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Can We Have International Control of Atomic Energy?

By Leo Szilard

Introduction

The policy of the United States to try to strive for an agreement eliminating atomic bombs from national armaments originated in 1945 with President Truman; he has never given up hope that this policy may yet be put into effect.

Unfortunately, our negotiations for the control of atomic energy were based on certain premises which were not very conducive to reaching an agreement.
~~There were these premises as a matter of fact.~~

Knowing that Russia has the bomb, the American people seem to sense the hardships and dangers that we face if the atomic arms race begins in earnest. Thus, while our representatives at Lake Success keep on playing their gramophone records whenever the subject of atomic energy comes up, the public has begun to grope for some solution that might lead to a satisfactory agreement.

In magazine articles and in the daily press, questions are being asked about whether we couldn't reach agreement on atomic control by dropping the demand for the elimination of the veto, by defining the stages in a manner that will satisfy Russia, or by proposing some form of control other than that of international management which we have hitherto tried to push. It is being suggested that perhaps we should couple the discussion on atomic energy with discussions aimed at general disarmament, as the Russians had always wanted us to do. Those who have reached the conclusion that atomic energy control, in the true meaning of the term, is unattainable are now proposing that we conclude a convention which would pledge

the nations, in case of war, to refrain from using atomic bombs and perhaps even renounce all strategic bombing.

There seems to be a general feeling that somehow we ought to try to stop the arms race right now, that the crying need of the hour is a standstill agreement on armaments which will give us a breathing spell.

Do these questions, suggestions, or proposals point a way to the solution of the problem with which we are faced? I do not believe so. I rather believe that we shall not be able to make any progress unless we first review our overall foreign policy. I believe that the crying need of the hour is a standstill agreement not on armaments, but rather on Germany. For what Russia and the United States may do in Germany in the near future might create a situation which cannot be remedied later. It might deprive Russia and the United States of freedom of action as far as disarmament and peace are concerned.

You probably know the story of the drunk who was poking under a street lamp in Trafalgar Square in London when a policeman tapped him on the shoulder and asked him what he was doing there. "I am looking for my house key," said the drunk. "Did you lose it here?" asked the policeman. "No," said the drunk, "I lost it in Soho." "If you lost it in Soho," said the policeman, "why, then, do you look for it here under this lamp?" "Well," said the drunk, "There is light here, and in Soho it is dark."

My point is, that the key to the control of atomic bombs does not lie in the narrow area of atomic energy on which the spotlights of public discussion are focused, but rather in the dark fields of our overall foreign policy which are only scantily illuminated by occasional comments.

The Real Issue

What is the real issue between Russia and the United States? What is the main goal of our present foreign policy in Europe?

In 1939 Great Britain decided to go to war with Germany rather than to accept a situation in which one country would militarily dominate the continent of Europe. The war was won, but when it ended, one country, Russia, had an overwhelmingly dominant military position on the continent of Europe. Soon after the war ended, Belgium, France, and Holland were militarily at the mercy of Russia in the sense that the Russian land armies could have overrun these countries.

We would rather not leave Western Europe for long at the mercy of Russia if we can help it. We have hoped to strengthen and arm Western Europe to the point where it could successfully resist a Russian attack until an American expeditionary force could come to its assistance.

Because we have been thinking in these terms for the last few years, we were not willing to consider an agreement providing for general disarmament, which Russia appeared to desire. For general disarmament -- so we argued -- could not touch Russia's main source of military strength in her large manpower which enables her at short notice to put into the field huge land armies. Thus general disarmament would perpetuate a situation in which France, Belgium, and Holland are militarily at the mercy of Russia.

By integrating Western Germany politically and economically with the rest of Western Europe, we have hoped to strengthen Western Europe to the point where it would be capable of holding an attack by the Russian armed forces.

Is Our Goal Attainable?

The first question I am going to raise is whether this **goal** of our foreign policy is still attainable now that Russia will soon have an appreciable quantity of bombs. re-typed

Because of the importance which a few large cities play in her structure, Western Europe is exceedingly vulnerable to atomic bombs. When Russia will be in a position to deliver such bombs in quantity anywhere in Europe, and when there will

nothing that America can do to protect European cities from destruction at the outbreak of the war, then the Atlantic Pact will have lost much of its value to Europe.

The rearmament of Western Germany would enormously strengthen the military power of Western Europe, and it will therefore undoubtedly be advocated on the ground that it is a calculated risk. But I believe it would be more correct to say that it is an incalculable risk.

Perhaps Western Germany, rearmed, would fight on our side. Perhaps even without rearming Western Germany, we could make ~~Western Europe strong enough~~ Western Europe strong enough militarily to offer us a base of military operations; perhaps in spite of bombs the French would hold out; perhaps there would be no Dunkirk. Maybe we could count on France as our military base in case of war and thus avoid the need to plan on establishing bridgeheads on hostile shores in Europe.

On questions of this sort, it is difficult to speak with any degree of assurance. There may be doubt either way, and I am content here, having raised the question, to leave it unanswered.

A Choice Must Be Made

But now we have to answer another question. Can we continue to pursue our foreign policy aimed at preventing Russia from remaining in an overwhelmingly dominant military position on the continent of Europe, and can we at the same time, obtain an agreement with Russia on eliminating atomic bombs from national armaments?

To this question my answer is a clear and unequivocal NO.

As long as we hold on to our present political goal in Europe, Russia will hardly be willing to deprive herself of the one weapon which, in the long run, might induce Western Europe to abandon her alliance with the United States. And even if this consideration did not weigh heavily with Russia, as it probably does, there is still this to be said:

Any effective agreement relating to disarmament and the elimination of atomic bombs must of necessity provide for measures of inspection of considerable scope. But under present conditions, Russia has valid reasons to keep the location of her key industrial installations secret, and therefore looks upon the iron curtain as her most important strategic defense. As long as we continue to regard France, Belgium, and Holland as a base of military operations against Russia, as long as we remain in a position to rearm Western Germany if we choose to do so, as long as we keep on developing long-range rockets as well as long-range bombers and actually remain in the possession of a considerable fleet of such bombers, and as long as we consider strategic bombing of Russia as the means of defending our allies, Russia will have valid reasons for refusing to enter into any agreement that provides for international inspection of installations on her territory.

Clearly international inspection, if it is to be effective, is not compatible with the degree of secrecy which Russia is anxious to maintain under the present conditions and which she believes she is successful in maintaining.

I conclude that an agreement between Russia and the United States on atomic disarmament is incompatible with the continuation of our present policy in Europe. We shall have to choose the one or the other; and clearly, this is not a choice to be lightly made.

What Use Is an Agreement?

Suppose then, for the sake of argument, that we are inclined to give preference to atomic disarmament and want to secure a peace settlement that would provide for general disarmament as well as the elimination of atomic bombs, is there any way for us not only to obtain such a settlement but actually to secure peace? Is there any way for us to offer France, Belgium, and Holland any security short of militarily counterbalancing the Russian land armies in Europe? To what principles can we look in a search for a method to give these countries security?

These are the question that I now propose to examine.

At the end of the First World War, peace could have been secured if the Western World had embraced the principle of collective security. The Second World War would probably not have occurred if collective action had been taken against Japan in 1931 when she invaded Manchuria, and failing that, if, by collective action, an oil embargo had been imposed on Italy when she attacked Abyssinia. All this time, Germany was watching on the sidelines, and when Italy was allowed to get away with it, she drew her conclusions.

The thesis that collective security could secure the peace was true after the First World War, but at that time it was rejected; today this thesis seems to be generally accepted, but it is no longer true. At least it is not true where Russia and the United States are concerned.

Russia and America are each militarily so powerful that no likely combination of nations would be in a position to coerce either of them. Moreover, militarily, the more important nations of the world must be considered as allies of either Russia or America and could not be expected to participate in collective action against their ally.

While it is a necessary prerequisite of peace that an agreement be reached between America and Russia, today there is no possible way to enforce such an agreement on the basis of collective security. And here we come to some vital questions:

"What is the use," you may ask, "to conclude an agreement if it cannot be enforced?" You may ask, "Can Russia be trusted to keep an agreement?"

Clearly a general peace settlement will deal with issues that are vital for America and Russia, and when such issues are at stake, nations cannot be trusted to keep an agreement unless the agreement is compatible with their vital interests, and keeps on serving their vital interests.

"What, then," you may ask, "is the use of concluding an agreement if the contracting parties can be trusted only to keep it as long as it suits them to do so?"

As I see it, this is the crucial question, and war or peace might turn upon our finding the right answer to this question.

I believe that today the problem of securing peace reduces itself to the successful accomplishment of two tasks: first, the drafting of an agreement which will reconcile the vital interests of America and Russia; and second, having concluded such an agreement, the adoption by both the United States and Russia of policies that will insure that the agreement will continue to be in accordance with each other's vital interests. Unless these requirements are met, the agreement will be of no value.

In the absence of any possibility of enforcement, the agreement will be of value only if it is so well balanced and so well adjusted to the real interests of the contracting parties that, if it were to lapse, they would, of their own free will, conclude it anew. An agreement that fulfills this requirement, might be said to be self-regenerating.

Could this requirement be met? I rather believe so.

If we approach the problem of drafting an agreement on the basis of such considerations, then clearly we must not consider our own interests only, but it is equally important to ask ourselves what the interests of our friends in Western Europe are and what the interests of Russia are -- what these interests are today and what they are likely to be in the future.

And even though Germany might not be one of the negotiating parties and an agreement might be imposed upon her, we will still have to be fully aware of her vital interests. For if we want to have peace, we shall have to make sure that the agreement does not run counter to her vital interests either.

Outline of a Possible Agreement

If we are ever to get an overall agreement, it is high time that the public discussion of such an agreement should get under way. Naturally the first tentative proposals will look foolish later, as public discussion reaches a more advanced stage. But because a start has to be made somewhere, sometime, it might as well be made right here and now. I shall therefore make an attempt to enumerate a number of points which such an agreement might comprise.

The basic philosophy of this tentative proposal is to balance in the agreement a major point in favor of Russia against a major point in favor of America. The agreement centers around a completely demilitarized but federally united Germany, not even precluding the possibility of a union of Austria with Germany.

The point in America's favor would be that this united Germany would be economically integrated with the rest of Western Europe.

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The point in favor of Russia would be that America would accept the fact that Russia will have a military position of overwhelming dominance on the continent of Europe.

France, Belgium, and Holland would cease to be allies of the United States. They would form a neutral bloc of their own, with the United States guaranteeing their neutrality in the sense that as long as Russia does not violate the neutrality of any one of them, the United States will respect the neutrality of all of them. With respect to them, the United States would assume a unilateral obligation to go to war with Russia if Russia should invade any of them or force any of them to surrender.

The agreement would provide for a continental customs union in Europe which would include Germany, and freely exchangeable currencies among all the members of that union.

The agreement would provide for the elimination of atomic bombs from national armaments, for general disarmament, and for inspection of sufficient scope to make the provisions relating to disarmament effective.

Before going any further, there are two questions we must settle in our minds:

1) If we resign ourselves to permit Russia to occupy militarily such an overwhelmingly dominant position in Europe, what then would prevent Russia from overrunning Germany, France, Belgium, and Holland? But perhaps we ought rather to ask what would induce Russia to overrun Germany, France, Belgium, or Holland. For clearly such an invasion would mean war with the United States, and notwithstanding the degree of disarmament that might be agreed upon, the potential strength of the United States in case of war, will remain very great. Russia would therefore hardly provoke war with the United States without some very important reason for doing so.

Naturally, if Russia were willing to fight a world war for the sake of establishing Communist governments in Germany, France, Belgium, and Holland, there is nothing in the set-up here proposed that would prevent her from occupying, after some initial resistance, all of Western Europe. There are those who believe that Russia would do just this, and who believe that if it hadn't been for the atomic bomb, Russia would have invaded Western Europe soon after the war was over. Those who believe this to be true must of necessity reject the solution which is being discussed here, but they must also of necessity conclude that there is no chance of achieving atomic disarmament. They are entitled to their opinion, but they ought to draw the logical conclusion from it that there is nothing left for America to do now but to step up the atomic arms race. What that will lead to I am not prepared to discuss on this occasion.

The rest of us who do not go along with that view, must examine whether Western Europe could achieve security short of militarily counterbalancing the Russian land armies. Security based on military strength is not the only way to achieve security, nor does military strength necessarily provide security. And

overstated

as time goes on and distances shrink, fewer and fewer nations will be able to attain security based on military strength.

The security of Mexico with respect to the United States is not based on military strength, nor is the security of Mexico absolute, and neither is her freedom of action absolute. For Mexico might no longer be secure if she decided to conclude an alliance with Russia and if Russia were to look upon Mexico as a base of military operations against the United States.

I should be inclined to think that Western Europe would be more secure from military action by Russia under the proposed set-up than it is today. For even in case of war with America, Russia might hesitate to violate the neutrality of Western Europe if by doing so, she would enable the United States to use Western Europe as a base of operations against her.

2) Military action, however, is not the only way by which Russia could conceivably conquer Western Europe. There will be those who think that Russia need not risk a world war in order to conquer Western Europe, that Russia can conquer it through Communist propaganda.

To me it seems rather curious that on the one hand, we tend to underestimate Russia's military power, and on the other hand, we tend to overestimate Russia's political power. Immediately after the war, Russia succeeded in creating Communist governments which are subservient to her in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and somewhat later in Hungary as well as Czechoslovakia. But in all these countries, Russia succeeded in this because Russian troops had moved in and under their protection, a police force was established which was subservient to Russia. Yugoslavia, where Russian troops did not move in, has a Communist government, but her government is not subservient to Russia.

The popular concept that in countries like Italy, France, Belgium, or Holland, Russia might gain power through an armed insurrection of a political minority, is not supported by any precedent. To transform a group of civilians in oppo-

sition to the established order into a fighting force, that can successfully meet in peacetime the organized military and police forces of the established government, is a task exceedingly difficult to accomplish. To my knowledge, it has never been accomplished in any European country in modern times.

Erased
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If we thus tentatively conclude that an overall agreement of the type proposed above is worth considering, then we must now examine the chances of Russia's accepting inspection and of getting inspection to operate in a satisfactory manner.

Should the proposed agreement in fact eliminate Russia's valid reasons for objecting to inspection, would then Russia be likely to welcome inspection?

Even then Russia would probably dislike the notion of inspection and everything that goes along with it. For secrecy is habit forming as atomic scientists very well know from their own experience. Secrecy tends to persist long after the reasons which brought it into existence have ceased to be operative. You start off with secrecy for the sake of security and you end up with secrecy for the sake of secrecy.

Yet when an agreement is offered to Russia from which she would have much to gain and which would make secrecy appear unimportant to her, Russia might overcome her reluctance to inspection.

In this respect we have an encouraging precedent in the record of the UNRRA control commissions that operated in Byelo-Russia and in the Ukraine. Here we offered Russia something she wanted -- relief, and we asked for something that she did not want to give -- freedom of movement for the Control Commission. Russia accepted our terms because she needed the relief. And she continued to grant freedom of movement to the Control Commission because she continued to need the relief.

We may dislike the Russian system of government, but at least it has this advantage: once agreement is reached on the highest level there is no sabotaging of the agreement at the lower levels. It might very well be that if we reach an agreement with Russia which provides for inspection, we would encounter even less trouble in Russia with inspection than she might encounter in the United States.

Yet we must squarely face the fact that the United States or Russia might have grievances arising from the implementation of the agreement and that it is difficult to conceive of any international body to which both Russia and the United States could entrust the right to adjudicate such grievances. The only effective recourse that Russia and the United States would have in such a situation would be to record their complaint and to press for a remedy. And in the absence of any adjudication of the complaint they can effectively press for a remedy only if they have the right to abrogate the agreement. If either of them fails to live up to the clauses of the agreement which relate to disarmament and inspection, this might involve a vital threat to the other's security. It is, therefore, logical that the United States and Russia should retain the right legally to abrogate in self-defense. Paradoxical though it may seem, it might very well be true that the danger that the agreement will in fact be abrogated is less if Russia and America have the legal right to abrogate it.

It would be advisable, of course, to provide in the agreement for a cooling-off period before an abrogation would become final and go into effect.

Within the framework of an overall agreement, the problem of Eastern Europe will have to be settled somehow. Shall we reconcile ourselves to Russian domination of Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria? I think that probably we shall not have much choice in this matter. We might raise the question of Hungary, and it would be even more important to raise the question of Czechoslovakia. For she, among all these countries, is the only one that has a long and successfully estab-

lished democratic tradition. To return to a democratic form of government in Yugoslavia would also be of importance, but if anything can be done about this, the United States can do more about it at present than could Russia.

If we create a united Germany, one might consider whether the overall agreement should not provide for the return to Germany, at some fixed future date, of the German territories which have been occupied by Poland. This in turn might make it necessary to compensate Poland by the return of at least some of the territories which Poland ceded to Russia with our approval. Because of the increasing domination of Poland by Russia, Russia's reluctance to cede territory to Poland might be less than it otherwise would be.

In this connection, Poland might be given further compensation in the form of large-scale economic aid aimed at the building up of her consumers' goods industries.

Such economic aid to Poland ought to be part of the general economic provisions of the agreement which might promise both Western and Eastern Europe economic assistance from the United States for an extended period of time. The greater Russia's stake would be in the economic revival of Europe, and the longer the period would be for which America would agree to assist in this revival, the greater confidence we could have in continued Russian cooperation.

Of all the problems involved in the making of peace, the most difficult is probably the creation of a prosperous and peaceful Germany -- a Germany which is demilitarized and which both Russia and the United States can trust to remain demilitarized.

A necessary condition for a peaceful Germany is to have satisfied those national aspirations of Germany on which the overwhelming majority of the German people are likely to unite. Dismembering Germany, prohibiting Austria from joining

a German federal union, or artificially limiting Germany's output of commodities, ought to be ruled out on this basis alone.

But even so, it is a foregone conclusion that in the years to come there will be a strong nationalistic movement in Germany.

How can we be sure that the police forces in Germany will not become subservient to a nationalistic movement? This latter problem cannot be solved simply by decentralizing the German police, for instance, by subdividing it into the police forces of the individual German states. For the danger does not primarily lie in the transformation of these police forces into an army, but rather in the possibility that by capturing the police forces, the nationalistic movement may capture the government of Germany. Once that happens, then demilitarization of Germany could be enforced only by armed intervention which would upset the stability of Europe.

But even assuming the police force to be safe, if Germany is a democracy patterned on the Weimar Republic -- a nationalistic movement might legally capture the government. What kind of political structure could we give Germany that would preclude this danger?

Superimposing some inter-allied control commission upon the government of Germany would hardly provide a workable solution to this problem. The creation of a supra-national governmental authority in Europe might solve it, but few countries in Europe would at present be willing to accept the restrictions which such a solution would impose on national sovereignty.

The question of Germany's political structure thus poses a problem which is probably incapable of a solution within the framework of established precedent. Something new, something imaginative, may have to be adopted. Perhaps we ought to base our thinking on the fact that the countries in Europe are strongly interdependent. What the German government does affects not only Germany, it affects all of Germany's

neighbors. Perhaps it would be possible to base the government of Germany on a political structure that would take into account the fact of this interdependence. But to elaborate upon this point would go beyond the scope of this paper.

We have concerned ourselves here almost exclusively with the Russian-American conflict. There are other conflicts in the world which require attention. But if the Russian-American conflict is settled, the United Nations will come into its own. The edifice of the United Nations was erected on the premise that the great powers would act in agreement with each other. When that premise holds true, the United Nations will be able to function as it was meant to function.

In the absence of a settlement in the Russian-American conflict, the danger that the atomic arms race will now begin in earnest is very great and the risk that this will involve for ourselves, as well as for all mankind, is incalculable. The overall agreement proposed here might not be favored by those whose only concern is that the United States shall be in the best possible strategic position if war comes. But unless we are willing to accept a less favorable strategic position for the sake of greatly improving our chances of attaining peace, we might be unable to make any progress toward peace.

Because it may take time to re-evaluate our foreign policy, it might be necessary to arrive at some informal agreement with Russia to make sure that in the meantime no irrevocable decisions are taken on the German issue by either Russia or America.

Any attempt to make a new start and to try to negotiate with Russia on the issue of atomic disarmament without being ready to remove the major obstacle that stands in its way; i.e. without being ready to settle the basic strategic conflicts in Europe, can only lead to disappointment. The negotiations on atomic disarmament have failed once, and that is unfortunate. Allowing them to fail a second time might be disastrous.



Michael Rougier—LIFE

SPECTATORS AT THE ARMED FORCES HEARING
In stunned silence.

Roscoes Out. Guardsmen with walkie-talkies yelled into their instruments; an ambulance came screaming up the drive. Its driver bawled: "Where are the wounded?" The effect of all this was spectacular: Lieut. Porterfield had told nobody—not even the Capitol police—that he was "recapturing" the Capitol from an imaginary but bloodthirsty mob.

Pedestrians peered and crowded, babbling curiously. A Capitol cop who was walking his beat on the West Front took one look at the shouting guardsmen and prepared for counter-measures.

"Honest to God," he said afterward, "I hadn't the least idea of what was coming off. I snuggles down in the bushes and takes out my roscoe. I swear if one of them had got between me and the white steps, so's I could have a good target, I'd have let him have it."

But before pistols barked, Police Lieut. William Reed, in charge of the night force at the Capitol, charged across the grounds, swollen with professional indignation and crying loudly for information. An MP informed him proudly: "We've just taken the Hill." "Get the hell out of the way," he roared, and descended on Dreamer Porterfield.

Beg Pardon. He pointed at Porterfield's carbine and yelled: "Is that thing loaded?" "No, sir," said the guardsman. "Well, son," said Reed happily, hauling out his .38, "mine is. Get going, you're under arrest."

Porterfield talked fast. After 20 minutes of heavy breathing the cops relented, decided not to throw him in jail for trespassing. The warriors returned to the armory and turned in their weapons. Back at Peoples Drug next day, the food department's most highly publicized member groaned: "Oh, Lord, it was just a routine problem. We didn't mean anything bad by it, honest!"

ARMED FORCES

The Incurrigible & Indomitable

The defense of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Force against attacks made on them by a rebellious group of Navy officers had reached its climax.

Hard-bitten General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had taken the witness stand before the tense audience in the House Armed Services Committee room. Infantryman Bradley began to read his statement, which he had handwritten without help from public-relations experts, in his quarters at Fort Myer.

"The real issue to which we should de-


vote our attention," he said, was "whether or not we are providing for the security of this country with the least expense to our economy." What were the requirements? Before the committee and the world, he repeated the U.S. military strategy agreed upon by the J.C.S.

"We are never going to start the war," he said. Therefore the strategy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was premised on the assumption that the U.S. would be attacked. "We will have to carry the war back to the enemy by all means at our disposal. I am convinced that this will include strategic air bombardment and large-scale land operations." There would be little need for Pacific island-hopping after the early phases, he thought, or any need for such amphibious operations as the Normandy invasion.

"If We Lose the War." Navymen had said strategic "mass" bombing by the Air Force's B-36 was militarily unsound, even immoral. Bradley gave them a direct unequivocal reply. Strategic bombing, he said, "is our first-priority retaliatory weapon," and the B-36 is the best heavy bomber in the U.S. arsenal.

"I find some comfort in the fact," he continued in his characteristic high-pitched voice, "that we have a long-range bomber that can fly from any base in the world, attack targets in the range of 4,000 miles and return home." It was obvious that "workers live near factories and that if you bomb the factories, you may bomb the people . . . Any great injury you can inflict upon the morale of that nation," he added, "contributes to the victory . . . We are all aware of the awful penalty if we lose the war." As for morality—"war itself is immoral."

Distaste for Disloyalty. For weeks, Bradley had been watching the Navy's admirals wage what he considered to be a reckless, unruly and dangerous campaign



Harris & Ewing

BRADLEY
In indignation.

NATIONAL AFFAIRS



JOHNSON & VINSON
Without anger.

Acme

against this concept. Now, his anger up, he indignantly denied that as J.C.S. chairman he had been prejudiced against the Navy. When he stood against the Navy it was because, as he saw it, the Navy was wrong. He had been against building the Navy's supercarrier, the keel of which was laid early this year, then abandoned.

He thought the funds could be better employed elsewhere. The only enemy in sight was a great land force which had negligible naval strength outside of its submarines.

The admirals had insinuated that the J.C.S. did not know how a war should be fought and Bradley's heavy brows lowered behind his spectacles as he made scornful reply: "Even if I were not personally involved, I would harbor a distaste for such lack of loyalty."

He knew the combat records of the members of the J.C.S.: himself, General Hoyt Vandenberg, who had commanded the Ninth Air Force in Europe, the Army's General J. Lawton Collins, who had commanded the VII Corps at Normandy. Then he got in a low blow: "I was not associated with Admiral Denfeld during the war. I am not familiar with his experiences . . . [Denfeld, by order of his superiors, spent most of the war in Washington as Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel]. Undoubtedly it was because of this record that he was appointed Chief of Naval Operations."

"Fancy Dans." The admirals had said that the Navy's power and prestige were being "nibbled to death" and that their service's morale was being wrecked. Replied Bradley sharply: "Senior officers decrying the low morale of their forces evidently do not realize that the esprit of the men is but a mirror of their con-

fidence in their leadership." As for admirals risking their careers to carry their case to the public, Bradley snapped: "I would like to offer some impartial advice to all aspiring martyrs: to be successful in a sacrifice, he must be 100% right . . . His sacrifice must be for the good of the entire nation . . ."

The crux of the whole matter, as he saw it, was: many in the Navy were "completely against unity of command and planning . . . Despite protestations to the contrary, I believe that the Navy has opposed unification from the begin-



VANDBERG
With figures.

Wide World

ning . . . This is no time," he went on sternly, "for 'fancy Dans' who won't hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals . . . I believe that the public hearing of the grievances of a few officers who will not accept the decisions of the authorities established by law . . . have done infinite harm to our national defense."

The Balance of the Bomb. When Omar Bradley finished his biting, indignant statement there was stunned silence in the committee room. In charging head down into the middle of the scrimmage he had given a final, climactic exhibition of the unseemly personal antagonisms which had split the nation's military chiefs. From a military standpoint he had all but blasted the Navy admirals' case. And before the week was out, torpedoed by the testimony of other non-Navy men, the Navy's arguments were little more than just afloat.

Was it true that the Air Force, with its \$1.4 billion B-36 program, was "putting all its eggs in one basket?" General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force chief, answered with figures. B-36s, he said, comprised only 5% (four groups) of the total of regular military aircraft. The Air Force also had eleven groups of other bombers (about 330 B-29s and B-50s), and some 33 groups of heavy and medium reconnaissance, fighter, troop carrier and other miscellaneous aircraft.

Said Vandenberg: the nation had to "counterbalance the potential enemy's masses of ground troops . . . No such balancing factor exists other than strategic bombing, including the atomic bomb."

The Air Force's Secretary W. Stuart Symington backed up Vandenberg, and deplored the whole public airing of the country's military doctrines. "Lightning Joe" Collins denied any Army plot to swallow up the Navy's Marine Corps as had been charged in the Navy's case.

"A Grand Lot." After these witnesses, all of whom had been personally involved in the Navy's accusations, voices began to tone down. To the witness stand came Herbert Hoover to say sadly: "It requires a year for newly wedded couples to get used to each other . . . I suppose one of the requirements of maintaining freedom is the public washing of linen." Came George Marshall to recall how he had to go out of his way during World War II to keep the proud and sensitive Navy happy, how he had to exercise "great restraint on the air fellows" because "I was opposed to overstatement of power and understatement of limitations."

The final witness was Defense Secretary Louis Johnson. He was expected to clash noisily with the House Committee's Chairman Carl Vinson, who had characterized Johnson's recent order to cut \$800 million from defense expenditures as "grandstanding." Johnson was in his most ingratiating mood, and so was Vinson. He