

11 A ~~disarming~~ previous
NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH - ~~THE GREAT~~ FALLACY.

The farmer was suing his wife for divorce "Judge, "-he said- "I cannot live with her anymore .She talks all the time , day and night she talks and talks." "She talks all the time"- said the judge-"what does she talk about ?" "Well, Sir," -said the farmer - "she don't say."

For years now the spokesmen of the Administration have hinted again and again that our main purpose in rearming is to become so strong that we can sit down with the Russians and negotiate an agreement with them.

"When we are strong we are going to negotiate " we are told again and again "Negotiation is fine"-you may say - "but what are we going to negotiate ?" Well Sir, they don't say.

Sometimes there is a hint that we want an agreement that will provide for far reaching, perhaps total disarmament. To say that ^{full}rearmament must be an accomplished fact in order to be able to agree on disarmament may sound paradox but it is in fact quite absurd.

The situation ⁱⁿ which Russia and the United States find themselves to-day has occurred repeatedly before and it was rarely resolved without war.

If it is to be resolved without war this time it will not be on the

basis of "negotiations from strength ". On the contrary, the whole concept of negotiations through strength is based on a fallacy. ^{for a while} We are led ~~to this~~ ~~fallacy~~ through ~~a~~ ⁱⁿ loose way of reasoning by analogy. And this fallacy , unless we get rid of it fast, may very well block the one remaining avenue of escape from the ~~s~~hreatening war.

What ~~xxxxxxx~~ reasoning by analogy is this ? What is this misleading analogy ? If two private persons are about to conclude an agreement the one who negotiates from strength is indeed in a favorable position. He can get the other fellow to sign an agreement in which many points are settled in his favor. And once the agreement has been signed on the dotted line he can count on the agreement being kept. If the other fellow does not perform he can be taken to court and one may be sure that the judgement of the court will be enforced.

But if Russia and the United States enter into an agreement , and one of them defaults what power or combination of powers can enforce the judgement of any court against either of them , short of a war of indefinite duration and uncertain outcome . The distribution of power in the world being what it is there is no possibility of enforcement against either Russia or the United States.

What use is it then for the United States to be particularly strong, just at the time when the agreement is about to be

negotiated ? Surely, this may help us to get the Russians to concede more points in our favor than they ~~otherwise~~ would. But the more points are settled in our favor the sooner may come the time when Russia will no longer consider it to be in her interest to keep the agreement in force. And then what ? And what are we going to do then ? Or are we going to try and maintain a great superiority in armaments , both strategic strength and military power proper, forever ? Is this desirable , and even if it seems desirable is it possible ? And ~~xxxx~~ ^{to be} assuming it were possible would it really secure peace ?

Or is there perhaps another solution to the problem to ~~xxxxxx~~ reach an agreement and to keep it in force ? How about thinking in terms of an agreement which would offer incentives to America and to Russia strong enough to induce them to maintain the agreement in force , not because they might have a legal obligation to do so , but because they would want to keep the agreement alive and in operation in order to continue to enjoy the benefits which they derive from it.

To make our point as clear as possible let us assume that the agreement concluded between Russia and America contains ^{to} ~~the~~ clause which permits either of them to abrogate it , simply by giving notice

of doing so~~x~~ (and there may be good reasons ~~why such a clause ought~~
~~perhaps~~ in favor of actually including such a clause in the agree-
ment). And then let us ask ourselves just what kind of an agreement does
it take to make it reasonably sure that neither Russia nor the United
States will make use of this right to abrogate ~~x~~. The issue of peace
will turn on wheather we can find an answer to this question.

Charles Walker

~~Will still put the old and the new~~

~~Will~~ Negotiating from the strength a fallacy
as a fraud -

The former was saying this
map, for the more Judge the
entire map can not have with
her ^{any} she talks all the time,
day and night she talks and
talks of Well, said the Judge, "So

she talks all the time - said the
Judge - yes does she talk about 2⁴
"Well ^{is} ~~judge~~ ^{said} the person
~~that~~ ^{she} ~~does not say~~"

For years now we have heard
from the spokesmen of the Admi-
nistrators ^{have printed} ^{again and again} that we must
~~be~~ ^{be} ~~arriving~~ ⁱⁿ ~~to establish~~ ^{that}
~~the~~ ^{of} ~~strength~~ ^{are}
~~examining~~ ^{in order to}
our main purpose is to
be ~~so~~ ^{come} strong that we can
not ~~harsh~~ ⁱⁿ ~~harsh~~ ⁱⁿ
with the Puritans
and negotiate an agreement ~~that~~
~~is~~ ^{is} ~~unfavorable~~ ^{unfavorable} ~~to us~~ ^{to us} with the
~~Puritans~~ ^{with them}. This has
been told ~~to us~~ ^{to us} When we are strong
we are going to negotiate
we are told again and again.
~~Will~~ You may want to know

Neyshadaban is fine you
may say but ~~what~~ what are
we going for neyshadaban?
Well sir, they don't say. —

Surely there is a hint
~~In the literature~~
~~In the kind of conflict which~~
~~the type of conflict~~

That we want an agreement
that will provide for reaching
disarmament. That ~~we have to~~
~~we have to~~ That ~~movement~~
~~for the test must be an action~~
~~we must be prepared to~~

~~must — and be and~~
~~be in fact, agreed to the test~~
— in that ^{to say} disarmament ~~it must~~

be an accomplished fact ~~and~~
in order to be able to agree an
disarmament ~~must~~ ~~provide~~
~~but as in reality it is~~ ~~absurd~~
This may sound paradox but it is in fact

The situation in which ^{must be almost} Russia
and the U.S. find themselves
today ~~has~~ has occurred repeatedly
~~in~~ before and it was rarely
resolved without war. If

is to be resolved without war
this time it will not be on
the basis of "neyshadaban
from strength". — On the

contrary the whole concept of
"neyshadaban from strength" is
~~a fallacy~~ ~~which~~ based on
a fallacy to which we are

led by a loose ~~may~~ may at
sea sailing by analogy.
~~And unless I thus follow~~ And
~~this far~~ And unless. And this
except unless we get ~~it~~
will if it just may very well
block the one remaining avenue
of escape from ~~the~~ the most
~~threatening~~ which
threaten to engulf us.

What is this fall's reasoning
by analogy?

If two private persons are about
to conclude an agreement
~~the~~ the one who negotiates from
strength is indeed in a favourable
position. He can get the other
fellow to sign an agreement
in which many of points
are settled in his favour.

and once the ~~other~~ agree-
ment has been signed on
the dotted line ~~he~~ can
~~take~~ ~~the~~ he can count on
the agreement being signed.
~~for there is a court to~~
~~enforce it~~ If the other
fellow does not perhaps he
can take him to court and
~~cannot~~ ~~an~~ ~~enforce~~ ~~the~~

But there is no court to ^{judge}
~~enforce~~ the U.S. ~~can~~ can take
its case and he can ^{enforce}
~~be~~ be sure that the agree-
ment will be enforced.

Very truly
Yours
John M. McK

Dr. But of Russia and the
U.S. enter into ~~an~~ an
agreement and one of
their defaults or omissions
~~what possible power or subordination of~~
~~can~~ can enforce a judge ^{power}
ment of any court against
either of them short of
a war of indefinite duration
and uncertain outcome.

There is obviously ^{at present} no
possibility of enforcement ^{under}
~~the~~ ^{power of the U.S.} ~~the~~ ^{power} ~~of the~~ ^{of the} ~~U.S.~~ ^{U.S.}
The ~~power~~ ^{power} ~~of the~~ ^{of the} ~~U.S.~~ ^{U.S.}
world being what it is *

~~What is then the use of being~~
~~strong at the~~ ~~policy~~ ~~collection~~
~~security can restrain~~

What use is it then to be
~~profoundly~~ ^{profoundly} strong
just at the time the agreement
is about to be negotiated. —
Surely this ~~would~~ ^{may} ~~help~~ ^{help} ~~us~~ ^{us} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~get~~ ^{get} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Russians~~ ^{Russians} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~concede~~ ^{concede} ~~more~~ ^{more} ~~points~~ ^{points} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~our~~ ^{our} ~~favor~~ ^{favor} ~~than~~ ^{than} ~~they~~ ^{they} ~~otherwise~~ ^{otherwise} ~~would~~ ^{would}. But the more points ~~are~~
are settled in our favor the
sooner will come the time
when it will be no longer
for Russia Russia will no
longer consider it to be
in her interest to keep
the agreement in force

and then what. Or are
we going to ~~maintain~~ by and
maintain a ~~very~~ great
superiority ~~in~~ the armaments
~~and strategic~~ both strategic
and military ~~at~~ strength
proper power? Is this
desirable and even if it
were desirable is it possible
~~and even~~ And even if it
were possible would it secure
peace?

Or is there another solution
to the problem to keep an
agreement in force?

What if the agreement, by removing
the danger of war and the
economic burden of armaments
~~is offered~~ offered strong
and confirmed incentives
to the U.S. and to Russia strong
enough to induce them to
maintain the agreement in
force not because they have
a legal obligation to do
so but because they
want to maintain such an
agreement ~~the now~~
to keep the agreement alive
and in operation.

If we want to examine whether
a proposed agreement is
desirable in the abstract
if we want to examine
whether some proposed

~~agreement~~

agreement is wholly for us

If we want to examine

Points

If we want to form an opinion
on any proposed agreement
between R and the U.S.

(for the sake of argument)
Let us assume that the

agreement concluded between
R and the U.S. contains a clause
permitting both R and the U.S.
to abrogate it ~~by~~ giving
notice of ~~simply~~ abrogation

— and there are indeed strong
argument in favor of
having such a clause ~~in~~
in fact included in ~~an~~ an
agreement. — and then
let us ask ourselves ~~first~~

~~what should the agreement~~
what kind of an agreement
does it take to make reasonably
~~sure~~ sure that neither

Russia nor the U.S. will
~~at~~ abrogate in the foreseeable
future. this is the problem.

But whether or not the agreement
does in fact ~~contain~~ ^{contain} a clause permitting
unilateral abrogation

By in trying to divide the
agreement we shall have to
keep in mind that an
abrogation may occur — in

fact even if the agreement
embodies ~~the~~ offer
strong assurances for
continued observance
to both countries. Governments
and ~~from~~ the people to whom
they may be responsive are
not always guided by rational
considerations and we
~~shall therefore have to~~
~~to give much attention~~
and we can therefore never
rule out entirely the possi-
bility of an abrogation.
~~Therefore~~ ^{in these given} it will be ~~not~~
~~unusually~~ necessary to ~~consider~~
very carefully these two
points

a.) In what program would
an abrogation of the agreement
leave us

b.) How can we make sure
that there is no secret ~~violation~~
of the announcement going on in
violation of the agreement,
~~while the agreement is~~
in all ^{embodied} place ^{affirmation}

But the main question we
hope first to answer is remains
this can we ~~draw~~ draw up
~~an arrangement~~ in which
Russia and America may
adhere and from which they
would derive great and
continued benefits as long
as they do adhere.

At this point we may ask
ourselves how is it that ~~the~~
~~the~~ 7 years have passed
since the end of the war
and at no time has either
the front nor any respectable
group of private citizens come
forward with a plan and
said "This is what may be
the answer to ~~the~~ ^{our} ~~the~~ problem
of Russia were willing
to accept it, only ~~we~~ are
stupid ought to accept it also."
~~One says to have one of course~~
There is of course more
than one reason for this.
First of all ~~we~~ we are knows
what ~~the~~ ~~our~~ this plan may
be. Many people must have
thought about it and have
ideas about it but no compe-
tent group has devoted enough
time to it to be able to
say they have thought
of all the angles and have
weighed all the pitfalls. -
~~There also are~~ And last
of all there is again the
great fallacy at work. -
~~One says to have one of course~~

Once we make public a
plan and declare ~~it~~ ~~it~~ it
acceptable to us and then
subsequently ~~the~~ ~~we~~ it comes to
negotiations ~~with~~
Russia these negotiations will

take of from the place and
then the Russian will press
for concessions and ~~the~~
~~in the end~~ we too will have
to give in here and there
if we want to negotiate at
all. This would be so of course
in any ordinary negotiation
of a business deal which
always has an element of
horse trading in it. But it
~~in the coming~~ any future
discussion with Russia
on the conditions of peace
if we want get anywhere
at all unless we first
understand and can make
the Russians ^{understand} somewhat
what kind of a problem
we are dealing with.

This is not a problem that
can be moved piece-meal
and can be negotiated
piece-meal. ~~It will not~~
~~be possible for us~~ if we
want a ~~lasting~~ agreement
that can ~~withstand~~ the stresses
of ~~it~~ hold up for the rest
of the century to agree
to any detail

It will be necessary to construct
a package that will hold
together. It is not a question
in obtaining concessions as many

concessions from the Russians
as we can get it and it
may even happen that when
~~we have to propose~~
~~submission of a draft~~
~~as acceptable to the Russians~~
we have to propose modifica-
tions of the draft in favor
of the Russians if we
feel that greater incentives
~~should be provided for~~
~~continue to~~ for should be
provided for Russia in
order for ^{give us greater assurance} ~~make more~~
~~certain that the~~
~~Russians will want~~

that we can count on
~~continued~~ Russia wanting
to maintain the agreement
in force ~~when~~ even when
~~conditions~~ ^{would} the existing
power situation ^{should} ~~changes~~
~~in~~ ~~for~~ ~~power~~
shift in her power.
General MacArthur told
me there is no substitute for
victory - ~~perhaps this is maybe~~
~~or~~, but there is one thing
~~more~~ certainly there is no
substitute for wisdom.

If we had a plan I say
we could ~~so~~ and should
make it known to the world
what it is. But before
we can have a plan there
will have to be more hard

Thinking done. It would
help though this is at
perhaps not indispensable
if we had discussions
with Russians before
formulating a plan
in detail. I say discussions
and not negotiations, for
the purpose of the discussion
is to discover what it
is that the Russians would
~~value most~~ could provide
the strongest incentives
for continued Russian cooperation
and for this we want to know
~~not~~ what the Russians value
most.

There are a few things we know
even without talking to ^{the} Russians
Russia spends between 20 to 30% of its
~~national~~ national income for
military, a ~~national~~ ~~portion~~
in social things ~~a~~ ~~portion~~
of 10% of the nat. income ~~to~~ ~~from~~
~~for~~ ~~capital~~ ~~from~~ ~~consumption~~

~~and~~ savings which ~~represent~~
~~an~~ amount to 10% of the
national income and which
represents the portion of the
national income that is not
consumed but ~~actually~~ ~~invested~~
usefully ~~invested~~ invested.
~~of this, it is said of 10-15%~~

If Russia is freed from the
need necessarily to keep up
the arms ~~race~~ ^{race} if she could
dabble or bicker

Insert

The nature of the conflict.

In the summer Congress
at Chicago work began
in earnest when ~~the~~
~~the~~ towards the end of the war.
The war against Germany was
~~now~~ virtually over the war against
Japan could not possibly be
lost. ~~The United States~~
~~had~~ It was natural then
to ask ourselves what kind
of a world we shall have when
the fighting ceases, ~~how~~ one we
going to live under the shadow
of the atomic bomb or will
we find a way to cope with
the problem that it poses.
~~One thing was clear to us at that~~
~~much of our discussion revolved~~
~~around the role of Russia~~
~~It was~~ There was little doubt
in our minds at that time
well before Potsdam and shortly
before Yalta that there ^{threatening} would be
a ~~danger~~ ^{serious danger} of a
Power conflict between Russia and
America when the war ends.
This perception with Russia was

was not due to ~~that~~ ^{same} ~~fact~~ ^{misunder-}
~~misunderstanding~~ ^{standing}, distrust of Russia
 but rather that we thought not
 of the distribution of power ^{for a long time} in ^{the} world
 the world in the postwar period ^{to come}
 after the war & preparedness for
 a modern war. Armaments
 have become more and more
 elaborate and expensive until
 we have finally reached the
 point where ~~it is~~ where
~~no nation can remain a great~~
~~military~~ ^{it} only few
 nations are left who
 can afford them. In order
 to maintain ~~a~~ ^{an} ~~army~~
~~its~~ ^{its} military establishment
 only ~~equipped~~ ^{equipped} ~~with~~ ^{with} modern arms
 a nation must have a wide
 margin between its total
 productive capacity and its
 total civilian ~~consumption~~
 consumption. will be able to maintain
 in the modern world a fully
 equipped military establish-
 ment. America has ~~such~~
 wide margin because its
 great productive capacity
 and Russia has a wide margin
 because it is able to keep
 civilian consumption
 at a low level. No other
 nation is at present in a
 comparable position.
 With only two major milit-
 ary powers in existence and

and ~~with~~ their common
enemy uniting with
the end of the war how
long will it take for
Russia and America
to look upon each other
as potential enemy
enemies & in a war
~~and the more that~~
~~and if~~ But once they can -
order themselves as much
long will it take
them to be concerned
before they begin to
jockey for position
that will give them
the that will give them
strategic advantages in
case of war & if there is
war we want to win that
war and ~~so~~ so do
the Russians. and this
is clear if there is an
issue on which there
can be no compromise and
so the stage is set for
a vicious circle in
which each step we take to
make more sure to win
the war if it comes
provokes a similar step
by Russia and vice versa
and each such step mani-
festly the chances of
establishing peace.

We saw this process at work
before in history and we
know where it leads.

Disorder Power politics can
~~be played~~ ~~more~~ ~~at~~ ~~chance~~
— as we have played it
under 3 Sec of State since
1845 — or more skillfully
as Hamilton or Lloyd would
would have us play it. —
~~But~~ In the latter case ~~power~~
~~will be~~ ~~power~~ the period of
power will be prolonged ~~but~~
~~the~~ ~~at~~ ~~power~~ a tangible goal
perhaps but not a lofty
one. — If war is to be avoided
altogether; if the vicious
circle is to be broken per-
manently it will take some-
thing unknown never before
attempted in history.
~~What~~ What is proposed
here is ~~is~~ the first ~~of~~
step in this of this
~~new~~ novel approach
to an old to the old problem.
As it can not be attempted
with any hope of success
not unless these responsibilities
for the formulation of great
policy here and in Russia
~~have~~ develop ~~unfettered~~ under
the change that has brought
~~about~~ nature of the problem
the change that has been

If unless they understand
in ~~that~~ what manner and
to what degree modern
A conditions have changed
important aspects of the
problem and the meaning
and consequences of war
itself. —

You may ask of course
is the conflict between the
and Russia ~~a~~ ~~the~~ primarily
a conflict between two
nations or is this a conflict
between two worlds of thought
~~the world of the free ^{democratic} nations~~
~~with God and who are with~~
~~God and the world of Russia~~
~~and other nations~~ —

Russia not determined to
conquer the world if not
for Russia then at least
for communism; is she
not using the communists
everywhere for
this purpose. And she
has succeeded already to
conquer a large subvert
a large part of the world and
to increase her power
position by subjugating
other nations. —

But
Both Russia and America, with
a possible armed conflict
in mind seem to be eager
to secure as many allies as

possible. America would
like to see these to have
these allies of possible to
be free and democratic but
if this is not possible the
~~we~~ has to these to have them
as allies or to have them
free and democratic but
outside her camp
But when these two things
get into conflict America
wants to have ~~the~~ the
only nation in her camp
first and democratic second
In the very same sense the
Russian want every country
communist ~~of~~ for that
means that if that
means that the country
will be securely in Russian
camp camps & Russian aim
and Russian aim are
the same but there methods
of fighting the cold war
are different. - In this
cold war we use the weapon
of economic aid Russia
uses the weapon of
communist propaganda
~~with the aid~~ and the
aid of the various
national communist
presses. When we disregard
disregard If we disregard
Russia's national interest in
the security allies how much

(remain)

strangely would Russia's
interested in seeing the
other countries go communist
would it be any stranger
than our ~~own~~ ~~own~~ remaining
interest in seeing those
same countries turn demo-
cratic. As to Russia's
path in communism abroad
~~is much~~ ^{any} stranger than
our path in democracy
abroad and just how
strange is either of these
paths?

However that may be the fact
remains that Russia did
not succeed to conquer ~~her~~
~~by propaganda~~ ~~any~~ ^{by} ~~draft~~ ^{gun}

a single country in Europe.
All countries in Europe which
went communist did so because
first a communist police was
installed by force. This happened
in Poland Rumania and Bulgaria
and then Czechs and Hungarians in
~~with Russian~~ the physical
presence of Russian troops on
the soil of the countries,
~~that that that~~ elsewhere in Europe
In Yugoslavia where Russia did
~~not~~ not put in her "army" police
things went ~~at~~ a different
way from the way Russia marched
them to you even though Com

shows most communist.

~~in Asia~~

Of course is a different and serious case of a communist Revolution ~~the~~ ^{perme} brought about by a powerful educated minority & Russia's ~~experience no doubt~~ ^{gives encourage} -

ment to such a Revolution even though she may not contribute to it anything in a material sense as in fact she did not in this case. ~~Other~~ ^{in Asia} ~~countries~~ in overpopulated nations like China ~~may~~ ^{might} go communist in the future and it is a safe bet that they will ~~unless~~ ^{unless} ~~two~~ unless they will embrace some form of democracy better suited to work in countries with a high ~~any~~ degree of illiteracy than does the parliamentary form ~~which~~ ^{which} we present to - the only form which we are able to present them these days in a silver platter. Insect. here

Many of these countries have
a high degree of illiteracy
and are condemned to a low
standard of living. ^{miserably}
~~the~~ short of giving them the
tools of controlling their
population increase and short
of presenting them with
a form of democracy other
than the parliamentary form
which ~~cannot~~ ~~practically~~
~~will~~ ~~enable~~ illiterate people
must if necessity go along
~~among~~ ~~in~~ the ~~way~~ ~~among~~
~~of~~ ~~among~~ illiterates.
Some countries of ~~the~~ this
type are likely to become dicta-
torship and more likely
than not communist develop-
ments. — Again Russia is
very extensive may ~~help~~ ~~accel-~~
erate this development
but Russia - material help
is not needed to bring
it about. —

~~This is the~~ ~~these are then~~
~~the realities which we must~~
~~be aware of~~ ~~most here~~ ~~from next page~~

We must be aware of these
realities before ~~attempting~~ ~~to~~
we begin to think of
~~what a Russian American~~
the possible scope of an
overall peace set up
in which America and
Russia might be

a party. —

Insert an extract of preceding page:

~~the Russian~~ ~~Communist~~ promises these under-
developed countries freedom
from want, and freedom from
fear - fear of unemployment -
But communism will not be able
to deliver the goods. For it
offers no ~~remedies~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~
~~only~~ ~~remedies~~ of redistribution
of land, and increased
industrial production and
just distribution of goods; it
does not propose to reduce the
birth rate. — In this respect
they are not better than we
are. ~~the~~ ^{to} ~~Communist~~ ^{economic} ~~advice~~ ^{be able to} which
we might extend to a country
like India ~~today~~ ~~for beyond~~
~~our present~~ ~~going for beyond~~
~~our Point~~ ~~assuming~~ we have
willing to go for beyond the
so-called Point 4 Program
will appreciably better the
lot of the people of India.
First of preventing them with
a poll tax that - taken say
once a month - will cut down
the birthrate to manageable
proportions - and help India
Point In this respect point

It is no less a fraud
than the promises of the
the communist - but in
~~all respects~~ ~~it is a~~
~~less effective~~ ~~fr~~
as frauds go and is the
less effective one. It is
not quite fair to blame the
Russians for this.

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Voice in the wilderness.