

Letter to Stalin

October 24, 1947

Dear Rabinowitch:

Enclosed is the final copy of my article. As you will see, everything has been removed which could be construed as a criticism of our foreign policy.

I am very anxious to get at an early date a Russian translation from you. Since you don't have a typewriter, I would plan on having photo copies made of your manuscript. When the article appears in the Bulletin, the full text will immediately be reprinted in Russian in Russky-Golos--the New York Russian newspaper. Dr. Kriukin, its director, was exceedingly enthusiastic about the article and wants to carry it. Whether it will be possible for me to make any other use of your translation I do not know. I am trying to clear the situation with the government, but I don't believe that the answer will come through early enough to justify further postponement of the publication in the Bulletin. Naturally, I am anxious to get a translation which does not lose the fine points and does not destroy the balance of the article.

I have written something else, not for publication, which will amuse you, and I am going to send you a copy as soon as I have it typed. It describes my trial as a war criminal after the third world war.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO 37 · ILLINOIS
INSTITUTE OF RADIOBIOLOGY AND BIOPHYSICS

1155 East 57th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois
June 29, 1949

Dr. Eugene Rabinowitch
Wardsboro, Vermont

Dear Rabinowitch:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I wrote to
H. J. Muller. Enclosed also is a copy of the Interrogatory to which
my letter refers. Please let me know what action you have decided
upon.

Sincerely yours,

Leo K. Howard

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Encl.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS

THE ENRICO FERMI INSTITUTE
FOR NUCLEAR STUDIES

July 26, 1957

Professor Eugene Rabinowitch
Department of Botany
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois

Dear Rabinowitch,

I am in the process of exploring what kind of reactions others might have to a proposal of holding in the future a sequence of meetings somewhat similar to the Pugwash meeting. Attached you will find a memorandum which I have written on the subject and sent to a number of people whose names are attached. This being vacation time, I do not expect an early response but when there is a significant response that is worth discussing I shall write you again.

In the meantime, could you jot down just a few lines and give me your own personal views on the subject of the memorandum?

With kind personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

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Encl.

P.S. Enclosed you will also find a copy of a covering letter to the memorandum that I sent to Professor Topchiev.

August 22, 1957

Dr. Eugene Rabinowitch
Department of Botany
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois

Dear Rabinowitch:

I believe you are one of those designated at Pugwash to serve on a continuing committee. I should appreciate your reading the attached note and letting me have your reaction as soon as convenient.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

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Encl.

gen file

G-4

Berlin,
24 October 1957

Dr. Eugene Rabinowitch
Department of Botany
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois

Dear Rabinowitch,

You remember the success the bulletin had in printing a number of case histories of men who were refused visas by the State Department. I wonder, whether the same technic could not be applied now to another problem. If one could get some ten to fifteen physicists, each one to state in their own case sincerely why they decided not to work for the government, then there would emerge a far truer and more colorful picture than could be obtained through articles that may express in a more abstract manner why scientists may be in general reluctant to join government projects. According to my proposal each man would describe the various considerations which led him finally to say: "To hell with it". If each man would say how he arrived at this decision including why and when they arrived at it, the "authorities" could learn a lot from this, if they indeed wanted to learn. Whether this proposal is feasible will depend whether there will be enough men who are willing to say the truth about their own feelings and motivations in connection with this issue.

You may ask Urey, Seitz and perhaps Wigner (who incidently is at present in Chicago for two months) whether they would be willing to tell their story if you decide that "case histories"

Letter to Dr. Eugene Rabinowitch
Department of Botany, University of Illinois, dtd.24 Oct.57

is, what is needed.

With kind regards

Sincerely

Copy
Dr. Edward Shils

(Leo Szilard)

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

"A Magazine of SCIENCE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS"

5734 UNIVERSITY AVENUE • CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS

MIDWAY 3-3056

May 20, 1958

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Leo Szilard
c/o Mrs. Norene Mann
RI 282

Dear Szilard:

As I told you over the phone, I have tried to compress your long article into something the Bulletin could handle. I enclose this draft about 5,000 words long, which covers about 8,000 words of yours (the sections, "The Strategic Stalemate," "The Basic Premise of American Military Policy," "How Either America or Russia Could Insure the Stability of the Stalemate," and "Halting the Arms Race, When and How?"). I think the condensation contains most, if not all, of what is essential in the original, avoiding the repetitiveness of the latter, and some tangential matters.

I think these sections form a unit in themselves. The rest could perhaps be converted into a second part of the article.

Following your explanation in our telephone conversation, I rewrote the Turkey-Syria example so as to make clear that the offer of "exchange of cities" is made by Russia to preserve the status quo and not to change it; so that the alternative for America in this case is to stay out and compel Turkey not to interfere in the affairs of Syria. On page 7 (in my text) you have another ambiguous statement about "unforeseeable contingencies" where Russia "might want to invade a territory which America is committed to protect." Does this, too, imply that this "protectorate" is engaged in aggression against a territory protected by the Soviet Union? If so, this should be made clear.

I assume now that your whole system is intended to stabilize the status quo, and to prevent its violation--by Russia, America or a satellite of either one of them. If this is so, the prerequisite for the system to become applicable is an explicit (or silent) agreement by both sides that what they really desire is universal maintenance of status quo. (This was the subject of my paper at Lac Beauport!) If such an agreement should exist, would there be need for the kind of security system you propose? If both sides should decide not only not to attack each other, but also to prevent their respective satellites from aggression against each other, should not a far-reaching disarmament (including abolition of atomic weapons) become possible--particularly if one accepts your viewpoint that what stands in the way is the desire to disarm, and not the difficulties of controlling it? Since I disagree with the latter, I can envisage a situation in which an agreement on political aims is reached,

but nuclear disarmament still remains impossible, because neither side can convince the other that this disarmament has been actually carried out. Under these conditions, an agreement on strategy of the type of that suggested by you could perhaps add in reconciling nations to the existence of atomic weapons on the other side; but the really important stabilization will be the result of agreement on common political aims--preservation of the status quo--rather than that on "how nuclear weapons will be used."

What seems to be the greatest difficulty in the world situation now is that neither side has the aim of preserving the status quo, but both hope to nibble away the influence sphere of the other. True, the Soviet government has made it understood that it would like to reach agreement on stabilization of the present situation; but does it mean that they would be willing to join America, for example, in guaranteeing the present frontiers of Israel?

I think the most valuable aspect of your article is that it points out the impossibility of enforcing the kind of limited strategy in local conflicts one side may consider most favorable, because the other side will be able to threaten a limited nuclear action against its enemy's territory, shifting the responsibility for unleashing an unlimited, all-out mutual destruction to its antagonist. Unfortunately, this possibility could be used to support local aggression, as well as a defense of the status quo. This is why your original example of Syria and Turkey could be so easily misinterpreted as an offer to America to pay a price for preserving Turkey from becoming a Soviet satellite, instead of as a price to be paid for preventing Turkey from converting Syria into a Western satellite.

These are my main doubts about your proposal. I have many minor criticisms. For example, why do you always present the Russian leadership as reasonable and America as being in the wrong and unreasonable? Do you really believe this to be the case? Or do you think it's "good tactics" to sell your program to the Russians?

I am going away for three weeks; will be in Champaign June 8-20, and again July 16-September 1. We can talk then about the possible use of your article by the Bulletin. I am returning the whole of your original article, including the parts not included in my condensation.

Yours,

Eugene Rabinowitch
Eugene Rabinowitch

ER:ljb
enc: (2)

Leo Szilard

Bethesda, Maryland

June 5, 1958

Dr. Eugene Rabinowitch
c/o Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
5734 University Avenue
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Rabinowitch:


Many thanks for your letter of May 20. I appreciate all the trouble which you have taken in this matter, but I still think the paper has to be expanded rather than shortened.

Concerning your question of why I always present the Russian leadership as reasonable and America as being in the wrong and unreasonable, my answer is as follows. I do not believe that this is the case, nor do I believe it is "good tactics" in order to sell ^{my} your program to the Russians, but what I believe is rather this. In civilized society it is customary for an individual, when conversing with another, to assume all the blame and to give the other credit both for real and imaginary virtues. In the past ten years these rules of courtesy have been grossly violated in international conversations, and I believe that we ~~are~~ ^{ought} to try to introduce this type of courtesy, ~~at least~~ into the conversation which might ~~not~~ ^{now} be starting up among individual Americans and Russians. I propose to express and stress this point when I write an expanded version of the paper and thus to give an explicit answer to the question which you raise. I shall attempt also to answer explicitly in the

revised version of my paper, on which I am beginning to work today,
the other questions which you raise in your letter.

With kindest regards,

Yours,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'L. Szilard', written over the typed name.

Leo Szilard

LS;mt

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
Dear Szilard:

From our conversation, I have not received a clear impression as to whether you would like to have a "short version" of your paper published in the September issue of the Bulletin, or not. I understand that you are preparing an enlarged version, which you hope to publish in full, but this should not make the publication of a condensed version in the Bulletin impossible. Please let me know at once what you think, since the September issue has to be put together by July 18, and I will be in the East between June 20-July 14.

We probably will publish in the September issue the Lac Beauport papers by Leghorn, Wiesner, Skobelczyn, and perhaps my own.

I will send you the proposed draft of the statement for Vienna as soon as it is typed out.

Yours sincerely,



Eugene Rabinowitch

ER:ljk

September 13, 1960.

Eugene Rabinowitch,
Department of ~~Biology~~, *Botany*
University of Illinois,
Champaign, Ill.

Dear Eugene,

Please read the enclosed memorandum which is addressed to Leghorn, Wiesner, Doty and Harrison Brown.

I am also enclosing for your information an exchange of letters with Khrushchev, a letter from Topchiev and a memorandum addressed to 'whom it does concern', which gives the background of the exchange of letters with Khrushchev. Please keep all this material confidential.

As you will see from this correspondence, I am not assuming any responsibility for making arrangements with Topchiev. I am prepared, however, to do my share in explaining to the advisers of both Nixon and Kennedy what it is that we are attempting to accomplish and in what manner we hope to accomplish it.

If you ever get to New York, please do contact me at extension 133, TRafalgar 9-3000.

Sincerely,



Leo Szilard

Enclosures