

When I first came to Germany in 1920 I had occasion to observe the reaction of the German people to the aftermath of the First World War. I lived with them through the times of the worst inflation; I saw the first flare-up of organized nationalism (the Kapp putsch) collapse as a result of the <sup>joint</sup> resistance ~~with the help~~ of the organized working class and the victorious allies. I lived with them through their genuine progress which they made towards democracy ~~which was stopped by~~ <sup>ended with the depression 1929 which</sup> the depression of 1929.

During the depression with an unemployment as great, <sup>as</sup> but no greater than in the other industrial countries, and in the absence of any constructive attempt to cope with it, I saw the rise of another aggressive nationalist movement. By the middle of 1931 there was little doubt that this nationalist movement will be victorious and arrived at this conclusion not because of the intrinsic strength of this movement but rather because of the conspicuous absence of any resistance to it on the part of those who were opposed to it. My own decision to leave Germany was made at that time and on this basis.

During the first years of <sup>after</sup> Hitler's taking office, <sup>in 1933</sup> following 1933, I lived in England and had occasion to observe the response of my English friends to the events which took place in Germany. I had many discussions with them on this subject and I did not hesitate to express my dismay when ~~on~~ one occasion after another was missed in stopping Germany on her path towards the Second World War. The last opportunity in this respect (at least, in my own opinion) was the open breach of the Treaty of Versailles which ~~the~~ Germany committed when she moved her army into the demilitarized zone <sup>of</sup> in the Rhineland. ~~From~~ the legal point of view France could have invoked the Locarno Treaty at that moment and could have called upon the British government to resist by military action Germany's "invasion" of her own territory. <sup>But</sup> (British public opinion was opposed at that ~~particular~~ time to British participation in such <sup>a</sup> military intervention and France did not invoke the Treaty of Locarno. There was, of course, no doubt that Germany would fortify the Rhineland and it was clear that ~~soon~~ thereafter Germany's <sup>military</sup> military might would make a military intervention on the part of the allies more and more difficult.

I remember very well how I tried to tell my English friends on this occasion that I deplored their lack of action not because I had any anti-German feelings but rather because of my sympathy for the German people. I had lived in Germany for thirteen years and while I did not feel as much at home there as I felt in England and America, I had a high regard for the German people. I tried to explain to my English friends why ~~This is not the time nor the place to discuss why~~ certain virtues, which as individuals the Germans possess, render them dangerous as a nation and that for the German people the choice was between enduring <sup>an early</sup> a military intervention that would stop the German government on its path towards war (~~an intervention that would not be war even if the German government chose to resist~~) and suffering a major war <sup>a little later</sup> at the end of which the German cities would lie in ashes and rubble. I <sup>recall</sup> remember the conversation very vividly. ~~They asked me~~ I remember their asking me whether if Germany <sup>really</sup> started a second world war and if she lost, this would be in my opinion the end of the German nation, and I remember my answer that Carthage was not destroyed until after the third Punic war and Germany might <sup>suffer the same fate after</sup> ~~cease to exist as a nation after she would~~ plunge the world ~~for~~ into war for the third time, but hardly ~~sooner.~~ the second time

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As I recall these discussions in England between 1933 and 1937

I do not see how <sup>any</sup> one could <sup>again</sup> hope to solve the German problem by means of a peace treaty which ~~imposes~~ imposes ~~all sorts of~~ "restrictions" on Germany and by relying on a pledge by the Great Powers <sup>to enforce these</sup> of military ~~intervention in case Germany disregards these restrictions.~~ <sup>intervention at the proper time.</sup> The military powers <sup>was</sup> of France and England were certainly sufficient to prevent the fortification of the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, but they did not take this action. Why is it any more likely that the <sup>Great Powers</sup> ~~Great Powers~~ would take such action in similar circumstances ten, twenty, or thirty years hence. The situation is certainly not more favorable in this respect after the Second World War than after the First World War, <sup>and</sup> if anything, it is less favorable. ~~It is less favorable because~~ <sup>because</sup> there has been a long period of occupation of Germany and also because it was conceded at Yalta that Poland should be compensated for her losses to Russia by territory obtained at the expense of Germany, <sup>will</sup> ~~would be~~ a strong resurgence of nationalism <sup>at an early date it would come along</sup> sooner or later and a strong organized nationalistic movement <sup>will certainly arise</sup> which would capture a large fraction of the voters in any democratically constituted Germany, ~~and~~  
Even now the Germans regard themselves <sup>in</sup> as potential allies of either the US or Russia and <sup>and</sup> look to another world war as <sup>the</sup> the hope for their <sup>salvation</sup> salvation.

~~The acceptance of~~ a unified and centralized Germany under a government responsible to the German people, but restricted by a peace treaty which is supervised by some control commission that would watch over Germany's <sup>and</sup> observation of the treaty, offers no reliable safeguards for the maintenance of peace. Such a commission would be completely powerless inside of Germany and would have to decide on <sup>a</sup> military intervention in case Germany should violate her obligations.

*Time*

We cannot materially improve this situation by putting our faith into artificial gadgets such as the division of Germany into a number of political units. Such a division would merely accelerate the rise of organized German nationalism to which it would give legitimate aim, i.e., the unification and centralization of the administration of Germany -- ~~that is~~, <sup>not</sup> an aim ~~which~~ could easily rally <sup>the majority of</sup> 95% if not 100% of the German voters.

The real question is whether we can find a setting in which the Germans will have a strong incentive for living as a peaceful nation; in which they can find ~~it~~ an outlet for their energies by working towards making their nation prosperous, and in which they can occupy a position <sup>which</sup> will in the long run permit them to feel as equals with ~~their~~ other nations and yet prevent ~~them~~ <sup>their neighbors</sup> from becoming, ~~as a nation~~, dangerous to their neighbors and the world as a whole.

<sup>¶</sup> We cannot solve this problem by ~~trying~~ turning the clock back and <sup>knowing to keep</sup> ~~decentralizing~~ Germany. <sup>decentralized</sup> In looking towards a solution, we must seek it <sup>rather</sup> in the direction in which the natural developments of the world as a whole is moving. In looking towards a solution we have to go back to fundamentals and display more imagination and resourcefulness than did the peacemakers at Versailles.

Europe is a crowded continent. The interdependence of the nations in Europe is greater than that of nations on other continents. The decisions of a German government affect not only the German people, they <sup>strongly also</sup> affect the Dutch, the Belgians, the French, the Danes, the Poles, the Czechs, etc. If we want to find a solution to the German problem, and to the problem of Europe in general, we must find a <sup>form of</sup> ~~way to create~~ a political organization in which this interdependence finds an adequate expression. <sup>¶</sup> There is no way in which we can impose <sup>at present</sup> a constitution on our allies. But we can make a beginning by creating a new <sup>new form of political organization</sup> political form of organization in Germany

and offer inducements to the other European nations to follow suit, and to go at least part of the way within the next ten years.

I believe we ought to set up a democratic Germany with a German government which is responsible to a Reichstag. But since the decisions of the German government affect all people in Europe, we should insist (in making the peace treaty) that only part of this Reichstag, perhaps 60% be elected by the German people and that the remaining seats be occupied by representatives elected by the French, ~~the~~ the Dutch, the Belgians, etc., etc. These <sup>all</sup> nations, whenever they elect members to their own parliament, could also elect their representatives to the German Reichstag. None of Germany's neighbors would have enough votes <sup>in the Reichstag</sup> to bully the German government. But <sup>a</sup> German government which would want to embark on a program of nationalistic ~~aggression~~ <sup>expansion</sup> would presumably be opposed by the representatives of most of the neighboring nations and would have to capture 5/6 of the German votes (about 83%) before it could obtain <sup>for such a program</sup> a simple majority <sup>in the Reichstag</sup>. The German political parties will <sup>presumably</sup> fall into three groups, the nationalists, the middle parties, and the communists. Most of the other countries represented in the German Reichstag will have political parties falling into these same three categories. We can assume that all communists in the Reichstag would vote as a block and <sup>strength</sup> therefore the ~~threat~~ of the communists in the Reichstag would ~~merely~~ reflect the average strength of the communists among the participating nations, <sup>thus should</sup> which ~~will~~ be insufficient to give them a majority in the Reichstag. On the other hand, the French nationalists would not with the German nationalists, they would vote with the German middle parties ~~and the nationalists~~ <sup>and these</sup> in the Reichstag ~~which~~ would be strengthened <sup>by the</sup> votes of both the middle parties and the nationalists of most participating

nations. In this way we may obtain a democratic regime in Germany in which the German government could not be captured by those forces that would render it dangerous to Germany's neighbors.

Of course it would be necessary to discuss in detail the organization and the structure of the German police force, which would have the task of safeguarding the constitutional German government. The chief of police ~~and~~ <sup>or</sup> the minister of interior might be made directly responsible to the Reichstag, and even the recruiting of the police force might be placed in the hands of offices which are in direct control of committees of the Reichstag, or the parties which constitute it. ~~There is no possibility that Germany will fall~~ In the long

run we cannot expect Germany to be satisfied with having a foreign representation in her Reichstag unless the other participating countries are willing to admit similar participation of foreigners in their parliaments. No doubt France and the other participating countries would emphasize that Germany had started two wars in this century and they have started none, <sup>Policy should</sup> ~~and that~~ <sup>provoke that</sup> therefore Germany ought to accept the participation of foreigners and that they need not to do so. Even though there is some justification for this argument and allowance ought to be made for it, I believe that these other countries ought to be willing to accept a similar participation of foreigners in their parliaments -- perhaps 20% in place of the 40% which Germany may be asked to accept. Is there any way to induce these countries to go along with some such plan concerning their own parliaments? For the time being the best we could do would be probably to provide in the peace treaty with Germany that the question of foreign participation in the German Reichstag will be laid

before the signatories of the peace treaty at the end of a fifteen-year period; that if two thirds of the nations represented in the German Reichstag <sup>will then</sup> agree to foreign representation in their parliaments in the amount of 20% <sup>then</sup> the foreign representation in the German Reichstag <sup>shall</sup> will remain in force but <sup>shall</sup> will be redistributed <sup>so as to be distributed</sup> among those nations who agreed to foreign representatives <sup>then</sup> in their parliaments.

|| If less than two thirds of the nations representing the German Reichstag <sup>shall</sup> agree to a foreign representative in their parliaments then the <sup>whole</sup> question of the foreign representation in the German Reichstag <sup>may</sup> will be revised and settled by two thirds vote of the signatories of the German peace treaty.

restored