

C
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

APRIL 5, 1940

Dear Dr. Sachs:

In order to carry out the suggestions of the President's letter to you today, will you please let me know who you think ought to be at the conference, any professors, and when exactly would be most convenient to all concerned. It strikes me perhaps Dr. Einstein would have some suggestions to offer as to the attendance of the other professors. I believe it would be quite appropriate to hold this meeting at the Bureau of Standards.

If you will give me fully your reactions on all this, I will proceed to get into action.

With best wishes, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

EDWIN M. WATSON
Secretary to the President

Dr. Alexander Sachs,
One William Street,
New York, N. Y.

May 11, 1940

Dear General Watson:

Persuant to the letters by the President and yourself of April 5, and the resultant conference with the governmental group held on April 27, I have pleasure in submitting through your good offices a report to the President together with recommendations.

I am advised by Dean Pegram that the experiment conducted at Columbia University with the aid of the governmental committee has been successfully completed this week and that Dr. Briggs and myself will receive a formal statement to this effect.

In view of this and the invasion of Belgium it has become necessary and urgent to confer with the President along the lines and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying letter of mine to him. Will you be kind enough to advise me as to the earliest available date for such a conference?

Yours sincerely,

May 13, 1940

Dear General Watson:

Supplementing my letter of Saturday, I am enclosing copy of a letter that I have just sent to Dr. Briggs, together with the enclosure. I trust these copies will serve to place the problems in proper perspective and also in the close-up of the practical and larger-scale international urgencies that I have alluded to.

Yours sincerely,

General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1945

My dear Mr. Lowen:

Mrs. Roosevelt will be glad to see Dr. Szilard but cannot do so until 4:30 p.m. on Tuesday, May 8, at her apartment in New York City, 29 Washington Square West. Will you ask Dr. Szilard to confirm this so that we will know whether it will be convenient for him?

Very sincerely yours,

Malvina C. Thompson
Secretary to
Mrs. Roosevelt

Mr. Irving S. Lowen
1 Jane Street
New York 14, New York

X

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1945

My dear Dr. Szilard:

I am writing to tell you that
in view of the present situation Mrs. Roosevelt
has had to cancel your appointment for May 8.

Very sincerely yours,

Malvina C. Thompson

Secretary to
Mrs. Roosevelt

Dr. Leo Szilard
The Quadrangle Club
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

F 12

April 18, 1945

I am writing to tell you that
in view of the present situation Mrs. Roosevelt
has had to cancel your appointment for May 8.
Very sincerely yours,

Marion G. Thompson
Secretary to
Mrs. Roosevelt

Dr. Leo Sillard
The Children's Club
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1945

Dear Miss Sullivan:

I received your letter of April 8 about the appointment Dr. Szilard had with Mrs. Roosevelt for Tuesday, May 8th. I am writing to say that Mrs. Roosevelt may not be able to be in New York at that time.

Very sincerely yours,

Malvina C. Thompson
Secretary to
Mrs. Roosevelt

Miss Lucartha P. Sullivan
Metallurgical Laboratory
Box 5207
Chicago, Illinois

Copy
Metallurgical Laboratory

P.O. BOX 5207
CHICAGO 80, ILLINOIS

BUTTERFIELD 4300

August 17, 1945

Mr. Matthew J. Connelly
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Connelly:

When Mr. Bartky and I called on you on May 25, you were kind enough to arrange *an* interview with Mr. Byrnes. H. C. Urey of Columbia University, Walter Bartky of the University of Chicago, and I saw Byrnes on May 28 and submitted to him a memorandum dated Spring, 1945 which was originally prepared for Mr. Roosevelt and which you have read. We are very grateful to you for the opportunity to present our views to Mr. Byrnes.

The enclosed envelope contains Mr. Einstein's letter, returned by Mr. Byrnes for transmittal to your office, and a copy of the memorandum which we left with Mr. Byrnes. You had previously seen both of these documents and they are merely transmitted for your files.

Enclosed also is the text of a petition which was signed by 67 scientists working in this Laboratory. It may not have crossed your desk since it had been transmitted in July via the War Department. Some of those who signed this petition have asked me that its text be now made public; and I wondered whether you would be good enough to let me know by August 24 if you considered its publication undesirable.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Leo Szilard

F 12 A

Washington University

Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri

January 11, 1945

Dr. Arthur H. Compton
The White House
Washington, D. C.


Dear Dr. Compton:

I have just received your letter of January 10, 1945, regarding the proposed exchange of information between the University of Chicago and the White House. I am very glad to hear that you are interested in this opportunity to present our views to the White House.

The enclosed envelope contains a copy of the letter which you have read, and a copy of the memorandum which we have prepared for your review. Both of these documents are for your information.

I should like to see the text of the petition which was signed by the scientists working in the laboratory at the University of Chicago since it has been transmitted in this form. I am sure that the text of those who signed the petition would be of great value to the White House and would be of great help to the White House in its consideration of the proposed exchange of information.

Very sincerely yours,



Leo Ballard

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SYMBOLS

DL - Day Letter

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Ship Radiogram

A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

(18)

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CAG28 22 GOVT=THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC 25 1100A
1945 AUG 25 AM 10 25

DR LEO SZILLARD=

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO=

REFERENCE YOUR TELEPHONE CALL THE PRESIDENT HAS YOUR LETTER UNDER ADVISEMENT. I WILL BE GLAD LET YOU KNOW HIS DECISION LATER.

REGARDS=

MATTHEW J CONNELLY SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT.

SZILLARD.

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Washington Trouble

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 3, 1945.

Dear Dr. Cohn:

Thank you very much for your letter
of October twenty-fifth.

I shall be glad to see Dr. Szilard and
Dr. Condon. Would you let me know when they plan to
be in Washington?

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely,

(Signed) Samuel I. Rosenman

Dr. Alfred E. Cohn
Rockefeller Institute for
Medical Research
66th Street and York Avenue
New York 21, New York

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1955

Dear Hugh:

Upon my return to the office following a little vacation, I received your letter of April fourth. It certainly was good to hear from you.


Frankly, the matter about which you wrote does not come within my immediate cognizance, but I have made considerable inquiry around here to see if anything along the line which you suggest in your letter would serve sufficient purpose to make it worthwhile for all concerned.

I find that the Secretary of State and his top advisers, as well as the President, are spending a great deal of time trying to work out a solution in this particular field and that the proposals made by your friends have been and are being given continuous and thorough study. Certainly we all appreciate the very great desirability of finding means of relieving the tension in the Formosa area and you can rest assured that everything possible will be done to accomplish this purpose.

We of course are most appreciative of the interest being shown by the people throughout the country in this all-important matter and I particularly appreciate your writing to me as you did. Please express our thanks to your friends for their interest and offer to be of assistance.

I hope that everything is going well for you, and with kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



Wilton B. Persons
The Deputy Assistant to the President

Brig. General Hugh B. Hester, Retired
The Penn Sherwood Hotel
3900 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania

THE PENN SHERWOOD HOTEL
(FORMERLY THE PENN SHERATON)

3900 CHESTNUT ST.
PHILADELPHIA 1, PA.

May 8 '55-

May Lo-

Herewith rate from General
Persons which I wish you (would) read
and pass along to Marshall McDiffie
with my regards.

How have you been and what
are your plans?

Really joins me in warm regards.

Sincerely,

Walter B. Weston

October 13, 1960.

George B. Kistiakowsky,
The President's Science Advisory Committee,
The White House Executive Offices Building,
Washington D.C.

Dear Dr. Kistiakowsky,

I should be grateful for your transmitting to the President the letter addressed to him, which is enclosed. An extra copy is enclosed for your files.

Should you yourself happen to be interested to hear more about my conversation with Khrushchev, I would make myself available at a time convenient to you, when you are in New York.

Yours sincerely,

Leo Szilard

Room 812,
The Memorial Hospital,
4444 East 68th Street,
New York 21, N.Y.

Telephone: TRafalgar 9-3000, Ext. 133.

Enclosure

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


October 24, 1960

Dear Dr. Szilard:

Thank you very much for your note of October 13th. Owing to my absence from Washington, it is only today, unfortunately, that I was able to transmit your letter to the President's secretary, and I am sure that the President will answer you shortly after he returns to Washington. Please excuse this unavoidable delay.

The information in your letter to the President about the discussion with Chairman Khrushchev is most interesting, and I would like to hear about other matters you have discussed. I will accept your invitation and will telephone you when I am next in New York. Unfortunately, I do not know at present when that will be.

Sincerely yours,



G. B. Kistiakowsky

Dr. Leo Szilard
Room 812
The Memorial Hospital
444 East 68th Street
New York 21, New York

October 26, 1960

Dr. G.B. Kistiakowsky
The President's Science Advisory Committee
The White House
WASHINGTON D.C.

Dear Dr. Kistiakowsky,

I am writing to thank you for your note of October 24 and to say that I shall be delighted to see you at your convenience when you are in New York.

You might find it easiest to set the time at short notice by calling me at Extension 133, the Memorial Hospital, at TRafalgar 9-3000. If this extension does not answer, then I am temporarily out of the hospital but should be back within a few hours. It is not safe to leave messages because their delivery is not reliable.

Sincerely yours,

LEO SZILARD

The Memorial Hospital, Room 812
444 East 68th Street
New York 21, New York.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


April 5, 1961

Dear Mr. Szilard:

I do indeed wish to thank you for the complimentary advance copy of your book entitled "The Voice of the Dolphins".

I look forward with interest to the opportunity of reading it.

Sincerely,



John J. McCloy
Adviser to the President
on Disarmament

Mr. Leo Szilard,
c/o Simon and Schuster,
630 Fifth Avenue,
Rockefeller Center,
New York 20, N. Y.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS

THE ENRICO FERMI INSTITUTE
FOR NUCLEAR STUDIES

April 14, 1961

John J. McCloy
Department of State
21st and Virginia Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I am grateful to you for having given me an opportunity to discuss with you the problem of disarmament last Tuesday. I am now in the process of preparing a short memorandum that I shall limit to the analysis of one single important aspect of this problem. When the memorandum which I am preparing is in presentable form, I shall take the liberty of asking you for an appointment in order to show it to you. If you were to read this short memorandum in my presence, I could then answer any questions that you might raise. It would be my hope that we could thus reach a concensus on one important aspect of the problem, and this I would regard as a major step forward.

The subject of my memorandum is as follows:

The Russians say that they want general and complete disarmament as a means of abolishing war. General disarmament would not, however, automatically abolish war and, until such time as America and Russia reach a meeting of minds as to how the peace may be kept in a disarmed world, we may not know whether we want or don't want general disarmament.

What kind of machinery could maintain the peace in a world which is disarmed down to machine guns? We cannot say with certainty to what the Russians would consent in this regard. But, independently of what the Russians would or would not accept, the realities of geography, on the one hand, and the prevailing general political situation on the other, would impose severe limitations on the effectiveness of any machinery that may be devised.

Those who drafted the United Nations Charter were aware of the fact that the machinery that they were setting up could maintain the peace only as long as the great powers would cooperate to this end. In my memorandum, I am led to conclude that even in a world disarmed down to machine guns, it would be impossible to do any better, with respect to this limitation, even if the Russians were to accept everything that may be reasonably demanded from them.

Would this go far enough towards securing the peace in a disarmed world to be deemed acceptable to the United States? This issue is not discussed in my memorandum because I see no chance to reach a concensus on it.

It would be impossible to reach a concensus because different people would give different answers to the question: "In what sense and to what extent can the Russians be trusted?"

There are those who believe that when Khrushchev says "we shall bury you", he means this in the literal sense. They hold that Russia's desire to dominate the world bears an uncomfortably strong resemblance to Hitler Germany's desire to dominate the world. When those who hold such views come to fully understand the nature of a world which is disarmed down to machine guns, they will be forced to conclude that even if Russia were to consent to everything that reasonably could be demanded of her, it would still be impossible to make the peace secure.

Having reached this conclusion, they may then turn their attention to the problem of arms control. Arms control, if it could be achieved, might greatly increase our security, but it is a completely different issue. Arms control may even retard, rather than accelerate, the advent of general disarmament because it would increase our security in an armed world and the Russians seem to be aware of this.

I personally believe that the analogy between Hitler Germany and Soviet Russia is a rather superficial one. On the basis of my appraisal of what it is that makes the Russians tick, I am led to conclude that general disarmament could lead to a secure peace provided that Russia would consent to what may be reasonably demanded of her.

No one can predict with certainty to what Russia may consent for the sake of getting the kind of disarmament which

John J. McCloy

April 14, 1961

- 3 -

she wants. It is possible, however, to make an educated guess in this regard. In my memorandum I venture such a guess, based on what I, myself, believe it is that makes the Russians tick.

If my appraisal is correct, then it should be possible to arrive at an acceptable solution to the problem, provided it were approached both by us and by the Russians in the proper spirit of humility. The real task is not to discover what Russia's intentions are, which may be just as ill-defined as our own intentions, but rather to try to reach a meeting of the minds with the Russians on how the peace may be kept in a disarmed world. If America and Russia were to reach a meeting of the minds on this issue, it would have a profound influence both on their intentions and on our intentions.

I am enclosing a spare copy of my book. You might decide to read, over the weekend, one of the short stories that is not connected with disarmament, unless you prefer to make use of the weekend for catching up on your sleep. You might get some pleasure out of reading "My Trial as a War Criminal", which is reprinted from the Law Review of the University of Chicago.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

April 17, 1961

John J. McCloy
U. S. Department of State
21st and Virginia Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

Enclosed is a condensation from The Voice of the Dolphins, which I said I would send you. Even though I have edited out the dolphins, there remains much fanciful fiction in this condensation. Knowing how beset you are by deadlines and how harassed you are by well-meaning visitors, I am not sure that you ought to indulge in reading fanciful fiction even though it is meant to show what it would take to achieve disarmament -- twenty-five years hence.

The disarmament problem is a complex one and I now believe that I probably could be more useful to you if I limited myself in my discussions with you to one single aspect of this problem. I have taken the liberty of spelling this out in a letter which I wrote you last week.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 17, 1961.

Dear Dr. Szilard:


Thank you very much for your letter of April 14. I will look forward to seeing your memorandum and you may be sure that I shall read it very carefully. I suggest you send it to me and then after I have read it, I will re-read it with you in your presence. We can talk about it then.

I think your thinking and mine is much closer than you imagine, for I have long had the view that we have to determine just what we mean by a disarmed world and what means exist in this world for keeping the peace before we can rationally talk about general and complete disarmament. I think that it is becoming somewhat clear what the Soviets mean by control after disarmament takes place. It is control they feel they can veto -- or by such a system of voting that they could be sure of the votes. From my conversations with the Russians, and they may not be as extensive as yours, I think I know what they mean by control. But I do believe that this should be explored further and brought right out into the open for serious examination and discussion.

It was good of you to send me your book, although I already have a copy of it. I am sure it will keep me awake.

With best regards,

Sincerely,


John J. McCloy

Dr. Leo Szilard,
Hotel Dupont Plaza,
Washington 6, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1961

Dear Dr. Szilard:

Enclosed is a list of PSAC members as you requested last night.

It was a great pleasure for me to meet you yesterday and if I can give you any more information at any time, I would be pleased to do so.

Sincerely yours,



David Z. Robinson

Professor Leo Szilard
Hotel DuPont Plaza
DuPont Circle
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

4/19/61

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New York 28, New York

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The Pentagon, Room 3E1006
Washington 25, D. C.

Executive
Officer

Mr. David Z. Beckler
Executive Officer
President's Science Advisory Committee
The White House (Rm. 203 EOB)
Washington 25, D. C.

Hotel DuPont Plaza
Washington 6, D.C.

July 3, 1961

Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It was a great pleasure to discuss with you the Berlin crisis. I have gone on record on this issue in a Letter which was printed in May, 1960, by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and I take the liberty of attaching a copy for your information. A somewhat shortened version of this letter was printed in the New York Times on April 16, 1960.

As a rule I am able to understand the moves the Russians are making by putting myself in their place and asking myself what I would do if I were in their shoes. I am, however, rather puzzled by their apparent desire to establish East Germany as an independent state. While on the face of it the situation in Europe may appear to be more stable if East Germany is recognised as an independent state, I personally have serious doubts about this.

There is considerable discontent in East Germany. As long as East Germany is not recognized as a sovereign state, putting down a revolt would be a police measure which the Russians could undertake without seriously risking international complications. But once East Germany is recognised as a sovereign country, then if there is a revolt and Russia sends in troops to put it down, West Germany may also be impelled to intervene and we may have a serious international crisis.

With all respect for Khrushchev's intelligence and judgement, which in general I hold in high regard, I wonder whether he has given sufficient thought to this.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Enc.

Kenneth O'Donnell
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Washington, D. C.
May 19, 1961

Dear Mr. O'Donnell:

I should greatly appreciate your transmitting to the President the enclosed letter. In November I tried to get an appointment with the President-elect through the good offices of Dr. Eugene J. Cohen but this did not work out. Jerome Wiesner, Chester Bowles and Walter Rostow have known me for quite some time and I have discussed with them on various occasions various aspects of my conversations with Khrushchev.

I would need to have about half an hour with the President. It would be preferable, however, to schedule the conversation at a time when the President could extend the conversation by fifteen or thirty minutes beyond the scheduled half hour, if he should wish to do so.

Because of the shortness of time you might find it difficult to schedule an appointment in advance and you might therefore prefer to try to set it up at short notice. If you would let me know that you want to "improvise" an appointment I would then keep the switchboard of my hotel informed of where I can be reached in an "emergency".

I am staying at the Hotel Dupont Plaza in Washington (telephone: HU 3 6000; Room 842.)

With best wishes.

Yours very truly,

LEO SZILARD
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

Copies: Chester Bowles
Jerome Wiesner
Walter Rostow
Harris Wofford

President John F. Kennedy
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Washington, D. C.
May 19, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

On October 5 I had an extended conversation with Chairman Khrushchev in New York and I am anxious to convey to you some of the insights which I gained from that conversation and a subsequent extended visit to Moscow. I believe that I now know what type of general approach would be likely to elicit a constructive response on the part of Khrushchev on the issue of Arms Control, and other related issues.

While in Moscow I attended the so called Pugwash meeting in December and learned on that occasion that a detailed memorandum covering my conversation with Khrushchev had been made available by the Soviet Government to those members of the Academy of Sciences who were scheduled to participate in that meeting.

I should be grateful for an opportunity to see you before you leave for Europe, if your time permits. I am writing to Mr. O'Donnell to say how he could set up an appointment at short notice.

Respectfully,

LEO SZILARD
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

July 30, 1961

Mr. John J. McCloy
U. S. Disarmament Administration
U. S. Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

Welcome back to Washington! Enclosed I am sending you, as I wrote I would, a memorandum dealing with the subject on "how to secure the peace" in a disarmed world. I would greatly appreciate an opportunity of discussing it with you after you have had a chance to read it.

A revised version of this rough memorandum -- dated July 18 -- will constitute one of three chapters of a comprehensive paper On Disarmament which I am submitting as a conference document to the "Pugwash Meeting" that will be held in September in Vermont.

Please contact me at your convenience at the Hotel DuPont Plaza, Washington 6, D. C.

With best wishes.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

August 18, 1961

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Many thanks for your kind note of August 3. It will be a pleasure to have lunch with you any time that you happen to be free; dinner might be even better if you have no family obligations which preclude dinner engagements.

Since I talked to you, Senator Sherman Cooper put my letter on the Berlin issue into the Congressional Record. The text is attached.

Also, since that time, the East Germans were forced to isolate East Berlin from West Berlin, in order to control migration. This makes me think that they might be now more open to suggestion of moving their capital from East Berlin to, say, Dresden or Leipzig and of setting up East Berlin and West Berlin, each, as a "free city" with free communications between them. If East Berlin is no longer their capital, it will be no more than an overgrown village and they could then easily control access from East Germany into East Berlin. This, of course, might make it necessary to shift some railroad junctions from East Berlin into the adjoining East German territory.

On the larger issue of settling the German problem, I believe that it might be necessary at this juncture to talk with key people of the West German steel industry and trade unions in order to explore what settlements may be acceptable to Germany -- in the long run. These conversations ought to be privately arranged and conducted, but they ought to have the blessing of the Government. If you are interested in this approach, we can discuss it when we see each other.

-2-

I am enclosing a chapter on "Inspection" taken from a comprehensive paper "On Disarmament" which I am submitting to the "Pugwash Conference" in September.

With kindest regards.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

Enclosure

August 18, 1961

Honorable John J. McCloy
U. S. Disarmament Administration
U. S. Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

Because you are so much interested at present in the Berlin issue, I am attaching a letter to the Editor which was ^{recently} originally placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Sherman Cooper. The thoughts contained in it are much the same which I reported to you earlier.

Since I last saw you, the East Germans isolated East Berlin from West Berlin in order to control the flow of the refugees. This makes me think that they might be now more open to the suggestion of moving their capital from East Berlin to, say, Dresden or Leipzig and of setting up East Berlin and West Berlin, each, as a "free city" with free communications between them. If East Berlin is no longer their capital, it will be no more than an overgrown village and they could then easily control access from East Germany into East Berlin. This, of course, might make it necessary to shift some railroad junctions from East Berlin into the adjoining East German territory.

I sent 12 copies of the comprehensive paper on disarmament which I am submitting to the conference at Stowe, Vermont to ^{the} your office of Miss Betty Goetz for distribution to those who may be interested. The third chapter of this paper discusses the need for a political settlement in Europe. I am not entirely happy with this chapter. I am in the process of re-writing it and I shall take the liberty to send you a revised version at a later date.

With best wishes.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard
Hotel DuPont Plaza
Washington 6, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 27, 1961

Dear Dr. Szilard:

I have read the material you sent me and I feel strongly that there are a number of things in your proposed letter that do not accurately represent American attitudes.

I have recently been testifying before Senate and House Committees on the disarmament bill and I was on "Meet the Press" a little while ago speaking on disarmament. The responses to my testimony and broadcast convinced me all the more that neither in official or in popular circles is it possible to say that the Americans are not deeply interested in disarmament. Of course there are some who speak out in opposition but probably no more than would be speaking out in opposition in the Soviet Union if they had an opportunity to do so. The mail and the support one receives is overwhelmingly favorable. The array of military witnesses is additional evidence that I feel completely negates the statements contained in the draft letter you showed me. General Clay, General Hull, General Lemnitzer, General Gruenther, President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter, Ambassador Lodge, former Secretary Lovett, Fred Eaton, Secretary of Defense Gates and many others, have been strong in their support of the disarmament bill and all this makes me feel that your approach really represents a misrepresentation of American opinion and attitudes. I believe that you would be doing a disservice to assume a disinterest on the part of the U.S. toward this vital problem. Even though you may feel that by stating this in the form you do you are apt to have a better reception from Mr. K., I think it is very unwise to humor him by a misrepresentation or at least by a doubtful premise.

The long history of the United States in regard to disarmament, and its strong inclination to disarm, too rapidly if anything, after the danger recedes as compared with the record of the Soviet Union and the statements of Lenin in regard to disarmament, makes me feel strongly that we have no reason whatever to be apologetic in respect to our sincerity or our position. I do not charge Mr. K with bad faith and I deeply resent it when Soviet officials charge us with it.

Dr. Leo Szilard,
Hotel Dupont Plaza,
Washington 6, D.C.


I was much impressed by many things that Mr. K said when I talked to him on the Black Sea but I was really disturbed that he spoke so frequently of his weapons. I never heard any American President, or even any military figure for that matter, speak so satisfyingly - or perhaps the word is lovingly - about his weapons. It rather disturbed me. He is almost too intrigued by them.

In short, I firmly believe we have as much, if not more reason, to doubt the sincerity of their attitude on disarmament as they do of ours. When we approach the actuality rather than the propaganda of disarmament the record seems to show that they are backing away. The Baruch Plan, our own actual disarmament and reduction of forces after the wars, the open skies proposal and now the test ban. I know that one can rationalize the Soviet position perhaps in respect to any one of these but the total impression is bad.

The plain fact is that we must face the issue squarely and without deceiving either ourselves or the Soviet Union. It is to both our interests to find the solution but this solution in my judgment is not going to be brought about on the thesis that they have been more reasonable than us in this matter.

As for the proposal on Germany, I see some great difficulties in it but I will not go into them here for there are difficulties in any proposals which have been made. If Mr. K would only permit an unrestricted negotiation of all proposals, I think we could arrive at a solution. I don't believe that we ought to, as he does, center on one and announce ahead of time that others are non-negotiable. I don't see how he can shop for self-determination around the world and deny it in Germany but I would be ready to talk about his proposal if he were ready to talk about ours.

Sincerely,



John J. McCloy
Adviser to the President
on Disarmament.

August 30, 1961

The Honorable
John J. McCloy
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I very much appreciate your kind letter of August 27. Your specific objection to the phrasing which reads "At the same time, the leadership of the Soviet Union is, of course, aware of the virtually total lack of interest in disarmament on the part of America", can be easily met by changing the phrasing, particularly since the exact degree of the current interest in disarmament in America is not relevant to the issue that I propose to raise.

Incidentally, I do not propose to say anything in my letter of which I am not fully convinced, for the sake of humoring Mr. K. On the other hand, I would not want to leave out from my letter anything that I believe to be both true and relevant on the ground that Mr. K would be likely to agree with me. If he did agree, that would be all to the good.

Being in favor of disarmament is not necessarily a virtue and opposing disarmament is not necessarily a vice. I, for one, have little respect for those who go all out for general disarmament without having any notion of how peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

If we ever reach the point when America would be willing to accept general disarmament, provided the Soviet Union were to accept what may be reasonably demanded of her, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union would then back down. At that point she might prefer such security which she may derive from holding on to the bombs, to the risks which general disarmament would entail, particularly in the absence of a sufficiently far-reaching political settlement.

Still, for the moment, the Russians appear to be much more strongly motivated in favor of disarmament than are most Americans, and I believe it is understandable why this should be so.

When I last saw you, you asked me if I thought it would be worthwhile for you to attend the meeting at Stowe, Vermont. It now turns out that neither Kapitza nor Federov are expected to attend. This then leaves only Igor Tamm, among the Russian participants, from whom you might glean some insight into the attitude of the Russians towards disarmament. He is a Nobel Prize winner in physics, generally interested in political problems and he states his opinions freely, and sincerely, in private conversations. He is not in the inner circle, however. Should he visit Washington after the Stowe meeting, and should you wish to see him, I should be glad to arrange for you to meet him.

Sincerely,



Leo Szilard

*Mabel August Mason
Wool 6-A-L*

September 1, 1961

Mr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Kissinger:

Enclosed is a memorandum which elaborates on the first point of the Appendix. The "Letter to the Editor" which I have sent you previously is attached to it.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

(Hotel Dupont Plaza)
Washington 6, D. C.

Enclosure

how
September 1, 1961

Memorandum from Leo Szilard

To: Henry Kissinger

The first paragraph of the Appendix of August 31, 1961 reads as follows:

"Both East Germany and West Germany shall be recognized as sovereign states and there shall be no limitation upon their freedom to federate with each other."

The purpose of this note is to elaborate on this point. A federation between the two German states does not pose a problem as long as this federation is loose and the governing body of the federation is barred from taking action except by having more than 50 percent of the East German votes as well as more than 50 percent of the West German votes. The real issue is under what conditions it may be possible to make progress from such a loose federation step-by-step towards a really united Germany.

The attitude of the Soviet Union towards the creation of a truly united Germany would presumably be governed by two considerations:

(1) The Soviet Union would not want to see a united Germany emerge which is militarily allied with the West. It follows that the Soviet Union will permit a true unification only when disarmament is progressed rather far and the issue of whether Germany is militarily allied with the West or is neutral loses its significance. When that time comes the Soviet Union should no longer be concerned about the

unification of Germany from a military point of view.

(2) The Soviet Union would not want to see the destruction of the socialist economy of East Germany. If the Soviet Union could be somehow assured that state ownership of the means of production in East Germany would survive, as a permanent institution, the unification of Germany, then one important obstacle to the unification of Germany would be removed.

Naturally, the treaty setting up a federation between West Germany and East Germany could contain a provision that would guarantee state ownership of the means of production in East Germany. ~~But~~ such a paper guaranty would not offer sufficient assurance. But if Labor and Industry in West Germany are made to understand the nature of this problem and reach the conclusion that they would be willing to have state ownership in Eastern Germany endure, after far-reaching unification of Germany takes place, then it may be possible to give the Russians assurances which may satisfy them.

It is my belief that this issue ought to be explored privately, at this juncture, with the leadership of the steel industry and the trade unions in West Germany. There are a number of arguments why both the steel industry and the Social Democratic Party of Germany may look with favor upon maintaining East Germany, as a socialist sector, within a united Germany, which would otherwise operate on the basis of a free market economy. Whether industry and labor

in West Germany would be responsive to these arguments can be determined only by adequately discussing with them the issues involved.

As I mentioned to you today, it might be possible for a few private individuals to look into this question in West Germany -- on a crash basis -- immediately after the German elections. Such an investigation would, of course, serve no useful purpose unless the Government recognizes the question as relevant to the overall issue.

The End

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1961

Dear Dr. Szilard:


I have your letter of August 30 and am wondering what your thoughts are in regard to the Soviet nuclear tests.

It now becomes quite apparent that all the time Mr. Dean was negotiating and honestly seeking to reach an agreement with the Soviets, they were preparing for the tests, the first of which occurred today. Mr. Khrushchev told me that he was not testing and did not intend to test, when I saw him on the Black Sea. The intelligence now indicates that there were very elaborate preparations going on during the summer.

I must say that I am shaken in my beliefs as a result of the Soviet action and I simply cannot find any substantial evidence in support of the statement contained in the fifth paragraph of your letter. I am gaining the conviction that all they have sought was a propaganda advantage through talking disarmament while they intensively developed their own weapon system.

They have been sincere in the belief that they were better off with us disarmed and they armed. Beyond this I have yet to locate the evidence.

Sincerely,



John J. McCloy
Adviser to the President
on Disarmament

Dr. Leo Szilard,
Hotel Dupont Plaza,
Washington 6, D.C.

September 1, 1961

The President of the United States
Attention: Richard Goodwin
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I take the liberty to send you attached an editorial printed in today's New York Times and to say that I believe the United States is missing a unique opportunity by failing to take a stand on the crisis in Brazil. I believe the United States ought to make it unmistakably clear that she favors in Brazil obedience to the constitution and opposes unconstitutional military pressure.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

Enclosure

V-112

September 1, 1961

The President of the United States
Attention: Richard Goodwin
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I take the liberty to send you attached an editorial printed in today's New York Times and to say that I believe the United States is missing a unique opportunity by failing to take a stand on the crisis in Brazil. I believe the United States ought to make it unmistakably clear that she favors in Brazil obedience to the constitution and opposes unconstitutional military pressure.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

Enclosure

September 5, 1961

Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Kissinger:

I have revised my proposal on the Berlin issue. The essential thoughts are the same, but I was trying to improve the presentation. In place of the three documents which I gave you, the material is now condensed in two documents: a memorandum "On the So-Called Berlin Crisis" and an Appendix to that memorandum. Both are dated September 3 and I am enclosing two copies for your information and *use,* views.

I might publish these two documents substantially as they stand as an article, provided I can get it printed almost immediately. Otherwise, intervening events might render an article of this sort obsolete.

With kind regards.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

Leo Szilard

Confidential

September 8, 1961

Mr. John J. McCloy
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

Attached to this letter is a document entitled "Appendix" which describes one particular solution to the so-called Berlin crisis-- wrapped up in the form of a package. This package is rather loosely drafted but nevertheless the true intent of its points should be clear enough, particularly if read in conjunction with the memorandum "On the Berlin Crisis" which is enclosed.

I have sent a copy of the Appendix and the memorandum to the White House, but I do not know whether the President got to see it. I have also sent word to the White House -- and again I do not know whether it has reached the President -- that if the general approach described meets with the approval of the White House, I would be prepared to go to Moscow and try to sell this approach to Khrushchev.

What matters is not the particular package which I have formulated; this package could be easily modified and perhaps improved. What matters is that we start out with the premise that the United States and the Soviet Union have the same goal in Europe, the goal to make Europe politically as stable as possible, and that we derive a solution, from this premise, on the basis of reasoned arguments.

I personally do not believe that a satisfactory solution can be arrived at as the result of prolonged, catch as catch can horsetrading.

Any comment that you might care to make would be greatly appreciated.

With best wishes.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

P.S. I am leaving tomorrow morning for Stowe, Vermont, to attend the Pugwash conference. I can be reached there in the course of next week at The Lodge.

September 21, 1961

The Honorable John J. McCloy
U.S. Disarmament Administration
U.S. Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

One of our conversations touched upon the need of making it possible for a small number of scientists and scholars, who are functioning as consultants to the Government, to devote their full time to the study of the problems upon which they are advising the Government. I told you that I would draft a memorandum, for circulation among those with whom I have discussed the subject. Enclosed is a copy of the memorandum for your information.

I saw Shep Stone a few days ago at Stowe, Vermont and discussed the matter with him briefly. Henry Kissinger who was in on this conversation said that he would see Stone this week or next and discuss the matter with him further. I am sending a copy of my draft both to Stone and Kissinger.

Any comment that you might care to make would be appreciated.

With kind regards.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Mr. John J. McCloy
U. S. Disarmament Administration
State Department
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I am on the point of leaving for the meeting in Stowe, Vermont, but first I want to answer your kind letter of September 1. In that letter you are raising the specific point concerning the resumption of testing by the Russians and also the general point to what sense and to what extent the Russians can be trusted. You have raised this general point already in your letter of August 27 and I am quite anxious to go into it in some detail. Let me, however, deal first with the resumption of the testing by the Russians.

It ~~didld~~ disturb me that the Russians started testing so promptly after announcing their intention to test.

I do not know whether Khrushchev's decision to test proceeded by a few weeks or a few months after his announcement that he would resume testing. If the decision to resume testing was mainly due to their need to test in order to develop bombs which can be carried by rockets light enough to be carried around on trucks, then it might be that the Russians delayed announcing their decision to test in the hope that the United States may decide to resume testing and by announcing her decision assume the blame.

I am not sure whether you imply in your letter that in the last few months the Russians were negotiating in bad faith in Geneva intending to create the impression that they want a test ban agreement at the time when they had already decided to resume testing. If this is what you meant, then I am prepared to say the following: The position which the Russians took in the Geneva talks within the last few months left no doubt in my mind that they have changed their minds on the test ban issue and would no longer want to conclude such a treaty. I am not saying this ex facto. At the little meeting which we had in Washington on August 29, attended among others by Doty and Kistiaskowdsky, Doty raised the question whether, at the forthcoming meeting at Stowe, we ought to discuss the position which the Russians are taking by the test ban issue in Geneva. I was opposed that we should do this on the ground that the Russians do not want the test ban and it is therefore wholly irrelevant what they are now saying in Geneva. To illustrate this point I told the story of the banker who is asked to finance a mining project and he replies that he is reluctant to do so because he does not like spinach. When asked what his dislike for spinach has to do with the mining project he replies, "My good man, if I do not want to do something, one reason is as good as a nother". In your letter of August 27, you mentioned negotiations on the Baruch plan, the open skies proposal and the test ban as examples presumably that we are negotiating in good faith where the Russians are not. The issue which you are raising

here is so important that I would be prepared to spend as much time as you wish in examining this thesis by ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ looking as closely as necessary at what actually went on during these negotiations. If and when you have time to spare to go into this, I shall stand ready to take up the challenge. Since ~~XXXXXX~~ neither you nor I have all the facts at our fingertips we might have to draw upon the help of some people who are involved in these negotiations. On the Baruch plan negotiations we may turn to Eberhard or Oppenheimer. On the open sky proposals Foster might help us out. On the test ban we would probably be able to manage without any outside help. My reason for thinking that it might be worse for you sometime to ~~XX~~ in some negotiations is my deep conviction that the basic reason for our inability to make progress with the Russians is our tendency to measure their actions with a yardstick which is quite different from the yardstick which we apply to our own actions. The statement issued by the ~~XXXXXX~~ On August 30 contains the following sentence: "The Soviet Government's decision to resume nuclear weapons testing indicates the complete hypocrisy of its provisions about general and complete disarmament". If this was said merely in order to get some propaganda mileage from the resumption of the testing by the Russians I would not consider it as any of my business, but I understand that the President, McGeorge, Bundy and Rusk have all seen this statement and if ~~XX~~ they really believe this sentence, then we are in serious trouble. This sentence caught my eye, first of all, because in the context in which it is presented it is a

non sequitur. This, however, is beside the point. The real issue is whether or not it is true. It would be a tragic mistake to be wrong about it and one of the most important issues which I would like to discuss with you when the occasion arises is how can we find out?

With best wishes.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS
THE ENRICO FERMI INSTITUTE
FOR NUCLEAR STUDIES

September 25, 1961

Dr. Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Doctor Kaysen:

I have decided that the "telephone" can wait and that there is something more urgent that needs to be doing. As you will see from the attached letter, I have asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy to see me. What I want to see him about is as follows:

I have been convinced for some time that no satisfactory solution of the Berlin issue is possible unless East Germany shifts its capital from East Berlin and East Berlin is permitted to become a free city, at about the same time that West Berlin may become a free city. If there is no satisfactory solution to the Berlin issue, West Berlin will remain a nuisance because it will wither away rapidly and its half empty shell will be a conspicuous monument - visible to all - to the failure of the West.

That the proposal that East Germany shift its capital will meet with sales resistance is a foregone conclusion. I believe, however, I am in an exceptionally good position to argue this point with Khrushchev both because I am deeply convinced that such a shift of the capital is essential for genuine accommodation and also

because I had a rather good conversation with Khrushchev about this point in October of last year.

While I might have a fair chance of selling him on the idea of setting up both East Berlin and West Berlin, each, as a free city, I would not undertake to try to sell him on setting up the whole of Berlin as one free city.

I could hop a plane and fly to Moscow, but there would not perhaps be much sense in my doing so unless I were given to understand that the general approach to the problem which is described in the attached article meets with the approval of the White House. This need not mean, of course, that the particular "package" described in the article is acceptable, as it stands. But it would need to mean that the general philosophy which this package represents is acceptable and that the relinquishing of East Berlin by East Germany would be part of some package, derived from such ^aphilosophy..

I wonder whether, if I were to go to Moscow, it might not be useful for some private person who has the confidence of the White House to accompany me as an observer. He could sit in on my conversations with Khrushchev, without actually participating in the conversation, and subsequently report to the White House.

Yours very sincerely,



Leo Szilard

Copy to Carl Kaysen

September 25, 1961

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Bundy:

I wonder if I could take a few minutes of your time in connection with a matter which I have touched upon in a conversation I had with Carl Kaysen. I am writing by the same mail to Mr. Kaysen in order to explain to him what I would want to see you about.

I shall take the liberty to call your office for an appointment or else your secretary could call me at the Hotel DuPont Plaza, HU 3-6000, Room 745, and leave a message if I am out.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

cc. Dr. Carl Kaysen

September 25, 1961

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Yours very sincerely,

LS

Leo Szilard

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS
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September 25, 1961


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Yours very sincerely,



Leo Szilard

cc. Dr. Carl Kaysen

HOTEL
DUPONT
PLAZA

DUPONT CIRCLE AND NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE N. W., WASHINGTON 6, D.C.

HUdson 3-6000

December 26, 1962

Dr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Dr. Bundy:

This morning I telephoned your office to say that I should be grateful for having an opportunity to see you at your convenience when you can spare the time.

I understand that recently, while I was abroad, Mark Raskin spoke to you about the Russian-American non-governmental exploration about which I had an exchange of letters with Chairman Khrushchev. I did not keep in communication with Mark Raskin while I was abroad, copies of the letters were given to him by a mutual, well-meaning, friend, and I had no advance knowledge that you would be approached in this matter.

Even though, before the Cuban crisis, I had discussed the issues involved in detail with several members of the Administration, I took care not to involve the Government and avoided to ask any Government official for advice.

At the present, more advanced, stage I still do not propose to ask any Government official for his advice, nor do I propose to argue the merits of the project at this time; I would like to inform you, however, if I may, how matters stand at present, particularly since I suspect that the information you have is incomplete and is likely to be misleading.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

LS/mnd

Monday, January 7, 1963

Dr. Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kaysen:

On the basis of the conversation which we had Saturday morning and your subsequent telephone call Saturday afternoon, it would seem that we have reached a meeting of the minds both on the objectives which the project ought to pursue and also on the qualifications of the participants.

If one is agreed on the objectives, then drafting the instructions to the participants is merely a matter of formulation, and I should be very happy to be guided by your judgment both in the formulation of the "instructions" and in the selection of the five American participants.

I have tried my hand at defining the objectives of the project, as well as describing the instructions under which the participants would operate, and you will find a rough draft, the fruits of my labor, enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

29.

Rough Draft

January 7, 1963

Proposed Instructions to the Participants of the Angels Project
by Leo Szilard

The task of the participants of the project is to try and come up with a rough sketch of the provisions of the first stages of a disarmament agreement which would provide for substantial economic savings and for a significant gain in military security.

The participants in the project would not be expected to guess what proposals their governments would or would not accept; rather they are expected to try to come up with a proposal which would make sense to themselves and which they would be prepared to recommend to their governments for acceptance, as a basis for negotiations.

By design the Russian and American participants represent a biased sample, *with the bias in favour* of those who think that it is very important to prevent an all-out arms race and believe that their governments ought to be willing to give up certain advantages which they might temporarily hold, and perhaps even assume certain temporary risks, for the sake of arriving at an agreement that would put an end to the arms race. In these circumstances it would not be too surprising if they came up with a proposal which Russia, America, or both would find unacceptable as a basis of negotiations.

There are several approaches to the problem of controlled arms reduction, however, and if the first proposal with which the participants come up is not regarded by their governments as an acceptable basis for negotiations, then the participants

ought to stand ready--perhaps after a rest period of two months-- to adopt another approach and to have another try at drafting an outline for the first stages of a disarmament agreement.

The participants ought to keep in mind that their task is not to negotiate an agreement but rather to provide their governments with some guidance as to what kind of an agreement may or may not be negotiable. Even though, because of the bias in the selection of the participants one may not say that what they would recommend would be likely to be negotiable, one may safely say that proposals which make no sense to the majority of the Russian participants or to the majority of the American participants would not be likely to be negotiable. This in itself could be of value, because it is important that America and the Soviet Union avoid conducting fruitless negotiations.

One would hope, of course, that the project would accomplish more than merely determine that certain proposals would not be negotiable.

One would hope that the project would be able to produce-- perhaps after a few fruitless trials--a draft which the governments would find acceptable as a basis for negotiations. If this came to pass, the Government could then first explore all the issues involved through informal conversations with the other governments involved. Once the Government has reason to believe that negotiations conducted along certain lines may be expected to lead to an agreement, it would be in a position to prepare public opinion and make it receptive for what the Government may later on officially propose.

Any one session conducted within the framework of the project may be scheduled to last for a period of two weeks, with the possibility of extending it for another week if in the judgment of the participants this appears desirable.

A period of two to three weeks is not sufficient however to come up with more than one draft proposal and therefore, if different approaches are to be explored a separate session will have to be devoted to each approach. If need be, such sessions may be held at intervals of about two months.

The participants must keep at all times in mind that the objective of the project is to discover what may be negotiable and it is not the function of the participants to negotiate with each other. There are a few points relevant in this regard which can be best illustrated by an example:

X
America and Russia are at present agreed in principle that during ^{the first stages} a certain stage in the disarmament process there may ^a be a major reduction in the number of delivery vehicles, including [^] long-range rockets, but that the number of delivery vehicles would not go down during this stage to zero. Rather, America and Russia may each retain at the end of this stage an agreed number of long-range rockets. What this number shall be, must in the end be determined through negotiations between the two governments involved. +

It seems to me likely that at the outset of the negotiations the American Government would set this number rather high and the Russian Government would set it rather low. It would serve

no useful purpose, however, and it would not be in keeping with the character of the project if the participants were to negotiate with each other and come up with a compromise regarding this number. Rather, in this particular case, as in general, each participant ought to state what he himself would find acceptable and would be prepared to recommend to his government, i.e. each participant ought to state the number of long-range rockets which--depending on the measures of inspection that would operate during the first stage-- he himself would be prepared to see retained at the end of the first stage. If this were done and if it turned out that most Russian participants would be willing to go up with that number, if necessary, as high as 100 or 200, and that most American participants would be willing to go down, if necessary, as low as 5 or 10, then this could be taken as an indication that the number to be retained would probably prove to be negotiable.

XX The discussion of this issue among the participants ought to bring out clearly the points of view which are relevant for determining the number of long range rockets that America and Russia may be permitted to retain at the end of the first stage. This would make it possible later on, when the measures of inspection that would operate during the first stage become ~~markedly~~ ^{more clearly} defined, to bring reasoned arguments to bear on the issue of what the number of rockets retained ought to be. This again is a special case of the general rule that the participants ought to set forth the points of view which guide

them in accepting or rejecting proposals with which they are confronted. X X

In order to minimize the risk that the participants might be too much guided in their own acceptance or rejection of a proposal by what their government might be currently willing to accept or ^{be} inclined to reject, the participants ought to refrain from communicating with their governments during the two to three weeks period of the session.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 28, 1963

TO: Mr. Szilard

FROM: Carl Kaysen

DRAFT
1/25/63

INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS

Discussion of proposals for general and complete disarmament by a small group of American and Soviet citizens, not acting as representatives of their governments, would have the purpose of exploring the area of possible agreement between the two nations on disarmament. The participants on each side would be selected so as to have both a technical knowledge of the problems of disarmament and an understanding of the concerns and views of their respective governments.

In their discussions, which would be informal, the participants would seek to understand each others views about disarmament proposals that might possible be workable. Both governments have agreed that the achievement of general and complete disarmament is a process which must proceed in steps. It is especially difficult to foresee at this time how the last stages of the process might work, without some experience with the first stages. Accordingly, it would seem useful for the group to concentrate on the problems of the earlier stages of the disarmament program, including the problem of transition from earlier to later stages.

Ideally, the end product of the discussion would be an agreed proposal or a number of proposals for the first stages of a general and complete disarmament treaty. However, in fact, any such agreed proposal would contain a number of crucial variables such as, for example, the rate of arms reduction, the length of the stages, the number of stages,

on which agreement or disagreement among the discussants would be of no great significance, since these variables would ultimately be a matter for political determination in the course of a negotiation. What would be important, rather, would be discussion of, and agreement on, the considerations which are involved in the choice of these variables, such as, for example, the relation of the rate of arms reduction to the character and degree of inspection, or the size of armed forces on each side needed for stability in the absence of complete disarmament.

The usefulness of the discussions need not depend on the two sides reaching agreements, even of a broad sort. If an appropriately selected group of participants failed to reach broad agreement and the nature of the disagreements are clear, this may be taken as a useful indication of the kind of difficulties that would be faced in any serious attempt at negotiation between the two countries.

~~If, on the other hand, the conference were able to go beyond agreements on the identity of the crucial variables and the broad principles that should determine their values to some agreement on a range of reasonable values, this might then indicate a possibility of successful negotiations between the two governments.~~

The respective participants on each side would undertake the obligation to explain to the officials of their respective governments responsible for dealing with disarmament problems both the conclusions

that had been reached and the nature of the considerations that led to these conclusions. The composition of the delegations should be such as to facilitate this task.

Since the discussants would not be representatives of their governments and not under instructions by their governments, it would seem appropriate to hold the meeting at some place away from both the American and Soviet capitals.

Because the American participants would have had some access to classified information, it might be useful to prepare a factual brief on U. S. and Soviet forces which could be used on an unclassified basis in the discussion.

January 31, 1963

Dr. Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kaysen:

After our meeting broke up today, I had lunch with Keeney. He was apprehensive that the President might veto his participation because he is in the White House, and thought that such a veto would be less likely in the case of Rathjins or Long because they are in a less exposed position. If you think that Keeney's apprehension is justified, this would then raise the question whether one ought to be satisfied with the participation of only one government person, i.e. either Long or Rathjins.

I don't see how this operation could be successful without including someone like Keeney, Rathjins, or Long. If it turns out that none of them can be included, then perhaps we ought to explore the possibility of having the session take place in Washington and arrange for the main participants to keep privately and informally in close contact with Keeney, Rathjins, and Long.

I propose to wait until you have decided in your own mind about the participation of governmental persons--in principle. Thereafter it might be desirable to repeat today's meeting in order to reach a consensus on who the people are

- 2 -

whom I should approach first. In the meantime I am listing on the attached sheet, names which could be included among those to be considered. I talked with some of them either personally or over the telephone before the Cuba crisis and their names are marked with an asterisk.

I forgot to tell you this morning that yesterday I saw Ambassador Dobrynin and told him that we had the green light from the White House but that the identity of the participants is as yet to be determined.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

cc: Franklin Long
Jerome Wiesner
Spurgeon Keeney

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1963


Dear Szilard:

Thank you for your note. I have talked further with Wiesner and Keeny. I have not had a chance to talk to Frank Long as he is out of town.

I agree with you that the question of governmental participation is important, but I do not think your further actions need wait on it. I would suggest, rather, that you go ahead on recruiting among the people on the list and get at least a few firm commitments. Otherwise we won't have an enterprise. I think with a few firm commitments the problem of relation between the group and the government can be explored in concrete terms rather than trying to settle it in advance in the abstract.

Among those names you now have on the list, I would wonder if Louis Sohn's experience and interest are really appropriate to the particular problems with which the discussions will be concerned. Henry Kissinger, on the other hand, might very well be a most useful participant.

Sincerely yours,


Carl Kaysen

Dr. Leo Szilard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Dupont Circle and New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington 6, D. C.

File Copy

HOTEL DUPONT PLAZA
WASHINGTON 6
D.C.

February 5, 1963

Dr. Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Kaysen:

I received your letter of February 1 Monday morning and have since that time talked over the telephone with Henry Kissinger, Roger Fisher, Harvey Brooks, Louis Henkin, and Herbert York. All of these may call you over the telephone before giving their final answer, with the exception of York who said he would call Franklin Long.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

cc: Jerome Wiesner
Franklin Long
Spurgeon Keeny

acute

February 20, 1963

Dr. Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Kaysen:

Attached you will find the letter which I had written to Thomas J. Watson, Jr. asking him whether he might be interested in financing the Angels project.

As you will see, the relevant passage reads: "Before visiting Moscow, it seemed advisable that I first return to Washington and clear matters with the White House. There I am dealing with Carl Kaysen, deputy to McGeorge Bundy, and I now have the green light from the White House to recruit the American participants."

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

February 14, 1963

Dr. Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington 25 D. C.

Dear Dr. Kaysen:

Attached is a copy of a letter which I received from York. As you may see, he is willing to participate "provided that the project is approved (even though not sponsored) by the United States Government."

Can we satisfy him on this score?

Sincerely yours,



Leo Szilard

cc: Jerome Wiesner

April 25, 1963

Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Kaysen:

I am supposed to see Adrian Fisher in the afternoon of Monday, the 29th, and I intend to report to you thereafter.

This might be water over the dam, but I wondered whether all has been done that could be done to convince Franklin Long that his contribution is fully appreciated at the highest places and to persuade him to stay at least one more year.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1963


Dear Szilard:

Thanks for your note.

I share your concern about Frank Long, but I think everything possible has been done, or at least everything I can think of doing.

I look forward to hearing from you early next week.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Carl Kaysen".

Carl Kaysen

Dr. Leo Szilard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Dupont Circle and New Hampshire
Avenue, NW
Washington 6, D. C.

May 8, 1963

Dr. Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Kaysen:

Enclosed is the memorandum which I mentioned to you. I have not made up my mind as yet through what channel to take it to the President, but it would be interesting to learn in any case whether or not it makes sense to Sorenson.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

FILE COPY

HOTEL LETTERHEAD

May 9, 1963

Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Kaysen:

I now have Foster's O.K. to the participation of Louis Henkin.

Preparations for the Angels Project have been moving rather slowly in Washington, perhaps because I was too disheartened to push them with vigor. Therefore, I have now asked Roger Fisher, Professor of Law at Harvard, to act as my deputy and take charge of all the preparations on the American side.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

cc: Roger Fisher

May 23, 1963

Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Kaysen:

I am grateful for the information that you gave me over the telephone this morning. I am wondering whether the modifications of the project represented by the attached memo would be a significant improvement.

Yours sincerely,

Leo Szilard

MEMO

May 23, 1963

There would be formed a group of perhaps twelve to fifteen distinguished citizens, who are knowledgeable and seriously concerned about the trend of current events. This group would meet once a week and each time invite one individual from within the Administration, chosen from a list of twenty. The task of the "guest" would be to try to look into the future and to come up with a set of desirable objectives which he thinks might, with luck, be attainable by the end of President Kennedy's second term. The "guest" could say how, what he would like to see done on a short-term basis, would fit in with this set of objectives and he could elaborate on one particular objective which is closest to his own field of interest.

In the ensuing discussion, the set of objectives presented by the "guest" would be scrutinized by the group; the group would presumably discuss whether these objectives are compatible with each other and whether - to the extent as these objectives may involve other nations - they are likely to become negotiable in the predictable future.

The discussion which would follow the presentation of the prepared statement would be off the record. Members of the group may however submit their observations in writing within two weeks to the secretary of the group. These observations would be made available to the "guest", who may within two weeks submit his answers in writing.

The prepared statement of the "guest", the observations submitted by members of the group, and the answers of the "guest" would be transmitted to the President. In addition, they would also be made available to such individuals within the Administration as are designated by the "guest".

In this fashion, those individuals within the Administration who are invited to appear before the group would have an opportunity to communicate their views to the President, without having to ask for the privilege of seeing the President.

No classified material would be communicated to the group. Its members would be free to make use of any thoughts expressed in these deliberations but not to attribute any particular view to any particular individual or to discuss such views in circumstances in which they could be traced to a particular individual who had participated in the deliberations of the group.

I am inclined to believe that it would be possible to secure distinguished and knowledgeable persons as members of the group and to arrange for the appearance of distinguished individuals from within the Administration before the group, provided this made sense to the President, and provided that the President made it clear that he would be glad to receive a copy of the prepared papers that are presented together with the "observations" and "answers".

June 3, 1963

Dr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Dr. Schlesinger:

The problem which I propose to discuss with you Thursday, if our tentative luncheon date materializes, is described in the enclosed memorandum. I have talked about it to a few people within the Administration and in the Congress and I understand that Minow has mentioned it to you. Naturally, I am more certain of the existence of the problem than of any "solution", and it might be that there is no solution.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

June 6, 1963

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Dr. Schlesinger:

I meant to leave the attached text of a proposal with you when we had lunch, but I forgot. It describes one way how the proposal contained in the memorandum of May 28th might be implemented and it says essentially what I told you at lunch.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

16 July 1963

Dr Carl Kayser

Dear Kayser,

I left Washington for Geneva early in the morning of 21 June. Shortly before, at a meeting held on Saturday, 22 June, Matthew Meselson (Harvard) raised the question whether we ought to go through with the "Angels-Project" unless there is some mechanism provided through which the American participants would be able to convey their conclusions to the President. The same doubts were expressed a few days earlier by Steven Miller (Cornell). Since I was quite uncertain in my own mind, whether or not to go forward with this project in the present circumstances, I tried to reach you over the telephone and when I failed I tried to reach Wiesner. I finally reached Wiesner late Saturday afternoon and subsequently I confirmed the conversation which I had with him by letter, of which I sent you a copy.

Being still uncertain in my own mind of whether the conference we propose to hold in August or September in Washington could be expected to be useful in the present circumstances I drafted yesterday a letter to Chairman Khrushchev in which I state all the facts and leave it up to his determination of whether or not to go through with the proposed project.

I then tried to reach you by telephone in Washington and discovered that you were in Moscow. In those circumstances I am transmitting to Chairman Khrushchev the letter that I drafted yesterday but I have added a postscript in which I state that you are in Moscow and in a better position than I am to say whether the conference we propose could be expected to be useful.

I am enclosing the text of my letter to Chairman Khrushchev, including the Appendix and the accompanying Memorandum.

If you wish to communicate with me you can reach me through
Ambassador Tubby's office, US Mission to International Organizations
in Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

Geneva, 15 July 1963

MEMORANDUM

from : Leo Szilard
to : Chairman N.S. Khrushchev

Acting as Chairman of a Committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, of which Professor Roger Fisher of the Harvard Law School is Vice-Chairman, I take the liberty to propose that a three-weeks meeting be held in Washington D.C. as early as possible in August or September of this year, but not starting before 7 August. The American Academy expects to cover the expenses of the Soviet participants while they are in Washington. In this regard the American Academy has received commitments for funds totalling \$ 20,000, of which \$ 12,500 are conditional upon the meeting being held before October of this year.

The following Americans would participate in this meeting :

Marvin Goldberger, Princeton University
Murray Gell-Mann, California Institute of Technology
Louis Henkin, Columbia University
Roger Fisher, Harvard University
Steven Muller, Cornell University

Those listed above have all recently functioned or are currently functioning as consultants either to the US Department of Defence or to the US Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament. A description of the qualifications of each of these men is attached.

Herbert York, formerly Director of the Livermore Laboratory who was in charge of Research and Development in the US Department of Defence during the Eisenhower Administration was also asked to participate in the conference. He cabled me that he cannot participate but would be willing to help in other ways. The text of his cable is attached.

The instructions to the participants which the American Academy has proposed are attached to the enclosed letter from the President of the Academy to President Kennedy. These instructions differ in form, but not in intent from the tentative "Instructions", dated 11 January 1963, which I have submitted. A copy of the latter is also enclosed.

We do not propose that the conference prepare a document representing the consensus of the participants. Rather each participant in the conference would be expected to formulate his own conclusions. If possible each

participant should individually record his conclusions in writing at the end of the conference and both time and facilities will be provided to enable the participants currently to record their thoughts in writing during the conference.

Professor Roger Fisher of the Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, would be in charge of all technical arrangements and all questions relating to dates and other arrangements should be addressed directly to him. During the summer he could be best contacted by the Soviet Embassy in Washington at Box 66, Vineyard Haven, Massachusetts, telephone 1590 M.

Questions relating to who the Soviet participants might be and relating to the intellectual preparation of the conference should for the time being be addressed to me. While in Europe I can be contacted through the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. After my return to America I can be contacted through the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C. I shall be staying in Washington at the Hotel Dupont Plaza, Washington 6, D.C.

APPENDIX

Geneva, 15 July 1963

A. If a disarmament agreement provides for far-reaching disarmament in the first stages then it will also have to provide for certain measures of inspection. According to the most advanced thinking in Washington there is apparently much less inspection needed than it was previously believed. Still the Congress of the United States could conceivably insist on measures of inspection which might not be really necessary. Measures of inspection which might facilitate spying activities would be difficult for the Soviet Union to accept.

In these circumstances our proposed conference would need to have some guidance in regard to the following question : For how far-reaching disarmament must the first stages of the disarmament agreement provide in order to give the Soviet Union a sufficiently great increase in military security and sufficiently substantial economic savings to make it worth while for the Soviet Union to accept the required measures of inspection ?

B. Disarmament does not take place in a vacuum and the kind of disarmament measures any of us may deem acceptable will depend on the political conditions that he would assume to prevail at the time when the disarmament agreement goes into effect.

The American participants for the proposed conference would be expected individually to formulate their conclusions in writing at the end of the conference. They would be expected to look a few years ahead and to make recommendations concerning the disarmament provisions that they would want to see go into effect a few years hence. Some of the American participants, including myself, would be quite reluctant to make recommendations in this regard, without explicitly stating the political premises upon which their recommendations are based. Only by stating what kind of a political settlement they envisage to be negotiable a few years hence, can they explain what they mean if they say that they would recommend certain disarmament provisions - provisions which are far-reaching enough to accomplish a useful purpose.

In these circumstances it is a foregone conclusion that the participants for the proposed conference would want to examine the problem of reaching political settlements, even though the conference would be concerned with the issue of political settlements only to the extent that it affects the possibility of the accomplishment of disarmament.

Accordingly, the proposed conference could greatly benefit from having some guidance regarding the kind of political settlements that might become negotiable a few years hence.

16 July 1963

Dr Carl Kaysen

Dear Kaysen,

I left Washington for Geneva early in the morning of 24 June. Shortly before, at a meeting held on Saturday, 22 June, Matthew Meselson (Harvard) raised the question whether we ought to go through with the "Angels-Project" unless there is some mechanism provided through which the American participants would be able to convey their conclusions to the President. The same doubts were expressed a few days earlier by Steven Miller (Cornell). Since I was quite uncertain in my own mind, whether or not to go forward with this project in the present circumstances, I tried to reach you over the telephone and when I failed I tried to reach Wiesner. I finally reached Wiesner late Saturday afternoon and subsequently I confirmed the conversation which I had with him by letter, of which I sent you a copy.

Being still uncertain in my own mind of whether the conference we propose to hold in August or September in Washington could be expected to be useful in the present circumstances I drafted yesterday a letter to Chairman Khrushchev in which I state all the facts and leave it up to his determination of whether or not to go through with the proposed project.

I then tried to reach you by telephone in Washington and discovered that you were in Moscow. In these circumstances I am transmitting to Chairman Khrushchev the letter that I drafted yesterday but I have added a postscript in which I state that you are in Moscow and in a better position than I am to say whether the conference we propose could be expected to be useful.

I am enclosing the text of my letter to Chairman Khrushchev, including the Appendix and the accompanying Memorandum.

2.

If you wish to communicate with me you can reach me through
Ambassador Tubby's office, US Mission to International Organizations
in Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


December 31, 1963

Dear Dr. Szilard:

Following up our conversation last week, I am enclosing a copy of the ACDA publication, "Blueprint for the Peace Race," which contains an outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. This document was tabled in Geneva by the U. S. almost two years ago.

In our discussions in Geneva, we have made it clear to the Soviet Union that this document is not a package that must be accepted or rejected in its entirety but is a proposal subject to negotiation. We have also made it clear that we are prepared to seek agreement of various mutually acceptable individual measures.

Sincerely yours,


Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

Enclosure

Dr. Leo Szilard
Dupont Plaza Hotel
Dupont Circle
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

June 25, 1963

Dear Dr. Szilard:

I finally made contact with Newton Minow who tells me that he will be moving to Chicago in July. I fear that this eliminates him from your picture.

Sincerely yours,



Arthur Schlesinger, jr.
Special Assistant
to the President

Dr. Leo Szilard
c/o Director General
CERN
Geneva, Switzerland

Received July 6/63

CONFIRMATION COPY

Geneva, Friday, 19 July 1963

IF
US EMBASSY MOSCOW

ATTENTION CARL KAYSEN YOUR MESSAGE RECEIVED TONIGHT stop I AM TOLD
MY LETTER HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED IN THE MEANTIME stop HOWEVER THE ONLY
ISSUE WHICH OUGHT TO BE RAISED WITH YOU IS WHETHER OR NOT THE PROJECT
I PROPOSED LAST OCTOBER WOULD STILL MAKE SENSE IN THE PRESENT, GREATLY
CHANGED, CIRCUMSTANCES stop IF CONSULTED ON THIS ISSUE I HOPE YOU WOULD
FEEL FREE TO STATE YOUR OPINION WHATEVER IT MAY BE stop BEST OF LUCK =

LEO SZILARD

File: Russel

MESSAGE TO DR. LEO SZILARD FROM CARL KAYSEN, MOSCOW

Thank you for your long message of 16 July. I am afraid that I cannot accept the responsibilities you have laid upon me. It was the condition of our arrangements and the condition of the President's letter to Hudson Hoaglund that your activities were private in character and that the relation of these activities to the official business of the Government was exactly that obtaining in many areas in which Government officials draw on the wisdom, experience and thoughts of private citizens and private groups as seems desirable. I of course am not a private citizen and never less so than at the present moment. It would be clearly inappropriate for me to discuss with Soviet officials the business of the academy study group in my present capacity. Further, it was my understanding from our last discussion that you had turned over management of this enterprise to Roger Fisher and that such further discussions as were necessary for me to be involved in would be with him.

July 18, 1963

file: Washington 63

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 21, 1963

Dear Mr. Szilard:

I write to acknowledge your imaginative note of November 14 to the President. Yours is a characteristically original suggestion, but I doubt if it would be useful for us to conduct our relations with Chairman Khrushchev through you.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Leo Szilard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Washington, D. C.

February 7, 1964

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Bundy:

Enclosed I am sending you a copy of a paper which will appear in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and attached to this letter you will find its Summary.

I wrote this paper in order to focus the discussion on the only significant step in arms control which could be negotiated in the absence of a general political settlement. In the unlikely case that you should find time these days to read this paper, I should appreciate an opportunity to answer any questions which you might have before February 20. On that date I am leaving for the West Coast where I intend to stay "permanently."

Your secretary could reach me at the Hotel Dupont Plaza, HU.3-6000, Room 745.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Leo Szilard