. In PNG, the agreement had no immediate legal effect but:

"Meanwhile the prospect of becoming a net exporter (in tandem with Australia) has necessitated a policy of discouragement of further plantings, in accordance with the Agreement. The Administration has ceased to encourage smallholder plantings in the Highlands and no further areas of land are being released to planters for coffee growing" (1966:88).

Ialibu area coffee planting fell victim to the world market situation and the priority given to established PNG coffee-producers in filling the expected quotas.

8 In his observations on pyrethrum growing in Ialibu villages, D. J. H. Kentish makes an observation in which is implicit a statement of the style of learning of villagers and in which he explicitly suggests a mode of agricultural extension. Kentish writes:

"Example is so important in influencing agricultural trends and not only the example of cultivation on agricultural stations. People need to observe a new crop dramatically changing the economic life of someone in their midst before they will faithfully copy the cultivation examples. Perhaps therefore, it would be wiser for the agricultural department to concentrate its efforts on a few key individuals, ensuring that at least some people have a fairly dramatic success with pyrethrum. Enthusiastic growers, however few, will make a better impact for pyrethrum at Ialibu than the many persuaded growers whose crops are failing fast" (1966b).

Krause and I have elaborated the implicit local theory of learning and knowledge, and the implications for extension policy in the Kewabe in Burkins and Krause (1982).

9 To keep this "pulling out the coffee" report by Williams and by our informants in perspective let me remind the reader that coffee had been planted in only three trial plots in Muli and approximately six other plots in nearby clan areas during the original 1962 patrol. Even assuming some spread through local exchanges (the Administration planted no more), very few people were growing Kewabe coffee in 1965. We should not envision mass uprootings by hundreds of growers.

10 Hunter estimated per capita income in the Kewabe during this period. From roadwork and other government labor, mission employment, vegetable sales in Ialibu, and minimal coffee sales from trial plots, he calculates an approximate total income to the division of AS8550. This yielded an

average per capita income of A\$1.23 over the entire Kewabe population.

Chapter 3

Muli's Pre-Capitalist Mode of Production

In June, 1980, Brigitte Krause and I entered Muli Census Division. Shortly after settling in among Muli Ekerepa, we conducted a survey of all households in Muli. One of the dimensions of local life we attempted to explore with this early survey was the array of material production activities in which each household was engaged. Certain problems with the survey process yielded less precise data than we would have liked regarding current activities. We could, nonetheless, derive the following summary about past and present household activities.

The survey process yielded one hundred eight completed responses from "Muli Ekerepa Households." Of the households surveyed, the following number were currently engaged in, or had at one time engaged in, each of the following activities:

Table 1: Past and Present Economic Involvements of Muli Households

<u>Activity</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Food Production	107	99
Sweet Potato	107	99
Greens	107	99
Pitpit (Edible grass)	107	99
Sugar Cane	107	99
Banana	106	98
Taro (Ma or "Chinese")	104	96
Onion	17	16
Cabbage	14	13
European Potatoes	3	3
Corn	3	3
Pumpkin	3	3
Lettuce	2	2
Beans	2	2
Cucumber	2	2
Tomato	2	2
Pineapple	1	1

<u>Activity</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Animal Husbandry	102	94
Pigs	102	94
Poultry	64	59
Cows	31	29
Sheep	5	5
Fish	2	2
Coffee Growing	96	88
Plantation Labor	79	73
Local Market Sales	78	72
Trade Store Ownership	49	45
Roadwork for Public Works Dept.	49	45
Miscellaneous Wage Labor	38	35
Vehicle Ownership or "Stock" Holding	4	4
Catechist/Minister	3	3
Government Professional Positions	3	3
Local Government Positions	2	2

Before we move on, a few comments need to be made about some of these figures. One informant, an elderly man who has a house alone but lives in the immediate vicinity of his sons, reported having no gardens. He focused only on the present (as we had hoped all respondents would). As this survey was of a highly preliminary nature, I see no reason to quibble over whether this man who sleeps alone but eats with his children constitutes a "household." What is clear in looking at the food production data is that certain crops are staples grown by "all" gardeners. Other crops are reportedly being grown in far fewer gardens.

The Animal Husbandry responses clearly conflate past and present activities. Thirty-one households responded that they had cows, but we observed no cows in Muli upon our arrival. Five had sheep, but, again, there were no Ekerepa-owned sheep upon our arrival. Fish and much of the poultry were also parts of history. Poultry does remain a part of current resources of many households, but by no means fifty nine percent. While pigs were ubiquitous, I do not know how many households were currently holding pigs at the time of our survey.

Coffee growing reflects current holdings. Coffee has only very recently been widely accepted in Muli (see Chapter 2). All of the other categories, save the last, combine past and present activities. The current (1980) Local Government Councilor (of whom there have been at least two others) and Village Court Magistrate (the one and only) account for the local government positions reported.

Virtually every Muli Ekerepa household produces food in its own gardens. Most households at least have had pigs. Most grow coffee currently, and have sent at least one worker off to plantations for a time, sold produce at the local market, and owned poultry. A significant portion of the population has owned a trade store, worked for the Public Works Department (now Works and Supply) as temporary wage laborer on road maintenance crews, or held some other wage labor position for some period of time.

Production in Muli includes a mix of self-produced gardening for consumption, smallholder cash-cropping, animal rearing for consumption, for sales, and for ceremonial exchange purposes, and migrant and local wage labor. But gardening is the heart of production in Muli. A person may perform labor for wages, but those wages have not purchased the land on which his or her house stands, nor do they purchase the bulk of the food eaten by the household. In a brief consumption survey, kaukau ("sweet potato"--TP) was reported eaten on 92% of the person-days¹ reported. No other food was reported eaten on more than 34% of person-days. Of the kaukau supplied to households, 98% were produced in the gardens of the consuming households, 2% was purchased at the market or from the garden of another household. A full 69% of the surveyed household supply

of foods came from household direct self-production, as measured in monetary value equivalents (a very conservative measure, given the relatively low cost of household-produced foods compared to the relatively high cost of imports such as tinned fish and tinned meat).

A person may build and run a tradestore, but the land on which all Muli Ekerepa stores have been built was obtained through manipulation of the land tenure system allocating garden and bush lands, not through rent or cash purchase of the land. Despite a colonial and national policy promoting the development of a cash economy, and especially a peasant or smallholder farmer economy, local production is not dominated by the use of its products as commodities. We shall see, in Chapter 4, that cash-cropping is as yet poorly developed in Muli. Market sales of garden products yield an average combined household income of approximately 30t weekly, while households consumed foods valued approximately K12.00 weekly at prevailing local prices (69% of which was supplied through household production, or approximately K8.00, far outweighing use for commodity sales). Even in the world of cash, a person may sell vegetable produce, work for wages, or raise cash crops, but the bulk of money flowing into local hands is not derived from these sources (see Chapter 4).

In gardening, we see the form of social production relations which color all other activities in Muli. It is necessary that we sketch this mode of production before we move on to consider Muli's response to government initiatives for development.

Gardening in Muli

While gardens without kaukau do exist in Muli, normally referred to as "bush gardens" (raa maapu--K) the paradigm case of gardening in Muli

is the process of making kaukau gardens. In the following discussion, my aim is to characterize the technical organization of garden production-- the forces of production --and the social relations of production within which gardening takes place. I will, therefore, restrict the discussion to gardening in mondo maapu (K) or kaukau gardens. The "typical" characterization presented has been derived primarily from descriptions by informants of their decision-making and work processes. Each attempt simply to observe an extended gardening session invariably ended the session in favor of spending time with the local European couple. All casual checks of garden areas we frequented were consistent with the descriptions by informants.

A striking feature of Muli gardens is their reported length of use, and the infrequency with which an entirely new garden needs to be made. During my garden survey, I observed gardens which were described to me as having been in use for as much as 30 years. This clearly needs to be better defined, and I shall do so in more detail below. Suffice it to say here that "in use" includes periods of fallow for parts of an active garden while other parts are under current production. The estimated length of time particular gardens had been in continuous use varied widely. The number of gardens currently in use varies among families, as well. The discussion which follows abstracts the typical processes of gardening in one garden.

The life of a garden in Muli begins with the decision to create it. It was generally agreed by our informants that the decision to make a new garden is a mutual decision between husband and wife (or wives). There are two primary factors motivating the decision to clear a new garden.

The most often mentioned was "declining quality of kaukau" being produced in existing gardens. When only pipia kaukau ("rubbish sweet potatoes"--TP) are being produced, it is deemed time to make new gardens and to allow the old one to rest. The second factor, mentioned only once, but in accord with the estimated time of planting of many of the gardens I saw, is the ceremonial cycle. When a large pig kill is anticipated, garden produce is required both to support the increased pig population and to feed the people who will come for the festivities. New gardens are made to handle the increased demand for produce, and can then be used for years thereafter.

The decision about garden location, too, is discussed by the couple. Either one of the pair may have noted a particularly inviting area of un--cleared land during their daily activities. Considerations about location include such factors as proximity to the family's house and to other currently active family gardens, and the location of active gardens belonging to other Ekerepa families. In this regard, one man reported changing his mind recently about a planned garden site near the River Ialo border of Ekerepa land. He was told by others to avoid this area because there were currently no other Ekerepa gardens there. The land was considered to be too close to birua ("enemy"--K) land. This could lead to two problems. A man working alone near enemy land may be more easily poisoned (through sorcery) by his enemies. The second problem is a consequence of the first. A man working alone near enemy territory "em i wokim pret" (he works afraid--TP). He is constantly looking up, fearful that his enemies are approaching, watchful. Distracted in this manner, he will not attend properly to his work, and may cut his leg with his ax or bush knife. The man in question eventually cleared an old garden used by his father, well inside Ekerepa territory.

When the decision about location of a garden has been made, it is up to the man to begin the process of making it. Ideally, he clears the bush along the borders of his proposed garden, sharpens cane grass (pitpit) sticks and uses them to fence off the area (guarding against the intrusion of pigs). He then turns to clearing the land inside the fence, cutting down trees and pitpit stands, digging out roots, burning all of the rubbish. The garden is then ready for the woman to take over. In practice, I saw few gardens with fences in Muli. Most of the gardens reportedly cleared in recent years were cleared in land covered by kunai grass ("sword grass"--TP), rather than forest. Informants consistently estimated that the process of clearing a kunai-covered garden required approximately 2½ to 3 months--two weeks to cut down the grass, and two months to remove the roots. All of this refuse is burned after it has dried.

The work of clearing a garden is normally performed alone, or by the brothers whose wives will share the cleared area for gardening. "Communal labor" in the sense of large parties of clansmen clearing several garden areas simply never existed in Muli gardening practices, in the memory of our informants. Yana Maita, one of the oldest living members of the clan, reported having cleared only one garden cooperatively in his lifetime--this done under the orders and direction of an Australian kiap in about 1969 or 1970 during a taim hanori ("hungry time"--TP; a period of low production in gardens. In this instance, the kiaps excused Ekerepa from roadwork for a time, and required clearing of new gardens.). "This was the first time I ever worked a garden together with other men." The actual allocation of laborers to garden clearing follows closely the principles of land tenure, to be considered below.

"Then it is time for the women." After the garden site is cleared and the rubbish burned, it is time for breaking ground, building kaukau mounds, and planting the garden. As sweet potatoes, or kaukau, are the primary crop in Muli, I will discuss the process of caring for kaukau at somewhat greater length than that of other crops to be described below. The whole process of planting, harvesting, and deciding to make new gardens was nicely summarized in a conversation with one Muli couple, Moke Okane and his wife, Melenyu:

Melenyu: Just dig, dig, dig, and plant the vines in the mountains. Then leave them to begin to grow. Then take some little kaukau out to make room for the big ones, and take some of the leaves for new mountains. Then leave the big ones in until the leaves begin to turn yellow.

DB: How do you know when to take out the little ones?

Moke: We counted the months by watching the moon. When three months were passed, we looked to see if little ones were there.

Melenyu: After the big kaukau are out, just replant the stems and more will grow. I can keep finding kaukau here where we sit even though I have already harvested here. I keep doing this (replanting the vine stems and reharvesting the mound) until grass grows up in the mounds. When there is enough grass to make a new mound, I turn the ground and make new ones. Sometimes if there is not enough grass, I bring some from somewhere else. Then the whole thing starts over again.

DB: How do you decide when to leave a garden and make a new one?

Melenyu: When the kaukau from a garden is small and black, the soil is no good. We leave the garden and look for new bush to clear.

Moke: When I have plenty of small piglets I make a new garden and feed the potatoes to us and the pigs. ... When there's good weather I clear the bush, burn it, leave it to dry, burn it again, then take out the pitpit roots and break up the ground. Then we make new kaukau mounds. The main time we make new gardens is when we have to make a long house. We will need plenty of kaukau, bananas, and other food to feed people on the many times for bringing posts, kunai, for the dances, etc. Then, if the new garden is not too dried out, we have new gardens to use. Each man makes his own garden. Everytime someone in your own line makes new gardens (for

long house construction) and you will bring food to help them, you make new gardens. ... I made this garden when we built the long house in Yaimaita (1977). Now I won't clear whole new areas. I'll just re-use the old places in which grass has come up. I'm too old to make a whole new garden.

A newly cleared garden begins with a woman. "Dig, dig, dig." Using a sharpened stick, or a worn and broken metal spade, a woman works on her knees to break the ground, scoops it with her hands into a mound (in Muli, mounds average six to nine feet in diameter, one to one and a half feet high in the center). She brings kaukau vines from another garden and plants them--a single mound receiving about seven cuttings, each about three feet long. A hard working woman usually completes at least five mounds in a day's gardening.

"When I'm strong I can work 10, 15, maybe 20 mounds in a day. But we don't usually work so quickly. We take breaks, and make five to ten mounds in a day" (Pupuyame, wife of Rawala, 1 April 81).

As kaukau is planted, a variety of other plants may also be included in the garden--a variety of greens, although by far the dominant green is named raani in Kewa (identified by Franklin as a member of the family Acanthaceae--1978:209), pitpit sugar cane, banana, are the most common in Muli kaukau gardens. When a new garden is created, all crops are planted at the same time. There is no attempt to time plantings for simultaneous maturity. After a first planting, the garden is left to grow. When asked how one knew when to return to begin harvesting, most informants described the appearance of the vines on the mound. When the leaves begin to turn yellow or the vine stem comes out of the ground, there would be kaukau developing, although still small. Women, said one man, look at the kaukau to know when to begin harvesting. They do not

think about how long the crop has been growing (women's accounts did not contradict his generalization). Men count months, by watching the moon. By either system, it was generally agreed that it takes a minimum of three months for small but edible kaukau to be present in the mound. By the end of six months, if there is nothing wrong with the ground there will be good, big kaukau. The harvest begins by removing a few kaukau from each mound. The harvester, generally a woman, works her way across a garden on a daily basis, harvesting sufficient quantity for the evening meal and the following morning meal, plus whatever pig supply is required. When she has completed a pass through the garden, she can begin again, finding more mature, larger kaukau. Many, but not all, of our informants reported that upon each harvesting from a mound, the vine stem is reinserted into the ground and that it will eventually produce another potato. This, of course, reduces the work required in re-turning and replanting mounds. Others choose not to exhaust the soil in such a manner, and simply harvest the garden, without stem replanting, then allow grass to grow over the mound.

A good garden provides food for approximately six to nine months from a single turning and planting of the mounds (varying based on size of garden, size of family, number of pigs). While one garden matures and comes into harvest, a hard-working "good" woman will continue to make new mounds in another garden area or another section of the same large garden area. The new area is typically one which has been used before. There are old mounds standing, covered with grass. These mounds are not empty of food. There are invariably pipia kaukau (so judged due to their small size) remaining in a mound after it has been harvested. These potatoes

are harvested when the mound is re-turned and replanted. The grass is pulled from the mound and laid in the center of a new mound site, allowed to dry, then covered with the dirt of the old mounds to form a composted new mound. I asked how a woman decided the number of mounds to make in a garden. The response was:

"When we look at this garden, there are mounds there. When I make new ones, I'll use the space between the mounds as the place for a new mound. All of us usually do it that way." (Pupuyame, 1 April 81).

The process of planting and harvesting kaukau can go on indefinitely. There are no "growing" seasons in Muli. All generally conceded that there was no reason, barring drought or frost, for any family to be without large kaukau at any time, if the family is industrious about clearing new gardens and continually planting new mounds. It seems, however, that the groups of the region, Muli included, have chosen a lifestyle into which is built a period of relative inactivity in gardening. When a garden holds many large kaukau, the incentive to continue planting is reduced. In many households, reportedly, production simply stops for a time. This results in a following period in which the large kaukau have been exhausted in the family gardens, and only the pipia kaukau referred to above remain. This period of time has come to be referred to locally as a taim hangri or rea ("hungry"--K)--a period of hunger. During such a time there is food--and kaukau specifically--available. One is said to be "hungry" because one spends so much time in the gardens looking through old mounds for small potatoes. I have been told by Muli residents that such a taim hangri occurs almost every year. Patrol reports from throughout the colonial period bear out the claim that the pattern holds for the entire district--Imbong'gu as well as Kewabe (see, e.g., Markwell

1961; Gari 1965; Sisley 1967; Tozer 1969; Kelly 1970; Probert 1971).

Yana Maita explained the pre-colonial consequences of such a pattern:

The persons who created this land, Kanda Sambo and Kanda Kape, said that sometimes there would be a period of hunger. They did not say why. But they said that we should not take any rest, that we should always be making new gardens so that a hangri would not come. But we did not follow his rules. We had these kaukau a long time. We thought they were trying to escape us. ... If I keep on making new gardens, the kaukau will come back. ... When I was a small boy the first hangri (that I experienced) came. My father said they came before too. Then lots of people really "died," and some of their bodies came off, because they did not have food. Then we fought others for food. When a hangri came, we fought others away. While we got food from their gardens we made new gardens and had enough to eat while our gardens grew up. (30 Jan 81)

Hangri, in the past, was an incentive for warfare and new planting. In the present, it is, for at least some, the spur which motivates an end to inactivity, a renewed effort in gardening. According to one local man, the pipia kaukau left in old mounds:

are the incentive for turning the ground. If we don't have kaukau (i.e., no large kaukau) then the wife goes to a place where there are still pipia and turns the ground. She brings home the pipia to eat, and at the same time builds new mounds. When we clear bush, we are really making new gardens. Turning the ground of old mounds is only looking for pipia kaukau.

Looking for pipia kaukau begin the cycle of planting kaukau anew.

As I noted above, when kaukau mounds are newly planted, several other garden crops are normally planted simultaneously. I will discuss briefly several of the most common crops planted, and their process of production. As a woman plants new kaukau vines, she will normally also plant "short pitpit" (pandi in Kewa, Setaria palmaefolia varieties,

sometimes referred to as "highlands asparagus") and greens (again, raani being most common). The process of planting these two crops is quite simple. Pitpit grows with branches shooting out from a main stem. To plant a new garden, one needs only to break off branches from plants in an old garden and stick them, broken end first, into the ground, jutting an inch or so into the new mound. Raani grows in clumps, from which a few sprigs can be plucked (leaving roots in the ground) and planted as a group into a new mound. From this little cluster a full and thriving clump of growth, perhaps a foot in diameter, will result. Both of these plants are readily available, easily planted, and continuous producers. They mature before kaukau and continue to produce after kaukau has been exhausted. The process of harvesting pitpit is just as simple--break off the desired number of branches (each about 8" long) at the same time as gathering the days kaukau. Raani, too, can be picked daily, but the process is said by all to be much more tedious. Raani is a short plant with small stems, like clover. Each stem must be plucked separately, taking care to leave the roots in the ground to regenerate. This work requires a lot of bending and work on hands and knees. This is one of the reasons given for what is reported to be the declining amount of raani in local gardens. People are "tired of" picking raani. They know that it can be bought for 10t at the twice weekly market, if they so desire (although most must not desire, as no one makes much money selling raani). Many people say that they simply will not eat raani any longer, unless they have fish or meat or minimally drippings with which to eat it--all available to local tradestores. Some people reported eating raani every day. Others said that they had grown les ("tired of"--TP) of raani.

Men, too, have some usual planting tasks as a new garden is planted. Sugar cane, banana trees, pandanus trees are all planted immediately (and continuing later for the trees, as the shoots become available, or as the spirit moves the planter). As sugar cane matures, it is supported by a stick, its leaves bound together with a vine. As it outgrows the binding, it is again covered and bound. It is harvested on demand, sufficient stalks for those "drinking" being cut with a bush knife, trimmed of leaves, and eaten. Banana and pandanus shoots come from already mature trees. They are planted usually along the fringes of gardens. When bananas mature and develop fruit, it is a man's job to cover the bunch of bananas with leaves and tie it shut. One man explained that this process "makes it hot inside and the bananas swell up and try to break the cover." Pandanus trees require no special care after planting, and require several years before they begin to bear fruit.

Taro (two varieties) and "long pitpit" or alamo (K) are also "men's crops." Alamo is a larger version of pandi, far less common in Muli gardens. Its planting process is similar. Some men complained that they had no starter plant, thus had no alamo. Others, but few that I surveyed, had a minimal supply. Taro is of two sorts, known locally as maa (K) and taro (TP,K) (the latter also referred to as "Chinese taro"). The indigenous variety, maa, is originally sprouted in water. The sprout will carry one taro root. This root can be harvested and the stem and leaf replanted to produce another root (simply by sticking the stem into the ground). Such replantings can be done indefinitely. Chinese taro produces a base root from which

several bulbous roots shoot off. These are the edible portion. When all of these secondary roots are eaten, a stem from one is replanted. It develops a central base root, and the process begins again (and the original base also is busy regenerating edible roots, as well).

Rather than extend this description of various garden crops, let me generalize the points most important in the context of this discussion. The organization of labor for each step in the gardening process could hardly be simpler, or less socialized. A two person production team decides when and where to establish a new garden. One of the team goes off alone and performs the initial tasks. This team member informs the other when the preparatory tasks are completed, and member two takes over, performing the tasks individually, as well. Each physical work process is performed individually. The day to day decisions about planting and harvesting are made by a single person except in unusual circumstances, when both team members may discuss planting and harvest needs.

The production team is normally constituted by a married couple-- a man and a woman. Tasks are divided by gender, usually following the stated local norms. Women, it is said, usually plant kaukau, pandi, greens, beans, corn and other European-introduced vegetables. Men usually plant sugar cane, maa, Chinese taro, banana trees, alamo, pandanus and all other tree crops. I was assured that these are norms based on knowledge and habit learned in childhood by accompanying same-sex parents in their daily activities.

"Men can't dig the kaukau. A man's back hurts when he does it. Its our custom from our ancestors that women do it. A woman's back doesn't hurt because she has been carrying kaukau since she was little. It will not hurt her" (Rimba, 20 Feb 81).

A man can plant kaukau (and some do); a woman can plant taro (and some do), if each knows how to do it, and has access to the supply of shoots. The exception to this ability to violate the customary gender pattern is in the planting of trees. Only men are to plant trees. The reasons are tied to the role played by trees in legitimating land claims. This will be elaborated below.

The process of production in gardening, then, requires two laborers, normally teamed by marriage, performing gender assigned roles on land made available to this production team. Decisions about the management of particular crops in the garden are made by the planter, who is said to be the owner or "base person" (reali or rewinya in Kewa, re--"base," ali--"man," winya--"woman"; as man or as meri in Tok pisin) of that crop. This brings us to consideration of the social relations by which production is organized.

The reali or rewinya of a plant is the person who plants and cares for it. The underlying principle expressed to me by one informant is that the person who performs the most work in producing the crop is the re-person of the crop, the person who controls the crop's dispersal. This man presented the example of sugar cane in his family gardens:

"My wife plants the sugar cane. But I (not my wife) go to the bush to cut posts, cut bush rope, get a tree to stand on while tying up the sugar cane, and do the tying. Its my sugar cane because I do more work. The kaukau is my wife's. Women usually work the things with leaves" (Petros Yana, 2 Feb 81).

Another informant explained that it is only the planter who knows what segment of a crop is planned for use in family consumption, or market sales, or ceremonial occasion.

"If a man has made a garden and not told his wife where these areas are, she generally will not harvest the kaukau because she fears that she will take from the wrong place and he will be cross. If, however, he has shown her the divisions, she can go harvest them without fear that she will disturb the plan. Of course, it is usually the women who do these things" (Loale, 16 Dec 80).

Be the underlying principles and explanations what they may, the rule stands.

"Its my sugar cane. My wife cannot take it without my permission."

"The sugar cane is mine to harvest. The kaukau belongs to my wife."

"My son (a small boy--DB) planted onions. He is the reali of these onions. If I want to eat one, but he cries, I will not eat it. No good that I block his desires."

Decisions in the Village Court, part of the introduced legal system, reflect the customary law. If a person has planted a crop on land to which he has no rights, the land owner (su reali "ground base man"--K) may remove the crop, but he must compensate the planter for the loss of the crop, as well. There are many social obligations which strongly affect food and planting decisions. A planter who failed to make appropriate harvest and distribution decisions would be the object of suspicion, anger, ridicule. A husband would probably feel free to raid his wife's kaukau garden if she flatly refused to bring him food. Nonetheless, the principle is generally applicable that the planter makes the decisions and owns the crop. Harvested crops may be consumed by the planter, shared with household members or other friends or relatives, given to clansmen and affines who help the planter's family in some stage of preparation for ceremonial activity, given to persons participating in

ceremonial exchange events, and nowadays they can be sold or exchanged for other goods at market. It should be noted that in the latter case of direct exchange of harvested goods at market, quantities are normally exchanged in ratios determined by the standardized monetary values of the goods at the local market.

On the whole, in day-to-day activities, the principle that "the producer owns the product" guides Muli Ekerepa material production. We need to consider a few limiting instances, all related to gender and control within the production team:

(1) The normal team, a married couple, produces a garden area, and within that area, several crops. As I've said, the producer of each individual crop is normally said to own it and to have power of distribution over it. No one would harvest a crop without clear permission and direction from the producer. One male informant stated flatly that one crop is different, kaukau. Should his wife for any reason fail to provide a man his daily kaukau, he has the right to go harvest his own meals. Other men suggested that such behavior on the part of a wife would warrant beating her.

(2) Unharvested crops can be sold in Muli. After planting is completed, a segment of a garden's produce, or even the whole of the crop, can be bought from its owner/producer. Informants assure me that this was a pre-colonial customary practice, in which the "fee" was a shell, pig, or other valuable. The buyer gained rights to the crop currently in production, and was responsible for providing the labor for harvest. Nothing new could be planted by the buyer, and upon exhaustion of the present crop, the garden reverted to use by the planter of the crop.

Recent year sales of such in-garden crops yielded Muli informants (the sellers) pigs, mother-of-pearl shells (kina--TP or rekere--Kewa) and money ranging from K10 to K110. The most commonly purchased crop is kaukau, and it is not uncommon that only the kaukau is purchased, while sugar cane, pandi, and other crops are to go unharvested by the purchaser. Kaukau is planted by women, worked by women. But it is most often reported that the husband received the proceeds of such a sale.

(3) Another limiting case, women's role in exchange, and especially in the ownership of pigs, clearly attended to by women but invariably "owned" by men, has been adequately summarized in a recent article by Josephides (1983) regarding Sugu Valley Kewa of the Kagua District, southwest of Muli (see also M.Strathern 1972:47-48; A.Strathern 1979:532 re: men's control of the exchange sphere; cf. Modjeska's excellent discussion of pigs, production and inequality in Highlands society--1982). In Muli, too, while all recognize the role of women in production of pigs, the product is not ultimately controlled by these female producers.

Control of the product in each of the instances referred to above remains within the household, and within the production team. Husband controls the product of wife. There are no equivalent contexts within which wife controls the product of husband. Women are dominated by their husbands, particularly through control of exchange. This domination could extend to the harvesting of greens, grass for skirts, etc. in practice males do not find reason to do so. But when a male is sufficiently concerned, he has the power to step in and to interfere with his wife's control of her products. Among Muli Ekerepa males, there was no doubt that this control is legitimated by the payment of bridewealth.

Women are "bought" (or "paid for") in marriage through this institution.

One informant suggested:

"Mipela baim meri long kalabusim em" (We pay for women in order to jail them--TP). We buy them to work in the garden, to have children, and to bring food. If a man wishes, he can kill his wife."

This informant stated the rights of the male in the extreme--the right to kill his wife with impunity. Such an attitude is reflective of reported past practice. One Muli man is said to have killed two wives. Wives could be beaten for seeming to be too lazy. A common report today has it that men are less demanding of women than they used to be. A patrol report suggested that a new system of legal recourse was instrumental in easing the pressures:

"Female emancipation is high and excited by the fact that whereas before the administration the husband was entitled in customary law to give his wife a thorough thrashing for any misconduct, he is now tied through local women having a tendency to lay assault complaints before a court at the slightest provocation by the male" (Creedy 1966).

But, as per the "kalabusim" ("to jail"--TP) comment cited above, while the demands and punishments may have eased, the structural relations of dominance have not been essentially altered. Men can control the "production quota" and dispersion of the products of women, and their claim to legitimacy is bridewealth--the "purchase" of women through marriage.

That women are seen as the object of men's control is further demonstrated by the idiom oft repeated that "daughters are our business." Men speak of the need to recoup the pay given for their own wives. Pay received for sisters and daughters is the only pay counted against the

debit in this idiom. But no Muli informant ever spoke to me of how much he had to make to cover his earlier investment. Maximizing one's receipts was the clear desire. "We have no other business here" explained one man, "our daughters are our coffee trees (nana repona kopi--K). Men spoke of the need to ensure that daughters accompanied their mothers to the gardens, so that they would learn gardening and so that others would see that their daughters were hard workers. A daughter should not be known as a regular frequenter of socials held in the six-to-six (dusk to dawn) social halls which have existed from time to time in the area (post-colonial entry). The point of these normative principles is to drive the value of one's daughter higher to raise the pay one can demand for her services in marriage.

In the ideal normative world constructed by Muli male informants, no woman can choose simply to affiliate herself with another group and go there to live with a man. Appropriate gifts must change hands. This ideal is violated frequently now, as women gain a freedom of movement unknown in pre-colonial days. But the grumbling heard within Muli when such a woman came to Muli, the moralizing statements that goods would have to be sent in exchange for this woman in order to do what is right, and to preserve the clan's name, made clear that women are to be traded, and exchange ties are to be established between men through marriages. Obtaining a wife free might seem to be to the individual male's immediate benefit. But the males' moralizing made clear their awareness of threat to the larger system if such short-term benefits are accepted. The goods offered are usually of less value in these instances, but there should be goods sent. Only through such exchange does one maintain

the legitimacy of ties between the men concerned, and thus the legitimacy of one's claim to control the work and offspring of the woman in question.

Production in Muli gardens is organized in highly individualized technical tasks. Individual men and women produce individual products. In daily activities, the principle of ownership by the producer is generally upheld. But we see in the above discussion that in Muli, the "producer" in question is normatively a male-headed household, rather than individual workers. Women join these households through marriage, and can leave them through divorce. The male, and the household which can be formed around him, are the constants in production, and the ultimate controller of the production team's products. Josephides summarizes the point regarding Kewa females:

"Thus, notwithstanding claims that certain items, in accordance with gender ideology, belong to women, women can never really hold fast to any of them. For all that women consider that they have the same rights as men and lay claims to their products and strive to control their lives; for all that there is an ideology that accords value to each individual; the unavoidable conclusion is that when it comes to very basic issues the fact that women are considered sojourners both in their natal and their marital home weakens their claims. ... A husband and wife appear to have equal rights to their joint income (although her input may be greater), but if they separate she forfeits her investment" (1983:300).

In order to form his production team, a man marries. He pays bridewealth for his bride to her line, and receives in return gifts of pigs, shells and other valuables, including a wife. In the single instance of a public bridewealth payment during our fieldwork, one Muli informant counted and summarized to us that Ekerepa was giving ten pigs (and other items) to the bride's line, and that "six pigs and the woman makes seven" were being returned. In the act of marrying, women are ritually

objectified, passed along as property. But no one mistakes a woman (and wife) for an ordinary piece of personal property. She becomes part of a production team, a family unit, and can conceivably exercise her right to dissolve that team through divorce. Marriage is not a "purchase" once made and completed. The exchange of bridewealth is the first of a lifelong series of exchanges between men affinally related. In the words of one informant, "we don't pay for a wife once, we pay for her many times through her life. We don't finish paying for her until she is very old." These exchanges, once begun, have a momentum and social weight of their own. There are obligations to fulfill, social status to be maintained or gained. The mode of recruiting the production team, marriage, establishes a relationship of dominance/subordination between team members, husband and wife. It at the same time establishes a social process between production units which in part determines the ability of the production unit to remain in existence. Failure to maintain the lifelong series of payments to the wife's line is likely to result in pressure from that line upon her to leave the team, to divorce her husband and return home to seek a more socially responsible marriage partner. Failure to continue payments, too, may cause one to run afoul of the ancestral spirits of one's wife, threatening the health of one's children. Maintaining the lifelong series of payments maintains a social relationship between men of two clans which can be exploited for support for other purposes. We'll see in Chapter 4 that the maintenance of marriage-based exchange ties is important in providing access to the fruits of the modern world, cash, commodities, and support in business.

We have established here that the basic unit of production is a "household"--man and wife (or wives, with the husband the focal point of analytically distinguishable household production units)--working within a set of social relations which determine the male as dominant within the production team, and within social relations which in themselves require continuing productive activities in the domain of ceremonial exchange in order to maintain the existence of the household. There is another major set of social relations of production which must be considered. I turn now to the relations determining a production team's access to the means of production--principally land--the Muli system of land tenure and the social relations inherent therein.

Land Tenure Among Muli Ekerepa

In the following discussion, I will look separately at the two classes of labor team members, men and women, and will consider their access to the primary means of production within the Muli system of gardening--land. In discussing land tenure, I will have recourse to two primary types of data, stated cultural norms and oral history. As elsewhere in the Highlands (cf. A.Strathern 1974), no account of Muli's land situation would be adequate considering either sort of data alone. The case of women can be dealt with more briefly, and will be considered first.

Women are destined to spend their lives working in someone else's garden. As a child, a woman works with her mother in gardens made by her father (or brothers, or father's brother...). She is expected to continue to do so until her marriage, at which time she moves to the land of her husband and begins to work his gardens. Should she leave her husband and

return to her home land, she will be shown a place to work in a garden made by her father or brothers. A woman's access to land is always mediated through a man. This is the ideally stated case in Muli, to which there is only a single potential exception (to be discussed below).

Women of the clan suffer from the fact that they do not "make" gardens. They are not allocated land in their own names. Throughout their lives, women retain a usufructory right to their natal clan land, so long as they can establish their relationship to brothers in the clan. They also have a right to be shown land by a husband--land that they alone will work. Failure to receive such an allocation is sufficient grounds for divorce. During a lifetime of gardening a husband's land, a woman establishes local recognition of her rights to the land and its (her) produce. Upon the death of her husband, a woman who has lived and worked for a long time with the clan will retain her right to garden "her" gardens--those shown her by her husband. A woman who remarries within the clan may retain access to the gardens made by her deceased husband as well as obtaining newly allocated gardens on the land of her new husband. But let a woman divorce and leave the clan, and the limits of her rights or ownership become apparent (as per Josephides, above). She goes elsewhere, and begins anew.

A woman cannot sell land, give it away, or pass it on in inheritance to children. A woman must be allocated land sufficient to provide for the needs of her children and herself. But the allocator of the land, a male, retains his own rights to the land. It is men who are the dominant persons in land tenure. It is they who control access to land. We turn to their consideration.

As children, boys own no land. They are expected to help their fathers on the fathers' land--gathering firewood, clearing gardens, planting and caring for men's garden crops. What distinguishes male children from female children (with regard to land tenure) is that at a time deemed appropriate by some adult male, the male child will be given land of his own. The appropriate time is usually upon marriage, or as the boy approaches marriageable age. Theoretically, a boy could enter new uncleared, unclaimed bush and claim his own land by clearing it. He who first enters such a bush area is said to have gardening rights to it. In practice, all Muli Ekerepa land has been parcelled out for at least two generations. By far the most common mode of land acquisition for the young men of Muli now coming of age is through patrilateral gift or inheritance (see below). All male Muli Ekerepa children have a right to receive a parcel of land as they enter adulthood. This right is voiced by clansmen even of those children born to Muli Ekerepa fathers but raised among some other clan. It is said that if these children come to Muli to live as they become old enough to choose, they will be given land of their own.

All members of Muli Ekerepa, man, woman, and child, all married-in females, and all non-Ekerepa men who have moved into Muli at local invitation and are co-resident--all of these people have certain direct use rights to all Muli Ekerepa land. It is stated ideally that these persons may hunt, fish, gather wild bush produce, cut firewood anywhere on Muli Ekerepa land. Should any individual exercise these rights, no one would attempt to stop them. Several informants did report that under normal circumstances one should and would restrict one's activities to areas

usually frequented. If there is a good reason to act out of the ordinary, social caution makes it sensible to inform the reali of the land area to be entered. While it is one's right to go anywhere on clan land, if one enters land not usually used, and if the owner of that land becomes sick or dies, one is likely to be the primary suspect of sorcery accusations. This will most likely result in one's paying compensation payments or being the target of retribution or both. The right to free access to all clan land has certain social limitations.

The man who is allocated a plot of land as his own cannot restrict the use rights referred to above. He does, however, gain further rights which are his alone. He is marked as the reali of the ground. He may mark wild trees for his own future use as firewood. He may take trees so marked by others (if on his land). He has veto power over any planned communal use of his land such as establishing a cattle project or building a store to be financed by some subset of the clan. He has the sole right to plant trees on this land. Only he may clear bush and make gardens on his land. Only he has the authority to grant these rights to anyone else on his own land.

These are all rights granted to a man upon allocation of land. It is important to note that failure to exercise one's rights in land invites encroachment by others. In fact, use of land creates strong rights whether or not they were originally allocated in a fashion deemed socially legitimate. One informant went so far as to say that the only way that a man could truly mark a segment of land as his alone is to make a garden on it. The holder of ungardened land is subject to social pressures by fellow clansmen to allow them to include the land in their own

projects, or perhaps to allow them to establish a temporary garden on unused land. But use by another in this fashion creates a strong counter-claim to ownership. Once a house or store is built on another's land with his approval (whether explicit or tacit in his failure to voice immediate opposition), he will be hard pressed to get it removed against the user's will, and then only at the cost of high compensation for removal of the building. Once someone has cleared and planted a garden on another's land, he will invariably claim the land as his own, and if refuted in court, will be awarded compensation for the loss of all of his developmental efforts. Despite the claimed existence of intro-clan usufruct in gardening, the local village court magistrate (and recognized bigman of the clan) warned one clansman that if he received even the smallest payment in exchange for land-use from another member of the clan, he would almost certainly have sold his land, lost it permanently. By using his land, and by exercising his authority to prevent others from building or gardening on it, a man protects his unique claims over his parcel.

Once a man has made a garden on a plot of land, it is deemed to be his land, whether he continues to use the garden or allows the land to lie fallow. The importance of planting trees is manifested in the latter case. When a plot lies fallow for many years, bush growth becomes quite heavy. After several years of disuse, someone else may claim that he is the land's reali, and try to garden the land (if he gardens successfully, he strengthens his initial claim). The true reali of the land has the sole right to plant trees on the land, and he is expected to do so. Proof that land is one's own, against the claims of another, resides in the

ability to point to trees in the plot and to recount the details of their planting or of their inheritance. Here, too, is another factor in the importance of use of one's land. When an area of land is left unused, rarely entered by the reali, an often reported tactic used to steal the land away from him is to plant trees in a secluded area, and to return several years later to point them out and claim the land. A man actively using his land is more likely to encounter the intruding trees and to have them removed before such a claim can be made (he must call the intrusion to the attention of the clan before uprooting the trees, if he wishes to avoid having to compensate the planter for the loss of his trees). This tactic reportedly occurred commonly enough in the past that there now exists a Local Government Council ordinance banning the planting of trees on the land of another. Planting trees, then, is an important activity in holding one's means of production. The fact that such planting is men's work is another aspect of the ideological maintenance of male dominance of the labor team.

"If we hadn't planted trees before, no one would know whose land an abandoned garden is. We plant them to mark ground. That is not a woman's work in our custom."

"Women just don't do it. Their mother's don't know and don't usually teach them. Fathers show boys all about it. When you plant a tree it has your name. Trees, pandanus, tanget (cordy-line), will prevent the ground from coming up bush altogether. You must tell your children about your trees. They will witness later that it is your ground."

A man establishes his singular dominance of a piece of land by gardening it and by planting trees on it. As reali, he controls access to that land. It is his right, too, to pass on this set of rights to others. Let us turn to the channels through which an individual gains access to land in Muli.

Inheritance of land in Muli tends to be through direct gift from ego's father or father's brother. In the ideal case, father will, at the time of marriage by his son, mark off part of his own holdings, including developed gardens, and give that portion to the newly married son. As each son comes of age, he, too, is allocated a portion of garden, until there remains but one son. He will be given land, and will most likely inherit the gardens retained by the father, upon the death of the parent. If a father should die before allocating land to his sons, they are recognized to have the principle claim on his lands. If, however, the sons are not mature enough to use the land immediately, close relatives may grant each other permission to use the land, recognizing that the sons may eventually insist on their rights to use. In this fashion, too, a son may be given land belonging to a father's brother. A father may allocate his brother's land to his own son in lieu of giving his own land, if the brother is deceased and has no sons capable of using the land. An heirless man can control the allocation of his lands by designating someone to receive all of a portion of the land. Such allocations are normally made to close relatives--brothers, brothers' sons. For example, one informant, Rawala, son of Reali, reported:

"Lalo and Alu are the second and third brothers of Reali. These two brothers did not have any children. I am using Alu's ground. Lalo and Alu were killed in a fight. They had no heirs. As Alu was dying he said to me 'Reali has three children. You, Rawala, can use the ground of my father.' I was married then."

Such decisions and allocations give the appearance of lineage rights over land--a plot of land remaining within the hands of a patrilineage through

the generations. In actual effect, a lineage norm does arise from Muli Ekerepa individual decisions (as per Barnes, treatment of "cumulative patrification," 1962), but there are no stated lineage rights over land. A man's sons, or his brothers' sons, will most likely inherit his land, presuming that he designates no one else to receive them. While a man cannot entirely disinherit his sons, unless they leave the clan, he also cannot be forced to grant his lands entirely to his close agnates. Individuals in Muli have been granted land by dying clansmen on the basis of past assistance or friendship, even though other clansmen had closer ties of kinship to the reali.

Non-agnates, too, can be given land rights on Muli Ekerepa land. A sister's son raised in Muli after the sister's divorce will be allotted land by her brothers and he will be treated as a fellow clansman. A sister's husband, too, might be enticed into moving into Muli.³ The most common explanation to me was the availability of better land in Muli. Male children may come to Muli with their mother, born of a former marriage. If these children so desire, as they become adults they will most likely have land made available to them by their mother's husband and his brothers. Men taking refuge with another clan after a fight (usually fleeing to affinally related clans) were allotted land to use for gardens. While many returned eventually to their original lands after colonial pacification, others remained living among their hosts, for all practical purposes absorbed by that clan and allotted land rights like a clansman. Once a man has been invited onto Muli Ekerepa land through any of the above ties, and been given land to use, he may pass this land on to his sons with all normal use rights. If his son, too,

remains resident among Muli Ekerepa and acts in concert with the clan on appropriate occasions, he is likely to retain recognition of his land rights in the midst of the clan.

In 1980-1981 Muli, this set of principles of individual control of land was the immediately apparent feature of the local land tenure system. It was reported by Muli informants that no one had the right or power to prevent a land holder from allocating a portion of his land to anyone he desired. This was said not to have been the case in pre-colonial times, when men lived together in a single men's house, and the big man of a house was said to exercise ultimate power over who joined the group and who was unwelcome.

The appearance of individual ownership of land is growing stronger in today's Muli. The level of social control of land boundary maintenance has changed from local clans to national government, far removed from daily consciousness of clan members. Before colonial pacification, the dominance of clan-land relations over man-land relations was far more visible. A man's ability to hold a portion of land depended on the clan's owning the land of which he held a portion. A clan's rights to its land ultimately depended upon its ability to hold the land militarily. Political alliances and warfare were endemic, as elsewhere in the Central Highlands (cf. Meggitt 1977, and references therein). Muli Ekerepa's current land holdings are the result of its military history, which I shall briefly recount.

Muli Ekerepa claims to have begun its history on land named Yarena, now a census division neighboring Muli Census Division. Here the clan founders, brothers named Eali and Asali, established their homes and began

the propagation of the line. Muli Ekerepa members claim that Yarena is their land, based on the former occupation by Eali and Asali. The clans now inhabiting Yarena--Moi and Rakili--do not dispute that Eali and Asali lived there, or that Muli Ekerepa could be called Yarena Ekerepa. They simply say that Eali and Asali lived on land given to them by the founders of Moi and Rakili, and that these latter men have prior claim to the land. Eventually, all agree, Eali and Asali or their descendants were driven from Yarena. The oldest living Muli Ekerepa men were told by their fathers that their grandfathers were among those driven out of Yarena. The clan fled to an area now in the western portion of Muli Census Division, land called Pulimita. At the time, this area and the land to the east was inhabited by members of Petemerepa, subclan of Wogoropa. These men were driven away, fleeing west to Kaware in the present Kagua District (just across the River Ialo from Muli). The elders of Muli Ekerepa (in 1980) were born in Pulimita. Much of the land now inhabited by Muli Ekerepa was originally Petemerepa land. The basic land boundaries seem to have remained fixed for some time during the early life of Muli's current elders, despite continual raiding (see Yana Maita's comments above re: raiding gardens of neighboring groups. Another man said that Muli Ekerepa had fought many neighbors, taking their gardens and raping their wives, continuing to the period shortly before pacification). Shortly before colonial inhabitation and pacification, an internal dispute erupted into warfare. The Kandemambu subclan of Ekerepa was driven out of Muli, along with the Yarena Rakili clan which had allied itself with the Kandemambu's. The arrival of the Australians, pacification, and colonial policy encouraging the return of

refugees to their homelands, led to the return of most of the refugee Kandemambu's to Muli, and to Yarena of the Rakili line and its allies, Moi. The boundaries of Muli Ekerepa land holdings were essentially fixed at that point by government suppression of the primary interclan land readjustment mechanism, warfare. Petemerepa attempts to resettle parts of their old land were reportedly foiled in colonial court, due to the length of time that Muli Ekerepa had inhabited the land (on the other hand, several persons of Petemerepa origins have been absorbed into Muli Ekerepa and inhabit land previously owned by their Petemerepa ancestors). Muli Ekerepa's earliest claims to land were legitimated by their ability to hold the land. Their current holdings rely on their historical ability to hold the land and to the system of government which has made relatively permanent the bounds existing at the entry of colonialism.

The fact that the clan no longer is the principal defender of its boundaries does not alter the fact that the clan-land relationship still dominates man-land relations. Guardianship of land is acquired through patrilineal inheritance or through allocations from affinal kin. Non-agnates receiving land are expected to participate with Muli Ekerepa in any clan activity, or with the land-granting sub-groups in their own ceremonial and small group projects. A non-agnate who fails to maintain a good social relationship with those who granted him the use of land will find quickly that he has worn out his welcome, and that his rights to the land he gardens are shaky. Maintaining the ability to exercise these rights to land depends upon maintaining good relations with those among whom one lives--the clan Muli Ekerepa. As Crocombe has written:

"In customary tenure systems, in which the precise circumstances of retention of rights is not specified, there is usually a degree of group conformity required if rights are to be retained" (1974:12).

Land rights, then, are derived from prior use, or from the previous guardian's passing on of his rights to a designated person. There need be no patrilineal tie as the basis for this inheritance or gift. But more important to holding one's land than this original granting of rights, especially in the case of newly arrived non-agnates, is a man's ability to maintain a good relationship with his co-residents.

The Clan in Muli



As is the case in many Highlands societies (cf. Strathern 1982b and references therein), Muli Ekerepa claims to have a membership tied agnatically to each other. In theory, each clan member can trace his relationship to the apical ancestors of the clan. As is also the case elsewhere, this claim of agnatic kinship must be treated as an idiom of group solidarity and identity, not as a valid statement of biological ties between clan members.

All men of Muli agree that the clan was founded by Eali and Asali. The clan is now divided further into several subclans. When asked originally, informants consistently replied that the clan has three ogeiruru (K) or "little lines" (sub-clans) within it. These are Mutanaya, Kandemambu, and Asakindipa. Muta, Naya, Kande, Asa, and Kindipa were all reportedly sons of Eali and Asali (accounts differing as to which ancestor fathered which sons). Mambu, I was told, was a clan brother, but had been descended from a coupling with a pig, not a woman. This porcine heritage does not effect current relations within the clan today.

In addition to the three subclans, each of which could be split into the individually named sub-sub-clans, there is another group in Muli named Yamerepaa. These men are nominally tied to Mutanaya, but claimed to have split away to be a group of their own. They inhabit a separate homestead area and are a distinct sub-sub-clan in the making. Each Muli Ekerepa male could easily identify to which of these sub-groups of the clan he or any other clansman belonged. But no two clansmen could agree on the precise genealogical ties of anyone to the apical ancestral names. Most genealogies offered could not account for the father-links of some men clearly recognized as members of Muli Ekerepa. Group discussions of these missing ancestors created consternation, amusement, and always a spirited discussion among informants. The idiom of agnatic ties to the clan, and thereby to each other, is clearly important in Muli as an ideological construct allowing organization of the social world. But few generally acceptable genealogies could go more than two generations past living persons without losing the ability to legitimate the memberships of several clansmen. In daily life, such legitimation is not necessary. A man's membership in the clan is obvious if he can obtain agreement that his father and his father's father were both clan members. The intervening ties to Eali and Asali are unimportant, although some persons went to great lengths to establish complete and correct genealogies for me, and to insist on the incorrectness of the others.

The most effective consanguineally organized groups in Muli Ekerepa are at the lowest hierarchical levels of organization by genealogy. In Kewa, a man and his sons (or his children, in general) can be referred to as an aralu ("mo Yakona aralu"--"that group headed by the father Yako").

Well-behaved sons are expected to accompany their fathers in their daily tasks, to "go aralu" and to learn what they must do as adults. An aralu will often pool its resources in ceremonial endeavors or in other projects requiring commitments of resources to a group goal. The next highest level of agnatic structure has no designating term (according to my informants, who disagree with Franklin 1978:217). The living sons of a deceased man, and all of the offspring of those living sons, can be referred to by appending the suffix--repaa⁴ to the name of the deceased father. If there be true agnatically related lineages in Muli, it is the groups so named (X-repaa) that deserve the title. Thus, the sons of Maita, Yana and Yandi, and their sons Petros Molo, Joseph Papu, Raymond Rami, Peter Yokomo, and Cornelius Kundiri can be referred to collectively as Maitarepaa. Upon the deaths of Yana and Yandi, they will become the focal names of Yanarepaa and Yandirepaa (see Figure 1). In the meantime, the group, Maitarepaa as a whole acts in concert in many activities requiring collective action--again primarily when that action requires the combination of material resources. It is this level of group that is the effective level of organization instrumental in carrying out many activities attributed to the clan or a major sub-clan. Pigkills held by Muli Ekerepa, for instance, are credited by outsiders to the whole clan, by clan members of non-sponsoring sub-clans to the sponsoring sub-clan, and by sponsoring sub-clan members to the X-repaa groups who take the role of initiators, planners for this kill. The lack of a referential term for this level of organization is not inhibiting in daily life, as the concrete names of these social divisions are known to those likely to use the names in discourse.





 = deceased
 = living

Figure 1: Creating X-repaa

Beyond the X-repaa level of organization, the idiom of relationship is that of patrilineage and consanguineal ties, but people freely admit that they cannot demonstrate accurately their genealogical brotherhood.⁵ They admit, as well, that many of the residents of Muli, men alleged to be members of the clan, have imperfect claims to this membership, if perfection be based solely on patrilineal ties. A large group within Ekerepa, cutting across all sub-clans, can be called Petemerepa, because their ancestry can be tied to that sub-clan of Wogoropa which inhabited much of the area prior to Muli Ekerepa. In one sub-sub-clan, Asa, there is not a single male whose claims to patrilineal purity will go unchallenged. Each Asa male has at one time or another been labelled as really belonging to one of several neighboring groups (Moi, Petemerepa, Nemola). Some Asa men dispute the claim, some are unmoved by it and ignore it in general discourse. The older men of Asa, whose claims would presumably be on shakiest ground, are invariably referred to by kin terms implying their membership in Ekerepa. Despite the occasional argumentative contention that they are in-migrant Moi, they are clearly recognized as clansmen and agnates (one was, in his prime, a noted pre-colonial bigman in Ekerepa). Perhaps there exists a process of non-agnate conversion in Muli akin to that described by Cook (1970:190-196) among the Manga, in which kin term application principles convert a non-agnatic line to agnatic terms within two generations. There are three other processes occurring concurrently that contribute to the conversion process in Muli: fading memory of land claims elsewhere; accumulation of personal ties to the ghosts of Muli; and attribution of Muli Ekerepa membership by outsiders to someone who participates with the clan in group-defining activities.

If a non-agnate moves to Muli and remains there, working land given to him by affinal relatives, he still has claim to land elsewhere--land that he or his fathers worked among another clan. His tie to Muli, his allegiance and dependence upon his local resources remain doubtful. His sons, growing up in Muli, and remaining in Muli, may or may not be shown the lands available to them among their agnatic (non-Muli) kinsmen. The grandsons of the original migrant are even less likely to know the location of old land claims, and their agnates less likely to remember or recognize those claims. Muli informants said that when no one remains alive who can point to the land boundaries and the planted trees on the old clan land, then the line descending from the original migrant is truly "Muli Ekerepa."

As a man moves into Muli, he enters land and a social group protected by the ancestral ghosts of others--the prior members of Muli Ekerepa. Upon his death, a man's sons (in pre-Christian tradition) would keep his skull in a small local shrine, feeding his spirit the blood and smoke of pigs, and seeking his good influence in providing for their well-being. As the sons die, they, too, join the X-repaa's accumulating local ghosts. The fathers of these second and third generation men act in conjunction with the other ghosts of Muli, and are called upon and fed when all Muli ancestors are so entertained, upon the occasions of killing pigs (see Apea 1977 for a fuller treatment of Muli pre-Christian spiritual beliefs; see also Meggitt 1965 for a summary of Enga beliefs, very similar to those I found in Muli). As one informant explained: "My father told us to call his name, and that we would call the rest of the ancestors through him." Having a local ancestor who had participated with Muli Ekerepa prior to

his death, a ghostly relative with direct relations with the ghosts of Muli Ekerepa, makes more legitimate one's claims to be the son of Eali.

As a non-agnatic migrant is seen by other clans to be participating with Muli Ekerepa in important contexts in which clan membership is implied by co-participation⁶, these other clans speak of the man as part of Muli Ekerepa, attributing clan membership to him. These contexts include those activities done "in the public eye" ("long ai bilong ol"--TP), such as pig kills, church and school building openings, singsing ("dance festival"--TP) ceremonies, business activities. To the degree that a man's participation reflects well upon Muli Ekerepa, raising the status of the clan's name, the attribution of membership is welcomed and accepted. The non-agnate is designated a brother. It is his demonstrated allegiance, not his natal heritage, which ultimately earns the man the right to be called by the clan name. If a non-agnate gardens only Muli land, participates only in Muli Ekerepa ceremonial activities, fights alongside other Muli Ekerepa as needed (in warfare, and now in plantation brawls), shares his food and goods with Muli Ekerepa men, than he is a Muli Ekerepa. If, on the other hand, a Muli resident of non-agnatic origins maintains ties with his natal group, using land there as well as in Muli, participating with them in group exchanges, brideprice, pigkilling, then the resident is viewed as having a dual allegiance. He has not demonstrated his total dependability as an Ekerepa. His allegiance in a crisis may be doubted. His non-agnatic status can be thrown up at him in an argument.

A man agnatically related to other Muli men is by definition recognized as being a member of Muli Ekerepa. So long as there are those who

remember him or his fathers having resided in Muli, he will be able to reactivate claims to land no matter how long his absence and no matter what his involvements elsewhere. The agnatic principle is real enough as a basis of access to clan land.⁸ The ancestors have seen to it that a man cannot rest on this basis of membership, however. Kewa culture requires that a man participate in a variety of gift-giving or exchange ceremonies throughout his lifetime (as is common throughout Melanesia). He must pay bridewealth for his wife (usually accumulated with the aid of fathers and brothers) and then ought to give pork to her line whenever pigs are killed. He gives to the wife's line upon the birth of a child and at various ritual times thereafter (protecting his wife and children from illness caused by anger in the wife's line about non-payment, and consequent ghostly attack). He must give to a deceased clansman's mother's line, and to a deceased wife's line, or must help those more closely related in making such payments. A man must, as well, participate in the generational pig kills sponsored by various sub-clans of Muli Ekerepa, occurring within the clan as a whole more than once a generation.⁹ A clan's failure to make a good showing in these affairs subjects its members to shaming and the anger of non-recipients. Political alliances are supported through the maintenance of responsible exchange activities. To uphold or strengthen its "name," a clan requires participation by all in support of good exchange relations with members of other clans.¹⁰ For clan agnates, too, it is very important that all public activities of the clan, or their respective sub-clans, be supported. Failure to contribute one's individual share of pigs, shells, and now money, to group exchange payments will subject one to ridicule within the clan as a "rubbish man."

It will also lose one the support of the ancestors. The ancestors are pragmatic beings. They have the ability to guide one's actions through providing insight as to likely outcomes (ancestors don't make a man do something, they show him a way. A wise man heeds the council of his dreams, the primary mode of ancestral communication). The ancestors have at heart the interests of the clan as a whole, and their own self interest. They wish to feed on the smoke of burning pigs at the occasion of clan pig kills. The clan can best feed the ancestors if they are in good relations as a strong clan with surrounding groups. A man who fails to help carry out the social exchange obligations of the clan undermines the strength of the group as a whole by diminishing the respectability of the clan and lessening its power to accumulate valuables for redistribution. Such a man will not be protected by the ancestors or the generalized ancestral spirits who gave their names to several spirit cults found in Muli and the Kewabe region at the entry of colonialism. His children, pigs, and crops will fail to prosper. His own health may be at stake. Agnates, too, feel the pressure of threatened sanctions in motivating their participation in clan activities, especially those involving exchange relations with other groups.

To summarize, gardening is the heart of material production among Muli Ekerepa. To be able to garden, a production team must be created, invariably through marriage. The team gains access to land, its principle means of production, through its ability to establish ties to a clan group, and its ability to maintain its relations to the rest of the resident clansmen. Maintenance of good relations is dependent upon sharing of goods among clansmen, and participating in clan exchange activities. While

gardening itself is minimally socialized as a labor process, it has as its preconditions the full participation in social activities which define and support the continuing existence of the clan as a whole, the system of interclan ceremonial payments. Participation in this ritual system socializes the production teams through their mutual participation as "clansmen" and "subclansmen." In the Kewabe, this participation, the forms of accumulation and distribution of valuables, maintain a clearly individualistic dimension within the collective gift-giving. Ritual participation is clearly grounded in the form of production team which dominates gardening--a household dominated by an individual male. Males cooperate in exchange (as per Wagner's 1967 description of Daribi structural principles) but cooperation presents either of two forms of action. If both (or all) cooperators are publically participating in a ceremony, they each make presentations as individuals to individuals of other clans or subclans. The presenter, in the typical public event, sharing of pork, holds the gift piece aloft and shouts the name of its recipient. There is no mistaking the identity of the individuals concerned. There is no identification with clans in the moment of giving (there is even an air of competition between clan members and X-repa lineages).

If, on the other hand, men are cooperating to amass a collection of valuables to be given to a single or few individuals, one or a few Muli Ekerepa men will act as the conduit for goods. These men are the men who have the primary moral obligation to provide the gift. It is these men who will be identified, in the public eye, as having given. They are responsible for pulling together the valuables by dunning their fellows for support.¹¹ In this case, "cooperation," both in its public form

and in Muli consciousness, emphasizes the initiative of this individual. It is he who will make the presentations in his own name. His supporters have agreed, in the situation concerned, to support his efforts. Ogan's explanation of cooperation among the Nasioi summarizes a point which is valid in Muli, as well:

"Nasioi do not view group effort as an association of equals (on the basis of equal share contribution), nor do they agree that the size of contributions should determine the shareholder's return. Rather they see cooperation as the offering of services--however small, provided the affiliation is clear cut--to an individual whom they believe superior in wisdom and/or industry. This individual is then to make returns on the basis of satisfying each follower's wants." (Ogan 1972:179-180).

In Muli, the status of big men depends upon their ability to coordinate such giving, and their ability always to support the socially required initiatives of others, enabling those others to maintain the respectability of their own names,¹² and through all of them, the name of the clan.

The system of production and production relations outlined in this chapter was present in Muli at the time of colonial penetration (ca. 1953). It was the producers acting within and shaped by this system who responded cooperatively or with resistance to Administration efforts to stimulate and to direct local integration into commodity oriented relations and activities. It was these producers who have incorporated cash and commodities into the reproduction of the social relations of production described in this chapter. It was the producers who were thus compelled to find sources of cash and commodities to meet their needs. In Chapter 4, I will discuss the efforts made by Muli residents to incorporate such cash-acquiring activities into local life, and the resultant shape of bisnis and money-making within Muli's precapitalist relations of production.

Notes on Chapter 3

1. "Person-days" were counted by multiplying the number of persons surveyed times the number of days surveyed. This survey involved six households for one week (seven days). Six adult males, six adult females, and twenty-seven children constituted the respondent population. If each had eaten any particular item once each day, that item would have been eaten on 273 person-days. Kaukau was eaten on 252 person-days, or 92% of possible person-days.

2. Why not plan ahead and avoid a hangri? I was told that any individual who worked hard and had plenty of large kaukau to eat would simply have to give or sell it to those who were without, until such time as his stock was depleted. (The alternatives enumerated were to leave large kaukau unharvested until most others had them again, or to lie to fellow clansmen saying that one had no large kaukau in order to avoid sharing).

3. It is of interest to me that I know of no case in which a wife's brother obtained land rights in Muli. These rights have been given to adults who gave brideprice, and not to those who received it. This was not a focus of my research in the field. I have no widespread survey to support the claim. I mention it in passing.

4. Franklin et al (1978) list this as a referential term. Leroy (1975) says that it is a Southern Kewa term equivalent to ruru in the north Kewa area. My Muli informants explicitly disagree, saying that there is no such term as "repaa."

5. They "freely admit" this when I specifically questioned conflicts and gaps in genealogies provided by various people. I did this on several occasions in large groups, and sat back to enjoy the ensuing discussion. After long, argumentative conversations, people would turn to me, and smilingly say "We don't know, we've forgotten those names." The local big man refused to be bothered at all about this "problem." He shrugged, saying, "I wasn't alive. How can I know," then proceeded with his business.

The question of one's agnatic link to the clan can be important in the event of an internal dispute. Those with weak claims and clear ties to another clan can be harassed and embarrassed into leaving by their more strongly linked opponents. But the possibility of conversion of non-agnatic status into agnatic status, and collective amnesia about that process after a few generations, aids the clan in remaining strong in numbers by attracting men from surrounding groups and winning their allegiance, or that of their descendants. While no Muli Ekerepa would offer this explanation in discussion of kin/clan terminology (saying instead "it's how our ancestors did it"), the same local big man used such reasoning in a modern context in an attempt to resolve an intra-clan dispute. He bellowed loudly over the angry voices of disputants that they had to resolve their differences and avoid divisive antagonism.

Ekerepa could not afford to chase men away, he said, because elections were approaching. The clan had to be strong in numbers in order to elect candidates sympathetic to Ekerepa's needs. His rhetoric won the moment (and ignored the lack of unity in recent Muli voting).

6. Leroy (1975) writes that among the South Kewa clan membership is essentially established by non-agnates through co-residence and co-participation with a clan. My Muli informants agree, and have elaborated the process of conversion.

7. Within clan sharing of goods is ubiquitous. Refusal to share can subject one to the jealous reactions of clansmen, and potentially to sorcery and poisoning. I'll discuss this further in Chapter 4.

8. And within an agnatic principle, a notion of kinship substance, male semen and female blood, as discussed in Strathern 1972b. Strathern's further developments of the notion of common substance mediated in food (1977) seem illuminating for Muli, too, as explained by his discussion of birth-place (1973). Kewabe non-agnates may be told, in the heat of argument, to go home to the place where their mogo ("placenta"--K) is buried (see Note 5 above).

9. Regarding Kewa pigkilling ceremonies, cf. Leroy 1975, 1979a, 1979b; Franklin et al 1978: 463-471. The Kewa fall within Strathern's classification of "home production" for exchange, passing on dead pigs or portions thereof (Strathern 1969, 1978).

10. Meggitt's summary (1971:198 n.12) expresses well the purpose underlying participation in the ceremonial exchange cycle in Muli. Muli Ekerepa does not participate in a Te or Moka cycle of live pig exchange. Equivalent Kewa pig ceremonies are "kills." Prestige is derived and used in the same fashion. Muli men told me that failure to participate in such ceremonies would subject them to ridicule, but even more importantly, to loss of mediated decisions, court cases. This could cost them a claim to land. A defendant in a court case might attribute the charges to jealousy of those who have more than the non-pig-killing (or non-bridprice-paying, etc.) men. The case would be dismissed on these grounds.

11. It is important not to presume that these "fellows" need necessarily be clansmen. All exploitable ties are used, as appropriate--agnates, affines, friends, workmates--anyone who would not be a potential recipient in the ceremony in question. Belshaw has made this point in discussing the lines of choice within a kindred, enabling "those who want to cooperate to do so, while others may stand out if they wish" among the Southern Massim (1955:55), and again with regard to cooperating groups in Fiji:

"Each major operation involved an exchange of services between groups linked not by a stable corporate organization but by the flexible manipulation of stable principles, in which affinal responsibilities loomed as large as lineal ones" (1964:276).

12. See Burkins and Krause (1982) for an elaborated discussion of maintaining one's name in Muli. The literature on "big-men" in the Highlands is large and well-known. The need for maintenance of a "normal" name, of preventive action to avoid being "rubbish" has not been treated as fully. Cf. Harris (1975) regarding the entry of Huli "ordinary" men into bisnis in order to maintain respectability rather than to gain status.

Chapter 4

Money and Money-Making in Muli

Upon the establishment of colonial rule in the Ialibu area, the colonial state imposed new demands on local labor and resources. In doing so, the Administration engaged in direct exchange relations involving various goods and services. This exchange came to involve the payment of cash. Muli was introduced to European money.

The early Kewabe area response to the introduction of money payments by colonial government officials was characterized by R.N.Colton:

"The people are very money conscious and appreciate its importance. They cannot see any way in which they can get this elusive stuff" (1965).

The conditions for obtaining "this elusive stuff" were, of course, controlled by the Europeans. The new demands on labor and resources offered wage labor opportunities in the creation of an improved local economic infrastructure. Roads were built. Government-purchased land was cleared. The Muli DPI Sheep Project, the Ialibu Local Government Council Cattle Project, and the Muli Base Camp were the principal sources of income evident in Muli and available to Muli Ekerepa residents. As government policy changed locally, Muli listened receptively to each new call for development. They sold land for development by outsiders. They attempted cash-cropping. They paid local government council taxes, hoping to foment economic development. Cooperation was based on two factors: First, the Europeans had demonstrated their knowledge and abilities in obtaining wealth. Muli residents wished to share in such success. Second,

the government was concurrently spreading wages throughout the area, as per above. It seemed to Muli residents that the exchange was fair, that the Europeans were adequately redistributing wealth to those who supported them in their initiatives. Such support was consistent with pre-colonial indigenous practices (cf. Ogan re:Nasioi, quoted at end of Chapter 2).

Rural development policy, adapting by necessity to the absence of external investment, came to encourage the development of local business and cash cropping. This "tacking on" of commodity-production and cash business to local garden-based production became national policy at independence (cf. National Planning Committee 1976). Government hoped that the opportunity to acquire money would act as the prime motivator in promoting local support for this national policy goal. As we've seen, the Ialibu area government encouraged a variety of routes to cash.

In Muli, cash was indeed named the prime motivator in attempts to do business or cash-cropping. In 1980, Muli informants explained that they engage in business or cash-cropping in order to obtain money to purchase trade goods. They voiced the need for cash in order to be able to buy clothing, soap, food. "Look around you," we were told, "you see school boys and old people in bark belts and leaves. They have no shirts, no trousers, no soap. Even the people who have European clothes, they are dirty, too." In 1968, Patrol Officer Hunter reported that people were anxious to purchase imported tradestore foods whenever cash was available. In 1981, we were told the same thing. Muli informants and persons from surrounding clan areas demanded that a kampani be established in the area to allow employment for money (about which more below).

Guided by the colonial government, and now, on occasion, by the extension agents of national and provincial government, Muli residents have engaged in a variety of activities designed to obtain cash. In this chapter, I wish to discuss the results of such activities as carried out by the members of one Highlands clan in the midst of a developing peripheral integration into the world economy. I will review the ways in which European-introduced modes of obtaining cash have been integrated into local activities, including cash-cropping for supralocal markets, and for local market sales, animal husbandry, wage labor both in the Muli/Ialibu area and on plantations, tradestores and Passenger Motor Vehicles (PMVs), and gambling (for no discussion of Muli money could be complete without taking note of gambling). I will argue through the chapter that each of these activities has been integrated into and dominated by the need to maintain good interpersonal relationships within the clan and with affines, primarily through gift-giving or "delayed reciprocal exchange" (Belshaw 1954:10). I will end the chapter with a consideration of the role played by money in maintaining this essentially precapitalist social system.

Muli Ekerepa refers to most cash-acquiring activities as "bisnis," borrowing the Tok Pisin word for "business." Franklin, in his Kewa Dictionary (1978) suggests the following Kewa equivalent: "gawanu situanu kopinu gorupa marekape kogono"--roughly "work like making cows, stores, and coffee come up" (Muli informants say that this gets the idea across, but by now, the term "bisnis" is well understood, and suffices). An important note must be made about Muli's conceptualization of bisnis. As Franklin's Kewa formulation suggests, bisnis is work, a kind of activity. One does not "have a business" in Kewa, one "does business." In attempting

to substantiate this linguistic point, I solicited examples of sentences about bisnis, and offered a construction of my own. All of the examples provided by my Muli informants were formed in the "do bisnis" structure.

For example:

Bisnis pea pe rupa? "How does one do bisnis"

Bisnis mogema epe rupa pu saminya. "We will learn how to do bisnis well and it will come up big."

When I offered:

Ipu epe bisnis wia. "He has (wia) good bisnis."

I was corrected with:

Ipumi epe bisnis pea. "He (plus subject marker) makes (pea) good bisnis."

Bisnis is conceived, in Muli, as an activity of human agents, not as a reified thing which one can possess. Thus, the phrase "mo bisnis" ("that bisnis"--K) should be understood to contain a gerund, translatable as "that doing business" or "that bisnis activity done by X."

I turn first, then, to Muli's experiences doing bisnis.

Cash-Cropping for Supralocal Markets

i) Coffee and Pyrethrum

The story of Muli coffee and pyrethrum has been sketched in brief in the general account of Ialibu and the Kewabe Sub-District (Chapter 2). Muli was the site of one of the trial plots in the initial coffee plantings of 1962. The plot was planted by a government patrol, in cooperation with a Muli resident. The patrol left, there was little Administration oversight during maturation, and world market conditions resulted in Administration's abandoning the crop. Locally coffee was considered a failure.

In 1965, the Department of Primary Industry (DPI) offered another solution to local development problems--pyrethrum. The trial plots of coffee were torn out and pyrethrum planted, also in a few plots selected by the kiaps. The patrol officers explained to local residents that pyrethrum would bear saleable flowers in a matter of months and money would come quickly, while coffee would still take several years to bear fruit. "Everyone" joined in the kiap organized production enthusiastically, except for the man on whose land the first trial communal plot was placed. He was jailed for a brief period for causing a disturbance over the decision. He saw the error of his ways and created no further problems. Pyrethrum was planted. It grew well, according to local informants (who never mentioned the drought-ruined first plantings referred to in Chapter 2). It was harvested. The world market prices fell, at this time, from an estimated 80t/kg. to about 30t/kg. (Mambo 1980). People felt that they were receiving almost no money, yet were required to invest a relatively large amount of labor. They refused to grow pyrethrum again.

The local decision was allowed to stand. Coffee was still growing elsewhere, and Muli Ekerepa was aware of the possibility of rejoining the ranks of growers.¹ Muli informants tell me that they looked at Kagua, and saw that the people who grew coffee there were not making much money.² They decided that it was better to remain idle and poor rather than to be hardworking and poor. Coffee remained low on Muli's development agenda for more than a decade, despite the coffee nursery located there in 1970. That coffee initiative passed Muli by, as extension agents travelled to communities in areas outlying the census division. Muli informants, reminiscing, report that their ground had been depleted of its strength

("graun i nogat gris"--"the ground has no fertility substance" - TP), and that the coffee would not have come up even if they had attempted it again. In the late 1970s, the Department of Primary Industry revised the plan for Muli area agricultural development. Coffee was again viewed as the answer to the needs for a source of cash in the area.³ Seedlings were made available and people were encouraged to replant coffee. Many Muli residents decided to try ("traim" - TP) coffee again, with a hesitation to overexert themselves before determining whether their ground would, indeed, support the crop. The spread of coffee planting in Muli has been slow, but steady, since that time. Ninety-five of 108 households (88%) reported having at least some coffee trees.

There has been one attempt to create a cooperatively worked and owned coffee grove in recent years, according to the Local Government Councilor who was one of the persons initiating the attempt. Dating of the attempt is hazy, but must have occurred since 1978, the beginning of tenure of the current Councilor. According to Loaya Yana, the Councilor in question, he and the Councilor from a neighboring clan planned and initiated a cooperative planting program, with support from DPI. The grove was to be on land made available by Loaya. Co-workers were recruited from both participating clans. Government finance was to pay for trees, fertilizer. When the trees came into production, all participating workers were to share in the proceeds. The ground was cleared by a group of local people, but before planting began, the workers discovered that they were not to be paid for the labor expended in clearing the plot, something they had not understood, it seems. The labor force revolted, unwilling to work on the land of another for possible future proceeds. The ground has become overgrown again.

and Muli's only effort at establishing a cooperative is history. Individually owned and planted coffee plots hold sway.

According to a local didiman ("agricultural extension officer" - TP) a well-worked plot of 300-400 trees can create an annual average income of K1,000 (in 1980 PNG Kina). About one-third of Muli households reported having that many trees or more in 1980 (see Table 2). But everyone stressed that we all had to wait to see whether coffee was a worthwhile investment of time and effort. For the earliest planters, following the DPI initiative in the late 1970s, the first coffee cherries were appearing in 1980-1981. For most people, there would still be a year or more before their trees had matured.

Table 2: Muli Household Coffee Tree Holdings (1980)

<u># Trees</u>	<u># Households</u>	<u>% Households</u>
0	13	12.0
1-100	27	25.0
101-200	15	13.9
201-300	8	7.4
301-400	5	4.6
401-500	17	15.7
501-600	2	1.9
601-700	3	2.8
701-800	2	1.9
801-	6	5.6
Unknown	10	9.2
	<u>108</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Selling coffee proved not to be so very easy in the area. None of the clan groups in the immediate area of Muli owned a vehicle. To be sold, coffee had to be transported to Mount Hagen or sold to a road-side buyer from Hagen plantation warehouses. Transporting more than a single private

bag of dried coffee beans to Hagen via public transit is both unwieldy and costly, although this method obtained a price that was known to be the highest available. Road-side buyers came to Muli on a few occasions (we were told initially that "the truck" comes on Thursdays. This proved to be one of many unreliable schedules we encountered). People from surrounding villages, the lower lying village of Paibo especially, brought beans to Muli to sell (Paibo was one of the communities served by the short-lived coffee nursery). They always asked first what price the seller wished to obtain for his or her bag of beans. It was clear that the buyer would have gladly paid any underpriced request. Sellers, however, recalled the high prices obtained in recent years when the South American crop had failed. They saw their bags of "K10" or "K20" bags, based on the prices the same bags had obtained under those most favorable conditions. Sellers' quotes were always extremely high. The buyer then weighed the bag, multiplied by a standard rate, and offered a price. A description of one morning's transactions is illustrative. On 14 August 1980, a truck from Banz, WHP, pulled up to the PMV stop in Muli. Five persons approached with coffee beans in bags. The first offered up his bag. It weighed 30 lbs. The seller requested K16-K20. He was offered K12 in response. He accepted the money. The second seller, too, had 30 lbs. of beans, and asked for K16. He, too, was offered K12. This man refused to sell and began the trip back to Paibo with his beans over his shoulder. The third seller, a woman, had 2.5 lbs., requested K3-K4, was offered K1, and refused to sell. The counter offers by the truck had clearly established a rate of 40t/lb. None of the sellers took this into account as they named their own asking price, each of the last four sellers complained loudly, arguing

that prices had been higher, and that the buyers were not willing to pay them fairly. The drivers explained that they could not offer higher prices, that prices in Mount Hagen, too, had dropped. They shrugged off the refusals to sell, and left the scene. Coffee was carried home to await future price rises. We see here an instance of the failure of capital to control production of the peasants. Local economy is not monetized sufficiently to force sales under prices determined by capital. Producers decide whether the return for their product is sufficient. The dried coffee beans do not decay rapidly. There is little pressure to sell at a specific time, or even at all. Coffee supply from the small holder areas is not stable. In fact, according to Ialibu DPI officials, two Mount Hagen factories had closed in 1980 due to the refusal of people throughout their buying areas to sell at the lower prices being offered.

In response to local complaints about the low prices offered by factory-sponsored trucks, Ialibu DPI initiated a coffee buying scheme in the Kewabe during September 1980. A monthly price was established by Mendi DPI headquarters. This price could be offered to local producers, and coffee purchased by DPI. The coffee was then to be transported to Hagen, sold, and the income returned to the general government coffers. Prices quoted to me by Ialibu DPI on 17 September 1980 were K1.17/kg. of high grade beans, 95t/kg. for low grade. On 6 October 1980, the first DPI coffee buying day took place. The price quoted publically was 90t/kg. The official explained that the price was a bit low due to the need to protect DPI from errors in grading the coffee. People accepted the explanation, but voiced dissatisfaction each time that a "K30" bag was offered purchase at K16. The arguments continued throughout the morning, but so

did sales. People were convinced that DPI was telling the truth, that it was offering a price higher than either the roadside buyers or the Hagen private companies (this argument was verified for the group by the few who had recently sold coffee in Hagen). Only six of fifty-three potential sales were refused in October. The sales, totalling K317.78, averaged K6.76 (ranging from .90 - 24.75). Only two of the sales were by Muli Ekerepa members--K2.70 and K1.80, total K4.5. The sale was viewed locally as a success. People wandered away saying that they could now go gamble because "fortnight" (payday) had come on Monday (not Friday, as normal). The coffee buying scheme was never repeated. Local producers showed up at the sale site each of the two following weeks, as DPI had scheduled. They waited. No one came to buy. DPI officials later explained that their truck had been under repair the first week, and that they had been called to a meeting in Mendi the second and had to use the truck to go there. Meanwhile, during a trip to Mendi, the provincial capital, I had been informed by a Provincial DPI official that Ialibu DPI agents had violated their authority in offering a reduced price to local producers. They could have, and should have, paid the amounts they had originally quoted to me in Ialibu. The official announced that he planned to look into the matter.⁴ Perhaps this was the reason for the Mendi meeting. In any case, the Ialibu agents never returned to Muli to buy coffee. After two weeks of no sales, producers no longer came to see. No further excuses were necessary, as no one asked why the sales had stopped. I was assured in Mendi that the Ialibu agents had acted properly in announcing the program and in purchasing coffee. Only the price was at issue. I never found out why the sales stopped. Discontinuation left Muli area residents to rely on the road-side buyers or

PMVs to Hagen to market their coffee. The DPI marketing scheme was short-lived and ineffective.

A similar difficulty for local producers in marketing goods sabotaged the only attempt I know of to resurrect pyrethrum as a local cash crop. Three Muli Ekerepa members obtained pyrethrum splits in 1978 from DPI (notes left in an old kiap office in Muli verify this). They were told to bring the dried flowers back to DPI and that the flowers would be purchased under the DPI produce purchasing scheme. The crop grew well. The flowers were dried and taken to Ialibu. The men were told that no money was currently available (money must be obtained from the Bureau of Management Services whenever DPI wishes to make such a purchase). The men were told to go home and store their goods. DPI would send someone to get the flowers at the earliest possible time. No one ever came. Eventually the flowers became compost in local gardens, and the second pyrethrum attempt went the way of the first.

ii) Mendi Hospital Kaukau Purchase

Throughout our stay in Muli, whenever the topic of development was discussed, Muli residents urged us to tell the government that kaukau is what local producers know how to grow. "If only they could make something from kaukau," locals mused, "we would be able to do a fine business." In September 1980, the opportunity seemed to present itself to Muli.

On 14 September 1980, on a wet and cold Sunday afternoon, a visiting Mendi official announced that the Mendi Hospital was always seeking kaukau for its food supplies, and that he had been told that Muli people could send kaukau to Mendi via the regular trips of medical personnel from Ragua

to Mendi. On this miserable day, at the invitation of the official, several Muli women dug kaukau and sold them to him for delivery to the hospital. This was to be the beginning of a series of such sales. After a long delay, which included an eventual visit to Mendi Hospital on my part, the plan was instituted. The Mendi Hospital committed itself to a once each week visit to Muli to buy kaukau at 10t/kg., and to buy all the greens and root crops made available locally. The hospital truck would carry clerk, scale, money and bags, a do-it-yourself marketing approach. We passed this information along to local producers during the week intervening between our Mendi visit and the first scheduled sales day.

On 15 October, the appointed day, the regular Wednesday market (see below) was noticeably larger than usual. The truck arrived, as promised. Sales were made in the midst of bedlam, pushing, shoving, yelling . . . all trying to ensure that their produce was purchased. Not all were successful, as eventually the truck was filled. In all, 946 kg. of kaukau and taro were purchased from 64 sellers for a total of K94.60 in cash. The average transaction exchanged K1.48 for 14.8 kg. of kaukau. Sales ranged from 3 to 30 kg.

On 22 October, the Mendi Hospital crew appeared again. They announced that they'd brought no scale with them. We arranged to get one from the Muli DPI Sheep Project, seemingly to the surprise and chagrin of the Hospital staff. Their second surprise was their announcement that they had only K40 to spend. After the K40 was dispersed, and the business ended for the day, the chief clerk announced that he would send a message to masta (me) when he would come next (I had spoken with this clerk and the hospital administrator in Mendi. He rightly assessed that this had become "my" project in

local eyes, and that no one else would coordinate communication.)

The locally-based agricultural extension officer pushed to establish a firm schedule, pointing out that local people could not plan their planting if they didn't know when sales would be made. The clerk said that he'd talk to his boss (who had arranged the sales and sent the crew) and send a message.

On 29 October, despite the lack of communication from Mendi, many people brought bags of kaukau to market, and awaited the arrival of the Mendi truck. It did not come. People shrugged, and carried their goods home. On 5 November, very few people brought extra goods, and the truck again did not come.

On 10 November, while in Mendi, I contacted the Chief Administrator of the Hospital to determine what had happened, and to suggest that a scaled down version of the plan might still continue. To my shock, Muli was promised twice weekly visits to buy 400kg. each time. The schedule was set to begin just two days hence.

On 12 November, the Mendi truck arrived, purchased the kaukau available on such short notice (about 300 kg), and announced the twice weekly schedule and the need for more kaukau each time.

The Hospital crew never returned. The staff failed to respond to a letter. Young male locals suggested that I express their anger and frustration in a letter to the government. Older producers suggested that the matter was "something belonging to the hospital." If the truck came again on a market day, there would be some kaukau to purchase. If not, no worry.

Local producers responded immediately, and on several occasions with short notice, to an opportunity to obtain cash by selling their produce.

In the absence of a continuing opportunity, we have no way of knowing just how regularly producers would have responded and how such an opportunity might have affected kaukau planting in the long run. Clearly, as in the case of pyrethrum growing of 1978, the failure of marketing facilities ruined the potential for a local cash-cropping initiative welcomed by the local producers, who "know how to grow kaukau."

iii) Summary

Muli has willingly participated in each cash-cropping scheme introduced by government officers--coffee, pyrethrum, and one occasion of kaukau. One of these crops, coffee, has had visible success in other areas in bringing money into the villages. The weight of this demonstration of success has convinced Muli to try coffee a second time, despite its early failure. The other two initiatives have been crushed by the very government which encouraged them. Pyrethrum failed to pay off as promised in its first introduction. Ialibu DPI simply failed to carry out its promise in the second. Local producers did not know where to turn, and awaited government action. In the case of kaukau sales, the enthusiasm of one branch of government went unmatched by another which was made responsible for carrying out the actions. Government said it would do something, and failed to do so. As government failed in this endeavor, it is unlikely that any local entrepreneur will step in to fill the marketing gap, in the absence of proof that a profit can be made in this fashion.

Cash-cropping is a small, but growing aspect of Muli's economy, now that coffee has again been planted. As in other areas, coffee will produce a steady flow of income into the hands of the clan. It has an already

established marketing infrastructure to ensure marketability of local products. It is the logical cash crop for Muli producers, in the absence of support or markets for others. The supralocal market for coffee and other cash crops has failed to impress its needs on Muli. The possibility that cash may flow in this way has Muli trying again. But, as we've seen, Muli feels no compunction about abandoning an effort if it doesn't fulfill its promise. Muli seeks cash, but feels free to choose the mode of acquisition. It is experimenting, for its own purposes, seeking to find the activities which will provide the highest return on labor or cash investment.

The Muli Market and Local Vegetable Sales

The colonial administration encouraged the development of vegetable gardening for sale of the product. As we discussed in the previous chapter, various introduced vegetables were accepted into local gardens for the purpose of sales. Few found their way into local diets in any significant way. Early produce sales occurred within the census division upon the arrival of an Administration vehicle sent specifically to purchase, or when a patrol passed through, camping in Muli.

Nowdays in Muli, the semi-weekly market is the normal source of sales of garden goods. Every Wednesday and Saturday morning, usually at about 10:00 a.m., a crowd of men and women from Muli and surrounding communities gathers in the Muli Base Camp area. People seat themselves on the ground and pile their goods in front of them in separate piles. The piles are typically valued at 10t per bundle, with the exceptional large items (pineapple, cabbage) being sold individually for some multiple of 10t.

Pricing, or more accurately, bundling and piling is standardized. Quantities of goods offered for the standard price of 10t (or "one shilling" or "li pamenda" - K) are equal from seller to seller. Asked how people decide what quantities to sell at the 10t price, sellers reply "We just know how much to sell for 10t." Negotiating prices or quantities is simply not done. A buyer may pay the requested price, ask for credit, or ask that a relative share his or her goods without charge, but reduced prices are not offered.

Much of the buying seems to take place from persons who are in some way related to each other. There are reports of sales or purchases between persons of no particularly close relationship, however. People also do exchange products with no physical mediation of money, although money mediates in determining the size of the bundles deemed equivalent.

There were usually about 30-50 market sellers at Saturday markets during our stay in Muli, somewhat fewer on Wednesday. Many fail to actually make a sale. Some sell a few bundles or piles of something. At most, in a typical week, sellers receive a little over one kina income. In my income survey group, sales by men averaged K1.30 on those occasions when a man chose to sell. For women the figure per selling occasion was 90t. But, the per capita average weekly income from market sales, during my survey, was 14t for each gender. Most people do not sell regularly. They bring goods to market at their whim, or when money is needed for a particular purpose. Some few sell regularly, then usually enter the omnipresent gambling circle with their receipts. Those who never sell say "no one comes to buy."

People do come to buy. Of the survey group, four men reported at

least one market purchase in half or more of the weeks surveyed, and all but two purchased an item at least once. Only one woman surveyed reported no market purchases, and six of the eleven women bought something in half or more of the weeks viewed. Table 3 lists the goods reported purchased at market by the survey group. The amount spent on kaukau is ten times that of any other item. The difference is highly inflated by the kaukau purchases of one family which was raising European pigs in a piggery. The pigs demanded food. The husband is employed at the local DPI Muli Sheep Project and cash was available to ease the burden of gardening to feed the animals. This couple spent a reported K37.40 on kaukau. The remaining ten households purchased K22.60 in kaukau combined, still substantially higher than the next highest good.

The second highest total good, pandanus nut, is a very popular food available only during the early portion of the year.

Three of the seven top sellers, sugarcane, flour pancakes, and buai (Highlands betel nut - TP) are consumed upon purchase. Their popularity is indicative of the social nature of the local market. Food, betel, and tobacco (including tradestore tobacco not included here) is purchased, immediately shared, and consumed.

While, in the aggregate, a wide variety of products was purchased at the Muli market, it is evident that local demand focuses primarily on a few staples (kaukau, greens, sugar cane, and to some extent bananas) and a few items consumed immediately among friends, essentially snack foods (sugar cane, flour pancakes, betel nut, and bananas). Purchasing kaukau, the top seller, reduces one of a woman's primary daily labor requirements --harvesting kaukau for consumption by people and pigs. It also extends

TABLE 3

Survey Group Market Purchases, February 8 - April 26, 1981

Product	Amount Expended			# Persons Purchasing		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Kaukau	60.00	24.20	35.80	13	5	8
Pandanus Nut	6.90	2.50	4.40	14	6	8
Sugar Cane	5.40	2.30	3.10	12	5	7
Flour Pancake	5.10	1.20	3.90	14	4	10
Greens	3.60	--	3.60	9	0	9
Banana	3.30	1.80	1.50	11	6	5
Betel	3.30	3.00	.30	8	6	2
Misc, Mix	2.00	2.00	--	1	1	0
Woven Belt	2.00	--	2.00	1	0	1
Cabbage	1.80	.60	1.20	4	1	3
Eggs	1.10	--	1.10	3	0	3
Tobacco	.90	.20	.70	5	1	4
Long Pitpit (Alamo)	.70	.40	.30	2	1	1
Cucumbers	.70	--	.70	4	0	4
Peanut	.60	.50	.10	3	2	1
Taro	.50	.30	.20	2	1	1
Pig Rope	.40	--	.40	1	0	1
Ginger	.30	.20	.10	2	1	1
Pumpkin Leaves	.30	--	.30	1	0	1
Mushrooms	.30	--	.30	1	0	1
Pork	.30	--	.30	2	0	2
Kaukau Leaves	.20	--	.20	1	0	1
Short Pitpit (Pandi)	.10	--	.10	1	0	1
Beans	.10	--	.10	1	0	1
Corn	.10	--	.10	1	0	1
Dacha (Leaf)	.10	.10	.10	1	1	0

the lifetime of the supply available in the garden. (It should be noted the amount of kaukau purchased is minimal compared to the amount harvested --a preliminary household consumption survey of six households, 98% of the kaukau supplied came from the household gardens. The survey is not statistically valid, but gives some idea of the magnitude of self-production relative to purchase of kaukau). It is said that when people have cash they are likely to buy food. It is little surprise that kaukau, chief among the foods, ranks high in purchases. The other items purchased, especially those at the lowest end of the list, are simply not high demand consumables. Many are not grown by most gardeners, and are purchased at market as occasional novelties. For instance, in a survey of the gardens of my survey group, I found that only certain crops were grown by virtually all of the twelve households: kaukau, sugar cane, pitpit, greens, bananas, pandanus, and taro. Even these are not always eaten. In preliminary household consumption survey (a sample of six households), I found that only kaukau (92%), rice (34%), tinned fish and meat (31%) and sugar cane (29%) were eaten on even one-third of days. Greens and pitpit (pandi), both found throughout all gardens, were reported eaten on 16% and 4% of days, respectively.

The picture derived from the income survey group shows a very restricted demand for market produce. The pattern of sales found within the same group show adaptation to the local demand pattern. Local sellers say, "I look to see what others bring to sell and then bring it too" or "I think 'maybe they'll buy this' and take something from my garden to market." Local sellers bring small quantities of goods to market. They come sporadically to sell. Of the surveyed males, one sells tobacco every week. None of the

others sell regularly. Two of them sold a single piece of male clothing during the survey. Among the surveyed females, the most frequent sellers (two persons) sold on four of the twelve weeks surveyed. One specializes in kura (K), dried grass used in making women's skirts. The other sold raani, the green, on three occasions and taro on the fourth. Kaukau was sold by at least one of these women in six of the surveyed weeks. Overall, women averaged one to two weeks of sales during the survey. Table 4 presents a summary of products sold by survey females during the twelve survey weeks of the income survey.

Table 4
Female Market Sales
(Survey Group, 8 Feb - 26 April 1981)

<u>Product Sold</u>	<u>Total Sales</u>	<u># Sellers</u>	<u># Weeks Sold</u>	<u>Avg. Sales Overall Per Seller</u>	<u>Avg. Weekly Sales Per Seller</u>
Kaukau	4.50	4	6	1.13	.75
Flour Pancake	4.20	1	2	4.20	2.10
Kura	2.10	2	5	1.05	.42
Raani	1.00	1	3	1.00	.33
Banana	1.00	1	1	1.00	1.00
Eggs	.90	2	2	.45	.45
Taro	.60	1	1	.60	.60
Tobacco	.10	1	1	.10	.10

Market sales bring a small income into the hands of local women in a highly sporadic fashion. Demand is not high, and focuses on those items in large supply. Purchasing basics saves work. But the use of money takes

other directions, as well (see below). Market purchases constituted only 2.7% of total expenditures during the income survey. This has clearly not been Muli's major road into the cash economy.

Animal Husbandry as Commodity Production

Another route to money suggested to Muli and the Ialibu area during the mid 1960s was the sale of cattle. Animal husbandry was to replace cash-cropping as the source of rural economic progress in the area. As I'll summarize below, Muli Ekerepa again involved itself in a government initiated program. Muli residents have since attempted to do business with cows, sheep, pigs and chickens. I will illustrate the business of animals in Muli with discussion of several projects by individuals in Muli, all reported to me initially as "bisnis."

The first reported cow purchase in Muli was by Loaya Yana, also the first trade store owner. Loaya was informed by a didiman that loans were available from the PNG Development Bank for cattle projects. He was encouraged to apply for a loan and to set up such a project because, he was told, "masta i laik dispeġa mit tumas" ("Europeans like this meat alot"--TP--i.e., there is a good market for the product). DPI apparently told him that they would assist in getting the meat to the Hagen "European" market. Loaya applied for the loan and was approved for A\$1400. He and subclan brother Kundi Ika convinced their brothers to allow them to fence off a large section of undeveloped kunai-covered land owned by the various members of the group. They fenced it, improved some of the grass with seed and fertilizer, aided by Loaya's loan money, and they asked for cows from DPI. Loaya financed his cows from his loan. Kundi used personal money

and a loan from two men from his wife's line (A\$60 each). Loaya received the first cow, then a second shipment arrived with more cows for Loaya and the one purchased by Kundi. Loaya first applied for his loan in 1973, and was approved in 1974. At some point thereafter, dates unclear, he claims to have owned ten cows. Five died in calving problems, according to his reports to DPI which was monitoring the project as agent of the Development Bank. They gave birth, then got skinny and died. Five others were killed at a pigkill sponsored by Loaya's line in 1977. One he killed himself, and four were sold to others to kill for a total of K360. K600 was immediately paid back to the Development Bank, K240 coming from the proceeds of Loaya's tradestore business. Three more cows were purchased drawing against the balance of the loan. One was sold as meat in Ialibu, for which Loaya received K220. Of this money, he claims to have kept K20 and to have repaid K200 to the then head of Ialibu DPI. This official, Loaya alleges, told him there were no receipts available and that he'd give one later. When "later" came, the man claimed never to have received the money. Loaya protested to the Bank, but was told that without a receipt he had no case, and that he still had to repay the money. With the loss or nonpayment of this money, Loaya fell behind on his repayments, and had paid nothing further by the end of 1980. He purchased two more cows later on, and put them in a pasture owned by his wife's line. They sold one of the cows, but have as yet given him no money. In addition, they refused to give him his other cow, saying that they had put too much effort into raising it. They promised to share the proceeds upon selling it. As we left the field, Loaya still owed the Development Bank K800. The Bank had sent letters and even a representative to talk about repayment, and

Loaya feared the consequences of his non-payment. However, the Bank had threatened no sanction, simply insisting on repayment. Loaya has responded that he will pay when his adopted daughter marries, using his share of the bridewealth to do so. Loaya considered that his cattle business had been a good project. It allowed him to help other people, to kill cows at ceremonial occasions. His only regret was that he had fallen afoul of the Development Bank.

Other Muli cows have been businesses on a far smaller scale. Palipa Pala, who dissolved a store, used the proceeds to purchase one cow, sold the meat, and used the money for consumption by his family. Katu Mu, who purchased a cow, killed it on the occasion of the opening of Muli Catholic Church. He sold half of it to two clansmen for K100, and ate and distributed the rest of the meat as one would a pig. Kundi Ika, Loaya's partner, killed his original cow, sold the meat among his line, receiving K200. He wanted to purchase another cow, but the wife of one of his co-investors died, and the man wanted his portion of the money for use in funeral payments. This left insufficient money to purchase another cow. On another occasion, he and his son-in-law worked together on the PWD road crew. Kundi participated in a "Sande"--a round robin savings system common among wage laborers⁵--and eventually received K200. From this money, he used K80, received a gift of K40 from his daughter, gave K40 to her husband who also had K80 from the PWD work, and the pair purchased two cows at K120 each. Kundi killed his in the pigkill mentioned above, and distributed the meat. He received his third cow from a local man who Kundi had helped in a funeral payment. This cow was killed and distributed at the opening of the Muli Church. The last two kills little resemble business. I asked

Kundi about the discrepancy between his label and his actions. He said that he wanted to do business with the cows, and that he had put them in the cow paddock for sale, but that no one had come to buy them. "I thought that no one was interested, so I gave them away, as I've told you." Kundi complained that the cows were causing trouble, breaking through the fence and eating greens in gardens. He had to pay compensation for the gardens. He really wanted to sell the cows, but no one came. Asked if he had received any marketing advice from DPI, Kundi replied that they had been very helpful in setting up his project, but had not offered any advice about the business side of the affair. His cows are gone. Loaya's cows are gone. Their cow fence stands empty. The wood from the yard area has been removed and used elsewhere.

This marketing problem was the downfall of another small scale project. Palipa Pala purchased two cows in 1978. He wanted to sell most of the meat and to have some to eat with his family. He announced to the community that on a certain date he would kill a cow and sell the meat. On the appointed day, he killed both cows, but only his relatives showed up, and they all said that they had no money. He gave all the meat away free.

The same problem confronted a new sheep project just underway during our field period. Yasa Palua's son returned home from the coast with K120. Yasa did not want to simply consume the money. He decided to try raising sheep, looking at the Muli DPI Sheep Project. DPI considers the project an experimental one, as I've noted earlier. They do not actively encourage local interest, nor will they recommend Development Bank loans for sheep projects. They will sell sheep to anyone who

can pay for them, and who plans to raise them for business, however. Yasa purchased four sheep (@K30) and prepared a yard for them, using land in the village of his brother-in-law. He gave his brother-in-law money to hold for him to be used to pay for the veterinary services DPI was willing to provide. The man gambled the money and lost it, delaying the project. Yasa abandoned this partnership, and constructed a fenced pasture on his own land. As we left the field, he had his sheep. DPI was advising him on their care, and Yasa was pleased with his project. We asked him how he planned to sell the sheep later on. Yasa replied that he would rely on DPI advice as to when to sell. He had already decided that he would price them at K40 each, yielding K10 profit, in his assessment. When we pointed out that this price failed to take into consideration the money for food and medicine, he said that DPI had pointed out the same and suggested that he sell for a higher price. Yasa continued saying that he was "born before the Europeans came" and did not know about these things. He thought that he would sell the sheep to anyone who came voicing interest. He had no plans to announce their availability, as he felt that people would be interested enough to make the approach. His judgement of interest was based on the fact that on occasion people had approached DPI to purchase sheep, and been refused, as they only wanted to consume the animals. Yasa wanted to fill this local demand. He failed to consider that the occasional demand might not match his own need to sell to avoid the continuing costs of feeding and medicating sheep. The local market for sheep seemed likely to match that for cows and chickens (see below). We learned eventually that Yasa killed his sheep as part of a church

ceremony. Apparently, no one came.

One local animal project, still underway as we left the field, seemed to be working well and headed for better things. Loale Rudu is a recent settler in Muli. He was raised in Kaware, across the Ialo River, where his father had fled during a dispute between Kandemambu and the other lines of Ekerepa. Loale was introduced to the Lutheran Church soon after arrival of the missions, saw the pasin bilong Yuropen ('European customs'-TP), and decided that this was the way for his people to progress. He became a Lutheran pastor and served as such for about 20 years. For reasons unknown to me, he then gave up the job and moved to Muli to settle on his father's land. He initially got a job at the Ialibu LGC Cattle Project, then was taken on at the Muli DPI Sheep Project, where he was still employed full-time as we left Muli. Loale wanted very much to be able to start some sort of project which would leave his children in a position better than that in which he was raised, and that which he saw around him in 1981. But he was unsure what was the best route to take. During 1980-1981 Loale tried a number of animal projects on a small scale - chickens, ducks and European "susu" pigs ("brood sow"-TP). He abandoned chickens as a bad idea after purchasing birds on two separate occasions from two different government agencies, DPI and Nonformal Education. Most of the birds died. Of those surviving, and not missing, he sold none. He was not impressed. Ducks worked a little better, but he found that there was no local market for them. Lack of familiarity, according to Loale, inhibited local interest. He managed to sell his ducks in Ialibu for a small profit, but assessed this as a type of project unlikely to make much money. He turned to European pigs. In 1979, in fact, Loale had

begun the application process for a Development Bank loan for this project. His proposal was for a modest loan to raise two European pigs. Bureaucratic delays, and a local dispute over his right to land resulted in his receiving the pigs (and loan approval) in early 1980. Loale had built a small piggery. He purchased pigs at K40 each (eventually buying three). He made regular Bank repayment, and was about to finish repayment way ahead of schedule in mid-1981. As with other Development Bank funded projects of which I'm aware, repayment was not coming out of the proceeds of the funded business, as is planned by the Bank (repayment schedules include a calculation of how long it will take a project to become operable and to bring a return). Loale paid out of his wages, and his family used little of his money for food or clothing. Loale wished to repay his loan rapidly, as he wished to establish good credit for a bigger loan after he finishes his experimentation (he planned to try sheep, as well, before making any final decisions). He used his funds judiciously in purchasing feed for the pigs. He and his wife carried kaukau and greens from their gardens to the pigs. He reportedly refused an offer of K1000 for one of the pigs, so that he could breed them. He did so, acquiring thirteen piglets, but losing the mother pig, eventually to sickness. As with the stories of Loaya's cows, I watched this mother pig waste away, weak, refusing to eat. She was finally killed as part of a funeral end-of-mourning feast. Loale's problem as we left the field was to figure a way to continue to feed the pigs as his loan money ran out. He is the person who purchased the large quantities of kaukau mentioned above in the market sales section of this report. To continue to do so at that rate and higher would cut deeply into his regular

earnings. If he could manage until the piglets were somewhat more mature, he had the opportunity for good business to develop. Pigs are in regular demand. European pigs mature more quickly than domestic pigs, and get far larger (they do not develop the same fat layer, however, a drawback in local eyes). Loale's self-restraint, remaining within his financial capacities, experimenting, seemed to be paying off⁶.

I've mentioned Loale Rudu's chickens, a failed project in his eyes, because the chickens died. I'd like to discuss two other large scale chicken projects in Muli. In 1977, the Yangpela Didiman organization, a Lutheran mission-based youth-oriented agricultural extension group, sent a worker named Aloysius to Muli. He moved into a house at the Community School and began a chicken project with school leavers. Why Aloysius came is not clear. The village person who became the de facto "papa bilong kakaruk" ("owner/caretaker of the chickens"--TP) (David Kiki) says that he approached the Adult Education Officer of the Province, who then contacted the Yangpela Didiman organization and arranged for Aloysius to come. In another version of the story, the Adult Education Officer, John Tompkins, came to Muli market to solicit interest, got it, then sent Aloysius. In any case, sometime in 1977, Aloysius came, Tompkins brought 100 chicks. Seventeen boys joined the project. They first built a shelter and fence at the school, and attended lectures by Aloysius on caring for chickens and on raising food for them. Aloysius provided seeds which many of the boys planted--sunflowers, soybeans, wheat, rice--to be used as food later. The boys were assigned tasks by Aloysius and David during the time the chickens were kept together. Each boy also had to contribute K1.50 for membership and feed. All seemed to be going well.

The boys each built small shelters and fences at their own homes and the chickens were distributed among them (they considered this a preferable arrangement, as they felt some were slack in their chores, and that all should simply take responsibility for their own birds). Aloysius also had the group start a number of fish ponds, and brought two European pigs for the group to own and care for. Then tragedy struck. Aloysius died accidentally. No one came to replace him. The administrative tie and source of information which had held the group together was gone. All of the boys continued to raise their own chickens, but only a few had any idea what to do with the foods they'd raised (and apparently did not discuss this among themselves). Aloysius was gone, and they had no idea where to get information. A few chickens were sold from the total lot, but mostly they were eaten. A few of the participants still had a few chickens during our stay. A few had left Muli to go to work on plantations. The others remained in Muli, but did nothing with chickens. When queried, these young men invariably replied that they did not know where to get chickens. When told, they countered that they did not have the money to buy chickens (almost all had been to plantations or have access to small sums of money). The fish ponds have dried up, the stock depleted long ago. One of the pigs was given to Aloysius' wife upon his death. The other apparently starved to death due to confusion about who was caring for it. This project was not conceived simply as a business project. An emphasis was to add protein to local diet. With the death of Aloysius, no one came to tell participants how to reproduce their products, and no one filled the role of leader of the project. It ended. This project gives us a glimpse of the marketability of chickens locally. None of the boys

would refuse to sell a chicken if offered sufficient money (sales were made ranging from K4-K7, precisely the going rate for chickens in Muli). None of the boys made any effort to attract buyers--but as we've seen that, too, is consistent with local marketing procedures. I have data accounting for 73 of the chickens. Of these 73, 40 were eaten by the owner and his immediate family, 21 were given to "wantoks" ("one talk," 'person who shares language,' loosely 'friend/relative'--TP), 8 were sold, and 4 died or were lost. Eight of seventy-three chickens sold is not a high proportion. Demand, it seems is not very large, despite the fact that most people do not have their own chickens, and everyone says chicken tastes good. As a business venture, despite the low costs involved, and initial administrative guidance, this project is not encouraging.

Unfortunately, this data was collected only after the other project referred to had begun. The local anthropologist couple was informed that the Office of Nonformal Education, with which the couple had both formal and informal ties, was encouraging development of local chicken projects. A young man in Muli told us that "villagers really like to eat chickens. You can sell them for K5. People just come and get them. We'll put up a sign, maybe." We encouraged this young man to start a chicken project, and helped him to do so. This project was to be strictly business, however, unlike the Yangpela Didman project. The local man provided all necessary labor, built a fine house, fed and cared for the chickens. The chickens matured. A sign was constructed. People were informed that there were chickens for sale. The time of maximum profitability came and went. Two birds were sold (of 50). The stores in Ialibu were approached (they sell frozen chicken). These stores receive their supply from Hagen

and were uninterested in local produce. Chickens, as a small scale business dependent upon a local market, failed. The scale of our operation was too small and undependable to interest stores.

No major animal business project has survived for long in Muli. Within the income survey group, only approximately 4% of total income and total expenditures are accounted for by animal sales and purchases. These all involved pigs. Cash is often, now, an intermediary element in exchanging pigs. We witnessed or heard reports during fieldwork of several purchases and sales. Invariably single pigs were involved. Informants told us that any time they obtained a large sum of each, they were likely to purchase a pig. When trying to raise cash, a man can offer up a pig for sale, as well. But, as with cattle, sheep, chickens, and susu pigs, there is no predictable demand for pigs. An owner must be willing and able to continue to feed and care for his pigs until such time as they are sold. Being the paradigm token of traditional value, this raises no problems in the case of pigs. There are other, more important, functions for pigs. When the occasion arises, a sale or purchase can be made. No one depends upon animal rearing for his financial income, not even Loale Rudu, who works full-time, and is looking actively for new modes of business.

Passenger Motor Vehicles (PMVs)

PMVs have been another major business interest in Muli. More people than I can account for have put money into PMV ventures locally and in other communities. Muli has attempted one cooperative PMV project. A lot of money was collected locally for a Muli PMV in the early 1970s.

Members of all the subclans invested, marking the Asa sub-subclan as "papa" of the project, as initiators and principal investors. The car broke down not long after it was obtained. It was taken to a repair shop in Mount Hagen, and stolen, "by some Chimbus" Muli people say. The Asa line tried to convince others in Muli to join together again to raise funds for another car, but the others had lost faith in Asa's judgement and refused. Another attempt to raise money for a PMV within Muli was initiated during our fieldwork. The project failed, broken by perceptions within the sub-subclan that only some of the group were saving properly, that too much had been said publically about the project making the group vulnerable to shaming if it failed (these men hoped to avoid this vulnerability by refusing to admit they had begun, saying that a few loud-mouthed younger men had talked but done nothing). Ultimately, mobilizing capital within the group and through its external ties was the problem.

In the absence of a local PMV, Muli men have often invested in the cars of other groups. A few examples of the universal experience will suffice.

Ambu Yako, with an eye to investments with high potential returns, gave money to three separate PMV ventures in Yate, Kaware, and Muli--a total of K195. He expected to receive a return on these investments of double his initial share. All three of the cars broke down shortly after purchase, none managing to get rolling again. No repayments were made.

Palipa Pala gave K300 to a PMV enterprise in Kagua. The car broke down. No money was repaid.

Petros Yana invested K800 in a Kagua owned car, with the agreement that he would receive double his share in return. The car ran for a long

time, and was still in operation when we entered the field. Petros tried to obtain his repayment, wishing to finance another business venture of his own. He was continually put off with complaints about the cost of repairs, etc. The car finally broke down while passing through Muli in 1981. It was left along the road for several days, was vandalized, and destined to become a rotting hulk. Petros has, as yet, received no repayment.

PMVs are good business if one can keep them running. But the benefits of the business rarely seem to get outside the line of the owners. Investors do not have a record of successful collection. Owners of cars which keep running tend to end up with more cars. Investors are kept at bay with ceremonial gifts from the car owners, at appropriate times. People in Muli refer frequently to the lack of a Muli car. The emphasis of their comments is not on the business of PMVs, however. People say that Muli has nothing, no coffee, no PMV. Other places are said to feel sorry for Muli because it has no car. Muli residents are dependent on other lines for rides and must pay their money to other lines because they have no car of their own. A car is a symbol of a group's prosperity. It gives a ples ("place" or "village"--TP) a nem ("name"--TP). It does, of course, bring in money, but at least equally important is the status which accrues (or which a group thinks accrues) to a line which successfully runs such a business. A PMV carries the name of one's ples throughout the region. It is a clear statement that persons from this ples deserve respect.

The Stores of Muli

In 1966, a "craze" in tradestores was reported in the Imbong'gu Sub-

district near Ialibu. Patrol Officer P.N.Sisley reported that, following the failure of cash-cropping, area residents were raising stores, supplied and encouraged by the Evangelical Bible Mission (1965b). A year later, the same officer wrote that 27 tradestores existed in all of the Ialibu District, only two of which were in the Kewabe Sub-district (1966). In 1973, P.O.Ben Probert (1973a) counted 138 stores in the Kewabe alone. Tradestores have been one of the simplest and most common forms of business undertaken in the area.

Upon arrival in Muli, we conducted the household survey referred to earlier. Of those households, 49 (45%) stated that at one time or another, past or present, they had had or still had tradestores. At the time of the survey (mid-1980) there were thirteen active stores in Muli, or one store for every 8.3 households.. Tradestores are the most prevalent kind of business in Muli other than coffee production. The high number of stores which were no longer functioning first attracted my attention. Why had 70% of all the stores closed? Were these businesses "failures"? What was, and is the role of these stores in Muli? In an attempt to answer these questions, I conducted a number of interviews with store owners past and present. I also asked about the stores in a number of informal contexts. A survey of selected stores was conducted, to be described below.

The story of the stores of Muli begins, and is well characterized by, that of Loaya Yana (the first to own cattle as well). Loaya's was the first store to appear in Muli. It was closed in early 1980. Loaya, a man now in his early forties, became a Catholic Catechist early in contact history in Muli--he estimates 1957. He served with the Catholics making

their rounds in the Kagua area, west of Muli, receiving pay reported at A\$1.00/month, plus provisions. He saved the money. After some years experience with the Catholic Missions, Loaya was sent on a trip around the larger region with one or two other Catechists--flown by plane to such places as Tari and Mendi in the Southern Highlands, Hagen and Banz in the Western Highlands, and Chimbu Province. The purpose of the trip was to familiarize him with the customs of these other places under control of the colonial administration so that he could return to tell those in Muli area of the changes in other places. Loaya went, looked, came back and told people of such customs as settling disputes in court rather than by fighting, and paying taxes. Also during this trip, Loaya saw tradestores for the first time. He decided that such an endeavor was a good idea, and decided to try it. He saw bisnis as a way to make money to buy food, soap, clothing for his family. He says he wanted to make "plenty of money." He used the A\$50.00 he'd saved to buy supplies from the Kagua Catholic Mission, the only local source of goods, and stocked the original Muli tradestore in the mid-1960s, with rice, fish, pouches of loose tobacco, soap, kerosene, blankets, tinned meat, clothes. People who had been out of Muli, working on the Highlands Labour Scheme were familiar with these products and bought them. The store thrived, managed by Loaya's clan brothers while he remained working with the Kagua Mission. Loaya says that his brothers sold some of the goods and consumed some of them. Whenever he delivered cargo, he did the same. Then in 1972, Loaya became quite ill. His line, fearful of losing another member after a recent loss through murder, brought him back to Muli, nursed him to health, and argued that he should remain there and not go back to work. After discussions

with the Mission, he did just that, and took over running the store. This began the long decline of the enterprise. Loaya and his wife had children. The children cried continually for biscuits, soda, meat--and were given the things they regularly demanded. Loaya, as store owner, was the person to whom people began to turn for help. He claims that at one point he and his wife were feeding fifteen people, including themselves. In addition, Loaya began his local drive to obtain a nem (a "big name"--TP--to become well known). The store continued to run, but Loaya began distributing the profits more rapidly than he was making them. Loaya says that his prime motivation was and is helping others--others who have no food in the village, or persons just passing through, or those without money. He says he wants to be in a position to help everyone--"sapos mi yet holim mani na meri bilong mi wantaim mipela kaikai, olgeta kaikai" ("if I have money and my wife and I eat, everyone eats"--TP). Over the years, Loaya and family bought pigs, cows, invested in the Muli PMV, ate store goods, gave out goods on credit and did not insist on repayment, gave similarly unpaid loans for PMV rides to Hagen, gave high contributions to funeral and brideprice payments, gave lots of money to the church locally, paid taxes for others, bought garden goods from others who wanted to make some money. Perhaps worst of all for the store, Loaya entered the gambling circles of Muli. "These things, dice and cards ... I played and I threw away K2 of mine, and I wanted to get it back. Ai! I wanted to get my money back! And I put in K2 more. Then I put in K10. I wanted to get my K2 back in this way, and now the money is finished. My store, too, is finished. I'm not worried about the store. It's nothing. I like helping people more, and thinking about the work of government." Through his

distributions, Loaya became Local Government Councilor from Muli to the Ialibu LGC. He attained his goal of getting a "name." He says that everyone applauded his actions. The store became saming nating ("Something nothing/no big deal"--TP) in the process of achieving his larger goal. When we arrived in Muli in June 1980, the store was closed. It remained closed until November, at which time Loaya's wife gave their sixteen year old son, Simon, about K20 from money she had received from one of her line. Simon bought some initial stock--rice and fish, sold them from the store, held on to the money, and bought increased stock. The store was running again. Loaya explicitly dissociated himself from the store in conversation with me, calling it a "giaman stua" ("mock store"--TP), not a big store a man like himself would open. The store continued to grow, then, as before, Loaya began to consume the profits, borrowing money to buy beer to give to his line, to play cards and failing to repay. The store was still running when we left the field in May 1981, but with very low levels of stock. Simon has difficulty keeping it in stock, as there is insufficient money available when he sells out.

As I've stated above, the story of this store is fairly typical in Muli. Other stores do not have such a long history, but they are just as dotted with periods of profit and growth, and periods of kaikai ("to eat"--TP, consuming supplies and capital) and decline in volume. Stores tend to close here for two reasons: (1) the owner chooses to use his accumulated capital for another venture; or (2) the owner bows to social pressure. gives goods on credit, and has no funds to replenish the stock when it is gone. Of course, both of these factors may combine to close a store. Paia Kundi and Ambu Yako are good examples of the thinking involved when choosing

to close a store. Pala, a young man of about 25, married with one small child, opened a store in about November 1979. He sold a pig for K40 and used that money to buy kago ("supplies"--TP) for the store. The store ran for three months, by which time the total capital in the store was K200. When the last of the kago was sold, Pala, with K200 in hand, purchased a cow from the Kegaro Local Government Council Cattle Project in Kagua. He killed the cow and sold the meat in his store. The money received, he and his wife used to buy food, clothes, smoke, give to friends. They consumed it all. Pala says that he would consider reopening the store if he came into a lump sum of K200 or so, but that otherwise it was simply not worth the effort to him. I asked him whether he thought his store adventure had been "good bisnis." He affirmed that it had been. He was explicitly aware of the hopes by many that their bisnis would grow and grow, from tradestore to PMV to big store, but still held that his store, too, had been "good bisnis":

PK: "Some men think that when they start a small tradestore, they'll get rich quickly through more bisnis. Others say they'll use it for the longhouses and pigs. It's 'good' if it does what you decide to do. Those who don't want to increase their bisnis use it for pigs, etc. They decide. Those who want to increase it, use it for bisnis to grow.

DB: Why do some men choose not to have their bisnis grow, if it can make money for them which they can use for pigs and shells too?

PK: If I make a tradestore and want it to get bigger, we think that some men will get jealous and poison me, and my bisnis will be alone. If, on the other hand, I make a little profit, use it to buy a pig, kill the pig, and distribute the meat, then if we don't die, we start again. Killing the pig and giving it away keeps the others from getting jealous."

Pala clearly chose the road his storing career would follow. He is aware of the possibility of choosing the "big bisnis" road, but has assessed

the risks involved and decided to take the more secure route. Pala used his store to obtain money for consumption. He used the cow in the same manner. He also has gone on a few occasions to Hagen plantation, expressly for the same purpose. When asked what would make him want to go to Hagen again, he responded "When I stay in the village there is no place to get money. If I already have money and can buy things, I will stay in the village. If I do not have money, I'll go to Hagen again." Pala's ventures into bisnis have been moderated by his desire to consume and his desire not to progress so fast as to raise jealousy in those around him. He has chosen the limits on his business.

In the case of Ambu Yako, some different choices have resulted in the same outcome--a closed tradestore. Ambu, a man of about 30, decided to open a store to make some money. He went into the bush, shot a bird, sold its feathers for decoration, and received K10. His wife sold kaukau at the market, accumulating another K10, which she gave to him. A brother gave him K10, and with the total K30 he went to Ialibu and purchased supplies of tinned fish, rice and pouches of tobacco. He claims that he ran his store for about eight years, during which time he built up a fund of about K1,000. He had other plans for this money. He purchased two cows from the Ialibu Local Government Council. One was eventually sold for K200, the other given to a man from another subclan within Ekerepa, soliciting his participation in a planned pigkill in Randelo. Ambu, invested, too, in the three PMVs discussed above. Ambu closed his store in the mid 1970s while investing in these other prospects, but set aside K200 in a bank passbook with the specific purpose of eventually restocking the store. In 1977, Muli Ekerepa held a ceremonial pigkill, sponsored

by men of another sub-clan. Ambu's own stock of pigs had been unexpectedly depleted by helping his brother pay funeral payments on the occasion of the death of his wife. Ambu felt it necessary to participate in the pigkill, and further, to help others of his line do so as well. He purchased three pigs with a combination of cash and small pigs, was given a fourth pig by his sister, then gave one each to his father, brother, and a subclan brother. All four men killed the pigs in the kill. The purchases used up his funds intended for store reopening, and he has simply not accumulated the capital to start again. He chose to participate in the pigkill rather than to reopen the store, because, if he had not participated in the kill, he would be subject to shaming from others in the future during arguments--"you did not kill any pigs, you did not give shells, you are a rubbish man!" To avoid this possibility was the motivation in deciding to use the banked money. The store had been set aside, initially, solely in hopes that a different bisnis venture (the PMVs) would be more profitable. But when this line of activity failed completely. Ambu had too little capital to satisfy both his bisnis desires and other local obligations he felt. The local needs won the day. The desire to avoid shame was stronger than that to make profit. End of store.

A single example of a "dina" ("loan"--TP) closure can be briefly cited. Yapa Roto received about K100 a year ago from a brother away at a plantation. He used some of the money to buy stock, built a store, and opened for business. He managed to keep his store going for about one year. He had constant battles trying to get people to pay their credit accounts whenever he needed money to buy new stock. But he continued to give out goods on credit. He said that people came to him claiming poverty.

and promising payment. Being a good man, he could not refuse their requests. The store closed at the end of 1980, stockless, for the last time. Yapa made the rounds of his debtors, could get none of the K60 owed him, and turned his store into a chicken coop. He failed to sell the chickens. A few months later, he and his family left Muli for a plantation, and did not return before we left.

One final example in which the combined effects of choice and granting of credit are clear. Palipa Pala opened a store about two years ago, using money from his father and brother (upon his request for help). The store was stocked only periodically--with stock being purchased, sold on credit, and being depleted without the cash on hand to restock. Palipa had to wait through these dry periods until others chose to pay their debts. At the time in which we talked, Palipa claimed that his store was still open, just unstocked (as it had been for months). But it was not simply credit that created this state. Some goods were sold for cash. This cash, rather than being held for more stock purchases, was used to purchase a pig--for K280. Asked why a pig rather than further stock, Palipa said that he thought that the pig would be more profitable. It would bear piglets and they could be sold. He decided that the store simply wasn't good enough bisnis, not profitable enough, and converted his capital into pigs.

The above examples are all stores which have been given up, whether in hopes of more profitable use of one's capital (PMVs, cows, pigs), or for more highly valued social purposes which consume the capital available to the store, or due to the frustrations of dealing with social pressures to distribute the capital. There were however, a number of stores running

as we left Muli. In order to get a sense of the patterns and volume of sales, the amount of money being channelled through these stores, we conducted a one fortnight stock and sales survey of six of the thirteen stores active during our stay--all those within easy walking distance, centrally located in the Muli area. The six surveyed stores were inventoried initially, forms for recording every sale were handed out. None of the stores keep any sort of written records, thus this procedure was anomolous and it must be presumed that there is some uncalculable error involved in what follows, due to failure to record accurately at times. At the end of the survey fortnight (16 October--13 October 1980), a final inventory was carried out, record forms collected, owners were questioned about the stock purchases during the period, and about any immediately noticeable discrepancies (e.g. "No, I didn't buy any more fish" "But you sold twice as many as you had" "Oh yeah, I bought a carton of fish") The summary results of this survey are presented in Table 5. All but one of the store owners purchased his or her supplies in Ialibu, usually at the Namasu wholesale counter. Thus, prices for the goods supplied could be reasonably accurately obtained, despite store owners wide variation in reported wholesale prices for any commodity. Sales incomes during the survey varied from K41 to K99. Stock wholesale value at the end of the survey (the inventory remaining in the stores) ranged from K0 - K66. The number of items sold in each store varied immensely. Nonetheless, a pattern did emerge--one which we've dubbed "subsistence storing." If we look at the net profit of the stores, calculated by subtracting losses (theft and spoilage are negligible--we presume losses are from outright gifts and personal consumption) at wholesale value

TABLE 5 TRADE STORE SALES, MULI - 16 OCTOBER-30 OCTOBER 1980

STORE #	# OF PRODUCTS	INITIAL STOCK VALUE	TOTAL SALES INCOME	WHOLESALE VALUE	GROSS PROFIT	END OF SURVEY STOCK VALUE	LOSS	NET PROFIT
1	7	90	42	29	13	39	22	- 9
2	15	135	99	74	25	21	40	-15
3	22	130	68	49	19	49	31	-12
4	19	146	68	45	23	67	40	-17
5	3	88	60	51	9	37	--	9
6	3	--	31	22	9	--	--	9
TOTAL	--	589	368	270	98	213	133	-35
AVERAGE	11.5	96	61	45	16	36	22	- 6

TOTAL SALES INCOME MINUS WHOLESALE VALUE EQUALS GROSS PROFITS.

GROSS PROFITS MINUS LOSS (ITEMS CONSUMED BY TRADE STORE OWNERS) EQUALS NET PROFITS

from the profit in sales (retail sales income minus wholesale value of the items sold), we find that none of the stores is making very much money, and that four of the five for which this figure can be calculated actually have net losses ranging from K9 - K17. These losses are the result of owners eating stock from the store, and owners distributing goods to friends. Both are common practice, and both cut significantly into store profitability, while not to the degree that the decision to purchase a pig or invest in a PMV does. A store provides imported foods to the owner-family virtually free of charge, while approximating simple reproduction of its stock, in the best of times.

A store provides a regular source of funds for market purchases, PMV rides, gambling, buying clothes, distribution to relatives, and a supply of foods otherwise not available in Muli. It provides a tool for accumulating a larger sum of capital when need be. This need is determined by factors external to the running of the store in every case, however. In Muli, despite the awareness of the possibility of a store serving purely for the accumulation of profit, none has done so. The accumulation of profit by an individual is not a legitimate goal in Muli. It must be subordinate to a socially acceptable reason for the accumulation. The social whole must see how the interests of the many are going to be served if an individual is to be freed of the normal day to day pressures to redistribute any accumulation of wealth. Muli stores remain a mechanism for achieving pre-capitalist individual and social goals (which include the consumption of processed foods, imported tobacco, etc.).

Wage Labor and Muli

There are and have been severe constraints on the growth of local business and cash-cropping. Government support systems, particularly for marketing of local products, have failed miserably. There is only an inconsequential local demand for purchasing vegetables, as manifested at local markets. Animals are useful in local ceremonial situations, but hardly constitute marketable products. The owners of tradestores and PMVs are faced with the need to distribute their profits among relatives rather than to hold the profits in business activity. They are inundated with requests for free services and goods, as well as credit. These constraints have limited the possibilities in individual cash acquisition as well as for economic growth through capital accumulation.

In the face of this limited ability to earn cash through business, many Muli informants have clamored for better opportunities for wage labor, as an alternative source of money.

Since the coming of the kiaps and the institution of the Highlands Labour Scheme, Muli Ekerepas have been involved occasionally in wage labor. There are loosely five categories of wage labor in which they have engaged: (1) plantation labor, whether at the coast with rubber and copra or in the Highlands with coffee and tea; (2) "professional" work, such as teaching, running an aid post or hospital. I've included elected government positions in this category in the table below; (3) Clerical/Administrative, consisting primarily of working in stores in Hagen; (4) Non-plantation labor, by which I refer to physical unskilled labor in road work, temporary government projects, and to semi-skilled work such as driving, painting; and (5) Catechist/Pastor. Considering

all members of Ekerepa about whom I have information and who were over 13 years of age in 1980 (one person estimated as born in 1966 being the youngest of anyone having engaged in wage labor, a 14 year old). Table 6 shows how many have had at least one experience in each of these kinds of labor and how many have had at least one involvement with wage labor in general.

Table 6

Muli Ekerepa Wage Labor Involvement, Aggregate
(Members Born 1966 or Before)

	Any Single Plan-		Prof.		Cler.		Labor.		Cate.			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Male	226	72.6	132	58.4	9	4.0	6	2.7	67	29.6	5	2.2
Female	219	11.4	21	9.6	0	0	2	0.9	3	1.4	0	0

Clearly (1) men have dominated the wage labor engagement of the supralocal cash economy by Muli Ekerepa, and (2) plantation work has provided by far the largest source of such work, followed distantly by intermittent periods of non-plantation labor.

That work which has been here dubbed "professional," with the exception of the elected positions mentioned, requires a higher than average education. These are the jobs to which school children have been encouraged to aspire. The men currently in positions of Aid Post Orderly (APO), Health Extension Officer (HEO), Teacher and Headmaster have "succeeded" in the eyes of all local residents. They have access to money, nice homes, responsibility. They are "man i gat save" ("learned men"--TP). There are two complaints normally voiced regarding these men: (1) they are not assigned to work in the vicinity of Ialibu where they

can be of direct service to their line; and (2) they have not, with one exception, provided much of the financial benefit to the village that their parents had hoped they would. The exception is a teacher, who after four years of working opened a trade store in Muli, to be run by his family (opened December 1980). This large investment of salary savings in Muli is unique within the group of educated professionals. The others have, for all practical purposes, disappeared from Muli. They do not maintain houses here, have no pigs or gardens, and if married have their wives with them away from the place. One of them has been begged by his father to come during the Christmas holidays each of several years. He has promised to do so on these occasions, then broken the promise without notice. These people, by succeeding in the school-bureaucracy ladder, have left the village for work purposes (and are excused for doing so by all residents, who know that there are no jobs for them in Muli). They have little tie with Muli except for kinship. At present, all are first generation absentees. They would have little difficulty in reactivating claims to local land and resources should they desire to do so. It remains to be seen what will happen to their children's claims.

These educated professional job positions are precisely that which parents send their (male) children to school in hopes of obtaining. As has been reported elsewhere, Muli parents are quite clear that they consider the payment of school fees for their children an investment. They wish to see their children in positions which allow the children a life different (i.e., richer) from their own, and which will allow the children to repay the investment of the parents.

"Mego nakina skul kambamari, na pakenalo pema agi lamisimare nogonaki yago nolalo pisima ('buying that boy's school, they must hear that we do this-- marry a woman, replace her with children and eat the pay' or 'the school boy whose school fee is paid must understand that we pay for our wives and recover the cost with the brideprice of children. It is the same with school fees.'--K)."

In the eyes of the parents, it is unfortunately the case that their children have not seen fit to pay them back as yet. Other parents, not attending to this nonpayment, are pushing their own children to go find work and to bring home pay (one of our principal aides and translators, a grade eight leaver, was chastised by his older brother for staying in the village...he was cautioned to be sure to get a letter of recommendation from us so that the time would not be a complete waste). These then are the rewards of the work world--high pay, good conditions, status at home.⁷ These professional jobs are few and far between. In a population which has very few young people who make it past standard six, there is little input, or hope of input to the local community from this sort of job. Professional jobs have done little for Muli directly. Those who have gained them have for the most part left the place.⁸

Even fewer Muli Ekerepas have managed to land clerical jobs than professional jobs. With the job world becoming more and more crowded, and minimum criteria for hiring on the rise, most of the current cohort of Muli employables simply lack the qualifications (and the connections) to get jobs. They are also not actively looking for jobs. All of the Muli school leavers who have completed more than six years of school had jobs in 1980, save our aide⁹. Two other grade eight leavers are strictly laborers, however. Recent vintage grade six leavers have not managed to

find jobs other than the plantation labor and public service intermittent labor that is available to the unschooled. People say that the government must aid the plight of these young men, but have no plans for doing so themselves. The young people in question, most still young unmarried men, just shrug and go about the business of being young men in the village--relatively carefree, not expected by their elders to be responsible (until marriage), looking at and being looked at by the opposite sex, gambling when they have money, occasionally helping their parents. Women are eventually married out, no differently than their unschooled age-mates. Men eventually marry--again no differently than their unschooled equals. Clerical jobs all based away from home, the closest in the land of enemies, Mount Hagen, have attracted only a few, and only three persons held such jobs during our field period.

The other "non-labor" work which has been or is currently held by local people is Catechist/Pastor of local churches. The pay for such work is minimal, no one having received more than K20 a month. Money is not the motivation here, nor is it a lucrative byproduct. Muli had three persons serving in this capacity in 1981--one the Catechist of the local Muli Catholic Church (since resigned, for reasons unknown to me), one a Bible Mission pastor, with a congregation of five (having dwindled from an initial 20), and a Catholic Catechist serving a nearby community, Mugaro, living away from Muli. None of these men is financially set apart from the rest of Ekerepa, nor are they bringing in plenty of money for the community.

Many Muli males (and three females) have at one time or another engaged in local non-plantation labor. The most common involvements are

those mentioned above--roadwork for the PWD and work on setting up the two local government husbandry projects. The two projects, the LGC Cattle Project and the DPI Sheep Project, had to be created out of kunai covered bush land. Local people were hired in large groups to clear the land, fence it, plant the pastures. Then their work was finished. This same sort of intermittent labor was available during the colonial administration when the road from Ialibu to Kagua was being built. Muli Ekerepa and other surrounding lines were regularly asked to provide men to work, and were paid in cash, at least from the mid-1960s on. All of this labor has been relatively short-term, with specific completed projects in mind. They have provided short-term flows of money into the community through several hands. Most recently, the periodic source of labor has been road work under contract to the Department of Works and Supply (formerly Public Works). When money is available, a foreman is sent out from Ialibu. He stops anyone he sees on the street in the vicinity of the proposed work and asks if that person wants to work. Almost all do. Quite a few Muli men of all ages, schooled and unschooled, have taken advantage of this offer to work. If it is rumored that the foreman is coming to hire, men spend their time around the road, just waiting in hopes of being picked. The work is hard, but the pay is steady (about K25/fortnight) and the length of work commitment is limited (and well within the ideal of six month stints suggested by some school leavers). When these contracts are available, approximately K125/fortnight is injected into the community (typical crews consisting of five persons), much of which is circulated through gifts, trade store payments, debt repayment, purchases of pigs, and gambling.

Plantation labor has been the major source of wage-employment for Muli Ekerepa. Over half (58.4%) of the male population has on at least one occasion spent at least one week at a plantation working. This is double the male incidence of non-plantation labor, the second highest source of wages. For females, far fewer have worked than males (9.6%), but again, within the female work experience, plantation labor has provided far more paid employment than any other source. Of all of the females who have gone to work on a plantation, only one has done so on her own (she was on a plantation during our fieldwork, and unavailable for interview). This person is highly atypical, and looked upon unfavorably locally (her reputation is impugned) as a result of her trips. The other women who have gone to plantations have gone with husbands or fathers. Of the women currently (November 1980) absent from Muli on plantations all are accompanying their husbands (with the single exception noted). These families are among those which have been given land on plantations for building a house and gardens. The women reportedly do work sometimes, invariably picking coffee, but during slack periods when only weeding jobs are available, they work gardens. I've heard of no case in which the wife continued to work while the husband did not. There were eleven of these women away from Muli in November 1980 (which is to say as well that there were eleven Muli married men whose wives have accompanied them to the plantations). All of these families have relocated in the Western Highlands. Eight of them have children with them, children mostly reported to be too young for school (a child ten years old could conceivably be labelled as such). This family plantation migration is a fairly recent phenomenon, all of the current absentees having gone since

1975, and most since 1977 (in a few cases the husband had gone earlier and then was joined by his wife). The only cases I know of in which a woman travelled to a plantation before 1975 involved a woman who travelled to Moresby with her husband, and a young girl who accompanied an uncle for one month to Mt. Hagen. Both occurred in 1974.

Two other married men were gone from Muli in November 1980, on plantations, having left their wives and children behind ("to tend the gardens"). There were also twenty-two unmarried males away from Muli, and three males whose marital status I do not know. All totalled, 10-15% of Muli males over 13 years of age are regularly off on plantations, and were in 1980.

For the 58.4% of Muli males who have gone to plantations, the average involvement overall is for each person to have made two trips of approximately one year each to the Highlands coffee or coastal rubber, copra and cocoa plantations. There has been quite a bit of variation from this average, however, ranging from one man who has made seven trips averaging just over one month each to others who left the village in 1974 and have not come back other than to visit, one trip to a plantation for over 72 months. The story of Muli plantation involvement, as I've been able to put it together, is a story in which the rate of incidence of long-term absences, mostly by young unmarried males, has remained reasonably stable after an initial buildup in the mid 1960s, but in which the opening of other opportunities has allowed two other patterns to grow up beside this stable group: short-term "hoppers" (my label) and the married couples to whom I've referred above. Muli's plantation labor story is as follows:

One man has claimed absurdly early dates for his first plantation involvements, claiming to have begun his third two year contract to the coast (with periods in Muli in between) in 1963. If the data cited from Patrol Reports (in Chapter 2 above) is to be believed, this man's dating must be discounted. By 1964, however, at least four unmarried men went to various spots at the coast (2 Rabaul, 1 Vunaluma, 1 Karua near Moresby). These were two year contracts. In 1965, two more young men left, again for two years each. Ten others left during the next years of the 1960s. Of these men, five never went to a plantation again, having completed one long tour of duty. Their typical explanation is that the work was very hard, that there were too many unpleasanties at the coast (insects, snakes, disease), and that they missed their relatives at home. The story of one illustrates the aid to Muli brought by these sojourners. Yapa Roto spent two years at the coast. He came home with a total of AS86.00. His relatives immediately inundated him with requests, and he distributed the cash completely. Finished! There was little he could have done, it seems, to hold the amount and to attempt to start any sort of local business endeavor. He was a young unmarried man with no status, who would be dependent on his relatives to help raise brideprice. It seems not to have occurred to him or his line to use the money in some collective venture such as a store, nor was there easy access to supplies, had the thought occurred to anyone. The money was brought back, distributed far and wide, consumed, and gone.

The first years of the 1970s continued in the same vein. But in 1973-1974, the picture began to change. The first of the modern school leavers began to make trips then. Transportation to Mount hagen seems

to have improved significantly, as well. In 1974 the first signs of a future pattern of shorter trips to plantations began to manifest itself. By 1978, two sub-groups of migrants could be distinguished. The sub-group of Muli males leaving for long-term periods at plantations was paralleled by a group who left Muli for less than a year at a time, often hopping from one plantation to another during their absence (the "record" hop included four different plantations during a seven month absence). School leavers are somewhat more likely to have been to a plantation at least once than are their agemates (or "poroman"--TP).¹⁰ (75% of school leavers, and 67% of their unschooled poroman)¹¹ Their poroman, however, averaged much longer trips when they went (schooled--2.45 trips/person of 6.65 months; unschooled--2.1 trips/person of 17.2 months per trip).¹²

Plantation life has its attractions. One local woman visiting from the plantation, explained that she and her husband like living at the plantation (in this case, Ailiamp, WHP) because "it's just like home except we have more money." She doesn't like the surrounding social environment of Hageners, and only rarely ventures off the plantation to Mount Hagen itself ("too many rascals trying to steal your money"), but the steady income does allow the purchase of plenty of clothes, the purchase of tradestore goods to vary the fare produced in her own gardens, and the giving of gifts to the omnipresent visiting relatives of both she and her husband's lines (she recounted about K200 worth of gifts to her brothers alone in the last year, as example). The relatively easy access to the Ialibu vicinity from WHP also allows contact to be maintained at home with periodic visits. One needn't give up one's village through

this long term absence, so long as some contact is maintained, some participation in group events (persons regularly return from Hagen for funerals, pigkills, brideprice assessments, then return to the plantation after this brief holiday). There is some indication that a stable life style could be growing up in this "family-on-the-plantation" pattern, at least for persons such as Muli Ekerepas who live fairly close to the area (not close enough, in their estimation). It remains to be seen what happens as such couples become older and have school aged children. Will they send the kids home to the family? force the plantation to establish schools? send the children to schools in enemy territory? keep the children out of school? go back home together? The answers have not been determined as yet in Muli. These families are something new.

The other category of migrants, single men, are not so new. A number of reasons have been offered by these men for leaving home. For one, some parents prod them to go. When a young man is sitting at home he does very little work, has no particular responsibilities, and is a continuing drain on his parents resources (read, especially, "mother"). He provides little in return. He does little toward producing his own future brideprice. Muli parents encourage the young men to go find jobs, go work on plantations, and to bring back money for the family and for bridewealth. Another factor explicitly stated has been the "city lights" factor. One newly married young man said mournfully, "I think I'll spend my whole life between Kanda and Ialibu. I wish I could see Australia or your place. Maybe I'll go to the coast next year and see another place." Others talk of the availability of entertainment and things to do--things

unavailable in Muli area. This availability of entertainment combines with that of money. A number of young men have put it to me that they would much prefer to stay in Muli, that they do not like the work on plantations ("I don't like the way the dew falls into my face when I shake the cherries off the trees in the morning." "They wanted me to work in the middle of a rain storm. I told them to wait for just a half hour and the rain would pass. They ordered me to go out anyway."). The problem, as they see it, is that there is no way for them to make money in Muli, and without money they cannot buy clothes, beer, food--all things they want very much. The young men of Muli are especially conscious of their clothes, and of not being clean. Most of them have one shirt and one pair of pants or shorts. These are constantly circulated among the group, and do not last very long. On plantations in WHP, one has money and is close to town where clothing can be purchased. A stock can be built up and held onto for a while, until one's eventual return to the village, where most of the goods will be redistributed. The hope of making enough money to start some sort of business at home (thereby avoiding future trips to plantations) is stated, but immediately qualified by those with experience, saying:

"We go with that idea, but then we get our pay and we go in town and we see all of the clothes, and beer, and chips and other foods, and we spend all of our money. We don't usually bring much home with us, and only rarely send any back. What we do bring back, some of it we give to our parents, the rest we use to buy fish and rice and to gamble"

and

"We don't really think of things like business or pigs too much. We usually say, we're young and our parents are still alive."

Several persons have said that they leave the plantation, at least ideally, when they have enough money to last them and their families for a while, enabling them to purchase store goods. One, Pala Kundi, has already been quoted as saying that he does not think of leaving Muli unless he has no money.

There is one other factor sometimes accounting for the decision to leave the place. There is a spontaneous pull in seeing a truckload of others, including friends and relatives, about to pull out. "When the truck comes and I see all of my wantoks ("one talks," loosely, "my friends") going on it, I get very excited, and I just jump on, too, and go work for a while." These are the celebrated instances when a man just leaves the village, without telling his family. People in Muli say that others see them go, and will surely tell parents or spouse, so "no worry!"

People who go to the coast, and who essentially lose contact with Muli for at least two years, do not seem to do much to benefit the village. Some bring back a minimal amount of cash, and distribute it along with clothing. Two have reported sending back enough to invest in someone's store (one of the recipients consumed the money, instead). One, cited above, brought back the capital for a short-lived sheep project. Others do not provide immediate benefit to Muli.

Those who go to the Western Highlands, men young and old, families, do seem to contribute something locally. There is a steady flow of money into the place, minimal though that flow is relative to total earnings. This flow of money seems to be one of the biggest sources of money coming into the village, although I cannot quantify that statement. On fortnights

Fridays, one group of Muli people inevitably heads off to Hagen to collect from relatives, expecting gifts if they visit, another segment awaits the arrival of visitors returning from Hagen, lining the local PMV stop late into the afternoon. Additionally, having relatives at an accessible plantation gives one a place to go. It breaks the local routine when a man can go visit his relatives (women rarely do).

On the whole, it is young single men and young married men who normally choose to go to a plantation, whether with or without spouse. The option is not open to single young women. It is conceivable that they'd literally be dragged back home if they were seen heading off alone. Older married couples are too well established locally to move away from their gardens and network of social relations. Older men do go occasionally to a plantation, but generally only if they have a particular purpose in mind for the money, and many have returned far more quickly than they'd anticipated, not liking the work.¹³

The moment of decision regarding going to a plantation is in the hands of the migrant. No one in Muli (or from the outside) can force another to go to work.¹⁴ The power of parents over children is limited. Muli children are raised to exercise their own wills. People do decide to go. Several factors affect the decision and the ongoing decisions about whether to stay at a plantation.

The push from the village includes the pressure felt by young schooled men to make a return to parents and relatives who invested in their school fees, as well as pressure to accumulate some portion of future bridewealth through personal effort (a route to bridewealth which was rather limited in precolonial times). The push also includes boredom

when in the village, created in part by the changes in local life imposed by pacification (no need for activities of war) and in part by comparison of the routine nature of village life to the novelty of activities and encounters during time spent elsewhere. Finally, the push includes the somewhat limited access to cash in the village of young unmarried men relative to older married men. Young unmarried men have no affines with whom to share money (see below re: "redistributing cash"). They have no pigs or other valuables to sell. They are not direct recipients of inter-clan exchange payments, and are dependent on intra-clan redistribution for this access to cash. These limitations are confronted by what seems to be a higher degree of desire or felt need for imported commodities (clothing, soap, foods, beer) in these young people, especially those who have been schooled (using early curriculum materials derived directly from Australian syllabuses with examples drawn from Australian life. Weeks and Guthrie, n.d., review curriculum development in PNG).

The pull of the plantations complements these push factors. Cash is readily available, virtually on demand, through plantation labor. The desired clothing, beer, and foods are available on plantations or in nearby towns, and the cash to purchase them is in hand. When relatives visit, cash and goods are available to give them, relieving somewhat the pressure of obligation unfulfilled to parents and relatives. Plantation work, too, structures the day and heightens the pleasure of free time spent together with fellow migrants (no one goes to a plantation, nowadays, without knowing that a wantok is there, or being accompanied by clansmen or affines).

Young men have few responsibilities in the village, and consequently little that requires doing. They cut firewood, play basketball, sing, gamble (when one of them gets money),¹⁵ and painim meri ("look for girls"--TP). They are aware of "things," like clothes, which they cannot buy without money. They have friends already at plantations. Many decide to go, at least for a while. One group of young school leavers agreed that six months was the ideal length of time to be away at a plantation. They go, but they have a place to return to. They've given up no rights. But it is hard work, under undesirable conditions. One does leave one's family and closest associates at home. One does enter the dangerous territory of enemies. Life in the village may be dull and financially unrewarding, but it is also infinitely less demanding on one's labor time.¹⁶

There exists a shifting threshold beyond which the undesirable elements of plantation life--working conditions, living in close contact with enemies and strangers, continual visits by relatives to ask for cash, and a general homesickness and sense of missing one's relatives--outweigh the benefits. Almost all Muli migrants have come back. They have had no trouble reintegrating into local life. Plantation migration from Muli tends to be circular, with the circle being completed sometimes quickly, sometimes slowly.

Redistributing the Wealth: Gambling and Gifts

Bisnis and wage labor are activities engaged in by Muli residents on an intermittent, limited basis. But in the aggregate, someone in Muli is nearly always bringing money or commodities into the community

through such activities. Two mechanisms ensure that the rewards of these activities are redistributed throughout the community and beyond. Gambling and gift-giving, or sharing, serve this redistributive function.

i) Gambling in Muli

During our first week in Muli, a young man told us that he was trying coffee, but that the best way to make money in the village was to gamble. In a sense, he turned out to be right. Gambling winnings produced 35.9% of the income reported in the Muli Money Survey, making it the highest single source of income. Gambling losses accounted for 23.6% of the expenditures, the second greatest category of expense. One simply cannot consider the cash economics of Muli without a discussion of gambling.

As is obvious in the data of Tables 7 and 8, gambling is principally an activity of men. Only one of the women in our survey reported any gambling activity for cash, accounting alone for both the winnings and losses by women in the tables (five of the eleven men reported gambling). Some women do gamble, most commonly after the close of the semi-weekly Muli market. Having earned a few "shillings" (10t coins), some elect to try their luck at increasing their holdings. More commonly, women play for raba ("rubber"--TP), small black rubber bracelet rings worn on the wrist. Raba can be purchased at the cost of only a few toea at Ialibu tradestores. Women's relative lack of money and the relatively high demand on their time by other functions inhibits large scale gambling. As with other social activities, the normal separation by gender prevents gambling from providing a major source of income for females. On the single occasion that a female wished to gamble a large sum of money during

Table 7

INCOME, HOUSEHOLD MONEY SURVEY
8 February-26 April 1981

<u>Source</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>%M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>%F</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>%T</u>
1. Gambling Winnings	1130.30	41.3	5.50	1.3	1135.80	35.9
2. Gifts, Cash	795.70	29.0	269.60	63.7	1065.30	33.7
3. Taken fr Business	235.05	8.6	2.70	0.6	237.75	7.5
4. Wages	226.64	8.3	10.00	2.4	236.64	7.5
5. Animal Sales	100.00	3.7	69.00	16.3	169.00	5.4
6. <u>Sande</u> Receipts	122.00	4.5	-	-	122.00	3.9
7. Anthro Fees	28.00	1.0	28.00	6.6	56.00	1.8
8. Local Produce Sales	18.50	0.7	17.90	4.2	36.40	1.2
9. Unharvested Crop Sales	30.00	1.1	-	-	30.00	1.0
10. Gifts, Goods	14.05	0.5	11.30	2.7	25.35	0.8
11. Bottle Deposit Returns	20.00	0.7	-	-	20.00	0.6
12. Coffee Sales	18.00	0.7	-	-	18.00	0.6
13. Compensation	-	-	9.00	2.1	9.00	0.3
14. Found	-	-	.10	0.0	.10	0.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	2738.24	100.1	423.10	99.9	3161.34	100.2
Per Capita Survey	124.47		19.23		71.85	
Weekly Per Capita	10.37		1.60		5.99	
Proj. Ann. Per Cap.	539.35		83.34		311.35	

Table 8

EXPENDITURES, HOUSEHOLD MONEY SURVEY
8 February-26 April 1981

<u>Expenditure</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>%M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>%F</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>%T</u>
1. Gifts, Cash	854.05	28.3	129.27	36.2	983.32	29.1
2. Gambling Losses	793.90	26.3	2.70	0.8	796.60	23.6
3. Trade Store Consumbls	284.20	9.4	120.40	33.7	404.60	12.0
4. Business Supplies	354.05	11.7	3.80	1.1	357.85	10.6
5. Beer	266.00	8.8	-	-	266.00	7.9
6. Animal/Shells	160.00	5.3	-	-	160.00	4.7
7. Market Produce	45.20	1.5	64.40	18.0	109.60	3.2
8. <u>Sande</u> Payments	80.00	2.7	-	-	80.00	2.4
9. Gifts, Goods	47.50	1.6	15.50	4.3	63.00	1.9
10. PMV Rides	43.90	1.5	8.20	2.3	52.10	1.5
11. Bail	24.00	0.8	-	-	24.00	0.7
12. Clothing	18.30	0.6	-	-	18.30	0.5
13. Unharvested Crops	16.00	0.5	-	-	16.00	0.5
14. Church Offering	3.30	0.1	7.65	2.1	10.95	0.3
15. Lost	10.00	0.3	.10	0.0	10.10	0.3
16. Social Hall Fees/Snacks	9.30	0.3	-	-	9.30	0.3
17. School Fees	4.80	0.2	3.10	0.9	7.90	0.2
18. LGC Taxes	4.00	0.1	2.00	0.6	6.00	0.2
19. Photos	3.00	0.1	-	-	3.00	0.1
Totals	3020.25	100.1	357.12	100.0	3377.37	100.0
(÷22) Per Capita Survey	137.28		16.23	(÷44) 76.76		
(÷12) Weekly Per Capita	11.44		1.35	(÷12) 6.40		
(x52) Proj. Ann Per Cap.	594.90		70.34	(x52) 332.62		

our field work, she gave it to her husband, who entered the male gambling circle and lost all of it in a brief afternoon. In the single instance with which I am familiar of men and women gambling together in Muli, young men and women played for raba. This was clearly a lark on the part of the males, entertaining themselves with young women. The rule against women participating with the men is by no means strictly enforced. One Muli male in the survey group reported having won well over K100 from a "Kebik meri" (a woman from the neighboring Kebik line--TP). Women may gamble with men, just as men may raise sweet potatoes. Its just not usually done. The pressures to give up money to the decision-making power of a male are strong. Women tend not to hold on to large amounts of money, and not to interact with men. The rest of our discussion of gambling will focus on men in Muli.

The principal gambling game in Muli is satu (TP--no translation), a game played with dice. Far less frequently, a deck of cards appear for a game of laki ("lucky"--TP). (See Laycock 1966,1967; Brandewie 1967 for characterizations of laki and other PNG card gambling games--Muli plays the ten point version of laki.) The mechanics of playing satu are very simply. Three dice are placed in a can or other container, and tossed out onto a board or flat surface. The resulting pattern of points is labelled either "pamenda" or "mala," Kewa for "one" or "four." If the majority of dice shows numbers ranging from one to three, the pattern is "one." If four to six hold the majority, it is "four." This ends round one of play. No one would play satu just for fun. The betting is the essence of the game (even small children imitating their parents "bet" stones or bottlecaps). The bet takes place before the throw of the

dice. Payment follows immediately upon the result of the toss. At the beginning of a gambling session, a man declares his intention to play either "one" or "four." He will not change his "point" so long as the session is continuous, and the dice are not changed. Betting involves a player of "one" (or "four") placing his coins (or occasionally paper money) onto the flat playing surface, and a player of the opposite point covering his bet. The winner picks up the pile. One's choice within this game is simply when and how much to bet, and against whom. Bets are between individuals. Individuals are usually participating as one of a few cooperating players, however--an implicit team. As play progresses, a passerby sees only a circle of men crouched, looking down into the middle of the circle, intent on each throw. Conversation between participants is minimal--an unusual state of quiet among the usually talkative, noisy, exuberant Kewa.

A man does not bet against men of his own line. Social context determines which level of hierarchy constitutes "line." In a neighboring community, Muli Ekerepa men would not gamble against each other, but only against men of the other ruru (clans) of the region. In Muli, men of the three subclans were said never to gamble within subclan lines. In an extraordinary moment, in local eyes, on November 11, 1980, three men of Asakindipa (two Asa and one Kindipa) gambled against each other (and with one Mutanaya)--the first time anyone could remember such an occurrence. The three had no one else to play with, and a large sum of money between them. All are regular satu players and close associates. To my knowledge, such incestuous gambling did not recur during our stay. In addition to

one's own brothers, a man does not play directly against his in-laws. This was stated to me in principle ("My tambu had K200, but I couldn't take it. Yondoepa did though.") As with other kin terms in the Highlands, the Tok pisin word tambu ("in-law"; "taboo") has varied application. It is not clear to me just how the restriction is practiced, to what limits of affinal relations, in gambling.

Gambling does have its known dangers, and its local opponents. Clearest to all is the ability of gambling to subvert local business. One young man, contrasting successful entrepreneurial activity in a neighboring line with the failed businesses of Muli, pointed out that the big man leader of business in the neighboring clan does not gamble. Muli business activities have regularly been dissolved through loss of potential capital in the gambling circles. Another informant described the circle as if it had a parasitic life of its own. He said that if anyone in the community is known to have money, the satu circle draws near and drains the money supply. Then it moves on. Pilai i kaikai bisnis long dispela ples ("Gambling eats the business of this place"--TP).¹⁷

Gambling was reportedly against the law in 1980-1981. When police drove by, boards, dice and cans disappeared. In the absence of police, gambling circles were omnipresent. Gambling could never be stamped out entirely, I was told. A "rubbish" man has no other road to riches. He would fight hard to circumvent any barrier to the potentially immediate, if short-lived, wealth to be derived from gambling. A 10t coin can turn into money enough to buy rice and fish, or to pay a ride to Ialibu. "We think, when all are killing pigs, that we'll take K2 and win K200, and

have a pig to kill too." Patrol Officer Probert, in 1973, noted the increase of gambling with any influx of money into the area, and the impossibility of eliminating it entirely (1973a). In 1981, a Muli informant returned from neighboring Urundere after four days of continuous gambling. He explained that more money than usual was available to the satu circles because "It's the time for killing pigs. Lots of men have bought pigs, and the ones who have sold are playing now in Urundere." Gambling continues as a principal source of hope and as a place to "throw away money" (troimwe mani--TP; spend money).

It is possible to win large sums of money when phenomena such as pig kills or the return of several labor migrants fills the community coffers with cash. One gambling night, a Muli man won K300 while another won K100. On other occasions, reports of winning K50 to K100 were not uncommon. Upon winning such sums, people report buying a pig or piglet, or replenishing store stock, as well as redistributing wealth. One must note, however, that big winning tends to be matched by big losing. In a game where fifty-fifty chances rules (if we can ignore the effects of individual use of magic charms to alter the probability of success), most players win big on some occasions, and lose big on others. The "successful" gambler is one who has the money to allow him to play again and again. Gambling is a means to gain money, but for many it is an end in itself, a form of entertainment, association with one's fellows, competition. Men gamble with different dreams. The man with 10t hopes to win enough to buy food and tobacco. The man with K2 hopes to win enough to buy a pig. The man with K50 thinks of opening a store. They come and play. The money goes round and round. Much of it gets

redistributed immediately upon being won. A clansman or affine standing by, empty-handed, is given a stake to allow him to enter the game.

Informants say, "It is not good that my brother has nothing while I hold money, when my number comes up." If the man receiving the money plays and wins, he may split the winnings with the giver, but is under no obligation to do so, nor to repay if the money is lost. The money is a gift among brothers and fellow gamblers.

"If I see my brother with no money while I am gambling, I give. I think 'if I have nothing, they'll give it to me to play when they win.' The boy who just gave me K10, I usually give to him. That's why he gave to me."

Giving to fellow players, clansman onlookers, and affines is good personal politics, and also insures one's ability to participate in future play even when one has no money with which to begin. Someone will give it.

Gambling is said by one Muli man to be his way of earning money.

It is the source of cash and entertainment for a number of regular players. It is the hope of many sporadic entrants into the satu circles. It provided more income in the Muli Money Survey period than any other source (but to less than half of the men surveyed). Gambling has become an institution in Muli. It serves as a center for speculation, for investment, with virtually instant results and none of the drawbacks associated with investing cash in business. The risk of loss is high, but the immediacy of potential payoff is attractive. In the absence of stronger business opportunities and more wage labor opportunities, Muli men and their neighbors will certainly continue to gamble. Perhaps more importantly, they will continue to redistribute their winnings, spreading the benefits of gambling to the whole community. For a few, gambling provides a

good cash flow. For the many, gambling provides money indirectly in the way of gifts.

ii) Redistributing Cash

"Gift money" (my label) is the second largest source of income reported in the Money Survey, constituting 33.7% of all income. Among women, it ranked an overwhelming first, at 63.7% of income. In addition, gift money is the single source of money reported received by all Money Survey respondents, male and female, young and old. Gifts also constituted a major category of expenditure for the survey group. Twenty of the twenty-two survey participants claimed to have given cash gifts. Only two other expenditure categories equalled or exceeded this number-- purchase of tradestore goods (all respondents), and purchases of market goods (20 of 22). In amount, cash gifts greatly outweigh either of these two categories--gifts account for 29.1% of total expenses, tradestore purchases for 12%, market purchases, 3.2% (see Table 8).

Gift-giving, or sharing, is a clearly evident part of daily life in Muii. Food, clothing, tobacco, and money flow easily from one person to another. No one would dream of sitting at the market eating sugar cane alone. A stick of cane is broken and shared. Ten toea coins are shared among a group of men, all buy buai and sit and chew together. Cash gifts are rationalized or offered for a variety of explicit reasons. The following were regularly mentioned as reasons for unsought gifts:

"He gave me money because he was sorry for me, because I had to pay a fine."

"He gave it free, saying 'I know you are short of tobacco. Go find it!'"

"He gave it, saying 'You are hungry. I see it. I give you this money.' "

"She gave me the money to buy meat for my child."

"He just gave it to me."

"I didn't give him enough pig at the last pigkill. Now I give him money on top."

"It was raining. He told me to get a PMV to go home."

"He was a friend of my father. I call him 'papa' and he calls me 'child.' "

There is no sanction against using money for purposes other than the giver's stated intention, however. The reasons are rhetorical and non-binding.

Gift requesting, too, is part of daily life. Requests between clansmen and acquaintances for sharing of the little things of daily life are as frequent as the unsolicited gifts. Clansmen feel free to request a share of food and tobacco, to borrow clothing, to ask for small amounts of money. It is bad social form to refuse such requests, suggesting implicitly that no relationship exists between the requester and the refuser. These requests are virtually never refused. There are simply no grounds upon which one can do so legitimately. Requests for larger items of aid--a sum of money to buy a pig or to pay a fine, or pigs and shells--are made in private. The size of the request alone increases the probability that the request will be refused. But even with large requests, the social value favoring sharing of holdings shapes the response. One cannot simply refuse a request from a clansman. The ultimate sanction against doing so is the fear of angering him. If he becomes jealous of one's holdings and angry over the refusal to share, he

might engage in sorcery, or might be willing to cooperate with one's enemies to introduce poison (romo--K) into one's food. The refusal of even the largest requests must be worded to save face and to be convincing. Essentially, one must lie to one's clansman, saying that one has none of the requested good. Local custom does legitimate such a claim if one has a resource that has been specifically reserved for some purpose (e.g., money set aside to help pay a son's bridewealth). Everyone understands that a bigman may often refuse requests, or plead indigence, while holding back large sums of money for some upcoming major event. Under these circumstances, no animosity is created upon being refused a request (if it is done in proper form). Otherwise, clansmen are supposed to share, and share they do.

As with the products of gardening, the individual who has somehow come to hold money is the person who has the right to redistribute it. While there are strong sanctions against hoarding money and refusal to share, no other individual has the power to force another to give money, short of physical force or theft--each of which is considered acceptable behavior only toward enemies and strangers. Within the clan, this means that even husbands and wives spoke of giving "my" money to the other, or receiving "his" or "her" money. In the Money Survey, a chief relationship manifested by the sharing of money was between husband and wife. Only one couple reported otherwise, the elderly wife reporting that "money is his business, gardening is mine," and that she always handed all money over to her husband. Table 9 shows the sums of money reported shared with spouses.

Table 9: Cash Gifts Between Spouses

		<u>Given to Spouse</u>	<u>Received from Spouse</u>
Person Reporting	Male	49.40	28.40
	Female	69.15	110.35
Total		<u>118.55</u>	<u>138.75</u>

It is important to note the discrepancy between the reports of husbands and wives. Husbands reported figures far lower than did wives. Such a discrepancy must give us pause about any of the money figures reported in our survey. We must remember that the figures reported are the best approximations available, but that the kina amounts cannot be treated as accurate in themselves. Nonetheless, we can see that something in the range of K120 flowed between spouses, and all agree that, in the aggregate, men gave more to their wives than vice versa. If we convert the figures to percentages of reported expenditures and receipts, we see too, that a very large portion of cash gifts involving females were gifts to and from their husbands (see Table 10).

Table 10: Spouse Gifts, Percentages

	<u>Given to Spouse</u>		<u>Received from Spouse</u>	
	<u>% of Gifts</u>	<u>% Total Inc.</u>	<u>% All Gifts</u>	<u>% Total Inc.</u>
MALE	5.8	1.6	3.6	1.0
FEMALE	53.4	19.4	40.9	26.1

Men on the other hand, gave and received a fairly small portion of their aggregate holdings to and from their wives, involving themselves in a larger and wider network of cash giving and receiving. Table 11 compares the average number of persons with whom men and women respondents had cash sharing relations during the survey period.

Table 11: Cash-Sharing Relationships

	<u>Gifts To</u>		<u>Gifts From</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Avg.</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Avg.</u>
Male	150	14	133	12
Female	55	5	73	7

Throughout the Money Survey, and in casual conversation, when asked why they had given money to a particular individual, or received from that individual, respondents explained the gift by referring to the relationship existing between the two persons and occasionally added a functional purpose to the reason. A typical response was "He's my tambu," and more elaborately, but less frequently "I gave K10 to my wife's father. He had to return brideprice to someone and needed it." Referring to relationship was normally treated as sufficient reason for giving small gifts--in the vein of comments I've reported above, which implied that one simply ought to share and wants to share upon meeting a "brother" or "affine" somewhere. The kinds of relationships referred to by far the most often were ties of kinship/clanship and affinal ties. Table 12 summarizes the kin/clan relations involved in cash gift exchanges during the Money Survey.

Table 12: Cash Gifts and Kin/Clan Relations

<u>Relation</u>	<u>Male Ego</u>		<u>Female Ego</u>	
	<u>Gave</u>	<u>Received</u>	<u>Gave</u>	<u>Received</u>
Ego's Clan	573.00	516.25	25.50	6.60
Spouse's Clan	103.70	43.10	114.87	226.60
Ego's Mo Cl.	13.40	6.35	0.00	2.50
Ego's Wi-Giv. Aff. ¹	10.70	1.20	.20	.20
Ego's Wi-Tak. Aff. ²	1.80	22.70	0.00	0.00
Sp. Clan's Affines	0.00	0.00	2.20	16.50
Sp. Mo. Clan	12.20	0.00	1.00	.40
Other Specified K/Cl.	1.00	6.20	.10	2.00
Schank Cl. Rel. Unk.	0.00	60.00	.00	0.00
Non-kin Nonclan	117.50	114.40	21.00	12.00

- Notes for Table 12: 1. Excludes Ego's Spouse's Clan
2. Excludes Ego's Clan

The strength of the clan as a social unit and of an individual's affinal ties are clearly demonstrated in money-sharing interactions. Intraclan exchanges between male clanmates accounts for five times as much money given and received as any other category of relationship. Within the clan, individual gifts averaged approximately K5.00 during the twelve week survey. There was little variation in amount when comparing gifts involving members of the same subgroup within the clan to gifts involving members of different subgroups. Gifts to male relations at the level of X-repaa, sub-subclan, subclan, and clan were essentially equivalent (that is, over the twelve week period a man gave K5.00 to a single other man of a particular relationship. This amount did not vary with any in-clan relationship). However, while the average amount of intra-clan gifts does not vary across groups, the money data does manifest a strong sub-grouping within the clan based on the number of transactions within sub-groups, or the density¹⁸ of the gift-giving relationships of an individual within the various sub-groups of Muli Ekerepa. The level of inclusion which seems to constitute a threshold is at the level of the subclan. In the aggregate, men in the survey group gave (and received) from approximately equal numbers of persons from within their own sub-subclan and the paired sub-subclan of their group. A number of cash gift relations were spread among the four remaining sub-subclans. That is, approximately two-thirds of a man's cash sharing ties within the clan occurred within his own subclan (one-third within his sub-subclan; one-third with his paired subsubclan). The other third was spread throughout the rest of the clan. Thus, while men do share across the whole clan,

and do refer to all men within the clan as "fathers," "brothers," and "sons," it is the subclan which distinguishes itself as a more densely unified group within the clan (based on cash-sharing ties). These findings in the Muli Money Survey match informant reports that pigkills are organized and sponsored by subclans, and that fights have broken out in Muli between subclans. It is subclansmen who work together, subclansmen who do not gamble against one another, subclansmen who never marry a subclan sister (unlike the rare but existing cases of marriage between subclans within Ekerepa). It is from subclansmen that men attempt to recruit support for their individual efforts in pigkills, bridewealth accumulation and ongoing payments, and business. It is these same men who manifest the strongest sharing ties in their cash gift-giving.

For women, by far the largest amount of cash exchange occurs with members of their husband's clan, women giving four times more money to members of the husband's clan than to members of their own clan. Women reported receiving ten times more money from husband's clansmen than from any other category of givers. Again, within "husband's clan," we can distinguish a smaller subgroup within which the sharing ties are most dense for these "wife" respondents. The number of cash gifts flowing between these women and persons within their husbands' sub-subclan is greater than the total number within the rest of Muli Ekerepa. Women's ties are far less widespread than men's.

The total internal cash-sharing within Muli Census Division shows even more strongly the nature of Muli Ekerepa as a functioning localized unit. Men share mostly with clansmen, but not all men residing in Muli are clansmen, including one of the survey respondents. Women share

mostly with their husbands' sub-subclan, but also with other women who have married into Muli. The functional social unit referred to as Muli Ekerepa includes primarily, but not exclusively, adult men recognized as members of the clan through their ability to refer to Ekerepa fathers, and adult women who are the wives of these men. But living with Muli Ekerepa, and participating with it in ritual ceremonies and daily activities are the real test of being "of Muli." Money flows primarily between co-residents of Muli, persons whose demonstrated allegiance is at least currently given to Muli Ekerepa. Intra-group sharing is seen dominant in two measures. The first, presented in Table 13 below, summarizes the number of sharing relations reported in the Money Survey, and the number which involved co-resident persons.

Table 13: Co-Residence and Cash-Sharing Relations

	<u>Total #</u>	<u>Co-Res #</u>	<u>% Co-Res.</u>
Male	245	163	66.5
Female	115	99	86.1
Total	360	262	72.8

An average of 72.8% of reported sharing relationships were ties between persons living in Muli. Only one person, a gambler who frequently receives and gives gifts while gambling in other communities, reported less than 50% of such ties. Male reports ranged from his 44.8% to 100% co-resident sharing. Female figures ranged from 66.7% to 100%.

The cash-sharing intra-clan, or co-resident relationships of Muli males tend to be bi-directional. Muli respondents both gave and received significant amounts of money from their co-residents. Whoever had none.

shared it. Such gifts are rarely held strictly accountable. A man accrues social status if he is able to continually give away money, but he has little power to require equivalent return for his gifts. What he has is the assurance that he will receive part of redistributions made by those to whom he has given, and that he has accumulated good will within the community through his giving.

Not all sharing took place between co-residents. Members of Ego's affinal clan, ego's spouse's affinal clan, ego's mother's clan and others gave and received cash, as summarized in Table 12 above. For the most part, the gifts reported during the twelve week survey were informal gifts. Little of the money was tied to the killing of pigs or ritual ceremonies between affines. In the midst of other activities which brought the persons together, or the occasion of a casual meeting somewhere, people felt compelled to share. As Table 12 indicates, such relations can extend across the array of kin possibilities. One gift reported was given by a male member of Muli Ekerepa to his "brother's wife's brother's wife," for instance. They can, too, include non-kin/non-clan related persons. I'll make a few comments about these payments.

It is interesting to see that cash-flow between male respondents and their affines matches the flow of valuables involved in brideprice and child payments. None of the payments reported were labelled as ceremonial payments between affines. Nonetheless, these casual day-to-day gifts flowed from wife-takers to wife-givers in a ratio approximately ten to one. Payments with ego's mother's clan matched the pattern, though not the ratio. Clearly, the social relations established by marriage impose their structure on cash-sharing activities. It is clear, too,

that maintenance of that structure now includes the passage of cash and commodities, within ceremonial and non-ceremonial contexts.

A significant amount of money was given or received by men of non-kin/non-clan relationships to the men of Muli. I must note that 68.9% of the gifts given by Muli to non-kin and 55.1% of the gifts received from non-kin were reported by a single person, the largest gambler in the clan. He frequently gives money to gambling acquaintances in other villages during a playing session, when they run out of money. They frequently return the favor. While no kinship is claimed by this informant to the gamblers in question, several of the non-kin were members of a clan, Moi, to which the respondent's father allegedly held allegiance in earlier days (see "clan" discussion in Chapter 3 above). My respondent denies any connections to the clan in question, but has singled out several friends from that group in his gambling gifts, whether coincidentally or not. The rest of this non-kin giving is accounted for in three categories: workmates, government workers located in the area, and persons labelled "pren" ("friends"--TP). Given what I've said above about working in Muli, it should be no surprise that only five workmate transactions were reported by three respondents. One of these met a former fellow worker (the respondent is no longer employed). One works on the Muli Sheep Project. The other is a member of the Local Government Council. Workmate sharing can have little effect on the flow of cash in Muli at this point in the area's development, but it does manifest the importance of the passage of tokens of relationship between "friends," as well as between clansmen and affines.

Government workers in the area are often forced to live among people unrelated or only distantly related to them. Their living situation makes them vulnerable if interclan antagonisms flare. During the survey, only two gifts were reported given by Muli Ekerepa men to government workers in the area (K2.60 total). Seven gifts, totalling K26.40, were reported received. Government workers have steady incomes, and live among those who don't. The flow is from the haves to the have-nots, from the guests to the hosts. One government worker lives in the middle of Muli, and has been virtually adopted by the clan. On many occasions I witnessed him providing cash for PMV rides and the like. His warm relationship with Muli Ekerepa earned him the guarantee of physical protection during an inter-clan incident resulting from the death of a man in a fight. Under local rules of payback, this man was very vulnerable, an isolated target member of the clan who had done the killing. Muli Ekerepa talked him out of fleeing, offering protection based on his past continuous help to the clan.

"Friends" were persons reported as such, and for whom a lack of any other relationship was claimed. One man, for example, reported striking up a conversation with a stranger in Ialibu, and later being given money by this "friend" when visiting him again. Seven such relationships were reported, totalling K13.00 in gifts given away, and K19.00 in gifts received.

The non-kin/non-clan relationships constitute a small percentage of the gift relations reported during the money survey--5% of the gifts given away by Muli and 9.5% of gifts received involved these persons. The chief ties through which cash flows as gifts are based on kinship and

clan relations. Most importantly, the gift ties are reported between those co-resident in Muli. The flow of gift money is channeled by the relations of social organization which channel, as well, the flow of women, pigs, shells, food, clothing, and other material goods. The ability to derive income from such gifts reduces the need felt by Muli Ekerepa members to find alternate ways to obtain money. But in order to have such a source of income, the relations themselves must be maintained, and gifts of money serve this function, as well. While money which is shared often serves to purchase consumable goods, each transaction makes a contribution to the maintenance or recreation of the social relations which encourage the sharing, and which organize Muli's production, in general.

Notes on Chapter 4

1 I've noted in Chapter 2, citing Dickson (1967), that colonial agricultural policy did not encourage a return to coffee production in the Ialibu area, despite noting that it grew well under proper care. See also Chapter 2, note 7 regarding the effect of world market conditions on this policy.

2 The Ialibu DPI office says that this was true; that due to the poor transport system available, very low prices were paid for coffee by DPI in the Kagua area. Converting coffee to cash by transporting it to Hagen required major costs reducing the amount which could be paid to suppliers.

3 The Muli and Ialo River area of the Kewabe is lower, more varied terrain and of slightly milder weather conditions than is Ialibu proper, which is located on a high flat kunai-grass covered plain. The "plan" for the Ialibu Basin did not, and does not, include coffee. The "improvement of subsistence" was the stated primary goal of DPI for Ialibu itself in 1980.

4 I approached this official to clarify the flow of coffee and cash beyond the District level. The official questioned the pricing discrepancy when I mentioned the 90t price offered. I did not approach the official with the intention of raising this issue.

5 A Sande is a system in which a group of laborers decide to join together to save money. On each fortnight payday, each laborer keeps a portion of his wages large enough to provide minimum food for the next two weeks. The rest of everyone's pay goes to a single individual. Next fortnight, the remainder goes to a second individual, etc. In this way, laborers manage to have enough money to buy a pig, or stock a store, etc. --purchases requiring far more money than a single pay. Laborers recognize the difficulty of holding on to money from fortnight to fortnight to accumulate a store of wealth. There are too many pressures to redistribute, too much temptation to gamble, too many cries from children for store goods. Better, it seems, to get a lump sum, spend it quickly, and to "stap nating" ("be nothing"--TP) again.

6 Another man in Ialibu has recently begun a very large piggery also funded by the Development Bank. He had 60 pigs at last count, mostly susu pigs. Both of these attempts to do business appealing to a local market in pigs are very new. The extent of this market remains to be seen. As all of the Highland ethnographies proclaim, pigs are tokens used quite frequently in local social systems. Demand for them does not depend solely on altered subsistence patterns, as does the market for chickens, cabbage and other introduced vegetables.

7 The high status given locally to those who do obtain these jobs was tragically demonstrated during our field work. A local man, about 26 years old had been educated, trained in health services, and was already a Health Extension Officer, heading a district medical staff in the Western Province. His body was returned to Muli on the evening of 27 December 1980, delivered in a plain wooden box with no report as to cause of death or date of death. Upon opening the coffin next day, it was discovered that his head was severely battered. Subsequent information suggests that the man drowned in a swimming or boating accident. Muli people are not sure whether to believe this. They are very explicit about their outrage at the way the man's body was treated. They complain that this was not some common worker at the coast. He was a big man inside the government. He should have been treated as such, not returned home naked, wrapped in plastic, decaying, in a plain poorly worked box. He should have been accorded treatment in keeping with his status as a big man. In addition, his body has been buried prominently near the road in the settlement of his father, rather than in the community cemetery far from the paths of daily traffic. His status as big man was the explanation given to me for this differential treatment.

8 For our assessment of the role education has played in developing Muli, see Burkins and Krause 1982.

9 Another grade eight leaver quit his job at Lama Saw Mill and returned to the village in 1981. He was tired of being away from the clan. His housemate left the job, and so did he.

10 Counting the school-leavers as those with either the earliest mission school or later government school experience, they range in estimated birthdates from 1946 to 1966 (the latest born school-leaver or non-school-leaver to have any plantation experience). A pair of groups were constructed for this comparison of male school leavers and of male unschooled, born 1946-1966.

11 On the other hand, the unschooled poroman were more likely to participate in non-plantation labor--30% to 23%.

12 These figures are based on a survey of males residing in Muli during our stay, asking about their entire plantation history. Calculated in another fashion, combining the "last trip to plantation" of all resident school-leavers and school-leavers absent at plantations (the length of this "last trip" calculated as length to November 1980 for the absentees), and comparing to same calculation among their unschooled agemates and elders (those born 1945 or before), we arrive at the following figures:

	<u>Months</u>	<u># Trips</u>	<u>Avg.Mo./Tr.</u>
School Lvrs.	500.88	34	14.7
Poroman	1237.50	43	28.8
Elders .	469.00	27	17.4

School leavers and the "older" group are similar in their average behavior, and only spending half as much time per plantation-employment period as are the unschooled agemates.

13 The local government councilor has a major debt outstanding with the Development Bank. He took his family to the plantation in 1980 to earn money to repay. The whole family was back at the end of the week, having earned enough to pay the PMV to come home. The Councilor says the recruiter promised big pay and said nothing about the lousy accommodations they'd have to put up with. The pay was small, the accommodations bad. They came back, and will not go again.

A local man, about 48 has gone to plantations three times in the last two years, never having gone before. He stayed for five months, two months, and two months on these trips. His stated desire was to make money to pay back debts. He did not manage to do so, does not like plantations, and has decided to wait for his daughters to come of age-- nana repona kopi "my coffee trees" he called them. No more plantations for him.

A local man about 40 went to Hagen in 1974, and stayed one month. He couldn't sleep because young men stayed up all night drinking and singing. He couldn't eat because people had to sleep in the pit for the fire. He never went back.

14 I know of only one instance in which a man was run out of the village. This happened when he became more and more frequently accused of poisoning people, both inside and outside Ekerepa. Even he had the choice to go to a plantation or to his wife's line. He chose the plantation.

15 DB: Where do you get the money when you're not working?

PK: For example, if I have K2 and there are 10 boys around, I change my K2 and give all 20t. We go to the market and each buy 10t worth of goods, then with the other 10t we gamble, hopin to win the rest with half of the crowd. At this moment I have nothing, but if I go to a place where they are playing, a friend will give me 10t and tell me to play on the other side.

16 One local man explained to me why I should remain in Muli rather than returning to the USA: "Laip bilong ples em i isi. Yu mas i katim paiawut, tasol saPOS yu laik, yu ken i sindaun nating na toktok, o slip, o raunim, o pilai satu na kas." "Life in the village is easy. You have to cut firewood, but if you prefer, you can sit and do nothing, or sleep, or walk around, or gamble." (Tok pisin quote)

17 Those wishing to continue to do business are advised by this informant to give their capital to a "strong man" who will not gamble-- advice this former businessman failed to heed. Regular gamblers counsel that one should never bring all of one's money to the gambling circle. One explained that to do so was like asking a fire to burn only half a house.

18 "Density" of relations exploited is a measure adapted from the "social network" literature--cf. Bott 1971; Barnes 1969. I have not calculated the precise numerical values here. The data as presented expresses the point sufficiently.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

From 1950 through 1980, a scant thirty years, Muli Ekerepa and the Ialibu Kewa have travelled the road from being an acephalic society unaware of much of the world around them to incorporation as democratically represented participants in that world, tied to and directly effected by international political and economic activities. In the previous chapters, I have described the historical process of the colonial Administration's attempts to engage Muli,¹ presented an analysis of the precapitalist mode of production which confronted the colonial administration in these attempts, and summarized Muli Ekerepa's efforts to incorporate forms of commodity-production, bisnis and wage labor, into that precapitalist mode of production, in order to address their growing need for access to cash and imported goods in the reproduction of their social life. In this conclusion I will draw together the threads of the developing class relations within which Muli Ekerepa produces, and the changing channels of access to cash and imported goods available to Muli. I will summarize the state of the class struggle. After discussing the significance of this study, I will close with my assessment of the principle vectors of change currently affecting the struggle to control Muli's production and the prospects for development in the immediate future.

Peasantization: Kewa Class and Clan

In 1950, Muli Ekerepa was a clan component of an acephalic society in which the social relations dominating production were those clan-man ties

and affinal ties described in Chapter 3. Individuals flowed among clan components of a regional system constituted as a moral community (as described by Morauta 1974). Individuals influenced the flow of labor and output through political manipulation of social ties and of ceremonial exchange relations. But there existed no structural appropriation of surplus labor or surplus product by one class from another.

Colonial penetration and pacification altered Ialibu society by imposing itself as a dominant class of government administrators, and by constituting Ialibu clan society as one class within a larger system through this confrontation. The mechanism by which this imposition was accomplished was simple enough--superior military power, aided by local ideology prizing men of power and wealth.

Two effects of the imposition of colonial control were immediate. With the pacification of local clans, the principal means of precapitalist regulation of access to land was replaced. Now colonial administrators, the kiaps, rather than warring clansmen, were the guarantors of that access. Maintenance of an important condition of social reproduction now lay in the hands of a dominant class. The second of these effects was the imposition of forced labor on a community-by-community basis in the interest of infrastructural development. Labor power was appropriated by strictly political means--the threat of jail in the absence of cooperation, i.e., the use of force to appropriate labor.

Political domination by the kiaps met with early resistance but legitimacy was granted to that dominance, eventually, through two processes. The ideological understanding of power held by Ialibu Kewas inclined them to interpret the obviously greater power of the white intruders as deriving

from the support of stronger spirits than those supporting the Kewas. As had occurred in precolonial times, people heeded the ideas of these powerful men and began the shift of allegiance to a new spirit--ending in the virtually universal Christianization of local groups.² The ability of the Europeans to use the counsel and support of their spirits to such obvious benefit accorded them the respect given to big-men, and the support of Kewa followers.

Secondly, although the kiaps forced labor on the road crews, they also paid the laborers with imported goods, and later with cash. This was certainly not an attempt to provide equal exchange of value for the labor received. It was not recruitment of labor through payment. However, payment did soften the force evident in the situation, giving a return to laborers for the efforts given to government projects, in effect paying back for support by redistributing colonial wealth.

The establishment of colonial control transformed the social conditions under which rural producers worked. But the Administration chose not to attempt to alter the basic relations of man-clan-land encountered in the region. Having guaranteed clan-land ties, but not man-land ties, the Administration left local producers dependent upon their ties to a clan for access to their means of subsistence and their means of production. This decision also meant that capital was not confronted by a class of landless proletarians. Capital (and its colonial agents) was confronted instead with a population capable of producing its own needs, dependent only upon the will of the Administration to maintain clan access to land. The task of forcing sufficient labor supplies to work for capital on plantations in PNG would have been enormous. The Administration did not attempt to

proceed with primitive accumulation in this manner. The struggle to integrate and subordinate indigenous production to the needs of the world capitalist social formation was carried out, instead, in the process of commoditization of local economy, the effort to increase indigenous consumption of commodities so as to create pressure within the indigenous system for participation in commodity production. In this process, the colonial administration had assistance from returning labor migrants and the missions.

The commoditization of Muli was begun through the imposed introduction of European goods into indigenous consumption. As noted above, labor on public works was forced. But laborers were paid for the work, receiving such items as European salt, red paint, and beads. As missions moved into the region they brought other goods in pay for labor or for permission to proselytize a clan. As cash payments began, Ialibu missions introduced trade stores stocking a variety of goods. After the initiation of Ialibu participation in the Highlands Labour Scheme, returning migrants brought back a taste for imported goods. The goods themselves held appeal in their use-value--warmth in clothing and blankets, different and "sweet" (rende pia--Kewa--'it is sweet'/it tastes good) tastes in foods. Imported goods gained prestige, too, through their association with European culture. The eventual acceptance of these goods into Muli's patterns of consumption is made clear in the data on use of cash for tradestore purchases presented in Chapter 4. Muli producers, too, developed that "inescapable need for cash" reported by Howlett (1977:3) from Goroka.

This developed need for cash and imports led Muli Ekerepa to seek out ways of obtaining them, and prompted them to respond positively to colonial

Administration talks on ways to develop the area, and to the opportunities available through the Administration to obtain these goods.

The colonial kiaps controlled access to the direct means of acquiring cash and commodities. They provided these goods in exchange for labor on public works projects. They acted as the agents of private capital in recruiting for migrant labor as part of the Highlands Labour Scheme. They initiated cash-cropping and animal husbandry production for export markets. Through the mediation of the kiaps, Muli producers found themselves confronted by a new class--private capital, the owners of plantations and of transport and processing facilities for cash-crops. The flow of surplus-value out of Muli could now be accomplished through means of unequal exchange dependent upon low returns to labor and commodity-producing peasants relative to the world market value of the goods produced. At the same time, these involvements increased the flow of cash and imported goods into Muli life.

The nature of the goods obtained through involvement in commodity-production must not be ignored. As I've noted in Chapter 4, the simple fact of labor-saving is one incentive mentioned by Muli informants for purchasing foods rather than consuming one's own garden production. But we should note that the majority of commodities available through the kiaps and commodity-production were imports--goods which were deemed superior in various ways to local goods, and which could not be produced locally. As the circulation of such goods increased, they in turn heightened the incentive to engage in production for commodity markets due to the unavailability of these goods through local production. The distinct use-value qualities of the goods available from the Europeans, and the inability of Muli to

recreate the technical processes of producing those use-values, prevented Muli producers from totally dissociating with production for commodity markets, even after the initial imposition by the colonial Administration ended. This process of commoditization, by early imposition and then integration into indigenous consumption patterns, accomplished the peasantization of Muli. It became part of the process of continuing primitive accumulation by the colonial state and capital. Now, in order to reproduce the social relations of production within which a family unit worked, it was necessary to gain access to the cash and imported goods brought by colonial penetration.

The need of the peasantry for cash and imported goods in order to reproduce itself requires that the class of peasants, in the aggregate, engage the classes of capital and government bureaucracy, the holders of the needed goods. As a class, the peasantry is relatively limited in its options for obtaining these goods. Wage-labor is available on plantations and in the mines, and sometimes through localized public works projects (see Barnett, 1979, regarding the political manipulation of public funds by big men to direct availability of the rewards of public works to their own constituent clansmen). Cash-cropping and other bisnis involving commodity production, circulation or sales yields certain returns. The peasantry, as a class, must engage the commodity system in order to get the desired goods.

Individual Muli peasant producers, or households, are not limited by this aggregate condition, however. The need to engage in commodity production is a need at the class level of analysis. The individual peasant has as further options the exploitation of intra-class mechanisms for

gaining access to cash and imported goods. It is not structurally necessary for a given individual to engage in commodity production. There are no rural proletarians in Muli. As we've seen in the data presented in Chapter 4, the majority of cash obtained and expended by Muli informants flows through gift-giving, or sharing relations, not through commodity exchange. The extent to which this is the case is a measure of the continuing dominance of a precapitalist social structure based in the form of Melanesian exchange described years ago by Belshaw:

"Exchange is a form of satisfying ends which is supplementary to direct production. In considering early Melanesian exchange, we must extend our concept of this term to cover the transfer of the right to use objects, temporarily or permanently, whether or not there is an immediate quid pro quo. For the most powerful incentive which prompted one man to let another use or obtain possession of his goods was the knowledge that, at some later date when occasion demanded, he could obtain a reciprocal favour. The custom of ultimate reciprocity, without which society could not have existed in its actual form, vitiates the conception of many economists as to the alternative to monetary exchange. This is often conceived to be instantaneous barter, which has the disadvantage that two people must, by some act of chance, be willing each to part with something that the other requires. Money is a means whereby a man may part with something new, storing its exchange value until he requires a later purchase. But money is not necessary in a community whose members realize that they are so interdependent that they cannot afford to lose the good will of the neighbours. For in such a society helpful acts are remembered and reciprocated" (1954:10).

Muli has most definitely been a community inhabited by persons who realize their interdependence. Residents of Muli are dependent upon maintenance of good relations with the clan for protection of their access to the means of production. Sharing goods on the basis of delayed or "ultimate" reciprocity, as per Belshaw's discussion, is a mechanism which both provides a symbolic statement of interdependence and recreates that relationship with each gift. Food, clothing, and household goods are shared

throughout the clan. Pigs, pearlshells, and women tie men together across clan lines in a well-known ritualized version of ultimate reciprocity.

In Muli, money, too, often functions as an object to be shared. In Muli, money has entered a social economy which is not driven solely by the need to commoditize and to deal formally with the value objectified in commodities produced. Money, like other goods, also circulates in a form of delayed or ultimate reciprocity. This allows a giver to store a relatively unquantified portion of social capital in the hands and minds of others. The gift of money does not store its value in objectified labor-power.³ It creates an undefined store of drawing power against the labor of others in an unequilibrated amount, as the situations of giving dictate and allow. In Muli, money, business and labor are all subordinated to the surviving system of ultimate reciprocity. Money and imported goods are available to many in the circulation of exchanges which cement local society.

In the preceding paragraphs, I've defined the upper and lower limits to Muli's integration as peasantry within the world capitalist social formation. At the upper limit of integration, all Muli households would necessarily engage in commodity-production in order to ensure their reproduction. At the lower limit, no Muli households would engage in commodity-production, relying instead on ties with other members of the peasantry to provide minimum needs for cash and imported goods through the mechanism of delayed reciprocal exchange. The data in Chapter 4 show clearly that neither of these situations is the case. The felt needs of Muli are not met solely through precapitalist reciprocal exchange ties. Neither do all Muli households feel compelled to enter commodity-production. The most widespread current bisnis activity, coffee growing, is reportedly

engaged in by 88% of Muli households. But barely 40% of Muli households report having planted 300 or more trees, the number recommended by DPI as an economically viable grove.

The pushes and pulls of life as a Muli peasant must be considered in accounting for individual variation in bisnis activity. The fact of being part of the peasantry reflects a need for cash, but does not dictate the mechanism of acquisition or the intensity with which it must be pursued. In fact, many persons exist for long periods of time without entering commodity-production. Individuals responding to varying needs within their life cycles, varying social demands on their resources, and varying desires to gain status, engage in commodity-production with different intensities.

It is beyond the scope of this study to account systematically for the variations to which I've referred in the engagement of Muli residents in commodity-production. A few broad comments must suffice. Many persons have attempted bisnis in one form or another at some time during the period of colonialism or since. Many of these same persons, and others, have engaged in wage labor. All of these activities have been intermittent and relatively short-term (with the exception of the long absent labor migrants discussed in Chapter 4). It is very important in Muli life to maintain the respectability of one's name, as I've discussed in Chapter 3. Access to cash and imported goods has become, increasingly, a necessity in maintaining that respectability. A man who never has money to share, never wears European clothes, never eats rice and fish, and who cannot reciprocate the sharing of goods by those who do have these things, such a man risks being treated as a "rubbish man," someone of lesser status than others in the clan. To label someone "rubbish" is an insult. To be so labelled is

extremely embarrassing and shaming. Many men seek ways of earning cash in order to maintain an economic state above some undefinable threshold of rubbish. But a man need not always have money, always wear new clothes, always eat rice and fish, etc., in order to maintain his local standing. Bisnis and redistribution of its proceeds need not be continuous. The structural position of a male Muli peasant prompts the "ordinary man" (one not seeking to become a big man) to engage in cash-acquiring commodity-production occasionally. He need not become a big man in business, and as we've seen, in Muli he invariably has not.

There have been a few men of Muli who have gone to far greater lengths to create growing bisnis, however. While all bisnis initiation has an entrepreneurial appearance, there are only a few examples of men attempting to gain status solely, or primarily, through the manipulation of bisnis means. These men might have become the initiators of incipient class differentiation with Muli. One, the papa of the Muli PMV, left Muli when he became the focus of sorcery accusations from both inside and outside the clan. He has not come back for several years. Another Loaya Yana, established the first tradestore and was one of the first to raise cattle. His social capital rose quickly as he redistributed proceeds with regularity. He was elected Local Government Councilor. But gambling losses, a loss of prestige when he ran afoul of a Development Bank loan, his inability to provide pay for workers on a cooperative coffee plot, have side-tracked Loaya's rise. His continuing redistributions depleted his store, eliminating his financial base. He has not proven to be a transformative local entrepreneur. Loale Rudu is experimenting with animal husbandry on a very small scale, channeling a significant portion of the wages he

receives as employee at the Muli Sheep Project into these experiments. His failure to redistribute among sub-clan members led one to challenge his bisnis practices on the basis of clan-membership claims (Loale is one of the Ekerepa with some Petemerepa ties, see Chapter 3 above). The questions raised about his rights to land made it imperative that he begin rechanneling resources into social investment (he did so in several appropriate settings, killing one of his susu pigs on one occasion, purchasing two sheep and killing them on another). It will be some time before Loale might be in a position to separate himself from dependence on clan and local gardening to maintain his social reproduction. Despite his full-time wage labor and his experiments with bisnis, Loale and family remain peasants at base. The locally recognized big man of Muli, Kama Okane, has thus far ignored business and used government affiliation to help maintain his status. Kama served as a bosboi ("foreman"-TP) on various public works projects, manipulating work assignments and other favors to his benefit (including acquiring a wife, according to both he and his wife). He has been a constable, Local Government Councilor, and now has settled in as Village Court Magistrate, a position allowing him to help local offenders avoid imprisonment on occasion, as well as controlling fines and local dispute resolution. None of these men (nor any others) has led the way to class differentiation within the clan, or between Muli and other clans. Muli remains a unified class of peasants confronted by capital and government. There is little evidence of a successful "simple reproduction squeeze" as we left the field. As it had under colonialism, government played a major role in local economy by controlling access to cash through its public works projects, and its role in channeling cash-cropping efforts through agricultural extension programs. Distant capital held control of

plantation labor possibilities. But Muli had been able to resist the initiative in pyrethrum growing, deeming the return on labor investment to be too low. Peasants of neighboring groups held back coffee sales for the same reason. Despite the recommendation of agricultural extension officers, no one has begun to use fertilizer or chemical aids in cash-cropping. Producers prefer to say "nogat mani" ("I don't have money"-TP) and to continue producing in their own low cost fashion: Access to cash and goods through redistribution undermines the pressure to engage in direct commodity-production. In 1981, as we left the area, Muli's resistance to the "squeeze" was more effective than government efforts to encourage more production.

Muli Ekerepa has integrated cash and imported goods into its patterns of consumption. The reproduction of Muli's relations of production has been partially commoditized. In order to meet its needs for cash and imported goods, Muli has incorporated wage-labor and bisnis into its array of productive activities. The forms of bisnis and labor have been directly shaped by government policy which has shaped the national economy and the regional economy into a peripheral formation of the world capitalist social formation. The role of the Kewabe area in that economy remains primarily that of labor reserve, in the absence of development of a viable cash-cropping alternative.

Integration into the world capitalist system has altered the conditions of reproduction of Muli's precapitalist mode of production. But these alterations have not transformed the local social relations within which production takes place. The pressures to alter those relations are minimal. The area is not the focus of attention for either capital or government.

Under current national circumstances, it seems that any pressure for change will have to arise locally. I'll discuss below the prospects of that occurring. Meanwhile, Muli Ekerepa plays its role in the peripheral economy, and maintains its status as a PNG peasantry on the periphery of the periphery.

Proper understanding of the creation and maintenance of peripheral capitalist formations requires the analysis of the microproduction systems operating within those formations. Through the analysis of aspects of the political economy of Muli Ekerepa, a clan group in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, I have demonstrated that models of analysis derived from critical political economy can be fruitfully applied to the study of these micro systems, components of the world capitalist social formation. The concrete situation encountered in Muli was that of a peasantry involved to a low degree in commodity-production and business. I have used an analysis of the form of integration of Muli's precapitalist mode of production into the world capitalist social formation, in order to account for this low degree of involvement in commodity-production, at the level of a class analysis.

Muli Ekerepa has been incorporated in the world system as a class of peasant producers. I have analyzed the process of formation of this class position and have focused on the form of integration of commodity production into Muli production resulting from that process. The model of analysis described in Chapter 1 led me to focus on the processes of production in Muli, the social relations within which those processes occur, and the conditions of reproduction of that combined structure, the mode of production present in Muli.

We have seen in the analysis, that the precapitalist mode of

production which organized Muli political economy in the precolonial period, was maintained as the principal form of production after the imposition of colonial control. Maintenance of the precapitalist structure as the mode within which commodity production would be encouraged, that is, the policy of peasantization carried out by the colonial Administration in Ialibu, carried with it implications affecting the ability of colonial government and capital to appropriate the surplus labor or surplus-value produced by these peasants. This dissertation has focused on analysis of the structural effects of the concrete class situation in Muli on the degree and form of participation in commodity-production by Muli Ekerepa.

In the analysis of the integration of Muli's precapitalist mode of production into the already peripheralized capitalist formation of the PNG economy, I have had to consider the conditions set on Muli production by systems external to Muli's control, including:

- (1) colonial and national government politics by which PNG development policy has been set, limiting clan commodity production possibilities to a narrow array of export products;
- (2) international market activity and economic agreements altering the context of development policy decision-making; and
- (3) government policy in which development activities are, or were, initiated, but in which consistent follow-up and support are missing.

But, as the analysis has shown, not the least of the social factors contributing to the reproduction of the larger peripheral formation is the

class position of Muli Ekerepa itself. The maintenance of Muli's precapitalist relations of production as the relations within which Muli's commodity-production is performed dictated that bisnis would be incorporated into local production activities in subordination to the reproduction of those precapitalist relations of production. The ability to do bisnis in Muli has its own preconditions. As we've seen, the maintenance requirements of those preconditions often led to an end to bisnis activity by a Muli individual.

Through the analytical model guiding this study, I have been able to present an analysis of the determining effects of class position in the decision-making of potential Muli bisnis persons. I have been able to account for the aggregate pattern of bisnis and wage-labor through this analysis.

Analysis of the process of commoditizing the Muli precapitalist mode of production lends weight to the position elaborated in Chapter 1 that studies of peripheral formations benefit from consideration of the specific class relations internal to those formations, and from the analysis of the conditions effecting the reproduction of the modes of production integrated into peripheral formations of the world capitalist system. The flow of surplus-value from periphery to center is certainly accomplished through the incorporation into Muli life of commodity-production. This incorporation, too, had its preconditions, however. The imposition of colonial Administration, development of a need for commodities through non-commoditized introduction of European goods into local consumption, integration of Muli's precapitalist mode of production into the colonial system through the transformation of its condition of reproduction, but not its internal structure, colonial exploitation of Ialibu labor-power through force to

create the geographic infrastructure necessary to enlarged exploitation of local labor resources by expatriate capital, each of these were necessary to enabling the commoditization of Muli's social reproduction.

This case study of Muli Ekerepa's integration into the world capitalist system through the peasantization of its precolonial, precapitalist mode of production, contributes to our knowledge and understanding of the peripheral formations of the world capitalist social formation. In the case of this peasantry in Papua New Guinea, we find an instance of capitalist dominance of a precapitalist mode of production through economic means, in accord with Bernstein's theoretical considerations of African peasantries. Capital attacks the precapitalist mode by commoditizing the reproduction of its social relations of production. The process of constituting the relations of production remains apparently non-economic, in Muli based on the relations of marriage and clan-membership and the forms of sharing and exchange attending these relations. But to the degree that maintaining these social relations of production is dependent on use of goods available primarily through commodity-exchange, this form of exchange penetrates the reproduction of those social relations within which precapitalist production occurs. Commodity-exchange becomes the condition of peasant production, production apparently taking place within social relations constituted by non-economic mechanisms.

As this commoditizations grows, the possibilities for direct control of peasant production grow, as capital seeks to squeeze that production in ways such as those theorized by Bernstein. Muli's low degree of commoditization of the conditions of reproduction of its precapitalist mode of production have allowed Muli producers to escape any strong effects of such

a squeeze.

In the final section of this work, I will look briefly at Muli's prospects for political economic transformation.

Muli Peasants: Prospects for Transformation

I will close this study with a brief consideration of the prospects for transformation of the class relations within which Muli Ekerepa produces. It is beyond the scope of my data to discuss national and international conditions. I will restrict myself to those forces within Muli impinging directly on the responses of local producers to the system around them. What, then, might bring about the internal differentiation of the peasantry reported as occurring elsewhere in PNG?

As we've seen, the point of struggle for control of Muli's production is in the degree to which Muli depends upon cash and commodity exchange for the reproduction of its social life. The low degree of commoditization currently characterizing Muli's mode of production limits the need to engage in commodity production, and consequently limits the need of individual producers to attempt to break the bonds of precapitalist peasant relations of production currently dominating Muli.

There are two dimensions of social pressure manifest in Muli which may, in time, lead to an increase in the commoditization of Muli's political economic reproduction, and to increasing local tensions to the point of transformation of Muli's relations of production. Both focus on the same group within Muli--young adult males, and the even younger males growing up to join them.

The young adult males of Muli, including those aged approximately

15-25 years old in 1980-81, were the first group of Muli Ekerepas to participate in formal education. The school, despite any hopes to the contrary (see Weeks and Gutherie n.d. regarding such hopes), has been seen by Muli residents as a modernizing institution. Youths attending school were taught about, and oriented to, a European-based, urban society. Their aspirations and expectations were shaped accordingly. These young men were also among the first in Muli to grow up in a world which always included commodities, government, cities, plantations. These youths were the people who most frequently complained about the difficulty of remaining clean in the village, of the lack of nice clothing. They and the youths following after them begin with expectations of a life different from those of their elders. With continued expansion of education, better developed communications media and advertising, these youths are susceptible to pressure to commoditize in ways that their elders are not.

The second dimension of building pressure comes from within Muli society. I've referred to it in Chapter 4 when discussing labor migration. Muli as a peasant society holds out to youth the possibility of partial self-support, in a way far larger than was available in precolonial society. The role of youths in precolonial society production was essentially to accompany their fathers--help cut firewood, clear gardens, provide support in the event of warfare. A youth did not have an important role in either providing his daily subsistence or in building the wealth for the first important ceremonial exchange of his adult life, bridewealth for his wife. Now, young men can do both. Through wage labor they can buy food for themselves and their families. They can, too, lay aside wealth, or give it to their fathers, for bridewealth. Parental pressure was manifest in some

Muli families to go and do either or both. There is no accepted way for a Muli parent to force his or her son to leave Muli to go to work. But mothers have complained aloud of the burden laid upon them by the responsibility to provide food for grown sons. Fathers and older brothers urge young men to begin saving for their marriage. As we've see, youths often simply shrug off the suggestions. But they feel the pressure, and sometimes respond by leaving the ples to go to work on a plantation. Even when they do not bring back riches, they have had one more taste of the pleasures of the city--the beer, foods, and clothing they listed as the pleasures of having money.

The combination of these factors is the strongest pressure on any group within Muli pushing the members of the group into further commodity production. As these young men age, there may be those among them who refuse to accept the limits to entrepreneurial activities set by the current precapitalist mode of production. But this development requires time. These young men, and those now in school in Muli, are several years away from being old enough to be effective leaders--within the clan.

Meanwhile, Muli Ekerepa voices its own plan for development. Muli residents want a road to development which offers them a higher standard of living. They want someone to demonstrate to them how business might be carried on without inevitably dissolving in the face of local social responsibilities to redistribute ones wealth. They want a road to development which builds on knowledge currently available to them. Muli's loudest cry is for the government to send a kampani. "Wage labor in Muli" is Muli's own development theme. "Give us a kampani." Muli wants outside capital to enter the area and to establish a business, a kampani. This "company"

is conceived as a plantation, the model of externally-based enterprise with which Ekerepa is most familiar. There is a clear logic to Muli's policy. A kampani located in Muli or its vicinity would:

(1) provide the opportunity for working close to home. No member of Ekerepa would be required to leave the clan's land. This would reduce the danger felt for each absent member of the clan. Clansmen living in isolated, unprotected situations are vulnerable to the attacks of the clan's enemies;

(2) give immediate access to an individual's earnings on the part of his relatives. In the early days of the Highlands Labour Scheme, Ialibu area residents complained that their absentee workers received their exit pay in Mount Hagen. This allowed the men to spend all of the money before coming back home. Relatives argued that in this fashion, the income was lost to the community. A company in Muli would pay its workers in Muli, and the money would be used locally;

(3) teach Muli how to run business better, through its demonstration effect. Informants envisioned that some persons, those who wanted to work, would enter employment with the company, observe operations, and later be knowledgeable enough to either begin their own business or buy the original business. It was felt that Muli needed to be assisted in this process;

(4) allow Muli residents to work when they feel the desire or need for cash. Work opportunity would be readily available in the local setting; and

(5) create a market for local produce. Persons who have gone off to plantations know that many workers must buy produce from local gardeners due to the lack of land available for personal production. They reason

that the same would be true in Muli. Here would be an outlet for goods that Muli knows how to make. Muli gardens and Muli stores would flourish.

The National Development Strategy (National Planning Committee 1976) explains why Muli's kampani is unlikely to come. In the meantime, Muli residents continue to engage in wage labor as it becomes available, primarily through the government roadwork contracts. This work does little to develop new patterns of economic behavior in Muli, and it does little to develop the locale even through the influx of capital. However, it is the cash-obtaining activity most closely matching the hopes just described for "company" or "plantation" work in the Muli area. Under Works and Supply roadwork, there is no input required but physical labor. Money can be acquired while remaining in Muli. There is no risk to an investment. The whole community has access to the laborer receiving the wages. The money circulates first in Muli, not Hagen or the coast. The drawbacks of this work include the relatively few jobs provided, the short length of time allowed for wage receipt (contracts usually being limited to three months), and the failure to draw outside labor into the Muli marketing area.

Muli values the availability of wage labor. It interferes least with other dimensions of local life, if it is available locally. Business opens doors to status, as well as cash, but involves high risk. Labor provides low-risk access to money with no other demands. Muli wants a kampani to bring expanded labor opportunities to the area because this mode of production is most compatible with the continuing dominance of and maintenance of their precapitalist mode, and allows them to better exploit the world of cash through the precapitalist system of gardening.

Muli voices its desire for kampani at every opportunity. Meanwhile, Muli Ekerepa continues its intermittent involvements in business. It sends its sons to plantations, exhorting them to bring back money. It educates its children and hopes that they will bring wealth and status to the clan. It looks for ways to raise the material standard of living in Muli without radically altering the labor input required or the social relations within which they produce. It continues to plant coffee and awaits the maturation of its trees. Muli waits on the periphery of the periphery. The coffee is coming. The kampani is not.

Notes on Chapter 5

1 I have made only passing reference to the history of influence in Ialibu by Christian missionaries and by educational agencies. The constraints of field site, time, and money limited my ability to broaden my research to include these domains of investigation. Such considerations remain to be addressed in constructing a comprehensive analysis of the incorporation of Muli and its neighbors into the world capitalist system. Regarding the effects of education on Muli's development, see Burkins and Krause (1982). For consideration of mission activities throughout the Southern Highlands Province, see Robin (1980, 1982). Susan Hecht has succinctly summarized the history of education policy in Papua New Guinea, and the relations between government and missions in delivering education services in the Southern Highlands (1981).

2 When such shifts of allegiance occur, belief in the existence in the spirits previously served does not end. Those spirits simply become ignored. Attending to the "subsistence" requirements of a strong spirit (pigs for precolonial spirits; prayers and church attendance for the new spirit) attracts its support in guaranteeing one's prosperity and health. It is the demonstrated power and prosperity of the Europeans that made it clear to the Ialibu Kewas that European spiritual backing was superior and worthy of following.

3 Although the money does carry this value with it and can always be converted easily into a commodity, unlike certain other tokens of social value in ritualized delayed reciprocal exchanges. Men have attempted the conversion of shells into cash for weeks on end, to no avail.

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