

If you get around among people, and talk with them about world-conditions and our relations with Soviet Russia...you're bound to hear an amazing amount of "war talk". It seems to be spreading like "wildfire".

More and more people seem to be surrendering to a kind of "war psychosis"....you hear them saying that war with Russia is inevitable.

And they're not all irresponsible people, or rabble-rousers either. It's not unusual to find business men...or industrialists talking seriously of the possibility of war within two or three years.

And there are others, of course, who are so resigned to the "inevitability" of war....that they have started talking about what they call a "preventative" war against the Soviets. That is, they argue that if there's bound to be a war then we should start it while the odds are on our side....while we alone have a stockpile of atomic-bombs. They seem to reason that....if we start dropping atomic bombs on Russia.... then we can put her in her place....and settle this thing very quickly.... without letting it become a World-War.

Not all the American people are resigned to "inevitable war" with Russia. In fact, a Gallup-poll of public opinion shows that 62% of the people want our government to keep on striving for an understanding with the Soviets. Only 31 percent have concluded that it's impossible to find a settlement....and therefore, we should go our way without Russia.

It's among this 31 percent that the "war talk" is to be found, of course. Incidentally, the war-veterans - who know what war is - make-up the largest group urging that we keep on trying.

In other words, it's the people who didn't have to fight the last war and who won't have to fight the next one....who are doing most of the talking about "inevitable war".

I mention all this as a sort of "preface" to a news bulletin received in our WBBM news-room just fifteen minutes ago.....

It comes from the atomic-scientists of Chicago....an organization made up of the men who "created" the atomic bomb....that weapon which some Americans are now saying we should use against the Russians in a "preventative" war.

These atomic scientists are frightened by that kind of talk.

They're frightened because they don't think the American people realize that - even with our atomic bombs - we could not win a "preventative" war.

It might come to the point where - to defeat Russia - we would have to atom-bomb the cities of all Europe....and the vast spaces of Eurasia as well - to drive out the Russian armies.

And while we were wrecking those cities with atom-bombs.... Russian planes might be attacking our cities with bacteria bombs.

While Europeans died by the tens of thousands from radio-activity....Americans might be dying by the tens of thousands from the plague.

They point-out that in the end, we would be committing suicide while attempting to commit murder.

If this is true - then no wonder these scientific men are afraid of the "drift" in American thinking....the resignation to "inevitable" war. They say that is enough people start thinking and talking that way...then war will become inevitable.

One of those who is most worried is Dr. Leo Zilard.

It was Dr. Zilard who took the initiative...back in 1939... in developing the atomic-bomb. At that time....in the first year of the war....he called to Franklin D. Roosevelt's attention various experiments which indicated that an atomic-bomb was a very definite

possibility.

From his report....our scientific and industrial resources were mobilized - secretly - for the great gamble.

In May of 1945 - before you and I even knew that the atomic bomb existed....six weeks, in fact, before the first one was tested in New Mexico....Dr. Zilard warned James F. Byrnes - then secretary of state - that this was a terrible discovery. He said that the atomic bomb might become a Frankenstein monster and jeopardize our own security. He foresaw difficulties even then, in bringing Russia into a system of international control. In fact, he said that if we did not win Russia's cooperation immediately after the first bomb was exploded....then we might never win it.

As you know....we still do not have an atomic agreement.... because of mutual Russian and American distrust.

And so last month, Dr. Zilard sent a letter to Attorney General Tom Clark....asking permission to send a letter direct to Joseph Stalin.

He asked the attorney general's permission....so he would not run afoul of our treason laws....

In that proposed letter to Stalin - which was made public just a few minutes ago - Dr. Zilard outlined the drift toward war. He spoke of the "war talk"...both in Russia and in the United States.

And he said rather ominously (and here I'm quoting the atomic scientist)... "If the present trend continues for six months, more likely than not, the course of events will be out of control of the two governments concerned."

So he proposed that Stalin himself go on the air...once a month...and speak directly to the American people.

He wanted to warn Stalin that whatever the Russian leader might say would be without effect, unless it was felt to be 100 percent sincere.

He wanted Stalin to outline Russia's proposals for a world settlement....and say -- quite definitely -- whether and how the Soviet system and our system can exist peaceably in the same world.

But that letter was never sent to Stalin.

Attorney General Tom Clark wouldn't permit it. Why....we haven't been told. The letter was made public just twenty-five minutes ago.

Of course, Dr. Zilard admits that what he proposed may sound like a "carck-pot" idea. He agrees the chances of its succeeding were very small from the start.

But he says -- the way things are going now -- only a "miracle" will save us from another war....and so he's desperately trying to conjure-up such a "miracle."

The traditional devices of diplomacy haven't worked....and so apparently Dr. Zilard thinks it's time for us to try some other method.

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FRONTIERS OF SCIENCE - QUINCY HOWE
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1947
6:15 - 6:30 PM EST

(AS BROADCAST)

As the Big Four Foreign Ministers sit down together in London to make a last stab at writing a peace treaty for Germany, one of the foremost atomic scientists has addressed an open letter - over their heads - to Premier Stalin. The letter appears in the December issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; just published. It is written by Dr. Leo Szilard, one of the men who first brought the possibility of the atomic bomb to President Roosevelt's attention and then played a large part in developing the actual weapon. Since the frontiers of science and the frontiers of politics so often overlap nowadays, it's not news for an atomic scientist to speak his mind on world affairs. But the proposal Dr. Szilard has made does call for special attention and comment.

Dr. Szilard points out that Russia and America have now reached a complete deadlock on the question of controlling atomic energy and on almost everything else. He fears this deadlock will lead, eventually, to a war nobody wants. He says that most atomic scientists share his fears. He says that most atomic scientists feel that both the United States and the Soviet Governments are pursuing mistaken policies; mistaken because they are completely irreconcilable. He therefore has written this open letter suggesting that Stalin speak directly to the American people at regular intervals, perhaps once a month, outlining a general settlement that would enable Russia and America to live at peace with each other. He also urges Stalin to invite President Truman to talk frankly to the Russian people through the Soviet press and radio.

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Dr. Szilard speaks for himself alone. He does not claim the support of any other atomic scientists. The Bulletin in which his letter appears has not endorsed his suggestion. One editor comments that of course Dr. Szilard has shown political innocence and that only a miracle could make his suggestion come true. And he quotes the Italian scientist Dr. Fermi as having defined a miracle as an event which has only a 10 per cent chance of happening. Dr. Szilard does not think his proposal has even one tenth of one per cent of a chance, but he's taking it anyway.

Dr. Szilard's letter deserves comment on two points. First, the lay-man cannot be reminded too often how much the atomic scientists fear the atomic bomb. Second, the proposal that Dr. Szilard makes - visionary as it must appear to the laymen - puts the scientist in a new role. Dr. Szilard is not only taking part in politics. He has made the kind of proposal that we used to associate with the most extreme type of religious idealist. The Bulletin to which he contributes has also printed many articles - including one in its current issue - favorable to world government. Like the case for complete non-resistance in wartime the case for world government in time of peace is morally unassailable. The trouble, according to most of its detractors, is that it leaves human nature out of account. If so, we have come full circle. A century ago, the scientist was the arch-materialist; the believer in orthodox religion, the arch-idealist. It would be unfair to religious idealists to say that the two have exchanged roles.

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But it is fair to say that now it is the idealistic scientist who expects men to act like gods.

Just as the extremes of religion and science meet in certain proposals about the control of atomic energy, so the atomic sciences and the science of astronomy have much in common for the very reason that they too seem poles apart. The Atomic scientist deals with completely invisible forces right under his nose. The astronomer deals with the entire universe and he soon will be able to see a billion light years away. That's the distance that it takes light one billion years to travel. Yet the atomic scientist and the astronomer see the same kind of thing. They both see solar systems, large and small, all apparently obeying the same laws, for the atom is simply a miniature solar system. And the astronomer, like the atomic scientist is also in the news these days now that the great 200-inch mirror has arrived at the new observatory on Palomar Mountain - 125 miles southeast of Pasadena, California. You've probably read or heard about the journey of this mirror. It's twice as large as the next largest reflector at Mount Wilson; not far away. The California Institute of Technology operates both telescopes under the single direction of Dr. Ira Bowen who will co-ordinate their work.

The Mount Palomar observatory has three stories. The new telescope has eight mirrors - not lenses, but mirrors - and the big 200-inch mirror, 24 inches thick and weighing 14 and a half tons, is the heart of the new instrument.

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The Corning Glass works which made the wedding presents that President Truman and Ambassador Douglas gave to Princess Elizabeth also made this giant lens. It cost \$600,000 when it was cast in 1935. It would cost more than twice as much to duplicate it today. The funds came from the Rockefeller Foundation and the whole project is costing 6 million dollars.

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What scientific returns can be expected on this investment? The giant Mount Palomar telescope will be used to photograph various heavenly bodies. It's not built primarily for astronomers to look through. It built primarily for them to take photographs which they can enlarge and study. When it is ready for actual use - and that probably will not be for some weeks time - astronomers hope to clear up at least three important matters. They expect to take photographs of the planet Mars that will show whether Nature or some form of life made its so-called "canals." They expect to be able to tell what chemical elements exist on other heavenly bodies and in what quantities. And they believe they can say for certain whether or not the universe is expanding. It so happens that at the same time the 200 inch mirror arrived at Mount Palomar, Dr. Harlow Shapley, director of the Harvard Observatory, declared in the annual report of the Smithsonian Institution, that the universe IS expanding and at a rapid rate. Dr. Shapley reports that a force that he calls "negative gravitation" causes whole galaxies like our own Milky Way - and there are about a hundred billion of them in all - to fly apart and separate. But do not worry. You are in no immediate danger. Developments of this magnitude take billions of years to work themselves out.

What does all this mean to you and me? The Mount Palomar telescope might throw a lot of new light on possible communication among the planets of our own solar system. It ought to show more about the nature of that solar system and of other solar systems and galaxies.

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And just as the atomic scientists found that their researches confirmed the findings of the astronomers, so the astronomers, with this new Mount Palomar telescope, may help the atomic scientists to learn more about the behavior of atoms and electrons.

Pure science - that is to say the study of the way things behave - soon become applied science - that is to say making things behave in a certain fashion. Astronomers cannot do much more about the universe than the weather man can do about the weather. But the natural principles that the astronomer observes in the universe around us can help us not only to understand but to control our own world and ourselves.

Two years ago the Smythe report on atomic energy upset a lot of our fixed ideas about the physical, material world in which we live. It showed us that matter amounts to nothing more nor less than concentrated energy. But we found it much easier to adjust ourselves to this new idea than we did to adjust ourselves to the implications of the atomic bomb. In January a book will appear which seems likely to have the same effect on some of our cherished beliefs as the atomic bomb had on the city of Hiroshima. The book is entitled Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. It was prepared with funds from the Rockefeller Foundation by Professor Alfred C. Kinsey of the University of Indiana and three associates. It deals with the sex habits of men in the United States. It's based on 12,000 detailed personal interviews with men of all ages and classes from all parts of the country.

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The publishing firm of W. B. Saunders of Philadelphia which specializes in medical books is printing 100,000 copies of the first edition. Except in the cases of book club selections that's more copies than almost any commercial publisher ever prints of any book for the general public. Yet Dr. Kinsey's book seems sure to become a best-seller. Already it has received considerable newspaper publicity. Next month most of the leading mass magazines as well as several class magazines will devote articles to Dr. Kinsey's findings.

The chief conclusions Dr. Kinsey reaches will shock and surprise a lot of us. He states as a fact that in their sexual behavior nineteen out of twenty men in the United States have at some time in their lives done something for which they could be criminally prosecuted. As I say, he bases this statement on 12,000 interviews with 12,000 individuals. Public opinion polls have predicted and reflected human behavior with 98 per cent accuracy on the basis of much less extensive interviewing - and Dr. Kinsey plans to interview a total of 100,000 Americans and produce eight more volumes during the next 25 years. A radio broadcast does not offer the time, nor is it perhaps the place, to go into details. But no coverage of the present frontiers of science can be complete if it does not refer to Dr. Kinsey's conclusions and what they mean. Freud based his theory and practise of psychoanalysis on the study of about 1,000 abnormal patients. Havelock Ellis who pioneered in the same field based his conclusions on about 200 persons, most of them abnormal too.

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But in the light of Dr. Kinsey's findings it's hard to say what is normal and what abnormal. The people he talked to were not suffering from any mental or nervous disorders. They were leading average lives. But it seems that the life of the average American - at any rate his sex life - does not always conform with our declared standards of behavior. Dr. Kinsey finds that sex morals differ in different classes. College graduates lead more conventional sex lives than men who did not get beyond high school.

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High School graduates lead more conventional sex lives than those who went only to grammar school. But Dr. Kinsey finds that the sex behavior of Americans has not changed much during the past fifty years. The notion that we have suddenly become more emancipated just isn't so. Apparently our fathers and grandfathers cut up just as much as we do - but talked about the capers even less frankly than we do. Dr. Kinsey confirms Dr. Frued who maintained that sex plays a large part in the lives of children. Dr. Kinsey also found that nearly all American men establish their sex habits in their teens. He doesn't think that joining the army and going off to war made much difference.

Dr. Kinsey's book will stir up plenty of controversy. No doubt about that. It will raise innumerable questions. Some people will wonder if we are not equally hypocritical about all the seven deadly sins. Is the seventh commandment the only one that is more honored in the breach than the observance? What would a questionnaire on the lying, stealing, covering, swearing, and honoring thy father and thy mother habits of the American people show? And how about Dr. Kinsey's statement that our sex habits have not changed much in several generations? Isn't the real point, perhaps, that no one would have thought of compiling such a book a couple of generations ago? Who would have published it? How many popular magazines would have given its contents a circulation running into the millions? And what would radio - if there had been radio - have done? What, for that matter, will radio do when the full details of Dr. Kinsey's findings reach the public? There, in this frank facing of disagreeable facts that our ancestors ducked; there is perhaps the real revolution in contemporary morals that Dr. Kinsey has hastened along. ras

Medical science has brought two more diseases more nearly under control. A team of doctors of the New York State Department of Health has tracked down the virus that causes intestinal flu. It is found in contaminated milk, water and food. And another team of wartime scientists announces as cure for malaria that works 95% of the time. (It's used with quinine and has proved the most powerful antimalarial drug in existence -- and the least poisonous, too.)

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "LETTER TO STALIN" WHICH HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION TO THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS BY DR. LEO SZILARD. IN THIS ARTICLE DR. SZILARD MAKES AN APPEAL FOR STALIN TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND ADOPT A NEW LINE OF APPROACH --NEW BOTH IN SUBSTANCE AND METHOD -- TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, CULMINATING IN A COMPREHENSIVE OFFER ON STALIN'S PART FOR A GENERAL SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD.

THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED.

I take the step of writing this "Letter" because I am deeply concerned about the deterioration of Russian-American relations, and also because I believe that the general sentiment which moves me to this action is shared by the majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy.

The steady deterioration of Russian-American relations has many disturbing aspects, but perhaps none is as serious as the lasting effect which it may have on the minds of the American people, as well as the minds of the people in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Here in America more and more men will say to me in private conversation that war with Russia is inevitable. These are men who are capable of thinking independently and are not guided by whatever editorials they may read in their newspapers. To me their attitude is a symptom of grave danger because once the American people close their minds on this subject war, in fact, will have become inevitable.

There are those who argue that there is no danger of an early war because at present Russia is too weak to start one and there is no precedent for the United States embarking on a preventive war. That there is no such precedent is, of course, true; but neither have the American people ever before been in a position where they had to fear that if they remain passive during a protracted period of uneasy peace they

may live to see the day when war -- if it breaks out --- will be brought to their homeland.

I do not mean to say that the United States may start a preventive war against Russia within the next six months; what I mean to say is that if the present trend continues for six months, a fateful change might take root in the minds of the American people and the situation would then be beyond remedy. Thereafter it would be merely a question of time -- a few short years, perhaps--- until the peace would be at the mercy of some Yugoslav general in the Balkans or some American admiral in the Mediterranean who may willfully or through bungling create an incident that will inevitably result in war. If the present trend continues for six months, more likely than not, the further course of events will be out of the control of the two governments involved.

The main reason for the present trend is the fact that two years have passed since the end of the war and no appreciable progress has been made toward a settlement. Russia and the United States have reached a deadlock.

All this does not come as a surprise to most of us who had worked in the field of atomic energy during the war and had time to adjust our thinking to the implications of the bomb. It was clear from the start that the existence of the bomb and the manner in which it was used would not make the settlement easier but rather more difficult. We knew that the world could be saved from another war only if both the United States and Russia were able to rise above the situation and before this can come to pass one of them will have to take the lead.

Situations of this general type are not without precedent in history; they occur also on occasion in the lives of individuals, and the story of one such occurrence made a very deep impression on me. In 1930, twelve years after the end of the First World War, I met a classmate of mine and we talked of what had happened to us

since we had separated. He had been a lieutenant in the Austrian Army, and in the last days of the war in the Carpathian Mountains he was in charge of a patrol. One morning they heard by way of rumor that an armistice had been concluded, but being cut off from communications they were unable to obtain confirmation. They rode out on patrol duty as usual, and as they emerged from the forest, they found themselves standing face to face with a Russian patrol in charge of an officer. The two officers grabbed their guns and, frozen in this position, the two patrols remained for uncounted seconds. Suddenly the Russian officer smiled and his hand went to his cap in salute. My friend returned the salute, and both patrols turned back their horses. "To this day," my friend said to me, "I regret that it was not I who saluted first."

Perhaps by writing this "Letter" today I may make some slight amends for my friend's tardiness, for in these troubled times it is not without some personal risk for an American scientist to write a "Letter" such as this one.

Today Russia and America find themselves standing face to face, each of them fearful of what may be the other's next political move. The American people want peace. The Russian people want peace also.

As I see it, Russia wants peace - as does the United States - not only for the next five or ten years, she wants peace for good. And if I am correct on this point then peace can yet be saved; it can be saved by you, yourself.

THE APPROACH SUGGESTED.

It is within your power to resolve the deadlock and thereby to permit a change in the course of United States foreign policy, but you can do this only if you decide to throw off the self-imposed shackles of the old-fashioned, and also of the new-fangled forms of diplomacy.

Russia and the United States are deadlocked on almost every point on which they have negotiated in the recent past. On every such point, Russia may have very good

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reasons for not yielding, and the United States may also have very good reasons for not yielding. I am not going to suggest that you should now yield on this point or that one, or that you should now "appease" the United States.

What I am suggesting in this "Letter" are a series of interconnected steps which are within your power to take. Because they are most unusual steps, these suggestions may appear quixotic to many and ridiculous to some.

What I am suggesting in this "Letter" may come somewhat as a shock to you. It may also come as a shock to some of my fellow-Americans who will read these lines. But this is not the time to hold back for fear of being exposed to ridicule or unwarranted accusations.

My first specific suggestion is that you speak directly and personally to the American people. What you may say to them, and you might wish to speak to them once a month, will be news, and because it will be news, it will be carried by the radio stations in the United States and will be reprinted in the newspapers. Naturally you would want to speak in Russian, but your interpreter could convey your speech sentence by sentence in English. Your speech could be recorded and released simultaneously in Russia and America.

The American people listen to their presidents because what the President says to them may affect their lives, and they will listen to you for exactly the same reason. But there is one important difference; you will be speaking to them as the head of a foreign state; your speech will be without effect with them unless it is believed to be one hundred per cent sincere. The sincerity of your expression, as well as the other tokens of sincerity which you may be able to present to the American people, will determine whether your speeches will strike home.

If your speeches to the American people were given full publicity in Russia, you would go a long way towards convincing the American people that you mean what you are saying to them.

And you would go a long way towards convincing the American people that they may expect fair play from you if you invited the President of the United States to address the Russian people just as often as you speak to the American public and accorded just as much publicity to his speeches in Russia as is given to yours in America.

All the machinery through which the American public is being kept informed in the United States would be at your disposal, and it would remain at your disposal in the absence of any attempt to use it for purposes of propaganda.

That you would be heard by the American people is certain; but how your speeches would affect them would depend both upon the substance and the tenor of these speeches.

What indeed should be the substance of your speeches?

What I suggest, in the first place, is that in your speeches you present to the American people a clear picture of a general settlement within the framework of a post-war reconstruction of the world, a settlement that would enable Russia and the United States to live in peace with each other.

At first you will be able to give such a picture in rough outline only; gradually you may be able to fill in more and more of the details. You might convey the details, perhaps, by issuing from time to time supplementary official reports.

By the time you have filled in the details, you will have given the American people more than merely a picture of a possible post-war world; you will have presented them with something that will amount to an offer for a post-war settlement.

You might well ask at this point, because it is indeed a crucial question, whether such a unilateral offer on your part, if it is generous, would not put you at a disadvantage from the point of view of later negotiations. You could easily make

it clear, however, that your offer has to be taken as a whole, that you are perfectly willing to modify any one single point to meet the wishes of the United States Government, but that for every point that the United States wants to have modified in her favor, you may ask that some other point be modified in Russia's favor. As long as this is clearly understood, you need not, and should not, hold back for the sake of later bargaining.

Such are the means through which you may be able to convince the American people that—in your view as well as in fact -- private enterprise and the Russian economic system and also mixed forms of economic organization can flourish side by side; that Russia and the United States can be part of the same world; that "one world" need not necessarily be a uniform world. Until such time as the American people as well as the Russian people shall be convinced of this all-important point, we shall remain headed towards war and not towards peace.

I am told that these days the opposite thesis is presented by authoritative writers in Russia. And if this opposite thesis should be accepted as correct in America as well as in Russia -- if it should be generally believed that there is indeed some inexorable law which, in the long run, makes war between your country and ours inevitable, then those in the United States who are now working for the preservation of peace would begin to feel that they are merely delaying the war which will be all the more terrible the later it comes.

THE RESPONSE EXPECTED.

Naturally you would want to know how the American people would respond if you should decide to take the initiative and adopt a new line of approach towards the United States. Would you really be able to break the present deadlock and thereby bring about a change in the course of United States foreign policy?

There is a vast body of men and women in the United States who view with genuine concern the rapid deterioration of Russian-American relations. Many of them have

grave doubts in their heart as to the general wisdom of the present course of United States foreign policy, while they regard with equal misgivings the Russian counterpart of this policy. If they do not at present take a stand in favor of changing the course steered by their own government, it is first of all because they do not see with sufficient clarity any practicable alternative course under present circumstances. Moreover they may believe that any attempt to bring about a change must necessarily come to naught as long as the speeches of your delegates will continue to follow a line of reasoning which is unacceptable to the large majority of the American public.

If you succeed in the difficult task of formulating in your own mind a practicable solution of the post-war issues and in conveying your picture of such a solution to the American public, then gradually, as you make statement after statement and issue report after report, a complete picture of an acceptable post-war settlement may unfold before the American people. By the time you will have filled in the details, and thus have implicitly extended a comprehensive offer, you also will have removed the block which had caused the deadlock.

This should have a direct and immediate effect on the foreign policy of the United States. Most Americans believe that those who are at present in charge of guiding American foreign policy were driven to the present policy because none other appeared practicable to them in the circumstances. It is generally believed that they are men of good will, who can be expected to change the present course the very moment they see a satisfactory way out of the present impasse.

You may or may not concur with this opinion. But in any case it is clearly within your power to give the American people a choice between two alternative courses of foreign policy. And if they do have a choice, the American people will exercise their choice--this I fervently hope--in favor of a course which may lead to peace. They will exercise their choice through all the mechanisms by which public opinion influences government policies in America. And those who are at present in charge of steering the course of American foreign policy may, to borrow a phrase of Mr. Stimson's,

"either change their minds or lose their jobs."

In this "Letter" I am trying to cope with a difficulty of communications which might be insurmountable. We in America have a crude and oversimplified picture of how political decisions come about in Russia. You in Russia may have a similar picture concerning America. It might be therefore difficult for a Russian to go along with the basic assumption of this "Letter", that in America the most important factor for political decisions is not a public opinion created by the press but rather the attitudes and opinions of the individuals who constitute the American public, and that these attitudes and opinions may become the controlling factor in certain circumstances. But if this "Letter" had not one chance in a thousand of receiving serious consideration in Russia, I still would want to write it rather than to face the charge of seeing the approaching catastrophe without even raising a hand trying to avert it.

If the conclusion were reached that the measures advocated in this "Letter" would be effective, if adequately implemented, it would become necessary to face the difficulties of implementation. The difficulties of formulating an adequate solution to the post-war issues which would be acceptable to both Russia and the United States, as well as the rest of the world, are greatly increased by the absence of any interchange of thought between Americans and Russians who are not encumbered by the responsibility of representing the views of their Governments. It is perhaps understandable that atomic scientists should particularly stress this point and that they should discuss with each other whether there is any proper way in which they could help to bring about such an interchange of thought. The difficulties which stand in the way of achieving this or even a reasonable substitute thereof are obvious. But in view of their special responsibility it is perhaps not unnatural that atomic scientists should wish to assist in the implementation of some significant endeavor aimed at the permanent establishment of peace.

The majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy are free from any anti-Russian bias and they do not include Communists, either in the narrow or wider sense of the term. The general sentiment underlying this "Letter" is, I know, shared by ^{them} ~~the majority~~, but the specific thoughts embodied in it and the decision of writing this "Letter" are my own and I am not speaking for any other person or persons.

LETTER TO THE EDITORS

November 10, 1947

Dear Sirs:

I am releasing the article "Letter to Stalin" for publication today since I no longer have much hope that it will be possible ultimately to obtain the government's permission requested in my letter addressed to the Attorney General. I had discussed this article with quite a number of persons outside the atomic scientists movement, and perhaps some of the questions raised, and the objections made, deserve to be recorded here.

One objection took the stereotyped form of "Why do you address yourself to Stalin? Why don't you write to President Truman?" Curiously enough, this very same phrase was used by two groups of persons -- those whose outlook is close to that of the Administration and those "left wingers" who oppose the foreign policy of the Administration. While these two groups use the very same phrase, they do not, of course, mean the same thing at all.

The "left wingers" mean that by writing such a "Letter" I am acknowledging that Stalin is the real obstacle to peace and I am neglecting to mention that actions on the part of our own Administration have contributed to, or have been largely responsible for, the present disturbing situation.

Those sharing the Administration's point of view seem to feel that, by addressing myself to Stalin, I am acknowledging that Stalin has a greater desire for peace, or has a greater ability to recognize the right path to peace, or else has a greater power to bring about a change than President Truman or his administration. These men will also say to me that those who are in charge of guiding American foreign policy are men of great ability who have an intense desire for peace. And if I accept this view as correct -- they say to me -- then I ought to propose to Stalin (if I must propose anything to him at all) that he make a comprehensive offer to the Administration, rather than that he address himself to the American people.

My answer to them is, of course, that their view of our policy-makers -- which incidentally is shared by the majority of the American people, as stated in

my "Letter" -- is irrelevant, for Mr. Stalin will base his actions on his own views rather than on ours. In my "Letter" I have, therefore, suggested a course of action which Mr. Stalin can follow even though his view may differ from ours. I suggested that if and when he has a case -- and at present there is no case before us -- he can take it to the highest authority in America -- the American people.

Why did I not ^{write} ~~write~~ to Mr. Truman? First of all, because I cannot say to Mr. Truman that if he made a comprehensive offer for settlement of the post-war issues the Russian government would respond favorably. I cannot possibly have any basis for knowing how the Russian government would respond to any such approach. On the other hand, I can say how I believe the American people would respond to a new approach on the part of the Russian government.

Moreover, while I would not wish to say that the conduct of our own foreign policy could in no way be improved upon under present circumstances, I do not believe that the problem which faces the world today can be solved at the level of foreign policy in the narrow sense of the term by the Administration; nor do I believe that it is within the power of the Administration to offer to the world a satisfactory solution of this problem without the full support of the American people for a bold and constructive solution. Since I have developed these thoughts in a previous article -- "Calling for a Crusade" which appeared in the April-May issue of the BULLETIN -- I need not again go into this point here. But I might perhaps add that today it no longer seems likely that popular support or popular pressure for a bold and constructive solution will be forthcoming unless the people would have reason to believe that they could expect the Russian government to be cooperative.

Leo Szilard

NOT FOR RELEASE!

THE FOLLOWING IS PART OF A LETTER SENT BY DR. LEO SZILARD TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER THE DATE LINE OF OCTOBER 25, 1947:

Enclosed is a copy of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" which I have submitted to the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS for publication.

If it were in every respect proper for me to do so, I would write a letter to Mr. Stalin embodying the thoughts contained in the enclosed article and would seek some way of transmitting such a letter to him through the good offices of some prominent person who is known to him. It would be my hope that if my letter were transmitted to Mr. Stalin in such a manner he would perceive the genuine anguish which prompted my writing it and that he might therefore give consideration to its contents.

If such a letter were in fact to be transmitted to Mr. Stalin through some proper and desirable channel I would probably want to postpone indefinitely the publication of the article.

The enclosed article does not touch on any specific dispute or controversy with the United States and the letter which I would send to Mr. Stalin would merely follow its text, possibly shortened by omissions. You may, in the circumstances, think that the transmission of such a letter would not come under the Logan Act of 1799. On the other hand, you might think that the transmission of such a letter might come under the Logan Act or some other similar act and therefore, in accordance with the Logan Act, I am herewith making the formal request for permission or authority of the Government for the transmission of such a letter in the meaning of the Act.

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

1126 EAST FIFTY-NINTH STREET
CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS



MIDWAY 0800 EXTENSION 1785
MIDWAY 10052

October 6, 1947

Mr. Thomas Finletter
Coudert Brothers
2 Rector Street
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Finletter:

I was doing a little biology this summer, and when I got to New York City about the middle of August, the symptoms of the present strained political situation struck me with full force.

I am enclosing the manuscript of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" and a copy of a letter which I have written to Secretary Marshall. Both have been submitted to the BULLETIN for publication.

I wonder whether you could find time to read the article and to scrutinize the letter addressed to Marshall.

The present plan is to have the article and the letter to Marshall printed in the next issue of the BULLETIN, which should appear around the 28th of October. Advance copies are being sent to a number of people by the BULLETIN with a request of commenting on it. The comments would be, if possible, printed in the same issue of the BULLETIN.

It is felt that if this article were accompanied by good comments on the part of persons whose voice carries weight, the chance that the article might have a good effect would be considerably increased. It is not expected that all people who have been asked to send in comments will be in a position to say that they approve of the contents of the article. Comments which would draw attention to the seriousness of the situation would also be helpful and could by implication express approval of the decision to write such an unusual article and to take such an unusual step as writing the letter to Marshall.

If you feel you can make some comment which might be useful if published along with the article, please address it, either in the form of a letter or a telegram, to the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. They would presumably be in a position to have it printed in the same issue. Such comments ought to be received, if possible, by October 10 and not later than Monday, October 13.

I would, of course, be very much interested also in any private comments you might care to make and which you may send me directly.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

1126 EAST FIFTY-NINTH STREET
CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS



MIDWAY 0800 EXTENSION 1785
MIDWAY 10052

October 6, 1947

Mr. Marshall MacDuffie
c/o Blair & Ogden
20 Exchange Place
New York, New York

Dear Mr. MacDuffie:

I was doing a little biology this summer, and when I got to New York City about the middle of August, the symptoms of the present strained political situation struck me with full force.

I am enclosing the manuscript of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" and a copy of a letter which I have written to Secretary Marshall. Both have been submitted to the BULLETIN for publication.

I wonder whether you could find time to read the article and to scrutinize the letter addressed to Marshall.

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I would, of course, be very much interested also in any private comments you might care to make and which you may send to me directly.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

P.S. I am sending an identical letter to Theodore Waller.

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

1126 EAST FIFTY-NINTH STREET
CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS



MIDWAY 0800 EXTENSION 1785
MIDWAY 10052

October 6, 1947

Mr. James G. Patton
National Farmers Union
3501 E. 46th Avenue
Denver, Colorado

Dear Mr. Patton:

I was doing a little biology this summer, and when I got to New York City about the middle of August, the symptoms of the present strained political situation struck me with full force.

I am enclosing the manuscript of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" and a copy of a letter which I have written to Secretary Marshall. Both have been submitted to the BULLETIN for publication.

I wonder whether you could find time to read the article and to scrutinize the letter addressed to Marshall.

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I would, of course, be very much interested also in any private comments you might care to make and which you may send me directly.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard.

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

1126 EAST FIFTY-NINTH STREET
CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS



MIDWAY 0800 EXTENSION 1785
MIDWAY 10052

October 4, 1947

Professor Linus Pauling
Department of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, California

Dear Pauling:

I was doing a little biology this summer, and when I got to New York City about the middle of August, the symptoms of the present strained political situation struck me with full force.

I am enclosing the manuscript of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" and a copy of a letter which I have written to Secretary Marshall. Both have been submitted to the BULLETIN for publication.

I wonder whether you could find time to read the article and to scrutinize the letter addressed to Marshall.

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I would, of course, be very much interested also in any private comments you might care to make and which you may send to me directly.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

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1126 EAST FIFTY-NINTH STREET
CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS



MIDWAY 0800 EXTENSION 1785
MIDWAY 10052

October 4, 1947

Mr. Theodore Waller
c/o Robert Frase
Great Falls Road
Falls Church, Virginia

Dear Mr. Waller:

I was doing a little biology this summer, and when I got to New York City about the middle of August, the symptoms of the present strained political situation struck me with full force.

I am enclosing the manuscript of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" and a copy of a letter which I have written to Secretary Marshall. Both have been submitted to the BULLETIN for publication.

I wonder whether you could find time to read the article and to scrutinize the letter addressed to Marshall.

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I would, of course, be very much interested also in any private comments you might care to make and which you may send to me directly.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

P.S. I am sending an identical letter to Marshall MacDuffie.

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

1126 EAST FIFTY-NINTH STREET
CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS



MIDWAY 0800 EXTENSION 1785
MIDWAY 10052

October 6, 1947

Mr. Gilbert F. White
Haverford College
Haverford, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. White:

I was doing a little biology this summer, and when I got to New York City about the middle of August, the symptoms of the present strained political situation struck me with full force.

I am enclosing the manuscript of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" and a copy of a letter which I have written to Secretary Marshall. Both have been submitted to the BULLETIN for publication.

I wonder whether you could find time to read the article and to scrutinize the letter addressed to Marshall.

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I would, of course, be very much interested also in any private comments you might care to make and which you may send me directly.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

EMERGENCY COMMITTEE of ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

INCORPORATED

ROOM 28, 90 NASSAU STREET
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Trustees

- ALBERT EINSTEIN
Chairman
- HAROLD C. UREY
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- LINUS PAULING
- LEO SZILARD
- V. F. WEISSKOPF

COPYFOC

New York Office

ROOM 523, 625 MADISON AVE.
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.
Phone ELDORADO 5-0904

October 11, 1947

Officers

- ALBERT EINSTEIN
President
- HAROLD C. UREY
Vice-President
- SELIG HECHT
Hon. Vice-Chairman
- JOSEPH H. SCHAFFNER
Executive Director
and Treasurer
- MICHAEL STRAIGHT
Secretary
- LILY PAYSON
Assistant Secretary-
Treasurer

The Honorable George C. Marshall
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Our colleague, Dr. Leo Szilard, whose deep interest in the welfare of free people has often found expression, as in his very important part in the development of the atomic bomb, has shown us, the Trustees of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, a letter that he has written for transmittal to Mr. Stalin. We desire to support his request that he be permitted to transmit this letter to Mr. Stalin through channels chosen by him. In giving this support to Dr. Szilard's request, the Emergency Committee points out that Dr. Szilard's appeal is his own personal creation, and does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Committee itself. Nevertheless the Committee feels that the state of international affairs at present is such that a personal effort of this sort is worth attempting, even though the chance of success may be very small.

We have the honor to remain,

Very truly yours,

A. Einstein.

Philip M. Morse
Albert Einstein
Chairman

Philip M. Morse
Acting Executive Director

October 14, 1947

The Honorable George C. Marshall
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:


Dr. Leo Szilard has read an article of his to the Administrative Committee of the Federation of American Scientists at its last meeting. Dr. Szilard informed us that he planned to ask your permission to send a letter based on this article to Premier Stalin.

We believe that Dr. Szilard's request should be granted because his letter may serve a useful purpose at this critical time.

Respectfully yours,

Robert E. Marshak
Chairman

REM:mlb

A large, handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert E. Marshak", is written over the typed name and title. The signature is written in dark ink and is quite fluid and stylized.

Letter to Stalin

October 24, 1947

Dear Rabinowitch:

Enclosed is the final copy of my article. As you will see, everything has been removed which could be construed as a criticism of our foreign policy.

I am very anxious to get at an early date a Russian translation from you. Since you don't have a typewriter, I would plan on having photo copies made of your manuscript. When the article appears in the Bulletin, the full text will immediately be reprinted in Russian in Russky-Golos--the New York Russian newspaper. Dr. Krimken, its director, was exceedingly enthusiastic about the article and wants to carry it. Whether it will be possible for me to make any other use of your translation I do not know. I am trying to clear the situation with the government, but I don't believe that the answer will come through early enough to justify further postponement of the publication in the Bulletin. Naturally, I am anxious to get a translation which does not lose the fine points and does not destroy the balance of the article.

I have written something else, not for publication, which will amuse you, and I am going to send you a copy as soon as I have it typed. It describes my trial as a war criminal after the third world war.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

NOT FOR RELEASE!

1135 E. 57th St.
Chicago, Ill.
October 25, 1947

The Honorable Tom C. Clark
Attorney General
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Clark:

Enclosed is a copy of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" which I have submitted to the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS for publication.

If it were in every respect proper for me to do so, I would write a letter to Mr. Stalin embodying the thoughts contained in the enclosed article and would seek some way of transmitting such a letter to him through the good offices of some prominent person who is known to him. It would be my hope that if my letter were transmitted to Mr. Stalin in such a manner he would perceive the genuine anguish which prompted my writing it and that he might therefore give consideration to its contents.

If such a letter were in fact to be transmitted to Mr. Stalin through some proper and desirable channel I would probably want to postpone indefinitely the publication of the article

The enclosed article does not touch on any specific dispute or controversy with the United States and the letter which I would send to Mr. Stalin would merely follow its text, possibly shortened by omissions. You may, in the circumstances, think that the transmission of such a letter would not come under the Logan Act of 1799. On the other hand, you might think that the transmission of such a letter might come under the Logan Act or some other similar act and therefore, in accordance with the Logan Act, I am herewith making the formal request for permission or authority of the Government for the transmission of such a letter in the meaning of the Act.

I am enclosing an endorsement of my request addressed to the Secretary of State on behalf of the Trustees of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists. The original is signed by Professor Albert Einstein of the Institute for Advanced Study, as Chairman and Dr. Philip M. Morse, Director of the Brookhaven National Laboratory, as Acting Executive Director of the Committee.

Very truly yours,

Leo Szilard

Copy:
The Secretary of State

NOT FOR RELEASE?

1155 E. 57th St.
Chicago, Ill.
October 25, 1947

The Honorable George C. Marshall
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Enclosed is, for your information, a letter sent by me to the Attorney General in which I request the permission of the Government to transmit a letter to Mr. Stalin that would follow the text of an article (possibly shortened by omissions) which I have submitted to the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS for publication. A copy of the article, entitled "Letter to Stalin", is also enclosed.

I am, of course, not asking for any endorsement of my position by the Department of State and I am directing my request for formal permission to transmit such a letter to Mr. Stalin to the Attorney General rather than to you, in order to avoid causing any embarrassment to your department. I would appreciate very much, however, your examining this case on its merits and advising the Attorney General of your conclusions, since I believe that this might make it easier for the Attorney General to give a favorable reply to my request.

The enclosed article takes the view that if Stalin took the initiative and adopted a new line of approach towards the United States, culminating in a comprehensive offer on his part for a general settlement, he could resolve the present deadlock. On this basis the article makes a number of specific suggestions relating to procedure.

I am enclosing an endorsement of my request addressed to you on behalf of the Trustees of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists which is signed by Professor Albert Einstein of the Institute for Advanced Study, as Chairman, and Dr. Philip M. Morse, Director of the Brookhaven National Laboratory, as Acting Executive Director of the Committee.

Very truly yours,
Leo Szilard

THE LOGAN ACT

7, F. C. A. Title 18, § 6

5. (Criminal Code, section 5, amended.) Criminal correspondence with foreign governments; redress of private injuries excepted.--Every citizen of the United States, whether actually resident or abiding within the same, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or in any foreign country, who, without the permission or authority of the Government, directly or indirectly, commences or carries on any verbal or written correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, with an intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the Government of the United States; and every person, being a citizen of or resident within the United States or in any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, and not duly authorized, who counsels, advises, or assists in any such correspondence with such intent, shall be fined not more than \$5,000 and imprisoned not more than three years; but nothing in this section shall be construed to abridge the right of a citizen to apply, himself or his agent, to any foreign government or the agents thereof for redress of any injury which he may have sustained from such government or any of its agents or subjects. (R.S. § 5335; Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, § 5, 35 Stat. 1088; Apr. 22, 1932, c. 126, 47 Stat. 132.)

R. S. § 5335 from Act Jan. 30, 1799, c. 1, 1 Stat. 613.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "LETTER TO STALIN" WHICH HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION TO THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS BY DR. LEO SZILARD. IN THIS ARTICLE DR. SZILARD MAKES AN APPEAL FOR STALIN TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND ADOPT A NEW LINE OF APPROACH -- NEW BOTH IN SUBSTANCE AND METHOD -- TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, CULMINATING IN A COMPREHENSIVE OFFER ON STALIN'S PART FOR A GENERAL SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD.

THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED.

I take the step of writing this "Letter" because I am deeply concerned about the deterioration of Russian-American relations, and also because I believe that the general sentiment which moves me to this action is shared by the majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy.

The steady deterioration of Russian-American relations has many disturbing aspects, but perhaps none is as serious as the lasting effect which it may have on the minds of the American people, as well as the minds of the people in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Here in America more and more men will say to me in private conversation that war with Russia is inevitable. These are men who are capable of thinking independently and are not guided by whatever editorials they may read in their newspapers. To me their attitude is a symptom of grave danger because once the American people close their minds on this subject war, in fact, will have become inevitable.

There are those who argue that there is no danger of an early war because at present Russia is too weak to start one and there is no precedent for the United States embarking on a preventive war. That there is no such precedent is, of course, true; but neither have the American people ever before been in a position where they had to fear that if they remain passive during a protracted period of uneasy peace they

may live to see the day when war -- if it breaks out -- will be brought to their homeland.

I do not mean to say that the United States may start a preventive war against Russia within the next six months; what I mean to say is that if the present trend continues for six months, a fateful change might take root in the minds of the American people and the situation would then be beyond remedy. Thereafter it would be merely a question of time -- a few short years, perhaps -- until the peace would be at the mercy of some Yugoslav general in the Balkans or some American admiral in the Mediterranean who may wilfully or through bungling create an incident that will inevitably result in war. If the present trend continues for six months, more likely than not, the further course of events will be out of the control of the two governments involved.

The main reason for the present trend is the fact that two years have passed since the end of the war and no appreciable progress has been made toward a settlement. Russia and the United States have reached a deadlock.

All this does not come as a surprise to most of us who had worked in the field of atomic energy during the war and had time to adjust our thinking to the implications of the bomb. It was clear from the start that the existence of the bomb and the manner in which it was used would not make the settlement easier but rather more difficult. We knew that the world could be saved from another war only if both the United States and Russia were able to rise above the situation and ~~that~~ before this can come to pass one of them will have to take the lead.

Situations of this general type are not without precedent in history; they occur also on occasion in the lives of individuals, and the story of one such occurrence made a very deep impression on me. In 1930, twelve years after the end of the First World War, I met a classmate of mine and we talked of what had happened to ~~both of~~ us

... we had separated. He had been a lieutenant in the Austrian Army, and in the last days of the war in the Carpathian Mountains he was in charge of a patrol. One morning they heard by way of rumor that an armistice had been concluded, but being cut off from communications they were unable to obtain confirmation. They rode out on patrol duty as usual, and as they emerged from the forest, they found themselves standing face to face with a Russian patrol in charge of an officer. The two officers grabbed their guns and, frozen in this position, the two patrols remained for uncounted seconds. Suddenly the Russian officer smiled and his hand went to his cap in salute. My friend returned the salute, and both patrols turned back their horses. "To this day," my friend said to me, "I regret that it was not I who saluted first."

Perhaps by writing this "Letter" today I may make some slight amends for my friend's tardiness, for in these troubled times it is not without some personal risk for an American scientist to write a "Letter" such as this one.

Today Russia and America find themselves standing face to face, each of them fearful of what may be the other's next political move. The American people want peace. The Russian people want peace also.

As I see it, Russia wants peace not only for the next five or ten years, she wants peace for good. And if I am correct on this point then peace can yet be saved; it can be saved by you, yourself.

THE APPROACH SUGGESTED.

It is within your power to ~~remove the block which caused~~ ^{resolve} the deadlock and thereby to permit a change in the course of United States foreign policy, but you can do this only if you decide to throw off the self-imposed shackles of the old-fashioned, and also of the new-fangled forms of diplomacy.

Russia and the United States are deadlocked on almost every point on which they have negotiated in the recent past. On every such point, Russia may have very good

reasons for not yielding, and the United States may also have very good reasons for not yielding. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ I am not going to suggest that you should now yield on this point or that one, or that you should now "appease" the United States.

What I am suggesting in this "Letter" are a series of interconnected steps which are within your power to take. Because they are most unusual steps, these suggestions may appear quixotic to many and ridiculous to some. What I am suggesting in this "Letter" may come somewhat as a shock to you. It may also come as a shock to some of my fellow-Americans who will read these lines. But this is not the time to hold back for fear of being exposed to ridicule or unwarranted accusations.

My first specific suggestion is that you speak directly and personally to the American people. What you may say to them, and you might wish to speak to them once a month, will be news, and because it will be news, it will be carried by the radio stations in the United States and will be reprinted in the newspapers. Naturally you would want to speak in Russian, but your interpreter could convey your speech sentence by sentence in English. Your speech could be recorded and released simultaneously in Russia and America.

The American people listen to their presidents because what the President says to them may affect their lives, and they will listen to you for exactly the same reason. But there is one important difference; you will be speaking to them as the head of a foreign state; your speech will be without effect with them unless it is one hundred percent sincere. The sincerity of your expression, as well as the other tokens of sincerity which you may be able to present to the American people, will determine whether your speeches will strike home.

If your speeches to the American people were given full publicity in Russia, you would go a long way towards convincing the American people that you mean what you are saying to them.

And you would go a long way towards convincing the American people that they may expect fair play from you if you invited the President of the United States to address the Russian people just as often as you speak to the American public and accorded just as much publicity to his speeches in Russia as is given to yours in America.

All the machinery through which the American public is being kept informed in the United States is at present at your disposal, and it will remain at your disposal if there will be no attempt to use it for purposes of propaganda.

That you would be heard by the American people is certain; but how your speeches would affect them would depend both upon the substance and the tenor of these speeches.

What indeed should be the substance of your speeches?

What I suggest, in the first place, is that in your speeches you present to the American people a clear picture of a general settlement within the framework of a post-war reconstruction of the world, a settlement that would enable Russia and the United States to live in peace with each other.

At first you will be able to give such a picture in rough outline only; gradually you may be able to fill in more and more of the details. You might convey the details, perhaps, by issuing from time to time supplementary official reports.

By the time you have filled in the details, you will have given the American people more than merely a picture of a possible post-war world; you will have presented them with something that will amount to an offer for a post-war settlement.

You might well ask at this point, because it is indeed a crucial question, whether such a unilateral offer on your part, if it is generous, would not put you at a disadvantage from the point of view of later negotiations. You could easily make

It is clear, however, that your offer has to be taken as a whole, that you are perfectly willing to modify any one single point to meet the wishes of the United States Government, but that for every point that the United States wants to have modified in her favor, you may ask that some other point be modified in Russia's favor. As long as this is clearly understood, you need not, and should not, hold back for the sake of later bargaining.

Such are the means through which you may be able to convince the American people that --in your view as well as in fact -- private enterprise and the Russian economic system and also mixed forms of economic organization can flourish side by side; that Russia and the United States can be part of the same world; that "one world" need not necessarily be a uniform world. Until such time as you shall convince the American people as well as the Russian people of this all-important point, we shall remain headed towards war and not towards peace.

I am told that these days the opposite thesis is presented by authoritative writers in Russia. And if this opposite thesis should be upheld by you as correct, if there is indeed some inexorable law which in the long run makes war between your country and ours inevitable, then those in the United States who are now working for the preservation of peace might begin to feel that they are merely delaying the war, which will be all the more terrible the later it comes.

THE RESPONSE EXPECTED

Naturally you would want to know how the American people would respond if you should decide to take the initiative and adopt a new line of approach towards the United States culminating in a comprehensive offer for a general settlement. Would you really be able to break the present deadlock and thereby bring about a change in the course of United States foreign policy?

There is a vast body of men and women in the United States who view with genuine concern the rapid deterioration of Russian-American relations. Many of them have

grave doubts in their heart as to the general wisdom of the present course of United States foreign policy, while they regard with equal misgivings the Russian counterpart of this policy. If they do not at present take a stand in favor of changing the course steered by their own government, it is first of all because they do not see with sufficient clarity any practicable alternative course under present circumstances. Moreover they may believe that any attempt to bring about a change must necessarily come to naught as long as the speeches of your delegates will continue to follow a line of reasoning which is unacceptable to the large majority of the American public.

If you succeed in the difficult task of formulating in your own mind a practicable solution of the post-war issues and in conveying your picture of such a solution to the American public, then gradually, as you make statement after statement and issue report after report, a complete picture of an acceptable post-war settlement may unfold before the American people. By the time you will have filled in the details, and thus have implicitly extended a comprehensive offer, you also will have removed the block which had caused the deadlock.

This should have a direct and immediate effect on the foreign policy of the United States. Most Americans believe that those who are at present in charge of guiding American foreign policy were driven to this policy because none other appeared practicable to them in the circumstances. It is generally believed that they are men of good will, who can be expected to change the present course the very moment they see a satisfactory way out of the present impasse, provided that such a change can also be expected to find public support.

You may or may not concur with this opinion. But in any case it is clearly within your power to give the American people a choice between two alternative courses of foreign policy. And if they do have a choice, the American people will exercise their choice -- this I fervently hope -- in favor of a course which may lead to peace. They will exercise their choice through all the mechanisms by which public opinion influences government policies in America. And those who are at present in charge of steering the course of American foreign policy may, to borrow a phrase of Mr. Stimson's,

either change their minds or lose their jobs."

PREREQUISITES.

If you should decide to adopt such a new line of approach toward the United States you might wish to initiate first of all an exchange of views between a group of Russians and a group of Americans who are genuinely concerned about the deterioration of Russian-American relations and who are not encumbered by the responsibility of representing the views of their governments. Such an exchange of views should give Russians a better understanding of America's needs and Americans a better understanding of Russia's needs. It should also facilitate the formulation in your own mind of some practicable solution of the problem which faces the world today and give you a better appreciation of the particular manner in which such a solution might be presented to the American public.

Under the present conditions of political stress it will not be easy to find for a form/such an exchange of views which is proper and which will permit self-respecting, patriotic American citizens to participate. Nor may it be easy for you to find Russians willing to display in such discussions their own personal opinions as distinguished from the official Russian position.

Also, I am sadly aware of the fact that in writing this "Letter" I am trying to cope with a difficulty of communications which is almost insurmountable. We in America have a crude and over-simplified picture of how political decisions come about in Russia. You in Russia have a similar picture concerning America. My whole "Letter" here is based on the thesis that in America the attitudes and opinions of the individuals who constitute the American public are an important factor -- and in certain circumstances may become the controlling factor -- for political decisions. My fellow-Americans

Who may read this "Letter" know that this thesis is correct and those of them who may disapprove of my "Letter" will do so on other grounds. But in presenting this thesis to someone who does not know America by personal experience, I can not be sure that he will even know what I am talking about. Perhaps, in the course of an extended conversation there would be some chance of getting this crucial point across. A "letter" of this sort is certainly not the very best way of accomplishing this exceedingly difficult task.

Obviously, the specific suggestions made in this "Letter" are foreign to the ways in which problems of this sort are dealt with in Russia, or for that matter, anywhere else in the world. And this, in itself, might make implementation very difficult. The main question to decide, however, is not whether implementation is difficult but rather whether the measures advocated here would be effective if implemented.

THE END

POSTSCRIPT:

Having presented a number of suggestions outlining in detail--perhaps in too great detail --a course which you might wish to adopt, I feel that I ought to go one step further at the risk that what I am going to say may seem out of proportion with the main theme of this "Letter "

The vast majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy are free from any anti-Russian bias, and they do not include Communists, either in the narrow or wider sense of the term. If I were called upon to do so -- I would try and gather a group drawn from their ranks who would be glad to sit down with a group of Russians whom you may select. If the Russian representatives were instructed to be frank with us and to express their private opinions rather than merely to defend the official Russian positions, we, too, would be frank with them and would feel free to express our personal opinions as distinguished from the official American positions. Under such circumstances there could ensue an exchange of views of no mean ^{significance.} ~~distinction~~. And such a free interchange

thought might make available a valuable fund of ideas and suggestions upon which the two governments might draw if a stage of governmental negotiations should be reached later. Naturally we would be pleased to see Russian scientists also included in such a group, particularly those whom we happen to know and have learned to respect. We have, of course, no intention of prying into their secrets just as we would not want them to search into ours. There would be no disclosure of any kind relating to the subject of atomic energy.

The group of atomic scientists which I would try to gather would not be composed of men and women who wield great political influence. Nor would they be able to say what terms for a general post-war settlement might be acceptable to the United States Government; but they should be able to say what kind of peace makes sense to ~~them~~ themselves, and whatever makes sense to them may also make sense to the American people, for they are part and parcel of the American people. Such a group of scientists is, of course, not wholly representative of the American people and would therefore ^{undoubtedly} wish to enlarge itself by drawing in men from many other walks of life -- men who are concerned about the welfare of America and who are also concerned about the welfare of the rest of the world, including Russia.

It is my earnest hope that by means of such discussions it may be possible to make available in the service of peace the same kind of imagination and resourcefulness which went into the development of the field of atomic energy during the war.

CLARIFICATION.

Meetings of this sort could not be held except with the approval of the State Department, for without such approval it might be both improper and unlawful for American citizens to participate. It is hard to believe, that faced with the present situation the State Department would oppose the holding of such meetings, but it is difficult to know whether the State Department would not prefer the meetings to be open rather than private and confidential.

Both open and private meetings have their own peculiar advantages and drawbacks. "Open" meetings mean that the press is admitted, and their presence might result in a

greater understanding on their part of the real issues and the real difficulties.

The general feeling underlying the suggestions contained in this "Letter" is, I know, shared by the majority of the atomic scientists, but the specific thoughts embodied in this "Letter" reflect only my own opinion as well as my own readiness to "do my bit", and I am not speaking at present on behalf of any other person or persons.

Carson

October 25, 1947

1155 E. 57th St.
Chicago, Ill.

The Honorable Tom C. Clark
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Clark:

Enclosed is a copy of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" which I have submitted to the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS for publication.

If it were in every respect proper for me to do so, I would write a letter to Mr. Stalin embodying the thoughts contained in the enclosed article and would seek some way of transmitting such a letter to him through the good offices of some prominent person who is known to him. It would be my hope that if my letter were transmitted to Mr. Stalin in such a manner he would perceive the genuine anguish which prompted my writing it and that he might therefore give consideration to its contents.

If such a letter were ^{in fact} to be transmitted to Mr. Stalin through some proper and desirable channel I would probably want to postpone indefinitely the publication of the article.

The enclosed article does not touch on any specific dispute or controversy with the United States and the letter which I would send to Mr. Stalin would merely follow its text, possibly shortened by omissions. You may, in the circumstances, think that the transmission of such a letter would not come under the Logan Act of 1799. On the other hand, you might think that the transmission of such a letter might come under the Logan Act or some other similar act and therefore, in accordance with the Logan Act, I am herewith making the formal request for permission or authority of the Government for the transmission of such a letter in the meaning of the Act.

I am enclosing an endorsement of my request addressed to the Secretary of State on behalf of the Trustees of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists. The

The Honorable Tom C. Clark: -2

original is signed by Professor Albert Einstein of the Institute for Advanced Study,
as Chairman and Dr. Philip M. Morse, Director of the Brookhaven National Laboratory,
as Acting Executive Director of the Committee.

Very truly yours,

Leo Szilard

Copy:
The Secretary of State

ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL

Department of Justice
Washington



October 29, 1947.

Edward H. Levi, Esq.,
Professor of Law,
University of Chicago Law School,
Chicago 37, Ill.

Dear Ed:

Thank you for your letter about Dr. Sziland's article. The matter will receive our prompt attention.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "George T. Washington".

George T. Washington,
Assistant Solicitor General.

125 East 56th Street
New York, N. Y.
October 29, 1947

Dr. Leo Szilard
Atomic Scientists of Chicago, Inc.
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Dr. Szilard:

Thank you for your letter of October 28 and the enclosures, namely your proposed article in the Bulletin and copies of your letters to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General and copy of the letter of the Emergency Committee to Secretary Marshall.

I have forwarded all documents, including the copy of your letter to me of October 28, to Mr. Ernest Gross, legal advisor to the Department of State, informing him that the copies I was sending to him were an informal submission for the purpose of expediting the matter. I also told him that I had advised you to consult your legal counsel with respect to your responsibility under the Logan Act and any other pertinent laws.

I regret that I will be out of town over the weekend but I hope to see you soon.

Very truly yours,

Marshall MacDuffie

Marshall MacDuffie

MM:evp

October 29, 1947

Professor Robert Wilson
Department of Physics
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

Professor Robert Wilson
Department of Physics
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

Dear Wilson:

Dear Wilson:

I am very much interested

I am very much disturbed about what is happening in the field of politics these days and therefore I tried to think hard of what any of us could do about it.

I am enclosing a copy of an article which has been submitted for publication to the BULLETIN, and a letter sent by me to the Attorney General. I wonder if you could discuss this article with the members of the Executive Committee of the Cornell group and inform either me or the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS of their reaction, by wire. No formal vote in the executive committee is either required or desirable. Some member of the executive committee could report back, giving his understanding of the feeling of the Committee.

The endorsement of the group could take either of three forms. The group could either say that they are in agreement with the article; or they could say that they are in agreement with the general sentiment which motivated my writing this article; or finally, they could simply say that they endorse my request to be permitted to transmit a letter following the text of the article, to Mr. Stalin.

Naturally, in each case, the actual wording is a personal matter for those who phrase the wire. The BULLETIN may wish to refer to letters or wires of this sort, and might even print some of them. This is a point which should be understood when writing any wire to me or to the BULLETIN in connection with this matter.

I would particularly appreciate it if the wire reporting the opinions of the Cornell group were signed by you, provided that this is convenient to you.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Encl.

I would particularly appreciate it if the wire reporting the opinions of your group were signed either under your signature or under someone else's signature who is not vulnerable.

THIS LETTER, WITH SLIGHT VARIATIONS, WAS SENT THE FOLLOWING:

Mr. Robert E. Marshak University of Rochester Rochester 7, N.Y.	Rochester Assn.
Dr. Harrison S. Brown Institute for Nuclear Studies Faculty Exchange	Atomic Scientists of Chgo
Mr. I. Estermann Carnegie Institute of Tech. Schenley Park Pittsburgh 13, Pa.	Pittsburgh Assn.
Mrs. Jane Hall P.O. Box 1663 Los Alamos, N.Mex.	Los Alamos Group
Mr. Robert W. Connick Dept. of Chemistry Univ. of Calif. Berkeley, Calif.	Northern Calif. Assn.
Mr. Bernard T. Feld Radiation Lab. M.I.T. Cambridge, Mass.	Cambridge Assn.
Mr. Hugh C. Wolfe 30 Lawrence Parkway Tenafly, N.J.	New York Assn.
Mr. R. W. Stoughton Box 342 Oak Ridge, Tenn.	AORES
Professor Robert Wilson Dept. of Physics Cornell Univ. Ithaca, N.Y.	Cornell Assn.

*Lyle Barst
Brookhaven Natl. Lab.
Upton, L.I., N.Y.*

X

November 3, 1947

c/o Alice Smith
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS
Room 6
Social Science Building
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Ill.

The Honorable Tom C. Clark,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Clark:

Pursuant to my letter of the 25th of October may I inform you of the following:

THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS has now definitely scheduled to print my article entitled "Letter to Stalin" in its November issue. I would not want this article to appear in that issue if you should find it possible to grant the permission requested in my letter of the 25th of October and the BULLETIN has agreed to withdraw the article from the November issue if they are advised by Monday, November 10th, 3 P.M., E.S.T. that such a permission is in fact forthcoming. This deadline is, I understand, five days beyond their usual one and will set the publication date for the 25th of November.

If it is unlikely that a favorable reply can be given to my request, it would seem advisable to inform the members of the Atomic Scientists movement of the steps I have taken in connection with this matter by releasing the text of this request dated October 25th for publication in the same issue of the BULLETIN which carries the article. I have therefore submitted it for publication to the BULLETIN but I did this with the proviso that it shall be omitted from the November issue which may carry the article itself, if I am advised by your office -- prior to the above-mentioned time of the deadline -- that a favorable reply is likely to be forthcoming by the time of the publication of the article on November 25th even though a final decision may not be reached by you at the time of the deadline.

It would be appreciated if all communications in connection with this matter were addressed by your office to me marked for the attention of Mrs. Alice Smith at the above given address, Telephone Midway 10052, or else Extension 1785 at Midway 0800, Chicago.

I do not expect to be in Chicago at the time of the deadline, but messages sent to me in care of Mrs. Alice Smith will automatically guide the action of the BULLETIN inasmuch as Mrs. Smith is its associate editor.

Very truly yours,

Leo Szilard

S. Szilard

1155 East 57th Street
Chicago 27, Ill.

November 3, 1947

The Honorable George C. Marshall,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to my letter of the 25th of October,
I am enclosing a letter addressed to the Attorney General,
dated November 3rd, 1947, for your information.

Very truly yours,

Leo Szilard

Leo Szilard

1155 East 57th Street
Chicago, Ill.

November 3, 1947

Mr. George T. Washington,
Assistant Solicitor General,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Washington:

Professor Edward H. Levi of the Law School of the University of Chicago informed me that he had informally contacted you in connection with the letter which I addressed to the Attorney General on October 25th, and I am therefore enclosing, for your information, a copy of a letter to the Attorney General dated November 3rd, 1947, which relates to the same subject matter.

The kind interest which you are taking in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

LS
Leo Szilard

1155 East 57th Street
Chicago, Ill.

November 3, 1947

Mr. Ernest Gross
Legal Advisor to the Department of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Gross:

Mr. Marshall MacDuffie informed me that he had informally submitted to you copy of a letter which I sent to the Secretary of State on October 25th, 1947. I am therefore enclosing, for your information, a copy of a letter addressed to the Secretary of State, dated November 3rd, 1947, which relates to the same subject matter.

The kind interest which you are taking in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Leo Szilard


November 8, 1947

Mr. George T. Washington
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Washington:

Enclosed, for your information, is a copy of a letter which I sent to the Attorney General.

Very truly yours,



Leo Szilard

November 8, 1947

Mr. Leon Henderson
Research Institute of America
1026 - 17th St., N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Leon:

A revised version of the article "Letter to Stalin" is scheduled to appear in the December issue of the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. This issue goes to press at 3 P.M., EST, Monday, November 10th and will probably also contain part of the letter addressed to the Attorney General in which I requested permission to transmit a letter following the text of the article.

There will probably be an early release prior to the actual publication (November 25) made by the BULLETIN.

I am writing you all this in order to avoid getting wires crossed. This, of course, does not allow time for personal interviews with officers of the Government, but the general atmosphere in Washington was such that it did not appear very likely that such personal interviews would have served a useful purpose. Therefore, it was decided not to delay the publication of the article any further in the probably vain hope that the permission requested can be obtained.

With very many thanks for your kind willingness to help in this matter,

Sincerely,



Leo Szilard

November 8, 1947

The Honorable George C. Marshall
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to my letter addressed to you on October 25, I am enclosing, for your information, a copy of a letter which I am sending today to the Attorney General.

Very truly yours,



Leo Szilard

Encl.

November 8, 1947

The Honorable Tom C. Clark
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Clark:

Pursuant to the letter which I sent you under the dateline of October 25, may I state that a revised version of the article entitled "Letter to Stalin" is scheduled to go to press at 3 P.M. EST, Monday, November 10, and that part of my letter addressed to you is also scheduled to be published in the same issue of the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS.

While this issue of the BULLETIN will probably not come out until November 25, I understand that the BULLETIN may make an early release any time after the issue has gone to press.

Very truly yours,

Leo Szilard

Enclosed copy of revised article.

November 8, 1947

Mr. Ernest Gross
Advisor to the State Department
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Gross:

Pursuant to the letter which I sent to the Secretary of State on October 25, I am enclosing a copy of a letter with which I am forwarding to the Secretary of State a copy of the letter sent today to the Attorney General.

Very truly yours,

Leo Szilard

LETTER TO THE EDITORS

November 10, 1947

Dear Sirs:

I am releasing the article "Letter to Stalin" for publication today since I no longer have much hope that it will be possible ultimately to obtain the government's permission requested in my letter addressed to the Attorney General. I had discussed this article with quite a number of persons outside the atomic scientists movement, and perhaps some of the questions raised, and the objections made, deserve to be recorded here.

One objection took the stereotyped form of "Why do you address yourself to Stalin? Why don't you write to President Truman?" Curiously enough, this very same phrase was used by two groups of persons -- those whose outlook is close to that of the Administration and those "left wingers" who oppose the foreign policy of the Administration. While these two groups use the very same phrase, they do not, of course, mean the same thing at all.

The "left wingers" mean that by writing such a "Letter" I am acknowledging that Stalin is the real obstacle to peace and I am neglecting to mention that actions on the part of our own Administration have contributed to, or have been largely responsible for, the present disturbing situation.

Those sharing the Administration's point of view seem to feel that, by addressing myself to Stalin, I am acknowledging that Stalin has a greater desire for peace, or has a greater ability to recognize the right path to peace, or else has a greater power to bring about a change than President Truman or his administration. These men will also say to me that those who are in charge of guiding American foreign policy are men of great ability who have an intense desire for peace. And if I accept this view as correct -- they say to me -- then I ought to propose to Stalin (if I must propose anything to him at all) that he make a comprehensive offer to the Administration, rather than that he address himself to the American people.

My answer to them is, of course, that their view of our policy-makers -- which incidentally is shared by the majority of the American people, as stated in

my "Letter" -- is irrelevant, for Mr. Stalina will base his actions on his own views rather than on ours. In my "Letter" I have, therefore, suggested a course of action which Mr. Stalina can follow even though his view may differ from ours. I suggested that if and when he has a case -- and at present there is no case before us -- he can take it to the highest authority in America -- the American people.

Why did I not ^{write} ~~write~~ to Mr. Truman? First of all, because I cannot say to Mr. Truman that if he made a comprehensive offer for settlement of the post-war issues the Russian government would respond favorably. I cannot possibly have any basis for knowing how the Russian government would respond to any such approach. On the other hand, I can say how I believe the American people would respond to a new approach on the part of the Russian government.

Moreover, while I would not wish to say that the conduct of our own foreign policy could in no way be improved upon under present circumstances, I do not believe that the problem which faces the world today can be solved at the level of foreign policy in the narrow sense of the term by the Administration; nor do I believe that it is within the power of the Administration to offer to the world a satisfactory solution of this problem without the full support of the American people for a bold and constructive solution. Since I have developed these thoughts in a previous article -- "Calling for a Crusade" which appeared in the April-May issue of the BULLETIN -- I need not again go into this point here. But I might perhaps add that today it no longer seems likely that popular support or popular pressure for a bold and constructive solution will be forthcoming unless the people would have reason to believe that they could expect the Russian government to be cooperative.

Leo Szilard

CONFIDENTIAL! NOT FOR RELEASE!

COPY FOR BULLETIN
November 10, 1947

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "LETTER TO STALIN" WHICH HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION TO THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS BY DR. LEO SZILARD. IN THIS ARTICLE DR. SZILARD MAKES AN APPEAL FOR STALIN TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND ADOPT A NEW LINE OF APPROACH --NEW BOTH IN SUBSTANCE AND METHOD -- TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, CULMINATING IN A COMPREHENSIVE OFFER ON STALIN'S PART FOR A GENERAL SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD.

THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED.

I take the step of writing this "Letter" because I am deeply concerned about the deterioration of Russian-American relations, and also because I believe that the general sentiment which moves me to this action is shared by the majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy.

The steady deterioration of Russian-American relations has many disturbing aspects, but perhaps none is as serious as the lasting effect which it may have on the minds of the American people, as well as the minds of the people in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Here in America more and more men will say to me in private conversation that war with Russia is inevitable. These are men who are capable of thinking independently and are not guided by whatever editorials they may read in their newspapers. To me their attitude is a symptom of grave danger because once the American people close their minds on this subject war, in fact, will have become inevitable.

There are those who argue that there is no danger of an early war because at present Russia is too weak to start one and there is no precedent for the United States embarking on a preventive war. That there is no such precedent is, of course, true; but neither have the American people ever before been in a position where they had to fear that if they remain passive during a protracted period of uneasy peace they

may live to see the day when war -- if it breaks out -- will be brought to their homeland.

I do not mean to say that the United States may start a preventive war against Russia within the next six months; what I mean to say is that if the present trend continues for six months, a fateful change might take root in the minds of the American people and the situation would then be beyond remedy. Thereafter it would be merely a question of time -- a few short years, perhaps-- until the peace would be at the mercy of some Yugoslav general in the Balkans or some American admiral in the Mediterranean who may willfully or through bungling create an incident that will inevitably result in war. If the present trend continues for six months, more likely than not, the further course of events will be out of the control of the two governments involved.

The main reason for the present trend is the fact that two years have passed since the end of the war and no appreciable progress has been made toward a settlement. Russia and the United States have reached a deadlock.

All this does not come as a surprise to most of us who had worked in the field of atomic energy during the war and had time to adjust our thinking to the implications of the bomb. It was clear from the start that the existence of the bomb and the manner in which it was used would not make the settlement easier but rather more difficult. We knew that the world could be saved from another war only if both the United States and Russia were able to rise above the situation and before this can come to pass one of them will have to take the lead.

Situations of this general type are not without precedent in history; they occur also on occasion in the lives of individuals, and the story of one such occurrence made a very deep impression on me. In 1930, twelve years after the end of the First World War, I met a classmate of mine and we talked of what had happened to us

since we had separated. He had been a lieutenant in the Austrian Army, and in the last days of the war in the Carpathian Mountains he was in charge of a patrol. One morning they heard by way of rumor that an armistice had been concluded, but being cut off from communications they were unable to obtain confirmation. They rode out on patrol duty as usual, and as they emerged from the forest, they found themselves standing face to face with a Russian patrol in charge of an officer. The two officers grabbed their guns and, frozen in this position, the two patrols remained for uncounted seconds. Suddenly the Russian officer smiled and his hand went to his cap in salute. My friend returned the salute, and both patrols turned back their horses. "To this day," my friend said to me, "I regret that it was not I who saluted first."

Perhaps by writing this "Letter" today I may make some slight amends for my friend's tardiness, for in these troubled times it is not without some personal risk for an American scientist to write a "Letter" such as this one.

Today Russia and America find themselves standing face to face, each of them fearful of what may be the other's next political move. The American people want peace. The Russian people want peace also.

As I see it, Russia wants peace - as does the United States - not only for the next five or ten years, she wants peace for good. And if I am correct on this point then peace can yet be saved; it can be saved by you, yourself.

THE APPROACH SUGGESTED.

It is within your power to resolve the deadlock and thereby to permit a change in the course of United States foreign policy, but you can do this only if you decide to throw off the self-imposed shackles of the old-fashioned, and also of the new-fangled forms of diplomacy.

Russia and the United States are deadlocked on almost every point on which they have negotiated in the recent past. On every such point, Russia may have very good

reasons for not yielding, and the United States may also have very good reasons for not yielding. I am not going to suggest that you should now yield on this point or that one, or that you should now "appease" the United States.

What I am suggesting in this "Letter" are a series of interconnected steps which are within your power to take. Because they are most unusual steps, these suggestions may appear quixotic to many and ridiculous to some.

What I am suggesting in this "Letter" may come somewhat as a shock to you. It may also come as a shock to some of my fellow-Americans who will read these lines. But this is not the time to hold back for fear of being exposed to ridicule or unwarranted accusations.

My first specific suggestion is that you speak directly and personally to the American people. What you may say to them, and you might wish to speak to them once a month, will be news, and because it will be news, it will be carried by the radio stations in the United States and will be reprinted in the newspapers. Naturally you would want to speak in Russian, but your interpreter could convey your speech sentence by sentence in English. Your speech could be recorded and released simultaneously in Russia and America.

The American people listen to their presidents because what the President says to them may affect their lives, and they will listen to you for exactly the same reason. But there is one important difference; you will be speaking to them as the head of a foreign state; your speech will be without effect with them unless it is believed to be one hundred per cent sincere. The sincerity of your expression, as well as the other tokens of sincerity which you may be able to present to the American people, will determine whether your speeches will strike home.

If your speeches to the American people were given full publicity in Russia, you would go a long way towards convincing the American people that you mean what you are saying to them.

And you would go a long way towards convincing the American people that they may expect fair play from you if you invited the President of the United States to address the Russian people just as often as you speak to the American public and accorded just as much publicity to his speeches in Russia as is given to yours in America.

All the machinery through which the American public is being kept informed in the United States would be at your disposal, and it would remain at your disposal in the absence of any attempt to use it for purposes of propaganda.

That you would be heard by the American people is certain; but how your speeches would affect them would depend both upon the substance and the tenor of these speeches.

What indeed should be the substance of your speeches?

What I suggest, in the first place, is that in your speeches you present to the American people a clear picture of a general settlement within the framework of a post-war reconstruction of the world, a settlement that would enable Russia and the United States to live in peace with each other.

At first you will be able to give such a picture in rough outline only; gradually you may be able to fill in more and more of the details. You might convey the details, perhaps, by issuing from time to time supplementary official reports.

By the time you have filled in the details, you will have given the American people more than merely a picture of a possible post-war world; you will have presented them with something that will amount to an offer for a post-war settlement.

You might well ask at this point, because it is indeed a crucial question, whether such a unilateral offer on your part, if it is generous, would not put you at a disadvantage from the point of view of later negotiations. You could easily make

it clear, however, that your offer has to be taken as a whole, that you are perfectly willing to modify any one single point to meet the wishes of the United States Government, but that for every point that the United States wants to have modified in her favor, you may ask that some other point be modified in Russia's favor. As long as this is clearly understood, you need not, and should not, hold back for the sake of later bargaining.

Such are the means through which you may be able to convince the American people that—in your view as well as in fact -- private enterprise and the Russian economic system and also mixed forms of economic organization can flourish side by side; that Russia and the United States can be part of the same world; that "one world" need not necessarily be a uniform world. Until such time as the American people as well as the Russian people shall be convinced of this all-important point, we shall remain headed towards war and not towards peace.

I am told that these days the opposite thesis is presented by authoritative writers in Russia. And if this opposite thesis should be accepted as correct in America as well as in Russia -- if it should be generally believed that there is indeed some inexorable law which, in the long run, makes war between your country and ours inevitable, then those in the United States who are now working for the preservation of peace would begin to feel that they are merely delaying the war which will be all the more terrible the later it comes.

THE RESPONSE EXPECTED.

Naturally you would want to know how the American people would respond if you should decide to take the initiative and adopt a new line of approach towards the United States. Would you really be able to break the present deadlock and thereby bring about a change in the course of United States foreign policy?

There is a vast body of men and women in the United States who view with genuine concern the rapid deterioration of Russian-American relations. Many of them have

have doubts in their heart as to the general wisdom of the present course of United States foreign policy, while they regard with equal misgivings the Russian counterpart of this policy. If they do not at present take a stand in favor of changing the course steered by their own government, it is first of all because they do not see with sufficient clarity any practicable alternative course under present circumstances. Moreover they may believe that any attempt to bring about a change must necessarily come to naught as long as the speeches of your delegates will continue to follow a line of reasoning which is unacceptable to the large majority of the American public.

If you succeed in the difficult task of formulating in your own mind a practicable solution of the post-war issues and in conveying your picture of such a solution to the American public, then gradually, as you make statement after statement and issue report after report, a complete picture of an acceptable post-war settlement may unfold before the American people. By the time you will have filled in the details, and thus have implicitly extended a comprehensive offer, you also will have removed the block which had caused the deadlock.

This should have a direct and immediate effect on the foreign policy of the United States. Most Americans believe that those who are at present in charge of guiding American foreign policy were driven to the present policy because none other appeared practicable to them in the circumstances. It is generally believed that they are men of good will, who can be expected to change the present course the very moment they see a satisfactory way out of the present impasse.

You may or may not concur with this opinion. But in any case it is clearly within your power to give the American people a choice between two alternative courses of foreign policy. And if they do have a choice, the American people will exercise their choice--this I fervently hope--in favor of a course which may lead to peace. They will exercise their choice through all the mechanisms by which public opinion influences government policies in America. And those who are at present in charge of steering the course of American foreign policy may, to borrow a phrase of Mr. Stimson's,

"either change their minds or lose their jobs." •

In this "Letter" I am trying to cope with a difficulty of communications which might be insurmountable. We in America have a crude and oversimplified picture of how political decisions come about in Russia. You in Russia may have a similar picture concerning America. It might be therefore difficult for a Russian to go along with the basic assumption of this "Letter", that in America the most important factor for political decisions is not a public opinion created by the press but rather the attitudes and opinions of the individuals who constitute the American public, and that these attitudes and opinions may become the controlling factor in certain circumstances. But if this "Letter" had not one chance in a thousand of receiving serious consideration in Russia, I still would want to write it rather than to face the charge of seeing the approaching catastrophe without even raising a hand trying to avert it.

If the conclusion were reached that the measures advocated in this "Letter" would be effective, if adequately implemented, it would become necessary to face the difficulties of implementation. The difficulties of formulating an adequate solution to the post-war issues which would be acceptable to both Russia and the United States, as well as the rest of the world, are greatly increased by the absence of any interchange of thought between Americans and Russians who are not encumbered by the responsibility of representing the views of their Governments. It is perhaps understandable that atomic scientists should particularly stress this point and that they should discuss with each other whether there is any proper way in which they could help to bring about such an interchange of thought. The difficulties which stand in the way of achieving this or even a reasonable substitute thereof are obvious. But in view of their special responsibility it is perhaps not unnatural that atomic scientists should wish to assist in the implementation of some significant endeavor aimed at the permanent establishment of peace.

The majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy are free from any anti-Russian bias and they do not include Communists, either in the narrow or wider sense of the term. The general sentiment underlying this "Letter" is, I know, shared by ^{them} ~~the majority~~, but the specific thoughts embodied in it and the decision of writing this "Letter" are my own and I am not speaking for any other person or persons.

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JOSEPH L. EGAN
 PRESIDENT

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MRS CYRIL SMITH

1/6 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 1126 EAST 59 CHGO

THERE IS DISAGREEMENT IN THE COMMITTEE WITH REGARDS TO PUBLISHING OUR LETTER TO MARSHALL SO PLEASE DO NOT PUBLISH IT= A EINSTEIN.

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BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

1126 EAST FIFTY-NINTH STREET

CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS

360

November 11, 1947

MIDWAY 0800 EXTENSION 1785
MIDWAY 10052

Mr. Ernest C. Colwell
HM W 11
Faculty Exchange

Dear Mr. Colwell:

Enclosed is an article entitled "Letter to Stalin", a memorandum written in 1945, a letter to the Editors dated November 10th and a copy of a letter addressed to the Attorney General dated October 25th, which are scheduled for publication in the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. Since the BULLETIN will probably make a release at an early date, and since it is expected that the article will be widely criticized and strongly attacked by a large section of the press, I felt that I ought to transmit to you a copy of the authentic text in advance of its publication.

Very sincerely yours,



Leo Szilard



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

November 11, 1947

Dr. Leo Szilard,
Institute of Radiobiology & Biophysics,
University of Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois.

Dear Dr. Szilard:


This is in reference to your letters addressed to the Attorney General, dated October 25, November 3, and November 8, 1947, relative to your proposed letter to Marshal Stalin.

We have taken up the matter with the Department of State, and have today received a communication from that Department signed by the Honorable Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State, and dated November 11, 1947. I enclose a copy of that letter for your information.

With regard to the questions of law involved, and particularly the application of the so-called Logan Act (18 U.S.C. 5), I wish to inform you that under the established policy of the Department of Justice the Attorney General does not advise private individuals as to the consequences of their acts under the criminal statutes. You may, of course, wish to consult your own attorney.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to the editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Very truly yours,


Acting Attorney General.

NOV 11 1947

My dear Mr. Attorney General:

The Assistant Solicitor General, in a conversation with The Legal Adviser of the Department of State, has asked for the Department's views concerning a request which has been received by the Attorney General from Doctor Leo Szilard for permission or authority of the United States Government to transmit to Marshal Stalin a letter prepared by Doctor Szilard. The Secretary of State has received from Doctor Szilard a copy of the text of the letter which in general terms sets forth Doctor Szilard's views concerning relations between the United States and Soviet Russia and which suggests to Marshal Stalin certain courses of action which Doctor Szilard favors.

The request made by Doctor Szilard for permission or authority to transmit the letter appears to have been made with a view toward the possible applicability of the so-called Logan Act (1 Stat. 613).

An examination of the text of the letter reveals that it purports to deal with matters affecting the foreign policy of the United States which have been and are now under active discussion between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as among the States members of the United Nations. It is not believed that the transmission of the letter would be of help in resolving the problems under discussion. It is, of course, the right of every citizen to give public expression of his personal views concerning the conduct of American foreign policy as well as his opinions regarding the measures which he feels would further the interests of the United States and the cause of world peace. The Department does not feel called upon to comment concerning the validity of Doctor Szilard's views or his right to give public expression to them.

It is

The Honorable
Tom C. Clark,
Attorney General.

It is the view of the Department that the granting of permission or authority to Doctor Sillard to transmit the letter in question to the Chief of State of the Soviet Union would be construed as an approval of the views expressed in the letter which, as has been stated above, are not of a nature to assist in the solution of the problems with which the letter deals. It is therefore concluded that it would not be in the national interest to grant the request.

Sincerely yours,

November 11, 1947

Mr. Paul Smith
San Francisco Chronicle
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Smith:

I wrote to you a few months ago concerning Professor Leo Szilard who at that time was visiting the Bay Region. We agreed that you and I might get together this last summer in California, but as circumstances developed, it was necessary for me to remain in the east all summer.

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that sometime this week Professor Szilard is releasing to the press a very important document that he submitted to Mr. James Byrnes just prior to his appointment as Secretary of State. I thought you might find the document interesting, and I would also like to inform you that it appears that the eastern papers, particularly the New York Times and Herald Tribune, are going to treat it as a document of substantial importance.

Simultaneously with the release of this document Professor Szilard is releasing an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" (copy enclosed) in which he expresses some of his viewpoints developed during this period of growing crisis between Russia and the United States. Many of us here in the east believe that this article is one that should be read by the American people. The New York Times, I believe, is intending to print the full text. (Both documents are being published in the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS for December).

I am indeed sorry that as yet you and I have not been able to get together, and I sincerely hope that business takes me home to San Francisco in the very near future. Please give my best regards to my friend Howard Brodie. I saw Merle Miller (formerly of YANK and now with Harpers) and he said that he was planning to be in San Francisco this month. He said that he hoped to see you while there.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Harrison S. Brown

XXXXXXXXXX

November 12, 1947

Mr. Marshall MacDuffie
Merck & Co.
161 - Sixth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. MacDuffie:

Enclosed are copies of documents which I sent Mr. Gross,
today.

Enclosed is also a memorandum which I wrote in 1945 and
which also will appear in the next issue of the BULLETIN.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

November 12, 1947

The Honorable George C. Marshall
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Enclosed is for your information a copy of a letter
which I sent today to the Attorney General and also
copies of the enclosures.

Very truly yours,

Leo Szilard

XXXXXXXXXX

November 12, 1947

Mr. Marshall MacDuffie
Merck & Co.
161 - Sixth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. MacDuffie:

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Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

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JOSEPH L. EGAN
PRESIDENT

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Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

V. F. Weisskopf & all trustees

To Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Care of or Apt. No. Department of Physics

Street and No. Cambridge, Massachusetts

Place

19

Upon receiving telegram from Morse and others advising against publishing article investigated cause of sudden concern. Find that Theodore Waller of INRRA showed copy to Bob Frase Department of Commerce who discussed it with Conden who called four trustees. This is no new evidence but of course article will be attacked if published and Bulletin will not indicate any reference to ECAS or poll of executive committees of scientists groups. Please show this to Feld. *Regards* Leo Szilard

Sender's name and address Atomic Scientists of Chicago
(For reference only)

Sender's telephone number



164 DUANE STREET NEW YORK 13, N. Y. WALKER 5-2600

PUBLISHED BY THE NEWSPAPER PM INC.

5 December 1947

Dr. Leo Szilard
Professor of Physics
University of Chicago
Chicago, Ill.

Dear Dr. Szilard:

Mr. Deutsch thought you would be interested in seeing his recent column on your letter to Stalin. Two tear sheets are enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

Myril Axelrod
Asst. to Albert Deutsch

a

NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.
MERCHANDISE MART, CHICAGO 54, ILLINOIS

WMAQ NEWS BROADCAST

TIME: 10:15-10:30 PM

DATE: November 24, 1947

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:

Following is an excerpt from the above broadcast, in which you may be interested:

Dr. Leo Szilard, a University of Chicago scientist, described as the "Father" of the atomic bomb--proposed in an open letter to Josef Stalin tonight that Stalin take the lead in seeking the basis of a lasting peace between Russia and the United States.

The scientist suggested that Stalin tell the Soviet Union's side of the story in a series of radio broadcasts to the United States and that the President of the United States be accorded the same privilege in Russia.

Szilard further proposed that the greatest possible publicity be given in the Russian press to both sides of the story. He assured Stalin that his statements would be a big play on Press and Radio here in the United States.

The atomic scientist prefaced his surprising offer to Stalin by saying that if the present trend of distrust between Russians and Americans continues for six months, the two governments will lose control of the situation.

Szilard holds that Stalin could build an argument, during his series of broadcasts to the American people, which would really be an offer of a post-war settlement;--an offer that would break the current deadlock which produces mistrust.

Dr. Leo Szilard is a 49 year old naturalized American who was born in Budapest, Hungary and who fled Germany--he taught at the University of Berlin--when Hitler came to power.

He is credited with bringing to the attention of President Roosevelt--in 1939--the scientific data which indicated that an atomic bomb could be produced.

-MORE-

WILLIAM RAY, Manager
News and Special Events Department,
NBC Central Division and Station WMAQ

WMAQ NEWS BROADCAST

TIME: 10:15-10:30 PM

DATE: October 24, 1947 (continued)

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:

Following is an excerpt from the above broadcast, in which you may be interested:

In March of 1945--prior to the detonation of the first A-Bomb,--Szilard prepared for President Roosevelt a detailed report on what this new weapon would do to the position America would hold in the post-war world.

Mr. Roosevelt died before he saw the report. But six weeks before the first bomb was tested in New Mexico, the Szilard report on the future was present to James F. Byrnes, F.D.R.'s "assistant president" and then Secretary of State.

The gist of this report--with secret information carefully deleted--was made public tonight, in the December bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. It is an amazing document in that Szilard anticipated that the creation of the A-Bomb would make more difficult the establishment of a lasting peace. He chart~~er~~ed, in detail, the exact results that our production of atomic bombs has produced.

His thesis is that the A-Bomb has taken from the United States the military advantage this country held for 30 years--its ability to outproduce the entire world in the matter of heavy weapons. He makes the point that any nation can afford to produce A-Bombs.

Dr. Szilard asserts that there will be an atomic war if any one nation wants such a war. He fears that one nation might strike first, to prevent an attack by any other nation.

However, the "Father of the A-Bomb" believes that fairly adequate world control can be established by agreement of three nations: The United States, Russia and Britain. But for that control to be effective, Russia would have to permit Americans

WILLIAM RAY, Manager
News and Special Events Department,
NBC Central Division and Station WMAQ

NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.
MERCHANDISE MART, CHICAGO 54, ILLINOIS

WMAQ NEWS BROADCAST

TIME: 10:15-10:30 PM

DATE: November 24, 1947 (continued)

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:

Following is an excerpt from the above broadcast, in which you may be interested:

and Britons to move freely about in Russia, to hire Russians for espionage and to have entry into every shop, factory and plant in the vast territory of the U.S.S.R.

What's more, Britain and the United States would have to make the same offer to Russia.

He acknowledges that these means of control are difficult. But Szilard argues that if it can be achieved: "We would then, perhaps, have a chance of living through this century."

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WILLIAM RAY, Manager
News and Special Events Department,
NBC Central Division and Station WMAQ

If you get around among people, and talk with them about world-conditions and our relations with Soviet Russia...you're bound to hear an amazing amount of "war talk". It seems to be spreading like "wildfire".

More and more people seem to be surrendering to a kind of "war psychosis"....you hear them saying that war with Russia is inevitable.

And they're not all irresponsible people, or rabble-rousers either. It's not unusual to find business men...or industrialists talking seriously of the possibility of war within two or three years.

And there are others, of course, who are so resigned to the "inevitability" of war....that they have started talking about what they call a "preventative" war against the Soviets. That is, they argue that if there's bound to be a war then we should start it while the odds are on our side....while we alone have a stockpile of atomic-bombs. They seem to reason that....if we start dropping atomic bombs on Russia.... then we can put her in her place....and settle this thing very quickly.... without letting it become a World-War.

Not all the American people are resigned to "inevitable war" with Russia. In fact, a Gallup-poll of public opinion shows that 62% of the people want our government to keep on striving for an understanding with the Soviets. Only 31 percent have concluded that it's impossible to find a settlement....and therefore, we should go our way without Russia.

It's among this 31 percent that the "war talk" is to be found, of course. Incidentally, the war-veterans - who know what war is - make-up the largest group urging that we keep on trying.

In other words, it's the people who didn't have to fight the last war and who won't have to fight the next one....who are doing most of the talking about "inevitable war".

I mention all this as a sort of "preface" to a news bulletin received in our WBBM news-room just fifteen minutes ago.....

It comes from the atomic-scientists of Chicago....an organization made up of the men who "created" the atomic bomb....that weapon which some Americans are now saying we should use against the Russians in a "preventative" war.

These atomic scientists are frightened by that kind of talk.

They're frightened because they don't think the American people realize that - even with our atomic bombs - we could not win a "preventative" war.

It might come to the point where - to defeat Russia - we would have to atom-bomb the cities of all Europe....and the vast spaces of Eurasia as well - to drive out the Russian armies.

And while we were wrecking those cities with atom-bombs.... Russian planes might be attacking our cities with bacteria bombs.

While Europeans died by the tens of thousands from radio-activity....Americans might be dying by the tens of thousands from the plague.

They point-out that in the end, we would be committing suicide while attempting to commit murder.

If this is true - then no wonder these scientific men are afraid of the "drift" in American thinking....the resignation to "inevitable" war. They say that is enough people start thinking and talking that way...then war will become inevitable.

One of those who is most worried is Dr. Leo Zilard.

It was Dr. Zilard who took the initiative...back in 1939... in developing the atomic-bomb. At that time....in the first year of the war....he called to Franklin D. Roosevelt's attention various experiments which indicated that an atomic-bomb was a very definite

possibility.

From his report....our scientific and industrial resources were mobilized - secretly - for the great gamble.

In May of 1945 - before you and I even knew that the atomic bomb existed....six weeks, in fact, before the first one was tested in New Mexico....Dr. Zilard warned James F. Byrnes - then secretary of state - that this was a terrible discovery. He said that the atomic bomb might become a Frankenstein monster and jeopardize our own security. He foresaw difficulties even then, in bringing Russia into a system of international control. In fact, he said that if we did not win Russia's cooperation immediately after the first bomb was exploded....then we might never win it.

As you know....we still do not have an atomic agreement.... because of mutual Russian and American distrust.

And so last month, Dr. Zilard sent a letter to Attorney General Tom Clark....asking permission to send a letter direct to Joseph Stalin.

He asked the attorney general's permission....so he would not run afoul of our treason laws....

In that proposed letter to Stalin - which was made public just a few minutes ago - Dr. Zilard outlined the drift toward war. He spoke of the "war talk"...both in Russia and in the United States.

And he said rather ominously (and here I'm quoting the atomic scientist)... "If the present trend continues for six months, more likely than not, the course of events will be out of control of the two governments concerned."

So he proposed that Stalin himself go on the air...once a month...and speak directly to the American people.

He wanted to warn Stalin that whatever the Russian leader might say would be without effect, unless it was felt to be 100 percent sincere.

He wanted Stalin to outline Russia's proposals for a world settlement....and say -- quite definitely -- whether and how the Soviet system and our system can exist peaceably in the same world.

But that letter was never sent to Stalin.

Attorney General Tom Clark wouldn't permit it. Why....we haven't been told. The letter was made public just twenty-five minutes ago.

Of course, Dr. Zilard admits that what he proposed may sound like a "carck-pot" idea. He agrees the chances of its succeeding were very small from the start.

But he says -- the way things are going now -- only a "miracle" will save us from another war....and so he's desperately trying to conjure-up such a "miracle."

The traditional devices of diplomacy haven't worked....and so apparently Dr. Zilard thinks it's time for us to try some other method.

DEC 3 RECD

FRONTIERS OF SCIENCE - QUINCY HOWE
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1947
6:15 - 6:30 PM EST

(AS BROADCAST)

As the Big Four Foreign Ministers sit down together in London to make a last stab at writing a peace treaty for Germany, one of the foremost atomic scientists has addressed an open letter - over their heads - to Premier Stalin. The letter appears in the December issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; just published. It is written by Dr. Leo Szilard, one of the men who first brought the possibility of the atomic bomb to President Roosevelt's attention and then played a large part in developing the actual weapon. Since the frontiers of science and the frontiers of politics so often overlap nowadays, it's not news for an atomic scientist to speak his mind on world affairs. But the proposal Dr. Szilard has made does call for special attention and comment.

Dr. Szilard points out that Russia and America have now reached a complete deadlock on the question of controlling atomic energy and on almost everything else. He fears this deadlock will lead, eventually, to a war nobody wants. He says that most atomic scientists share his fears. He says that most atomic scientists feel that both the United States and the Soviet Governments are pursuing mistaken policies; mistaken because they are completely irreconcilable. He therefore has written this open letter suggesting that Stalin speak directly to the American people at regular intervals, perhaps once a month, outlining a general settlement that would enable Russia and America to live at peace with each other. He also urges Stalin to invite President Truman to talk frankly to the Russian people through the Soviet press and radio.

pd

(MORE)

Dr. Szilard speaks for himself alone. He does not claim the support of any other atomic scientists. The Bulletin in which his letter appears has not endorsed his suggestion. One editor comments that of course Dr. Szilard has shown political innocence and that only a miracle could make his suggestion come true. And he quotes the Italian scientist Dr. Fermi as having defined a miracle as an event which has only a 10 per cent chance of happening. Dr. Szilard does not think his proposal has even one tenth of one per cent of a chance, but he's taking it anyway.

Dr. Szilard's letter deserves comment on two points. First, the lay-man cannot be reminded too often how much the atomic scientists fear the atomic bomb. Second, the proposal that Dr. Szilard makes - visionary as it must appear to the laymen - puts the scientist in a new role. Dr. Szilard is not only taking part in politics. He has made the kind of proposal that we used to associate with the most extreme type of religious idealist. The Bulletin to which he contributes has also printed many articles - including one in its current issue - favorable to world government. Like the case for complete non-resistance in wartime the case for world government in time of peace is morally unassailable. The trouble, according to most of its detractors, is that it leaves human nature out of account. If so, we have come full circle. A century ago, the scientist was the arch-materialist; the believer in orthodox religion, the arch-idealist. It would be unfair to religious idealists to say that the two have exchanged roles.

(MORE)

But it is fair to say that now it is the idealistic scientist who expects men to act like gods.

Just as the extremes of religion and science meet in certain proposals about the control of atomic energy, so the atomic sciences and the science of astronomy have much in common for the very reason that they too seem poles apart. The Atomic scientist deals with completely invisible forces right under his nose. The astronomer deals with the entire universe and he soon will be able to see a billion light years away. That's the distance that it takes light one billion years to travel. Yet the atomic scientist and the astronomer see the same kind of thing. They both see solar systems, large and small, all apparently obeying the same laws, for the atom is simply a miniature solar system. And the astronomer, like the atomic scientist is also in the news these days now that the great 200-inch mirror has arrived at the new observatory on Palomar Mountain - 125 miles southeast of Pasadena, California. You've probably read or heard about the journey of this mirror. It's twice as large as the next largest reflector at Mount Wilson; not far away. The California Institute of Technology operates both telescopes under the single direction of Dr. Ira Bowen who will co-ordinate their work.

The Mount Palomar observatory has three stories. The new telescope has eight mirrors - not lenses, but mirrors - and the big 200-inch mirror, 24 inches thick and weighing 14 and a half tons, is the heart of the new instrument.

(MORE)

The Corning Glass works which made the wedding presents that President Truman and Ambassador Douglas gave to Princess Elizabeth also made this giant lens. It cost \$600,000 when it was cast in 1935. It would cost more than twice as much to duplicate it today. The funds came from the Rockefeller Foundation and the whole project is costing 6 million dollars.

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What scientific returns can be expected on this investment? The giant Mount Palomar telescope will be used to photograph various heavenly bodies. It's not built primarily for astronomers to look through. It built primarily for them to take photographs which they can enlarge and study. When it is ready for actual use - and that probably will not be for some weeks time - astronomers hope to clear up at least three important matters. They expect to take photographs of the planet Mars that will show whether Nature or some form of life made its so-called "canals." They expect to be able to tell what chemical elements exist on other heavenly bodies and in what quantities. And they believe they can say for certain whether or not the universe is expanding. It so happens that at the same time the 200 inch mirror arrived at Mount Palomar, Dr. Harlow Shapley, director of the Harvard Observatory, declared in the annual report of the Smithsonian Institution, that the universe IS expanding and at a rapid rate. Dr. Shapley reports that a force that he calls "negative gravitation" causes whole galaxies like our own Milky Way - and there are about a hundred billion of them in all - to fly apart and separate. But do not worry. You are in no immediate danger. Developments of this magnitude take billions of years to work themselves out.

What does all this mean to you and me? The Mount Palomar telescope might throw a lot of new light on possible communication among the planets of our own solar system. It ought to show more about the nature of that solar system and of other solar systems and galaxies.

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And just as the atomic scientists found that their researches confirmed the findings of the astronomers, so the astronomers, with this new Mount Palomar telescope, may help the atomic scientists to learn more about the behavior of atoms and electrons.

Pure science - that is to say the study of the way things behave - soon become applied science - that is to say making things behave in a certain fashion. Astronomers cannot do much more about the universe than the weather man can do about the weather. But the natural principles that the astronomer observes in the universe around us can help us not only to understand but to control our own world and ourselves.

Two years ago the Smythe report on atomic energy upset a lot of our fixed ideas about the physical, material world in which we live. It showed us that matter amounts to nothing more nor less than concentrated energy. But we found it much easier to adjust ourselves to this new idea than we did to adjust ourselves to the implications of the atomic bomb. In January a book will appear which seems likely to have the same effect on some of our cherished beliefs as the atomic bomb had on the city of Hiroshima. The book is entitled Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. It was prepared with funds from the Rockefeller Foundation by Professor Alfred C. Kinsey of the University of Indiana and three associates. It deals with the sex habits of men in the United States. It's based on 12,000 detailed personal interviews with men of all ages and classes from all parts of the country.

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The publishing firm of W. B. Saunders of Philadelphia which specializes in medical books is printing 100,000 copies of the first edition. Except in the cases of book club selections that's more copies than almost any commercial publisher ever prints of any book for the general public. Yet Dr. Kinsey's book seems sure to become a best-seller. Already it has received considerable newspaper publicity. Next month most of the leading mass magazines as well as several class magazines will devote articles to Dr. Kinsey's findings.

The chief conclusions Dr. Kinsey reaches will shock and surprise a lot of us. He states as a fact that in their sexual behavior nineteen out of twenty men in the United States have at some time in their lives done something for which they could be criminally prosecuted. As I say, he bases this statement on 12,000 interviews with 12,000 individuals. Public opinion polls have predicted and reflected human behavior with 98 per cent accuracy on the basis of much less extensive interviewing - and Dr. Kinsey plans to interview a total of 100,000 Americans and produce eight more volumes during the next 25 years. A radio broadcast does not offer the time, nor is it perhaps the place, to go into details. But no coverage of the present frontiers of science can be complete if it does not refer to Dr. Kinsey's conclusions and what they mean. Freud based his theory and practise of psychoanalysis on the study of about 1,000 abnormal patients. Havelock Ellis who pioneered in the same field based his conclusions on about 200 persons, most of them abnormal too.

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But in the light of Dr. Kinsey's findings it's hard to say what is normal and what abnormal. The people he talked to were not suffering from any mental or nervous disorders. They were leading average lives. But it seems that the life of the average American - at any rate his sex life - does not always conform with our declared standards of behavior. Dr. Kinsey finds that sex morals differ in different classes. College graduates lead more conventional sex lives than men who did not get beyond high school.

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High School graduates lead more conventional sex lives than those who went only to grammar school. But Dr. Kinsey finds that the sex behavior of Americans has not changed much during the past fifty years. The notion that we have suddenly become more emancipated just isn't so. Apparently our fathers and grandfathers cut up just as much as we do - but talked about the capers even less frankly than we do. Dr. Kinsey confirms Dr. Fried who maintained that sex plays a large part in the lives of children. Dr. Kinsey also found that nearly all American men establish their sex habits in their teens. He doesn't think that joining the army and going off to war made much difference.

Dr. Kinsey's book will stir up plenty of controversy. No doubt about that. It will raise innumerable questions. Some people will wonder if we are not equally hypocritical about all the seven deadly sins. Is the seventh commandment the only one that is more honored in the breach than the observance? What would a questionnaire on the lying, stealing, covering, swearing, and honoring thy father and thy mother habits of the American people show? And how about Dr. Kinsey's statement that our sex habits have not changed much in several generations? Isn't the real point, perhaps, that no one would have thought of compiling such a book a couple of generations ago? Who would have published it? How many popular magazines would have given its contents a circulation running into the millions? And what would radio - if there had been radio - have done? What, for that matter, will radio do when the full details of Dr. Kinsey's findings reach the public? There, in this frank facing of disagreeable facts that our ancestors ducked; there is perhaps the real revolution in contemporary morals that Dr. Kinsey has hastened along. ras

Medical science has brought two more diseases more nearly under control. A team of doctors of the New York State Department of Health has tracked down the virus that causes intestinal flu. It is found in contaminated milk, water and food. And another team of wartime scientists announces as cure for malaria that works 95% of the time. (It's used with quinine and has proved the most powerful antimalarial drug in existence -- and the least poisonous, too.)