

Negotiation from Strength or a Meeting of the Minds

For many years during the post-war period and especially during the time Dean Acheson was Secretary of State, there was much talk about ^{the} building of strengths so that when the right time comes, we should be able to negotiate from strength. There was ^a ~~some vague~~ presumption ~~that as a result of such negotiations, we may achieve far-reaching and perhaps total disarmament and some confused presumption~~ that by negotiating from strength we can settle most controversial points in our favor and after that we will need strength no longer so that we might agree to far-reaching and perhaps total disarmament.

There is more than just one fallacy involved in the concepts upon which such reasoning is based. If you negotiate a business deal in private life and if you are in a strong position when you do so, you may indeed be able to settle ~~the~~ ^{most} controversial points in your favor and once you get the other fellow to sign on the dotted line, he will have to perform or else you will take him into court. But what good would it do to make Russia sign an agreement in which ^{most} ~~no~~ controversial points are settled in our favor. [?] Where is the court before which we could take Russia, and who could enforce the verdict of ^{any} ~~this~~ court? ^{vital} Collective security might very well have been the answer to the ^{vital} ~~problem~~ of enforcing agreements ^{after the First World War}. But today there exists no combination of nations that short of a war of indefinite duration and unpredictable outcome could coerce Russia, or for that matter the United States ^{and} and even if America today had overwhelming military strengths and was ready to use ^{it} ~~them~~ in a showdown, she could use ~~them~~ ^{in the} ~~the only thing she could not necessarily~~ ^{would be} ~~negotiated from strength only if what she wanted to negotiate was unconditional~~ surrender. ^{PP} Clearly being militarily strong at the time when we sit down to negotiate might lead Russia to sign an agreement that ^{appears to} ~~suits~~ our purposes, but the only way to make her keep such an agreement is to maintain indefinitely our overwhelming military superiority. This is not compatible with far-reaching disarmament ^{let alone with total disarmament.}

~~Draft of paper of Neg from strength of a meeting~~

Transition from "Negotiating from strength" to Disarmament

We must face the fact that such an agreement would remain in force only as long as the United States and Russia want to keep it in force; for there exists no combination of powers that could coerce either Russia or the United States. The concept of collective security breaks down if it becomes impossible to "enforce" short of a war of indefinite duration and unpredictable outcome. In these circumstances we ^{might} ~~may~~ as well assume that Russia and the United States ^{will} ~~would~~ reserve the legal right to abrogate the agreement at any time, either wholly or in part. And ~~this should help us~~ ^{By assuming this we are at least honest} to recognize ~~clearly~~ that the real problem is to find an answer to this question: What kind of arrangement would offer both Russia and the United States such strong continuing incentives ^{for keeping the arms in operation} that the chances of abrogation by either of them could be regarded as remote?

Only if we have a satisfactory answer to this question can we outline an agreement that will be self-sustaining so that there would be little likelihood of abrogation - and that is the only kind of agreement that would be worth having today.

Practically all nations would have to be a party to such an agreement. ^{but} The right to abrogate could be reserved ^{only by} ~~by~~ a few of them, ^{and} ~~but~~ since most of them could not be given such a right, some machinery for enforcement would have to be set up.

~~Still, as far as~~ Russia and the United States ~~are concerned~~ the only real ^{security only through} ~~safeguard~~ they can offer to each other would lie in arrangements that would guarantee the early discovery of any secret evasion of the agreement, particularly of its disarmament provisions. ^{by other nations?} And if such secret evasions of the agreement were suspected, either by the United States or by Russia, each could exert pressure on the other by threatening to abrogate the agreement in part unless she is given freer access to information, or can otherwise be convinced that there are, in fact, no secret evasions.

What kind and what degree of disarmament would best serve the purpose of a stable peace? What are the successive steps in which a far-reaching agreement could be implemented without exposing any of the participants to internal subversion or to intolerable danger in case of an early abrogation?

If we think of preserving peace on the basis of an arrangement which the great powers could abrogate if they wanted to - and there is no sense of thinking about an arrangement in any other terms - then clearly ~~one of the main concerns~~

~~that both Russia and America must have when they sit down to "negotiate" is to provide sufficient incentive for the other~~ ^{in their own concern} ~~to be reasonably sure that the other~~ ^{in the draft agreement}

~~will be eager to maintain the agreement in force in the future as far as thought can reach.~~ ^{wish to} This is, of course, ^{is as} ~~(very different from trying to settle as many~~ ^{kind of negotiation which is}

~~controversial points in one's favor as possible.~~ ^{their own} ~~What is needed is not to exert~~ ^{one in which both parties} ~~pressure through strength,~~ ^{attempts} ~~but to reach a meeting of the minds on what the main~~ ^{has to} ~~needs~~ ^{real}

~~needs of each nation are, which are so vital that each nation will be eager to keep the agreement in force because~~ ^{if} ~~the agreement meets these needs.~~ ^{substantially} ~~If the~~

~~agreement is of any use at all, it will create a setting in which the probability of war will be regarded as remote, and the issues which will become important in~~

~~such a setting are quite different from the controversial issues which are important in the present setting~~ ^{only because in this setting} ~~in which war is regarded as quite probably and~~ ^{accordingly} ~~in which, therefore, the main concern of each nation must be to improve its chance~~ ^{must be}

~~to win the war if it comes.~~ ^{current} ~~If one thinks of an agreement in such terms, one~~ ^{group of} ~~would expect the reasonable men to negotiate on the part of America, other~~ ^{where} ~~reasonable~~ ^{and another group of}

~~men to negotiate on behalf of Russia, each insisting that certain important points~~ ^{would have to} ~~are settled in the other's favor, for the sake of increasing the incentives that the~~ ^{be} ~~agreement will give to the other for wanting to maintain the agreement in operation~~ ^{in order to give them}

~~and to lessen the chance that the other party might abrogate after the agreement~~ ^{or minimize} ~~has been in operation for a few years.~~ ^{he} This, of course, is an entirely different

~~concept of negotiation than the concept of negotiating from strength.~~ ^{after it} ~~concept of~~ ^{of} ~~negotiation than the concept~~ ^{that} ~~of negotiating from strength.~~

As long as America and Russia think in terms of negotiating from strength, they will be unwilling to disclose in advance just what kind of agreement they


have in mind, for in the kind of negotiations which aim at settling most controversial points in your own favor, you cannot disclose in advance what you will accept lest what you disclose will become the starting point of the negotiations from which you will have to yield ground during the negotiations in order to achieve a compromise. In negotiations of this kind, you have to start out by asking for way more than you hope to get and by offering way less than you might be willing to give.

Because America and Russia have been thinking in terms of negotiating from strength at no time was Russia or America willing to give the world a picture of the over-all settlement which they would consider satisfactory. This is perhaps the basic reason why no picture of a world peace - real peace - has emerged at any time in the post-war world.

It is always ~~st~~ ^{either} ~~has~~ ^{or} ~~every~~ ^{how} ~~or~~ ^{late}

As long as Russia and America think in terms of negotiating from strength, the time will ^{probably} never be right for ^{the} starting ^{at} such negotiations. This is ~~not~~ a ~~static world,~~ but a world of rapidly shifting power relationships. There will hardly be a period of time when the balance of military power does not shift either in favor of America or in favor of Russia. America would ~~then~~ want to postpone negotiations as long as the former ^{holds} ~~is the case~~, and Russia would want to postpone the negotiations when the latter ^{holds,} happens.

of nations at the
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let alone with total disarmament. As long as America and Russia think in terms of arriving at an agreement by negotiating from strength, they will be unwilling to disclose just what kind of agreement they have in mind, for in the kind of negotiation in which the aim is to settle most controversial points in your favor, you cannot disclose in advance what you will accept or else what you ~~will accept~~ ^{disclose} will become the starting point of the negotiations, and you will have to yield ground during the negotiations in order to achieve a compromise. In negotiations of this kind, you have to start out by asking for way more than you hope to get and by offering way less than you might be satisfied with. [And if you are lucky, ~~you~~ ^{might} end up with an agreement and settle the controversial points which you think ~~are~~ ^{more} important only to find out that the controversial points which were important in the setting, ~~your~~ ^{when your} main consideration was to win the war if the war comes, are not ~~at all~~ ^{the} important issues in the new setting which you try to achieve - namely a setting where the probability of war occurring is regarded as remote.]

As long as Russia and America think in terms of negotiating from strength, the time will never be right for starting such negotiations. For a number of years after the war, America's stockpile of bombs was rapidly increasing, while Russia did not have a single bomb; and it appeared that America ~~can~~ ^{could} build up a ~~system of~~ ^{no power base} alliances based on Western Europe. Because of the rapidly increasing military superiority of America, the time was obviously not ripe for negotiating from strength, and it appeared better to postpone such negotiations. This period has hardly ended when the rapid increase of Russian military might made it inadvisable for Russia to negotiate since clearly she could much better negotiate from strength ^{first of} by waiting a few more years when her stockpile of bombs would ~~be a~~ ^{and her jet bombers} match ~~for~~ ^{ours} ours.

It is difficult to see how negotiating from strength could lead to a satisfactory solution of the problem which we face. ^{My point is} What needs to be done is not to negotiate from strength but rather to reach a meeting of the minds ~~This can come about only~~ ^{on a setting in} on the basis of an entirely different approach to the problem, and I shall try to ~~present the concepts which appear to be relevant.~~ ^{what the military strength is} present here the concepts which appear to be relevant.

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In addition the implementation of the current ideas on civilian defense seems to be exceedingly difficult. Even the simplest requirement of making test evacuations of cities meets with obstacles. These tests are resisted on the ground that they disrupt "business as usual" for a day and, thereby, with the consequent loss of a considerable fraction of the day's business profits.

The present situation can be summed up as follows:

The United States appears to threaten to start an atomic war, if fighting breaks out in the Formosa conflict. If atomic weapons are used in a local conflict, the restraint which may be initially exercised by both sides will gradually break down and in the end atomic H-bombs are likely to be used.

The Government wants to reduce the arms expenditure for conventional weapons and is gradually narrowing itself into a position where it will have no choice but to use atomic weapons in any local conflict. At the same time the civilian population remains completely defenseless against atomic attacks and the refusal to suffer business losses prevents the limited progress that could be made in the direction of increasing their chances of survival, in case of atomic warfare.

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Can disarmament go far enough to permit Russia to divert from its military expenditure an amount ^{equal} equivalent to 20% of its national income into investment in the consumer goods industry and its related industries which ^{should} would lead to a doubling of the standard of living in Russia every 12 years? Can it go far enough to permit ⁱⁿ the United States either an increase of about \$1000 in the yearly spendable family income, or a ten hour weekly reduction in the working hours or two months paid vacation for every worker? - - What kind and what degree of disarmament will be needed in order to make it easy to discover secret violations of the disarmament provisions? Should we think in terms of eliminating guided missiles, jet bombers and other effective ~~means which are suitable~~ for the delivery of bombs rather than in terms of controlling the stockpile of fissionable materials? Should we eliminate from national armaments all mobile heavy weapons permitting only machine guns while leaving ^{uncontrolled} free all ~~pure~~ weapons means of defense such as anti-aircraft rockets, short range fighters, etc. ^{as well as} and heavy guns in built-in fortifications? -- Could one ^{set up} separate the different regions of the World local ~~police~~ international police organizations that ^{accept the} could prevent the violation of the agreement by the ^{from} nations of the region by arresting the individuals who may be held responsible for such violations? Should we permit the national police of certain nations to retain ^{in certain countries} a limited quantity of light mobile weapons (guns, tanks, etc) as a protection against subversion and, if so, how much and for how long? What kind and what quantity of fire power would ^{the international} such a regional police force need in order to discourage the national police of an offending nation ~~to interfere with its~~ ^{keep} inter-fering with its operations? How would the members of such an inter-national ^{place} be recruited in order to offer assurance that the regional

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~~international police force have been recruited~~

police force ^{might} would ~~not~~ intervene in the internal affairs of the nations of the region? ^{you} What are the regions in which it would be necessary to maintain a ^{local international} police force of substantial size? --

Would this kind of disarmament leave the nations in a tolerably position if an abrogation occurred, say, five or ten years from now? What are the successive steps in which a far-reaching agreement could be implemented without exposing any of the participants to intolerable danger in case of an early abrogation? How big must be the first step of implementation in order to represent a sufficiently large "investment" ^{to convince us that no} that none of the major nations would enter into the agreement if they ^{had at} ~~contemplated~~ at the outset ^{the} any intention of abrogating the agreement?

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~~Insert: What are the outstanding political issues with which the agreement must cope? What are the national aspirations of the various nations that the agreement must satisfy either in one single stroke at the outset or gradually according to a predetermined schedule less they subject the agreement to a strain that might either lead to abrogation by one of the great powers or make enforcement necessary against one of the smaller nations?~~

~~All these ^{careful} questions which require wisdom and consideration.~~

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legitimate

Should the agreement frankly recognize spheres of influence and, if so, should it set up a predetermined schedule, extending if necessary, over one or two generations, for the gradual "liberation" of one territory after another from such spheres of influence?

What are the legitimate national aspirations of the various nations that the agreement must satisfy ~~either~~ at the outset, or gradually according to a predetermined schedule, lest they subject the agreement to a strain that might either lead to abrogation by one of the great powers, or make enforcement necessary against one of the smaller nations?

Should the agreement set up a fund under the control, perhaps, of some regional international organizations for the advancement of the economic development (and population control) of the less industrialized and frankly underdeveloped areas and should there be a graduated world income tax ~~set up~~ ^{accepted} to provide the necessary funds?

Should the agreement set up principles regulating the redistribution of raw materials?

What ~~other~~ major operating international institutions ^{must} could be set up in order to develop ~~as fast as possible~~ a World Community that would have a fair chance to evolve peacefully in the course of several generations so that the ultimate state, i.e. ^a World under One Government, may ^{eventually} be reached without going through another World War? — — ~~Yes~~

*all these questions will require
wisdom and will need careful
considerations. —*

Outline

(Set 2)

0. Introduction

1. Solution by negotiation from strengths.
2. We must face the fact ... (from page 5 of old draft).
3. Discovery of secret evasions.
4. Partial abrogation. Where does abrogation leave us? Large initial investment the only guarantee of premeditated abrogation.
5. Enforcement against smaller nations.
6. How far should disarmament go and ^{why}~~how?~~

Introduction

The Russian-American conflict which has arisen after the war was foreseeable and was in fact foreseen by many. It was foreseen ^{for instance many} by the Germans, who did not cease to ask our ~~victorious~~ troops when they marched into Germany at the end of the war, "When are you going to fight Russia?" ~~And~~ I it was ~~no less clearly~~ foreseen ^{also} by many of my friends working on the uranium project at the University of Chicago. Our predictions were not based on the particular political system under which Russia is ruled or on Russia's professed aim of world conversion to Communism,

They were, rather, based on the fact that Russia and the United States were ~~the~~ ^{the} only great military powers left when the war ended. ~~That~~ ^{This} fact alone ~~was quite~~ ^{some thought} ~~sufficient to bring about a power conflict.~~ ^{combined with the 200 tons of the bomb which brings}

^{Russia and America within each other's range will lead}
 A power conflict of this sort is cursed by an inherent instability, for once attention is focused on the possibility of war, the most important consideration is to win that war if it comes. Almost every controversial issue, when settled either in Russia's or America's favor, will increase either Russia's or America's chance to win ^{such a} the war; and since the issue of who is going to win the war is one

^{issue} on which a compromise is not possible, no progress whatever can be made by trying to settle by agreement ~~one by one~~ ^{one} any of these issues. Such unilateral ^{steps} ~~action~~ as America or Russia might ~~undertake~~ to improve their military ~~or strategic~~ position is, ~~at the same time,~~ ^{are} more likely than not to increase the chances of war.

^{obvious cycles}
 Similar ~~situations~~ have arisen in the world before this time. When the growing power of Athens threatened Sparta and the growing power of sparta threatened Athens, both nations were ~~in peace time~~ ^{increasingly} guided in their policy by the goal of winning the war if war came. Both tried to improve their chance by increasing more and more the number of their allies.

would lead to a dangerous power conflict.

multilaterally

~~and more allies~~ And in the end, the war came, apparently against the wishes of both Athens and Sparta, when

which might very well have ended at its end to

For a while after the war, Russia and America moved in the footsteps of Athens and Sparta, and had it not been for the invention of the atomic bomb and the stockpiling of such bombs by America and Russia, the course of the "cold war" would have

~~been~~ *remained to be an insuperable barrier toward* closely followed the period that preceded the Peloponnesian War, with the "cold war" leading to a Third World War at the end of which ~~victorious Germany would dominate Europe, including large parts of Russia, and a victorious Japan would dominate China.~~

remained and victorious, victorious Germany would dominate Europe, including large parts of Russia, and a victorious Japan would dominate China.

This is, of course, where we came in, for we entered the Second World War precisely in order to prevent such a result.

The invention of the atomic bomb and the stockpiling of such bombs by America and Russia will probably ~~prevent world history from reenacting the Peloponnesian War.~~

The stockpiles of such bombs, which Russia as well as America may soon have available, if she doesn't have it available now, ~~do not make it impossible for America and Russia to fight a war with each other, for they can by tacit agreement refrain from~~

~~bombing each other's cities.~~ But ~~such~~ stockpiles protect Russia, as well as America, from being utterly defeated in such a war, as long as each is willing to resist

defeat by devastating, if need be, the enemy at the cost of being devastated ~~themselves.~~

Each might successfully avert defeat, even if they are not willing to pay such a high price, as long as they can deceive the world into believing that they are willing to pay any price rather than agree to unconditional surrender.

The fact that war between Russia and America ~~can~~ no longer be fought through to total victory reduces the inherent instability in the present power conflict, and it does so ~~largely~~ *mainly* because it ~~greatly~~ decreases the strategic importance of the present controversial issues. In this sense, the existence of the bomb makes it easier to resolve the present conflict though, ~~at the same time, it makes a problem which we have to solve in the long run much more difficult.~~ In fact the bomb has created a problem which cannot be solved, ~~on the level at which political thinking - even the best of political thinking - has moved in the past.~~

As long as Russia is willing to resist defeat by devastating, if need be, the United States at the cost of being devastated herself, she cannot be ~~utterly~~ ^{really} defeated. Even if she is not willing to pay such a high price, she ~~could~~ successfully avert defeat as long as she can ^{persuade} ~~deceive~~ America into believing she is willing to pay any price rather than to agree to surrender. The same, of course, holds for America.

Because of the bombs, the war between Russia and America can no longer be fought through to a victorious end. Because of the bombs, the strategic importance of the present controversial issues becomes less and less day by day. The bombs do not prevent Russia and America from increasing more and more the number of their allies, but it makes it less and less likely that these allies will take the risk of entering the war on either side, if war should come. It seems likely that the bombs have halted, or will soon hereafter bring to an end the trend towards ^a ~~the~~ war, engulfing ^{Western Europe and therefore of} most of the civilized world. ~~If~~ ^{if we get} through the next three years without war, it seems likely that the inherent ^{instability of the present} ~~instability of a~~ power conflict will be ~~greatly reduced~~ ^{not to great diminished} by the bomb, and in this sense, one might say that the bomb ~~has~~ ^{was} become a factor for peace. In another sense, however, the bomb has created a problem which cannot be solved at all on the level at which political thinking - even the best of political thinking - has moved in the past. ^P In the past, a legitimate aim of ~~our~~ ^{C.E.} foreign policy - even the best of foreign policy - was to preserve the peace; ~~that is~~, to lengthen the interval between two subsequent wars. But today, postponing the next world war, which will when it comes be fought with hydrogen bombs, can hardly be considered as a legitimate aim of a sensible policy. What we need to do ~~now~~ ^{has to do} is to create a setting in which the advent of another war may be regarded ^{as a perhaps} ~~as a~~ conceivable, but ^{very} ~~exceedingly~~ improbable occurrence. To create such a setting is ~~not~~ clearly a new problem, and it is useless to search for a precedent in history.

policy in the past was to lengthen the interval between two major wars. Postponing the ^{next} ~~Third~~ World War which will, when it comes, be fought with hydrogen bombs, can hardly be considered the worthwhile objective of policy, unless, of course, one knows what to do during a short reprieve that such a policy may win to create ^{for} a setting in which the advent of another war becomes improbable. ^{But} ~~To~~ create such a setting is clearly a new problem, ^{and it is useless to rush for a} ~~for which there is no~~ precedent in history.

R

That ultimately the world will live under one government, if ^{human society is} ~~life~~ can be preserved at all, can hardly be doubted by anybody who understands the meaning of history.

Whether this ultimate state will be reached within two, three, or four generations is not an important issue. The important issue is rather how this ultimate state can be reached without going through another world war. ^R The problem which faces

the world today ^{two thus} ~~will have~~ two facets. First of all, we must solve the problem of changing over from a setting in which war between Russia and America appears probable, to a setting in which such a war is considered merely as a remote possibility. This change cannot come about in one single jump. It will require a

number of steps taken one after the other. However, it will not be possible to agree on the first step unless we are able to agree on all the steps, including

the last ^{one} ~~step~~. That is, it will be necessary to agree on ^{at the outset} ~~of the~~ settlement ^{by drawing a clear picture} such as ^{at the outset} ~~one after the~~ other, and also to agree ^{it will be necessary} ~~in what~~ stages and at what rate the final arrangement is

^{reached} ~~to be~~ approached. ^{through what} ~~I~~ shall refer to this approach to the problem as "predetermined

gradualism", and I believe that it is the key to the solution of a number of problems with which we are faced, ^{if} ~~assuming that~~ we succeed, through a set of

arrangements representing one single package, ^{(more towards a} ~~at the outset~~ to resolve the Russian-American conflict and to ^{will be} ~~create~~ a setting in which the probability of war

no longer claims our ~~immediate~~ attention. We ~~are~~ then ^{will be} ~~faced~~ with the next ^{with the} ~~urgent~~ problem ^{next in importance} ~~to~~ build a world community that will permit reaching the ultimate

state of world government within two, three, or four generations without going through another world war.

If we now turn our attention to the resolution of the Russian-American conflict, we must make some assumptions about the groups of men that make up the Russian Government or the American Government and the / ~~difference~~ between these groups and the effect which public opinion in Russia or America has on these groups; as it were, the effect of these groups on public opinion within their own nation.

There are those who believe that the actions of the Russian Government in the past ten years cannot be understood and its future actions cannot be predicted, except by taking into account the fact that the long-range aim of the Russian Government is world rule of Communism. Those who believe this think that the Russian-American power conflict cannot be understood without taking into account the ideological conflict with which it is ^{inseparably} interwoven. In order to examine the merits of these views, let us first of all compare the professed aims ^{with} and the actual actions of our own Government and also examine to what extent ^{the actions of} our own Government can be identified with ^{the} American people and to what extent their actions, as do all Government actions, are guided preponderantly by considerations of political expediency rather than on ideological preference. Clearly, if we examine the set of values which we cherish, ^{as a people we} we value freedom, Democracy, and an economic system based on a free market highly; and I believe we ^{cherish} value them in this order. ^{Contrary} The public discussion of these issues has somewhat blurred the fact that ^{in holding} freedom and Democracy ^{are not inseparable} are two rather different concepts. Imperial Germany, ^{even political freedom} for instance, before the first World War, enjoyed as much ~~political~~ freedom as we enjoy today in the United States, and probably ^{even rather abundant} a little more. It was not a Democracy in the sense that the Government could not be removed by the results of any election, ^{but} even though an election may have changed the parliamentary majority in a sense adverse to the Government. The example of imperial Germany shows how freedom, as represented by a living Bill of Rights, can exist in the absence of

Insert to Page 4b

Insert 1 - and I would like other nations to partake of the benefits of freedom and democracy.

Insert 2 - ~~but~~ ^{however} it places the principle of non-intervention above the desire to have freedom and democracy prevail ~~but~~ ^{and} for the Government there is something even more important than upholding the principle of non-intervention.

and [Document]

~~parliamentary~~
 political democracy. There can be no doubt that the American people cherish ~~both freedom and democracy~~ ^{both freedom and democracy} ~~and all three values.~~ However, when it comes to the actions taken by the Government, other considerations take precedence. It is true that the Government would prefer other nations to have freedom and democracy, other things being equal. But when it comes to choosing between a democratic government that declines to cooperate with us in the "cold war," or a military dictatorship that is willing to cooperate, ~~the~~ ^{our} Government unhesitatingly favors the latter. This was ~~amply~~ ^{recently} demonstrated in Iran, where we welcomed a military rule that replaced the democratically elected government of Mossadegh, and could not have done so successfully had the Iranian Army not been equipped with American tanks and other heavy weapons. This was ~~again~~ ^{also} demonstrated in Egypt, where we welcomed the military government that forcibly put an end to ~~the~~ ^{parliamentary form of} democracy.

When ~~it comes~~ ^{AS} to freedom, the Government's utterances show great concern about the freedom of the Poles, Roumanians, and Hungarians, about which the Government is powerless to do anything short of going to war, ~~but~~ the same concern is not manifested ~~by~~ ^{as the front concerning with respect to} the lack of freedom in many of ~~the~~ countries of South America, some of which live under a rather vicious form of dictatorship. In South America, when it comes to action by our ~~own~~ ^{own} Government, while we would like to see the nations in South America have freedom and democracy, ~~there is something else that takes precedence over the principle of non-intervention.~~ ^{most II} When a nation in South America, in free and democratic elections, puts in a government that not only refuses to cooperate with us in the "cold war," but that might be subservient to Russia, our desire to see that democratic government ~~be~~ ^{be} replaced by a dictatorship that is subservient to us, takes precedence over the principle of non-intervention. We saw that clearly demonstrated in the case of Guatemala.

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Another argument in favor of maintaining tariffs is a need to preserve certain industries that could not survive in the absence of tariffs, so that our production facilities might be available in case of war, when we might be cut off from imports from abroad. Once more we see that improving our chances to win the war, if war comes, takes precedence over our desire to see free trade prevail.

the - need us assumed

If we are not aware of the set of values of the American people, and if we do not listen to speeches made by members of the Government, and if we observe nothing but the actual actions of the American Government, it is not at all clear that such an observer would detect in the actual actions of our Government any indication for a preference to see freedom and democracy prevail in other nations and to see the market economy prevail outside of the United States, where no United States investments abroad are directly involved.

international trade.

Argument

from observer of visitor from another planet who would not listen

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When it comes to our preference for a free market, in principle we are in favor of it. It would follow that we ought to abolish all tariffs, perhaps not very fast, but gradually, according to a pre-determined schedule, until the tariffs ^{all} has become zero. ^{when it comes to fundamental action after considering} But other considerations take precedence over our adherence to the principles of the free market, when it comes to ~~practical~~ ^{take precedence over our preference for} Government action.

Tariffs cannot be abolished without adversely affecting the ^{moral and financial} moral and material interests of management and labor of certain industries. Since vested interests wielding political influence are affected, we could abolish tariffs only by adequately compensating these vested interests financially for the loss which they would suffer. This, our Government has so far not been prepared to do, ^{in part} presumably because its professed belief in the system of a free economy is not sufficiently strong to overcome the inertia that stands against the adoption of unprecedented, even though necessary, measures. ^{and in part because}

^{As the} As a result of lack of courage to act in defense of our own convictions, our friends cannot sell enough goods in this country to provide them with the currency they need to import other goods from this country and, instead of trade, we ^{provide them} give them aid. This, too, is in a sense an unprecedented measure, and the reason it was adopted is ^{and it was} probably ~~due to~~ ^{adopted because} the Government's desire to solve the economic problem of our friends in a way which creates a certain degree of political ^{dependence} subservience - the kind of political ^{dependence} subservience which free trade would not involve. ^{the nature desired by the people} Having examined to what extent ~~our~~ ^{the nature desired by the people} professed set of values control the action of the American Government and to what extent considerations of political expedience take precedence, we may not attempt to consider the same question with respect to the Russian Government.

In China, the revolution is new and may ^{not} have a Messianic quality. The Russian Revolution is 40 years old, and almost two generations have passed since its inception. An American Communist ^{might} very well believe that the Russian political system will, if universally adopted, bring about paradise on earth. No Russian

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Is it likely that Russians, either the common people or any of the members of the Government, like to face the danger of being sent to prison without trial and really believe that their administrative procedures will protect them from unjust punishment? Is it not more likely that ^{as the time to} the lack of freedom in Russia ^{have long ago lost} has long ago made the members of the Russian Government ^{of} lose the conviction ^{which} from being in possession of the magic formula for happiness, but must be shared with all people in the world, ^{2 and without a conviction} which is a prerequisite for embarking on a Messianic conquest of the world. ^{2 the element we all} We have all seen in our lifetime how the British ruling class has lost the conviction that British imperialism is bringing ^{Substantive independent} ~~real benefit~~ to under-developed countries, and how, as this conviction was lost, British imperialism lost its fervor and ^{conviction} seems to be aggressive.

Communist, in his senses, who ^{knowing} has lived under that system can conceivably believe this
 so. The religious fervor of spreading Communism all over the world for the sake
 of bringing happiness to people can, therefore, not be a major motive for the group
 of men who ^{may} form the Russian Government. ^{the} parliamentary form of democracy is
 not the only conceivable political system under which a good human society can live.
 But freedom, such as defined by the Bill of Rights, is essential to human happiness.
 To the extent to which this kind of freedom is absent in Russia, an essential
 factor to human happiness is lacking, ^{there. Is it likely} and those who think that Russians, either
 common people or members of the Government, like to be imprisoned without trial ^{face the danger of being}
 and are willing to trust administrative procedures to procure justice, are probably ^{quite wrong.}
^{will protect them from unjust punishment?}
 quite wrong. The lack of freedom in Russia has probably, as much weakened the
 good conscience of the Russian Government that is needed for a Messianic conquest ^{any eye discerned the members of from the good}
 of the world. ^{We all have witnessed how} Gandhi's activities in India have shaken the belief of the
 British in the justification of the kind of imperialism in which their fathers
 and grandfathers sincerely believed. ^{in order} That the Russian Government would like to
 see other countries go Communist and, therefore, to ensure that the governments
 of those countries will cooperate with Russia rather than with America in the "cold
 war," can be taken for granted. That Russia will look upon the Chinese revolution
 and the success of the Chinese Government in organizing China ^{as a major problem} to the point where
 Russia might go to war in defense of China, is also very likely, most

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Whether it has any concrete meaning to say that Russia's long-range aim is Communist domination of the world in the sense that this is a principle which will enable us to predict Russian response to an adequate attempt to establish peace, is open to doubt. It is no more than a conjecture and, to my mind, a very unlikely one. No one in the United States believes that our own political acts can be derived from any long-range aim in any way connected with our professed beliefs. Why should Russia be any better than we are in this respect, and what indication is there that Russia is any better than we are when it comes to weighing political expediency against the set of values officially professed by the Government and probably, in fact, cherished by the people.

Handwritten note: This is the letter

Handwritten: But we must not put undue stress
 Much stress is laid on Russia's post-war record of subverting nations by bringing about Communist revolutions. ~~But~~ ^a the only countries in Europe where such Communist Governments displaced ~~the~~ ^a preceding government, (more or less democratically elected), was in countries where either Russia moved in with troops and the elections took place with Russian troops in occupation, or else in ^{of} countries like Czechoslovakia, where Russia moved in with troops and put in a native police force, which was ^{imposed by Russia} ~~organized along Communist lines~~. In Yugoslavia, where no Russian troops moved in, there became established a Communist Government but not one that was subservient to Russia, ^{this was a facade} but rather ~~one~~ which was willing to play along with us and with whom we were willing to play along. ^P The situation might very well turn out to be different in under-developed nations. It is true that so far only Indo-China, where the Nationalist movement and the Communist movement joined forces to fight for liberation from a Colonial power, turned Communist. But the future might bring about Communist governments in other under-developed nations. ^P Here we are up against a serious problem. As ^{the} result of a curious lethargy in political thinking, there have been developed

no forms of democracy which are ^{rather} ~~more~~ suited for the government of under-developed countries than is a parliamentary form of democracy. This latter form has functioned well in modern times only in a few places in the world, such as in Britain, the United States, and France; and there it functioned not so much because of the perfection of ~~such a~~ ^{the} system as it did because of the civic virtues that will permit even an imperfect system to function ~~intolerably~~ well, except in the case of ~~great~~ stresses ~~such as are imposed~~ in case of acute danger of war or a major economic depression.

Because we have not developed adequate forms of democracy suited to function under modern conditions, ^{in underdeveloped countries} it is likely that many nations will live under dictator-

ships rather than under any form of democracy, and the ~~kind of~~ ^{kind of} tradition of ~~cooperation~~ ^{and discipline} which the Communist movement has developed, gives it a great advantage over other movements ^{in the} establishment of a dictatorship. ^{signed it} All that one can ^{legitimately} say on this score is, I believe, that given a setting in the world in which war

is no longer regarded as probable and the need to win the war, when it comes, no longer ~~takes precedence~~ ^{drives} in the minds of either the American or the Russian Govern- ment to build up alliances, the present great concern of the American Government

and the Russian Government ^{over revolutionary and} ~~camp -~~ ^{debates} in remote regions of the world might disappear as a source of conflict between them.

that may be
inconsistent with reality

Let us now, for the sake of argument, make ~~the most favorable~~ ^{these} assumption ^{that} that the Russian Government is moved by much the same kind of consideration as is the American Government; that both Governments are comprised ~~by~~ a sufficiently large number of reasonable men who are susceptible to arguments based on enlightened self-interest; that we can create conditions that neither Government ~~can be expected to keep in agreement,~~ ^{will} ~~(even though they may have entered into the agreement in good faith),~~ ^{be} if ~~they have~~ ^{he has} sufficiently strong incentives for abrogating ~~it~~ the agreement; that the aspect of ideological conflict, which seems to be involved is of minor importance, ~~and~~ ^{rather} having made all these favorable assumptions, ~~ask~~ ^{we may now} ourselves the following question: "What kind of an international arrangement would resolve the present power conflict and create a setting in which war ~~could~~ ^{the probability of} be considered remote?" It is my contention that to give the answer to this question is not easy; that so far nobody has presented an answer to it; and that if an adequate answer were found, it would contain the answer to 95% of those questions ~~which represent a real problem,~~ ^{which we must have no matter} the remaining 5% which remained unconsidered ~~dealing with the ideological conflict that is superimposed on the power conflict~~ ^{in that circumstances we make an} and that has been left under consideration in formulating the assumptions. It is, ~~therefore,~~ ^{the role that the ideological conflict} my contention that without giving a clear answer ~~on the basis of the~~ ^{which is superimposed on the power conflict} above stated assumptions, ~~an intelligent discussion of the issue is impossible.~~ ^{having these}

I am well aware of the fact that the opposite position is taken by many people who believe that Russia's long-range aim is Communist domination of the world and that without taking this into account, we are not able to predict the Russian response to any ~~adequate~~ ^{at} attempt ~~to~~ ^{ing} establish peace. This, to me, ~~appears to be a~~ ^{however} conjecture ~~and a very unlikely one.~~ ^{dangerous} It assumes a kind of superiority of decision making in the Russian Government, which I find difficult to believe can exist in reality. No one believes that the political acts of the United States can be derived from any such long-range aim or ~~are closely connected with our~~ ^{are} ~~professed~~ ^{from our} beliefs. What

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reason is there to believe that Russia is ^{of} so superior to us ^{and that the} ~~in being guided by~~ ^{reforms of the}
~~the values officially~~ ^{one guided by the} ~~professed by the Government~~ ^{principles} and probably, in fact, cherished
 by the people rather than by political expediency. ^{operatively} I, personally, ^{found} that it
 is no more difficult to understand Russian responses to our actions in the post-
 war period than it is to understand our responses to Russian actions, simply by
 asking myself what I ^{myself} would do if I happened to be entrusted with Governmental
 responsibility and had to ^{on one side or the other} ~~make my~~ decisions ^{these may} on ~~the basis of~~ enlightened self-
 interest. In either case, there are ^{of course} occasions when the Russian Government or the
 American Government did not do what I would have done ~~if~~ I had been placed in
 their position ^{and} such deviations must, of course, be expected, for sometimes a
 Government's action is based on less accurate information ~~of the facts~~ than can be
 gleaned by an intelligent reader, who carefully follows the daily press. ^{and an} On
 other occasions, ^{the} men who are involved in day-to-day operations ^{level} ~~are~~ inclined to ^{be}
 give too much weight to the immediate consequences of their actions at the expense
~~of the consequences that may be expected to happen a year or two hence~~ ^{and, on}
~~thirdly,~~ ^{still other occasions} sometimes action in foreign policy reflects the needs of domestic policy
 rather than ^{time} national interest.

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Let us now, for the sake of argument, make these assumptions: The Russian Government is moved by much the same kind of considerations as is the American Government. In both Governments, there ^{are} is a fair number of reasonable men who are susceptible to arguments based on enlightened self-interest. Neither Government is willing to assume that the other will keep an agreement if it has a sufficiently strong incentive for abrogating it, even though the agreement may have been entered into in good faith. The ideological conflict between Russia and America which looms so large in ^{the} public utterances of Government representatives is far less important in determining what actions either government will undertake than is ^{the} a power conflict in which the two governments are caught at present.

Having made these assumptions, we may now ask ourselves the following question: What kind of an international arrangement ~~will~~ would resolve the present power conflict and create a setting in which the possibility of war could be regarded as remote?

It is my contention that unless we are able to give an answer to this question on the basis of ^{the} the assumptions stated above, ^{which} represent a simplification of an actually more complex situation, it is impossible to discuss intelligently the real issues in the framework of ^{the} the admittedly more complex reality. ^{And of} If we are able to give an answer to this question on the basis of ^{the} the simplified assumptions, we may have ^{dealt with some} answered 95% of the real issues.