

# Phil Felgner

*Interview conducted by*

*Mark Jones, PhD*

*July 22, 1997*

SAN DIEGO TECHNOLOGY ARCHIVE



## Phil Felgner



Dr. Felgner received his Ph.D. in Biochemistry/Neuroscience from Michigan State University in 1978 and also completed Postdoctoral training in Biophysics at University of Virginia. He has over 25 years of experience in the biotechnology industry, including senior research positions at Syntex Research where he developed the first cationic lipid reagent for gene transfer. In 1988, Dr. Felgner became Director of Product Development, Chief Scientific Officer and founder of a start-up company, Vical, Inc. With colleagues at Vical and at the University of Wisconsin, Dr. Felgner made a landmark discovery regarding functional reporter gene sequences and demonstrated that potent antiviral immune responses could be generated following intramuscular injection of plasmids encoding viral antigens. These findings have led to development of a new class of infectious disease vaccines referred to as "DNA vaccines". Dr. Felgner has been issued more than 35 patents and published over 100 scientific papers, and for his numerous biotechnology innovations, he received the Southern California 1996 "Inventor of the Year" award. He went on to found Antigen Discovery, Inc. and served as a Professor at the University of California Irvine.

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**INTERVIEWEE:** Phil Felgner

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1 **FELGNER:** One of the stories that Ted Greene tells is how he tried to take, basically,  
2 the Hybritech story to Syntex for funding, and he likes to yuck it up about how they  
3 turned down this multi-million dollar opportunity.

4 **JONES:** That was so obvious at the time.

5 **FELGNER:** Yeah, so you have that story.

6 **JONES:** Yeah, he was calling that Cytex at the time.

7 **FELGNER:** Well, when I came over from Syntex, you know, these were the two guys  
8 that I met [Ted Greene and Tim Wollaeger], and so they filled me in on all that  
9 important history, too. And I think Syntex was considered to be kind of an ideal  
10 example of, you know, an idealized example of a successful pharmaceutical business,  
11 and guys like Ted Greene, when they were trying to build their models, were  
12 modeling them after something like Syntex.

13 **JONES:** Because Syntex had been the only new success story in the industry in quite  
14 some time?

15 **FELGNER:** Right. And at that time, Genentech wasn't mature enough to be  
16 considered an example, so they would use Syntex. And he really felt snubbed when he  
17 went back there, because, you know, he was sort of idealizing them, and he thought  
18 that they would right away embrace what he had, the new things that he had going at  
19 Hybritech, and that never came about. So, how would you like to start this?

20 **JONES:** Well, I'd like to start by asking you about the very early stages of your career.  
21 For instance, how did you originally become interested in science?

22 **FELGNER:** Well, personally, I was in college during the late '60s when there was a lot  
23 of unrest on campuses and stuff, and I wasn't sure what I wanted to do. I thought I  
24 might play guitar, and I went over for a summer to Europe to get guitar instruction  
25 from various classical guitarists over there.

26 **JONES:** Who did you study with?

27 **FELGNER:** Well, actually, most of my study was with a guy in San Francisco named  
28 Michael Lorimer. Do you know of him?

29 **JONES:** Well, yeah, I mean, he's a famous guy.

30 **FELGNER:** Yeah, I have a guitar from him. I bought a guitar from him. I hired a guy  
31 here recently who is more gung-ho on guitar even than I was. He's got five guitars  
32 and there's a little bit of a classical guitar sort of group here. There's a good guitar  
33 builder downtown here.

34 **JONES:** Taylor, or a classical guitar builder?

35 **FELGNER:** Classical guitar. Anyway, what I decided to do was to go and actually  
36 work in a lab as an undergraduate and then see what it was like. I wasn't really that  
37 keen on studying in college, but I thought that I'd just go in there and try to work on  
38 it. I was always interested in science when I was growing up. The Disney Channel,  
39 or...it wasn't the Disney Channel, but Walt Disney was on television every week, and  
40 one of the things that he always did was to bring in these scientists, you know, and  
41 show all the latest science stuff. And Mr. Wizard was on, and that had a lot of appeal  
42 for me, so I was keen on science at that time. But it didn't really connect from studies,  
43 that it was that cool, so I just started working in the lab, and went into a guy's lab. His  
44 name was John Wilson, and I told him essentially that. You know, I said, 'I'd like to  
45 see to what it's like to actually work in a lab,' so I did that.

46 **JONES:** Where was this at?

47 **FELGNER:** Michigan State. And so, I found that I really liked to do that. I spent all  
48 my time doing that, and then just kept on working to get my advanced degrees there,  
49 at Michigan State.

50 **JONES:** And why did you choose biochemistry in particular? Is that the lab you had  
51 happened to wander into?

52 **FELGNER:** Yeah, pretty much, that was it. You know, biological sciences were, you  
53 know, popular, and that was where people were working, and so I went into a  
54 biochemistry lab. I did pretty well in chemistry, so I went into biochemistry, and the  
55 biochemistry lab. And then, basically, it just became an apprenticeship as far as I'm  
56 concerned. You know, I wasn't really going to school anymore, I was just working  
57 from then on. It was all just that.

58 **JONES:** You were working with Wolff at the time?

59 **FELGNER:** Wilson, John Wilson. OK, so then I went through school, I had some nice  
60 papers and things, and I went into a biophysics lab in Charlottesville, Virginia.

61 **JONES:** At the university? This was a postdoc position?

62 **FELGNER:** The University of Virginia at Charlottesville, a postdoc, right. Well, I  
63 guess the graduate student experience is of some note because there was a conflict at  
64 that time going on that was unclear to me as I was going through, but there was sort  
65 of a conflict between faculty who felt that advanced education should be more an  
66 extension of undergraduate school, where you did a lot of coursework, versus sort of  
67 a sink or swim mentality, where you would throw people into the real world and have  
68 them do original research. So, I was in that side of the thing, and so was my professor.  
69 There was a big battle that went on, and I was in the crossfire all the time when I was  
70 over there, so it was quite a time. I got kicked out of the program twice, but I got back  
71 in and everything, and it all worked out fine, afterwards.

72 **JONES:** What were you working on there?

73 **FELGNER:** It was on a brain enzyme. An enzyme in the brain. It was a  
74 neurochemistry project, and I learned a lot about membranes at the time, or was  
75 getting familiar with the problems in understanding the functions of membranes.  
76 Membranes are important in the brain, especially because of the kind of nervous  
77 conduction that's going on the surface of nerve cells. So, I decided to join Tom  
78 Thompson, who was a biophysicist studying the details of membrane structure at a  
79 very detailed level, with pure systems, not with complex biological systems. And  
80 there, we started working on liposomes. And it became very clear that cells had a  
81 charge, a net charge. All cells have a net negative charge, and people began to  
82 understand that, and we learned how cell membranes were comprised of these lipid  
83 molecules and how they were organized, in their details, you know, what their

84 properties were. The membranes were real stable structures. It just became more and  
85 more clear to me that cells were negatively charged, cells had a net negative charge,  
86 and that all the lipid molecules that you have available are either neutral or  
87 negatively charged, so there were no positively charged lipids available in nature. And  
88 there were actually very few positively charged surfaces in nature at all. One of the  
89 few places that you find a positively charged surface is on the surface of a crab cell,  
90 and there's something called chitosan that's actually interesting now because they're  
91 using it as a transfection reagent. But anyway, everything seems to be negatively  
92 charged, and if you're making a liposome, you had all the available components for  
93 making liposomes, and all you could make is a negatively charged liposome or a  
94 neutral one. So, if trying to use a liposome....have you learned about liposomes at all?

95 **JONES:** I know just the basics.

96 **FELGNER:** They're little vesicles, and they're made of a very thin bi-layer membrane  
97 that's only, you know, five nanometers thick, which is a thousandth of a millimeter  
98 and then a thousandth of that yet. It's very, very thin, and you can put things in there,  
99 and we did some of these things at Vical. You can put substances inside those  
100 vesicles, and they'll stay in there for years on end. They won't leak out, even though  
101 that little membrane is so thin. And that's what our cells are made of, these thin  
102 membranes. Anyway, you can make these little vesicles, and that's what we were  
103 studying in this biophysics lab, how to make them purer and homogeneous in a way  
104 that you could understand them better. And then, around 1980, people started  
105 getting interested in these things as drug delivery systems.

106 **JONES:** Who was doing that?

107 **FELGNER:** Well, it started with a guy named Alex Bangham, in 1965, and then there  
108 were people like Dmitri Papahadjopoulos, who further developed the practical  
109 applications of those things as drug delivery systems. And then, about that time, the  
110 venture capital investment climate was very good. Let's see, Hybritech would have  
111 come a little bit later, but Genentech would have been about 1976, and they were  
112 getting pretty happy with that, so they were looking around for other investments,  
113 and liposomes was one of the things that investors were interested in. Three liposome  
114 companies, at least, got started. Liposome Company, and then Liposome Technology  
115 Incorporated, which changed its name to Sequus recently, and Vestar, which recently  
116 merged with another company, and they're now called Nexstar. Those companies

117 started right around 1980-81, and I was getting interviewed for working at those  
118 places.

119 **JONES:** Let me ask you, while you were going through, doing the PhD and the  
120 postdoc, were you thinking about a traditional academic career path?

121 **FELGNER:** Yeah, I think so. I think I was, but I got called from these liposome  
122 companies with this biotech opportunity coming up, and then I got a call from  
123 Syntex.

124 **JONES:** Did these calls come through Thompson?

125 **FELGNER:** Yeah, they were looking to take advantage of this potential drug delivery  
126 opportunity, and Syntex was interested in having a group work on that. So, I was  
127 getting interviewed from those companies. I had an orientation towards patenting  
128 things. Thompson was always kind of amused by that. It never crossed his mind to  
129 patent anything, to take some discovery and then think about what the potential  
130 opportunities would be, and then put that together into a patent. So, I was doing  
131 that. It seemed natural to me to do that there.

132 **JONES:** You filed some patents at that time? On work you were doing...

133 **FELGNER:** In Thompson's lab. And then, the liposome companies. I remember being  
134 really amazed because there was this one, this one place I got interviewed, the  
135 Liposome Company, by Mark Ostrow. I know Mark, and you may run across Mark  
136 Ostrow sometime. I think I've told him this little story, too. I remember feeling like I  
137 was naive. I was naive of the pharmaceutical business, and I was naive of this biotech  
138 environment. So, I went over to New Jersey and he picked me up at the airport, and  
139 started telling me about all these wonderful things they were going to do with  
140 liposomes. They were even going to put interferon in a liposome, blow it up a  
141 person's nose, and they were going to cure the common cold. And I was so amazed. I  
142 thought, 'Boy, I must be stupid. I could never do this.' So, I really felt like I needed to  
143 go to a professional pharmaceutical company and learn about how, you know, one  
144 goes about this pharmaceutical business. It happened later that I realized that Mark  
145 needed that, too. And in fact, the Liposome Company developments were real slow,  
146 among the liposome companies, and it got the investors very perturbed because they  
147 had to keep making these investments year after year. And what was clear was...well,  
148 it seems like what you usually see is these dichotomies played out all the time, you

149 know, two different groups with different points of view always fighting against each  
150 other. So in graduate school, it was the sink or swim pragmatists versus the  
151 academics. In this liposome company thing, it was the biophysicists who thought that  
152 these pharmaceutical development people were ignorant, and just weren't intelligent  
153 enough, and that they were going to be able to develop these things just easily,  
154 because of all of the stuff that they knew, and then the pharmaceutical development  
155 people probably just thought these other guys were crazy, you know, they didn't  
156 know anything about the real practical issues of developing drugs. So, what happened  
157 was, when the Liposome Company people, when they would go to meetings, over a  
158 period of years, what would be revealed to them were all of these pragmatic drug  
159 development issues. And then at the meetings, they would be shown this. You know,  
160 they would show like a flow chart of how you should go about developing a drug,  
161 which, you know, is Pharmaceutical Sciences 101 for the people who actually get  
162 trained in that area. And so, the investors were investing in years and years' worth of  
163 training that these people were going through, to just learn these things. But then,  
164 you know, on the other hand, what was so hard is that you couldn't take that other  
165 technology and put it in the hands of the conventional pharmaceutical development  
166 people. They wouldn't do it, either. Well, I was at Syntex, and basically Syntex was an  
167 advanced postdoc as far as I was concerned. I was there for six years. I wasn't a  
168 postdoc, but that's what it was. It was a beautiful place.

169 **JONES:** You had a number of opportunities at the time. Why did you choose Syntex?  
170 Was it because this would be like a postdoc and you would have a lot of freedom?

171 **FELGNER:** Yeah, I just went there and it's a beautiful campus, and all the people  
172 were just like academic people who didn't have to worry about giving lectures, you  
173 know. They had weekly seminars, all kinds of people coming through all the time,  
174 and they had a beautiful library. And when I went there, I was constantly studying  
175 because there would be seminars from people in different disciplines that I didn't  
176 know, who I was just listening to, so I'd get this next new one, and I'd be in the library  
177 trying to figure out what I had just heard, you know. So, in a very short period of  
178 time, what you can do in a company like that, because there are so many disciplines,  
179 there are all of your different sort of scientific categories, there's chemistry and  
180 pharmacology and physiology and cell biology, and whatever else there is, so those  
181 are almost like academic activities going on there, but then there is the pragmatically  
182 oriented segment of the company involved in actually characterizing drug candidates,  
183 metabolism and toxicology labs, and then all the people who are actually trying to,



184 once they've identified a drug candidate, they're trying to make sure that that can be  
185 put into a vial and then offered as a stable product, you know. So, you have a lot of  
186 physical chemists who are making sure that those things are stable. So, it was  
187 basically a six year education as far as I was concerned.

188 **JONES:** But the work was somewhat more focused than it would be in an academic  
189 setting, certainly?

190 **FELGNER:** Well, obviously, everything was focused towards drug development, yeah.

191 **JONES:** And this was 1982?

192 **FELGNER:** Six years I was there, until '88.

193 **JONES:** Can you recall your thought processes, did you perceive any kind of risk in  
194 doing this as opposed to following the academic track? Did you think, for instance,  
195 that if you got into this and found that you didn't like it, you know it's not for me,  
196 that you could go back?

197 **FELGNER:** No, actually, at that time, what I was thinking...it didn't take long before I  
198 was thinking that I was going to be a lifer, that I was going to be a Syntex employee  
199 and that was going to be it. I got married and had kids and then I thought, that's  
200 probably going to be it, and it was fine. I thought that everything is going to be just  
201 fine, there's no problem here. Then my wife, who was working at Syntex, went to  
202 Genentech, and then we got exposed to the biotech atmosphere, which was really  
203 cool. So that was one thing that was going on. The other thing that was going on was  
204 the science at Syntex, which was related to this issue that I mentioned earlier about  
205 positively charged liposomes not being available, and all cell surfaces having a  
206 negative charge. I felt that there would be a good opportunity, they had a lot of good  
207 chemists there, and I thought that maybe they could make a positively charged lipid.

208 **JONES:** So you could send it to...

209 **FELGNER:** Send it to cells, and they would just merge with cells right away. It would  
210 be a real good delivery system. So the chemists made those compounds and we  
211 patented those, a whole series of compounds. Then I set out to test their utility in a  
212 whole bunch of different applications, and one was to see whether or not we could  
213 deliver DNA into cells with these things. And there, the first thing was, we had good  
214 molecular biology there, so we could get good plasmids. And I had Hardy Chan make

215 up some plasmid for me, and then mixed up these liposomes with the DNA. The first  
216 thing that was really unusual about that was that when I combined them, what I  
217 thought was going to happen was that everything would aggregate and agglutinate,  
218 like sometimes you see with antibodies and antigens, when you mix them up, you  
219 just get a an aggregation in there. And what was surprising, and it probably doesn't  
220 seem that earthshaking today, but it didn't aggregate. You know, it formed a nice  
221 suspension. It maybe made a little side event, something going on, and then it just  
222 sort of cleared up. And I thought, 'My God! Are they not interacting? How could this  
223 be? They must be interacting,' because the DNA is so highly negatively charged and  
224 these things are so much positively charged, they must be interacting, and so, we ran  
225 a little experiment and showed, 'Yeah, OK, they're interacting.' But what happened  
226 was, they got together in a very organized way, not just a disorganized gammish in  
227 there. They formed new entities, so now the DNA was wrapped up in this lipid and it  
228 had a nice little...maybe something like a virus-like structure. So, that was real  
229 exciting, but that was before we found out anything about there being any kind of  
230 gene delivery activity, and I brought in an intern, a summer intern, an undergraduate  
231 intern, and she knew how to run some of the enzymatic assays that we needed to use  
232 to look for gene delivery activity, and she did the first experiment, and right away it  
233 worked, so we could deliver genes into cells.

234 **JONES:** What year was this?

235 **FELGNER:** That was around 1984. So we patented all this at Syntex, and then  
236 published on it. And these guys got wind of that result, Karl Hostetler, and Dennis  
237 Carson, and Doug Richman, and they had their own ideas about what they wanted to  
238 do for Vical, to do this nucleotide anti-viral project with liposomes.

239 **JONES:** Did you get in contact with them early on?

240 **FELGNER:** Well, I went to a meeting, I went to one of these Gordon conferences, and  
241 it was on something like, I don't know, smectic mesophases and crystalline  
242 structures, or something, and I go to the meeting and here is this MD, Karl Hostetler,  
243 over there, and what's he doing at a bizarre conference like this? I sat next to him and  
244 he said, 'Why don't we go out and play golf,' so I went out to play golf with him, and  
245 he tells me that he's interested in setting up a company down here in San Diego, and  
246 that they had these ideas to do. And I told him he's crazy, you know, to set up a  
247 company, he doesn't know what he's getting into, that this deal sounds just like Mark

248 Ostrow all over again. You know, drug development you should leave to the big  
249 pharmaceutical companies. I don't know, we kept on talking, I guess, that week, and  
250 got together a couple of other times, and I think that the people that founded it  
251 figured that I could do this drug development project, and they also thought on the  
252 backburner, this gene delivery stuff might be able to come along. Well, at the same  
253 time at Syntex, I felt that Syntex, that it would be well for Syntex to invest in the gene  
254 delivery opportunity, and they felt that they wanted to show that they were glad  
255 about what I was doing at Syntex, and they were working on trying to figure out how  
256 to come up with some kind of promotion, and the promotion they wound up doing  
257 was offering me was to, basically, I was going to stop doing everything that I did  
258 before and I was going to now become really valuable to the company...

259 **JONES:** As an administrator?

260 **FELGNER:** Yeah, I was going to go into the pharmaceutical development area. And  
261 the people that were working with me were going to have to change what they were  
262 doing, and they weren't really keen on that either, and so they offered me the job, and  
263 then they said, 'We're going to find you a new home,' and here's what it is. The next  
264 day I went home and talked to my wife about this job down here, and we agreed to  
265 come down and take the job here, and so the next day, I went up to the, actually, I  
266 guess it was the President of the company, John Freed, and I said, 'Well, I found that  
267 new home, and it's in San Diego,' and so, I just came down and we started to set up  
268 the labs down here.

269 **JONES:** Had Syntex devoted resources to developing the gene delivery, or were they  
270 just basically looking at the liposome technology for drugs?

271 **FELGNER:** They felt that the gene delivery technology, a number of people expressed  
272 the opinion, who had some authority, that gene therapy was for the year 2050, and it  
273 wasn't something that Syntex was going to be developing.

274 **JONES:** And that was a big part of your decision, that you wanted to pursue that and  
275 they weren't going to?

276 **FELGNER:** Yeah, and I felt that the gene delivery was something that needed time to  
277 develop, and I thought that 1995 was probably the right time. And I thought that  
278 Vical could be a good incubator for that technology, so I went to the Board and asked  
279 them for, Tim Wollaeger, for money and support for that thing to go on as a

280 backburner project. They agreed, and we funded the Jon Wolff lab to do studies in  
281 animals. We didn't have an animal colony at that time, and we didn't have staff with  
282 molecular biology experience and stuff like that, so, Jon was interested in carrying on  
283 with that. I ran into Jon because I went over to Ted Friedman's lab, and I had spoken  
284 with Ted on the phone, because these cationic liposomes that were able to deliver  
285 DNA into cells became a real popular transfection reagent, which I arranged while  
286 still at Syntex to get BRL, to get GIBCO BRL [Life Technologies] to sell those as  
287 reagents for molecular biologists, because I started sending them around gratis to  
288 people all over the world, and pretty soon, I was sending out hundreds of shipments a  
289 year, you know, and so I inquired and BRL picked up on the reagents, and they did an  
290 agreement with Syntex. Now, in remembering that agreement, there was this, they  
291 got a percentage of the gross sales, and as their sales increased, Syntex got a higher  
292 percentage all the time. So, for like a hundred thousand dollars in sales, they only got  
293 10%, but when it was five hundred thousand, it went up to 15%, and when it was over  
294 like three million dollars, it topped out at like 30%. So, 30% of their sales  
295 were...because nobody ever figured, at that time, they probably figured, well, it's  
296 probably pretty safe, it's not going to go up that high. But it didn't take long, and they  
297 were sending, every year, a million dollars over to Syntex, or more, on the sales of  
298 those products. So, they were real popular products. And so, I found out about the  
299 gene therapy business just by talking to these people who wanted to use these  
300 reagents, and had different interests, and Ted Friedman was one of those people, and  
301 I spoke with him. So, when I came down here, knowing that he was in the gene  
302 therapy area, I thought I'd go over and visit and see what he had going on, and Jon  
303 Wolff happened to be in the lab, and Ted was not. So, I talked with Jon about...

304 **JONES:** He was at UCSD?

305 **FELGNER:** Yeah, in Ted Friedman's lab, working as a postdoc there. And we talked  
306 about this project and it was to see whether these same reagents that worked in  
307 cultured cells, whether they would work also in animals. And then he said, 'OK, I'm  
308 moving to another lab. I got a job as a faculty member at Wisconsin and I'll be able to  
309 do this project beginning January 1st, 1989.' So, he got everything worked up and we  
310 made up formulations and sent them over there, and he tested them in animals, and  
311 right away, we got gene expression. The expression that we got, most of it was in the  
312 muscle. When we injected muscle it was the best, and then we did experiments  
313 leaving out these liposomes, just using the naked DNA. And that worked as well as  
314 anything else we had.

315 **JONES:** Do you remember how you came up with the idea of doing that? Because  
316 nobody had done it before, and nobody thought it would work.

317 **FELGNER:** Yeah, well, the idea of doing gene therapy without viruses came from our  
318 experience in working with this lipid reagent which was able to deliver genes very  
319 effectively in cultured cells, and where this work was being done in a pharmaceutical  
320 company, we were thinking, 'Well, we've got this in a vial.' I mean, here is our lipid  
321 and our DNA and they're all in a vial. It looks just like a drug, you know? And what  
322 people do, still, today, at a pharmaceutical company, is they have things that they test  
323 in cultured cells. And they say, 'Well, OK, it's doing what its supposed to do in the  
324 cultured cells, now I'll take that thing into an animal, and see if it works in an animal.'  
325 So, we used that same kind of thinking with these reagents. I mean, other people  
326 were concentrating on the cells and not the product. Because we were in a  
327 pharmaceutical thing, we were concentrating on the product. We said, 'Oh, it looks  
328 like we have a product here that might be able to deliver genes, that does deliver  
329 genes into cells,' and this is how people do things in a pharmaceutical company, you  
330 do things on cells, and if it works on the cells, you go to the animals. So, our next  
331 step, when I was just coming to Vical, was to get those things into the animal. So, we  
332 went ahead and put those in the animal and right away, we got as much as expression  
333 as we were used to seeing in these cultured cell systems, so we were very excited and  
334 started drafting the patent. The thing was, it was exciting to be able to see the  
335 expression, but it wasn't a home run at that point because we thought that it was  
336 something that required cationic lipids, and Syntex owned the first cationic lipid  
337 patent. However, I was aware that that patent would allow other groups to come in  
338 and develop other cationic lipids that were not claimed in that one, because the  
339 Syntex was not claimed broadly to exclude any and all cationic lipids, and that is kind  
340 of an interesting twist. In the biotech environment, if you would have made a  
341 discovery like was made at Syntex, if that was done at a biotech company, you would  
342 patent absolutely as broadly as you possibly could in order to exclude all competitors.  
343 In the pharmaceutical business, though, it was a collegial environment where all of  
344 the people in the different pharmaceutical companies sort of worked together to keep  
345 a good pharmaceutical, and not a combative pharmaceutical environment. So, in  
346 patenting, they would patent compounds that the chemistry department at Company  
347 A felt that they could do a good job on, and they'd patent, you know, those  
348 compounds, and then they accepted the risk that another company would come  
349 along and patent their series of compounds. So, these cationic compounds that were

350 made at Syntex, that were so good at transfecting cells, that patent was a compound  
351 patent on a restricted set of compounds and not meant to exclude all competitors  
352 coming in. So, this is where we were. When we set up the initial experiment, we said,  
353 'OK, if we're going to make a business out of this at Vical, it's not really going to  
354 interest the investors that much because, yeah, we've got our compounds,' I mean, we  
355 made some of our own compounds that weren't in the Syntex patent, 'but there's  
356 going to be Syntex out there, big old Syntex, and they could just jump all over us.' But  
357 then, very quickly we found that we didn't need the lipids in there. So then this  
358 patent all of a sudden had much greater significance. We knew that we could make a  
359 naked DNA patent, and that was completely as broad as could be, excluding anybody  
360 else, and now we had a basis for a new biotech business.

361 **JONES:** So, initially, the work that you were doing was sort of a secondary project.  
362 Was the main project at the time Doug Richman's stuff with AZT?

363 **FELGNER:** Yeah, AZT and liposomes, that was the main thing.

364 **JONES:** Did those guys recruit you to Vical because of your expertise in liposomes?

365 **FELGNER:** Yeah, they felt that I could do that project, to encapsulate the AZT in  
366 liposomes and develop a product, so there was a technical challenge, to develop a  
367 pretty complicated delivery system, and a pretty complicated formulation. They felt  
368 that I had the know-how to carry that out. And I did. We did exactly what we were  
369 intending to do for Burroughs-Wellcome, under contract, that whole thing proceeded  
370 for three or four years.

371 **JONES:** You were doing the naked DNA experiments and then Burroughs-Wellcome  
372 sort of killed the AZT project, right?

373 **FELGNER:** We got all the way through, we did our job, the product went into  
374 production at Burroughs, so that they knew that they could make the product  
375 according to specifications. We tested it in animals and tox studies and everything, so  
376 all that was done. Then they had to make a decision whether or not they were going  
377 to develop this product. So it was a product, but they decided that it was not a market  
378 that they wanted to go into at that time. It was going to be, it was always going to be,  
379 an IV, an intravenous product. It was probably going to be a drip, you know, and it  
380 became clear that, you know, a lot of their patients were living under bridges and  
381 stuff like that, and they didn't see, you know, that they were going to be really able to

382 offer that type of a product. Plus, there were other things coming along. After three  
383 years, four years, went by, other things started falling into place.

384 **JONES:** Was it the case that after that, you know, if that wasn't going to be  
385 developed, if Vical was essentially done, was it the case that the company was looking  
386 around for what to do next and the naked DNA project was ready to go?

387 **FELGNER:** I think that at the time it was more difficult than that because they were  
388 crashing head on into each other, and it was, 'Are we going to do this, or are we going  
389 to do that?' And the original founders certainly didn't want to give up, it was very  
390 difficult to give up the original basis for founding the company. And it was an  
391 excruciatingly difficult time for everyone on the Board. You know, the Board  
392 members understood that they were funding Vical to do this nucleotide anti-viral  
393 project, and that's what they had assimilated. And they didn't have, in their minds,  
394 they were not prepared for the possibility of a gene therapy business. I think the  
395 original founders and I thought that it would come along, but I wasn't thinking until  
396 1995, so I didn't think that we really would have to bring it up yet. So, it was a  
397 backburner kind of thing. The Board members then were always asking, well, 'How  
398 was this nucleotide anti-viral project going to make money for Vical?'

399 **JONES:** Who were the Board members involved?

400 **FELGNER:** Oh boy, well, Ted Greene and Tim were both on the Board at that time,  
401 and oh geez, I don't know. We had twelve Board members. That was another  
402 amusing thing. How can twelve guys, all with egos as big as a house, ever come to any  
403 kind of agreement? Anyway, what happened was, eventually Sequoia was one of the  
404 key groups there, and they couldn't go back to their partners and keep asking for  
405 more money, finally. Meanwhile, though, there were these other venture capital  
406 groups like Venrock and Kleiner-Perkins that hadn't invested in Vical, but were  
407 extremely interested in the gene therapy opportunity.

408 **JONES:** Do you have any knowledge of how they got interested? Who sold the idea to  
409 them? Was it Tim and Ted?

410 **FELGNER:** Well, actually, do you know Alex Barkus?

411 **JONES:** No.

412 **FELGNER:** You should probably call Alex Barkus. Alex, I don't know how much he  
413 will tell you about it, but, you know, I had many late night phone conversations with  
414 Alex who was working with Kleiner-Perkins at the time. Maybe he's still with Kleiner-  
415 Perkins, but he really understood everything that was going on at Vical at the time.  
416 He understood the nucleotide anti-viral business and he understood the gene therapy  
417 business that was coming along, and the opportunity there. So, while there was all  
418 this turmoil around trying to figure out how to restructure Vical, one thing that came  
419 out was that we were going to have two divisions. So, we had a gene therapy division  
420 and we had a nucleotide anti-virals division. But then you had to fund these  
421 businesses, so you had to get investors who understood it. So, it was an opportunity  
422 for Alex and Venrock to come in. And eventually, Alex, with all the negotiations and  
423 everything, Kleiner-Perkins got pushed aside. They decided not to invest and  
424 Venrock took the leading position and funded it. Then the terms of their funding  
425 were that the nucleotide anti-viral technology would be divested. It would be sold off.  
426 So, it was sold, and several million dollars came into the company.

427 **JONES:** Who bought it?

428 **FELGNER:** Most of that went over to Vestar, which then became Nexstar.

429 **JONES:** And Karl Hostetler then became involved with them?

430 **FELGNER:** Yes.

431 **JONES:** Now originally, the company got started with Karl's work on calcitonin. His  
432 idea was to put calcitonin in a lipid envelope, I guess, but that didn't go very far? By  
433 the time you came into the company, had that been completely abandoned?

434 **FELGNER:** We had work going on in the calcitonin area. Yeah, we identified a  
435 number of potential opportunities with calcitonin and liposomes. But where the  
436 funding came was from Burroughs-Wellcome. We got about four years' worth of  
437 quite a bit of funding.

438 **JONES:** So, there wasn't much money around to do that work?

439 **FELGNER:** No. It wasn't separately funded. We kept trying to look for partners. I  
440 mean, when we would go to potential partners, we would present the whole package,  
441 and calcitonin was in there and we kept accumulating data on it. But the nucleotide



442 anti-viral technology was bought. The calcitonin technology was never bought by  
443 anybody.

444 **JONES:** Well, let me just back up a little bit. When these guys were first recruiting  
445 you to come here, now, did that seem like a risk? I mean, by now, you had a family,  
446 right? And you were at Syntex, which was secure.

447 **FELGNER:** Well, you know, yeah. I mean, we dealt with that, my wife and I. But a  
448 couple of years earlier, my wife had made the jump to Genentech. And that was really  
449 fun, you know? We had a good experience there. So, yeah, sure we thought about this  
450 risk thing, but we came to grips with it. I don't know. We just felt really confident.  
451 When we came here, there was nothing but the lab space, and we built up the labs. I  
452 guess I was concerned about practical things, about whether or not the lab would  
453 have the resources that we needed, like 'What if we run out of pipette tips?' Things  
454 like that. 'What do I do if I need a glassblower,' or, 'What do I do if I need some lucite  
455 cut?' You know, things like that. But then, in coming down here, one of the surprises  
456 was that we were able to fill out the lab in a matter of a couple of weeks, and we were  
457 able to get all of the equipment in, and we were doing experiments. There's  
458 infrastructure here. This is such a center of research activity, that the vendors go out  
459 of their way to make it as easy as possible for all of our companies to work here. So,  
460 this is one of the things about the San Diego area, there's this infrastructure that's in  
461 place to allow companies like this to be able to work very smoothly. All of these  
462 logistical details, about getting animals, or building up your facility and getting the  
463 plumbing right, you know? The architects here know what the government  
464 regulations are for the kind of sewage system that you need to dump your washings  
465 from the animal cages down into the sewage system. All of these things, there's just  
466 this network, that you just sort of fall softly down into when you come into the Bay  
467 Area. That was what worried me. You know, I felt confident about the project. I really  
468 felt that the AZT project was going to work out, and I was right in the sense that we  
469 could do what we wanted to do, and, in fact, it worked in the animal models, but it  
470 didn't become a product that went into for other reasons that related to the market  
471 and the patient population and other drug entities that came along that meant that it  
472 wasn't going to hit, you know, it wasn't really going to be needed. So I was really  
473 confident about all of that, about that part.

474 **JONES:** And you had a good impression of the people who were involved?

475 **FELGNER:** Yeah, oh yeah. I felt really comfortable with Karl, and with Tim, and with  
476 Ted, you know. Yeah, I mean, they didn't project any sense of concern, you know, or  
477 anything like that, when we came down here. One of the things that they said was,  
478 'It's just like Syntex here, you know, except that everything's spread out and you have  
479 different names on the different companies. But it's going to be like one big  
480 company.' That was one of the sort of funny things. They would send out this idea  
481 like, whenever there was an opportunity for some synergy between two companies  
482 like, say, Vical and Cytel, it would be really easy to, you know, get everybody together  
483 and work together, and, you know, create a new joint venture and then, things would  
484 just move much faster here, even than they would if you had two different  
485 departments at Syntex, you know, you wouldn't be able to get together in the same  
486 way. Now, I've never seen one of those happen yet since we've come here. But, I don't  
487 know, I guess that the other thing we thought about is, we thought about, 'Well, how  
488 many of these companies actually go under, and the people end up in the street?' And  
489 it doesn't happen that much, you know. It doesn't happen that often. Somehow  
490 people manage to do what they need to do in order to keep these companies going.  
491 Now, in retrospect, it looks like we were geniuses for coming out here, because  
492 Syntex is down the tubes now, and our friends that we have still over there, you  
493 know, they say it's miserable. There really wasn't any sign when we left that there was  
494 going to be that kind of turmoil over there, but it didn't take more than a year or two  
495 after we left, not because we left, but because of all of the other things that were  
496 impacting us in this business, you know, it just went down in the dumper. So, it was  
497 great that we left before all of that stuff started happening. That wouldn't have been  
498 fun at all.

499 **JONES:** What was Dennis Carson's role in this? I know that you collaborated with  
500 him later. Was he very involved in the early stages?

501 **FELGNER:** Well, Karl brought in Dennis and Doug. You know, when you're starting a  
502 company like this, you have to have some kind of critical of mass, and what is it going  
503 to be? Well, you know, bringing in some people that have reputations. Karl is really  
504 an entrepreneur. Doug and Dennis aren't entrepreneurs, but they had reputations,  
505 you know, they had strong scientific reputations, and he merged them together to  
506 make sense out of what the three of them were doing. And they were friends, they got  
507 along well. Dennis understood the potential for the gene therapy opportunity and  
508 one of the key things that he did was when we made the naked DNA discovery, he

509 drafted a letter to the Board to affirm the significance of that finding, so they were  
510 hearing it from a different source, a source that they respected.

511 **JONES:** Let me ask you about organizing research here. You've been in academic  
512 settings, you were at Syntex, which was a pretty big, you know, maybe not one of the  
513 biggest, but still a big pharmaceutical company, right, and this was a little rascal  
514 start-up where you have to put a research program together. Did you do that with  
515 any kind of plan? What was the idea of how you would do it?

516 **FELGNER:** Well, yeah, the plan and the staffing was very, very focused, and we  
517 brought in staff that were necessary to carry that out. As far as separating academic  
518 from industrial research, I don't separate it that well, which is a problem on both  
519 ends, whether you're talking to an academic or an industry person, because one guy's  
520 idea of what's focused may be different from somebody else's. What we had to do  
521 with that project, I knew that we would succeed, but I don't know exactly what was  
522 going to succeed. So we had to set up a huge matrix of different formulation variables  
523 to look at, and then set up a system for getting through and examining all of those  
524 different variables, so that we could get down to one. Now, somebody could have  
525 looked at that and said, 'Shit, this is much too broad,' you know, 'Why are you doing  
526 all of these zillions of different variables?' And, you know, to me, we were doing it to  
527 be sure that we would succeed. And to somebody else, they might figure, well, you  
528 should just pick one, something like that. It's easy to get, you know, from a certain  
529 perspective, it wouldn't be, somebody would have thought that it was not focused  
530 and there were unnecessary things done. But through this process, we covered all  
531 these areas, and we learned a lot. We learned a lot that is of academic interest. And  
532 sometimes, almost sometimes, it seems that sometimes pragmatic types will even  
533 downgrade something because you learn something academic out of it, something of  
534 academic interest. Because if you learned something of academic interest, then you  
535 must not have been focused. But I think that if you're too narrowly focused, you can  
536 sometimes end up in dead ends, and then you get to where you're trying to go as  
537 quickly.

538 **JONES:** Have you disseminate this stuff? Have you maintained ties with the academic  
539 community and published this stuff?

540 **FELGNER:** Well, we try. I think that one of my roles in the company is that I'm  
541 supposed to do that, I'm supposed to keep ties and connections with the academic  
542 community.

543 **JONES:** Well, you know what's going on in universities and elsewhere in industry, so  
544 you don't have any problems identifying people that you want to bring in?

545 **FELGNER:** No.

546 **JONES:** Do you have any problems convincing them to come?

547 **FELGNER:** No, you know, because this type of technology that we're in is of great  
548 interest to many, many people interested in the biological sciences from an academic  
549 perspective, and, yeah, I really have a hard time, as I was saying, I have a hard time  
550 separating what is of academic interest versus what is pragmatic.

551 **JONES:** Well, do you think that companies like this do a good job of integrating these  
552 two different approaches?

553 **FELGNER:** I don't think that, as a rule, as a general rule, seeing this all over, I think  
554 that it's very easy in a biotech company for people to lose sight of technology  
555 development, as opposed to product development. So, there's a sense that the  
556 technology or the inventions, if you want to call them inventions, are made at  
557 universities and then transferred over to the biotech companies, and then it becomes  
558 a product development exercise. It's as if you can't have a marriage between  
559 technology development and product development in the same environment, and I  
560 think that that is a real problem all over. It's because all of these things, when they  
561 get into a biotech company, are very virginal, they're very new technologies, and they  
562 may not have intrinsic in them everything that's needed. All of the nuances and all of  
563 the improvements that need to be developed in order for them to really succeed as,  
564 you know, successful products at some stage, and the development cycle is long, so  
565 by the time your product comes out, you're using eight year old technology. And  
566 again, there is a tendency in the company if you can't say that you're doing product  
567 development, then you're doing something academic, and that may be unnecessary.  
568 But people in technology development can do product enhancements that may  
569 actually turn out to be necessary for the survival of a certain type of product. And it's  
570 not that they're necessarily any less focused, you know. So, I think that there's a real  
571 tendency for the companies to say, 'We're in this for product development.' In every

572 company, there should be just as much understanding that there needs to be  
573 technology development and product development. Whatever their technology is,  
574 they need to develop that technology, you know, and they also need to deal with all  
575 the issues that are necessary in order to do product development. And then these  
576 things can be made to merge together. But again, if everybody starts thinking about it  
577 as a dichotomy, then they end up feeling like it's one or the other. "We can't do both,"  
578 you know, 'We have limited resources, we can't do both,' is usually what will be  
579 brought out.

580 **JONES:** So you consciously try to balance that.

581 **FELGNER:** Sure.

582 **JONES:** From the time that you really got involved in taking this seriously, getting a  
583 PhD, and moving on, how hard have you worked over the years? Harder at one place  
584 rather than another, perhaps?

585 **FELGNER:** No, for me it wasn't any different. What made the biggest difference for  
586 me is my kids, because I used to work at night, but now the kids take the priority.  
587 And the kids, as they grow older, they actually become more demanding. So, that has  
588 more of an impact than any of the other issues. And I didn't really end up working  
589 harder when I came here, I wasn't any more or less motivated. It wasn't that. But, for  
590 me, I have prioritized my kids at a certain stage, because they're going to be, you  
591 know, five more years or so, and they're going to be out of the house, and then I can  
592 have my evenings free again. So, I'll probably up my amount of stuff I do.

**END INTERVIEW**

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**The San Diego Technology Archive (SDTA)**, an initiative of the UC San Diego Library, documents the history, formation, and evolution of the companies that formed the San Diego region's high-tech cluster, beginning in 1965. The SDTA captures the vision, strategic thinking, and recollections of key technology and business founders, entrepreneurs, academics, venture capitalists, early employees, and service providers, many of whom figured prominently in the development of San Diego's dynamic technology cluster. As these individuals articulate and comment on their contributions, innovations, and entrepreneurial trajectories, a rich living history emerges about the extraordinarily synergistic academic and commercial collaborations that distinguish the San Diego technology community.