


# THIRD WORLD

Volume 1 Number 7

University of California, San Diego

Friday, March 5, 1971

## POLICING THE EMPIRE



Here we go again. It seems that the United States brand of "Law and Order," whatever that may be, is not confined only to these shores. The Agency for International Development (AID), a US foreign aid program, has been running... ah, shall we say a brisk business in maintaining the status quos around the world (as long as they are favorable to these United States, I might add). But then again, what decent self-respecting super power be it Amerika, Russia, Europe or whatever isn't running some type of game down on the underdeveloped nations of the world? Anyway, the US is spending your hard-earned tax dollars doing a counterinsurgency thing on people telling (Uncle) Sam to get his damn foot off their necks. Manifest Destiny rides again!

The now familiar panacea for domestic ills, 'law and order,' has long been used to describe American objectives in the troubled areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America. While the federal Government did not start aiding local u.s. pllice agencies until 1968 (under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe street Act), we have been supplying the police of selected underdeveloped nations with equipment, arms, and training since 1954. U.S. funds have been used to construct the National Police Academy of Brazil, to renovate and expand the South Vietnamese prison system, and to install a national police communications network in Colombia. The Agency for international Development (AID) estimates that over one million foreign policemen have received some training or supplies through the US 'Public Safety' program- a figure which includes 100,000 Brazilian police and the entire 85,000 -man national Police Force of South Vietnam.

US foreign aid programs in the underdeveloped 'Third World' call for a modest acceleration of economic growth to be achieved wherever possible through the normal profit-making activities of U.S. corporations and lending institutions. It is obvious, however, that atmosphere of insecurity and rebelliousness does not provide an attractive climate for investment. In the rapidly urbanizing nations of the Third World, civil disorders have become a common phenomenon as landless peasants stream to the cities in search of economic and cultural opportunities. Since most of these countries cannot satisfy the aspirations of these new city-dwellers under present economic and social systems, built up tensions are increasingly giving way to attacks on the status quo. After his 1969 tour of Latin America, Nelson Rockefeller noted in his report to the President that while Latin armies "have gradually improved their capabilities for dealing with Castro-type agrarian guerrillas," it appeared that "radical revolutionary elements in the hemisphere (are) increasingly turning toward urban terrorism is their attempts to bring down the existing order." This prediction has already been borne out in Brazil and Uruguay, where urban guerrillas have staged spectacular bank robberies and kidnappings.

Since the late 1950's a paramount concern of American policy makers has been the preservation of social stability in countries deeded favorable to US trade and investment. US military planning has been shaped by the need to provide, on a moment's notice, trained counterinsurgency forces that can be flown to the aid of friendly regimes threatened by popular insurrection. The Military Assistance Program has been used to upgrade the capabilities of indigenous forces to overcome rural guerilla forces. Finally, on the premise that the police constitute the "firstline of defense against the subversion" the Agency for International Development has funneled American funds and supplied into the hands of Third World police forces.

During hearing on the foreign assistance appropriations for 1965, AID Administrator David Bell described the rationale behind US police assistance programs as follows;

Maintenance of law and order including internal security is one of the fundamental responsibilities of government....

Successful discharge of this responsibility is im-

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**THE AFRICAN CULTURAL TRADITIONS CLASS OF MUIR COLLEGE WILL PRESENT A FESTIVAL ON SATURDAY, MARCH 13.**

The general background will be based on the role of traditional artists, the process of creation, and the function of art in African culture. Integration of music, dance, costume, literature and food will give a view of West African traditions. The production will be held on the lawn of Third College (near the Provost's office.) Activities will begin around 1:00 p.m. There will be no admission charge but donations will be appreciated to cover the cost of the production. Everyone is invited.

### Natcho is back!

Our beloved friend NATCHO is back. He was seen recently at a peace rally in Tijuana. All carnals-beware of him!



Alternatives

by Vincent Hollier

No matter how you look at it, no matter how you slice it, the difficulties facing people today call for a fresh new approach. We're up against unconventional problems that call for some unconventional solutions. A new system of thought is needed-- a new sense of direction-- to replace these outmoded views which linger on; hanging, still confusing us by their very presence. As we look today, we are rapidly approaching the final disintegration of six thousand years of outmoded western civilization-- if not eastern civilization too-- a disintegration so complete that out of the ruins, there will never come any resurrection of the old forms and institutions of mankind. We are at the crossroads between the old and the new. We stand on the threshold of the creation of a new era for man-- a new world idea.

One key cornerstone in the formation of these new ideas will be the power of the mind-- that vast storehouse of energy that has yet to be tapped. The less you've immersed yourself within the stagnant waters of Amerika, the sharper your powers will be. Conforming to this Amerikan thing cuts off and narrows your field of vision-- it dulls your inborn sharpness, your ability to create. It causes you to operate at a fraction of your potential. The people or that portion of the population that has never really been within this Amerikan "society" has the best chances of having enough imagination left to create the new ideas needed, but like all worthwhile things, this formation will not be easy. First people must re-examine themselves, their ways of thinking, the ideas they hold dear, things of a personal nature, things deep down with the vaults of the mind. The low must be displaced with the high. The self must be looked into and subjected to the clear light of truth-- the real! Next, one learns to become harmonious with the rhythms of life. Just like there are certain times and beats to music-- life has its own rhythms and one must dance in order to survive-- get in step or perish. We must learn to focus our energies both as a group and as individuals. It makes me mad a hell when I see blacks around this school-- on the dopes, crying about how "I can't do no math" or "I can't do no science". F\*\*K THAT SHIT! As long as you operate off that cannot-do-it-crap-- you ain't going to be able to do nothing. We can do anything we put our minds to. The power is there-- use it. Change this place (UCSD) to fit your needs. Look at these profs! Look at what they were able to do, operating off this limiting thing they are into. Imagine what we can do; if we just free our minds. Speaking of freedom of minds, let me get on dope for a minute. The use of dope is extremely incorrect at this moment of time. Dope has a tendency to pacify. It's all right to get high every now and then-- you be the judge. But look-- being constantly stoned no matter what you think, impairs your will and dulls your desire to confront the situations that arise in life. Look how the Western powers used the dopes (opium) to keep the Chinese in line.

Look at things for yourself, make up your own mind-- but don't wait too long-- time is short and growing shorter. Break out, bust out-- do the unexpected! What? Yeah, do the unexpected!! Use your mind, use those powers to bring the ideas you have into reality! Break away from the standard, routine way of doing things. One of the reasons that Anglos are in the situation that they are in today, is because they are linear-- drab and predictable. Don't fall into the same hole. Profit by their mistakes. Think for yourselves-- learn to seek out the truth in situations in life. By pass the leader-follower logjam. Why do you need leaders? No one can lead you any better than yourself. You wanna move on something? Lay out the facts why-- everybody hashes things over until common ground is reached-- then you move. Damn that I-know-better-than-you-do-follow-the-leader-- stuff. Let that die with the past.

So here we stand in the darkness of the edge of night. Ahead of us, the glow of life lights the horizon. Many setbacks, hardships, and almost insurmountable obstacles lie between us and our goal, but in spite of this, we will triumph. A new awareness, a different relationship and meaning to life, a greater consciousness of the self; these will be the factors that will guide you (us) through the tumultuous transitional period that will occur as we move from this phase of time to the next. Not any one of us is without the power to contribute to the making of the future. Not any one of us is free from the responsibility for making the future. It all begins and ends with you; the real beginning of change, any change, starts with you looking into and freeing your mind.

The Movement: WHERE IS IT GOING?

It would appear that a definition of the Movement is at this time needed very badly. The primary movement emphasis seems to be in the direction of Political Prisoners. Political prisoners are important to the Movement in that they are the physical embodiment of this repressive society. But the important distinction is that they are not the core of the Movement.

In the statement that Angela Davis released from the Women's house of Detention in New York, she clearly emphasized the fact that the press had obscured the real issues, that she was framed by this repressive society; that this society is unresponsive and unconcerned with the problems of Black and Brown people. Her anger was deeply illustrated by the fact that her main point was not that she was a prisoner, but rather that something definitely needs to be done about the causes that create the problems.

So we are faced with the real question, why is it that the Movement (enthusiasm) on this campus centers around political prisoners? Is it that basically lack the initiative and creativity to improvise and implement working programs in terms of creating a base in our communities for political awareness? Where are the child care centers, no strings attached? Where are the energies that could be devoted to established programs working with our people? Why is it that we devote our primary interest to wasting too much time on trying to get Angela or whoever out of jail. Realistically, the only way Angela is going to be freed at this time, is if she is physically busted out of jail. Not that Angela is not important, her ideas and her situation require popular support but when there are so many things to be done, our first interests should be directed towards actions. This university is too isolated for us to isolate ourselves any more. We must remember that our roots are in our communities and that they need whatever knowledge we can help with, taking up the "political prisoners" banner exclusively is a heavy polarizer and neither the students nor the community need to be split any farther apart.



POLICING THE EMPIRE

perative if a nation is to establish and maintain the environment of stability and security so essential to economic, social, and political progress.

Plainly, the United States has very great interests in the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of law and order under humane, civil concepts and control. . . . When there is a need, technical assistance to the police of developing nations to meet their responsibilities promotes and protects these U.S. interests.

The Public Safety program is not large in comparison to the military aid program--but its supporters can muster some impressive arguments in its favor. It is argued, for instance, that the police--being interspersed among the population--are more effective than the military in controlling low-scale insurgency. Supporters of the police assistance program also point out that police forces are cheaper to maintain than military forces, since they do not require expensive "hardware" like planes, tanks and artillery.

These arguments, advanced by men like Col. Edward Lansdale of the CIA, received their most favorable response from President John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert, then the Attorney General, in the early 1960's. Presidential backing was responsible for a substantial expansion of the Public Safety program in 1962, and for the centralization of all U.S. police assistance activities in AID's Office of Public Safety (OPS). The State Department memorandum establishing OPS is noteworthy for its strong language--the memo, issued in November 1962, declared that AID "vests the Office of Public Safety with primary responsibility and authority for public safety programs and gives that Office a series of powers and responsibilities which will enable it to act rapidly, vigorously, and effectively . . . powers greater than any other technical office or division of AID." The two Kennedys also gave enthusiastic support to the creation of an Inter-American Police Academy in the Panama Canal Zone. (In order to open the Academy to police officers from other countries, it was later moved to Washington, D.C. and reorganized as the International Police Academy.)

The Office of Public Safety is empowered to assist Third World police organizations in three ways: (1) by sending "Public Safety Advisors" who provide "in-country" training for rank-and-file policemen; (2) by providing training at the International Police Academy and other U.S. schools for senior police officers and technicians; and (3) by shipping weapons, ammunition, radios, patrol cars, jeeps, chemical munitions and related equipment.

Using Latin America to measure the scope of these activities, we find that 90 Public Safety Advisors are stationed in 15 countries, and that some 2,000 Latin police officers have received training at the International Police Academy. Total OPS expenditures in these 15

Table listing staff members: Editor-in-Chief (Carmen Nevarez), Copy Editors (Laurie Alexandre, Linda Clark), Photography Editor (Michael Leslie), Art Editor (Marta Lomell), and a list of STAFF including Paula Bacchus, Alexis Lane, Richard Lapping, Ayda Lucero, Annie Moritz, Camy Sharrick, Michael Vasquez, and friendly janitor--Peter.

THIRD WORLD is an officially recognized student opinion journal by the Communications Board of the University of California, San Diego, Building 250, Matthews Campus, La Jolla, California 92037. Publication is bi-monthly on Wednesdays. The office for THIRD WORLD is located in Room 353, 250 Matthews Campus. For advertising, phone 453-2000, X1917 or write to the above given address. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the University nor of the student body as a whole. P.O. Box 5038 La Jolla, California

International Page ECUADOR

Seizes Boats Because Her People Need Food

Manuel "Valderrama" Zacamora

Recently, Ecuador, a Third World Country, saw itself suffering under/retaliation from the US government and business. Her Crime-- struggling to feed her people by defending her 200 mile sea limit.

Ecuador is not the only Latin-American country which has stood up to the Anglo-Saxon arrogance. Peru and Chile also have drawn the line. It is true that the 200 mile limit is disputable, that Ecuador and the other two countries are the only ones recognizing a 200 mile limit, but their only gripe is that that the US fishing boats buy licenses. The US, on the other hand, only recognizes a 12 mile limit. She further advises these American companies fishing in Ecuadorian limits to disregard the statutes.

It is obvious that the reason that Ecuador seeks to regulate those additional 188 miles, is that she needs to feed her people.

Ecuador's chief industry is agriculture, along with the hard fact that only 5% of her land is arable, due to the volcanic geography. Hardly enough is produced to feed her 6,000,000 people.

Next, we have that Ecuador is the largest producer of bananas, but if you dig around you will find United Fruit reaping the profits. Yes, bananas are grown in Ecuador, but the profits are in US banks.

Ecuador relying on agriculture and tropical fruit for its national

survival can hardly be considered an industrial nation. Consequently it relies on the fishing industry, foreign aid and investment. To be able to go on fishing, she needs to have well-equipped boats. The US will now cancel aircraft sales and ship repair credits for one year.

The aircraft sales can be done without, but the ship repair credits is another story. With the present need, Ecuador will have to

look for new solutions. Here is where the worries of Ecuador become Communist sink in. Soon we will probably see in the media: "Marines sent to Ecuador to fight Communism." But look around a little and you'll discover those crying are your local fishing business firms.

While the commotion was taking place, a group of local women were demonstrating at the Los Angeles Ecuadorian Embassy. Their actions were blown up in the media. (Incidentally, they just happen to be from our local "poor" community of Point Loma.) They made the following demands: 1) We must not let Ecuador step over the U.S., 2) We supported America, so America should support us, 3) Ecuador is turning Communist, 4) We must stop the overreaction of those Ecuadorians.

And finally the hypocrisy and arrogance shown in their cry: "If God had wanted Ecuador to have that much territory, he would have made Ecuador much bigger."

Headlines, and countless inches were spent on the actions taken by the women, but little was said of the massive student support shown by the Ecuadorian students. Thousands demonstrated in the streets of Quito, the capital, in support of the government's actions.

Not only Ecuador's, but also Chile and Peru's determination in enforcing her sea limit can be best explained by her need and the New Nationalism that has arisen throughout Latin America.

The New Nationalism, according to a magazine called ACCION is one that opposes foreign domination of the domestic basic industries and the establishment or continuation of outside firms that exercise over-influence upon the national economy.

The countries advocating, seek a new system for distribution of the national income 2) agrarian reform for the rural peasants 3) a higher standard of living in the cities 4) change in the economic structures. The demands are being backed by those individuals with higher incomes with an attitude of "acceptance lack of resistance before the inevitable".

DROP ARROGANCE

The US also should drop its arrogance and broaden its viewpoint of Latin American countries for they are moving forward in motion and change, and it, too is "inevitable". The action taken by Ecuador is only a manifestation of the new breed in Latin America moving towards solving their common problems. With the retaliation now being suffered by Ecuador, like the unjust Cuban economic blockade, all we can deduce is that even though she is being punished, in the long run, it is in her benefit.

And as a result, it is hoped that the US government along with its fishing industries respect the integrity of those Latin American countries claiming a 200 mile, see limit--for their claim is, once again, only out of need.

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countries reached an estimated \$39 million by July 1, 1970 (outlays in individual countries ranged from the \$1-\$2 million spent in Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela, to \$3 to \$4 million subsidies to Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama and Peru). The leading beneficiary of the Public Safety program in Latin America was Brazil, which received \$7.5 million in OPS funds by the middle of 1970. AID's Program and Project Data Presentations to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1971 noted that "through December 1969, the Public Safety project in Brazil has assisted in training locally over 100,000 federal and state police personnel. Additionally, 523 persons received training in the U.S." The AID document added that the project "has supported a substantial increase in police telecommunications" and that "substantial increases in police mobility have been achieved, primarily through funding for Brazilian manufactured vehicles."

In providing this kind of assistance, OPS notes that most countries possess a unified 'civil security service' which, "in addition to regular police include paramilitary units within civil police organizations and paramilitary forces such as gendarmeries, constabularies, and civil guards which perform police functions and have as their primary mission maintaining internal security." The AID program is designed to encompass all of these functions. According to OPS:

Individual Public Safety programs, while varying from country to country, are focused in general on developing within the civil security forces a balance of (1) a capability for regular police operations, with (2) an investigative capability for detecting and identifying criminal and/or subversive individuals

and organizations and neutralizing their activities, and with (3) a capability for controlling militant activities ranging from demonstrations, disorders, or riots through small-scale guerrilla operations.

As noted in the 1962 State Department memo, OPS possesses unique powers not granted to other AID bureaus. These powers enable OPS to "act rapidly, vigorously and effectively" in aiding Latin regimes threatened by popular uprisings. When a crisis develops in a Latin capital, OPS officials often stay up "night after night" in their Washington, D.C., office to insure that needed supplies--including radios and tear gas--reach the beleaguered police of the friendly regime.

Several instances of such rapid action by OPS have been identified. In 1962, when the government of Venezuela (then headed by President Romulu Betancourt) came under heavy pressure from urban guerrillas of the Armed

Forces of National Liberation (FALN), President Kennedy launched a crash program to improve police operations in Caracas. A Public Safety Advisor named John Longan was secretly flown into the Venezuelan capital to head a team of police instructors. Using techniques developed by Special Forces instructors, Longan and his assistants provided Venezuelan police with intensive training in riot-control operations. According to Peter T. Chew, a journalist sympathetic to OPS, Longan's men "persuaded Venezuelan police to favor the old-fashioned shotgun and showed how shotguns, firing buckshot and gas grenades, could be effectively used against terrorists." OPS advisors were also brought into the Dominican Republic after the 1965 insurrection to give crash courses in crowd-control techniques. In the space of a few months, thousands of Dominican police were schooled in the handling of anti-riot chemical agents, large quantities of which were presumably supplied by AID.

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# Race War In Cairo, Illinois

For a long time in this country, tensions between the races has been simmering, sometimes boiling into armed clashes. As things become more and more tense, the prospect of open, naked genocide against certain "minority" elements in this society, becomes a distinct possibility. As Amerika finds herself in an increasingly desperate situation at home and abroad, she may feel she has no choice. The prospects are frightening, a racial war where your uniform is the color of your skin. Still it can happen and may happen. Printed below is an article on Cairo, Ill., a place where maybe the first battle of a long and bloody war is being fought. You be the judge—only time and you will tell.

The following article appeared in the February 21, 1971 issue of THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE. The article, "BAD DAY AT CAIRO, ILL." was written by J. Anthony Lukas.

CAIRO, Ill. Sister will be waiting a But she can't take me across Because I got one more river to cross, to cross, to cross.

THE gospel singers huddled beneath a huge poster of a revolver resting on a Bible. Then they aligned apart, bobbing and weaving in their miniskirts and boots, the organ whirring high and moaning low, the faithful in St. Columba's Church clapping their hands to the driving, syncopated beat.

"Jesus will be waiting

He's going to take me across Because I got one more river to cross, to cross, to cross.

Before the last church had died, the Rev. Charles Koen, leader of Cairo's black United Front, took his stance at center stage. His Afro out, lined like a warrior's helmet against the blue-green of the stained-glass window, he thanked the sisters for their song, which he said was "all too appropriate" for that day.

"The essence of our struggle today is that we got one more river to cross," he said softly. "We crossed the Nile. We crossed the

Mississippi! We crossed the mighty Ohio! But the river we're going to cross downtown today isn't a physical river. It's a river of the spirit.

"On the other bank I can see brother Nat Turner. I can see brother Malcolm X. I can see brother Martin Luther King. But they can't bring us across. Only faith will bring us across," he said, his voice louder now, hammering home the rhythmic phrases, an amulet in the shape of a clenched fist swaying from his neck.

"It may be kind of tough to cross this river. You might see some brothers fall, going across. But no matter how many folks they kill, no matter how many armored cars they bring in, we got to have faith. We're going to show them down there today. We're going to show them we'll picket downtown as long as there is a downtown."

Then he motioned for the crowd to gather around and the faithful surged forward, covering the platform, clogging the narrow aisle, heads bent forward toward the minister as he prayed beneath a banner reading "Before I'll Be a Slave I'll Be Buried in My Grave."


On the sidewalk outside, the crowd spun off into tight little knots to discuss the decision Koen had just metaphorically announced: to defy a new city ordinance which virtually banned picketing downtown. The Front had been picketing downtown businesses for 21 months as part of its boycott to protest the merchants' discrimination in hiring. When it promptly challenged the new law in Federal court, it was assured by the city attorney that the police would not try to enforce the regulations

until the court ruled. But nobody at the church could be sure what the picketers might face downtown that afternoon. Cairo's retail merchants were pushing a new "tough line" toward the Front. Seriously hurt by the boycott, they had sought the ordinance so they could recoup at least some of their losses during the Christmas shopping season. There were rumors that if the police didn't enforce the ordinance some of the town's "white vigilantes" might take the matter into their own hands.

JUST before 3:30 P.M., about two dozen pickets climbed into cars for the three-minute ride across town to Cairo's main shopping street, Commercial Avenue. The avenue was festooned for the holidays: gold and silver tinsel dangling on cables strung from the rooftops of the two- and three-story loft buildings; artificial snow frosting the corners of the plate-glass windows; parking meters wound with red and white paper and topped with big red bows like giant candy canes.

The picketers hoisted placards—"No Jobs No \$\$\$," "Your Guns Produce No \$\$\$," "The Boycott Is Not Over; Meet Our Demands"—and began marching single-file down the avenue's west sidewalk. As they came abreast of the fire station at Ninth Street they could see what awaited them. Both sidewalks from there south bristled with Cairo policemen and special Alexander County sheriff's deputies—some of them known white vigilantes—armed with automatic carbines, submachine guns,

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Picket line protesting racist unemployment in Cairo, Ill.

"grease guns," shotguns and oversized riot sticks.

As one picket line approached Eighth Street, several policemen exchanged heated words with Herman Whitfield, a husky picketer who was out on bail after being charged with aggravated battery in the beating of a white man and conspiracy to murder another. Within seconds, the police were struggling with Whitfield and—according to some eyewitnesses—beating him around the head with clubs. A policeman fired a shot in the air.

Having driven from the church and parked my car on a side street, I was walking toward Commercial Avenue when I heard the shot. Running to the corner, I saw four or five policemen drag Whitfield toward an unmarked police car. Two of them heaved him with great force against the car's side, then pulled him back a few feet and heaved him at the car again. Whitfield, his arms pinioned behind him, smiled and said, "That's hip, man, that's real hip."

Just then, the United Front's white van, emblazoned with pink and green flowers and slogans like "Christ Is Love" and "Black Is Beautiful," sliced into the intersection. The driver, a Front activist named Switch Wilson, took one look at what was happening and tried to swerve out again, but half a dozen policemen and deputies surrounded the van, weapons at the ready. One deputy pointed a shotgun at Wilson in the driver's seat and ordered him out. Wilson reached for the door, but another officer ripped it open and whipped his club down on Wilson's left arm. At that, the deputy in front of the van fired his shotgun in the air.

Other shots rang out from behind the Security National Bank, in the direction of the Ohio River levee. Policemen and deputies, crouching, scuttled across the street into the bank's parking lot, scanning the levee, raising their rifles to fire.

Later, we learned that a deputy, Lloyd Bosecker, armed but not in uniform, had been shot in the groin during the volley of shots behind the bank. Four young blacks were arrested and charged with attempted murder or conspiracy to commit murder.

As shots spattered in the alley, Koen continued to lead a dozen pickets up and down the west sidewalk under the glowering eyes of merchants clustered behind their plate-glass windows. "Gunfire ain't never going to stop us," Koen muttered as he reached the corner and spotted the Rev. Larry Potts, one of Cairo's most militant whites, leaning against a building. "You preach about that tomorrow, Potts," he shouted. Potts glared back icily.

In front of Walder's Men's Wear, several tight-faced white men listened intently to Jimmy Dale Jr., a cadaverous sheriff's deputy dressed in a blue windbreaker and black baseball cap with "Police" embroidered in gold across the brow, and carrying a well-oiled grease gun with a folding stock. "I nearly got one of them niggers this time," Dale told them.

Suddenly, several more shots stammered behind the bank. "Everybody off the streets," the police and deputies shouted. The Police Department's blue armored car, an old Brinks truck with thick steel plating added around the front and sides, began lumbering down Commercial Avenue.

It was getting dark and I decided

it was time to get back to my motel.

THE "Commercial Avenue Shoot-out" on Dec. 5 marked a new stage in the racial conflict which has racked Cairo for nearly two years. It was the first gun battle downtown and the first major bout of gunfire in daylight.

But, in other respects, it was only the natural extension of the continuing violence between elements of Cairo's white and black communities. Probably no other American locality in recent years has lived through such persistent, systematic, stubborn racial violence as this tiny city at the southern tip of Illinois. Since March 31, 1969—when Cairo's current spate of violence began—gunfire has broken out on more than 140 separate occasions here. While the major racial battlefields of the sixties—Watts, Detroit, Newark—have regained a measure of equilibrium, Cairo's shooting goes on and on.

But what does it mean? Is Cairo, as some have suggested, merely a bizarre anomaly, a monstrous hold-over from some earlier era of race relations, an isolated enclave now going through the agonizing accommodations the rest of us faced years ago? Or is it, on the other hand, an ominous portent of the future? Is it, as Mayor Pete Thomas contends, "eight to ten years ahead of the rest of the nation in race relations," a foretaste of the polarization which awaits us all, the "two nations—black and white" which the Kerner Commission warned us about? Is Cairo our destiny?

FROM the start the city had been prey to criminals. In 1856, 48 citizens began patrolling the community at night, and The Cairo Times soon reported that the town was "quiet as a claret-colored cat." The vigilantes disbanded when the city hired five policemen, but the vigilante tradition persisted. In 1909, William (Froggy) James, a Cairo Negro, was arrested for raping and murdering a white girl. Fearing mob violence, Sheriff Frank Davis took James out of town, but a pack of outraged citizens chased him 27 miles, took the black man back to Cairo and shot him. Still unsatisfied, the mob then broke into the courthouse, seized Henry Salzner, a white man arrested for killing his wife, and hanged him from a telegraph pole.

In his "History of Cairo," published three years later, John M. Lansden, a Cairo attorney, said these lynchings "set before us in the clearest light the evil that flows from a community taking or allowing others to take the law into their own hands."

Lansden also noted another Cairo characteristic—sensitivity to criticism, whether from Dickens or closer to home. When such criticism is voiced, Lansden remarked, some Cairoites say "it is a falsehood and that Cairo is all right. . . . Others say if it is such a place as is represented one should not publish it abroad and keep people from coming here and in business. . . . And finally, others say we don't care, Cairo is good enough for us; if one does not like the town as is, let him go elsewhere." (In the restaurant across from my motel hung a sign, "Cairo: Love It or Leave It.")

SINCE 1920, when Cairo reached its peak of 15,000, its population has steadily declined—to 6,150 today (about 40 per cent black). But the situation is even worse than these statistics show. For those who have left are chiefly the young, vigorous and ambitious of both races who saw no future for themselves in Cairo. Those who remain are large-



A pair of bullet holes through a double pane of glass in a window of St. Columba's rectory, HQ of the black United Front in Cairo, line up with a third point: the cupola of the police station, across the street called Sniper's Alley.

ly the very young, the very old, the apathetic, embittered and defeated.

Meanwhile, the exodus was partly offset by an influx of poor, unskilled blacks from the Deep South. Blacks looking north today are attracted to Cairo in part because of Illinois' relatively generous welfare payments. Almost 30 per cent of its population gets some form of public assistance.

According to the 1960 census, of 86 Illinois cities with populations between 5,000 and 10,000, Cairo ranks first in poverty with 44.6 per cent of its families living on incomes of less than \$3,000 per year. With the city's traditional unskilled jobs—stevedoring, picking cotton, stacking lumber—now hard to come by, unemployment is over 10 per cent (more than double that for blacks).

About a third of Cairo's blacks live in Pyramid Court, the sprawling public-housing complex of two-story

brick buildings huddled against the Mississippi levee. Others live in drab frame houses with sagging porches in the Uptown East section. Those lucky enough to have jobs may make seat padding for the Burkart Company, work as domestics or pick soybeans or strawberries in the summertime. The tiny black "middle class" is made up largely of school teachers and postal or highway workers.

Despite these conditions, many Southern blacks feel more at home in Cairo than they would in a Chicago slum because Cairo is essentially a Southern city. Its Chamber of Commerce prose lays it on a bit thick—"where catfish still sizzle in frying pans and canebrakes cluster in the river, where dignified old Southern mansions hear the swish of sternwheelers"—but Cairo is farther

cont page



The Rev. Charles Koen leads a United Front rally at St. Columba's. Cairo's whites call him a "hoodlum" and say: "Koen's got to go."

# Bloque Estudiantil Democratico

by Jorge Rives

En una reunion con el Bloque Estudiantil Democratico el Sabado 30 de Enero, les pedi a algunos de los miembros que dieran a conocer cual es el proposito de su relacion con el movimiento Chicano de aqui. Las siguientes palabras son de uno de los dirigentes, Gilberto Covarrubias, que ha sido uno de los mas activos en las organizaciones: "Esta organizacion nacio a raiz de los golpes y asesinatos que el gobierno de Gustavo Diaz Ordaz hizo a los estudiantes de Mexico en 1968. Cuando vimos que la forma de

organizacion que teniamos los estudiantes en Baja California ademas de burocratica era muy expuesta a los golpes del gobierno y por lo tanto nuestras acciones no eran todo lo que se necesitaba en una organizacion que se planteaba el cambio de sistema economico, politico, y social como la unica salida a los muchos problemas que tenemos en nuestras escuelas, como son falta de cupo, malos maestros y una educacion deformada que hace que el estudiante al graduarse, sale a enriquecerse y no ha servir al pueblo. Inconformes con todo esto nos organizamos de tal forma que a nuestro parecer nos permite

luchar sin comprometer a la organizacion y sus funciones. Asi fue como nacio el Bloque Estudiantil Democratico (B.R.D.) cuyas experiencias han sido pocas, pero muy buenas.

## PRESOS EN LECUMBERRI

En 1969 nos lanzamos a la lucha por la libertad de nuestros companeros que aun estan presos en las masmorras de Lecumberri, de lo cual logramos conjuntamente con los estudiantes de todo el pais, que se hiciera claridad al pueblo que nuestros companeros presos no son delincuentes, sino que en realidad los delincuentes son quienes ordenaron encarcelarlos y que se

encuentran como sanjueles chupandole la sangre al pueblo. En la pasada campana electoral de junio del setenta, nos pronunciamos por no votar y por que nadie votara, puesto que al votar lo unico que haciamos era el juego al gobierno, para justificar su estancia en el poder politico. Organiza cada 6 años un circo o un juego donde desde antes se sabe quien va ganar, asi pues nuestra posicion es de izquierda y nos sentimos intimamente ligados a los grandes hombres como el Che, Mao-Tse Tung y Ho Chi Minh, e identificados y hermanos de los Vietcongs, Tupamaros, far de Guatemala, los Cubanos, y en E.U.A. nos sentimos ligados y deseamos luchar conjuntamente con los Chicanos, Negros, en fin con

todos los grupos revolucionarios que en todo el mundo estan luchando por la liberacion plena del hombre."

## MEJORAR RELACIONES

Estas fueron las palabras de Gilberto Covarrubias con las cuales expreso la existencia de esta organizacion. Como tal vez algunos de ustedes recordaran, Gilberto en compania de otro brigadista, vinieron a hablar a M.E.C.H.A. acerca de su organizacion, pero el recibimiento, como ustedes recordaran, fue muy poco grato y sin interes de parte de nuestra inactiva y conservativa organizacion. Espero tener mas contacto con ellos y tal vez con la nueva mesa directiva de M.E.C.H.A., podamos lograr una unidad mas amplia con nuestros hermanos de Mexico.

## CAIRO, ILLINOIS

south than Richmond, Va. And its racial attitudes are not very different from those of Selma, Ala., or Jackson, Miss.

With one major difference. Cairo is near enough to St. Louis, Chicago and Detroit that its Negroes have absorbed some of the militancy bred there first by the labor movement and then by the new brand of Northern black.

As early as 1937, something very close to a race riot broke out in Cairo. Following a rally to protest low relief payments, several hundred Negroes marched on the Alexander County Emergency Relief Office and seized boxes of food, then broke into several stores, and beat a merchant and three policemen. Two years later, a Missouri deputy sheriff was killed by striking Negro workers outside the cottonseed-oil plant. So it should have been no surprise when the civil-rights movement brought more violence to Cairo. In 1952, during a controversy over school desegregation, a Negro dentist's home was firebombed and two crosses burned on the Mississippi levee.

Then, on July 16, 1967, a 19-year-old Negro soldier died in the city jail. Police said he had hanged himself with his shirt, but blacks charged police had beaten and killed him. This time the black community responded. Three white-owned stores, a warehouse and a lumberyard were firebombed. National Guardsmen were called in and for three nights they ringed Pyramid Court.

This clash led to negotiations be-

tween blacks and the city leadership, during which the city promised to hire more blacks in municipal departments which had few or none at that time. Some of the promises were kept; most were not.

That same July, some 500 whites—including city officials and leading businessmen—responded in more traditional Cairo fashion. Led by Peyton Berbling, state attorney for Alexander County, they formed a group called the Committee of Ten Million (the name drawn from the national citizens' organization Dwight Eisenhower proposed to combat crime) "to protect our families, our homes and our property." Although the committee members said they were not vigilantes, they wore white plastic Civil Defense helmets (they were soon known as the "White Hats") and patrolled the streets with rifles in radio-equipped cars. Many were designated deputy sheriffs or deputy coroners.

In September, 1968, Father Gerald Montroy, a young Catholic priest, was assigned by the bishop of the Belleville Diocese to work among Cairo's poor. Charging that the White Hats were terrorizing the city's blacks, he led a campaign which resulted in their disbanding under state pressure. (Since then, a new white organization—United Citizens for Community Action—has emerged, with largely the same membership and apparently much the same purposes.)

Following three hours of gunfire on March 31, 1969, elements of the black community responded by launching their boycott of downtown

stores and forming the United Front. The lead in these moves came chiefly from Charles Koen, the Cairo-born black who, while licensed as a minister in the African Methodist Episcopal Church, had recently returned from a year as Prime Minister of the militant Black Liberators in St. Louis. Under his leadership, the Front has been nominally committed to nonviolence, but also pledged to vigorous self-defense, which means it will "fire when fired upon."

And fire it has. With the city growingly polarized around the United Front and the U.C.C.A., gunfire has rattled night after night along "Sniper's Alley," the scant 200 yards between St. Columba's and the police station. Fires have razed white stores, a vacant TB sanitarium and, most recently, the Veterans of Foreign Wars building. Two men have been killed as a direct result of the violence and several others wounded. State police have often been called in to keep the two factions from doing even worse things to each other.

So, as Christmas, 1970, approached and the tinsel went up along Commercial Avenue, Cairo looked much like any small American town at holiday time. But it wasn't. Cairo had known palmy days and a grandiose dream. For whites, the good days were gone and the dream had soured; for blacks, who never shared the good days, the dream lay ahead. And the gap between those dreams and reality ached somewhere deep in people's guts.


ON the morning of Dec. 6, I woke in my room at the Morse Motel to the rush of state police cars on the asphalt outside. The smartly tailored troopers seemed to be everywhere in town that morning, and I decided I ought to go down and see their chief.

Lieut. Don Evers, commander of the special state police detachment in Cairo, is a relaxed but obviously capable professional. "It was pretty rough out there yesterday," he said. "So I called for reinforcements. We got 24 new men in overnight, which gives us 63 troopers here now.

"Things are definitely getting worse here. A lot of the shooting we've had the past two years didn't amount to all that much. Some guy—black or white—would get a bottle of wine in him, go out on his front lawn and fire his rifle in the air—brrrrrp—then go back inside. But we'd be up all night trying to find out what was happening. It was just a harassment sort of thing, not really trying to kill somebody.

"But lately they've been leveling those shots out. Last June, one of our sergeants was riding by Pyramid Court and got a slug in the left shoulder. Later in the summer, a corporal got hit in the right foot. Completely without provocation. We didn't even return the fire. There's people on both sides of this thing now—not many, but a few—who are shooting to kill. And that's one hell of a situation in the state of Illinois!"

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INTERNATIONAL WEEK OF SOLIDARITY WITH LATIN AMERICA APRIL 19 TO 25

ments state that "SP agents penetrate subversive organizations," and "use intelligence collection, political data [and] dossiers compiled from census data . . . to separate the bad guys from the good." AID has nothing to say about the criteria used to separate the "bad guys" from the "good guys"; anyone familiar with Vietnamese scene knows, however, that the SP's major responsibility is surveillance of non-Communist groups that could pose a political challenge to the regime in power. Persons who advocate negotiations with the NLF are routinely picked up by the Special Police and sentenced to stiff prison terms.

Pacification usually brings to mind "good-will" projects like school construction and free medical care; in Vietnam, however, the paramount task of the U.S. pacification effort is the identification and neutralization of the local NLF administrative apparatus—in Pentagon nomenclature, the "Viet Cong Infrastructure" (VCI). The counter-infrastructure campaign was initiated by the CIA in July 1968 as the "Phung Hoang" program—better known in English as Operation Phoenix. This program, incorporated into the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) effort, is described by American officials as "a systematic effort at intelligence coordination and exploitation." In the intelligence phase, all allied intelligence services—including South Vietnam's Special Police Branch and America's CIA and military intelligence organizations—are supposed to pool the data they have collected (or forcibly extracted) from informers and prisoners on the identity of NLF cadres. It is for this ultimate purpose that most of the other police functions described above—interdiction, identification, registration and surveillance—are carried on. In the exploitation phase of Phoenix, members of the paramilitary National Police Field Forces, sometimes assisted by the Army, make secret, small-scale raids into contested areas to seize or eliminate persons who have been identified by the intelligence services as "VCI agents." In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the head of CORDS, ex-CIA agent William E. Colby stated that in 1969 a total of 19,534 suspected VCI agents had been "neutralized"—of this amount 6,187 had been killed, 8,515 arrested, and 4,832 persuaded to join the Saigon side. Colby insisted that Phoenix did not constitute an "assassination" or "counter-terror" operation.

Each of the counterinsurgency programs described has been accompanied by an expansion of the prison population of South Vietnam. Since prison management is considered a major task of the overall police responsibility, the U.S. Public Safety program includes substantial assistance to the Directorate of Corrections—the Saigon agency ultimately responsible for the operation of South Vietnam's 41 civil prisons. U.S. aid has enabled the Directorate to enlarge the prison system from its 1967 capacity of 20,000 prisoners to the present capacity of 33,435 inmates.

In the past two years, OPS expenditures in support of prison maintenance has totaled \$1.6 million. Specific project targets in the current year, according to AID's *Program and Project Data Presentations to the Congress*, include: "the renovation and expansion of selected correction centers, the addition of up to 1,000 trained personnel to administer correction centers . . . and the implementation of a plan for relocating prisoners in order to reduce overcrowding and provide greater security from VC attacks." To achieve these targets, "AID will provide technical advisors to help supervise relocations and to train new recruits . . . [and] will provide supplies for prison security . . ." One of the facilities selected for the relocation program was the dread prison on Con Son island with its now-notorious "tiger cages."

In order to upgrade the administrative capabilities of the Corrections directorate, AID regularly provides training to Vietnamese prison officials "outside of Vietnam." Although AID does not divulge any details, the ten officials receiving such training in the current fiscal year are probably among the 60 Vietnamese police officers brought to the U.S. to attend special courses. According to the AID manual on *Public Safety Training*, foreign police personnel can attend an 18-week course in "Penology and Corrections" at Southern Illi-

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nois University in Carbondale. The Southern Illinois program includes instruction in such topics as: "disposition of convicted offenders and juveniles; philosophy and practice of correctional institutional management; methods of correctional staff training and development." The program also includes a course on "Correctional Institute Design and Construction."

. . . provision of commodity and advisory support for a police force of 108,000 men by the end of FY 1971; . . . assisting the National Identity Registration Program (NIRP) to register more than 12,000,000 persons 15 years of age and over by the end of 1971; continuing to provide basic and specialized training for approximately 40,000 police annually; providing technical assistance to the police detention system including planning and supervision of the construction of facilities for an additional 8,000 inmates during 1970; and helping to achieve a major increase in the number of police presently working (6,000) at the village level.

This presentation, it must be remembered, only represents programs under AID authority; missing from this prospectus are NP activities financed by the CIA and the Defense Department. Military Assistance funds are used to finance the activities of the paramilitary National Police Field Forces (NPF), which, by January 1969, constituted a small army of 12,000 men organized into 75 companies (our expansion plans call for a total complement of 22,500 men and 108 companies by the end of this year). Because of the "military commonality" of their equipment, all commodities support to the NPF is provided by the Pentagon. The extent of CIA contributions to the National Police is of course impossible to determine; it is known, however, that the CIA has been involved in modernizing Vietnam's secret police files since 1955. One does not have to invoke the sinister image of the CIA, however, to establish beyond a doubt that the United States is intimately involved in every barbarous act committed by the South Vietnamese police on behalf of the Saigon government.

*At Home Application*

In studying the U.S. Public Safety program abroad, one is sooner or later struck by the extent to which the goals, doctrines and practices of this program have been adopted by the authorities here as an answer to our own internal difficulties. Thus when Administrator Bell tells us that "public safety forces have done and can do much to prevent conspiracy and the development of disruptive situations, and to insure an environment of law and order which supports the orderly social, economic, and political development of emerging nations," one can easily picture Ronald Reagan or Spiro Agnew speaking in the same terms of our own police apparatus. AID spokesmen have in fact made a determined effort to advise other government officials of the domestic application of techniques developed by OPS for use abroad. In September, 1967, Public Safety Director Byron Engle told the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) that "in working with police in various countries . . . we have acquired a great deal of experience in dealing with violence ranging from demonstrations and riots to guerrilla warfare." Much of this experience, he asserted, "may be helpful in the United States." Among the specific recommendations made by Engle for the control of urban disorders were: the massive use of chemical munitions, stringently enforced curfews, and the establishment of special tactical police units available on a 24-hour stand-by basis. Precisely the same recommendations were made to President Johnson by former Pentagon aide Cyrus Vance, and were later put into effect in Washington, D.C., when rioting broke out following the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. And when, in the wake of this rioting, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, a principal feature of the Public Safety program—Federal assistance to local police forces—became an established mechanism for domestic law enforcement.

The previous article appeared in the Sept. 18, 1970 issue of COMMONWEAL magazine. The article, "POLICING THE EMPIRE" was written by Michael T. Klare.

CAIRO, ILLINOIS

Cairo radio station whose license renewal is being challenged by the United Front on the grounds that it is racially biased. On Oct. 25, Stout wrote a story about "squads of armed Negro men" making three attacks on the Cairo police station, during which they fired "hundreds" of rounds into the station at point-blank range. But a New York Times reporter who arrived the next day found only 17 small pockmarks on the building's sandstone face—some of which dated from earlier gunfire—and far more bullet holes in a Negro-owned tavern and St. Columba's rectory across the street. Several reliable law-enforcement officials suggest that Mr. Stout's report was at best exaggerated.)

David Cain also conceded that The Citizen did not intend to publish anything about the camera incident. "In a big city you might feel you had to write about it because you couldn't let the police get away with something like that," he said, "but things are done differently in a small Illinois town."

One afternoon that week, another photographer had his own troubles with the Cairo police. Carl Hampton, a young black who takes pictures for the United Front, was following a Front protest march through town when police stopped the last car in the caravan, roughly searched its occupants, then arrested the driver for an "illegal muffler." Hampton was snapping pictures of the arrest when a white policeman sidled up to him. I was standing directly behind them and heard the policeman whisper: "There's a whole lot of us after you, boy. We're going to kill you, you know that? We're going to kill you for sure."

BEFORE I'd gotten to town, I'd been given a copy of a survey on the Cairo Police Department carried out last year by the International Association of Chiefs of Police on a grant from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. The survey concluded that the Cairo police were "generally untrained and incapable of coping with the many problems facing them." Some of its sharpest criticism was reserved for the police's handling of racial and community relations: "Lines of communication have not been kept open with various groups in the community. . . . In their contact with citizens, both black and white, officers are often impolite and discourteous. . . . There is some evidence that members of the department, both black and white, have become personally involved in disputes between various factions in the community. . . . Professional law-enforcement officers must not take sides in disputes, no matter what their personal opinions or values may be." In other words, the Cairo police were not part of the solution; they were part of the problem.

To check these and other allegations, I tried to see Fred Theriac, a gaunt, taciturn man who is Cairo's fourth police chief in 18 months. For several days the desk sergeant said the chief wasn't in. When I finally tracked him down, he made an appointment but broke it. That afternoon I found him sipping coffee with his deputy at the Mark Twain Restaurant. When I asked once more for an interview, he refused. "You reporters just distort what we give you anyway, so I ain't giving you any more."

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**Part 1: PEOPLE GET READY. HOW TO SURVIVE A LITTLE LONGER THAN YOU WILL IF YOU KEEP DOING WHAT YOU'RE DOING RIGHT NOW!**

- DOPE**
1. Everyone should know what dope is kept in the house, and where it is.
  2. Dope should be kept in a central place so that it can be flushed down the toilet quickly. Keep no more in the house than you can get rid of with one flush.
  3. No seeds, roaches, etc. should be kept lying around the house.
  4. Large amounts of dope kept around the house will jeopardize everyone who lives there. Someone who is dealing should take care of business outside the house, and keep the dope somewhere else.
  5. Pills without prescriptions are illegal.
  6. **DON'T BUY OR SELL DOPE TO PEOPLE YOU DON'T KNOW WELL.** Also be careful not to invite dealers to your house. You never know when someone might decide to turn you in to get themselves off the hook.
  7. If the cops come, **DON'T THROW THE DOPE OUT THE WINDOW.** If they have the place surrounded, they will find it and bust you.

**WEAPONS** 1. Talk together about what weapons are in the house, whether they are legal, etc. Only keep guns in the house that you can use; large stashes of weapons should be kept in other places that can't be linked to the movement or to a commune.

2. Decide where each weapon should be kept. Everyone should know where they are, and how to use each one.
3. Talk about self-defense, including its consequences. Everyone should be clear as to whether weapons should be used in a given situation. The ENTIRE house should agree on the same procedure.
4. If weapons are illegal, you should decide whether you want to keep them on your property at all.
5. Don't leave ammo or empty shells around, especially those belonging to guns that you don't own.
6. If you have bought or sold a gun, keep a receipt. Keep a record of the serial numbers of your legal guns.
7. If your guns are stolen, you must decide whether to report that to the police. Remember that your fingerprints may be on the gun, and that you do not want to be linked to a crime that you did not commit.
8. Don't clean guns or practice your aim in front of a window with the curtains drawn. Never talk about guns, dope, etc. while someone else is talking on the phone in the same room.
9. If you are carrying weapons to and from the house, be very careful. Neighbors or a passing police car could break out. A large container or guitar case is handy for carrying weapons.
10. Know gun laws — federal, state, and local.

**REMEMBER**

1. All decisions should be made with the full knowledge and participation of everyone in the house.
2. If, for any reason, a pig tries to stop you on the street, before you go into your house, you should stop and deal with the pig right there. Do not go into the house or to your car, or you will jeopardize your entire house, or give the pigs reason to search your house or car. If the pig decides to bust you, he can search whatever area you're in.
3. Property around the house, such as yards, basements, garages, etc. is still considered part of the house, even if they are unattached.

**YOUR NEIGHBORS AND YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD**

1. Get to know your neighbors — you might need each other in an emergency. This is also protection so that neighbors do not get uptight if a lot of people come into your house. Remember that your neighbors can call the pigs on you, if they see guns or a lot of people and want to know what's going on.
2. Get phone numbers of your neighbors in case you need to call. Set up a phone tree. If you trust them, begin talking about setting up an emergency operation so that you can call on each other, rather than on the pigs.
3. Learn about your neighborhood, and what is going on. Get a good idea of the layout of your neighborhood, including alleys, vacant lots, hiding places, and where the nearest pay phone is.
4. Know the bus lines in your area even if you have a car, and know where the buses go.
5. Know your mailman. If he's a friend, he can tell you whether the FBI

**PAPERS**

1. If you do not want to be connected to a house, don't keep ID or personal papers with your name on them there.
2. Books and papers that you don't want found by the pigs should not be kept in the house.
3. ID that's not kept on your person should not be kept in the house.
4. Scraps of paper with phone numbers and addresses and address books should not be left lying around. Code your address book.
5. Bankbooks and extra cash or emergency money should not be kept in a place where the pigs can rip it off. They should be very well secreted or in another house.

Banks rent safe deposit boxes for \$6 per year. They can come in handy.



**How to survive a little longer than you will if you keep doing what you're doing right now!**

has come around to see who lives in your house.

6. Be aware of cars in the neighborhood, or cars that could belong to pigs or FBI. Notice whether anyone seems to be watching the house, or if there are a lot of phone or gas and electric trucks around; they work with the pigs.
7. Don't try to impress your neighbors with how heavy you are. You are planning for survival. Don't jeopardize that with egotrips.

**YOUR COMMUNITY OF FRIENDS**

1. Talk with your friends about basic security. Always remember that the pig could be on the phone, bugging your house, etc.
2. The key to security is to operate on a 'need to know' basis. Be careful of rumor-mongering. Don't start gossip that could lead to panic.
3. Set up a place where people can meet in an emergency. It should be accessible 24 hours a day, and be a place where a lot of people would not look suspicious.
4. If an emergency arises, and everyone decides that it's best to split the house, don't all go to the same place. Have a quick meeting beforehand to decide:
  - a) how to get in touch with each other.
  - b) where the check-in time and place will be, and with whom.
  - c) what is the exact information that everyone has in regard to the emergency situation.
  - d) who must be called, or who has been called.
  - e) calm each other down, and don't panic.
5. Each house should have access to a

certain amount of cash. If in the house, it should be very well hidden. It should not be hidden with dope, weapons, etc. Each person should know where it is. If it is not in the house, the same rules apply.

6. Know how to get a friend out of jail if he's busted. This included bail contacts, information on the person busted for the bail bondsman, knowing how to bail someone out, where to reach bail bondsmen, lawyers, doctors, and hospitals in case someone is injured, etc.
7. Everyone should be prepared in first aid, and each house should have a first aid kit.
8. Everyone should know how to drive commonly used cars. People should practice driving each other's cars, to use them in an emergency. There should be duplicate sets of keys for each car, so that if someone gets ripped off with their keys, another person can use the car with an alternate set.
9. Everyone should know the house of some person not likely to be hot, to go to in a situation that requires security.

**CHILDREN**

1. Children should know what to say to a pig, or any unknown stranger or inspector, and what not to say.
2. Children should know how to use the phone and whom they can call in case of an emergency.
3. Children should know how to get to a friend's house by bus or cab, in an emergency.
4. If the parents of a child are busted, the child can be ripped off by the State. People should plan who would take care of their children in that situation. There should be several people in different houses who make this commitment.

**PART II: WHEN THE SHIT'S COMING DOWN IN YOUR HOUSE, COPS KNOCK ON THE DOOR WITH A SEARCH WARRANT OR AN ARREST WARRANT.**

1. ALWAYS KEEP YOUR DOORS SECURELY LOCKED.
2. When someone knocks on the door, ask who it is **WITH THE DOOR SHUT.**
3. If it's the police, make them identify themselves. **ASK THEM IF THEY HAVE A WARRANT.** Building, fire, and health inspectors (often pigs in disguise) also need warrants to enter your house, no matter what they tell you. Call a lawyer immediately, and warn other people in the house.
4. If they say they have a warrant, **ASK THEM WHAT FOR. TELL THEM TO SHOVE IT UNDER THE DOOR.** If they say they have a warrant, **ASK THEM WHAT FOR. TELL THEM TO SHOVE IT UNDER THE DOOR.** If they say they have a warrant, **ASK THEM WHAT FOR. TELL THEM TO SHOVE IT UNDER THE DOOR.**
5. You can let them in, if you want to, **OR ELSE THEY WILL BUST IN.** IF THEY HAVE AN ARREST WARRANT:
6. The police should tell you who the warrant is for. If they have reason to believe that the person named in the warrant is in the house, they will probably bust in, even if you say they can't come in.
7. If the person named in the warrant is in the house, they will have to make the political decision of whether to surrender. If the victim surrenders, she or he should go outside the door, shut and lock it. This will prevent the police from inviting themselves into the house at the same time. They will have to bust in.
8. If the victim tries to escape, she/he might find cops at the back door or surrounding the house, which will mean heavier charges like resisting arrest or attempting to escape. Be careful.
9. If the pigs have reason to believe that the person named in the warrant is in the house, and she/he has not surrendered, they will search the house where the person might be in — closets and under beds. This is not an unreasonable place like drawers, etc. Try to stick with them. They will search it, you know that.
10. **IF THE POLICE TRY TO COME INTO THE HOUSE WITHOUT A WARRANT: TELL THEM, "YOU CANNOT COME INTO THE HOUSE."** Get witnesses who hear you say that.
11. **IF THE FBI COMES TO THE DOOR:** If the FBI comes looking for someone, they will need a warrant; they only need to say that they have probable cause to believe that the person they're seeking is on the premises. **IF THEY COME WITHOUT A WARRANT, ALWAYS MAKE THEM BUST DOWN THE DOOR.** minutes to clean out your house and prepare sisters and brothers.
12. **WHEN THE COPS OR FBI BUST INTO YOUR HOUSE:**
  1. If they find dope or illegal property or guns and ask whose it is, **NO ONE SHOULD SAY WHOM IT BELONGS TO.** If they find guns and the guns are legal, you should claim ownership.
  2. **DON'T TALK. DON'T TALK. DON'T TALK.** Demand your right to a lawyer at once. You are only required to identify yourself by giving your name and address. If they ask more questions, say: **"I HAVE NOTHING TO SAY UNTIL I TALK TO A LAWYER."** You can say that even if you don't have a lawyer. If you don't have bread, you're entitled to a lawyer.
  3. **NEVER CONFESS TO ANYTHING.** If you confess, you will never get out of a bust.
  4. **REMEMBER EVERYTHING.** Write down what happened.
  5. Get a good look at the cops. Write down their badge numbers.

**AFTER THE PIGS HAVE SPLAT**

16. Make a thorough search to see if they've planted anything in the house of illegal property they overlooked. Check especially for explosives, etc.
17. Alert your friends and a lawyer. Set off the collective defense plan.
18. Every member of the house should write down what happened as soon as possible after the raid.
19. Remember that you're probably under closer than usual surveillance. Don't lead the pigs to other people and places they shouldn't know about, including cool ones that can be used as hide-outs, etc.
20. If you haven't already, begin now to assume that your phone is tapped and your house bugged.

**B. ON THE STREET AND HASSLED BY THE COPS**

1. If the police ask you for identification, **YOU ARE REQUIRED TO IDENTIFY YOURSELF.**
2. Without arresting you, **THE COPS CAN LEGALLY PAT YOU DOWN FOR WEAPONS** because you could be a threat to their immediate safety. The patdown is supposed to be only on the outside of your clothing. **UNLESS THEY FEEL AN OBJECT THAT COULD BE A WEAPON, THEY CANNOT GO THROUGH YOUR POCKETS,** without first arresting you.
3. You also may be expected to **ACCOUNT FOR YOUR PRESENCE.** Without going into a long explanation, you should do so.
4. If the cops continue to ask questions, you should say, **"AM I UNDER ARREST?"**
5. If they say no, but continue to ask questions, you should say, **"I HAVE NOTHING TO SAY UNTIL I TALK TO MY LAWYER."** (Even if you don't have one yet.)
6. If they say yes, you should say, **"WHAT ARE THE CHARGES?"** The police are required to tell you the charges.
7. If the police bust you, they are entitled to search you. If you are **NOT** under arrest and they search you, you should say, **"I DO NOT CONSENT TO A SEARCH."** Get witnesses who hear you say that.
8. The police **MIGHT** warn you of your rights, like the right to remain silent. They might try to get you to sign a paper saying that they told you your rights, but **NEVER SIGN ANYTHING.** You do not have to sign anything, and you should continue to refuse to do so.
9. **FURTIVE CONDUCT** is grounds for arrest, so don't do anything that looks suspicious. Your attitude makes a difference to the pigs. If you make smartass remarks the pigs will try to bust you on something. **BE COOL.**
10. **NEVER CONFESS TO ANYTHING.**
11. **REMEMBER EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENS SO THAT YOU CAN ACT FOR YOUR OWN DEFENSE OR AS A WITNESS: GET A GOOD LOOK AT THE COPS AND THEIR BADGE NUMBERS SO YOU CAN WARN YOUR FRIENDS.**
12. **THE PIGS AND UNDERCOVER AGENTS ARE REQUIRED TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WHEN THEY BUST YOU OR ASK YOU FOR INFORMATION. REMEMBER IF THEY DO THIS OR NOT.**



**Don't Carry More Than You Can Eat**

# AID CONT.

continued from page 3

AID officials insist that Public Safety assistance is "not given to support dictatorships." But there are apparently exceptions to this rule: Administrator Bell told a Senate Committee in 1965 that "it is obviously not our purpose or intent to assist a head of state who is repressive. On the other hand, we are working in a lot of countries where the governments are controlled by people who have shortcomings." Not wanting to embarrass AID or any of the people we support who have "shortcomings," Bell did not mention names.

It is entirely possible that one country Bell was referring to is Brazil—a country which enjoys a substantial OPS contribution despite well-documented reports that political prisoners are regularly being tortured by the police. In justifying continued OPS aid to such regimes, Bell explained that "... the police are a strongly anti-Communist force right now. For that reason it is a very important force to us." Obsessed by the Cold War ideology shared by all U.S. police agencies, it is no surprise that these men should consider a small amount of (allegedly) Communist-led terrorism to be sufficient reason to subsidize the repressive apparatus of a totalitarian regime.

AID officials are fully aware that in many countries receiving OPS aid the police are regarded with suspicion and resentment by the native population because of a tradition of brutality and oppression. Since provocative police behavior frequently inspires anti-government campaigns, "the development of responsible and humane police administration and judicial procedures" is an important aspect of the Public Safety program. Students at the various OPS schools are advised to "stay out of politics" (i.e., to support whatever regime happens to be in power), and are trained in the techniques of "non-lethal crowd control" (i.e., the massive use of riot gases). The main objective of this approach, according to OPS Director Byron Engle, is to prevent situations

in which "an oppressive police force drives a deep wedge between the people and their government." As a successful application of this philosophy, OPS cites the case of the Dominican Republic, where—after intensive training in the use of chemical agents—"police action against the Communists was so effective that the insurgents did not even end up with the body of a dead comrade to drag through the city in false martyrdom."

## 'Public Safety' in Vietnam

The Public Safety program in South Vietnam is the largest and one of the oldest U.S. police assistance programs—half of AID's Public Safety Advisors and more than half of OPS's annual budget are committed to Vietnam operations. The Vietnam program began in 1955, when Michigan State University received a contract from the International Cooperation Administration (AID's predecessor agency) to assemble a team of police experts to advise the government of Ngo Dinh Diem. Ultimately 33 advisors served in the Police Division of the now famous Michigan State University Group (MSUG); of this group, at least a few are known to have been CIA agents. The police division supervised the reorganization of Vietnam's decrepit police system, provided training in a variety of police skills, provided small arms and ammunition, and helped establish a modern records system for filing data on political suspects.

The MSUG effort was superseded in 1959 by a Public Safety Division (PSD) under direct U.S. management. In keeping with President Kennedy's call for increased counterinsurgency initiatives, the program was vastly expanded in 1962. Beginning with a staff of six in 1959, the PSD mission in Vietnam increased to 47 in 1963, and to 204 by mid-1968. Total support of the PSD program had reached \$95,417,000 by the end of fiscal year 1968, and has continued at the rate of about \$20 million a year; (some of these funds are supplied by the Department of Defense rather than by AID).

From the very start of the Vietnam conflict, the National Police (NP) of South Vietnam has been regarded by our government as a paramilitary force with certain responsibilities related to the overall counterinsurgency effort. In the Foreword to a manual on *The Police and Resources Control in Counter-Insurgency* (Saigon, 1964), Chief Frank E. Walton wrote that "the methods included in this text are emergency procedures not utilized in a normal peace-time situation. They are stringent, war-time measures designed to assist in defeating the enemy..." In order to upgrade Vietnamese police capabilities to carry out its wartime responsibilities, PSD supervised the consolidation of all regional, provincial and specialized police agencies under the directorate of National Police in 1962, and subsequently prepared a "National Police Plan" for Vietnam in 1964.

Under the plan, the NP's personnel strength grew from 19,000 men in 1963 to 52,000 by the end of 1965, 70,000 in 1967, and 85,000 by the end of 1969. To keep pace with this rapid growth, the plan provided for a vast increase in U.S. technical assistance, training and commodity support. Public Safety Division aid and management have become so extensive, that the National Police might more properly be considered a U.S. mercenary force than an indigenous institution.

### Specific Functions

The specific counterinsurgency functions performed by the police—resources control, identification, surveillance and pacification—are spelled out in an OPS brochure on *The Role of the Public Safety In Support of the National Police of Vietnam* (Washington, D.C., 1969), and in AID's *Program and Project Data Presentations to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1971*.

*Resources Control* is defined by Public Safety Advisor E. H. Adkins, Jr., as "an effort to regulate the movement of selected resources, both human and material, in order to restrict the enemy's support or deprive him of it altogether..." In order to prevent the flow of supplies and people to and from villages loyal to the National Liberation Front (NLF), 7,700 members of the National Police currently man some 650 checkpoints at key locations on roadways and waterways, and operate mobile checkpoints on remote roads and trails. By 1968, more than 468,456 persons had been arrested in this program, of whom 28,000 were reported as "VC suspects." AID reported that "Resources control efforts in 1969 resulted in nearly 100,000 arrests including more than 10,000 known or suspected VC. Confiscations included 50,000 units of medicine/drugs and 6,000 tons of contraband foodstuffs."

The *National Identity Registration Program* is described by OPS as "an integral part of the population and resources control program." Under a 1957 law, amended in 1967, every Vietnamese 15 years and older is required to register with the Saigon government and carry identification cards; anyone caught without the proper ID cards is considered a "VC suspect" and subject to imprisonment or worse. At the time of registration, a full set of fingerprints is obtained from each applicant, and information on his or her political beliefs is recorded. By 1971, 12,000,000 persons are to have been reached by this identification/registration program. "Once completed," AID explains, "the identification system will provide for a national repository of fingerprints and photographs and biographical data. It will be one of the most complete national identification systems in the world, and one of the most badly needed."

*Surveillance* of persons and organizations suspected of harboring anti-government sentiments is the responsibility of the NP's Special Police Branch (SP). The Special Branch is nothing more or less than Vietnam's secret police; originally the Indo-Chinese branch of the French *Sûreté*, the SP was known as the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation during the Diem regime. According to the 1962 decree establishing the National Police, the SP was given the responsibilities of: "Gathering information on political activities," and "carrying out undercover operations throughout the country, searching for, investigating, keeping track of, and prosecuting elements indulged in subversive activities." OPS docu-

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## CAIRO, ILLINOIS

MY next stop was a diner on the edge of town where I'd agreed to meet Leonard Boscarine, a young reporter for The Cairo Evening Citizen. I'd heard that the police had taken Boscarine's camera away during the fracas on Commercial Avenue. I wanted to check that out.

"Yeh," he told me. "I was up where the deputy got shot and I saw these three black guys spread-eagled against a wall with police standing over them. I started to take a picture and this cop shouted: 'Hey, you can't take our picture,' shaking his club at me. Then Charlie Jestus, the assistant police chief, came over and said: 'Give me that damn camera.' Jestus knew me and I showed him my credentials just to make sure. But he took the camera and put it in his car. We got it back later, but the film had been ripped out."

"I was really mad, and I got even madder when I found out the paper wasn't even going to report anything about it. The merchants told our advertising man we'd better be careful what we said about the Saturday events or they wouldn't buy any more ads. I guess that scared the editor because we're not going to publish anything about the camera. When I told Jim Flannery, the city editor [whose brother is a police sergeant] how disgusted that made me, he just looked up and said: 'A man's got to eat.'"

Boscarine told me more about his life in Cairo. Born in Eldorado, 90 miles to the northeast, he'd received a journalism degree from Southern Illinois University, then served in the Army as a Vietnam combat correspondent and a public-information specialist. When he got out of the Army, The Citizen hired him as its police reporter.

"At first, people were really friendly. They'd come up and say: 'Hey, how about coming down to the Kiwanis? Be glad to sponsor you.' But they began to cool off pretty quick after I'd been on the police beat for a while. The Mayor and the Police Commissioner would give out these great statements about how it was the blacks who did all the shooting. So I'd go over to the United Front and see what they had to say. There was usually a lot of difference."

"Hell, at journalism school they taught me a reporter ought to get both sides of a story. But down here people didn't like that. In September, the Mayor and Police Commissioner came in and asked that I be fired. Instead, the paper switched me to the farm beat. After Saturday, I don't know what they'll do."

The next day, Boscarine was fired. So I went down to see David Cain, the young Texan who is editor-publisher of The Citizen. Cain said he had fired Boscarine because he had become too "emotionally involved" in the racial story. "He was inclined to use his mouth too much and his ears too little," he said. "Our readers just came to doubt the veracity of his reports."

(The credibility of news coverage in and from Cairo has been widely questioned in recent months. No national news organization has a staffer here. The Associated Press relies on its stringers at The Citizen. United Press International uses Bob Stout, news director of WKOR, the

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- IN YOUR CAR**
1. Don't drive your car with headlights, taillights out, unless you are prepared to get hassled by the pigs. If you've got dope in the car, have a warrant out on you for a traffic ticket, or even drop litter outside your car, you are inviting a bust. The cops can pull you over for a traffic violation, and then bust you for something else.
  2. When a cop signals you to pull over, pull over to the right side of the road and stop. Turn off your engine. If you think you're being tailed, but the pig hasn't signaled to you, then pull into a private driveway. The pig must get permission to be on that person's property before he can question you.
  3. If a pig pulls you over and comes out of his car with a drawn gun, the best plan is probably to lie down, face-down, spread eagled in the middle of the street. That way, he can't claim that you tried to make any quick moves that would give him an excuse to kill you.
  4. If you have dope with you, DON'T THROW IT OUT THE WINDOW. The cops will be looking for that.
  5. Get your driver's license and car registration ready, and get out of the car ready to hand the cops both items. They are legally allowed to make you identify yourself and the car, and can bust you for refusal to do so.
  6. The cops will expect you to account for your presence. Get

your story ready, even before you are stopped. Everyone should have the same story, like on the way to a party, just went to see friends, stopped for something to eat, etc.

7. If the cops keep asking questions or start hassling you, ask them, "AM I UNDER ARREST?" If they say yes, ask them what the charges are. The pigs are required to tell you the charges. Don't give them time to think up new ones, although they make tack on more later. If the cops say no and start to search you, say, "I DO NOT CONSENT TO A SEARCH," and get witnesses who heard you say that.

9. The pigs are only supposed to search your car after they have said you are under arrest. But if they see dope or a weapon in the car, this gives them the legal right to investigate.

10. Don't co-operate by opening the trunk of your car. You can tell them that you know that they are not supposed to search the car unless they bust you, but be careful how you tell them. You don't want to help open the trunk because they might do something illegal that won't hold up in court.

**DON'T CARRY DOPE, ILLEGAL PROPERTY, OR HAVE BROKEN LIGHTS ON YOUR CAR WHEN DOING POLITICAL WORK.\*\***

This information was compiled by the regional offices of the National Lawyer's Guild. Know it thoroughly but it is not a substitute for an attorney's advice. If you have questions or problems, contact a lawyer.

## CAIRO, ILLINOIS

But I did manage to talk to Wilbert Beard, a black who resigned as a police sergeant last November. The International Police Chiefs' report was out of date in one respect: all four blacks on the department when the survey was made have since quit or retired, and the department is now all-white.

Beard resigned after he was suspended on request of the part-time Police Commissioner—Carl Meisenheimer, head of the local Coca-Cola bottling company—for failing to carry out his orders (assigning men to a detail). "Of course I refused. I was a trained police officer and he wasn't. That's part of the problem with the department. Even the chief doesn't have the real power. The Mayor and Police Commissioner interfere all the time in the smallest matters."

Beard's three and a half years on the force were uncomfortable ones. "I felt very isolated. Even though I was a sergeant and supposedly in charge of a shift, I'd be out in my car and I'd hear the white policemen talking on the radio about 'Code 4' and 'Operation So-and-So' that I didn't know anything about. Everybody knew but me. And before a shooting spree, the whites on the force knew all about it. It was uncanny, but they'd already have men on stand-by."

Most of the time, the white policemen kept their feelings to themselves when Beard was around. But he heard a radio operator say: "What we ought to do is go out and drop a bomb on Pyramid Court."

But what bothered Beard most of all were the close ties between white policemen and the U.C.C.A. "A former chief once admitted to me that most of the white policemen were in the U.C.C.A. The White Hat guys were certainly in and out of the police station all the time, carrying their rifles, and real chummy with the police."

That week I got a list of the 36 deputy sheriffs named earlier in the bill by Alexander County Sheriff Donald Turner. The use of deputy commissions to legitimize vigilantes is an old practice in Cairo. Turner, while serving as county coroner some years ago, created 200 deputies. But in June, 1969, when the White Hats

were disbanded, all deputy commissions were called in, and the State Attorney General's office ruled that in the future all deputies must be

"trained and uniformed officers with legitimate law-enforcement duties."

But this rule hasn't been followed. The 36 deputies on the current list include only a handful of trained officers, among them Charlie Jestus, the assistant police chief who confiscated Boscarine's camera. Moreover, it included at least five men known to be active, militant members of the U.C.C.A. and several others strongly sympathetic to the group. Among the five militants is Bob Hogan, who in 1955 pleaded guilty to a charge of "malicious mischief" growing out of the firebombing of the black dentist's home. Hogan was found guilty and placed on probation for a year. Today, he is a sheriff's deputy authorized to patrol the streets of Cairo with a rifle or sub-machine gun and keep racial peace.

One afternoon, I dropped in on the man who revived the vigilante tradition in modern Cairo: Peyton Berbling, county state's attorney and a member of the tight-knit white oligarchy which has ruled Cairo for decades.

They say Berbling's father used to carry a good-luck charm made from the finger joint of a Negro lynched in Kentucky during the early years of the century. But the state's attorney is a mild, soft-spoken man in a yellow cowboy shirt and string tie. "A whole lot of fuss has been made about the White Hats," he said. "A bunch of us up in the Northwest just wanted to get together and protect our neighborhood, that's all. They bought these damn white hats for 75 cents, a real bargain. Now if they'd been green, nobody would have said a thing."

But the United Front, he said, was quite a different matter. "It's like that movie, 'Bad Day at Black Rock'; a gang comes into town and just takes over. The Front has brought in every goddam goon and hoodlum around as a strong-arm outfit. How do you explain that two of those guys we arrested last Saturday were from Wichita and one from St. Louis? My own wife has been insulted by these pickets downtown. They've used ugly words, obscenities. And who are they? I don't think a single one of them pays a single penny in taxes. And yet they're trying to put men out of business who've been paying taxes here for 100 years."

**NEXT I went to see Lou Michelson, the 26-year-old owner of Michelson's Jewelry and president of the Cairo Retail Merchants Association.**

When he took over the Merchants' Association last spring, Cairo's retailers were in a bad way. Several stores—including Woolworth's, the mainstay of every Main Street—had closed and others were teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. Under his leadership, the association mounted a major promotional campaign to encourage people to do their Christmas shopping in Cairo: a Santa Claus who arrived by helicopter and set up headquarters in a little red house on Eighth Street, Christmas Cash Sweepstakes, and slogans ("Shop Cairo Where Your Business Is Needed and Appreciated").

"Sure," Michelson told me, "we've been hurt badly. But it's not the boycott that's doing it. Black shoppers' buying power is limited anyway. It's not even the local whites that hurt us. It's the whites from surrounding areas—Kentucky, Missouri, rural Illinois. Cairo used to be a regional shopping center. But those outlying people are frightened away by the sniping and arson. So if we can stop the violence, we don't care about the boycott."

"But violence is at the heart of the Front's plan and it is a plan. I hesitate to use the word 'Communism,' but it's like a blueprint to take over a community—no, to destroy it. First, they destroy the economy, then they destroy the educational system, then the political and democratic processes, then the civic form of government, then the social and cultural atmosphere."

"I believe Cairo was handpicked for this plan because of its high concentration of poor blacks and its limited law enforcement. Once they destroy Cairo, and work all the bugs out of their scheme, they'll start all over in another community."

Who, I asked, were "they"?

"The black revolutionaries, the black militants, and here that means Koen. The whites in this community have decided they can't work with Koen. Even a few months ago we were all hung up on this 'communications' business. The state, the Federal Government, everybody, was telling us you have to 'communicate' with them. Well, we had a couple of meetings, but they were farces. You can't communicate with men like Koen."

"What proved that to us once and for all was the Front's rejection of our 'Proclamation for Peace and

Progress' last September. The city and the merchants got together and

made the most generous, sincere offer we could: to hire 12 blacks full-time and six part time in our stores, while the city was going to hire six black police trainees and six black fire trainees. Well, the Front rejected it out of hand. Shall I tell you why? Because if they accepted the offer they'd have to call off the boycott and if the boycott is broken their whole thing falls apart."

"Eighteen jobs was a good offer. Hell, we only have 60 people working in the downtown stores. And some of those are already Negroes. I've got one—Melvin Palma—who's been with us for 32 years. I imagine Melvin's a lot like most blacks here. They don't agree with the United Front but they're too scared to say so. Koen and his crowd have threatened, intimidated and harassed the blacks in this town until they don't dare oppose them. Well, he's not going to intimidate us. We've had enough. Koen's got to go."

In recent months, this has become the recurrent theme of Cairo's white leadership. It rests heavily on their contention that Koen is not a responsible black leader but a "hoodlum."

I looked up Koen's record in St. Louis, the center of his "militant" activities before he returned to Cairo. It is true that as Prime Minister of the Black Liberators there he was arrested and convicted several times. But one wonders whether these arrests reflect Koen's violent nature or the St. Louis Police Department's harassment of black militants.

Once he was picked up for driving without a taillight and fined \$5. Another time, he was arrested for driving without brake lights, failure to display a driver's license and improper state plates. At the police station, police later testified, Koen and his companion attacked them and the officers had to defend themselves. Koen, who received severe scalp lacerations and two broken hands in the fracas, was sentenced to six months in jail; but the Police Department suspended two officers and reprimanded four others for using "excessive force" in the incident.

In another case, Koen and three others were arrested for making "inflammatory and threatening" speeches to a meeting, but were acquitted. Commenting on that case, The St. Louis Post-Dispatch called the arrests the result of "overzealous and misdirected police work" and said it hoped the police realized that "harassment

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## Cairo

of the militants in an effort to run them out of town regardless of their civil rights will not be tolerated."

But those who know Charles Koen well say he has always had a fierce temper. They say his temper was particularly aroused when the Tri-State Informer, Cairo's white militant newspaper, published his birth certificate with an entry "Father Unknown" under the headline "Does Anyone Know This Illegitimate?" A friend says: "Charles hasn't forgotten that. And if it makes him bitter toward some whites in town, can you blame him?"

Others concede that the United Front under Koen's leadership, did set out to rid the black community of certain well-known "stool pigeons" before confronting the white community. This effort apparently resulted in the death of one informer: Floyd Parker. "The way I understand it," says one well-informed source, "some blacks started shooting into Floyd's house just to scare him. A stray bullet hit him. It wasn't a serious wound, but he was so frightened to go outside he lay down in his bathtub and bled to death. It was three days before they found him."

Another black the Front suspects of being an informer is James Avery, a former Cairo policeman who ran a tavern in Snipers Alley. The tavern used to be a favorite drinking spot among Front members, but when Avery accused two of them of stealing from him, beat them up and dragged them across the street to the police station, the Front boycotted his place so effectively that it closed in December. Since then, Avery has challenged Koen's leadership-calling for an election in the Front and circulating petitions-but he has apparently found little support.

Just how deep Koen's support runs in the black community is difficult to measure. Only a few hundred blacks-many of them children-attend the weekly rallies. But there is little open opposition. Front spokesmen say they know of only eight blacks who regularly violate the boycott of downtown stores. Undoubtedly there are others who find Koen too militant but say nothing for fear of what might happen to them. Yet most of the black community seem to regard him as working in their behalf.

And white militants are constantly making new recruits for the Front. During the Dec. 5 shootout, one black city employe was lighting the Christmas decorations along Commercial Avenue when the police turned their guns on him. "What you doing?" he shouted. "You know me." "Yeh," one policeman acknowledged, "but we're awful mad now, so get out of here."

**W**ITH all the firing in both directions, Pyramid Court is a dangerous place to roam at night. So when several other white newsmen and I asked for an interview with Charles Koen, Manker Harris, a white minister who serves as the Front's public-relations man, had to drive us to Koen's small apartment in the housing project. Halfway in, he turned off his lights and gunned the car quickly down the darkened road. In front of Koen's apartment, we waited in the car for several minutes until Manker was sure we'd been recognized.

But once we were inside, Koen and his wife greeted us warmly and found us seats in the tiny living room under a portrait of Malcolm X and a mock diploma from the "School of Cotton Picking." A box of rifle shells rested on the record player.

I started by asking Koen about Lou Michelson's charge that the job issue was just a fake. What issues were essential to the Front?

"Sure, we're serious about jobs. Forty per cent of the jobs in Cairo are held by whites from Kentucky. We're half the population and we're entitled to half the jobs. So what do the merchants offer: 12 full-time jobs!"

"But in another sense, you know, Michelson is right. These things are no longer the issue. Because the way the whites responded with the White Hats and guns and armored cars means the real issue for us has become survival. We stand on the threshold of being annihilated."

Still only 25, Koen has the presence of a much older man. His face is dramatic, with flaring nostrils, a high forehead and all sorts of complex planes and angles. His voice rings with conviction.

Someone asked whether Cairo wasn't going through pretty much what Southern communities went through in the early sixties. "Cairo encompasses a lot of the sixties' civil-rights thing," Koen replied, "But the mistakes made in the sixties aren't being made here. People have learned to defend themselves. We have to defend ourselves because no law-enforcement body will do it. A little while ago, a black man moved next to a white man here and the white man got his rifle and went to threaten the black man's wife. But Berbling wouldn't issue a warrant for him."

Koen feels Cairo is so polarized now that the situation can be resolved only by pressure from outside: "The man who could bring justice here is the Governor [Richard Ogilvie]. But for him to act would be to jeopardize his Republican power base in southern Illinois. He'd lose his base, but he'd gain his soul."

The Front's leaders do not expect the Governor to act. So they are digging in for the long haul, attempting to set up autonomous black institutions. Already, the Front has formed a black grocery store, a black clothing store and a pre-fab housing factory; it plans a feeder-pig program, a broom factory and a shopping center.

**M**ODERATES are very hard to find in Cairo these days. "Moderates are hard to find in any war, and don't kid yourself, this is a war," said David Cain. "Would you stand in Times Square the day we declared war on Germany and plead for moderation?"

Among the few moderates I found were Bob and Dave Lansden, partners in the law firm of Lansden & Lansden and grandsons of the man who wrote the "History of Cairo" 59 years ago. The current Lansdens are Princeton graduates and have an unpretentious erudition that makes them seem strangely out of place in Cairo, figures straight out of a Faulkner novel. Both have consistently stood up for black men's rights at the expense of their reputation and safety. Last Oct. 23, while Bob Lansden was next door at the Mark Twain Restaurant, someone put a volley of shots through their office windows.

The other moderate I met is Charlie Metheny, the 70-year-old white man who used to run telegrams to Cairo's cathouses. Charlie knows Koen from way back and, as he puts it, "I'm not about to stop seeing him just because some of my white friends don't like it." When he accepted a place on the United Front's Housing Board a little while back, some of his old friends snubbed him down at the Elks' Club and someone

put a sign on his door: "Get Out Tomorrow."


But Charlie doesn't mind. "I'm not pro-black or pro-anything. I don't have much time left, so I drink a bit, gamble a bit, see that woman of mine

'cross the river, and live the way I want to. I just think blacks are entitled to live their lives, too. They're entitled to a bit of dignity and self-respect like anybody else. Why don't people here see that?" ■



# LOS ANGELES

January 31, 1971



# WOMEN IN CUBA

This is the second in a series of articles dealing with Cuba in 1970. The author was a member of the third contingent of La Brigada Venceremos, which lived and worked in Cuba from August through October of 1970. The author is a white woman.

## HISTORY

In pre-revolutionary Cuba, there were three primary roles

# WOMEN

## The Longest Revolution; Chicana Perspective

By Rita Flores

As a Chicana, I find there is much to relate to with regard to the Revolutionary participation of women in other countries. The Revolution in America is swelling in strength. Blacks and Chicanos are mobilizing; in their attitudes and in their life styles.

Both Black and Chicana women are oppressed in many of the same ways that the women in, for instance, Algeria or Cuba were, are still are. Chicanas suffer from the repressive attitudes of their men, of the concept of machismo, to a degree that makes their participation in revolutionary struggle subject to their awareness of their predicament. The Chicanas who are in high school in California, for example, remain mostly unaware of their capacity for breaking the cycle of getting married and having babies. Since that is what they mostly see around themselves, and since these social pressures appear inevitably unavoidable, they feel that is where they belong; stabilized by the strength of having their own families.

Very few Chicanas are allowed, or even motivated to pursue their education beyond high school. Indeed, many drop out of high school to get married or when they become pregnant. In support of this statement is the fact that the average education of Chicanos is 8.1 years. Higher education is not the solution but it is at least a step in helping the Chicana to obtain an awareness of her potential to the Chicano Movement, and the Revolutionary struggle.

It is not the solution, because the institutions of higher learning are founded on white, middle-class and upper-class mentality: the purpose of these institutions being to transform the students into productive members of white upper-class capitalism. It is training by the elite to produce an elite which will perpetuate the elite in this country.

Thus, many Chicanos who go to college, go to escape into the white bourgeois society and many leave college with exactly that mentality. Those who retain this mentality are useless to the Movement and are, in fact, counter-revolutionaries.

assigned to woman: household slave, mother, and pleasure object. These roles were perpetuated not only by the capitalist economy (The roles are profitable because they encourage consumerism, provide for a large amount of unpaid labor, and keep a large segment of society subjugated, hence weakening tremendously the people's power to challenge the ruling forces), but also by the Catholic church and the Latin American

Apart from the fact that few Chicanos ever go to college, is the fact that there are many pressures on the Chicana not to go, even if she has the necessary potential and educational qualifications.

In many Chicano families it is unheard of for a woman to leave the family unless to get married. There is a well-defined stigma attached to those Chicana who lose their virginity before marriage; virginity being a prized and necessary possession to most Chicano men, and many Chicano parents fear that their daughter will lose their virginity if they go away to college.

If a Chicana can succeed in breaking the tradition, and she makes it to college, she must suffer the repression of those Chicanos also in college who are caught up in the concept of "machismo" and who refuse, for the most part, to accept her as an intelligent individual and co-worker in the Revolution.

The Chicano, in that he is the bastard offspring of Mexico and has for the most part, Mexican ethics and ideals, shares the Mexican view of women. Paz's description of the Mexican women is also the Chicano's view of the Chicana.

The Chicano, therefore, does not expect and finds it hard to accept the intellectual offerings of the Chicana. The Chicano in college finds it hard to participate in the Revolutionary Consciousness and the activities of the Chicanos.

It is the area of the Chicano Movement that presently requires the most concentration. The Chicana must become aware of her potentials as a woman, as a Chicana, as a Revolutionary. Then and only then, as a full strength force can the Movement for the Liberation of Chicanos and all oppressed peoples be effective.

"In a revolution, people gain dignity through working together. For women this achievement is relatively more revolutionary than for men because they were always deprived of dignity."

version of male supremacy, machismo. (Note: we do not use this Spanish word because we feel that male supremacy is solely a Latin American problem, nor because we feel that the problem is basically any worse in Latin America than elsewhere.) It is used because it describes a particular type of male supremacy, and because this is the term the Latin Americans themselves use to describe it.) In the middle and upper classes, there was no suitable work for "nice" girls, and only virgins were considered eligible brides, which meant that a woman had absolutely no alternative to marriage if she was to a) eat, and b) gain sexual fulfillment without tarnishing her family name or her reputation. In the campo (countryside), common law marriages were practiced widely; no one could afford to get married anyway, and women had to work outside the home, but the role of household slave still held, so this meant that after a hard day of work in the fields, she was expected to come home, only to have to keep house and mind the kids as well. For free. Prostitution, one of the most blatant manifestations of male supremacy, existed just about everywhere.

The revolution which triumphed in 1959 brought fantastic changes to the life of every Cuban, men and women alike. Women in fact played an important role in the actual struggle against Batista. Haydée Santamaría and Melba Hernández are national heroines because of their participation in the attack on the Moncada Garrison on July 26, 1953 -- the date which is now celebrated as the beginning of the Cuban Revolution -- and many other women were in guerrilla bands throughout the struggle. But only after political power was achieved did the status of all women change radically.

## ECONOMIC LIBERATION

When the economy was totally restructured by the Revolutionary government, the acute unemployment problem turned into a shortage of workers, so that women were not only able to work, they were encouraged to do so. As education became universal and free, more women than ever were able to attend university, and today they are free to work in any profession for which they are qualified -- be it medicine or tractor driving -- with no wage differentials. In fact, in the case where a husband and wife find jobs in different places, and they decide not to live apart (many couples have been known to remain apart for long periods of time so that they can best serve

the Revolution), the decision is made not on the basis of what the husband wants to do -- as it almost always is in our country -- but on whose job is most vital to the Revolution.

Instead of being penalized for their natural function as child bearers, as women workers are in this country, Cuban women are given paid leave to bear their babies, up until 45 days after giving birth. From this 45 days on, day care centers -- centros infantiles -- are available free of charge everywhere. A child may be left in a circulo from morning till evening six days a week, or even overnight. The children get balanced meals, lots of attention, and medical care if they should need it. This is of course a major breakthrough in the struggle of women to use their creativity in a meaningful job other than housework. But problems still exist for women in Cuba -- the old social, sexual, and cultural oppressions have not been dealt with on the same scale as the economic ones. The next article in this series will deal with this aspect of woman's place in the Cuban Revolution.



# Community Police Force

by Chaka

This is a message to the community and the campuses from a handful of students from the University of San Diego and Mesa College who, over the past five months, have been working first toward community control of the police and, now radicalization of the entire justice system so that it will be responsive to the needs of all people and oriented toward imaginative problem solving.

If we cannot get together a dedicated, talented corps of students and community people -- a creative coalition -- then the harassment, the persecution of ethnic

political, cultural, and age minority groups in the streets by police and in the courts will go on;

the Frankensteinian monster with the tension, hatred, and distrust between all groups will grow bigger; the harried, bureaucratic, faceless court process now existing will go on; the glutted one-sided probation and parole procedures will go on; the hideous Orwellian zoos of jails and prisons, the dank rotting away the listless staring, the playing card mentality the censoring of mail and literature, the homosexuality, the hard drug trafficking,

the kangaroo courts among prisoners, the subterranean dictatorships, the contamination of criminality will go on; a grand jury overwhelmingly composed of the wealthy, old, and conservative; the enforcement of laws, statutes regulating private morality will go on; the disregard of community, say, as the fate of its own people, its own ends, its own needs, will go on, and with this the disjointed vapid philosophies that guide this society.

We're not just trying to build a reform movement. More needs to be done than just bringing about certain specific changes in any one area. If we took over tomorrow, and by "we" I mean young, relatively leftist people, that still would be just reforming a procedural change. Peoples' heads have to be in a different place. The change has to be in

peoples' views of themselves -- in just how moving, how valuable how causative, they can be and thus, other people as well. We're saying: YOU CAN DO IT. It's spiritual, as well as political, philosophical, or what have you. We're saying that you can have an effect, you can be the cause. If enough people with good minds get it together, they can come up with imaginative ideas, and imaginative ways to implement them. We've waited long enough for the system. We learned that from the student revolts, peace movements women's liberation, and black militancy. We're trying to put something together with the same fervor as the anti-war movement but a sustained fervor permeating the ethic, the nature of the culture.

It seems to have come to that abrasive point where the impli-

ed alternatives to working within the system is violent attack upon the system. True fervor for change cannot arise from an attitude of vengeance.

All people are oppressed. The oppressor is oppressed in the exercise of oppression. We are prisoners of our own psychology. All the more reason for a course of compassion. Imagination can prevail where it never could. You might say we're radical. Our ideas certainly are; and when you think about it, so are our methods. There is nothing revolutionary about violence. Violence is the establishment where it is today. Violence has been an intrinsic force in the fluctuation of history since life began. What is really revolutionary would be a life-bred, life-giving means of change.

We're offering a hybrid movement, not a compromise, but a necessity. We don't believe in the system. We believe in the people. We aren't trying to lead anything and we're not particularly daydreaming about the effect we can have. We'll do what we can, in the justice system in the rest of society, in peoples' heads, and ask other students and community people to join us. either way, we'll do what we believe in.

Maybe we're an alternative to the weathermen, maybe we're not, but the only alternative to guerrilla warfare, is guerrilla peace-fare.

We're meeting with Jack Walsh, Supervisor. We've met with Sheriff Duffy and are meeting with him again.

We're meeting with Police Officials and hope to meet with Hoopler, Hahn's nominee for the next police chief. We're also nominating ex-chief Kimble of Beverly Hills for Police Chief when Hahn's choice comes up for confirmation.

We've sent copies of our legislative program to Senator Mills and Assemblyman Pete Chacon, and will send copies to all the legislature.


We're introducing proposals to the California Council on Criminal Justice for federal funding.

We're contacting foundations to obtain matching funds to set these proposals up as experimental projects.


We're contacting private firms to get funds to operate on, emphasizing that we're an alternative to the weathermen.

We really need people. We need widespread support. We need muckrakers-people to investigate, people to lobby, to contact people, people with imaginative ideas, not just in the field of justice but in all areas of society. We need political organizers and people good at publicity, fund raising and thinking.

Join us if you can. If you want to learn more--call 233-0644, 233-9573, or 454-7530.




Proposed design for a multi-function Police Patrol Vehicle



# LA RAZA UNIDA

CHICANOS GO OUT IN NUMBERS AND VOTE MOSTLY FOR DEMOCRATS YEAR AFTER YEAR.

THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES TAKE CHICANOS FOR GRANTED.



IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT IN BOTH PARTIES THERE ARE RACIST!


AND THERE ARE CONSERVATIVES IN BOTH PARTIES

EVEN THE POLICE ARE FROM BOTH PARTIES



THERE ARE LIBERALS IN BOTH PARTIES

SO THE CHICANOS TRY THREE PARTIES AND RAN THEIR OWN CANDIDATES (Republican, Democratic and Peace and Freedom)



MEANWHILE THE DEMOCRATS ARE

AND THE REPUBLICANS ARE REALLY HAVING A BALL

BUT THE CHICANOS ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THE NEEDS OF THE ANGLO, BUT DEDICATED ONLY TO THE INTEREST OF THE CHICANOS



NOW THE BIG BOSS POLITICANS FROM BOTH PARTIES WANT THE CHICANO HELP AFTER MOST OF THE CHICANO CANDIDATES HAVE BEEN DEFEATED.

