## MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY LINCOLN LABORATORY

LEXINGTON 73, MASSACHUSETTS

VOlunteer 2-3370

September 28, 1960

Dr. Leo Szilard Room 812 Memorial Hospital 444 Fast 68th Street New York, New York

Dear Dr. Szilard:

Thinking about your request for suggested names of people to stay on beyond the main Pugwash Conference has been somewhat difficult because I do not have much of an image of the level of people anticipated, whom they will be talking to, why, or about what. I have been drawing up more extensive lists of people, for various purposes, at the request of the new disarmament agency in the Department of State, but this has been a good deal easier because the functions these people are to perform is somewhat broken down and it is understood that they do not expect the very best people available for all of their various jobs. (Among other things, there is a one-too-many correspondence between the very best people and the various jobs.) The following people have been suggested on the assumption that what is wanted is the best possible discussion of all possible issues by a rather small group. Some of them would be less appropriate to the discussion of certain specifics, such as a weapon test ban.

To begin with, I assume that the better qualified people from the presently scheduled Pugwash delegates, specifically including yourself, Jerry Wiesner, Dick Leghorn, and, possibly, Dali Kybal, would be automatically included.

If it would not upset the Soviets too much, my first suggestion beyond these would be Herman Kahn. Kahn is exceptionally good right across the board, on military, political, technical, and strategic aspects, as well as on many specifics of arms control. He knows what civilization is all about. On the other hand, he is known as a United States military planner, and widely but incorrectly regarded as rather inhuman. If the Soviets have heard of this reputation, they might react rather adversely, at least until they had a better chance to know him. Jerry Wiesner would say that he talks too much, which has an element of truth but seems to me to be a small price to pay.

Next, I would suggest Harold Brown, who is now Director of the Livermore Laboratory, and was Deputy Director under Teller prior to Teller's departure. However, if the Soviets know who he is, he may well be even more objectionable than Herman Kahn. In addition, he is somewhat more conservative than Herman when it comes to trading some military security for possible political gains. He has been an advocate of a limited nuclear strategy but is definitely showing some signs of weakening. However, he is not a fanatic; he is very bright; and he is well versed in this subject area.

Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, should also be considered. He is exceptionally good at identifying political relationships and problems, and possible political gains. He is not quite so well qualified on technical or strategic problems.

One choice that would be particularly attractive to me would be Lewis C. Bohn, until recently of the RAND Corporation and still living in Santa Monica, but actually being paid by Lockheed. He could reasonably be described as a professional student of arms control, having devoted the great bulk of his time to this subject in the past several years, and he is one of the two or three best versed people in the subject. He is also reasonably smart and imaginative, and has originated several proposals of substance and identified many problems in the field. On the other hand, he suffers from rather extreme inhibitions, and does not show up particularly well in a group discussion, most especially if the group includes some very powerful and vociferous such as Brown and Kahn. He is very seriously concerned about the state of the world, in a way that most of us are not. He would be useful if there were someone else there who was sympathetic to him, and could make use of him as a sort of one-man staff, outside of the main discussions, though of course with him sitting in on the discussions themselves. Either Kahn or Wiesner would be sufficiently sympathetic in this sense.

Charles H. Townes, a physicist of substance who was formerly at Columbia and more recently has been Vice-President of the Institute of Defense Analyses, should probably be considered. I do not know him personally (except where otherwise noted to the contrary, I do know all of the other people named in this letter personally) but I do know that Townes has been active studying arms control problems and policies in the past several months, and what I have heard of him would suggest that he would be a good choice. I should imagine that Jerry Wiesner knows him and you could probably get a better reading from Jerry.

My final suggestion for the first team would be Albert Wohlstetter. I have had some personal contact with Wohlstetter, but nothing like as much as in the cases of Kahn, Brown, and Bohn, and much of the content of this recommendation stems from what I have read of his material and from what I have heard from others.

The following three suggestions are essentially suggestions at the level of the second team, though they are quite respectable and would be well worthwhile in the event that several of the foregoing people could not be obtained or in the event that a larger group were desired. (Each of these three is appreciably better than several of the people on the total list of Pugwash participants or people to be contacted.

First, I would suggest Henry ("Harry") Rowen, generally an economist at RAND but on leave for the coming year at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. He has been an intermittent member of our summer study and is very good at summarizing current strategic views and concepts.

Next, you might consider Arthur Barber, who has been (and still is) a full-time member of our summer study. He is normally the group leader of the Systems Analyses Group at the Air Force Cambridge Research Center. With this background, he is of course exceptionally well versed in current military technology and capabilities. He is also not unreasonable on other aspects of the business.

September 28, 1960 Dr. Leo Szilard -3-Finally, it would be worth considering Spurgeon Keeny, though he might find it quite difficult to attend. He is a civil servant on Kistiakowski's staff, principally concerned with disarmament. He has been at the meetings of the technical working groups on the weapon test ban. He is quite well versed on the subject in the large, on the political machinery in Washington, and he is quite good as a diplomat Passing now to the research centers, the first I should mention would be RAND. Two of the significant RAND people (Kahn and Wohlstetter) were mentioned above; another who should be mentioned is William W. Kaufmann. I do not know Kaufmann personally, but know quite well several people who are acquainted with him, and I understand that he is quite good in the type of work you were interested in. At the Harvard Center for International Affairs, in addition to Bowie (mentioned above), one might mention Tom Schelling and Henry Kissinger. As you probably know, Schelling is very bright in certain directions, but seems to many of us to have peculiar views of the world. Kissinger has a much less chilly outlook on the world and is also fairly good. At the Princeton center, the only one whose reputation is sufficiently known to me to be worth comment is Klaus, Knorm, I do not know him personally, but am assured by Herman Kahn that he is quite good. At the MIT Center of International Studies, I know Max Millikan and Ithiel Pool, and have a slight acquaintance with Walter Rostow. So far as I am aware, Rostow is not interested in arms control. Millikan is interested and ex officio was a member of the Steering Committee of our summer study, but I think he has not devoted much time to the subject. Pool is quite interested in the subject and has devoted a good deal of time to substantive work on the role and formation of public opinion. He is at least fairly good. I hope these remarks may be of some use to you. D. D. Brennan/jeg D. G. Brennan DGB: jej Dictated by Dr. Brennan but signed in his absence, due to his departure on a trip.

I was in hopes of stopping in to see you in NY day before yesterday, but it did not prove possible. Your memo of 10/21 is worth more discussion; some comments indicated on attached copy can be further elaborated if you wish. Will send you paper on test ban problems early (Monday) next week.

Don Brennan

Dear Leo:

This should seem familiar to you. We are grateful to you for your help, of various kinds.

I have fed in some

I have fed in some suggestions that may, with sufficient luck, eventuate in John McNaughton being kept in Washington.

I expect to see you at the Academy meeting next Wed.

eve., where I shall have two
Soviet (NISTOTS) as quests. One
of them may be familiar to
you from the Moscow Conference,
at I is conceivable he may be a Soviet
participant in our Study Group.

Repards—

Brennan





QUAKER RIDGE ROAD, HARMON-ON-HUDSON, N. Y. CABLE ADDRESS HUDSON 914 RO 2-0700

June 20, 1963

Dr. Leo Szilard Hotel Dupont Plaza Dupont Circle Washington, D. C.

Dear Leo:

The enclosed proposal sets forth a more careful analysis of the scheme I discussed with you over a lunch not long ago, and it is possible you may find the paper interesting.

I expect to be staying at the Dupont Plaza myself on Tuesday and next Wednesday of next week, but may not have much of a chance to say "hello". I shall call on you then if an opportunity arises, but if not, it won't be long before I'll be down again.

Sincerely,

D. G. Brennan

DGB:oc Enclosure:

"A Proposal for a Staff Integration Program"

June 21, 1963

D.G. Brennan Hudson Institute Quaker Ridge Road Harmon-On-Hudson, N.Y.

Dear Don:

I am sorry that I shall miss you if you come here on Tuesday because I am leaving on Monday for Europe. I should be back within a month or so and I hope to see you then if you come to Washington.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard