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Feb 9/62

YOU ARE INVITED TO HEAR DR. LEO SZILARD

In cooperation with the Davis peace group, the below listed families will sponsor an 'open house' on Thursday, February 8, at 8:30 P.M. The purpose of this arrangement is to give those who do not have access to F.M. receivers an opportunity to hear a broadcast of a speech by Dr. Leo Szilard on the subject: Are We on the Road to War? This speech was originally given at the University of California at Berkeley and has aroused considerable interest among groups seeking alternatives to the arms race. Dr. Szilard is a renowned physicist who, as editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, is well versed on the political and scientific problems we face. His contacts with scientific and political leaders have included a discussion on disarmament with Premier Khrushchev and provide a sound basis for his views.

The following persons have volunteered their homes for this occasion and cordially invite anyone interested in hearing Dr. Szilard.

Gerald Berton - 812 Douglas
Robert Bynum - 1208 Cornell
John Conrad - 1026 Ovejas
Bruce Glassburner - 951 Cypress
Dora Hunt - 113 B Street
Fred Iltis - 815 East 8th
John Jungerman - 712 Elmwood
Kurt Kreith - 320 I Street
Arthur Lillyblade - 838 Linden Lane
Jack Luick - 227 1st Street
Josephine Maillard - 312 A Street
Robert Mc Innes - 1301 Madrone
Donald Ranstead - 612 D Street
Sherman Stein - 811 Oak

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For those who have access to F.M. receivers and would prefer to listen at home, the broadcast is scheduled to start at 8:45 P.M.

We urge you to listen and give Dr. Szilard's program for alternatives to nuclear disaster your serious consideration.

Note

to the Speech of Dr. Leo Szilard "Are We On the Road to War?"

If you have read a copy of this speech -- written for the Harvard Law School Forum, Swarthmore College, Western Reserve University and the University of Chicago -- and if you live in any of these University Communities, you may want to participate in the proposed experiment. If you wish to do this, you are asked:

(a) to look into your heart and try to discover whether you, yourself, would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives -- as finally formulated -- had your wholeheartedly support and you thought that the movement could be effective.

(b) to ask some of your fellow students whether they might not wish to participate in the experiment also.

(c) to show Dr. Szilard's speech to people in your home community who might be interested and to determine which of these would be likely to form part of a dedicated minority that would give all-out support to a movement of the kind described by Dr. Szilard.

Dr. Szilard would appreciate your writing to him early in January and advising him to how many people you have talked and how many of these and who of these (name and address), you think, could be counted upon.

Those to whom you talk in your home community should not go and recruit still others. They may however put you into contact with others who might be interested, and you will be then in the position to evaluate their interest and to report back.

You can get additional copies of Dr. Szilard's speech:

In the Boston area from Michael or Barbara Brower, 3 Dana Street, Cambridge 38, Mass., telephone Elliot 4-1371.

In the Swarthmore area from Paul Mangelsdorf, Department of Physics, Swarthmore College, telephone KI. 3-0200.

In the Cleveland area from K. Suzanne Lega, Assistant to the Dean, Cleveland College, Western Reserve University, Cleveland 6, Ohio, telephone CE. 1-7700, Extension 116.

In the Chicago area from The Department of Political Science, Social Science Building, the University of Chicago, telephone MIdway 3-0800.

Volunteers from the University of Chicago student body are preparing and mailing copies of Dr. Szilard's speech. In order to cover expenses of mailing and reproduction, each recipient is requested to pay 25 cents per single copy and 20 cents per copy in bulk orders of ten or more. Please send cash to David Greenberg, or if you wish to make out a check--Mrs. Ruth Adams of the Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists has consented to accept the payment in her name.

David Greenberg
Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists
935 East 60th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

Mrs. Ruth Adams
Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists
935 East 60th Street
Chicago 37, Illinois

ARE WE ON THE ROAD TO WAR?

Note to the speech of Dr. Leo Szilard

If you have read a copy of this speech--written for a number of university audiences--you may want to participate in the proposed experiment. If you wish to do this, you are asked:

(a) to look into your heart and try to discover whether you, yourself, would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives--as finally formulated--appealed to you and you thought that the movement could be effective.

(b) to show Dr. Szilard's speech to people who might be interested and to determine who of these would be likely to form part of a dedicated minority that would give strong support to a movement of the kind described by Dr. Szilard.

(c) to write to Dr. Szilard, Hotel Dupont Plaza, Washington 6, D.C. as soon as possible telling him if you will support such a movement yourself, and advising him to how many people you have talked and how many of these and who of these (with names and addresses) you think could be counted upon.

You can get additional copies of this speech from: Michael or Barbara Brower, 3 Dana Street, Cambridge 38, Mass., Telephone Eliot 4-1371, at 25 cents each for 1-10 copies, plus 15 cents each for all additional copies.

About the Author of this Speech

The following note is taken from Dr. Szilard's book, The Voice of the Dolphins. Containing five stories of political and social satire, this book was published in 1961 by Simon and Schuster in paper for $1.

"Dr. Leo Szilard was among the first to conceive of the possibility of an atomic chain reaction and to recognize what it would mean to the world. The first patent issued in America in the field of atomic energy was issued jointly in his name and the name of the late Enrico Fermi. With Professor E.P. Wigner he shared the Atoms for Peace Award for 1959.

"In 1939 Szilard took the initiative in inducing the U.S. Government to assume responsibility for the development of atomic energy. The historic letter which Albert Einstein wrote on August 2, 1939, to President Roosevelt was based on the work of Fermi and Szilard. In 1945 Szilard assumed the leadership of those of his colleagues who were opposed to dropping atomic bombs on the cities of Japan. In 1946 he led the successful fight of his colleagues against the May-Johnson Bill, which would have placed the development of atomic energy in the U.S. in the hands of an agency not under the direct "civilian" control of the President. At present Dr. Szilard is professor of biophysics at the University of Chicago."

Leo Szilard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Washington 6, D.C.

Berkeley, California
January 9, 1962

"ARE WE ON THE ROAD TO WAR?"

by Leo Szilard

For a number of years now, you have had an opportunity to observe how we, as a nation, respond to the actions of the Russians, and how the Russians respond to our responses. Those of you who have watched closely the course of events, in the past six months, may have been led to conclude that we are headed for an all-out war. I myself believe that we are, and that our chances of getting through the next ten years, without war, are slim.

I, personally, find myself in rebellion against the fate that history seems to have in store for us, and I suspect that some of you may be equally rebellious. The question is, what can you do?

War seems indeed to be inevitable, unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present. You, as Americans, are not in a position to influence the Russian government; it follows that you would have to bring about a change in the attitude of the American Government which, in turn, may bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian Government.

It is conceivable that if a dedicated minority were to take effective political action, they could bring about the change in attitude that is needed. But such a minority can take effective action only if it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which it may unite. I shall try to outline to you today such a set of political objectives.

Ever since the end of the war, the policies of the great powers have consistently followed the line of least resistance, and this line leads to an unlimited arms race. I do not believe that America can be made safe by keeping ahead in such an arms race.

There have been repeated attempts to stop the arms race by negotiating an agreement that would provide for some form of arms control. So far, all such attempts have failed, and each time they were followed by the continuation of the arms race, with renewed vigor.

Towards the end of the Eisenhower Administration, it was generally expected that the next administration would adopt a new approach to this problem and that a fresh attempt would be made to bring the arms race under control.

When Khrushchev was in New York a year ago last October, I tried to see him, in the hope of finding out how responsive he might be to such a new approach. I was told that they had scheduled fifteen minutes for me but, as it turned out, the conversation went on for two hours. At that time, it was not known whether Kennedy or Nixon would get elected, and I started off the conversation by saying that no matter who is elected, the Government would try to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of stopping the arms race. Khrushchev answered--and he spoke in all seriousness--that he believed this also.

A year ago last November, I checked out of the hospital in New York, where I had been confined for over a year, took a taxi to the airport, and flew to Moscow to attend the 6th Pugwash Conference. I was accompanied by my wife, who is also my doctor, and I stayed on in Moscow for about a month beyond the end of the conference. I stayed on in Moscow in order to engage in private conversations with our Russian colleagues, because I knew from experience that only in private conversations is it possible to get anything across to them or to discover what they really believe to be true.

None of our Russian colleagues brought up the issue of bomb tests in any of these conversations in Moscow, even though two years earlier some of them had been passionately interested in this issue. I found, however, an undiminished interest in far-reaching disarmament which would result in substantial savings. On one occasion, I had tea with Fedorov, the General Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with no one present except my interpreter. I had met Fedorov before and I always got along well with him. On this particular occasion, he spoke to me as follows:

"You must really believe me when I tell you that we want general disarmament. You have seen all this construction work going on in Moscow; it has been going on for many years; still we are not able to catch up with the housing shortage. If we had disarmament, we could not only solve this problem, but many of our other economic problems as well. Also, we could develop other nations on an unprecedented scale. So far, we are building only one hydro-electric dam in Africa--the Aswan Dam in Egypt; if we had disarmament, we could, and we would, build twenty such dams in Africa."

I tried to impress upon our Russian colleagues that the Kennedy Administration would make a serious effort to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of arms control, but that the new Administration would need time--six months and more than six months, perhaps--to find its bearings on this issue and to get organized to deal with it.

When I returned to this country in February, I decided to stay in Washington for a while.

In Washington, my friends told me that the Government was going to make a sincere effort to reach an agreement with Russia on the cessation of bomb tests and that a reasonable proposal would be made to the Russians on this issue. They would have liked to hear from me that Russia would be likely to accept such a proposal, but coming fresh from Moscow, I had serious doubts on this score.

The invasion of Cuba took me by surprise. When I first heard about it, it was not clear, as yet, whether we were going to give air support to the invading Cuban exiles and whether we would, if necessary, send in the Marines also. My immediate reaction was that of alarm, for I believed that if we did any of these things, we would seriously risk war with Russia. I did not think that Russia would try to intervene in the Caribbean area, and I did not think that the Russians would launch long-range rockets aimed at our cities. I thought, however, that Russia might make some military move elsewhere, probably in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it would seem that I was wrong, for Tom Slick of San Antonio, Texas recently set forth, apparently on good authority, that, if America

had openly intervened in Cuba, at that point, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

I would not venture to appraise just how close we came to an all-out war, on the occasion of the Cuban incident. I am reasonably certain, however, that if our intervention in Cuba had been successful, this would have blocked for many years to come any possibility of reaching an agreement on arms control with Russia. Failure to reach an accommodation on the Berlin issue might, of course, produce the same result.

I would not entirely exclude the possibility of war over Berlin, but to me it seems more probable that this crisis will be resolved by some uneasy compromise, and that it will not lead to an all-out war. Russia may bring pressure on West Berlin in order to promote any one of a number of her foreign policy objectives, but, on the larger issue, the issue of Germany, the true interest of America and Russia is the same. The true interest of both countries is to have Europe politically as stable as possible.

I am convinced that the Berlin issue could be satisfactorily resolved by negotiations, but this conviction is based on the belief that there is something that the Russians want that we should be willing to give them, and that there is something that we want that the Russians should be willing to give us in return.

There are many people who do not share this belief. They hold that the Berlin issue was artificially created by Russia for the purpose of humiliating America, for breaking up NATO, and for converting West Germany into a Communist state.

Many people, perhaps the majority, believe that the Russians are very much like the Nazis; that they have concrete plans for bringing about, one way or another, our total defeat in Europe, and also for subjugating the whole world to their rule.

Many people have a black and white picture of the world; they believe that the nations fall into two classes: the peace-loving nations, and those who are not peace-loving. America, France and England, and generally speaking our allies, including Germany and Japan, are peace-loving. Russia and China are not peace-loving nations. Twenty years ago, the situation was somewhat different: at that time, Russia was a peace-loving nation, but Germany and Japan were not.

Many people believe that ever since the atomic bomb forced the unconditional surrender of Japan, America has unceasingly tried to rid the world of the bomb, and that all her efforts were frustrated by Russian intransigence.

When I listen to people who hold such views, I sometimes have the feeling that I have lived through all this before and, in a sense, I have. I was sixteen years old when the first World War broke out, and I lived at that time in Hungary. From reading the Hungarian newspapers, it would have appeared that, whatever Austria and Germany did was right and whatever England, France, Russia, or America did was wrong. A good case could be made out for this general thesis in almost every single instance. It would have been quite difficult for me to prove, in any single instance, that the newspapers were wrong, but somehow, it seemed to me unlikely that the two nations located in the center of Europe should be invariably right, and that all the other nations should be invariably wrong. History, I reasoned, would hardly operate in such a peculiar fashion, and gradually I was led to conclusions which were diametrically opposed to the views held by the majority of my schoolmates.

Many of my schoolmates regarded me as something of an oracle because I was able to cope with the mysteries of lower arithmetic which baffled them, and one of them asked me one day quite early in the war who would lose the war. I said that I didn't know who would lose the war, but that I thought that I knew who ought to lose the war; I thought that Austria and Germany, as well as Russia, ought to lose the war. Since Austria and Germany fought on one side, and Russia on the other, it was not quite clear how this could happen. The fact is, of course, that it did happen.

I am not telling you this in order to impress you with how bright I am. Nobody at sixty can claim to be as bright as he was at sixteen, even though in most cases it is not the intelligence that deteriorates, but the character. The point I am trying to make is that even in times of war, you can see current events in their historical perspective, provided that your passion for the truth prevails over your bias in favor of your own nation.

After the First World War, when I lived in Berlin, a distinguished friend of mine, Michael Polanyi, asked me one day what I thought ought to be the rule of human conduct regulating the behavior of an individual in society. "Clearly," he said, "you cannot simply ask a man to be generous to other people, for if the other people are mean to him, and if he follows your rule, he may starve to death." "But," said Polanyi, "perhaps the rule ought to be 'Be one per cent more generous to people than they are to you.' " This should be sufficient, he thought, because if everyone were to follow this rule, the earth would, step by step, turn into a livable place.

I told him that, to my mind, this would not work at all, because if two people behave the same way toward each other, each is bound to think that he is 30 per cent more generous than the other. Clearly, the rule would have to allow for this bias. Perhaps if we were to stipulate, as the rule of conduct, "Be 31 per cent more generous to the others than they are to you," such a rule might work.

America and Russia are not following any such rule of conduct. Moreover, their bias greatly exceeds 30 per cent. Most Americans apply a yardstick to America's actions which is very different from the yardstick which they apply to Russia's actions. Whenever their bias in favor of their own nation gets into conflict with the truth, the odds are that the bias will prevail. As a result of this, they are not capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective. They may well realize that we are in trouble, but they cannot correctly diagnose the cause of the trouble, and, therefore, they are not in a position to indicate what the right remedy might be.

The people who have sufficient passion for the truth to give the truth a chance to prevail, if it runs counter to their bias, are in a minority. How important is this "minority?" It is difficult to say at this point, for, at the present time, their influence on governmental decisions is not perceptible.

If you stay in Washington, you may gain some insight into the manner in which important governmental decisions come about; you may get a feel of what kind of considerations enter into such decisions, and what kind of pressures are at work.

With President Kennedy, new men moved into the Administration. Many of them understand the implications of what is going on and are deeply concerned. But, they are so busy trying to keep the worst things from happening, on a day-to-day basis, that they have no time to develop a consensus on what the right approach would be, from the long-term point of view.

There are also a number of men in Congress, particularly in the Senate, who have insight into what is going on and who are deeply concerned, but mostly they lack the courage of their convictions. They may give a lucid analysis of the trouble in private conversations and then at some point or other, they will say: "Of course, I could not say this in public."

In Washington, wisdom has no chance to prevail at this point.

Last September, Life Magazine printed an article about me which said that I was in Washington trying to find out if there was a market for wisdom. Thereupon, I received a flood of letters from colleges and universities inviting me to give lectures. Most people get some pleasure out of hearing themselves talk, and so do I, yet I did not see much point in going around the country giving talks, if all I had to say was, that there was no market for wisdom. Therefore, I declined all these invitations; that is, I declined that all, until Brandeis University invited me to attend a Special Convocation and to receive an honorary doctor's degree. At that point, my vanity got the better of me, and I accepted. At Brandeis, I spoke at dinner informally to the Trustees and Fellows of the University, and this was my closest contact with the grass roots since I moved to Washington--if indeed, you may regard the Trustees and Fellows of Brandeis as grass roots.

I told them at Brandeis that I thought we were in very serious trouble; people asked me what there was that they could do about it, and I had no answer to give.

Is there, indeed, anything that these people--or for that matter I, myself, could do at this point that would make sense?

When I got back to Washington, I started to think about this, and I believe it will be best now if I simply recite to you how my thoughts developed from this point on.

The first thought that came to my mind was that--in cooperation with others--I could try to set up an organization in Washington--a sort of Lobby, if you will--which would bring to Washington, from time to time, scholars and scientists who see current events in their historical perspective. These men would speak with the sweet voice of reason, and our lobby could see to it that they would be heard by people inside of the Administration, and also by the key people in Congress.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished scholars and scientists would be heard, but that they might not be listened to, if they were not able to deliver votes.

Would they be listened to if they were able to deliver votes?

The minority for which they speak may represent just a few per cent of the votes, and a few per cent of the votes alone would not mean very much, just as the sweet voice of reason alone would not mean very much. Still, the combination of a few per cent of the votes and the sweet voice of reason might turn out to be an effective combination. And, if the minority for which these men speak, were sufficiently dedicated to stand ready not only to deliver votes, but also to make very substantial campaign contributions, then this minority would be in a position to set up the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington.

The problem which the bomb poses to the world cannot be solved except by abolishing war, and nothing less will do. But first of all, we must back away from the war to which we have come dangerously close.

Could such a dedicated minority agree not only on the long-term political objectives which need to be pursued in order to abolish war, but also on the immediate political objectives, the objectives which must be pursued in the next couple of years, in order to make the present danger of war recede to the point where attention can be focused on the task of abolishing war?

America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in an atomic arms race, and an agreement providing for arms control is a necessary first step towards abolishing war. An agreement on arms control does not seem to be, however, "around the corner." It might very well be, therefore, that in the immediate future America would have to take certain unilateral steps. Some of these steps would be taken in order to reduce the present danger of war; other steps would be taken so that if a war breaks out, which neither American nor Russia wants, it may be possible to bring hostilities to an end before there is an all-out atomic catastrophe.

Such unilateral steps are not adequate substitutes for negotiated agreements, and they can carry us only part of the way, but still there are some unilateral steps which can and should be taken at the present time. I propose to discuss with you at this point what these steps may be:

The issue of bomb tests and the issue of bomb shelters are peripheral issues; they are more the symptoms of the trouble we are in, than the cause of the trouble, and I propose to turn now to issues which I believe to be more important.

1.) Nothing is gained by America's winning meaningless battles in the cold war and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed. Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among the nations.

The first director of this Agency was an American, and his term expired recently. Since, next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, America could have proposed that the next director of the Agency be a Russian. Instead, America proposed a Swede, who was not acceptable to the Russians, and since America had the votes, she was able to win one more victory in a meaningless battle of the cold war.

All this "victory" did was to reduce the chances of finding some useful function for this Agency, because the Russians resent being pushed around in this Agency, and there is no way for us to force them to play ball.

I believe that it would be important for the Government to reach a major policy decision, and for the President to issue an Executive Order against fighting meaningless battles in the cold war.

We have a cultural exchange program with the Russians but their State Department and our State Department are playing a game of "if you hit our scientists, we shall hit your scientists." Accordingly, our State Department imposes senseless travel restrictions on our Russian colleagues who visit this country.

These travel restrictions are not aimed at the safeguarding of any secrets, but are merely one way of hitting back at travel restrictions which the Soviet Government occasionally imposes on American scientists who travel about in Russia.

I believe that representations ought to be made, at as high a level of the Administration as is necessary, for the Secretary of State to find some other assignment in the State Department for those who have, up till now, handled the East-West Cultural Exchange Program.

2.) I believe that America could and should make two crucially important policy decisions and that she should proclaim these decisions.

First of all, America should resolve and proclaim that she would not resort to any strategic bombing of cities or bases of Russia (either by means of atomic bombs or conventional explosives), except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs, or if there is an unprovoked attack with bombs against one of America's allies.

Further, America should make a second policy decision and should proclaim this decision. In order to understand the meaning and relevance of this second decision, it is necessary to consider the following:

Soon after the war, when Russia did not as yet have any atomic bombs, she proposed that the bomb be outlawed. This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently Sulzberger of the New York Times discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of such unilateral pledges renouncing the use of the bomb. Khrushchev said on this occasion that if there were a war, even if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force must no longer be victory. The objective can only be to make a conquest difficult and unpalatable by making it painful and expensive. If force is used then, an all-out war which neither side wants can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory, or anything approaching victory.

Keeping this point of view in mind, America could and should adopt the policy that if, in case of war, she were to use atomic bombs against troops in combat, she would do so only on our own side of the pre-war boundary.

America would then be bound by a pledge to this effect in case of war, as long as Russia imposes a similar restraint on her conduct of the war.

Manifestly, this type of use of atomic bombs would be a defensive operation and moreover, it would be a very effective defensive operation, either on the part of Russia or on the part of America, as long as the restraints remain in effect on both sides.

Such a pledge would be no less clear than the simple pledge renouncing

the use of the bomb, but it would be much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge. And if neither side aims at anything approaching victory, then it would greatly reduce the danger of an all-out war.

When I discussed this issue in Germany three years ago, the people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs. I do not know to what extent West German cities could be spared by a judicious tactical use of atomic bombs by American forces, but I do know that if America were to use bombs beyond the pre-war boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

Recently , the United Nations Assembly voted with a more than two-thirds majority, 55 against 20, to outlaw the use of atomic bombs in war. The use of atomic bombs in warfare was declared by the Assembly to be a crime and a violation of the United Nations Charter.

Since the machinery of the United Nations was set up for the purpose of maintaining peace among the smaller nations, assuming the cooperation of the great powers to this end, attempts to regard a two-thirds vote of the Assembly as legally binding must necessarily fail. Still, the United States must not fly in the face of world opinion and simply disregard the vote of the General Assembly, when a two-thirds vote of the Assembly expresses the legitimate concern of a great majority of the nations that the use of atomic bombs in warfare might lead to a world catastrophe. Rather, out of respect for world opinion and in its own interest, the United States ought to go as far towards complying with it as valid considerations for its own security permit. The restrictions on the use of atomic bombs in case of war which I am advocating are advocated with this end in view.

Western Europe is not inferior to Russia either in manpower or in resources and it would be possible for Western Europe to build up within five years conventional forces to the point where it could completely renounce the use of atomic bombs against troops in combat in case of war. But even this would be to no avail unless the nations involved give up any thought of fighting limited wars for "limited objectives," and use force only to make a conquest difficult and, with luck, to prevent it.

As long as there is no agreement providing for arms control, and Russia remains in possession of large stockpiles of bombs, America has no choice but to maintain a strategic atomic striking force. However, we should maintain such a force only as protection against America or her allies being attacked with bombs or missiles. The number of bombs retained for this purpose need not be very large, and more important than the number of bombs retained is the invulnerability of the bases from which they would be launched. If these bases are invulnerable, so that no single massive attack against them could substantially damage America's ability to retaliate, then America needs to retain only enough bombs to be able to destroy, in retaliation, a substantial number of Russia's cities, after giving due notice to permit their orderly evacuation.

It must be made clear, however, that if America adopts the policy here advocated, she thereby renounces the threat of strategic bombing as a <u>general deterrent</u> because she could then make this threat only in case Russia would drop atomic bombs, and drop them on <u>our</u> side of the pre-war boundary.

I, personally, do not believe that America would lose much by giving up the threat of strategic bombing because the deterrent effect of such a threat is negligible unless the threat is believable.

If America were to threaten to drop bombs, in case of war, on a large number of Russian cities, knowing full well that Russia would retaliate by dropping bombs on a large number of American cities, such a threat would be tantamount to a threat of Murder and Suicide. The threat of murder and suicide would not be a believable threat, in the context of the so-called Berlin Crisis, nor would it be a believable threat in the context of any other similar conflict in which America's rights and interests may be at stake, but not America's existence as a nation.

Those responsible for the planning of strategy in the Department of Defense would concede this much. According to persistent press reports there is, however, an increasingly influential school of thought in the Department of Defense which holds that in case of war with Russia, America may engage in strategic bombing, aimed at the destruction of Russian rocket bases and strategic air bases. America would not bomb any of Russia's cities if she can help it, as long as Russia did not bomb any of America's cities.

This school of thought holds that, at present, Russia does not have many long-range rocket bases and strategic air bases, that the location of many of these bases is known, and that most of them are vulnerable so that they could be destroyed by attacking them with bombs. By building enough long-range solid-fuel rockets (Minutemen) and submarines capable of launching intermediate-range solid-fuel rockets (Polaris), America may be able to keep ahead in this game for the next five years. By that time Europe should build up conventional forces to the level where it may be possible for the West to forego the use of atomic bombs.

Those who advocate such a policy believe that if America should succeed in knocking out, say, 90% of Russia's strategic atomic striking forces, then the Russians may speak to us as follows, "We have enough rockets left to destroy a large number of American cities, but we know that if we did this America might retaliate by destroying all of our cities. Therefore, we are going to hold our fire and we propose to negotiate peace. We concede that the power balance has now shifted in America's favor and we are now willing to yield on a number of issues on which we took an inflexible stand prior to the outbreak of hostilities." If this were to happen America would have won a victory even though it may be a victory in a limited sense of the term only.

In technical language this kind of a policy is called, "counterforce strategy" and it is my contention that the adoption of this strategy would have disastrous consequences.

As long as war is not abolished and force may be resisted with force it will be necessary to consider both the means that may be employed and the aims which may be pursued. Whether only conventional weapons are used, or whether atomic bombs are used also, may be an important question, but far more important is the issue of whether force is resorted to in order to discourage conquest by exacting a price, if necessary a very high price, or whether the aim is victory. I do not believe that in a conflict between America and Russia it would be possible to avoid an all-out atomic catastrophe if there were a resort to force and if the aim were to settle controversial issues in our favor through victory or something approaching victory.

Naturally, if there is a war and America resorts to the bombing of bases in Russia, one could not expect the Russians to sit idly by and watch America picking up step by step one base after another. It follows that America would have to start the strategic bombing of Russian bases with a sudden, massive attack

and to try to destroy all vulnerable Russian bases of known location in the first attack. Accordingly, a counterforce policy is of necessity, a "first strike against bases--in case of war"--policy.

There are, of course, people in the Department of Defense who have serious doubts that America would actually adopt such a strategy in case of war, yet they believe that--at the present juncture--it is a good thing to threaten to bomb Russian bases in case of war because, this is a more believable threat than the threat of "murder and suicide."

I do not know just how believable this threat is, but I do know that at best we are purchasing an increased restraint on Russia's part, for a year or two, and that we are purchasing it at a very high price. For whether we adopt a counterforce strategy or merely give Russia the impression that we have adopted such a strategy, we are provoking an all-out atomic arms race and may within a very few years reach the point of no return in this regard.

I believe that it is imperative to oppose: (a) the adoption of plans which provide for the bombing of Russian rocket and strategic air bases in case of war, and (b) the adoption of the policy of "deterring" Russia with the threat that America would resort to this kind of strategic bombing in case of war. I believe that the rejection of both these policies is an attainable political objective because there is sufficient doubt inside the Administration about their wisdom.

3.) America could and should resolve that atomic bombs and the means suitable for their delivery which are supplied by her and which are stationed in Europe, shall remain in the hands of American military units which are under American command, rather than be placed under the control of NATO. As long as America is committed to defend Western Europe, there is no valid argument for turning over bombs to the control of other Western European nations.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the United States Government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of balancing any such pressure by bringing domestic political counter-pressure to bear on the Government.

America should stand firm in opposing the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs by Germany as well as means suitable for their delivery. It is conceivable, of course, that all attempts to achieve arms control may fail and that in the end it will not be within the power of the United States to prevent Germany from producing its own bombs and rockets. At about the same time the United States may, however, also free herself from her commitment to defend Germany against external military intervention. But our concern here is primarily with the present and not with developments that may conceivably occur in the unpredictable future.

4.) Not every issue can be solved by Congress passing a law, and there are borderline issues where political action alone can bring no solution because the specific knowledge is lacking of how to go about the solution. The issue of general disarmament seems to be such a borderline issue.

I believe that, at the present time, little could be gained by bringing pressure on the Administration to enter into formal negotiations with Russia on the issue of General Disarmament, because--as they say, "You can lead a horse to the water, but you can't make him drink."

I believe that no substantial progress can be made towards disarmament until Americans and Russians first reach a meeting of the minds of the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

American reluctance to seriously contemplate general disarmament is largely due to uncertainty about this point. If it became clear that a satisfactory solution of this issue is possible, many Americans may come to regard general disarmament as a highly desirable goal.

On the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world, progress could probably be made reasonably fast, through non-governmental discussions among Americans and Russians. I believe that such discussions ought to be arranged through private initiative, but with the blessing of the Administration.

It remains to be seen whether the newly created Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament will be in a position to mobilize the imagination and resourcefulness which is required and whether it may be necessary for a major private group to help them out or to prod them along--as the case may be.

The Russians know very well that America is not ready seriously to contemplate general disarmament and this, to my mind, explains why, in spite of being strongly motivated for disarmament, the Russian Government displays in its negotiations on this issue much the same attitude as does the American Government. As far as negotiations on disarmament are concerned, hitherto both governments have been mainly guided by the public relations aspect rather than by the substantive aspect of the issue.

The Soviet Union's attitude might change overnight, however, if it became apparent that America was becoming seriously interested in disarmament.

The Russians are very much aware of the great economic benefits they would derive from disarmament, and I believe that the Soviet Union would be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it. It stands to reason that this should be so, for the Soviet Union spends on defense an even larger fraction of her industrial output than America does.

America is at present committed to protect certain territories which are located in the geographical proximity of Russia. In the case of general disarmament, America would not be able to live up to such commitments. Disarmament will therefore be politically acceptable to America only if it is possible for her to liquidate most of her present commitments--without too much loss of prestige and without seriously endangering the interest of the other nations involved.

Khrushchev seems to be very much aware of this. Therefore, it is quite possible that if it came to serious negotiations on the issue of disarmament, and if it became manifestly necessary to reach a political settlement in order to permit America to liquidate her military commitments, then the Soviet Union would go a long way towards seeking an accommodation.

The so-called Berlin Crisis, which centers around the commitments which America made to West Berlin, might very well be a case in point.

5.) General disarmament will, if we are lucky, eliminate war, but it will not end the rivalry between America and Russia.

It is a foregone conclusion that American efforts towards creating an orderly and livable world will be frustrated in Southeast Asia and Africa because of our failure to devise forms of democracy which would be viable in these regions of the world. The task of devising forms of democracy which would be suitable to the needs of such areas is not a task that the Government can handle. Various forms of democracy may have to be devised which are tailor-made to fit the various areas. A major private group could tackle and ought to tackle this problem. If it is not solved more and more under-developed nations will become dictatorships;

some of them may have a rapid succession of dictator after dictator and, in the end, the people may have to choose between Chaos and Communism.

It is also a foregone conclusion that America's efforts to raise the standard of living of under-developed nations may be frustrated in those areas where the birth rate is high, infant mortality is high, and there is little arable land left. Improvement in the standard of living will initially lead to a fall in infant mortality, and if the birth rate remains high, the population will shoot up so rapidly that economic improvements will not be able to catch up.

Our failure to develop methods of birth control, suitable for the needs of such areas, is responsible for this state of affairs. The development of such methods is not a task which the Government can undertake. The Government could not create research institutes which would attract scientists who are ingenious and resourceful enough to come up with an adequate solution. A major private group could and should tackle this problem.

If it should turn out that it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which reasonable people could generally agree, and if these objectives could count on the all-out support of a sizable, dedicated minority--then I should be impelled to go further, and I would plan to do so along the following lines:

I would ask about fifteen distinguished scientists to serve as Fellows of a Council which might be called Council for Abolishing War or perhaps Council for a Livable World. The Fellows (who would all be scientists) would elect the Board of Directors of the Council, but membership on the Board of Directors would not be restricted to scientists.

This Council would, first of all, assemble a panel of political advisors, whose identity would be public knowledge, and in close consultation with these advisors, it would formulate two sets of objectives. To the first set belong those objectives which cannot be attained at the present time through political action because it would take further inquiry, and perhaps even real research to know, in concrete terms, what needs to be done. To the second set belong those objectives which can be pursued through political action because it is clear what needs to be done.

The Fellows of the Council would set up a research organization aimed at the pursuit of the first set of objectives and they would elect the Trustees of that organization. The Fellows of the Council would also set up a political organization aimed at the pursuit of the second set of objectives, and they would elect the Board of Directors of that organization. Membership on the Board would not be restricted to scientists. Because one of the major functions of the second organization would be to lobby, we may refer to it for our purposes tonight as the Lobby.

The Lobby would hold hearings, perhaps once every four months, and would subsequently proclaim in detail the immediate political objectives it proposes to support. It would communicate these objectives, perhaps in the form of a series of pamphlets, to all those who are believed to be seriously interested. Those who regularly receive the communications of the Lobby would be regarded as members of the Movement, if they are willing actively to support at least one of the several specific objectives proclaimed by the Lobby.

It seems to me that there is no need to enlist those who are interested as members of an organization. What one needs to create is not a membership organization, but a Movement.

The articulate members of the Movement would be expected to discuss the relevant issues with editors of their newspapers and various columnists and other opinion makers in their own community. They would be expected to write to, and in other ways keep in touch with, their Congressman and the two Senators of their own State.

One of the functions of the Lobby would be to help the members of the Movement clarify their own minds on the political objectives they wish actively to support and to help arrange appointments for those members who come to Washington to see Congressmen, Senators and certain key members of the Administration.

The members of the Movement would be regarded as pledged to vote in the primaries as well as in the elections. As far as federal elections are concerned, they would be pledged to cast their vote, disregarding domestic issues, solely on the issue of war and peace.

Further, the members of the Movement would be regarded as pledged annually to spend 2% of their income on campaign contributions. The members would be asked to make out a check payable to the recipient of the campaign contribution but to mail that check to the Washington office of the Lobby for transmission. In this manner the Lobby would be in a position to keep track of the flow of campaign contributions and to maintain a more effective contact with the recipients of these contributions.

Those in high income brackets may be left free to contribute 3% after taxes rather than 2% before taxes. There would be a provision for student members of the Movement that would permit them to spend a lesser amount on campaign contributions than adult members. All members of the Movement would be free to wear an emblem that would identify them as members of the Movement if they wish to do so.

Those who wish to support the Movement but do not want to go so far as making political contributions in the amount of 2% of their income, may regard themselves as supporters of the Movement if they spend either 1% of their income on political contributions or $100 per year, according to their own preferences. Such supporters of the Movement may expect to receive the advice and guidance of the Lobby and may make use of the services rendered by the Lobby on the same terms as the members of the Movement.

So that each member of the Movement may know where his contribution should go, in order to be most effective in furthering the political objectives which he has chosen to pursue, the Lobby would keep in touch with each member. The Lobby would keep the members informed about the particular contests for seats in Congress which are of interest to the Movement; it may advise one member to take an interest in one of these contests and another member to take an interest in another of these contests.

This does not mean the Lobby would explicitly endorse anyone running for office. It may be assumed that if the importance of a given contest is brought to the attention of a member, the member will have no difficulty figuring out for himself which of the two candidates for office he ought to support.

For covering the operating expenses of the Lobby and the Research Organization (which would be maintained independently and operated parallel to the Lobby), one would look to the members of the Movement. Each year a certain group of the members would be asked by the Board of the Lobby or the Trustees of the Research Organization to contribute 2 per cent of their income to them, rather than to spend it for political contributions. One year this group might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "C." Another year it might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "R," etc.

The influence of the Movement would be greatly enhanced if the Lobby were able to say not only how many votes it represents, in toto, but also how many

votes it represents in each state and in each congressional district. So that the Lobby may not make false representations concerning the votes it may be able to deliver, the Board would from time to time ask all those who regularly receive its communications, to say which of the political objectives proclaimed by the Board they propose to support and if they intend to perform with respect to those objectives as members of the Movement are expected to perform.

The Movement must not wield the power that it may possess crudely. People in Washington want to be convinced, they do not want to be bribed or blackmailed. He who gives consistently financial support to certain key members of Congress may evoke their lasting friendship and may count on their willingness to listen to him as long as he talks sense. He who talks to members of Congress, but does not talk sense, will not accomplish anything of lasting value, even if he temporarily sweeps some members of Congress off their feet by making huge political contributions to them.

There are many intelligent men in Congress who have insight into what goes on; the Movement could help these men to have the courage of their convictions. There are others in Congress who are not capable of such insight; the only thing to do with them is not to return them to Congress, and to replace them with better men. This may make it necessary to persuade better men to run in the primaries and to stand for election. To find such better men must be one of the tasks of the Movement, and the Lobby must be prepared to help the members of the Movement to perform this task.

As I said at the outset, I did not come here to enlist any of you in such a Movement or to launch such a Movement. I came here to invite you to participate in an experiment that ought to show whether such a movement could be successfully launched.

First of all, I ask each of you to look into your own heart and try to discover whether you yourself would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives--as formulated from time to time--appealed to you and you thought that the Movement could be effective.

Those of you who wish to participate in the experiment are asked to show a copy of this speech to people who might be interested and to determine who of these would be likely to be part of a dedicated minority that would give all-out support to a movement of the kind I have described.

I would appreciate your writing me, as soon as possible, how many people you have talked to, and how many of these and who of these (name and address), you think could be counted upon.

As soon as the result of this experiment, and other experiments of a similar nature, indicate that such a Movement could get off the ground, provided it were started in the right way and on a sufficiently large scale, then the Council for Abolishing War would be constituted. Presumably the Council would attempt to identify 25,000 to 50,000 individuals who would be willing to make campaign contributions in the amount of 2% of their income as long as they approved of the political objectives advocated by the Council and as long as they thought the Movement would be effective. Presumably, if the Council is successful in this, the Fellows of the Council would proceed to establish the Lobby.

By the time the Movement attains 200,000 members it would represent about $20 million per year in campaign contributions or $80 million over a four year period. Whether such a Movement could grow further and come to represent not only a significant amount in campaign contributions but also a significant number of votes, would then presumably depend on the future course of world events.

Leo Szilard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

Christmas 1961

ARE WE ON THE ROAD TO WAR?

by Leo Szilard

For a number of years now, you have had an opportunity to observe how we, as a nation, respond to the actions of the Russians, and how the Russians respond to our responses. Those of you who have watched closely the course of events in the past six months may have been led to conclude that we are headed for an all-out war. I myself believe that we are, and that our chances of getting through the next ten years without war are slim.

I, personally, find myself in rebellion against the fate that history seems to have in store for us, and I suspect that some of you may be equally rebellious. The question is, what can you do?

War seems indeed to be inevitable, unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present. You, as Americans, are not in a position to influence the Russian government; it follows that you would have to bring about a change in the attitude of the American Government which, in turn, may bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian Government.

It is conceivable that if a dedicated minority were to take effective political action, they could bring about the change in attitude that is needed. But such a minority can take effective action only if it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which it can unite.

I shall try to outline to you tonight a set of political objectives and you shall be the judges of how satisfactory these objectives may be.

Next, I would like to discuss with you what kind of political action it would take to alter the course of events; cause the present danger of war to recede, and to open the door to a constructive effort to abolish war.

To abolish war is a tall order, and I speak of it therefore with reluctance. It has been apparent, however, ever since the end of the war, that the bomb would pose a problem to the world for which there is no precedent and which cannot be solved short of abolishing war.

Ever since the end of the war, the policies of the great powers have consistently followed the line of least resistance, and this line leads to an unlimited arms race.

There have been repeated attempts to stop the arms race by negotiating an agreement that would provide for some form of arms control. So far, all such attempts have failed, and each time they were followed by the continuation of the arms race, with renewed vigor.

Towards the end of the Eisenhower Administration, it was generally expected that the next administration would adopt a new approach to this problem and that a fresh attempt would be made to bring the arms race under control.

When Khrushchev was in New York last October, I tried to see him, in the hope of finding out how responsive he might be to such a new approach. I was told that they had scheduled fifteen minutes for me but, as it turned out,

the conversation went on for two hours. At that time, it was not known whether Kennedy or Nixon would get elected, and I started off the conversation by saying that no matter who is elected, the Government would try to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of stopping the arms race. Khrushchev answered--and he spoke in all seriousness--that he believed this also.

On November 25 of last year, I checked out of the hospital in New York, where I had been confined for over a year, took a taxi to the airport, and flew to Moscow to attend the 6th Pugwash Conference. I was accompanied by my wife, who is also my doctor, and I stayed on in Moscow for about a month beyond the end of the conference. I stayed on in Moscow in order to engage in private conversations with our Russian colleagues, because I knew from experience that only in private conversation is it possible to get anything across to them or to discover what they really believe to be true. None of our Russian colleagues brought up the issue of bomb tests in any of these conversations in Moscow, even though two years earlier some of them had been passionately interested in this issue. I found, however, an undiminished interest in far-reaching disarmament which would result in substantial savings. On one occasion, I had tea with Fedorov, the General Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with no one present except my interpreter. I had met Fedorov before and I always got along well with him. On this particular occasion, he spoke to me as follows:

"You must really believe me when I tell you that we want general disarmament. You have seen all this construction work going on in Moscow; it has been going on for many years; still we are not able to catch up with the housing shortage. If we had disarmament, we could not only solve this problem, but many of our other economic problems as well. Also, we could develop other nations on an unprecedented scale. So far, we are building only one hydro-electric dam in Africa--the Aswan Dam in Egypt; if we had disarmament, we could, and we would, build twenty such dams in Africa."

I tried to impress upon our Russian colleagues that the Kennedy Administration would make a serious effort to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of arms control, but that the new Administration would need time--six months and more than six months, perhaps--to find its bearings on this issue and to get organized to deal with it.

When I returned to this country in February, I decided to stay in Washington for a while.

In Washington, my friends told me that the Government was going to make a sincere effort to reach an agreement with Russia on the cessation of bomb tests and that a reasonable proposal would be made to the Russians on this issue. They would have liked to hear from me that Russia would be likely to accept such a proposal, but coming fresh from Moscow, I had serious doubts on this score.

The Cuban invasion took me by surprise. When I first heard about it, it was not clear, as yet, whether we were going to give air support to the invading Cuban exiles and whether we would, if necessary, send in the Marines also. My immediate reaction was that of alarm, for I believed that if we did any of these things, we would seriously risk war with Russia. I did not think that Russia would try to intervene in the Caribbean area. Nor did I think that the Russians would launch long-range rockets aimed at our cities. I thought, however, that Russia would make some military move elsewhere, perhaps in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it would seem that I was wrong, for Tom Slick of San Antonio, Texas recently disclosed, apparently on good authority, that, if America had openly intervened in Cuba at that point, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

I would not venture to appraise just how close we came to an all-out war on the occasion of the Cuban incident. I am reasonably certain, however, that if our intervention in Cuba had been successful, this would have blocked for many years to come any possibility of reaching an agreement on arms control with Russia. Failure to reach an accommodation on the Berlin issue might, of course, produce the same result.

I would not entirely exclude the possibility of war over Berlin, but, to me, it seems more probable that this crisis will be resolved by some uneasy compromise, and that it will not lead to an all-out war. Russia may bring pressure on West Berlin, in order to promote any one of a number of her foreign policy objectives, but, on the larger issue, the issue of Germany, the true interest of America and Russia is the same. The true interest of both is to have Europe politically as stable as possible.

Neither Russia nor America really knows how to accomplish this goal. America may favor certain solutions and Russia may favor certain other solutions; still, it would be rather odd if America and Russia went to war with each other over the issue of what is the best solution for securing the peace in Europe.

I am convinced that the Berlin issue could be satisfactorily resolved by negotiations, but this conviction is based on the belief that there is something that the Russians want that we should be willing to give them, and that there is something that we want that the Russians should be willing to give us in return.

There are many people who do not share this belief. They hold that the Berlin issue was artifically created by Russia for the purpose of humiliating America, for breaking up NATO, and for converting West Germany into a Communist state.

Many people, probably the majority, believe that the Russians are very much like the Nazis; that they have concrete plans for bringing about, one way or another, our total defeat in Europe, and also for subjugating the whole world to their rule.

Many people have a black and white picture of the world; they believe that the nations fall into two classes: the peace-loving nations; and those who are not peace-loving. America, France and England, and generally speaking our allies, including Germany and Japan, are peace-loving nations. Russia and China are not peace-loving nations. Twenty years ago, the situation was somewhat different; at that time, Russia was a peace-loving nation, but Germany and Japan were not.

Many people believe that Russia, by supplying arms on a vast scale to the Chinese Communists, managed to take control of China. They recollect, further, that when American troops, fighting under the flag of the United Nations, crossed the 38th parallel, moved up across North Korea to the Yalu River, and destroyed the hydro-electric power plant which supplied Manchuria with electricity, all at once--and without any provocation--Chinese Communist hordes crossed the Yalu River and thus frustrated the efforts of the United Nations to unify Korea under free elections.

Many people believe that ever since the atomic bomb forced the unconditional surrender of Japan, America has unceasingly tried to rid the world

of the bomb, but that all her efforts were frustrated by Russian intransigence.

When I listen to people who hold such views, I sometimes have the feeling that I have lived through all this before and, in a sense, I have. I was sixteen years old when the first World War broke out, and I lived at that time in Hungary. From reading the newspapers in Hungary, it would have appeared that, whatever Austria and Germany did was right and whatever England, France, Russia, or America did was wrong. A good case could be made out for this general thesis, in almost every single instance. It would have been difficult for me to prove, in any single instance, that the newspapers were wrong, but somehow, it seemed to me unlikely that the two nations located in the center of Europe should be invariably right, and that all the other nations should be invariably wrong. History, I reasoned, would hardly operate in such a peculiar fashion, and it didn't take long until I began to hold views which were diametrically opposed to those held by the majority of my schoolmates.

Many of my schoolmates regarded me as something of an oracle because I was able to cope with the mysteries of lower arithmetics which baffled them; some of them asked me one day quite early in the war who would lose the war. I said that I didn't know who would lose the war, but that I thought that I knew who ought to lose the war. I thought that Austria and Germany, as well as Russia, ought to lose the war. Since Austria and Germany fought on one side and Russia on the other side, it was not quite clear how this could happen. The fact is, of course, that it did happen.

I am not telling you this in order to impress you with how bright I am. Nobody at sixty can claim to be as bright as he was at sixteen, even though in most cases it is not the intelligence that deteriorates, but the character. The point I am trying to make is that even in times of war, you can see current events in their historical perspective, provided that your passion for the truth prevails over your bias in favor of your own nation.

After the war, when I lived in Berlin, a distinguished friend of mine, Michael Polanyi, asked me one day what I thought ought to be the rule of human conduct regulating the behavior of an individual in society. "Clearly," he said, "you cannot simply ask a man to be generous to other people, for if the other people are mean to him, and if he follows your rule, he will starve to death." "But," said Polanyi, "perhaps the rule ought to be 'Be 1 percent more generous to people than they are to you.'" This should be sufficient, he thought, because if everyone were to follow this rule, the earth would, step by step, turn into a livable place.

I told him that, to my mind, this would not work at all, because if two people behave the same way toward each other, each is bound to think that he is 30 percent more generous than the other. Clearly, the rule would have to allow for this bias. Perhaps if we were to stipulate as the rule of conduct, "Be 31 percent more generous to the others than they are to you," such a rule might work.

America and Russia are not following any such rule of conduct. Moreover, their bias greatly exceeds 30 percent.

Most Americans apply a yardstick to America's actions which is very different from the yardstick which they apply to Russia's actions. Whenever their bias in favor of their own nation gets into conflict with the truth, the odds are that the bias will prevail. As a result of this, they are not capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective. They may well

realize that we are in trouble, but they cannot orrectly diagnose the cause of the trouble and therefore, they are not in a position to indicate what the right remedy might be.

The people who have sufficient passion for the truth to give the truth a chance to prevail, if it runs counter to their bias, are in a minority. How important is this "minority?" It is difficult to say at this point, for, at the present time, their influence on governmental decisions is not perceptible.

If you stay in Washington, you may gain some insight into the manner in which important governmental decisions come about; you may get a feel of what kind of considerations enter into such decisions, and what kind of pressures are at work.

With President Kennedy, new men moved into the Administration. Many of them fully understand the implications of what is going on and are deeply concerned. But, they are so busy trying to keep the worst things from happening, on a day-to-day basis, that they have no time to develop a consensus on what the right approach would be, from the long-term point of view.

There are also a number of men in Congress, particularly in the Senate, who have insight into what is going on and who are deeply concerned, but they lack the courage of their convictions. They may give a lucid analysis of the trouble in private conversations and then at some point or other, they will say: "Of course, I could not say this in public."

In Washington, wisdom has no chance to prevail at this point.

Life Magazine printed an article about me in September which said that I was in Washington trying to find out if there was a market for wisdom. Thereupon, I received a flood of letters from colleges and universities inviting me to give lectures. Most people get some pleasure out of hearing themselves talk, and so do I, yet I did not see much point in going around the country giving talks, if all I had to say was that there was no market for wisdom. Therefore, I declined all these invitations; that is, I declined them all, until Brandeis University invited me to attend a Special Convocation and to receive an honorary doctor's degree. At that point, my vanity got the better of me, and I accepted. At Brandeis, I spoke at dinner informally to the Trustees and Fellows of the University, and this was my closet contact with the grass roots since I moved to Washington--if indeed, you may regard the Trustees and Fellows of Brandeis as grass roots.

I told them at Brandeis that I thought we were in very serious trouble; people asked me what they could do about it, and I had no answer to give.

Is there, indeed, anything that these people--or for that matter I, myself--could do that would make sense?

When I got back to Washington, I started to think about this, and I believe it will be best now if I simply recite to you how my thoughts developed from this point on.

The first thought that came to my mind was that--in cooperation with others--I could try to set up an organization in Washington--a sort of lobby, if you will--which would bring to Washington, from time to time, scholars and scientists who see current events in their historical perspective. These men would speak with the sweet voice of reason, and our lobby could see to it that

they shall be heard by people inside the Administration and also by the key people in Congress.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished scholars and scientists would be heard, but that they would not be listened to, if they were not able to deliver votes.

Would they be listened to if they were able to deliver votes?

The minority for which they speak might represent perhaps ten percent of the votes, and ten percent of the votes alone would not mean very much, just as the sweet voice of reason alone would not mean very much. Still, the combination of ten percent of the votes and the sweet voice of reason might turn out to be an effective combination. And, if the minority for which these men speak were sufficiently dedicated to stand ready not only to deliver votes, but also to make substantial political contributions, then this minority would be in a position to set up the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington. The problem which the bomb poses to the world cannot be solved except by abolishing war, and nothing less will do. But first of all, we must back away from the war to which we have come dangerously close.

Could such a dedicated minority agree not only on the long-term political objectives which need to be pursued in order to attain a livable world but also on the immediate political objectives which must be pursued in the next couple of years in order to make the present danger of war recede to the point where attention can be focused on the task of abolishing war?

I do not propose to say here much about the long-term objectives, but I want to discuss now a set of immediate political objectives on which a dedicated minority could perhaps unite. Please keep in mind, however, that this is just a first try.

The issue of bomb tests and the issue of bomb shelters are peripheral issues; they are more the symptoms of the trouble we are in than the causes of the trouble.

I would not want to say that a foolish large-scale shelter program might not also become the cause of serious trouble. But still I think that political pressure should not be focused on this issue, and the same holds for the issue of bomb tests.

The central issue which will face the Kennedy Administration is, whether America shall try to retain her strategic striking forces as a deterrent, or whether she shall retain them merely as protection. This issue has been brought into focus by the current Berlin crisis.

Currently, voices are heard demanding that free access to West Berlin shall be defended at all cost. Spokesmen of the Administration emphasize that, if necessary, we would drop the bomb on Russia. We are told that our atomic striking forces are far superior to those of Russia, that, at this time, Russia has only 50 long-range rockets and only 150 long-range bomber planes, and that we have many more than that, and many people believe that this threat deters Russia from contesting our rights in Berlin.

If we intend to drop our bombs on Russia in case of war and expect Russia to drop her bombs on us, so that both countries would be wholly devastated, then our threat to drop bombs on Russia is tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide.

The threat of murder and suicide is not a believable threat, in the

context of the Berlin conflict, and it would not be a believable threat in the context of any other similar conflict.

The threat of dropping bombs on Russia, in case of war, would be a believable threat however if America's strategic striking forces were able to cripple most, if not all, of Russia's rocket and bomber bases by one sudden single blow, and if it were America's intention to "strike first" in case of war.

Opinions differ on how successful such a first strike against bases would be today, and whether the Russian counterblow would demolish twenty, ten, one, or none of our cities.

Be that as it may, the Administration will have to decide whether the strategic striking forces of America shall be maintained in the long run at a level where they would have an adequate first strike capability, and whether America should adopt a "first strike against bases if necessary" policy.

Let us pause for a moment to examine what such a policy would involve. It would involve, first of all, a great increase in the projected number of solid fuel long-range rockets, and the development of more powerful hydrogen warheads for these rockets. This would be necessary because the Russians would, of course, harden their rocket bases.

Secondly, it would involve the manufacture of a large number of rockets that would function as decoys, in order to neutralize the anti-missile missiles, by means of which the Russians may be expected to defend their rocket bases.

Further, since we could not expect to destroy every single Russian base and submarine in a first strike, we would have to embark on a major development program in order to have adequate anti-missile missiles available for the defense of our cities.

And lastly, we would be more or less forced to embark on a shelter protram involving an annual expenditure of perhaps $20 billion. The shelters would have to protect not only against fall-out, but also against heat and blast. The problem of getting the people into the shelters at the right time would probably offer no major obstacle, since if we plan to strike first, the Government should be in a position to get the people to take shelter at the right time.

Only if such defensive measures were included in the program would the maintenance of a first strike against bases capability permit America to retain the bomb as a deterrent.

To me it seems conceivable that America's strategic striking forces could be boosted to the level where, for a limited period of time, they would be capable of an adequate first strike against bases. It is not likely, however, that they could be maintained indefinitely at such a level. Presumably periods when America has a first strike capability would alternate with periods when she does not have such a capability. And if there were a major international crisis during one of the periods when we have a first strike capability, the Government would be under strong pressure to start a preventive war.

The decision to start a preventive war would always be a hard decision for any President to take, particularly since he would never be quite certain just how many of our own cities would be hit. But in certain circumstances, his hand could be forced by a commander of an overseas strategic base, or a submarine capable of launching rockets.

If a commander of a strategic base or a submarine were to drop bombs on,

say, three Russian cities, then the Russians would be expected to strike back with all they have, and the President would have no choice but to order an all-out first strike against the bases of Russians.

A "first strike if necessary" policy would mean an atomic arms race, with the sky as the limit. I do not believe that America could be made secure by trying to keep ahead in such an arms race, and I would be in favor of resisting the adoption of such a policy, if necessary through vigorous political action.

In deciding against such a policy, we must, however, recognize, that if America renounces the "first strike if necessary" policy, she loses the deterrent effect of her strategic striking forces. For, clearly, if these forces are not capable of a first strike against Russian bases, then any threat that America would attack Russia with bombs, in case of war, would be tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide and would, therefore, not be believable.

If America renounces the first strike policy, then the strategic striking forces of America could thereafter function only as protection. If these forces are arranged in such a manner that a sudden attack on them could not substantially reduce their ability to strike a major counter-blow, then these forces may be looked upon as protection against the possibility that America might be attacked with bombs.

A clear policy decision to the effect that America is going to maintain an invulnerable second strike, but would not adopt a "first strike if necessary" policy would leave open the door to an agreement on arms control. This is important, because an agreement on arms control (providing for far-reaching disarmament) is a necessary first step towards abolishing war.

An agreement on arms control would have to involve, however, not only Russia but also China, and it is not likely that negotiations including China may get under way within the next twelve months. It might very well be, therefore, that in the immediate future America would have to take unilateral steps in order to reduce the present danger of an all-out war.

Such unilateral steps are not adequate substitutes for negotiated agreements, and they can carry us only part of the way, but still there are some unilateral steps which need to be taken at the present time. I propose to discuss with you at this point what unilateral steps America could and should take at the present time.

(1). I believe that America could and should make unilaterally two crucially important policy decisions and that she should proclaim these decisions.

First of all, America should proclaim that she would not resort to any strategic bombing of cities or bases (either by means of atomic bombs or conventional explosives), except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs, or if there is an unprovoked attack with bombs on cities or bases of one of America's allies.

Further, America should make a second policy decision and should proclaim this decision. In order to understand the meaning and importance of this second decision, it is necessary to consider the following:

Soon after the war, the Soviet Union proposed that the atomic bomb be outlawed. This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently Sulzberger discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of unilateral pledges, renouncing the use of the bomb. Khrushchev said on this occasion that if there were a war, and if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out, what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force can no longer be victory. The objective can only be to exact a price.

As long as force is used at all, an all-out war which neither side wants, can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory, or anything approaching victory.

Keeping this point in mind, America could and should proclaim that if, in case of war, she were to use atomic bombs against troops in combat, she would do so only on her own side of the pre-war boundary. America would be bound by this pledge in case of war, as long as Russia imposes a similar restraint on her conduct of the war. Manifestly, this type of use of atomic bombs would be a defensive operation.

Such a pledge would be no less clear than the simple pledge renouncing the use of the bomb, but it would be much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge. And if neither side aims at anything approaching victory, then the pledge would greatly reduce the danger of an all-out war.

When I discussed this issue in Germany three years ago, the people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs. I do not know to what extent West German cities could be spared by a judicious tactical use of atomic bombs by American forces, but I do know that if America were to use bombs beyond the pre-war boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

(2). America could and should resolve that atomic bombs and the means suitable for their delivery, which are supplied by her and which are stationed in Europe, shall remain in the hands of American military units which are under American command, rather than be placed under the control of NATO. As long as we are committed to defend Western Europe, there is no valid argument for turning over bombs to the control of other Western European nations.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the United States Government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of counterbalancing any pressure by bringing political pressure to bear on the Government.

(3). Nothing is gained by America winning meaningless battles in the cold war and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed. Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among the nations.

The first director of this Agency, Sterling Cole, is an American, and his

term expired recently. Since next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, we could have proposed that the next director of the Agency be a Russian. Instead, we proposed a Swede, who was not acceptable to the Russians, and since we had the votes we were able to win a victory in a meaningless battle in the cold war.

This "victory" has reduced the chances of finding some useful function for this Agency, because the Russians resent being pushed around and there is no way for us to force them to play ball in this Agency.

I believe that it would be important for the Government to reach a major policy decision, and for the President to issue an Executive Order against fighting meaningless battles in the Cold War. Some political action in support of such an Executive Order might be necessary.

(4). We have a cultural exchange program with the Russians but their State Department and our State Department are playing a game of "if you hit our scientists, we shall hit your scientists." Accordingly, our State Department imposes senseless travel restrictions on our Russian colleagues who visit this country. These travel restrictions are not aimed at the safeguarding of any secrets, but are merely one way of hitting back at travel restrictions which the Soviet Government occasionally imposes on American scientists who travel about in Russia.

The Russians have opened up their country to tourist travel to a considerable extent, and if we wish to encourage this development, as we probably ought to, then American tourists should not be given spying assignments. Tourists make poor spies, and we are losing more than we are gaining by trying to use them as spies.

I believe that representations ought to be made, at as high a level of the Administration as is necessary:

(a) for the Secretary of State to find some other assignment in the State Department for those who have, up till now, handled the East-West Cultural Exchange Program;

(b) for the President to issue an Executive Order to the CIA directing it to refrain from approaching those who go to Russia as tourists.

(5). Not every issue can be solved by Congress passing a law, and there are borderline issues where political action alone can bring no solution because the specific knowledge is lacking of how to go about a solution. The issue of general disarmament seems to be such a borderline issue.

I believe that, at the present time, little could be gained by bringing pressure on the Administration to enter into formal negotiations with Russia on the issue of General Disarmament, because--as they say, "You can lead a horse to the water, but you can't make him drink."

I believe that no substantial progress will be made towards disarmament until Americans and Russians first reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

American reluctance to seriously contemplate general disarmament is largely due to uncertainty about this point. If it became clear that a satisfactory solution of this issue is possible, many Americans may come to regard general disarmament as a highly desirable goal.

On the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world, progress could probably be made reasonably fast through non-governmental discussions

among Americans and Russians. I believe that such discussions ought to be arranged through private initiative, but with the blessing of the Administration.

It does not seem likely that the newly created Disarmament Agency will be in a position to mobilize the imagination and resourcefulness which is required, and I believe that it may be necessary for a major private group to help them out or to prod them along--as the case may be. This may or may not require political action of one sort or another.

The Russians know very well that America is not ready seriously to contemplate general disarmament and this, to my mind, explains why, in spite of being strongly motivated for disarmament, the Russian Government displays in its negotiations on this issue much the same attitude as does the American Government. As far as negotiations on disarmament are concerned, hitherto both governments have been mainly guided by the public relations aspect rather than by the substantive aspect of the issue.

The Soviet Union's attitude might change overnight, however, if it became apparent that America was becoming seriously interested in disarmament.

The Russians are very much aware of the great economic benefits they would derive from disarmament, and I believe that the Soviet Union would be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it. It stands to reason that this should be so. The Soviet Union spends on defense a much larger fraction of her industrial output than America does.

America is at present committed to protect certain territories which are located in the geographical proximity of Russia. In the case of general disarmament, America would not be able to live up to any such commitment. Disarmament will, therefore, be politically acceptable to America only if it is possible for her to liquidate her present commitments--without too much loss of prestige and without seriously endangering the interest of the other nations involved.

Khrushchev seems to be very much aware of this. Therefore, it is possible that if it came to serious negotiations on the issue of disarmament, and if it became manifestly necessary to reach a political settlement in order to permit America to liquidate her military commitments, then the Soviet Union would go a long way towards seeking an accommodation.

The so-called Berlin Crisis, which centers around the commitments which America made to West Berlin, might very well be a case in point.

(6). General disarmament will, if we are lucky, eliminate war, but it will not end the rivalry between America and Russia.

It is a foregone conclusion that American efforts towards creating an orderly and livable world will be frustrated in Southeast Asia and Africa because of our failure to devise forms of democracy which would be viable in these regions of the world. The task of devising forms of democracy which would be suitable to the needs of such areas is not a task that the Government can handle. Various forms of democracy may have to be devised which are tailor-made to fit the various areas. A major private group could tackle and ought to tackle this problem. If it is not solved, more and more underdeveloped nations will become dictatorships; some of them may have a rapid succession of dictator after dictator and, in the end, the people may have to choose between Chaos and Communism.

It is a foregone conclusion that America's efforts to raise the standard

of living of underdeveloped nations may be frustrated in those areas where the birth rate is high, infant mortality is high, and there is little arable land left. Improvement in the standard of living will initially lead to a fall in infant mortality, and if the birth rate remains high, the population will shoot up so rapidly, that economic improvements will not be able to catch up.

Our failure to develop methods of birth control, suitable for the needs of such areas, is responsible for this state of affairs. The development of such methods is not a task which the Government can undertake. The Government could not create Research Institutes which would attract scientists who are ingenious and resourceful enough to come up with an adequte solution. The amount of money which would be involved is not much, and a major private group could and should tackle this problem.

If it should turn out that it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which reasonable people could generally agree, and if these objectives could count on the all-out support of a sizable minority--admittedly a very big "if"--then I should be inclined to go further, and I would go further along the following lines:

I would ask seven to twelve distinguished scientists to form a Council, which might be called the Council for Abolishing War or perhaps better, Council for a Liveable World. This Council would, first of all, assemble a panel of political advisers, whose identity would be public knowledge and formulate in close consultations with those advisers two sets of objectives. To the first set belong those objectives which cannot be attained at the present time through political action because it would take further inquiry, and perhaps even research, to know, in concrete terms, what needs to be done. To the second set belong those objectives which can be pursued through political action, because it is clear what needs to be done.

The members of the Council would set up a Research Organization aimed at the pursuit of the first set of objectives, and they would serve as the Trustees of that organization.

The members of the Council would also set up a political organization aimed at the pursuit of the second set of objectives, and they would serve as the Board of Directors for that organization. Because one of the functions of the second organization would be to pursue political objectives we may refer to it for our purposes here as "The Lobby".

It seems to me that there is no need to create a membership organization and to enlist those who are interested as members of such an organization. What one needs to create is not a membership organization, but a Movement.

The Board of the Lobby would hold hearings, perhaps once every four months, and would subsequently proclaim in detail the immediate political objectives it proposes to support. It would communicate these objectives perhaps in the form of a series of pamphlets, to all those who are believed to be seriously interested. Those who regularly receive the communications of the Board would be regarded as members of the Movement, if they agree with the general aims pursued by the Board, and if they are willing actively to support at least one of the several specific objectives proclaimed by the Board.

The articulate members of the Movement would be expected to discuss the

relevant issues with the editors of their newspapers and various columnists and other opinion makers in their own community. They would be expected to write to, and in other ways keep in touch with, their Congressman and the two Senators of their own State. Also each articulate member would be expected to keep in touch with at least one key member of the House or the Senate.

One of the main functions of the Lobby would be to help the members of the Movement clarify their own minds on the political objectives they wish actively to support and to help arrange appointments for those members who come to Washington to see Congressmen, Senators and certain key members of the Administration.

The members of the Movement would be regarded as pledged to vote in the primaries as well as in the elections. As far as federal elections are concerned, they would be pledged to cast their vote, disregarding domestic issues, solely on the issue of war and peace. The members of the Movement would be further regarded as pledged annually to spend 2 per cent of their income on political contributions.

So that each member of the Movement may know where his contribution should go in order to be most effective in furthering the political objectives which he has chosen to pursue, the Lobby will keep in touch with each member. The Lobby would keep the members informed not only in general about the particular contests for seats in Congress which are of interest to the Movement, but it may advise one member to take an interest in one of these contest and another member to take an interest in another of these contests.

This does not mean the Lobby would explicitly endorse anyone running for office. It may be assumed that if the importance of a given contest is brought to the attention of a member, the member will have no difficulty figuring out for himself which of the two opposite candidates for office he would want to support.

For covering the operating expenses of the Lobby and the Research Organization (which would be maintained independently and operated parallel to the Lobby), one would look to the members of the Movement. Each year a certain group of the members would be asked by the Board of the Lobby or the Trustees of the Research Organization to contribute for 2 per cent of their income to them, rather than to spend it for political contributions. One year this group might be composed of those whose name starts with the letter "P" and another year it might be composed of those whose name starts with the letter "C", etc. etc.

The influence of the Movement would be greatly enhanced if the Lobby were able to say not only how many votes it represents, in toto, but also how many votes it represents in each state and in each congressional district. So that the Lobby may not make false representations, concerning the votes it may be able to deliver, the Board shall from time to time ask all those who regularly receive its communications, to say which of the political objectives proclaimed by the Board they propose to support and if they intend to perform with respect to those objectives as members of the Movement are expected to perform.

The Movement must not wield the power that it may possess crudely. People in Washington want to be convinced, they do not want to be bribed or blackmailed. He who gives consistently financial support, to certain key members of Congress, may evoke their lasting friendship and may count on their willingness to listen to them, as long as they talk sense. He who talks to members of Congress, but does not make sense, will not accomplish anything

of lasting value, even if he temporarily sweeps some members of Congress off their feet by making huge political contributions to them.

There are many intelligent men in Congress who have insight into what goes on. The Movement could help these men to have the courage of their convictions. There are others in Congress who are not capable of such insight. The only thing to do with them is not to return them to Congress, and to replace them with better men. This may make it necessary to persuade better men to run in the primaries and to stand for election. To find such better men, must be one of the tasks of the Movement, and the Lobby must be prepared to help the members of the Movement to perform this task.

I did not come here to enlist any of you in such a Movement or to launch such a Movement. I came here to invite you to participate in an experiment that ought to show whether such a movement could be successfully launched.

First of all, I ask each of you to look into your own heart and try to discover whether you yourself would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives -- as formulated from time to time appealed to you and you thought that the movement could be effective.

Next, you may want to ask others -- within this University community - whether they might not wish to participate in the experiment also.

Those of you who wish to participate in the experiment are asked to show a copy of my speech to people in your home community who might be interested and to determine which of these would be likely to form part of a dedicated minority that would give all-out support to a movement of the kind I have described.

I would appreciate your writing me in about four to six weeks to how many people you have talked and how many of these and who of these (name and address), you think, could be counted upon.

Those to whom you talk in your home community should not go and recruit still others. They may, however, put you into contact with others who might be interested, and you will be then in the position to evaluate their interest and to report back.

This experiment is meant to be based on the communities centered on Harvard University, Swarthmore College, Western Reserve University, the University of Chicago, Stanford University, the University of California at Berkeley, Reed College, and the University of Oregon.

If enough of you collaborate in this experiment, with luck we might be in a position to know within two months whether a movement of the kind I have described could get off the ground.

Those of you who participate in this experiment may need to have a copy of this speech, and we can discuss later on just how I can get a copy to you.

If the result of this experiment indicates that such a movement could get off the ground, then perhaps one would want to start the Movement with talks, in front of large student audiences across the country, from coast to coast. If within the next 12 months one could find 20 thousand students who would go all-out in support of the Movement, and if each student would, directly or indirectly, bring ten other people into the Movement, then the Movement could rapidly attain 200,000 members. This would represent about 20 million dollars per year in political contributions, or 80 million dollars for a four-year

period, and this is probably as much as one would want to have.

Whether such a movement could grow further and could come to represent one or two million votes would then probably depend on the future course of world events.

The End

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Are We on the Road to War?

LEO SZILARD

"Are We on the Road to War?" is the text of a speech which Leo Szilard has recently given at nine American colleges and universities in order to invite students to participate in an experiment. The response could show whether a political movement of the kind described in the speech would take off the ground provided it were started on a sufficiently large scale. When the BULLETIN *asked Dr. Szilard for permission to reprint the text of the speech, he agreed on condition that he may extend the experiment to the readers of the* BULLETIN. *Accordingly, those readers who believe that they would be willing to spend two per cent of their income for campaign contributions—provided that the political objectives formulated meet with their approval—are invited to participate in the experiment by writing Dr. Szilard before May 31, 1962, at the Dupont Plaza Hotel, Washington 6, D.C., giving their name and address and briefly indicating the degree of their interest. Reprints may be secured from the* BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, *935 E. 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois. Single copies, 10 cents; 25 or more, seven cents each.*

For a number of years now, you have had an opportunity to observe how we, as a nation, respond to the actions of the Russians, and how the Russians respond to our responses. Those of you who have watched closely the course of events in the past six months, may have been let to conclude that we are headed for an all-out war. I myself believe that we are, and that our chances of getting through the next ten years without war are slim.

I personally find myself in rebellion against the fate that history seems to have in store for us, and I suspect that some of you may be equally rebellious. The question is, what can you do?

War seems indeed to be inevitable, unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present. You, as Americans, are not in a position to influence the Russian government; it follows that you would have to bring about a change in the attitude of the American government which, in turn, may bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian government.

It is conceivable that if a dedicated minority were to take effective political action, they could bring about the change in attitude that is needed. But such a minority can take effective action only if it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which it may unite.

Ever since the end of the war, the policies of the great powers have consistently followed the line of least resistance, and this line leads to an unlimited arms race. I do not believe that America can be made secure by keeping ahead in such an arms race.

There have been repeated attempts to stop the arms race by negotiating an agreement that would provide for some form of arms control. So far, all such attempts have failed, and each time they were followed by the continuation of the arms race, with renewed vigor.

Toward the end of the Eisenhower administration, it was generally expected that the next administration would adopt a new approach to this problem and that a fresh attempt would be made to bring the arms race under control.

When Khrushchev was in New York a year ago last October, I tried to see him, in the hope of finding out how responsive he might be to such a new approach. I was told that they had scheduled fifteen minutes for me but, as it turned out, the conversation went on for two hours. At that time, it was not known whether Kennedy or Nixon would get elected, and I started off the conversation by saying that no matter who is elected, the government would try to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of stopping the arms race. Khrushchev answered—and he spoke in all seriousness—that he believed this also.

A year ago last November, I checked out of the hospital in New York, where I had been confined for over a year, took a taxi to the airport, and flew to Moscow to attend the sixth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. I was accompanied by my wife, who is also my doctor, and I stayed on in Moscow for about a month beyond the end of the conference. I stayed on in Moscow in order to engage in private conversations with our Russian colleagues, because I knew from experience that only in private conversations is it possible to get anything across to them or to discover what they really believe to be true.

None of our Russian colleagues brought up the issue of bomb tests in any of these conversations in Moscow, even though two years earlier some of them had been passionately interested in this issue. I found, however, an undiminished interest in far-reaching disarmament which would result in substantial savings. On one occasion, I had tea with Fedorov, the General

Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with no one present except my interpreter. I had met Fedorov before and I always got along well with him. On this particular occasion, he spoke to me as follows:

> You must really believe me when I tell you that we want general disarmament. You have seen all this construction work going on in Moscow; it has been going on for many years; still we are not able to catch up with the housing shortage. If we had disarmament, we could not only solve this problem, but many of our other economic problems as well. Also, we could develop other nations on an unprecedented scale. So far, we are building only one hydroelectric dam in Africa—the Aswan Dam in Egypt; if we had disarmament, we could, and we would, build twenty such dams in Africa.

I tried to impress upon our Russian colleagues that the Kennedy administration would make a serious effort to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of arms control, but that the new administration would need time—six months and more than six months perhaps—to find its bearings on this issue and to get organized to deal with it.

When I returned to this country in February, I decided to stay in Washington for a while.

In Washington, my friends told me that the government was going to make a sincere effort to reach an agreement with Russia on the cessation of bomb tests and that a reasonable proposal would be made to the Russians on this issue. They would have liked to hear from me that Russia would be likely to accept such a proposal, but coming fresh from Moscow, I had serious doubts on this score.

The invasion of Cuba took me by surprise. When I first heard about it, it was not clear, as yet, whether we were going to give air support to the invading Cuban exiles and whether we would, if necessary, send in the Marines also. My immediate reaction was that of alarm, for I believed that if we did any of these things, we would seriously risk war with Russia. I did not think that Russia would try to intervene in the Caribbean area, and I did not think that the Russians would launch long-range rockets aimed at our cities. I thought, however, that Russia might make some military move elsewhere, probably in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it would seem that I was wrong, for Tom Slick of the Slick Oil Company, in San Antonio, Texas recently set forth, apparently on good authority, that, if America had openly intervened in Cuba, at that point, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

I would not venture to appraise just how close we came to an all-out war on the occasion of the Cuban incident. I am reasonably certain, however, that if our intervention in Cuba had been successful, this would have blocked for many years to come any possibility of reaching an agreement on arms control with Russia. Failure to reach an accommodation on the Berlin issue might, of course, produce the same result.

I would not entirely exclude the possibility of war over Berlin, but to me, it seems more probable that this crisis will be resolved by some uneasy compromise, and that it will not lead to an all-out war. Russia may bring pressure on West Berlin in order to promote any one of a number of her foreign policy objectives, but on the larger issue, the issue of Germany, the true interest of America and Russia is the same. The true interest of both countries is to have Europe politically as stable as possible.

I am convinced that the Berlin issue could be satisfactorily resolved by negotiations, but this conviction is based on the belief that there is something that the Russians want that we should be willing to give them, and that there is something that we want that the Russians should be willing to give us in return.

There are many people who do not share this belief. They hold that the Berlin issue was artificially created by Russia for the purpose of humiliating America, for breaking up NATO, and for converting West Germany into a communist state.

Many people, perhaps the majority, believe that the Russians are very much like the Nazis; that they have concrete plans for bringing about, one way or another, our total defeat in Europe, and also for subjugating the whole world to their rule.

Many people have a black and white picture of the world; they believe that the nations fall into two classes: the peaceloving nations, and those who are not peaceloving. America, France, England, and generally speaking our allies, including Germany and Japan, are peaceloving nations. Russia and China are not peaceloving nations. Twenty years ago, the situation was somewhat different: at that time, Russia was a peaceloving nation, but Germany and Japan were not.

Many people believe that ever since the atomic bomb forced the unconditional surrender of Japan, America has unceasingly tried to rid the world of the bomb, and that Russian intransigence, alone, blocked progress in this direction.

When I listen to people who hold such views, I sometimes have the feeling that I have lived through all this before and, in a sense, I have. I was sixteen years old when the first World War broke out, and I lived at that time in Hungary. From reading the Hungarian newspapers, it would have appeared that whatever Austria and Germany did was right and whatever England, France, Russia, or America did was wrong. A good case could be made out for this general thesis, in almost every single instance. It would have been quite difficult for me to prove, in any single instance, that the newspapers were wrong, but somehow, it seemed to me unlikely that the two nations, located in the center of Europe, should be invariably right, and that all the other nations should be invariably wrong. History, I reasoned, would hardly operate in such a peculiar fashion, and gradually I was led to conclusions which were diametrically opposed to the views held by the majority of my schoolmates.

Many of my schoolmates regarded me as something of an oracle because I was able to cope with the mysteries of lower arithmetic which baffled them and one of them asked me one day quite early in the war who would lose the war. I said that I didn't know who *would* lose the war, but that I thought that I knew who *ought* to lose the war; I thought that Austria and Germany, as well as Russia, ought to lose the war. Since Austria and Germany fought on one side, and Russia on the other side, it was not quite clear how this could happen. The fact is, of course, that it did happen.

I am not telling you this in order to impress you with how bright I am. Nobody at sixty can claim to be as bright as he was at sixteen, even though in most cases it is not the intelligence that deteriorates, but the character. The point I am trying to make is that even in times of war,

you can see current events in their historical perspective, provided that your passion for the truth prevails over your bias in favor of your own nation.

After the first World War, when I lived in Berlin, a distinguished friend of mine, Michael Polanyi, asked me one day what I thought ought to be the rule of human conduct regulating the behavior of an individual in society. "Clearly," he said, "you cannot simply ask a man to be generous to other people, for if the other people are mean to him, and if he follows your rule, he may starve to death." "But," said Polanyi, "perhaps the rule ought to be 'Be one per cent more generous to people than they are to you.'" This should be sufficient, he thought, because if everyone were to follow this rule, the earth would, step by step, turn into a livable place.

I told him that, to my mind, this would not work at all, because if two people behave the same way toward each other, each is bound to think that he is 30 per cent more generous than the other. Clearly, the rule would have to allow for this bias. Perhaps if we were to stipulate as the rule of conduct, "Be 31 per cent more generous to the others than they are to you" such a rule might work.

America and Russia are not following any such rule of conduct. Moreover, their bias greatly exceeds 30 per cent.

Most Americans apply a yardstick to America's actions which is very different from the yardstick which they apply to Russia's actions. Whenever their bias in favor of their own nation gets into conflict with the truth, the odds are that the bias will prevail. As a result of this, they are not capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective. They may well realize that we are in trouble, but they cannot correctly diagnose the cause of the trouble and therefore, they are not in a position to indicate what the right remedy might be.

The people who have sufficient passion for the truth to give the truth a chance to prevail, if it runs counter to their bias, are in a minority. How important is this minority? It is difficult to say at this point, for, at the present time, their influence on governmental decisions is not perceptible.

If you stay in Washington, you may gain some insight into the manner in which governmental decisions come about; you may get a feel of what kind of considerations enter into such decisions, and what kind of pressures are at work.

With President Kennedy, new men moved into the administration. Many of them understand the implications of what is going on and are deeply concerned. But, they are so busy trying to keep the worst things from happening, on a day-to-day basis, that they have no time to develop a consensus on what the right approach would be, from the long-term point of view.

There are also a number of men in Congress, particularly in the Senate, who have insight into what is going on and who are concerned, but mostly they lack the courage of their convictions. They may give a lucid analysis of the trouble in private conversations and then at some point or other, they will say: "Of course, I could not say this in public."

In Washington, wisdom has no chance to prevail at this point.

Last September, *Life* magazine printed an article about me which said that I was in Washington trying to find out if there was a market for wisdom. Thereupon, I received a flood of letters from colleges and universities inviting me to give lectures. Most people get some pleasure out of hearing themselves talk, and so do I; yet I did not see much point in going around the country giving talks, if all I had to say was that there was no market for wisdom. Therefore, I declined all these invitations; that is, I declined them all, until Brandeis University invited me to attend a special convocation and receive an honorary doctor's degree. At that point, my vanity got the better of me, and I accepted. At Brandeis, I spoke at dinner informally to the trustees and fellows of the university, and this was my closest contact with grass roots since I moved to Washington—if, indeed, you may regard the trustees and fellows of Brandeis as grass roots.

I told them at Brandeis that I thought we were in very serious trouble; people asked me what there was that they could do about it, and I had no answer to give.

Is there, indeed, anything that these people—and for that matter I, myself—could do at this point that would make sense?

When I got back to Washington, I started to think about this, and I believe it will be best now if I simply recite to you how my thoughts developed from this point on.

The first thought that came to my mind was that in cooperation with others, I could try to set up an organization in Washington—a sort of lobby, if you will—which would bring to Washington, from time to time, scholars and scientists who see current events in their historical perspective. These men would speak with the sweet voice of reason, and our lobby could see to it that they be heard by people inside the administration, and also by the key people in Congress.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished scholars and scientists would be heard, but that they might not be listened to, if they were not able to deliver votes.

Would they be listened to if they were able to deliver votes?

The minority for which they speak might represent a few per cent of the votes, and a few per cent of the votes alone would not mean very much. Still, the combination of a few per cent of the votes and the sweet voice of reason might turn out to be an effective combination. And if the minority for which these men speak, were sufficiently dedicated to stand ready not only to deliver votes, but also to make very substantial campaign contributions, then this minority would be in a position to set up the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington.

The problem which the bomb poses to the world cannot be solved except by abolishing war, and nothing less will do. But first of all, we must back away from the war to which we have come dangerously close.

Could such a dedicated minority agree not only on the long-term political objectives which need to be pursued in order to abolish war, but also on the immediate political objectives, the objectives which must be pursued in the next couple of years, in order to make the present danger of war recede to the point where attention can be focused on the task of abolishing war?

America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in an atomic arms race and an agreement providing for arms control is a necessary first step toward abolishing war.

An agreement on arms control does not seem to be, however, "around the

corner." It might very well be, therefore, that *in the immediate future* America would have to take certain unilateral steps. Some of the steps would be taken in order to reduce the present danger of war; other steps would be taken so that if a war breaks out, which neither America nor Russia wants, it may be possible to bring hostilities to an end before there is an all-out atomic catastrophe.

Such unilateral steps are not adequate substitutes for negotiated agreements, and they can carry us only part of the way, but still there are some unilateral steps which should be taken at the present time and I propose to discuss at this point what these steps may be.

The issue of bomb tests and the issue of bomb shelters are peripheral issues; they are more the symptoms of the trouble we are in than the cause of the trouble, and I propose to turn now to issues which I believe to be more relevant.

1.) Nothing is gained by America's winning meaningless battles in the cold war, and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed. Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among nations.

The first director of this agency was an American, and his term expired recently. Since, next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, America could have proposed that the next director of the agency be a Russian. Instead, America proposed a Swede, who was not acceptable to the Russians, and since America had the votes she was able to win one more victory in a meaningless battle of the cold war.

All this "victory" accomplished was to reduce the chances of finding some useful function for this agency, because the Russians resent being pushed around in this agency and there is no way for us to force them to play ball.

I believe that it would be important for the government to reach a major policy decision, and for the President to issue an executive order against fighting meaningless battles in the cold war.

We have a cultural exchange program with the Russians but their State Department and our State Department are playing a game of "if you hit our scientists, we shall hit your scientists." Accordingly, our State Department imposes senseless travel restrictions on our Russian colleagues who visit this country. These travel restrictions are not aimed at the safeguarding of any secrets, but are merely a way of hitting back at travel restrictions which the Soviet government occasionally imposes on American scientists who travel about in Russia.

I believe that representations ought to be made, at as high a level of the administration as is necessary, for the Secretary of State to find some other assignment in the State Department for those who have, up till now, handled the East-West Cultural Exchange Program.

2.) I believe that America could and should make unilaterally two crucially important policy decisions and that she should proclaim these decisions.

First of all, America should resolve and proclaim that she would not resort to any strategic bombing of cities or bases of Russia (either by means of atomic bombs or conventional explosives), except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs, or if there is an unprovoked attack with bombs against one of America's allies.

Further, America should make a second policy decision and should proclaim this decision. In order to understand the meaning and relevance of this second decision, it is necessary to consider the following:

Soon after the war, when Russia did not as yet have any atomic bombs, she proposed that the bomb be outlawed. This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs, either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases, or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently, Sulzberger of the *New York Times* discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of such unilateral pledges, renouncing the use of the bomb. Khrushchev said, on this occasion, that if there were a war, even if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force must no longer be victory. The objective must only be to make a conquest difficult and expensive.

If force is used then an all-out war, which neither side wants, can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory, or anything approaching victory.

Keeping this point of view in mind, *America* could and *should* adopt *the policy that, in case of war, if she were to use atomic bombs against troops in combat, she would do so only on her own side of the prewar boundary.*

In case of war America would then be bound by a pledge to this effect as long as Russia imposed a similar restraint on her conduct of the war.

Manifestly, this type of use of atomic bombs would be a defensive operation and moreover, it would be a very effective defensive operation, either on the part of Russia or on the part of America, as long as the restraints remain in effect on both sides.

Such a pledge would be no less clear than the simple pledge renouncing the use of the bomb, but it would be much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge. And if neither side aimed at anything approaching victory, then it would substantially reduce the danger of an all-out war.

When I discussed this issue in Germany three years ago, people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder-Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs. I do not know to what extent West German cities could be spared by a judicious tactical use of atomic bombs by American forces, but I do know that if America were to use bombs beyond the prewar boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

Recently, the United Nations Assembly vetoed with a more than two-thirds majority, 55 against 20, to outlaw the use of atomic bombs in war. The use of atomic bombs in warfare was declared by the Assembly to be a crime and a violation of the United Nations Charter.

Since the machinery of the United Nations was set up for the purpose of maintaining peace among the smaller nations, assuming the cooperation of the great powers to this end, attempts to regard a two-thirds vote of the Assembly as legally binding must necessarily fail. Still the United States must

not fly in the face of world opinion and simply disregard the vote of the General Assembly, when a two-thirds vote of the Assembly expresses the legitimate concern of the great majority of the nations that the use of atomic bombs in warfare might lead to a world catastrophe. Rather, out of respect for world opinion and in its own interest, the United States ought to go as far toward complying with it, as valid considerations for its own security permit. The restrictions on the use of atomic bombs in case of war which I am advocating, are advocated with this end in view.

Western Europe is not inferior to Russia either in manpower or in resources and it would be possible for Western Europe to build up within five years conventional forces to the point where it could renounce the use of atomic bombs against troops in combat in case of war. But even this would be to no avail unless the nations involved give up any thought of fighting limited wars for "limited objectives" and resort to force only to make a conquest difficult and, with luck, to prevent it.

As long as there is no agreement providing for arms control, and Russia remains in possession of large stockpiles of bombs, America has no choice but to maintain a strategic atomic striking force. However, it should maintain such a force only as protection against America or her allies being attacked with bombs. The number of bombs retained for this purpose need not be very large, and more important than the number of bombs retained is the invulnerability of the bases from which they would be launched. If these bases are invulnerable, so that no single massive attack against them could substantially damage America's ability to retaliate, then America needs to retain only enough bombs to be able to destroy in retaliation a substantial number of Russia's cities, after giving due notice to permit their orderly evacuation.

It must be made clear, however, that if America adopts the policy here advocated, she thereby renounces the threat of strategic bombing as a general *deterrent* because she could then make this threat only in case Russia would drop bombs, and drop them on *our* side of the prewar boundary.

I, personally, do not believe that America would lose much by giving up the threat of strategic bombing, because the deterrent effect of such a threat is negligible unless the threat is believable.

If America were to threaten to drop bombs on a large number of Russian cities in case of war, knowing full well that Russia would retaliate by dropping bombs on a large number of American cities, such a threat would be tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide. The threat of murder and suicide would not be a believable threat, in the context of the so-called Berlin Crisis, nor would it be a believable threat in the context of any other similar conflict in which America's rights and interests may be at stake, but not America's existence as a nation.

Those responsible for the planning of strategy in the Department of Defense would concede this much.

According to persistent press reports there is, however, an increasingly influential school of thought in the Department of Defense which holds that, in case of war with Russia, America may engage in strategic bombing, aimed at the destruction of Russian rocket bases and strategic air bases. America would not bomb any of Russia's cities if she can help it, as long as Russia did not bomb any of America's cities.

This school of thought holds that, at present, Russia does not have many long-range rocket bases and strategic air bases, that the location of many of these bases is known, and that most of them are vulnerable and could be destroyed by attacking them with bombs. By building enough long-range solid-fuel rockets (Minutemen) and submarines capable of launching intermediate range solid-fuel rockets (Polaris) America may be able to keep ahead in this game for the next five years.

Those who advocate such a policy believe that if America should succeed in knocking out, say, 90 per cent of Russia's strategic atomic striking forces, then the Russians would probably speak to us as follows: "We have enough rockets left to destroy a large number of American cities, but we know that if we did this America may retaliate by destroying all of our cities. Therefore, we are going to hold our fire and we propose to negotiate peace. We concede that the power balance has now shifted in America's favor and we are now willing to yield on a number of issues on which we took an inflexible stand prior to the outbreak of hostilities." If this were to happen America would have won a victory even though it may be a victory in a limited sense of the term only.

Naturally if there is a war and America resorts to the bombing of bases in Russia, one could not expect the Russians to sit idly by and watch America picking up step by step one base after another. It follows that America would have to start the strategic bombing of Russian bases with a sudden, massive attack and to try to destroy all vulnerable Russian bases of known location, in the first attack.

There are, of course, people in the Department of Defense who have serious doubts that America would actually carry out such a first strike against bases, in case of war, yet they believe that—at the present juncture—it is a good thing to threaten to bomb Russian bases in case of war because this is a more believable threat than the threat of "murder and suicide."

I do not know just how believable this threat is, but I do know that at best we are purchasing an increased restraint on Russia's part for a year or two, and that we are purchasing it at a very high price. For whether we adopt such a strategy or merely give Russia the impression that we have adopted such a strategy, we are provoking an all-out atomic arms race and may within a very few years reach the point of no return, in this regard.

Therefore, I believe that it is imperative to oppose: (a) the adoption of plans which call for a first strike against Russian rocket and strategic air bases in case of war, and (b) the adoption of the policy of "deterring" Russia, with the threat that America would resort to such a first strike in case of war. I believe that the rejection of both these policies is an attainable political objective because there is considerable doubt within the administration of the wisdom of these policies.

3.) *America could and should resolve that atomic bombs and the means suitable for their delivery, which are supplied by her and which are stationed in Europe, shall remain in the hands of American military units which are under American command, rather than be placed under the control of NATO.* As long as America is committed to defend Western Europe, there is no valid argument for turning over bombs to the control of other Western European nations.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the United States government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of balancing any such pressure by bringing domestic

political counterpressure to bear on the government.

America should stand firm in opposing the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs by Germany as well as the production of means suitable for their delivery.

It is conceivable, of course, that all attempts to achieve arms control may fail and that in the end it will not be within the power of the United States to prevent Germany from producing its own bombs and rockets. At about the same time the United States may however also free herself from her commitments to defend Germany against external military intervention. But we are not concerned at this point with developments that may conceivably occur in the unpredictable future.

4.) Not every issue can be solved by Congress passing a law, and there are borderline issues where political action alone can bring no solution because the specific knowledge is lacking of how to go about the solution. The issue of general disarmament seems to be such a borderline issue.

I believe that, at the present time, little could be gained by bringing pressure on the administration to enter into formal negotiations with Russia on the issue of general disarmament, because—as they say, "You can lead a horse to the water, but you can't make him drink."

I believe that no substantial progress can be made toward disarmament until Americans and Russians first reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

American reluctance to seriously contemplate general disarmament is largely due to uncertainty about this point. If it became clear that a satisfactory solution of this issue is possible, many Americans may come to regard general disarmament as a highly desirable goal.

On the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world, progress could probably be made reasonably fast, through nongovernmental discussions among Americans and Russians. *I believe that such discussions ought to be arranged through private initiative, but with the blessing of the administration.*

The Russians know very well that America is *not* ready seriously to contemplate general disarmament and this, to my mind, explains why, in spite of being strongly motivated for disarmament, the Russian government displays in its negotiations on this issue much the same attitude as does the American government. As far as negotiations on disarmament are concerned, hitherto both governments have been mainly guided by the public relations aspect rather than by the substantive aspect of the issue.

The Soviet Union's attitude might change overnight, however, if it became apparent that America was becoming seriously interested in disarmament.

The Russians are very much aware of the economic benefits they would derive from disarmament, and I believe that the Soviet Union would be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it. It stands to reason that this should be so for the Soviet Union spends on defense an even larger fraction of her industrial output than America does.

America is at present committed to protect certain territories which are located in the geographical proximity of Russia. In the case of general disarmament, America would not be able to live up to any such commitments. Disarmament would therefore be politically acceptable to America only if it is possible for her to liquidate her present commitments—without too much loss of prestige and without seriously endangering the interests of the other nations involved.

Khrushchev seems to be very much aware of this. Therefore, if it came to serious negotiations on the issue of disarmament, and if it became manifestly necessary to reach a political settlement in order to permit America to liquidate her military commitments, then the Soviet Union might go a long way toward seeking an accommodation.

5.) General disarmament may, if we are lucky, eliminate war, but it would not end the rivalry between America and Russia.

It is a foregone conclusion that American efforts toward creating an orderly and livable world will be frustrated in Southeast Asia and Africa because of our failure to devise forms of democracy which would be viable in these regions of the world. The task of devising forms of democracy which would be suitable to the needs of such areas is not a task that the government can handle. Various forms of democracy may have to be devised which are tailor-made to fit the various areas. *A major private group could tackle and ought to tackle this problem.* If it is not solved, more and more underdeveloped nations may become dictatorships; some of them may have a rapid succession of dictator after dictator and, in the end, the people may have to choose between chaos and communism.

It is a foregone conclusion that America's efforts to raise the standard of living of underdeveloped nations may be frustrated in those areas where the birth rate is high, infant mortality is high, and there is little arable land left. Improvement in the standard of living will initially lead to a fall in infant mortality, and if the birth rate remains high, the population will shoot up so rapidly that economic improvements will not be able to catch up.

Our failure to develop biological methods of birth control, suitable for the needs of such areas, is responsible for this state of affairs. The development of such methods is not a task which the government can undertake. The government could not create research institutes which would attract scientists who are ingenious and resourceful enough to come up with an adequate solution. *A major private group could and should tackle this problem.*

If it should turn out that it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which reasonable people could generally agree, and if these objectives could count on the all-out support of a sizable and dedicated minority, then I should be impelled to go further, and I would plan to go further along the following lines:

I would ask about fifteen distinguished scientists to serve as fellows of a council which might be called Council for Abolishing War or perhaps Council for a Livable World. The fellows (who are all scientists) would elect the board of directors, but membership on the board would not be restricted to scientists.

This council would, first of all, assemble a panel of political advisors, and then in close consultation with these advisors, it would formulate two sets of objectives. To the first set belong those objectives which cannot be attained at the present time through political action because it would take further inquiry, and perhaps even real research to know, in concrete terms, what needs to be done. To the second set belong those objectives which can be pursued through political action because it is clear what needs to be done.

The fellows of the council would

set up a research organization aimed at the pursuit of the first set of objectives, and they would elect the trustees of that organization. The fellows of the council would also set up a political organization aimed at the pursuit of the second set of objectives, and they would elect the board of directors of that organization. Because one of the major functions of the second organization would be to lobby, we may refer to it for our purposes as the lobby.

The council would hold hearings, perhaps one every four months, and would subsequently proclaim in detail the immediate political objectives it proposes to advocate. It would communicate these objectives, perhaps in the form of a series of pamphlets, to all those who are believed to be seriously interested. Those who regularly receive the communications of the council would be regarded as members of the movement, if they are willing *actively* to support *at least one* of the several specific objectives proclaimed by the council.

It seems to me that there is no need to enlist those who are interested as members of an organization. What one needs to create is not a membership organization, but a movement.

The articulate members of the movement would be expected to discuss the relevant issues with editors of their newspaper and various columnists and other opinion makers in their own community. They would be expected to write to, and in other ways keep in touch with, their congressman and the two senators of their own state.

One of the functions of the lobby would be to help the members of the movement clarify their own minds on the political objectives they wish actively to support.

The members of the movement would be regarded as pledged to vote in the primaries as well as in the elections. As far as federal elections are concerned, they would be pledged to cast their vote, *disregarding domestic issues,* solely on the issue of war and peace.

The members of the movement would be regarded as pledged annually to spend two per cent of their income on campaign contributions. The members would be asked to make out a check payable to the recipient of the campaign contribution but to mail that check to the Washington office of the lobby for transmission. In this manner the lobby would be in a position to keep track of the flow of campaign contributions.

Those in high income brackets may be left free to contribute three per cent after taxes rather than two per cent before taxes.

All members of the movement would be free to wear an emblem that would identify them as members of the movement, if they wish to do so.

Those who can not spend two per cent of their income on campaign contributions may regard themselves as supporters of the movement if they spend either one per cent of their income or $100 per year, according to their preference. Such supporters of the movement may receive the advice and guidance of the lobby on the same terms as the members of the movement.

So that each member of the movement may know where his contribution should go, in order to be most effective in furthering the political objectives which he has chosen to pursue, the lobby would keep in touch with each member. The lobby would keep the members informed about the particular contests for seats in Congress which are of interest to the movement; but it may advise one member to take an interest in one of these contests and another member to take an interest in another of these contests.

For covering the operating expenses of the lobby and the research organi-

zation (which would be maintained independently from and operated parallel to the lobby), one would look to the members of the movement. Each year a certain group of the members would be asked by the lobby to contribute two per cent of their income to it, rather than to spend it for political contributions. One year this group might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "C." Another year it might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "R," etc.

The movement must not wield the power that it may possess crudely. People in Washington want to be convinced, they do not want to be bribed or blackmailed. He who gives consistently financial support to certain key members of Congress, may evoke their lasting friendship and may count on their willingness to listen to him as long as he talks sense. He who talks to members of Congress, but does not talk sense, will not accomplish anything of lasting value, even if he temporarily sweeps some members of Congress off their feet by making huge political contributions to them.

There are many intelligent men in Congress who have insight into what goes on; the movement could help these men to have the courage of their convictions. There are others in Congress who are not capable of such insight; the only thing to do with them is not to return them to Congress, and to replace them with better men. This may make it necessary to persuade better men to run in the primaries and to stand for election. To find such better men must be one of the main tasks of the movement, and the lobby must be prepared to help members of the movement to perform this task.

I did not come here to enlist any of you in such a movement or to launch such a movement. I came here to invite you to participate in an experiment that would show whether such a movement could be successfully launched.

First of all, I ask each of you to look into your own heart and try to discover whether you yourself would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives—as formulated from time to time—appeal to you and you thought that the movement could be effective.

Those of you who wish to participate in the experiment are asked to show a copy of this speech to people in your home community who might be interested and to determine who of these would be likely to be part of a dedicated minority that would give all-out support to a movement of the kind I have described.

I would appreciate your writing me, as soon as possible, how many people you have talked to and how many of these and who of these (name and address), you think, could be counted upon.

If the result of this experiment indicates that such a movement could get off the ground, provided it were started in the right way and on a sufficiently large scale, then the Council for Abolishing War would be constituted. Presumably the council would attempt to identify 25,000 individuals who would be willing to make campaign contributions in the amount of two per cent of their income. Presumably, if the council is successful in this, the fellows of the council would proceed to establish the lobby.

By the time the movement attains 150,000 members it would presumably represent about $20 million per year in campaign contributions or $80 million over a four year period.

Whether such a movement could grow further and come to represent not only a decisive amount in campaign contributions but also a significant number of votes, would then presumably depend on the future course of world events.

on to say, "Before I enter into this I must emphasize that Newton himself was better aware of the weak sides of his thought structure than the succeeding generations of students. This fact has always excited my reverent admiration . . .." This is a beautiful statement of the need to keep an open mind for the discovery which may require revision of even the most cherished concepts. The lesson is such a powerful one that Godel's proof seems almost anticlimatic.

A. D. White [7] describes a long series of forced reinterpretations of theological positions in the face of advancing knowledge. Noting these failures of theology along with inadequacies of more modern theologies, Walter Lippman [8] showed that it is quite possible to rough out the basis for a useful guide to right and wrong without theology and using only knowledge. He did not deal with that religious experience which has provided guides for behavior beyond the range of available knowledge.

White was careful in his introduction to point out that his arguments were against some theologies and not religion. So are mine. Religion is a matter of experience, and experiences to me are facts. If God doesn't change, we can come to know more about Him by studying the experiences which people have and have had which they attribute to Him. The Information Revolution offers an opportunity to broaden the base of our understanding of Him and consequently of our ethical conceptions.

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KIRKPATRICK TO SPACE JOB

Jac Kirkpatrick has recently been awarded a job by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) at Ames Research Center in Mt. View, California. He will be working in advanced research and liason work related to the forthcoming Pioneer and Biosatellite series of satellites.

Jac, a '62 graduate of Graceland, received his B.S. degree in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Kansas, February of this year. While at K.U., he won the local American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) student lecture award. He also presented his lecture and paper, "The Use of Point Source Projection in Low Budget Simulators," in the AIAA southwestern state competition in Arlington, Texas, where he was awarded second place.

He is a member of Tau Beta Pi, Sigma Tau, and Sigma Gamma Tau honorary engineering societies as well as a member of the Dean's List. Jac has been a residence hall counselor at Ellsworth Hall for two years, and a laboratory assistant in the engineering instrumentation laboratory this past year. He has had a two year research grant from the National Office of Naval Research to carry out research on the ground effect machines with the use of the GEM III, a 2000 pound hovercraft.

Are We On The Road To War?*

*Leo Szilard***

For a number of years now, you have had an opportunity to observe how we, as a nation, respond to the actions of the Russians, and how the Russians respond to our responses. Those of you who have watched closely the course of events in the past six months, may have been led to conclude that we are headed for an all-out war. I myself believe that we are, and that our chances of getting through the next ten years without war are slim.

I personally find myself in rebellion against the fate that history seems to have in store for us, and I suspect that some of you may be equally rebellious. The question is, what can you do?

War seems indeed to be inevitable, unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present. You, as Americans, are not in a position to influence the Russian government; it follows that you would have to bring about a change in the attitude of the American government which, in turn, may bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian government.

It is conceivable that if a dedicated minority were to take effective political action, they could bring about the change in attitude that is needed. But such a minority can take effective action only if it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which it may unite.

Ever since the end of the war, the policies of the great powers have consistently followed the line of least resistance, and this line leads to an unlimited arms race. I do not believe that America can be made secure by keeping ahead in such an arms race.

There have been repeated attempts to stop the arms race by negotiating an agreement that would provide for some form of arms control. So far, all such attempts have failed, and each time they were followed by the continuation of the arms race, with renewed vigor.

Toward the end of the Eisenhower administration, it was generally expected that the next administration would adopt a new approach to this problem and that a fresh attempt would be made to bring the arms race under control.

When Khrushchev was in New York a year ago last October, I tried to see him, in the hope of finding out how responsive he might be to such a new approach. I was told that they had sched-

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**Hungarian-born nuclear physicist; associate of Einstein and Fermi, died 1964. His efforts have resulted in the formation of the Council for a Livable World.

uled fifteen minutes for me but, as it turned out, the conversation went on for two hours. At that time, it was not known whether Kennedy or Nixon would get elected, and I started off the conversation by saying that no matter who is elected, the government would try to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of stopping the arms race. Khrushchev answered—and he spoke in all seriousness—that he believed this also.

A year ago last November, I checked out of the hospital in New York where I had been confined for over a year, took a taxi to the airport, and flew to Moscow to attend the sixth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. I was accompanied by my wife, who is also my doctor, and I stayed on in Moscow for about a month beyond the end of the conference. I stayed on in Moscow in order to engage in private conversations with our Russian colleagues, because I knew from experience that only in private conversations is it possible to get anything across to them or to discover what they really believe to be true.

None of our Russian colleagues brought up the issue of bomb tests in any of these conversations in Moscow, even though two years earlier some of them had been passionately interested in this issue. I found, however, an undiminished interest in far-reaching disarmament which would result in substantial savings. On one occasion, I had tea with Fedorov, the General Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with no one present except my interpreter. I had met Fedorov before and I always got along well with him. On this particular occasion, he spoke to me as follows:

> You must really believe me when I tell you that we want general disarmament. You have seen all this construction work going on in Moscow; it has been going on for many years; still we are not able to catch up with the housing shortage. If we had disarmament, we could not only solve this problem, but many of our other economic problems as well. Also, we could develop other nations on an unprecedented scale. So far, we are building only one hydroelectric dam in Africa—the Aswan Dam in Egypt; if we had disarmament, we could, and we would, build twenty such dams in Africa.

I tried to impress upon our Russian colleagues that the Kennedy administration would make a serious effort to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of arms control, but that the new administration would need time—six months and more than six months perhaps—to find its bearings on this issue and to get organized to deal with it.

When I returned to this country in February, I decided to stay in Washington for a while.

In Washington, my friends told me that the government was going to make a sincere effort to reach an agreement with Russia on the cessation of bomb tests and that a reasonable proposal would be made to the Russians on this issue. They would have liked to hear from me that Russia would be likely to accept such a proposal, but coming fresh from Moscow, I had serious doubts on this score.

The invasion of Cuba took me by surprise. When I first heard about it, it was not clear, as yet, whether we were going to give air support to the invading Cuban exiles and whether we would, if necessary, send in the Marines also. My immediate reaction was that of alarm, for I believed that if we did any of these things we would seriously risk war with Russia. I did not think that Russia

would try to intervene in the Caribbean area, and I did not think that the Russians would launch long-range rockets aimed at our cities, I thought, however, that Russia might make some military move elsewhere, probably in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it would seem that I was wrong, for Tom Slick of the Slick Oil Company, in San Antonio, Texas recently set forth, apparently on good authority, that, if America had openly intervened in Cuba, at that point, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

I would not venture to appraise just how close we came to an all-out war on the occasion of the Cuban incident. I am personally certain, however, that if our intervention in Cuba had been successful, this would have blocked for many years to come any possibility of reaching an agreement on arms control with Russia. Failure to reach an accommodation on the Berlin issue might, of course, produce the same result.

I would not entirely exclude the possibility of war over Berlin, but to me, it seems more probable that this crisis will be resolved by some uneasy compromise, and that it will not lead to an all-out war. Russia may bring pressure on West Berlin in order to promote any one of a number of her foreign policy objectives, but on the larger issue, the issue of Germany, the true interest of America and Russia is the same. The true interest of both countries is to have Europe politically as stable as possible.

I am convinced that the Berlin issue could be satisfactorily resolved by negotiations, but this conviction is based on the belief that there is something that the Russians want that we should be willing to give them, and that there is something that we want that the Russians should be willing to give us in return.

There are many people who do not share this belief. They hold that the Berlin issue was artificially created by Russia for the purpose of humiliating America, for breaking up NATO, and for converting West Germany into a communist state.

Many people, perhaps the majority, believe that the Russians are very much like the Nazis; that they have concrete plans for bringing about, one way or another, our total defeat in Europe, and also for subjugating the whole world to their rule.

Many people have a black and white picture of the world; they believe that the nations fall into two classes: the peaceloving nations, and those who are not peaceloving. America, France, England, and generally speaking our allies, including Germany and Japan, are peaceloving nations. Russia and China are not peaceloving nations. Twenty years ago, the situation was somewhat different: at that time, Russia was a peaceloving nation, but Germany and Japan were not.

Many people believe that ever since the atomic bomb forced the unconditional surrender of Japan, America has unceasingly tried to rid the world of the bomb, and that Russian intransigence, alone, blocked progress in this direction.

When I listen to people who hold such views, I sometimes have the feeling that I have lived through all this before and, in a sense, I have. I was sixteen years old when the first World War broke out, and I lived at that time in Hungary. From reading the Hungarian newspapers, it would have appeared that whatever Austria and Germany did was right and whatever England, France, Russia, or America did was wrong. A good case could be made out for this general thesis, in almost every single instance. It would have been quite difficult for me to prove, in any single instance, that the newspapers were wrong, but somehow, it seemed

to me unlikely that the two nations, located in the center of Europe, should be invariably right, and that all the other nations should be invariably wrong. History, I reasoned, would hardly operate in such a peculiar fashion, and gradually I was led to conclusions which were diametrically opposed to the views held by the majority of my schoolmates.

Many of my schoolmates regarded me as something of an oracle because I was able to cope with the mysteries of lower arithmetic which baffled them and one of them asked me one day quite early in the war who would lose the war. I said that I didn't know who *would* lose the war, but that I thought that I knew who *ought* to lose the war; I thought that Austria and Germany, as well as Russia, ought to lose the war. Since Austria and Germany fought on one side, and Russia on the other side, it was not quite clear how this could happen. The fact is, of course, that it did happen.

I am not telling you this in order to impress you with how bright I am. Nobody at sixty can claim to be as bright as he was at sixteen, even though in most cases it is not the intelligence that deteriorates, but the character. The point I am trying to make is that even in times of war, you can see current events in their historical perspective, provided that your passion for the truth prevails over your bias in favor of your own nation.

After the first World War, when I lived in Berlin, a distinguished friend of mine, Michael Polanyi, asked me one day what I thought ought to be the rule of human conduct regulating the behavior of an individual in society. "Clearly," he said, "you cannot simply ask a man to be generous to other people, for if the other people are mean to him, and if he follows your rule, he may starve to death." "But," said Polanyi, "perhaps the rule ought to be 'Be one per cent more generous to people than they are to you.'" This should be sufficient, he thought, because if everyone were to follow this rule, the earth would, step by step, turn into a livable place.

I told him that, to my mind, this would not work at all, because if two people behave the same way toward each other, each is bound to think that he is 30 per cent more generous than the other. Clearly, the rule would have to allow for this bias. Perhaps if we were to stipulate as the rule of conduct, "Be 31 percent more generous to the others than they are to you" such a rule might work.

America and Russia are not following any such rule of conduct. Moreover, their bias greatly exceeds 30 per cent.

Most Americans apply a yardstick to America's actions which is very different from the yardstick which they apply to Russia's actions. Whenever their bias in favor of their own nation gets into conflict with the truth, the odds are that the bias will prevail. As a result of this, they are not capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective. They may well realize that we are in trouble, but they cannot correctly diagnose the cause of the trouble and therefore, they are not in a position to indicate what the right remedy might be.

The people who have sufficient passion for the truth to give the truth a chance to prevail, if it runs counter to their bias, are in a minority. How important is this minority? It is difficult to say at this point, for, at the present time, their influence on governmental decisions is not perceptible.

If you stay in Washington, you may gain some insight into the manner in which governmental decisions come about; you may

get a feel of what kind of considerations enter into such decisions, and what kind of pressures are at work.

With President Kennedy, new men moved into the administration. Many of them understand the implications of what is going on and are deeply concerned. But, they are so busy trying to keep the worst things from happening, on a day-to-day basis, that they have no time to develop a consensus on what the right approach would be, from the long-term point of view.

There are also a number of men in Congress, particularly in the Senate, who have insight into what is going on and who are concerned, but mostly they lack the courage of their convictions. They may give a lucid analysis of the trouble in private conversations and then at some point or other, they will say: "Of course, I could not say this in public."

In Washington, wisdom has no chance to prevail at this point.

Last September, *Life* magazine printed an article about me which said that I was in Washington trying to find out if there was a market for wisdom. Thereupon, I received a flood of letters from colleges and universities inviting me to give lectures. Most people get some pleasure out of hearing themselves talk, and so do I; yet I did not see much point in going around the country giving talks, if all I had to say was that there was no market for wisdom. Therefore, I declined all these invitations; that is, I declined them all, until Brandeis University invited me to attend a special convocation and receive an honorary doctor's degree. At that point, my vanity got the better of me, and I accepted. At Brandeis, I spoke at dinner informally to the trustees and fellows of the university, and this was my closest contact with grass roots since I moved to Washington—if, indeed, you may regard the trustees and fellows of Brandeis as grass roots.

I told them at Brandeis that I thought we were in very serious trouble; people asked me what there was that they could do about it, and I had no answer to give.

Is there, indeed, anything that these people—and for that matter I, myself—could do at this point that would make sense?

When I got back to Washington, I started to think about this, and I believe it will be best now if I simply recite to you how my thoughts developed from this point on.

The first thought that came to my mind was that in cooperation with others, I could try to set up an organization in Washington—a sort of lobby, if you will—which would bring to Washington, from time to time, scholars and scientists who see current events in their historical perspective. These men would speak with the sweet voice of reason, and our lobby could see to it that they be heard by people inside the administration, and also by the key people in Congress.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished scholars and scientists would be heard, but that they might not be listened to, if they were not able to deliver votes.

Would they be listened to if they were able to deliver votes?

The minority for which they speak might represent a few per cent of the votes, and a few per cent of the votes alone would not mean very much. Still, the combination of a few per cent of the votes and the sweet voice of reason might turn out to be an effective combination. And if the minority for which these men speak, were sufficiently dedicated to stand ready not only to deliver votes, but also to make very substantial campaign contributions, then this minority would be in a position to set up the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington.

The problem which the bomb poses to the world cannot be solved except by abolishing war, and nothing less will do. But first of all, we must back away from the war to which we have come dangerously close.

Could such a dedicated minority agree not only on the long-term political objectives which need to be pursued in order to abolish war, but also on the immediate political objectives, the objectives which must be pursued in the next couple of years, in order to make the present danger of war recede to the point where attention can be focused on the task of abolishing war?

America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in an atomic arms race and an agreement providing for arms control is a necessary first step toward abolishing war.

An agreement on arms control does not seem to be, however, "around the corner." It might very well be, therefore, that *in the immediate future* America would have to take certain unilateral steps. Some of the steps would be taken in order to reduce the present danger of war; other steps would be taken so that if a war breaks out, which neither America nor Russia wants, it may be possible to bring hostilities to an end before there is an all-out atomic catastrophe.

Such unilateral steps are not adequate substitutes for negotiated agreements, and they can carry us only part of the way, but still there are some unilateral steps which should be taken at the present time and I propose to discuss at this point what these steps may be.

The issue of bomb tests and the issue of bomb shelters are peripheral issues; they are more the symptoms of the trouble we are in than the cause of the trouble, and I propose to turn now to issues which I believe to be more relevant.

1. Nothing is gained by America's winning meaningless battles in the cold war, and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed. Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among nations.

The first director of this agency was an American, and his term expired recently. Since, next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, America could have proposed that the next director of the agency be a Russian. Instead, America proposed a Swede, who was not acceptable to the Russians, and since America had the votes she was able to win one more victory in a meaningless battle of the cold war.

All this "victory" accomplished was to reduce the chances of finding some useful function for this agency, because the Russians resent being pushed around in this agency and there is no way for us to force them to play ball.

I believe that it would be important for the government to reach a major policy decision, and for the President to issue an executive order against fighting meaningless battles in the cold war.

We have a cultural exchange program with the Russians but their State Department and our State Department are playing a game of "if you hit our scientists, we shall hit your scientists." Accordingly, our State Department imposes senseless travel restrictions on our Russian collegues who visit this country. These travel restrictions are not aimed at the safeguarding of any secrets, but are merely a way of hitting back at travel restrictions which the Soviet government occasionally imposes on American scientists

who travel about in Russia.

I believe that representations ought to be made, at as high a level of the administration as is necessary, for the Secretary of State to find some other assignment in the State Department for those who have, up till now, handled the East-West Cultural Exchange Program.

2. I believe that America could and should make unilaterally two crucially important policy decisions and that she should proclaim these decisions.

First of all, America should resolve and proclaim that she would not resort to any strategic bombing of cities or bases of Russia (either by means of atomic bombs or conventional explosives), except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs, or if there is an unprovoked attack with bombs against one of America's allies.

Further, America should make a second policy decision and should proclaim this decision. In order to understand the meaning and relevance of this second decision, it is necessary to consider the following:

Soon after the war, when Russia did not as yet have any atomic bombs, she proposed that the bomb be outlawed. This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs, either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases, or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently, Sulzberger of the *New York Times* discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of such unilateral pledges, renouncing the use of the bomb. Khrushchev said, on this occasion, that if there were a war, even if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force must no longer be victory. The objective must only be to make a conquest difficult and expensive.

If force is used then an all-out war, which neither side wants, can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory, or anything approaching victory.

Keeping this point of view in mind, *America* could and *should* adopt *the policy that, in case of war, if she were to use atomic bombs against troops in combat, she would do so only on her own side of the prewar boundary.*

In case of war America would then be bound by a pledge to this effect as long as Russia imposed a similar restraint on her conduct of the war.

Manifestly, this type of use of atomic bombs would be a defensive operation and moreover, it would be a very effective defensive operation, either on the part of Russia or on the part of America, as long as the restraints remain in effect on both sides.

Such a pledge would be no less clear than the simple pledge renouncing the use of the bomb, but it would be much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge. And if neither side aimed at anything approaching victory, then it would substantially reduce the danger of an all-out war.

When I discussed this issue in Germany three years ago, people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder-Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs. I do not know to what extent West German cities

could be spared by a judicious tactical use of atomic bombs by American forces, but I do know that if America were to use bombs beyond the prewar boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

Recently, the United Nations Assembly vetoed with a more than two-thirds majority, 55 against 20, to outlaw the use of atomic bombs in war. The use of atomic bombs in warfare was declared by the Assembly to be a crime and a violation of the United Nations Charter.

Since the machinery of the United Nations was set up for the purpose of maintaining peace among the smaller nations, assuming the cooperation of the great powers to this end, attempts to regard a two-thirds vote of the Assembly as legally binding must necessarily fail. Still the United States must not fly in the face of world opinion and simply disregard the vote of the General Assembly, when a two-thirds vote of the Assembly expresses the legitimate concern of the great majority of the nations that the use of atomic bombs in warfare might lead to a world catastrophe. Rather, out of respect for world opinion and in its own interest, the United States ought to go as far toward complying with it, as valid considerations for its own security permit. The restrictions on the use of atomic bombs in case of war which I am advocating, are advocated with this end in view.

Western Europe is not inferior to Russia either in manpower or in resources and it would be possible for Western Europe to build up within five years conventional forces to the point where it could renounce the use of atomic bombs against troops in combat in case of war. But even this would be to no avail unless the nations involved give up any thought of fighting limited wars for "limited objectives" and resort to force only to make a conquest difficult and, with luck, to prevent it.

As long as there is no agreement providing for arms control, and Russia remains in possession of large stockpiles of bombs, America has no choice but to maintain a strategic atomic striking force. However, it should maintain such a force only as protection against America or her allies being attacked with bombs. The number of bombs retained for this purpose need not be very large, and more important than the number of bombs retained is the invulnerability of the bases from which they would be launched. If these bases are invulnerable, so that no single massive attack against them could substantially damage America's ability to retaliate, then America needs to retain only enough bombs to be able to destroy in retaliation a substantial number of Russia's cities, after giving due notice to permit their orderly evacuation.

It must be made clear, however, that if America adopts the policy here advocated, she thereby renounces the threat of strategic bombing as a general *deterrent* because she could then make this threat only in case Russia would drop bombs, and drop them on *our* side of the prewar boundary.

I, personally, do not believe that America would lose much by giving up the threat of strategic bombing, because the deterrent effect of such a threat is negligible unless the threat is believable.

If America were to threaten to drop bombs on a large number of Russian cities in case of war, knowing full well that Russia would retaliate by dropping bombs on a large number of American cities, such a threat would be tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide. The threat of murder and suicide would not be a believable threat, in the context of the so-called Berlin Crisis, nor would it be a believable threat

in the context of any other similar conflict in which America's rights and interests may be at stake, but not America's existence as a nation.

Those responsible for the planning of strategy in the Department of Defense would concede this much.

According to persistent press reports there is, however, an increasingly influential school of thought in the Department of Defense which holds that, in case of war with Russia, America may engage in strategic bombing, aimed at the destruction of Russian rocket bases and strategic air bases. America would not bomb any of Russia's cities if she can help it, as long as Russia did not bomb any of America's cities.

This school of thought holds that, at present, Russia does not have many long-range rocket bases and strategic air bases, that the location of many of these bases is known, and that most of them are vulnerable and could be destroyed by attacking them with bombs. By building enough long-range solid-fuel rockets (Minutemen) and submarines capable of launching intermediate range solid-fuel rockets (Polaris) America may be able to keep ahead in this game for the next five years.

Those who advocate such a policy believe that if America should succeed in knocking out, say, 90 per cent of Russia's strategic atomic striking forces, then the Russians would probably speak to us as follows: "We have enough rockets left to destroy a large number of American cities, but we know that if we did this America may retaliate by destroying all of our cities. Therefore, we are going to hold our fire and we propose to negotiate peace. We concede that the power balance has now shifted in America's favor and we are now willing to yield on a number of issues on which we took an inflexible stand prior to the outbreak of hostilities." If this were to happen America would have won a victory even though it may be a victory in a limited sense of the term only.

Naturally if there is a war and America resorts to the bombing of bases in Russia, one could not expect the Russians to sit idly by and watch America picking up step by step one base after another. It follows that America would have to start the strategic bombing of Russian bases with a sudden, massive attack and to try to destroy all vulnerable Russian bases of known location, in the first attack.

There are, of course, people in the Department of Defense who have serious doubts that America would actually carry out such a first strike against bases, in case of war, yet they believe that—at the present juncture—it is a good thing to threaten to bomb Russian bases in case of war because this is a more believable threat than the threat of" murder and suicide."

I do not know just how believable this threat is, but I do know that at best we are purchasing an increased restraint on Russia's part for a year or two, and that we are purchasing it at a very high price. For whether we adopt such a strategy or merely give Russia the impression that we have adopted such a strategy, we are provoking an all-out atomic arms race and may within a very few years reach the point of no return, in this regard.

Therefore, I believe that it is imperative to oppose: (a) the adoption of plans which call for a first strike against Russian rocket and strategic air bases in case of war, and (b) the adoption of the policy of "deterring" Russia, with the threat that America would resort to such a first strike in case of war. I believe that the rejection of both these policies is an attainable political objective because

there is considerable doubt within the administration of the wisdom of these policies.

3. *America could and should resolve that atomic bombs and the means suitable for their delivery, which are supplied by her and which are stationed in Europe, shall remain in the hands of American military units which are under American command, rather than be placed under the control of NATO.* As long as America is committed to defend Western Europe, there is no valid argument for turning over bombs to the control of other Western European nations.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the United States government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of balancing any such pressure by bringing domestic political counterpressure to bear on the government.

America should stand firm in opposing the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs by Germany as well as the production of means suitable for their delivery.

It is conceivable, of course, that all attempts to achieve arms control may fail and that in the end it will not be within the power of the United States to prevent Germany from producing its own bombs and rockets. At about the same time the United States may however also free herself from her commitments to defend Germany against external military intervention. But we are not concerned at this point with developments that may conceivably occur in the unpredictable future.

4. Not every issue can be solved by Congress passing a law, and there are borderline issues where political action alone can bring no solution because the specific knowledge is lacking of how to go about the solution. The issue of general disarmament seems to be such a borderline issue.

I believe that, at the present time, little could be gained by bringing pressure on the administration to enter into formal negotiations with Russia on the issue of general disarmament, because —as they say, "You can lead a horse to the water, but you can't make him drink."

I believe that no substantial progress can be made toward disarmament until Americans and Russians first reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

American reluctance to seriously contemplate general disarmament is largely due to uncertainty about this point. If it became clear that a satisfactory solution of this issue is possible, many Americans may come to regard general disarmament as a highly desirable goal.

On the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world, progress could probably be made reasonably fast, through nongovernmental discussions among Americans and Russians. *I believe that such discussions ought to be arranged through private initiative, but with the blessing of the administration.*

The Russians know very well that America is *not* ready seriously to contemplate general disarmament and this, to my mind, explains why, in spite of being strongly motivated for disarmament, the Russian government displays in its negotiations on this issue much the same attitude as does the American government. As far as negotiations on disarmament are concerned, hitherto both governments have been mainly guided by the public relations aspect rather than by the substantive aspect of the issue.

The Soviet Union's attitude might change overnight, however, if it became apparent that America was becoming seriously interested in disarmament.

The Russians are very much aware of the economic benefits they would derive from disarmament, and I believe that the Soviet Union would be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it. It stands to reason that this should be so for the Soviet Union spends on defense an even larger fraction of her industrial output than America does.

America is at present committed to protect certain territories which are located in the geographical proximity of Russia. In the case of general disarmament, America would not be able to live up to any such commitments. Disarmament would therefore be politically acceptable to America only if it is possible for her to liquidate her present commitments—without too much loss of prestige and without seriously endangering the interests of the other nations involved.

Khrushchev seems to be very much aware of this. Therefore, if it came to serious negotiations on the issue of disarmament, and if it became manifestly necessary to reach a political settlement in order to permit America to liquidate her military commitments, then the Soviet Union might go a long way toward seeking an accommodation.

5. General disarmament may, if we are lucky, eliminate war, but it would not end the rivalry between America and Russia.

It is a foregone conclusion that American efforts toward creating an orderly and livable world will be frustrated in Southeast Asia and Africa because of our failure to devise forms of democracy which would be viable in these regions of the world. The task of devising forms of democracy which would be suitable to the needs of such areas is not a task that the government can handle. Various forms of democracy may have to be devised which are tailor-made to fit the various areas. *A major private group could tackle and ought to tackle this problem.* If it is not solved, more and more underdeveloped nations may become dictatorships; some of them may have a rapid succession of dictator after dictator and, in the end, the people may have to choose between chaos and communism.

It is a foregone conclusion that America's efforts to raise the standard of living of underdeveloped nations may be frustrated in those areas where the birth rate is high, infant mortality is high, and there is little arable land left. Improvement in the standard of living will initially lead to a fall in infant mortality, and if the birth rate remains high, the population will shoot up so rapidly that economic improvements will not be able to catch up.

Our failure to develop biological methods of birth control, suitable for the needs of such areas, is responsible for this state of affairs. The development of such methods is not a task which the government can undertake. The government could not create research institutes which would attract scientists who are ingenious and resourceful enough to come up with an adequate solution. *A major private group could and should tackle this problem.*

If it should turn out that it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which reasonable people could generally agree, and if these objectives could count on the all-out support of a sizable and dedicated minority, then I should be impelled to go further, and I would plan to go further along the following lines:

I would ask about fifteen distinguished scientists to serve as fellows of a council which might be called Council for Abolishing War or perhaps Council for a Livable World. The fellows (who are all scientists) would elect the board of directors, but membership on the board would not be restricted to scientists.

This council would, first of all, assemble a panel of political advisors, and then in close consultation with these advisors, it would formulate two sets of objectives. To the first set belong those objectives which cannot be attained at the present time through political action because it would take further inquiry, and perhaps even real research to know, in concrete terms, what needs to be done. To the second set belong those objectives which can be pursued through political action because it is clear what needs to be done.

The fellows of the council would set up a research organization aimed at the pursuit of the first set of objectives, and they would elect the trustees of that organization. The fellows of the council would also set up a political organization aimed at the pursuit of the second set of objectives, and they would elect the board of directors of that organization. Because one of the major functions of the second organization would be to lobby, we may refer to it for our purposes as the lobby.

The council would hold hearings, perhaps one every four months, and would subsequently proclaim in detail the immediate political objectives it proposes to advocate. It would communicate these objectives, perhaps in the form of a series of pamphlets, to all those who are believed to be seriously interested. Those who regularly receive the communications of the council would be regarded as members of the movement, if they are willing *actively* to support *at least one* of the several specific objectives proclaimed by the council.

It seems to me that there is no need to enlist those who are interested as members of an organization. What one needs to create is not a membership organization, but a movement.

The articulate members of the movement would be expected to discuss the relevant issues with editors of their newspapers and various columnists and other opinion makers in their own community. They would be expected to write to, and in other ways keep in touch with, their congressman and the two senators of their own state.

One of the functions of the lobby would be to help the members of the movement clarify their own minds on the political objectives they wish actively to support.

The members of the movement would be regarded as pledged to vote in the primaries as well as in the elections. As far as federal elections are concerned, they would be pledged to cast their vote, *disregarding domestic issues,* solely on the issue of war and peace.

The members of the movement would be regarded as pledged annually to spend two per cent of their income on campaign contributions. The members would be asked to make out a check payable to the recipient of the campaign contribution but to mail that check to the Washington office of the lobby for transmission. In this manner the lobby would be in a position to keep track of the flow of campaign contributions.

Those in high income brackets may be left free to contribute three per cent after taxes rather than two per cent before taxes.

All members of the movement would be free to wear an emblem that would identify them as members of the movement, if they wish to do so.

Those who can not spend two per cent of their income on campaign contributions may regard themselves as supporters of the movement if they spend either one per cent of their income or $100 per year, according to their preference. Such supporters of the movement may receive the advice and guidance of the lobby on the

same terms as the members of the movement.

So that each member of the movement may know where his contribution should go, in order to be most effective in furthering the political objectives which he has chosen to pursue, the lobby would keep in touch with each member. The lobby would keep the members informed about the particular contests for seats in Congress which are of interest to the movement; but it may advise one member to take an interest in one of these contests and another member to take an interest in another of these contests.

For covering the operating expenses of the lobby and the research organization (which would be maintained independently from and operated parallel to the lobby), one would look to the members of the movement. Each year a certain group of the members would be asked by the lobby to contribute two per cent of their income to it, rather than to spend it for political contributions. One year this group might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "C." Another those whose names start with the letter "R," etc.

The movement must not wield the power that it may possess crudely. People in Washington want to be convinced, they do not want to be bribed or blackmailed. He who gives consistently financial support to certain key members of Congress, may evoke their lasting friendship and may count on their willingness to listen to him as long as he talks sense. He who talks to members of Congress, but does not talk sense, will not accomplish anything of lasting value, even if he temporarily sweeps some members of Congress off their feet by making huge political contributions to them.

There are many intelligent men in Congress who have insight into what goes on; the movement could help these men to have the courage of their convictions. There are others in Congress who are not capable of such insight; the only thing to do with them is not to return them to Congress, and to replace them with better men. This may make it necessary to persuade better men to run in the primaries and to stand for election. To find such better men must be one of the main tasks of the movement, and the lobby must be prepared to help members of the movement to perform this task.

I did not come here to enlist any of you in such a movement or to launch such a movement. I came here to invite you to participate in an experiment that would show whether such a movement could be successfully launched.

First of all, I ask each of you to look into your own heart and try to discover whether you yourself would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives —as formulated from time to time —appeal to you and you thought that the movement could be effective.

Those of you who wish to participate in the experiment are asked to show a copy of this speech to people in your home community who might be interested and to determine who of these would be likely to be part of a dedicated minority that would give all-out support to a movement of the kind I have described.

I would appreciate your writing me, as soon as possible, how many people you have talked to and how many of these and who of these (name and address), you think, could be counted upon.

If the result of this experiment indicates that such a movement could get off the ground, provided it were started in the right way and on a sufficiently large scale, then the Council for Abolishing

War would be constituted. Presumably the council would attempt to identify 25,000 individuals who would be willing to make campaign contributions in the amount of two per cent of their income. Presumably, if the council is successful in this, the fellows of the council would proceed to establish the lobby.

By the time the movement attains 150,000 members it would presumably represent about $20 million per year in campaign contributions or $80 million over a four year period.

Whether such a movement could grow further and come to represent not only a decisive amount in campaign contributions but also a significant number of votes, would then presumably depend on the future course of world events.

SPANISH STUDIES IN MEXICO

In a recent *Newsletter* from Mildred and Harold Smith, of Saltillo, Mexico the following statement was made regarding opportunities for study in Spanish, and residence in our Church Student Center at Saltillo.

"A special six-weeks course in Spanish is offered here in Saltillo by the International Academy of Spanish beginning July 1 and ending August 5. A variety of subjects (taught in Spanish) is also offered. The tuition for 6 to 8 semester hours is $165.00. Many colleges in the States will allow credits for these courses if arrangements are made before taking the courses. Board and room in pensions will cost $130.00. In private homes where at least four stay (no rooms for one person) the cost will be $110.00. We can offer board and room at the Student Center for $80.00 if enough students come to fill the quarters. Spanish will be the official language and the help here will be Spanish-speaking people. Spanish type meals will, in general, be served and house rules will be observed. For definite information about the courses offered, write to Miss Mary Wise, P. O. Box 601, Redlands, California.

We cannot house students attending any other college here in Saltillo due to the different beginning and ending dates of those other schools. Our students in the Center finish their school year just prior to July 1, which enables us to go right into the summer course of the International Academy of Spanish. It is the opinion of appointee Robert Fishburn and his wife, Rosemary, (they are both teachers here in Saltillo and are in a position to know) that the International Academy of Spanish is one of the best schools in Mexico. American students coming here to improve their Spanish and their knowledge of Mexican history and culture can do no better in any other school. Any person interested in staying at the Student Center should contact us at once, since our space here is definitely limited—'first come, first served.' Write to: Centro Estudiantil Resteumex, Cuauhtemoc 559 Sur, Saltillo, Coahuilla, Mexico. A deposit of $25.00 should accompany your application for admission to the Student Center."

Bob Fishburn, our missionary in charge, also happens to be head of the Department of Industrial Safety at the State Technical Institute in Saltillo and is in a position to give counsel on education in Mexico.

Man's Role In His Environment

*Bernard Butterworth**

Throughout his long history man has had difficulty understanding his role as a part of his environment. The young science of ecology, which considers the environment and the interactions of plants and animals, has generally disregarded man in the ecosystem. The recent upsurge of the world's human population with its skyrocketing demands for water, food, living space, and the resulting forms of environmental pollution, have caused man to reconsider and seriously alter his thinking about his accommodation with the world. As the physician who knows he must not cure the organ, or even the disease, but help the patient. Man is just beginning to realize that it is not enough to improve political and economical systems. Man must learn how to attain and maintain a favorable biochemical relationship and equilibrium with his total environment on a world scale.

Man has so cleverly manipulated the natural vegetation and animal life on earth, to satisfy better his needs and desires, that he has become the one dominant force over most of the face of the earth. As a logical result of these controls and his dominance, man has augmented his own numbers to thousands of millions of individuals, and he continues to increase at a fantastic rate. In fact, man has been so successful in propagating his own kind, that his success may soon become his main problem. In natural ecological systems, a disturbance of the balance in numbers is always followed by counter-balancing forces which restore an equilibrium. Man's control over his environment makes manipulation of these rules possible, but there remains the question of how far man may swing the balance in one direction and still be able to maintain an equilibium with his environment.

There is one common denominator which controls our future. Specifically, this involves the ratio between human populations and the supply of natural resources with which they live, that is, soil, water, plants and animals, which are highly unstable and change hourly in response to human acts. Man has taken the great resources of the earth for granted. Through his mistreatment much of the earth's productivity has fallen to such an extent that what one man-hour formerly could accomplish now requires ten to one hundred man-hours of labor. Bernard Baruch has said that on some of our overgrazed western cattle ranges the cattle must run so fast and so far to get enough to eat, that they wear themselves out. Man must

*Ph.D., biology, USC; U. of Mo. at K.C., elder.

ILLINOIS-INDIANA CONFERENCE

As the *University Bulletin* goes to press, John Darling, Jr., sponsor of the University of Illinois Liahona Fellowship writes of plans for the Illinois-Indiana Liahona Conference to be held April 30-May 2, at Camp Howard, south of Mahomet, Illinois. Participating in leadership roles in the conference will be several Illinois business men, Gordon Lambert, Donald L. Lusha, Max M. Matthews, and Donald L. Vogelsang. Visiting ministers Apostle Cecil Ettinger and Seventy Victor Hatch will be present to lead discussions and deliver keynote addresses. Charles Brockway, Charles E. Mader, Administrative Assistant of Evanston Township High School, and Edward L. Choate, Purchasing Agent and Personnel Director of the Auditorium, Independence, will also be on hand.

This conference is unique in that it is being supported financially by contributions from four districts in Illinois. In this way there will be no expense, other than that of transportation, for those attending the conference. Working with the theme, "This God I Know," the college students, military personnel and professional people at the conference will seek to clarify God as the creative depth in their particular fields of interest.

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has served in the Peace Corps in Laos, presented a challenge for stewardship-minded groups to hearts and minds of all the importance of love, and respect for the dignity and worth of each individual God has created, that all might seek to build up and establish his earthly Kingdom.

The wide scope of stewardship as an expression of a total life gave impetus to Saturday's meetings. Leading small group discussions under the topic, "The Stewardship of My Profession," were Irene Jones, "The Home and Family;" Mark Thoman, "Medical and Biological Science;" Jerry Runkle and Jim Closson, "Social Sciences;" and Maurice Coffman, "Engineering." The conference also shared in the ministry of Carl Mesle and Robert Taylor.

High point of the conference was an address given by Jerry Runkle on Sunday morning. A fellowship service culminated the week-end experience, reminding the students of the significance of stewardship as the total response to the ministry of Jesus Christ.

NORTHEASTERN LIAHONA CONFERENCE

Fifty-one college students, servicemen and friends registered at the Northeastern states Liahona Conference held in Boston, Massachusetts, at Fisher Junior College, February 20-21. An additional fifteen or twenty ministers and guests attended, bringing nearly seventy-five persons to most activities.

"Vocationally Valid Values" was the theme of the conference. Leaders included Dr. Stanley Johnson, Associate Professor of Psychology at New York University; Dr. Evan V. Shute, a medical doctor and long-time college student leader; Elder F. Carl Mesle, supervisor of the church's program of ministry to college students and military personnel; and Elder Elroy E. Hanton, regional administrator in the northeastern United States.

Students came from such points as Maine, Pennsylvania, Washington, D. C.; and Virginia, as well as many other northeastern communities. Elder Albert Fisher, president of the Southern New England District, Elder James Overly, missionary in that district, and Elder Kenneth Green, missionary in the New York City area, were among those on hand.

The conference dealt with the problems faced in reconciling the demands of one's vocation and one's personal value system. The structure of personal values, the function that they play in individual behavior, and the effect that vocational demands can place on these values were discussed in the four classes taught by Dr. Shute and Dr. Johnson and in two panel discussions.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PLANS MAY REGIONAL CONFERENCE

The night of the Great February Blizzard about ten members of the new Liahona Fellowship at Ohio State University met in the home of District President, Frank Fry; with Faculty Advisor, Dr. Sam Daykin and College Committee member, Carl Mesle, Regional Representatives, Dr. Malcom Ritchie and his assistant, Tony Lampe of Dayton, were kept away by the blizzard, but met with Carl the next morning at Dayton.

The group met primarily to make plans for the Ohio Regional College Student Conference scheduled for Ohio State University May 22-23. Facilities, dates, themes, personnel and all were considered. President Ralph Kleinline and "Associate President" Bea Kleinline, his wife, were left to organize the Conference committees and keep the ball rolling. The theme finally chosen was "Spiritual Courage."

KEY ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE—ADDRESS BY DR. LEO SZILARD

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, in the past few months, Dr. Leo Szilard, who is now living in Washington, D.C., has spoken at Harvard, Swarthmore, Western Reserve, the University of Chicago, the University of California at Berkeley, Stanford, Reed, Oregon University, and Sarah Lawrence on the question "Are We On the Road to War?" The text of the speech given at those nine colleges and universities appeared in article form in the April 1962 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. For a provocative, original, and highly stimulating discussion of some of the key issues of war and peace now confronting the Nation, I commend to Senators a reading of Dr. Szilard's article.

I do not necessarily endorse everything that Dr. Szilard has said, but I be-

lieve his views are worthy of widespread public discussion.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Dr. Szilard's article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ARE WE ON THE ROAD TO WAR?

(By Leo Szilard)

For a number of years now, you have had an opportunity to observe how we, as a nation, respond to the actions of the Russians, and how the Russians respond to our responses. Those of you who have watched closely the course of events in the past 6 months, may have been led to conclude that we are headed for an all-out war. I myself believe that we are, and that our chances of getting through the next 10 years without war are slim.

I personally find myself in rebellion against the fate that history seems to have in store for us, and I suspect that some of you may be equally rebellious. The question is, What can you do?

War seems indeed to be inevitable, unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present. You, as Americans, are not in a position to influence the Russian Government; it follows that you would have to bring about a change in the attitude of the American Government which, in turn, may bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian Government.

It is conceivable that if a dedicated minority were to take effective political action, they could bring about the change in attitude that is needed. But such a minority can take effective action only if it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which it may unite.

Ever since the end of the war, the policies of the great powers have consistently followed the line of least resistance, and this line leads to an unlimited arms race. I do not believe that America can be made secure by keeping ahead in such an arms race.

There have been repeated attempts to stop the arms race by negotiating an agreement that would provide for some form of arms control. So far, all such attempts have failed, and each time they were followed by the continuation of the arms race, with renewed vigor.

Toward the end of the Eisenhower administration, it was generally expected that the next administration would adopt a new approach to this problem and that a fresh attempt would be made to bring the arms race under control.

When Khrushchev was in New York a year ago last October, I tried to see him, in the hope of finding out how responsive he might be to such a new approach. I was told that they had scheduled 15 minutes for me but, as it turned out, the conversation went on for 2 hours. At that time, it was not known whether Kennedy or Nixon would get elected, and I started off the conversation by saying that no matter who is elected, the Government would try to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of stopping the arms race. Khrushchev answered—and he spoke in all seriousness—that he believed this also.

A year ago last November, I checked out of the hospital in New York, where I had been confined for over a year, took a taxi to the airport, and flew to Moscow to attend the sixth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. I was accompanied by my wife, who is also my doctor, and I stayed on in Moscow for about a month beyond the end of the conference. I stayed on in Moscow in order to engage in private conversations with our Russian colleagues, because I knew from experience that only in private conversations is it possible to get anything across to them or to discover what they really believe to be true.

None of our Russian colleagues brought up the issue of bomb tests in any of these conversations in Moscow, even though 2 years earlier some of them had been passionately interested in this issue. I found, however, an undiminished interest in far-reaching disarmament which would result in substantial savings. On one occasion, I had tea with Fedorov, the General Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with no one present except my interpreter. I had met Fedorov before and I always got along well with him. On this particular occasion, he spoke to me as follows:

"You must really believe me when I tell you that we want general disarmament. You have seen all this construction work going on in Moscow; it has been going on for many years; still we are not able to catch up with the housing shortage. If we had disarmament, we could not only solve this problem, but many of our other economic problems as well. Also, we could develop other nations on an unprecedented scale. So far, we are building only one hydroelectric dam in Africa—the Aswan Dam in Egypt; if we had disarmament, we could, and we would, build 20 such dams in Africa."

I tried to impress upon our Russian colleagues that the Kennedy administration would make a serious effort to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of arms control, but that the new administration would need time—6 months and more than 6 months perhaps—to find its bearings on this issue and to get organized to deal with it.

When I returned to this country in February, I decided to stay in Washington for a while.

In Washington, my friends told me that the Government was going to make a sincere effort to reach an agreement with Russia on the cessation of bomb tests and that a reasonable proposal would be made to the Russians on this issue. They would have liked to hear from me that Russia would be likely to accept such a proposal, but coming fresh from Moscow, I had serious doubts on this score.

The invasion of Cuba took me by surprise. When I first heard about it, it was not clear, as yet, whether we were going to give air support to the invading Cuban exiles and whether we would, if necessary, send in the Marines also. My immediate reaction was that of alarm, for I believed that if we did any of these things, we would seriously risk war with Russia. I did not think that Russia would try to intervene in the Caribbean area, and I did not think that the Russians would launch long-range rockets aimed at our cities. I thought, however, that Russia might make some military move elsewhere, probably in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it would seem that I was wrong, for Tom Slick of the Slick Oil Co., in San Antonio, Tex., recently set forth, apparently on good authority, that, if America had openly intervened in Cuba, at that point, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

I would not venture to appraise just how close we came to an all-out war on the occasion of the Cuban incident. I am reasonably certain, however, that if our intervention in Cuba had been successful, this would have blocked for many years to come any possibility of reaching an agreement on arms control with Russia. Failure to reach an accommodation on the Berlin issue might, of course, produce the same result.

I would not entirely exclude the possibility of war over Berlin, but to me, it seems more probable that this crisis will be resolved by some uneasy compromise, and that it will not lead to an all-out war. Russia may bring pressure in West Berlin in order to promote any one of a number of her foreign policy objectives, but on the larger issue, the issue of Germany, the true interest of America and Russia is the same. The true interest of both countries is to have Europe politically as stable as possible.

I am convinced that the Berlin issue could be satisfactorily resolved by negotiations, but this conviction is based on the belief that there is something that the Russians want that we should be willing to give them, and that there is something that we want that the Russians should be willing to give us in return.

There are many people who do not share this belief. They hold that the Berlin issue was artificially created by Russia for the purpose of humiliating America, for breaking up NATO, and for converting West Germany into a Communist state.

Many people, perhaps the majority, believe that the Russians are very much like the Nazis; that they have concrete plans for bringing about, one way or another, our total defeat in Europe, and also for subjugating the whole world to their rule.

Many people have a black and white picture of the world; they believe that the nations fall into two classes: the peace-loving nations, and those who are not peace-loving. America, France, England, and generally speaking our allies, including Germany and Japan, are peace-loving nations. Russia and China are not peace-loving nations. Twenty years ago, the situation was somewhat different: at that time, Russia was a peace-loving nation, but Germany and Japan were not.

Many people believe that ever since the atomic bomb forced the unconditional surrender of Japan, America has unceasingly tried to rid the world of the bomb, and that Russian intransigence, alone, blocked progress in this direction.

When I listen to people who hold such views, I sometimes have the feeling that I have lived through all this before and, in a sense, I have. I was 16 years old when the First World War broke out, and I lived at that time in Hungary. From reading the Hungarian newspapers, it would have appeared that whatever Austria and Germany did was right and whatever England, France, Russia, or America did was wrong. A good case could be made out for this general thesis, in almost every single instance. It would have been quite difficult for me to prove, in any single instance, that the newspapers were wrong, but somehow, it seemed to me unlikely that the two nations, located in the center of Europe, should be invariably right, and that all the other nations should be invariably wrong. History, I reasoned, would hardly operate in such a peculiar fashion, and gradually I was led to conclusions which were diametrically opposed to the views held by the majority of my schoolmates.

Many of my schoolmates regarded me as something of an oracle because I was able to cope with the mysteries of lower arithmetic which baffled them and one of them asked me one day quite early in the war who would lose the war. I said that I didn't know who would lose the war, but that I thought that I knew who ought to lose the war; I thought that Austria and Germany, as well as Russia, ought to lose the war. Since Austria and Germany fought on one side, and Russia on the other side, it was not quite clear how this could happen. The fact is, of course, that it did happen.

I am not telling you this in order to impress you with how bright I am. Nobody at 60 can claim to be as bright as he was at 16, even though in most cases it is not the intelligence that deteriorates, but the character. The point I am trying to make is that even in times of war, you can see current events in their historical perspective, provided that your passion for the truth pre-

vails over your bias in favor of your own Nation.

After the First World War, when I lived in Berlin, a distinguished friend of mine, Michael Polanyi, asked me one day what I thought ought to be the rule of human conduct regulating the behavior of an individual in society. "Clearly," he said, "you cannot simply ask a man to be generous to other people, for if the other people are mean to him, and if he follows your rule, he may starve to death." "But," said Polanyi, "perhaps the rule ought to be 'Be 1 percent more generous to people than they are to you.'" This should be sufficient, he thought, because if everyone were to follow this rule, the earth would, step by step, turn into a livable place.

I told him that, to my mind, this would not work at all, because if two people behave the same way toward each other, each is bound to think that he is 30 percent more generous than the other. Clearly, the rule would have to allow for this bias. Perhaps if we were to stipulate as the rule of conduct, "Be 31 percent more generous to the others than they are to you" such a rule might work.

America and Russia are not following any such rule of conduct. Moreover, their bias greatly exceeds 30 percent.

Most Americans apply a yardstick to America's actions which is very different from the yardstick which they apply to Russia's actions. Whenever their bias in favor of their own Nation gets into conflict with the truth, the odds are that the bias will prevail. As a result of this, they are not capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective. They may well realize that we are in trouble, but they cannot correctly diagnose the cause of the trouble and therefore, they are not in a position to indicate what the right remedy might be.

The people who have sufficient passion for the truth to give the truth a chance to prevail, if it runs counter to their bias, are in a minority. How important is this minority? It is difficult to say at this point, for, at the present time, their influence on governmental decisions is not perceptible.

If you stay in Washington, you may gain some insight into the manner in which governmental decisions come about; you may get a feel of what kind of considerations enter into such decisions, and what kind of pressures are at work.

With President Kennedy, new men moved into the administration. Many of them understand the implications of what is going on and are deeply concerned. But, they are so busy trying to keep the worst things from happening, on a day-to-day basis, that they have no time to develop a consensus on what the right approach would be, from the long-term point of view.

There are also a number of men in Congress, particularly in the Senate, who have insight into what is going on and who are concerned, but mostly they lack the courage of their convictions. They may give a lucid analysis of the trouble in private conversations and then at some point or other, they will say: "Of course, I could not say this in public."

In Washington, wisdom has no chance to prevail at this point.

Last September, Life magazine printed an article about me which said that I was in Washington trying to find out if there was a market for wisdom. Thereupon, I received a flood of letters from colleges and universities inviting me to give lectures. Most people get some pleasure out of hearing themselves talk, and so do I; yet I did not see much point in going around the country giving talks, if all I had to say was that there was no market for wisdom. Therefore, I declined all these invitations; that is, I declined them all, until Brandeis University invited me to attend a special convocation and receive an honorary doctor's degree. At that point, my vanity got the better of me, and I accepted. At Brandeis, I spoke at dinner informally to the trustees and fellows of the university, and this was my closest contact with grassroots since I moved to Washington—if, indeed, you may regard the trustees and fellows of Brandeis as grassroots.

I told them at Brandeis that I thought we were in very serious trouble; people asked me what there was that they could do about it, and I had no answer to give.

Is there, indeed, anything that these people—and for that matter I, myself—could do at this point that would make sense?

When I got back to Washington, I started to think about this, and I believe it will be best now if I simply recite to you how my thoughts developed from this point on.

The first thought that came to my mind was that in cooperation with others, I could try to set up an organization in Washington—a sort of lobby, if you will—which would bring to Washington, from time to time, scholars and scientists who see current events in their historical perspective. These men would speak with the sweet voice of reason, and our lobby could see to it that they be heard by people inside the administration, and also by the key people in Congress.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished scholars and scientists would be heard, but that they might not be listened to, if they were not able to deliver votes.

Would they be listened to if they were able to deliver votes?

The minority for which they speak might represent a few percent of the votes, and a few percent of the votes alone would not mean very much. Still, the combination of a few percent of the votes and the sweet voice of reason might turn out to be an effective combination. And if the minority for which these men speak, were sufficiently dedicated to stand ready not only to deliver votes, but also to make very substantial campaign contributions, then this minority would be in a position to set up the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington.

The problem which the bomb poses to the world cannot be solved except by abolishing war, and nothing less will do. But first of all, we must back away from the war to which we have come dangerously close.

Could such a dedicated minority agree not only on the long-term political objectives which need to be pursued in order to abolish war, but also on the immediate political objectives, the objectives which must be pursued in the next couple of years, in order to make the present danger of war recede to the point where attention can be focused on the task of abolishing war?

America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in an atomic arms race and an agreement providing for arms control is a necessary first step toward abolishing war.

An agreement on arms control does not seem to be, however, "around the corner." It might very well be, therefore, that in the immediate future America would have to take certain unilateral steps. Some of the steps would be taken in order to reduce the present danger of war; other steps would be taken so that if a war breaks out, which neither America nor Russia wants, it may be possible to bring hostilities to an end before there is an all-out atomic catastrophe.

Such unilateral steps are not adequate substitutes for negotiated agreements, and they can carry us only part of the way, but still there are some unilateral steps which should be taken at the present time and I propose to discuss at this point what these steps may be.

The issue of bomb tests and the issue of bomb shelters are peripheral issues; they are more the symptoms of the trouble we are in than the cause of the trouble, and I propose to turn now to issues which I believe to be more relevant.

1. Nothing is gained by America's winning meaningless battles in the cold war, and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed. Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among nations.

The first director of this agency was an American, and his term expired recently. Since, next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, America could have proposed that the next director of the agency be a Russian. Instead, America proposed a Swede, who was not acceptable to the Russians, and since America had the votes she was able to win one more victory in a meaningless battle of the cold war.

All this victory accomplished was to reduce the chances of finding some useful function for this agency, because the Russians resent being pushed around in this agency and there is no way for us to force them to play ball.

I believe that it would be important for the Government to reach a major policy decision, and for the President to issue an Executive order against fighting meaningless battles in the cold war.

We have a cultural exchange program with the Russians but their State Department and our State Department are playing a game of "if you hit our scientists, we shall hit your scientists." Accordingly, our State Department imposes senseless travel restrictions on our Russian colleagues who visit this country. These travel restrictions are not aimed at the safeguarding of any secrets, but are merely a way of hitting back at travel restrictions which the Soviet Government occasionally imposes on American scientists who travel about in Russia.

I believe that representations ought to be made, at as high a level of the administration as is necessary, for the Secretary of State to find some other assignment in the State Department for those who have, up till now, handled the East-West cultural exchange program.

2. I believe that America could and should make unilaterally two crucially important policy decisions and that she should proclaim these decisions.

First of all, America should resolve and proclaim that she would not resort to any strategic bombing of cities or bases of Russia (either by means of atomic bombs or conventional explosives), except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs, or if there is an unprovoked attack with bombs against one of America's allies.

Further, America should make a second policy decision and should proclaim this decision. In order to understand the meaning and relevance of this second decision, it is necessary to consider the following:

Soon after the war, when Russia did not as yet have any atomic bombs, she proposed that the bomb be outlawed. This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs, either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases, or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently, Sulzberger of the New York Times discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of such unilateral pledges, renouncing the use of the bomb. Khrushchev said, on this occasion, that if there were a war, even if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force must no longer be victory. The objective must only be to make a conquest difficult and expensive.

If force is used then an all-out war, which neither side wants, can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory, or anything approaching victory.

Keeping this point of view in mind, America could and should adopt the policy that, in case of war, if she were to use atomic bombs against troops in combat, she would do so only on her own side of the prewar boundary.

In case of war America would then be bound by a pledge to this effect as long as Russia imposed a similar restraint on her conduct of the war.

Manifestly, this type of use of atomic bombs would be a defensive operation and moreover, it would be a very effective defensive operation, either on the part of Russia or on the part of America, as long as the restraints remain in effect on both sides.

Such a pledge would be no less clear than the simple pledge renouncing the use of the bomb, but it would be much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge. And if neither side aimed at anything approaching victory, then it would substantially reduce the danger of an all-out war.

When I discussed this issue in Germany 3 years ago, people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder-Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs. I do not know to what extent West German cities could be spared by a judicious tactical use of atomic bombs by American forces, but I do know that if America were to use bombs beyond the prewar boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

Recently, the United Nations Assembly vetoed with a more than two-thirds majority, 55 against 20, to outlaw the use of atomic bombs in war. The use of atomic bombs in warfare was declared by the Assembly to be a crime and a violation of the United Nations Charter.

Since the machinery of the United Nations was set up for the purpose of maintaining peace among the smaller nations, assuming the cooperation of the great powers to this end, attempts to regard a two-thirds vote of the Assembly as legally binding must necessarily fail. Still the United States must not fly in the face of world opinion and simply disregard the vote of the General Assembly, when a two-thirds vote of the Assembly expresses the legitimate concern of the great majority of the nations that the use of atomic bombs in warfare might lead to a world catastrophe. Rather, out of respect for world opinion and in its own interest, the United States ought to go as far toward complying with it, as valid considerations for its own security permit. The restrictions on the use of atomic bombs in case of war which I am advocating, are advocated with this end in view.

Western Europe is not inferior to Russia either in manpower or in resources and it would be possible for Western Europe to build up within 5 years conventional forces to the point where it could renounce the use of atomic bombs against troops in combat in case of war. But even this would be to no avail unless the nations involved give up any thought of fighting limited wars for "limited objectives" and resort to force only to make a conquest difficult and, with luck, to prevent it.

As long as there is no agreement providing for arms control, and Russia remains in possession of large stockpiles of bombs, America has no choice but to maintain a strategic atomic striking force. However, it should maintain such a force only as protection against America or her allies being attacked with bombs. The number of bombs retained for this purpose need not be very large, and more important than the number of bombs retained is the invulnerability of the bases from which they would be launched. If these bases are invulnerable, so that no single massive attack against them could substantially damage America's ability to retaliate, then America needs to retain only enough bombs to be able to destroy in retaliation a substantial number of Russia's cities, after giving due notice to permit their orderly evacuation.

It must be made clear, however, that if America adopts the policy here advocated, she thereby renounces the threat of strategic bombing as a general deterrent because she could then make this threat only in case Russia would drop bombs, and drop them on our side of the prewar boundary.

I, personally, do not believe that America would lose much by giving up the threat of strategic bombing, because the deterrent effect of such a threat is negligible unless the threat is believable.

If America were to threaten to drop bombs on a large number of Russian cities in case of war, knowing full well that Russia would retaliate by dropping bombs on a large number of American cities, such a threat would be tanamount to a threat of murder and suicide. The threat of murder and suicide would not be a believable threat in the context of the so-called Berlin crisis, nor would it be a believable threat in the context of any other similar conflict in which America's rights and interests may be at stake, but not America's existence as a nation.

Those responsible for the planning of strategy in the Department of Defense would concede this much.

According to persistent press reports there is, however, an increasingly influential school of thought in the Department of Defense which holds that, in case of war with Russia, America may engage in strategic bombing, aimed at the destruction of Russian rocket bases and strategic air bases. America would not bomb any of Russia's cities if she can help it, as long as Russia did not bomb any of America's cities.

This school of thought holds that, at present, Russia does not have many long-range rocket bases and strategic air bases, that the location of many of these bases is known, and that most of them are vulnerable and could be destroyed by attacking them with bombs. By building enough long-range solid-fuel rockets (Minutemen) and submarines capable of launching intermediate range solid-fuel rockets (Polaris) America may be able to keep ahead in this game for the next 5 years.

Those who advocate such a policy believe that if America should succeed in knocking out, say, 90 percent of Russia's strategic atomic striking forces, then the Russians would probably speak to us as follows: "We have enough rockets left to destroy a large number of American cities, but we know that if we did this America may retaliate by destroying all of our cities. Therefore, we are going to hold our fire and we propose to negotiate peace. We concede that the power balance has now shifted in America's favor and we are now willing to yield on a number of issues on which we took an inflexible stand prior to the outbreak of hostilities." If this were to happen America would have won a victory even though it may be a victory in a limited sense of the term only.

Naturally if there is a war and America resorts to the bombing of bases in Russia, one could not expect the Russians to sit idly by and watch America picking up step by step one base after another. It follows that America would have to start the strategic bombing of Russian bases with a sudden, massive attack and to try to destroy all vulnerable Russian bases of known location, in the first attack.

There are, of course, people in the Department of Defense who have serious doubts that America would actually carry out such a first strike against bases, in case of war, yet they believe that—at the present juncture—it is a good thing to threaten to bomb Russian bases in case of war because this is a more believable threat than the threat of "murder and suicide."

I do not know just how believable this threat is, but I do know that at best we are purchasing an increased restraint on Russia's part for a year or two, and that we are purchasing it at a very high price. For whether we adopt such a strategy or merely give Russia the impression that we have adopted such a strategy, we are provoking an all-out atomic arms race and may within a very few years reach the point of no return, in this regard.

Therefore, I believe that it is imperative to oppose: (a) the adoption of plans which call for a first strike against Russian rocket and strategic air bases in case of war, and (b) the adoption of the policy of "deterring" Russia, with the threat that America would resort to such a first strike in case of war. I believe that the rejection of both these policies is an attainable political objective because there is considerable doubt within the administration of the wisdom of these policies.

3. America could and should resolve that atomic bombs and the means suitable for their delivery, which are supplied by her and which are stationed in Europe, shall remain in the hands of American military units which are under American command, rather than be placed under the control of NATO. As long as America is committed to defend Western Europe, there is no valid argument for turning over bombs to the control of other Western European nations.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the U.S. Government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of balancing any such pressure by bringing domestic political counterpressure to bear on the government.

America should stand firm in opposing the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs by Germany as well as the production of means suitable for their delivery.

It is conceivable, of course, that all attempts to achieve arms control may fail and that in the end it will not be within the power of the United States to prevent Germany from producing its own bombs and rockets. At about the same time the United States may however also free herself from her commitments to defend Germany against external military intervention. But we are not concerned at this point with developments that may conceivably occur in the unpredictable future.

4. Not every issue can be solved by Congress passing a law, and there are borderline issues where political action alone can bring no solution because the specific knowledge is lacking of how to go about the solution. The issue of general disarmament seems to be such a borderline issue.

I believe that, at the present time, little could be gained by bringing pressure on the administration to enter into formal negotiations with Russia on the issue of general disarmament, because—as they say, "You can lead a horse to the water, but you can't make him drink."

I believe that no substantial progress can be made toward disarmament until Americans and Russians first reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

American reluctance to seriously contemplate general disarmament is largely due to

uncertainty about this point. If it became clear that a satisfactory solution of this issue is possible, many Americans may come to regard general disarmament as a highly desirable goal.

On the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world, progress could probably be made reasonably fast, through nongovernmental discussions among Americans and Russians. I believe that such discussions ought to be arranged through private initiative, but with the blessing of the administration.

The Russians know very well that America is not ready seriously to contemplate general disarmament and this, to my mind, explains why, in spite of being strongly motivated for disarmament, the Russian Government displays in its negotiations on this issue much the same attitude as does the American Government. As far as negotiations on disarmament are concerned, hitherto both governments have been mainly guided by the public relations aspect rather than by the substantive aspect of the issue.

The Soviet Union's attitude might change overnight, however, if it became apparent that America was becoming seriously interested in disarmament.

The Russians are very much aware of the economic benefits they would derive from disarmament, and I believe that the Soviet Union would be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it. It stands to reason that this should be so for the Soviet Union spends on defense an even larger fraction of her industrial output than America does.

America is at present committed to protect certain territories which are located in the geographical proximity of Russia. In the case of general disarmament, America would not be able to live up to any such commitments. Disarmament would therefore be politically acceptable to America only if it is possible for her to liquidate her present commitments—without too much loss of prestige and without seriously endangering the interests of the other nations involved.

Khrushchev seems to be very much aware of this. Therefore, if it came to serious negotiations on the issue of disarmament, and if it became manifestly necessary to reach a political settlement in order to permit America to liquidate her military commitments, then the Soviet Union might go a long way toward seeking an accommodation.

5. General disarmament may, if we are lucky, eliminate war, but it would not end the rivalry between America and Russia.

It is a foregone conclusion that American efforts toward creating an orderly and livable world will be frustrated in Southeast Asia and Africa because of our failure to devise forms of democracy which would be viable in these regions of the world. The task of devising forms of democracy which would be suitable to the needs of such areas is not a task that the Government can handle. Various forms of democracy may have to be devised which are tailor made to fit the various areas. A major private group could tackle and ought to tackle this problem. If it is not solved, more and more underdeveloped nations may become dictatorships; some of them may have a rapid succession of dictator after dictator and, in the end, the people may have to choose between chaos and communism.

It is a foregone conclusion that America's efforts to raise the standard of living of underdeveloped nations may be frustrated in those areas where the birth rate is high, infant mortality is high, and there is little arable land left. Improvement in the standard of living will initially lead to a fall in infant mortality, and if the birth rate remains high, the population will shoot up so rapidly that economic improvements will not be able to catch up.

Our failure to develop biological methods of birth control, suitable for the needs of such areas, is responsible for this state of affairs. The development of such methods is not a task which the Government can undertake. The Government could not create research institutes which would attract scientists who are ingenious and resourceful enough to come up with an adequate solution. A major private group could and should tackle this problem.

If it should turn out that it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which reasonable people could generally agree, and if these objectives could count on the all-out support of a sizable and dedicated minority, then I should be impelled to go further, and I would plan to go further along the following lines:

I would ask about 15 distinguished scientists to serve as fellows of a council which might be called Council for Abolishing War or perhaps Council for a Livable World. The fellows (who are all scientists) would elect the board of directors, but membership on the board would not be restricted to scientists.

This council would first of all, assemble a panel of political advisors, and then in close consultation with these advisors, it would formulate two sets of objectives. To the first set belong those objectives which cannot be attained at the present time through political action because it would take further inquiry, and perhaps even real research to know, in concrete terms, what needs to be done. To the second set belong those objectives which can be pursued through political action because it is clear what needs to be done.

The fellows of the council would set up a research organization aimed at the pursuit of the first set of objectives, and they would elect the trustees of that organization. The fellows of the council would also set up a political organization aimed at the pursuit of the second set of objectives, and they would elect the board of directors of that organization. Because one of the major functions of the second organization would be to lobby, we may refer to it for our purposes as the lobby.

The council would hold hearings, perhaps one every 4 months, and would subsequently proclaim in detail the immediate political objectives it proposes to advocate. It would communicate these objectives, perhaps in the form of a series of pamphlets, to all those who are believed to be seriously interested. Those who regularly receive the communications of the council would be regarded as members of the movement, if they are willing actively to support at least one of the several specific objectives proclaimed by the council.

It seems to me that there is no need to enlist those who are interested as members of an organiaztion. What one needs to create is not a membership organization, but a movement.

The articulate members of the movement would be expected to discuss the relevant issues with editors of their newspaper and various columnists and other opinion makers in their own community. They would be expected to write to, and in other ways keep in touch with, their Congressman and the two Senators of their own State.

One of the functions of the lobby would be to help the members of the movement clarify their own minds on the political objectives they wish actively to support.

The members of the movement would be regarded as pledged to vote in the primaries as well as in the elections. As far as Federal elections are concerned, they would be pledged to cast their vote, disregarding domestic issues, solely on the issue of war and peace.

The members of the movement would be regarded as pledged annually to spend 2 percent of their income on campaign contributions. The members would be asked to make out a check payable to the recipient of the campaign contribution but to mail that check to the Washington office of the lobby for transmission. In this manner the lobby would be in a position to keep track of the flow of campaign contributions.

Those in high income brackets may be left free to contribute 3 percent after taxes rather than 2 percent before taxes.

All members of the movement would be free to wear an emblem that would identify them as members of the movement, if they wish to do so.

Those who cannot spend 2 percent of their income on campaign contributions may regard themselves as supporters of the movement if they spend either 1 percent of their income or $100 per year, according to their preference. Such supporters of the movement may receive the advice and guidance of the lobby on the same terms as the members of the movement.

So that each member of the movement may know where his contribution should go, in order to be most effective in furthering the political objectives which he has chosen to pursue, the lobby would keep in touch with each member. The lobby would keep the members informed about the particular contests for seats in Congress which are of interest to the movement; but it may advise one member to take an interest in one of these contests and another member to take an interest in another of these contests.

For covering the operating expenses of the lobby and the research organization (which would be maintained independently from an operated parallel to the lobby), one would look to the members of the movement. Each year a certain group of the members would be asked by the lobby to contribute 2 percent of their income to it, rather than to spend it for political contributions. One year this group might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "C." Another year it might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "R," etc.

The movement must not wield the power that it may possess crudely. People in Washington want to be convinced, they do not want to be bribed or blackmailed. He who gives consistently financial support to certain key Members of Congress, may evoke their lasting friendship and may count on their willingness to listen to him as long as he talks sense. He who talks to Members of Congress, but does not talk sense, will not accomplish anything of lasting value, even if he temporarily sweeps some Members of Congress off their feet by making huge political contributions to them.

There are many intelligent men in Congress who have insight into what goes on; the movement could help these men to have the courage of their convictions. There are others in Congress who are not capable of such insight; the only thing to do with them is not to return them to Congress, and to replace them with better men. This may make it necessary to persuade better men to run in the primaries and to stand for election. To find such better men must be one of the main tasks of the movement, and the lobby must be prepared to help members of the movement to perform this task.

I did not come here to enlist any of you in such a movement or to launch such a movement. I came here to invite you to participate in an experiment -that would show whether such a movement could be successfully launched.

First of all, I ask each of you to look into your own heart and try to discover whether you yourself would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives—as formulated from

time to time—appeal to you and you thought that the movement could be effective.

Those of you who wish to participate in the experiment are asked to show a copy of this speech to people in your home community who might be interested and to determine who of these would be likely to be part of a dedicated minority that would give all-out support to a movement of the kind I have described.

I would appreciate your writing me, as soon as possible, how many people you have talked to and how many of these and who of these (name and address), you think, could be counted upon.

If the result of this experiment indicates that such a movement could get off the ground, provided it were started in the right way and on a sufficiently large scale, then the Council for Abolishing War would be constituted. Presumably the council would attempt to identify 25,000 individuals who would be willing to make campaign contributions in the amount of 2 percent of their income. Presumably, if the council is successful in this, the fellows of the council would proceed to establish the lobby.

By the time the movement attains 150,000 members it would presumably represent about $20 million per year in campaign contributions or $80 million over a 4-year period.

Whether such a movement could grow further and come to represent not only a decisive amount in campaign contributions but also a significant number of votes, would then presumably depend on the future course of world events.

DISTORTED ATTACK ON U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the May 15, 1962, issue of the Economic Council Letter was brought to my attention recently. It contained such a grossly distorted and blatantly inaccurate attack on the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, that I sent a copy to Mr. Foster, the Agency's Director, for comment. Since other Members of Congress may have seen the letter or received complaint about the Agency from constituents who saw the letter, I ask unanimous consent that the May 15 letter of the Economic Council and the Agency's Council and the Agency's comments on it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter and comments were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., June 4, 1962.

The Honorable JOSEPH S. CLARK,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR CLARK: This is in reply to your letter of May 21 in which you enclosed Economic Council Letter No. 527, dated May 15, 1962, commenting on the Public Law 87-297, the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. I note that the National Economic Council and its president, Mr. Merwin K. Hart, have consistently written disparagingly of many U.S. institutions and policies. It is not surprising, therefore, that now the council is undertaking to attack the new U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. While it is not useful to deal with all the inaccuracies contained in the letter, I believe there are some major inaccuracies which should be made the subject of specific comment.

The first criticism made by the letter is a criticism of the powers given to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The first instance which the letter cites as an exclusive power is: "He may negotiate directly with representatives of other nations, with international organizations, with diplomatic representatives of the United States at home and abroad."

The letter is apparently referring to section 34(a) of the act which provides as follows:

"SEC. 34. Under the direction of the Secretary of State—

"(a) the Director, for the purpose of conducting negotiations concerning arms control and disarmament or for the purpose of exercising any other authority given him by this Act, may (1) consult and communicate with or direct the consultation and communication with representatives of other nations or of international organizations and (2) communicate in the name of the Secretary with diplomatic representatives of the United States in this country and abroad."

I fail to find anything extraordinary in the Congress authorizing an official, who is responsible to the President and the Secretary of State, to conduct negotiations with foreign governments. This authority was requested in the draft bill transmitted by the President and was recommended by the Secretary of State in his testimony in support of the bill. The authority contained in this bill was endorsed by the major high officials of the Eisenhower and Truman administrations who had broad experience with disarmament problems. These include former Secretaries of Defense Robert Lovett and Thomas Gates and former Secretary of State Christian Herter. President Eisenhower himself endorsed the need of an expanded effort in the field of arms control and disarmament as is represented by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

To make perfectly clear how U.S. disarmament policy is made I want to stress that all important policies are decided by the President after thorough discussion by a Committee of Principals which consists of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President's National Security Adviser, the President's Science Adviser, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, and the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Furthermore, you will note that the author of the letter failed to note the proviso in section 33 of the act, which reads as follows:

"SEC. 33. The Director is authorized and directed to prepare for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of such other Government agencies, as the President may determine, recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy: *Provided, however,* That no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States."

The second objection made by the author of the letter is that the Agency, by executive order, may take over the activities and facilities of the Defense Department, including records, property, civilian personnel, and funds. The author of the letter instructs anyone who doubts this to read section 47 of the law. The letter goes on to state, however, that although the Congress might, within 60 days, prevent any such transfer, this provision could be evaded by a transfer ordered when Congress was not in session. Here I believe that the author of the letter should have followed his own advice and read section 47 of the law because 47(b) expressly provides that "No transfer shall be made under this subsection until (1) a full and complete report concerning the nature and effect of such proposed transfer has been transmitted by the President to the Congress, and (2) the first period of 60 calendar days of regular session of the Congress following the date of such report by the Congress has expired without adoption by either House of the Congress of a resolution stating that such House does not favor such transfer. The procedures prescribed in title II of the Reorganization Act of 1949 shall apply to any such resolution." In other words, the statement that such a transfer could be made effective when Congress was not in session is a plain misstatement.

The author of the letter apparently finds objectionable the fact that a disarmament agreement which might be negotiated for presentation to the Senate might include provision for the "elimination of our Army, Navy, and Air Force," and for "the establishment of a United Nations Force." The author's description of such a disarmament agreement is completely in error and has no relationship to anything contemplated by the U.S. Government when he writes: "All that would be left to the people of the United States would be the world police force," and the people of the United States would have "their personal rifles, shotguns, and revolvers, on which free people depend, in the last analysis, for their defense against tyranny, * * * first registered and then seized." In the first place, the U.S. disarmament plan has proposed no such seizure of small arms. In the second place, if freedom could be guaranteed against tyranny by the sole existence of rifles, shotguns, and revolvers, then today the people of Hungary, of East Germany, of Poland, and of other countries would be free. They had such weapons, but the Soviets had tanks, missiles, aircraft, and submarines. These are some of the weapons the Soviet Union has used to suppress freedom. The U.S. disarmament policy is directed toward finding means for achieving peaceful settlement of differences rather than through the use of such arms.

The Economic Council letter does not grasp at all the purpose of a disarmament policy. It does not understand that behind such a policy is the effort to remove the likelihood of a destructive and catastrophic war engulfing the world and destroying our civilization. The author of the letter would have his readers think that only U.S. weapons were being reduced, whereas the program is directed at removing force and aggression as the tools of Soviet states. As the weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States are reduced, and whether the Soviet Union will let us inspect its territory to verify that they have been reduced is still a great obstacle to agreement, the United States contemplates the strengthening of the United Nations. It is firm U.S. policy to work for the use of law rather than force as the major means by which disputes can be settled and this is where the United Nations and its various subsidiary agencies have helped to prevent and stop aggression. Any United Nations peace force established would only be established after the United States, including two thirds of the U.S. Senate, had been satisfied that the political control over such a force in no way jeopardized our national security.

The author of this letter completely overlooks the emphasis which is placed upon the reduction and elimination of those arms which are aimed at the United States by our potential enemies. The adoption of such an attitude would not help the security of the United States; it would put it in greater jeopardy. As President Kennedy said in his United Nations address last fall:

"Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by

madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

"Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons—10 million times more powerful than anything the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth—is a source of horror, and discord, and distrust. Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes, for disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness—for in a spiraling arms race, a nation's security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase."

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM C. FOSTER.

[From the Economic Council Letter, May 15, 1962]

WHAT GOES ON HERE?

On September 26, 1961, an act to establish a U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was signed into law (Public Law 87–297) by the President. The National Economic Council was one of the first to write about this in council letter No. 512, October 1, 1961.

If there is a more dangerous law on the statute books, the National Economic Council is unaware of it. It should be repealed forthwith.

Because the law covers more than 8 pages and its provisions are set forth in legal verbiage, requiring puzzling out by the average mind, its dangerous implications are not readily grasped. Perhaps many of the Senators and Representatives voting for the act did not fully see its potentials.

The Director of this Disarmament Agency, under the direction of the Secretary of State, is clothed with enormous and unprecedented powers, which may be augmented by Executive orders.

He may negotiate directly with representatives of other nations, with international organizations, with diplomatic representatives of the United States at home and abroad.

The Agency, by Executive order, may take over the activities and facilities of the Defense Department, including records, property, civilian personnel, and funds. You doubt this? Read section 47 of the law.

While it is true that Congress may, within 60 days, exercise its veto power on certain acts of the Agency, it is possible that transfers may be ordered while Congress is not in session. The law must be read and studied before its full significance can be comprehended. For example, the law defines the terms "arms control" and "disarmament" as meaning "the identification, verification, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, or elimination of Armed Forces and armaments of all kinds." During the debate in the House an endeavor was made to strike out the word "elimination," as its inclusion could result in the United States being left without any Armed Force whatever. The endeavor failed (80 noes, 52 ayes). Where were the rest of the Members?

In short, the Agency may well be called, in the words of Representative ASHBROOK, of Ohio, the "surrender agency." In its potentials, it permits the signing away of some of our essential sovereign rights, it authorizes the transfer of our atomic energy plants, it permits the elimination of our Army, Navy, and Air Force, it envisages the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force, it points, of course, to vast unemployment and consequent depression, coupled with the toughest of reemployment problems.

The very existence of this Agency calls loudly for every citizen to use all possible legitimate means to induce his Congressman and two Senators to go about wiping this ill-conceived law from the statute books, if we are to remain a free and sovereign people. It's as important as that.

Under this act the people of the United States could be completely disarmed. Their Army, Navy, and Air Force could be taken from them. Their personal rifles, shotguns, and revolvers, on which free people depend, in the last analysis, for their defense against tyranny, would be first registered and then seized.

All that would be left to the people of the United States would be the world police force. But that police force would be directed by the United Nations. The Congress and the legislatures of the States—indeed, the President of the United States himself—would have no say in the matter.

And the United Nations would not leave its interests in the United States to American police, for such police units might side with American citizens. The police units stationed in the United States would be made up from other countries, say, from Russia, Red China, India, Cuba, the Congo, and Ghana. How will you like that, Mr. and Mrs. American Citizen and American boy and girl? But once this situation comes it will make no difference whether you like it, or not. It will be fastened on you. And your children's children will exist under it.

So the time to act is now. The time to get mass action is on Independence Day—on July 4 next. The Arms Control and Disarmament Act must be repealed. Write to Theodore Jackman, Post Office Box 9517, St. Petersburg, Fla., sending 15 cents for one copy of his broadside, containing much information. Send $1 and get seven copies. Call a small meeting of thoughtful citizens of your community and plan to take action. What action? It will come to you when you read this broadside.

Incidentally, you will note from this broadside whether your Congressman and your two Senators voted for or against this act. If against, ask one of them to be the speaker at a public meeting; if for, ask some other strong public man to speak.

Every candidate for either House of Congress from your district or State must know how you feel.

This disarmament act must be repealed.

CONTEST WITHOUT WAR

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, William Ernest Hocking, Alford professor emeritus of philosophy, Harvard University, has sent to me a remarkable paper he has written entitled "Footholds: Toward a World Order Allowing Contest Without War." With his permission I should like to share his writing with readers of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, I ask unanimous consent that Professor Hocking's paper and the covering letter which he wrote to me be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article and letter were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MADISON, N.H.,
April 30, 1962.

Hon. JOSEPH S. CLARK,
Senator from Pennsylvania,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CLARK: You have been calling for fresh and constructive thinking about ways to achieve peace. You have stated eight premises, and mentioned certain areas for discussion. You have spoken of the climate of opinion in this country, as needing improvement.

In my judgment, you are sounding just the right note. And what is needed is not a mass of technical literature, but a very plain grouping of the judgments on which a way out of the intricacies over which we could stumble into a meaningless war can be shown. This I have tried to do, and I submit it as a partial response to your call.

Yours very truly,

WILLIAM E. HOCKING.

FOOTHOLDS

(By W. E. Hocking)

PREFACE

Raison d'etre

Civilized humanity is today drifting toward a war which no one wants and no one could win.

One might comment on the absurdity of this situation, if it were not a threat of the utmost tragedy; the most powerful civilization the world has known, powerful in mental command and technical equipment, devoid of a clear plan for escaping self-destruction.

Why?

The root trouble—I risk the assertion—is in the morals of our high mentality—our willingness to assume that we know what the war, if it came, would be about, when in fact we do not know. And we lack the moral force to face our confusion and fight our way through to truth. There is no issue which a war could settle.

We know well enough the names of the opposing parties, their banners, their slogans—compact names for opposing beliefs in economy, politics, philosophy—and we assume that we know the world purpose of our opponent as involving our own compulsory acceptance of his ideology. Refusing this putative compulsion, in the name of liberty versus dictatorship, we think we have a sufficient casus belli.

We are uneasily aware that party-names and banners have to be compact commoncoin; that actual issues are thus oversimplified. We are somewhat less on our guard as to the need that a banner adopt an ideal as a party perquisite, an object of exclusive virtue and loyalty; these banner labels cannot stop to note the limiting conditions of validity (as of liberty unlimited) nor to confess sheltered self-interests snuggling under the flag of the ideal. Each moves toward presenting its case to the world, and incidentally to itself, as the all good versus the all evil. Such a situation, if it were actual, would still hardly condone a war of annihilation, though it might ease the concept: but to believe it actual requires an abeyance of thought.

The chief source, however, of our present confusion is elsewhere. There is, indeed, a conflict of ideologies; but with that, a conflict of cliques-and-methods, the tactics by which the opposing groups undertake to put their ideologies into effect. The word "communism" has in many quarters almost lost interest as a type of social-economic organization, coming to stand primarily for a certain strategy of expansion which offends our principles of fair play. We disapprove of the ideology, but we are not proposing to settle accounts with it by war; what we propose to fight is "the gang" and its methods.

We confuse our thinking by the assumption that communism is identified with this method of advancing its cause. With a moment's reflection we recall that the association is historical, not intrinsic. Communism appears in this century as a party of revolution, inheriting the ethic of an up-hill fight, confronting not a ballot-box rejection but an avowed will to destroy the movement root-and-branch. As a matter of life and death, a revolutionary party is likely to reply with all the methods of political realism, of cunning, cruelty, deceit. It attempts to enforce acceptance of its ideology, creating by terror a false unanimity of opinion; it demands the obsequious services of artists and men of letters; it resorts at heed to banishment and assassination. It creates, in

brief, the police state, as long as its own survival is threatened by an opponent whom it regards as equally unprincipled and far more hypocritical.

In our abhorrence of these methods, we incline to treat communism as a block-phenomenon whose ideology is completely disposed of, for all decent citizens, by the procedures of its advance, supported by its theory of class war, and its appeal to revolution in its own classics.

For us of today, the strife we have to deal with is thus twofold: it is a conflict of ideologies; but it is also a conflict of the groups or "gangs" and their modes of action, their principles or lack of principle.

And the current attempts to deal with this strife fall into two classes showing different types of futility. There are those who argue it out with the contrasting ideologies, as if they were the whole issue, easing the whole picture into an academic frame, as in a Platonic dialogue. And there are those who deal solely with the gangs-and-methods, assuming the crimes of revolution inherent in the ideology, and condemning in advance anyone who so much as lends an ear to the reprobate point of view. Both of these attempts, I say, are futile. But the second, closing in advance any possibility of cure, is incapable of recognizing actualities. Erich Fromm rightly calls this temper pathological.

I shall follow neither of these programs. I shall begin with the ideologies-in-action, developing their own self-criticism through experience. I shall then propose a method of interaction which can supplant the distemper of the revolutionary upsurge, a way to contest without war.

But this effort, as of today, must not involve another learned treatise, another opportunity for confusion. The immediate need is for a wide and general clarity, a singling out of the underlying simplicities, the grounds of necessary agreement which underlie every actual contest, and a method of workout for the residual and very real issues, a method compatible with world order.

I shall here try to outline those few commonsense footholds, practically self-evident, which can provide an arena for orderly contest and judgment.

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.

APRIL 30, 1962.

FOOTHOLDS TOWARD A WORLD ORDER ALLOWING CONTEST WITHOUT WAR

I. Every ideology, when put into practice on a national scale, is changed by experience.

This holds good whether or not such changes are acknowledged by authorities committed to an orthodoxy. For experience—as distinct from outside criticism—brings about one's own discovery of faulty premises, or of faulty apprehension of the ideas involved, and so initiates the process of self-correction.

(Self-correction is at the basis of that type of change or development of ideas sometimes called "dialectic").

II. As a result, there is in the world today, on a national scale, no pure communism and no pure capitalism.

The U.S.S.R. economy approaches a state capitalism—as all industrializing involves a conservative accumulation of capital and a study of personal incentive. The U.S. economy, with graduated income tax, New Deal legislation, compulsory contribution to "social security" * * * approaches in various respects a "welfare state."

In brief, all working economies are "mixed economies"; the originally hostile ideologies, without losing contrast of principle, tend to converge, a most striking history of unintended rapprochement.

III. In view of this convergence, pure hostility—the all-good-versus-all-evil attitude—is no longer even intelligent.

Pure evil, if we can find it, deserves no toleration, still less appeasement: all that is decent in us revolts against compromising with corruption for the sake of peace. But the will to find pure evil—indulging the luxury of condemnation—may be equally vicious. No great power can today intelligently devote itself to the political extinction of its ideological opponent, engaged as that opponent must be—and verifiably is—in the inexorable process of learning from experience.

The alternative, accepted coexistence, experimental and competitive, becomes the rational basis of policy, at the moment when it has become the necessary basis, since nuclear war has become an intolerable resort, an uncivilized threat.

The ideal of requiring unconditional surrender, implied by the demand to push the cold war to the point of victory, thus calling out the maximum of fear and disposition to preventive attack, involves the maximum of fallacy, and of provocation—a perfect example of the Roman adage, optima corrupta pessima, "the corruption of the best becomes the worst." (summa jus summa injuria).

IV. It follows at once, in direct challenge to current assumptions—that no great power can, in sober realism, entertain the goal of world conquest.

This goal is radically different from the "world revolution" of traditional Marxian eschatology, a proletarian overturn from within. But the vision of world-sway still animates the expensive urge of Communist policy—legitimate enough, provided the means used are open competitive persuasions rather than force or fraud. The myth of world triumph is the normal utopia of every warmly held political ideal; the nature of that vision excludes the notion of military conquest as a fit means for making an ideal prevail.

But my present point—in full view of the enormous military preparations on both sides, and also of the catch-as-catch-can methods of Communist advance—is that no great power, thinking through the actual position of a world conqueror, can in sober realism want it. The facts of experimental change, just reviewed, undermine the conviction of finality essential to the intent of world conquest. And, in addition, the following considerations make themselves felt:

The problem of administration on a world scale present obstacles no government is prepared to meet. It suffices to imagine the U.S.S.R. undertaking to administer the United States, whether before or after a nuclear holocaust.

The self-interest of each competitor, during the experimental period, calls for the continuing existence of its opposite number, as a source of critical ideas and techniques. Obviously, the conquest of either competitor by the other would at once terminate the competition, with its independent experiments. But further, the actual lively concern for scientific, technical, cultural exchange implies that neither opponent wishes the elimination of the other.

And since in the present confrontation, world conquest means the destruction of one competitor, the play of brinkmanship, indulged in by both, holds itself carefully from actual explosion, even if destruction were not self-destruction: the play is permeated with a pathological insincerity. The 'aim at world conquest' is a synthetic nightmare.

V. Once the sham of world conquest is disposed of, the vicious circle of the arms race is potentially broken.

That circle I have elsewhere formulated as follows: communism must be destroyed, because, for communism, capitalism must be destroyed. And for communism, capitalism must be destroyed, because, for capitalism, communism must be destroyed.[1]

Both premises now disappear. The arms race becomes an intolerable masquerade.

In point of fact, the perilous poise of complete readiness to strike, without striking, indicates the presence of an effective inhibition toward authorship of mass ruin: let us say a factor within the psychological reality of a will-not-to-destroy, to that extent, however subordinate, an element of world peace in action.

And the presence of this fragmentary motive contains the promise of the possibility of world law. The hope for a working international law, rendered difficult by the absence of a common world-custom, world-tradition—the historical background which Savigny rightly demands for an effective code—has led to the assumption that international law can be excogitated from general ethical principles, and that we can thus gain "World Peace Through World Law." But law can have no hold on minds not moved by the dignity as well as the fragility of the civilization so far achieved on both sides of the line. We must rather reach world law through world peace. And of that peace, we have a glimpse in this inhibition, which implies common agreement on coexistence and the conditions of intercourse and experiment.

VI. The cancellation of world conquest as an objective calls for an affirmative technique for advance beyond the stage of denunciatory confrontation. Coexistence implies not only the right to carry on the ideological experiment, each for itself, but a mutual interest in the progress of each experiment: the experiment is by each party, but it is for mankind.

A state of cultural tension has been historically a frequent perhaps normal, condition of thinking humanity (though never before has such tension enjoyed the advantage of such clear-cut ideological definition, extended more or less vaguely to the thinking masses). The outcome of such tensions has frequently been a synthesis, a union of opposing ideas—with correction—more significant than either alone.[2] The dialectical self-corrections of experience frequently result in unintended syntheses: our "mixed economies" are cases in point, in effect tentative syntheses; so also the set of principles proposed by Sun Yat Sen in his San Min Chu I, now honored alike by Mao Tse-tung's China and a new postage stamp issued by Uncle Sam, none less. But syntheses cannot be aimed at; they must arrive as hypotheses, subject to the test of experience. And they imply an intimate acquaintance by each of the experiment of the other.

The most effective and available instruments of advance are exchanges in the personnel of the sciences and arts, and conferences across boundaries.

VII. For significant experiment in the field of the existing opposition of ideologies, there are certain postulates to be observed.

We note that the opposition is not simply economic: it affects the entire area of human life—politics, ethics, the meaning of history, law, religion, the liberty of the arts—an ideology is a composite social directive, with its own uniting esprit de corps. And obviously, deliberate experiment on a national scale, and in full view of other nations, is not feasible over this whole range. Obviously, also, it will involve the political arm.

Recalling that a nation, by its nature, is an experiment in lawmaking, an individual experiment having its own flavor, the political arm may fairly undertake experimental alterations in the national institutions, subject to these conditions:

a. Imposing ideas, beliefs, sentiments by political power is a self-defeating enterprise,

[1] Strength of Men and Nations," 128, 182 f.

[2] Cf. Henry A. Murray's important discussion in Daedalus, summer 1961, p. 556 ff., under the heading "Unprecedented Evolutions."

at once a violation of human dignity and an insured futility. It is the chronic illusion of political power that it can compel belief.

b. The state may, however, undertake experiments in the field of overt action; and an experiment requires unanimity of action pro tempore, within the implied behavior; and with the possibility that the experience may induce changes of opinion. (The attempt to regulate agriculture is a case in point, in which the political arm itself may have something to learn.)

c. Divergent experiments on opposite sides, pertinent to the present conflict, must have as one aim, to determine the area of necessary agreement, with the understanding that no opposition can be total.

VIII. The sciences have become the natural center of this technique of exchange and conference across boundaries. For here the necessary agreements are most obvious and most central. The instruments of all social action, whether of economy or war, depend for their success on a valid scientific groundwork; and the radical advances in the physical sciences connected with the names of Max Planck, Niels Bohr, Lorentz, Einstein, have compelled all human techniques of contention to come to unity on their terms.[3]

There was at one time an official Soviet psychology (centered on Pavlov) and an official Soviet biology (Lysenko). But the compulsions of the competition itself have established unity of technique in these fields. Joint conferences, such as those begun at Pugwash, tend to extend this area. The techniques underlying industry, and involving property, yield agreement less readily, but the yield (as in agriculture, in which U.S.S.R. has often welcomed the sharing of methods, from the time of the early efforts in dryfarming to the recent exchanges on the arts of raising corn).

Though an ideology is in one sense a philosophy, and an area of necessary agreement in philosophy would be most effective, rapprochement is here most difficult; and yet also visible, as when "dialectical materialism," strongly disturbed by new concepts of matter, considers whether matter is "autodynamic." Conferences between philosophers, across boundaries, are under consideration, not with the idea of eliminating differences, but with the idea of defining them.

IX. Experimental mixtures of the commune-and-authoritative with the individualist-and-free will not be limited to the major contestants. They must be in order in wide variety, and under a wide range of political backgrounds.

Hence the notion of throwing around the Western Hemisphere a cordon sanitaire from which Socialist ingredients are to be excluded becomes incongruous. Monroe Doctrines are not qualified to exclude ideas, nor experiments with ideas.

Nor can the United States in accord with its own professions impose its system on others, whether affirmatively or by ostracizing its counterpart. Nor can it limit their liberty to undertake experiments of their own choice, assuming that the choice is genuinely their own, and not in turn imposed from outside.

Further, with the vanishing of the shooting-war relation between the opposing types of order, there arises a question whether the proportion of the authoritarian to the individualist may be a function of the stage of development in which a given community stands, rather than an absolute ideal for all states.

X. The ultimate, and most effective, foothold remains to be stated.

[3] Cf. the series of "Studies in Soviet Thought" published by D. Reidel Publishing Co. of Dordrecht, for the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.

The central difficulty in all diplomacy is the problem of the motivation of the opponent. The most reasonable of proposed settlements may be hopeless because of the factors of suspicion and hostility on one side or both. It is almost a fixed habit of the professional diplomat to assume that the motivation of his opponent is a fixed quantity: he represents "the enemy," period.

For any emergence from the present impasse, the indispensable postulate is that the motives of opponents are capable of change in view of the necessary interests, hence agreements, of human beings. The one hopeless foreign policy is that which demands victory over an opponent assumed unchangeably perverse. It is devoid of the one quality capable of effect, the power and will to remake the motives of the antagonist, by way of certitudes necessarily universal, but capable of being invoked only by one who himself is aware of them, ceasing to be the diplomat and becoming for the moment the plain human being with the full sense of good-and-evil as the core of everyman's consciousness, immediately shareable. (And particularly with a willingness to admit the errors of one's own past misdirected hostilities.) (The "Spirit of Camp David" was no illusion; while it lasted it contained the possibility of changing history.)

On the basis of such shared certitudes creative risks can be taken including the risk attending unilateral rejection of nuclear tests—not otherwise. This means that the ultimate power in the field of foreign policy must be personal, and find its place in person-to-person encounter. The ultimate effort is to change motives, so that rational coexistence becomes possible; and that effort must never be surrendered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

PEACE CORPS IN TANGANYIKA

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I noticed in yesterday's Washington Post a two-paragraph story that indicated a considerable amount of criticism in Tanganyika, Africa, relating to the Peace Corps. I am happy to report this morning that I have a letter from the Director of the Peace Corps, Robert Shriver, which reads as follows:

DEAR SENATOR HUMPHREY: You probably saw the attached two-paragraph story in today's Washington Post. I think you will be interested in seeing the full Reuters dispatch which the Post did not carry.

I am also attaching some additional material which may interest you. It underscores the fine reception the Peace Corps has received in Tanganyika. In fact, ministers of the Government of Tanganyika have asked us to send approximately 75 additional volunteers, of which the Peace Corps has agreed to supply 30 nurses and 2 lab technicians this year.

The two paragraphs in the Post this morning gave a completely distorted picture of the situation in Tanganyika, and I wanted you to have the complete story.

Sincerely,

ROBERT SARGENT SHRIVER, Jr.,
Director.

I ask unanimous consent that the two-paragraph story of June 12 in the Washington Post be printed in the RECORD at this point, together with the Reuters dispatches from Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, dated June 12, an article from the Baltimore Sun of Friday, May 18, and another story from Tanganyika, dated June 6, by W. D. Friedenberg, of the Scripps-Howard newspapers.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, June 12, 1962]

PEACE CORPS HIT IN TANGANYIKA

DAR ES SALAAM, TANGANYIKA, June 11.—A vitriolic attack on the U.S. Peace Corps was made here today during a budget debate in Parliament.

John Mwakangale, regional commissioner in the Southern Highlands region, said Peace Corps members are "undermining the Tanganyika Government" and that "wherever they are stationed trouble starts."

DAR ES SALAAM, TANGANYIKA, June 12.—Prime Minister R. M. Kawawa defended the Peace Corps last night against a legislator's charges that the young Americans were stirring up trouble in Tanganyika.

The east African leader told Parliament he had challenged John Mwakangale to back up his charges with evidence but the National Assemblyman could not do so.

Several other Government Ministers rose to the defense of the Peace Corps volunteers. One emphasized the Americans had been officially invited to the country.

Mwakangale, who represents the Mbeya district in southern Tanganyika and is Government agent for the region, had complained that there were three Peace Corps workers in his area but none had come to see him.

"Wherever they are, we always hear of trouble," he declared. "You hear of people trying to overthrow the Government. These people are not here for peace. They are here for touble."

Kawawa accused Mwakangale of "irresponsible speech."

[From the Baltimore Sun, May 18, 1962]

PEACE CORPS LIFE RUGGED

(By Joseph R. L. Sterne)

DAR ES SALAAM, TANGANYIKA, May 17.—Wading hipdeep in swamps with hippos snorting behind a curtain of tall grass, riding the Kilombero River in a dugout canoe, palavering with tribal chiefs at sunset after a long day on safari, sleeping under thatch-roofed shelters, getting up in the morning to find a crowd of natives wanting to join the hike because there is safety in numbers in elephant country.

Such is the rugged outdoor life that enlistment in the Peace Corps has brought to two young Americans.

As members of the 35-man team of engineers, surveyors, and geologists who arrived in Tanganyika last September, 22-year-old Thomas Katus, of McIntosh, S. Dak., and 24-year-old Jerry Parson, of Albany, N.Y., are ready, henceforth, to take President Kennedy at his word.

Unlike some Peace Corps teachers in West Africa who have found life comparatively soft, the Tanganyika group has encountered the very hardships Mr. Kennedy talked about when he called for volunteers soon after his inauguration.

FLOODED TRAILS

Two surveyors spent 6 weeks straight in the bush country near the Ruanda-Urundi border. Katus and Parson have gone on several 80-mile hikes along flooded trails. One volunteer, a Japanese-American named Allen Tamura, spent so much time with the Wogogo tribe that he will become an honorary member when the chief gets around to killing a goat.

Yet, for all these challenges not a single man has wanted out. Going quietly about their job in helping with Tanganyika's $2,500,000 feeder-road program, they have earned the quiet gratitude of this country's

To Dan M. Singer

corrected

Leo Szilard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

Jan 9/62

~~November 15~~, 1961

ARE WE ON THE ROAD TO WAR?
by Leo Szilard

For a number of years now, you have had an opportunity to observe how we, as a nation, respond to the actions of the Russians, and how the Russians respond to our responses. Those of you who have watched closely the course of events in the past six months may have been led to conclude that we are headed for an all-out war. I myself believe that we are, and that our chances of getting through the next ten years without war are slim.

I, personally, find myself in rebellion against the fate that history seems to have in store for us, and I suspect that some of you may be equally rebellious. The question is, what can you do?

War seems indeed to be inevitable, unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present. You, as Americans, are not in a position to influence the Russian government; it follows that you would have to bring about a change in the attitude of the American Government which, in turn, may bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian Government.

It is conceivable that if a dedicated minority were to take effective political action, they could bring about the change in attitude that is needed. But such a minority can take effective action only if it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which it can unite.

I shall try to outline to you tonight a set of political objectives and you shall be the judges of how satisfactory these objectives may be.

Next, I would like to discuss with you what kind of political action it would take to alter the course of events; cause the present danger of war to recede, and to open the door to a constructive effort to abolish war.

To abolish war is a tall order, and I speak of it therefore with reluctance. It has been apparent, however, ever since the end of the war, that the bomb would pose a problem to the world for which there is no precedent and which cannot be solved short of abolishing war.

Ever since the end of the war, the policies of the great powers have consistently followed the line of least resistance, and this line leads to an unlimited arms race.

There have been repeated attempts to stop the arms race by negotiating an agreement that would provide for some form of arms control. So far, all such attempts have failed, and each time they were followed by the continuation of the arms race, with renewed vigor.

2, Leo Szilard, "Are We On the Road to War?"

Towards the end of the Eisenhower Administration, it was generally expected that the next administration would adopt a new approach to this problem and that a fresh attempt would be made to bring the arms race under control.

When Khrushchev was in New York last October, I tried to see him, in the hope of finding out how responsive he might be to such a new approach. I was told that they had scheduled fifteen minutes for me but, as it turned out, the conversation went on for two hours. At that time, it was not known whether Kennedy or Nixon would get elected, and I started off the conversation by saying that no matter who is elected, the Government would try to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of stopping the arms race. Khrushchev answered--and he spoke in all seriousness--that he believed this also.

On November 25 of last year, I checked out of the hospital in New York, where I had been confined for over a year, took a taxi to the airport, and flew to Moscow to attend the 6th Pugwash Conference. I was accompanied by my wife, who is also my doctor, and I stayed on in Moscow for about a month beyond the end of the conference. I stayed on in Mowcow in order to engage in private conversations with our Russian colleagues, because I knew from experience that only in private conversation is it possible to get anything across to them or to discover what they really believe to be true. None of our Russian colleagues brought up the issue of bomb tests in any of these conversations in Moscow, even though two years earlier some of them had been passionately interested in this issue. I found, however, an undiminished interest in far-reaching disarmament which would result in substantial savings. On one occasion, I had tea with Fedorov, the General Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with no one present except my interpreter. I had met Fedorov before and I always got along well with him. On this particular occasion, he spoke to me as follows:

"You must really believe me when I tell you that we want general disarmament. You have seen all this construction work going on in Moscow; it has been going on for many years; still we are not able to catch up with the housing shortage. If we had disarmament, we could not only solve this problem, but many of our other economic problems as well. Also, we could develop other nations on an unprecedented scale. So far, we are building only one hydro-electric dam in Africa--the Aswan Dam in Egypt; if we had disarmament, we could, and we would, build twenty such dams in Africa."

I tried to impress upon our Russian colleagues that the Kennedy Administration would make a serious effort to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of arms control, but that the new Administration would need time--six months and more than six months, perhaps--to find its bearings on this issue and to get organized to deal with it.

When I returned to this country in February, I decided to stay in Washington for a while.

In Washington, my frieds told me that the Government was going to make a sincere effort to reach an agreement with Russia on the cessation of bomb tests and that a reasonable proposal would be made to the Russians on this issue. They would have liked to hear from me that Russia would be likely to accept such a proposal, but coming fresh from Moscow, I had serious doubts on this score.

The Cuban invasion took me by surprise. When I first heard about it, it was not clear, as yet, whether we were going to give air support to the invading Cuban exiles and whether we would, if necessary, send in the Marines also. My immediate reaction was that of alarm, for I believed that if we did any of these things, we would seriously risk war with Russia. I did not think that Russia would try to intervene in the Caribbean area. Nor did I think that the Russians would launch long-range rockets aimed at our cities. I thought, however, that Russia would make some military move elsewhere, perhaps in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it would seem that I was wrong, for Tom Slick of San Antonio, Texas recently disclosed, apparently on good authority, that, if America had openly intervened in Cuba at that point, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

I would not venture to appraise just how close we came to an all-out war on the occasion of the Cuban incident. I am reasonably certain, however, that if our intervention in Cuba had been successful, this would have blocked for many years to come any possibility of reaching an agreement on arms control with Russia. Failure to reach an accommodation on the Berlin issue might, of course, produce the same result.

I would not entirely exclude the possibility of war over Berlin, but to me, it seems more probable that this crisis will be resolved by some uneasy compromise, and that it will not lead to an all-out war. Russia may bring pressure on West Berlin, in order to promote any one of a number of her foreign policy objectives, but, on the larger issue, the issue of Germany, the true interest of America and Russia is the same. The true interest of both is to have Europe politically as stable as possible.

Neither Russia nor America really knows how to accomplish this goal. America may favor certain solutions and Russia may favor certain other solutions; still, it would be rather odd if America and Russia went to war with each other over the issue of what is the best solution for securing the peace in Europe.

I am convinced that the Berlin issue could be satisfactorily resolved by negotiations, but this conviction is based on the belief that there is something that the Russians want that we should be willing to give them, and that there is something that we want that the Russians should be willing to give us in return.

There are many people who do not share this belief. They hold that the Berlin issue was artificially created by Russia for the purpose of humiliating America, for breaking up NATO, and for converting West Germany into a Communist state.

Many people, probably the majority, believe that the Russians are very much like the Nazis; that they have concrete plans for bringing about, one way or another, our total defeat in Europe, and also for subjugating the whole world to their rule.

Many people have a black and white picture of the world; they believe that the nations fall into two classes: the peace-loving nations, and those who are not peace-loving. America, France and England, and generally speaking our allies, including Germany and Japan, are peace-loving nations. Russia and China are not peace-loving nations. Twenty years ago, the situation was somewhat different: at that time, Russia was a peace-loving nation, but Germany and Japan were not.

Many people believe that Russia, by supplying arms on a vast scale to the Chinese Communists, managed to take control of China. They recollect, further, that when American troops, fighting under the flag of the United Nations, crossed the 38th parallel, moved up across North Korea to the Yalu River, and destroyed the hydro-electric power plant which supplied Manchuria with electricity, all at once--and without any provocation--Chinese Communist hordes crossed the Yalu River and thus frustrated the efforts of the United Nations to unify Korea under free elections.

Many people believe that ever since the atomic bomb forced the unconditional surrender of Japan, America has unceasingly tried to rid the world of the bomb, but that all her efforts were frustrated by Russian intransigence.

When I listen to people who hold such views, I sometimes have the feeling that I have lived through all this before and, in a sense, I have. I was sixteen years old when the first World War broke out, and I lived at that time in Hungary. From reading the newspapers in Hungary, it would have appeared that, whatever Austria and Germany did was right and whatever England, France, Russia, or America did was wrong. A good case could be made out for this general thesis, in almost every single instance. It would have been difficult for me to prove, in any single instance, that the newspapers were wrong, but somehow, it seemed to me unlikely that the two nations located in the center of Europe should be invariably right, and that all the other nations should be invariably wrong. History, I reasoned, would hardly operate in such a peculiar fashion, and it didn't take long until I began to hold views which were diametrically opposed to those held by the majority of my schoolmates.

Many of my schoolmates regarded me as something of an oracle because I was able to cope with the mysteries of lower arithmetics which baffled them; some of them asked me one day quite early in the war who would lose the war. I said that I didn't know who would lose the war, but that I thought that I knew

who ought to lose the war. I thought that Austria and Germany, as well as Russia, ought to lose the war. Since Austria and Germany fought on one side, and Russia on the other side, it was not quite clear how this could happen. The fact is, of course, that it did happen.

I am not telling you this in order to impress you with how bright I am. Nobody at sixty can claim to be as bright as he was at sixteen, even though in most cases it is not the intelligence that deteriorates, but the character. The point I am trying to make is that even in times of war, you can see current events in their historical perspective, provided that your passion for the truth prevails over your bias in favor of your own nation.

After the war, when I lived in Berlin, a distinguished friend of mine, Michael Polanyi, asked me one day what I thought ought to be the rule of human conduct regulating the behavior of an individual in society. "Clearly," he said, "you cannot simply ask a man to be generous to other people, for if the other people are mean to him, and if he follows your rule, he will starve to death." "But," said Polani, "perhaps the rule ought to be 'Be 1 percent more generous to people than they are to you.'" This should be sufficient, he thought, because if everyone were to follow this rule, the earth would, step by step, turn into a livable place.

I told him that, to my mind, this would not work at all, because if two people behave the same way toward each other, each is bound to think that he is 30 percent more generous than the other. Clearly, the rule would have to allow for this bias. Perhaps if we were to stipulate as the rule of conduct, "Be 31 percent more generous to the others than they are to you," such a rule might work.

America and Russia are not following any such rule of conduct. Moreover, their bias greatly exceeds 30 percent.

Most Americans apply a yardstick to America's actions which is very different from the yardstick which they apply to Russia's actions. Whenever their bias in favor of their own nations gets into conflict with the truth, the odds are that the bias will prevail. As a result of this, they are not capable of seeing current events in their historical perspective. They may well realize that we are in trouble, but they cannot correctly diagnose the cause of the trouble and therefore, they are not in a position to indicate what the right remedy might be.

The people who have sufficient passion for the truth to give the truth a chance to prevail, if it runs counter to their bias, are in a minority. How important is this "minority?" It is difficult to say at this point, for, at the present time, their influence on governmental decisions is not perceptible.

If you stay in Washington, you may gain some insight into the manner in which important governmental decisions come about; you may get a feel of

what kind of considerations enter into such decisions, and what kind of pressures are at work.

With President Kennedy, new men moved into the Administration. Many of them fully understand the implications of what is going on and are deeply concerned. But, they are so busy trying to keep the worst things from happening, on a day-to-day basis, that they have no time to develop a consensus on what the right approach would be, from the long-term point of view.

There are also a number of men in Congress, particularly in the Senate, who have insight into what is going on and who are deeply concerned, but they lack the courage of their convictions. They may give a lucid analysis of the trouble in private conversations and then at some point or other, they will say: "Of course, I could not say this in public."

In Washington, wisdom has no chance to prevail at this point.

Life Magazine printed an article about me in September which said that I was in Washington trying to find out if there was a market for wisdom. Thereupon, I received a flood of letters from colleges and universities inviting me to give lectures. Most people get some pleasure out of hearing themselves talk, and so do I, yet I did not see much point in going around the country giving talks, if all I had to say was that there was no market for wisdom. Therefore, I declined all these invitations; that is, I declined them all, until Brandeis University invited me to attend a Special Convocation and to receive an honorary doctor's degree. At that point, my vanity got the better of me, and I accepted. At Brandeis, I spoke at dinner informally to the Trustees and Fellows of the University, and this was my closest contact with the grass roots since I moved to Washington--if indeed, you may regard the Trustees and Fellows of Brandeis as grass roots.

I told them at Brandeis that I thought we were in very serious trouble; people asked me what they could do about it, and I had no answer to give.

Is there, indeed, anything that these people--or for that matter I, myself--could do that would make sense?

When I got back to Washington, I started to think about this, and I believe it will be best now if I simply recite to you how my thoughts developed from this point on.

The first thought that came to my mind was that--in cooperation with others--I could try to set up an organization in Washington--a sort of lobby, if you will--which would bring to Washington, from time to time. scholars and scientists who see current events in their historical perspective. These men would speak with the sweet voice of reason, and our lobby could see to it

that they shall be heard by people inside the Administration and also by the key people in Congress.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished scholars and scientists would be heard, but that they would not be listened to, if they were not able to deliver votes.

Would they be listened to if they were able to deliver votes?

The minority for which they speak might represent perhaps ten percent of the votes, and ten percent of the votes alone would not mean very much, just as the sweet voice of reason alone would not mean very much. Still, the combination of ten percent of the votes and the sweet voice of reason might turn out to be an effective combination. And, if the minority for which these men speak were sufficiently dedicated to stand ready not only to deliver votes, but also to make substantial political contributions, then this minority would be in a position to set up the most powerful lobby that ever hit Washington. The problem which the bomb poses to the world cannot be solved except by abolishing war, and nothing less will do. But first of all, we must back away from the war to which we have come dangerously close.

Could such a dedicated minority agree not only on the long-term political objectives which need to be pursued in order to attain a livable world but also on the immediate political objectives which must be pursued in the next couple of years in order to make the present danger of war recede to the point where attention can be focused on the task of abolishing war?

I do not propose to say here much about the long-term objectives, but I want to discuss now a set of immediate political objectives on which a dedicated minority could perhaps unite. Please keep in mind, however, that this is just a first try.

The issue of bomb tests and the issue of bomb shelters are peripheral issues; they are more the symptoms of the trouble we are in than the causes of the trouble.

I would not want to say that a foolish large-scale shelter program might not also become the cause of serious trouble. But still I think that political pressure should not be focused on this issue, and the same holds for the issue of bomb tests.

The central issue which will face the Kennedy Administration is, whether America shall try to retain her strategic striking forces as a deterrent, or whether she shall retain them merely as protection. This issue has been brought into focus by the current Berlin crisis.

Currently, voices are heard demanding that free access to West Berlin shall be defended at all cost. Spokesmen of the Administration emphasize

that, if necessary, we would drop the bomb on Russia. We are told that our atomic striking forces are far superior to those of Russia, that, at this time, Russia has only 50 long-range rockets and only 150 long-range bomber planes, and that we have many more than that, and many people believe that this threat deters Russia from contesting our rights in Berlin.

If we intend to drop our bombs on Russia in case of war and expect Russia to drop her bombs on us, so that both countries would be wholly devastated, then our threat to drop bombs on Russia is tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide.

The threat of murder and suicide is not a believable threat, in the context of the Berlin conflict, and it would not be a believable threat in the context of any other similar conflict.

The threat of dropping bombs on Russia, in case of war, would be a believable threat however if America's strategic striking forces were able to cripple most, if not all, of Russia's rocket and bomber bases by one sudden single blow, and if it were America's intention to "strike first" in case of war.

Opinions differ on how successful such a first strike would be today, and whether the Russian counterblow would demolish twenty, ten, one, or none of our cities.

Be that as it may, the Administration will have to decide whether the strategic striking forces of America shall be maintained in the long run at a level where they would have an adequate first strike capability, and whether America should adopt a "first strike if necessary" policy.

Let us pause for a moment to examine what such a policy would involve. It would involve, first of all, a great increase in the projected number of solid fuel long-range rockets, and the development of more powerful hydrogen warheads for these rockets. This would be necessary because the Russians would, of course, harden their rocket bases.

Secondly, it would involve the manufacture of a large number of rockets that would function as decoys, in order to neutralize the anti-missle missiles, by means of which the Russians may be expected to defend their bases.

Further, since we could not expect to destroy every single Russian base and submarine in a first strike, we would have to embark on a major development program in order to have adequate anti-missile missiles available for the defense of our cities.

And lastly, we would be more or less forced to embark on a shelter program involving an annual expenditure of perhaps $20 billion. The shelters would have to protect not only against fall-out, but also against heat and blast.

The problem of getting the people into the shelters at the right time would probably offer no major obstacle, since if we plan to strike first, the Government should be in a position to get the people to take shelter at the right time.

Only if such defensive measures were included in the program would the maintenance of a first strike capability permit America to retain the bomb as a deterrent.

To me it seems conceivable that America's strategic striking forces could be boosted to the level where, for a limited period of time, they would be capable of an adequate first strike. It is not likely, however, that they could be maintained indefinitely at such a level. Presumably periods when America has a first strike capability would alternate with periods when she does not have such a capability. And if there were a major international crisis during one of the periods when we have a first strike capability, the Government would be under strong pressure to start a preventive war.

The decision to start a preventive war would always be a hard decision for any President to take, particularly since he would never be quite certain just how many of our own cities would be hit. But in certain circumstances, his hand could be forced by a commander of an overseas strategic base, or a submarine capable of launching rockets.

If a commander of a strategic base or a submarine were to drop bombs on, say, three Russian cities, then the Russians would be expected to strike back with all they have, and the President would have no choice but to order an all-out first strike against the bases of the Russians.

A "first strike if necessary" policy would mean an atomic arms race, with the sky as the limit. I do not believe that America could be made secure by trying to keep ahead in such an arms race, and I would be in favor of resisting the adoption of such a policy, if necessary through vigorous political action.

In deciding against such a policy, we must, however, recognize, that if America renounces the "first strike if necessary" policy, she loses the deterrent effect of her strategic striking forces. For, clearly, if these forces are not capable of a first strike against Russian bases, then any threat that America would attack Russia with bombs, in case of war, would be tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide and would, therefore, not be believable.

If America renounces the first strike policy, then the strategic striking forces of America could thereafter function only as protection. If these forces are arranged in such a manner that a sudden attack on them could not substantially reduce their ability to strike a major counter-blow, then these forces may be looked upon as protection against the possibility that America might be attacked with bombs.

A clear policy decision to the effect that America is going to maintain an invulnerable second strike, but would not adopt a "first strike if necessary" policy would leave open the door to an agreement on arms control. This is important, because an agreement on arms control (providing for far-reaching disarmament) is a necessary first step towards abolishing war.

An agreement on arms control would have to involve, however, not only Russia but also China, and it is not likely that negotiations including China may get under way within the next twelve months. It might very well be, therefore, that in the immediate future America would have to take unilateral steps in order to reduce the present danger of an all-out war.

Such unilateral steps are not adequate substitutes for negotiated agreements, and they can carry us only part of the way, but still there are some unilateral steps which need to be taken at the present time. I propose to discuss with you at this point what unilateral steps America could and should take at the present time.

(1). I believe that America could and should make unilaterally two crucially important policy decisions and that she should proclaim these decisions.

First of all, America should proclaim that she would not resort to any strategic bombing of cities or bases (either by means of atomic bombs or conventional explosives), except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs, or if there is an unprovoked attack with bombs on cities or bases of one of America's allies.

Further, America should make a second policy decision and should proclaim this decision. In order to understand the meaning and importance of this second decision, it is necessary to consider the following:

Soon after the war, the Soviet Union proposed that the atomic bomb be outlawed. This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently Sulzberger discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of unilateral pledges, renouncing the use of the bomb. Khrushchev said on this occasion that if there were a war, and if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out, what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force can no longer be victory. The objective can only be to exact a price.

As long as force is used at all, an all-out war which neither side wants, can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory, or anything approaching victory.

Keeping this point in mind, America could and should proclaim that if, in case of war, she were to use atomic bombs against troops in combat, she would do so only on her own side of the pre-war boundary. America would be bound by this pledge in case of war, as long as Russia imposes a similar restraint on her conduct of the war. Manifestly, this type of use of atomic bombs would be a defensive operation.

Such a pledge would be no less clear than the simple pledge renouncing the use of the bomb, but it would be much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge. And if neither side aims at anything approaching victory, then the pledge would greatly reduce the danger of an all-out war.

When I discussed this issue in Germany three years ago, the people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs. I do not know to what extent West German cities could be spared by a judicious tactical use of atomic boms by American forces, but I do know that if America were to use bombs beyond the pre-war boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

(2). America could and should resolve that atomic bombs and the means suitable for their delivery, which are supplied by her and which are stationed in Europe, shall remain in the hands of American military units which are under American command, rather than be placed under the control of NATO. As long as we are committed to defend Western Europe, there is no valid argument for turning over bombs to the control of other Western European nations.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the United States Government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of counterbalancing any pressure by bringing political pressure to bear on the Government.

(3). Nothing is gained by America winning meaningless battles in the cold war and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed. Take the international Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among the nations.

The first director of this Agency, Sterling Cole, is an American, and his term expired recently. Since next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, we could have proposed that the next director of the Agency be a Russian. Instead, we proposed a Swede, who was not acceptable

to the Russians, and since we had the votes we were able to win a victory in a meaningless battle in the cold war.

This "victory" has reduced the chances of finding some useful function for this Agency, because the Russians resent being pushed around and there is no way for us to force them to play ball in this Agency.

I believe that it would be important for the Government to reach a major policy decision, and for the President to issue an Executive Order against fighting meaningless battles in the Cold War. Some political action in support of such an Executive Order might be necessary.

(4). We have a cultural exchange program with the Russians but their State Department and our State Department are playing a game of "if you hit our scientists, we shall hit your scientists." Accordingly, our State Department imposes senseless travel restrictions on our Russian colleagues who visit this country. These travel restrictions are not aimed at the safeguarding of any secrets, but are merely one way of hitting back at travel restrictions which the Soviet Government occasionally imposes on American scientists who travel about in Russia.

The Russians have opened up their country to tourist travel to a considerable extent, and if we wish to encourage this development, as we probably ought to, then American tourists should not be given spying assignments. Tourists make poor spies, and we are losing more than we are gaining by trying to use them as spies.

I believe that representations ought to be made, at as high a level of the Administration as is necessary.

(a) for the Secretary of State to find some other assignment in the State Department for those who have, up till now, handled the East-West Cultural Exchange Program;

(b) for the President to issue an Executive Order to the CIA directing it to refrain from approaching those who go to Russia as tourists.

(5). Not every issue can be solved by Congress passing a law, and there are borderline issues where political action alone can bring no solution because the specific knowledge is lacking of how to go about the solution. The issue of general disarmament seems to be such a borderline issue.

I believe that, at the present time, little could be gained by bringing pressure on the Administration to enter into formal negotiations with Russia on the issue of General Disarmament, because--as they say, "You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink."

13, Leo Szilard, "Are We on the Road to War?"

I believe that no substantial progress will be made towards disarmament until Americans and Russians first reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

American reluctance to seriously contemplate general disarmament is largely due to uncertainty about this point. If it became clear that a satisfactory solution of this issue is possible, many Americans may come to regard general disarmament as a highly desirable goal.

On the issue of how to secure the peace in a disarmed world, progress could probably be made reasonably fast through non-governmental discussions among Americans and Russians. I believe that such discussions ought to be arranged through private initiative, but with the blessing of the Administration.

It does not seem likely that the newly created Disarmament Agency will be in a position to mobilize the imagination and resourcefulness which is required, and I believe that it may be necessary for a major private group to help them out or to prod them along--as the case may be. This may or may not require political action of one sort or another.

The Russians know very well that America is not ready seriously to contemplate general disarmament and this, to my mind, explains why, in spite of being strongly motivated for disarmament, the Russian Government displays in its negotiations on this issue much the same attitude as does the American Government. As far as negotiations on disarmament are concerned, hitherto both governments have been mainly guided by the public relations aspect rather than by the substantive aspect of the issue.

The Soviet Union's attitude might change overnight, however, if it became apparent that America was becoming seriously interested in disarmament.

The Russians are very much aware of the great economic benefits they would derive from disarmament, and I believe that the Soviet Union would be willing to pay a commensurate price for obtaining it. It stands to reason that this should be so. The Soviet Union spends on defense a much larger fraction of her industrial output than America does.

America is at present committed to protect certain territories which are located in the geographical proximity of Russia. In the case of general disarmament, America would not be able to live up to any such commitment. Disarmament will, therefore, be politically acceptable to America only if it is possible for her to liquidate her present commitments--without too much loss of prestige and without seriously endangering the interest of the other nations involved.

Khrushchev seems to be very much aware of this. Therefore, it is possible that if it came to serious negotiations on the issue of disarmament, and if it became manifestly necessary to reach a political settlement in order to permit America to liquidate her military commitments, then the Soviet

Union would go a long way towards seeking an accommodation.

The so-called Berlin Crisis, which centers around the commitments which America made to West Berlin, might very well be a case in point.

(6). General disarmament will, if we are lucky, eliminate war, but it will not end the rivalry between America and Russia.

It is a foregone conclusion that American efforts towards creating an orderly and livable world will be frustrated in Southeast Asia and Africa because of our failure to devise forms of democracy which would be viable in these regions of the world. The task of devising forms of democracy which would be suitable to the needs of such areas is not a task that the Government can handle. Various forms of democracy may have to be devised which are tailor-made to fit the various areas. A major private group could tackle and ought to tackle this problem. If it is not solved, more and more under-developed nations will become dictatorships; some of them may have a rapid succession of dictator after dictator and, in the end, the people may have to choose between Chaos and Communism.

It is a foregone conclusion that America's efforts to raise the standard of living of underdeveloped nations may be frustrated in those areas where the birth rate is high, infant mortality is high, and there is little arable land left. Improvement in the standard of living will initially lead to a fall in infant mortality, and if the birth rate remains high, the population will shoot up so rapidly, that economic improvements will not be able to catch up.

Our failure to develop methods of birth control, suitable for the needs of such areas, is responsible for this state of affairs. The development of such methods is not a task which the Government can undertake. The Government could not create Research Institutes which would attract scientists who are ingenious and resourceful enough to come up with an adequate solution. The amount of money which would be involved is not much, and a major private group could and should tackle this problem.

If it should turn out that it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which reasonable people could generally agree, and if these objectives could count on the all-out support of a sizable minority--admittedly a very big "if"--then I should be inclined to go further, and I would go further along the following lines:

I would ask seven to twelve distinguished scientists to form a Council, which might be called Council for Abolishing War or perhaps better, Council for a Livable World. This Council would, first of all, assemble a panel of political advisors, whose identity would be public knowledge, and then it would formulate, in close consultation with these advisors, two sets of objectives.

To the first set belong those objectives which cannot be attained at the present time through political action because it would take further inquiry and research to know, in concrete terms what needs to be done. To the second set belong those objectives which can be pursued through political action because it is clear what needs to be done.

The members of the Council would set up a research organization aimed at the pursuit of the first set of objectives, and they would serve as the Trustees of that organization. The members of the Council would also set up a political organization aimed at the pursuit of the second set of objectives, and they would serve as the Board of Directors for that organization. Because one of the functions of the second organization would be to lobby, we may refer to it for our purposes tonight as the Lobby.

The Board of the Lobby would, from time to time, revise the political objectives which it proposes to pursue and it would communicate these objectives--perhaps in the form of a series of pamphlets--to all those whom the Board believes to be seriously interested.

It seems to me that there is no need to enlist those who are interested as members of an organization. What one needs to create is not a membership organization, but a Movement.

Those who regularly receive the communications of the Board would be regarded as members of the Movement, provided that they spend, say, two percent of their income in support of the Movement. A small fraction of this amount would go to the Board for covering the operating expenses of the Lobby; the rest of it would go for political contributions made directly by each individual involved.

So that the members of the Movement may know where their political contributions would be most effective, they would have to keep in close touch with the Lobby. The Lobby would keep them informed about the key contests for seats in Congress, and the members should have no difficulty in figuring out where their contributions should go, even if the Lobby may not explicitly endorse anyone running for office.

The members of the Movement who are articulate would be expected to communicate not only with their own Congressmen and the Senators of their own states, but, also, each with at least one key member of the House or Senate. Above all, the articulate members of the Movement would be expected to discuss the relevant issues with the editors of their newspapers and various columnists, and other opinion makers, in their own community. They would be pledged to vote in the primaries, as well as in the elections. And they would be pledged to cast their vote--disregarding domestic issues--solely on the issue of war and peace.

The influence of the Lobby would be greatly enhanced if it were able to say not only how many votes it represents, in toto, but also how many votes it

represents in each state and in each congressional district. So that the Lobby may not make false representations in this regard, all those concerned would be asked, from time to time, to inform the Board if they disagree with the political objectives proclaimed or if, for any other reason, they do not intend to perform as the members of the Movement are expected to perform.

The Lobby must not wield the power that it may possess crudely. People in Washington want to be convinced, they do not want to be bribed or blackmailed. He who gives consistently financial support to certain key members of Congress may evoke their lasting friendship and may count on their willingness to listen to him as long as he talks sense. He who talks to members of Congress, but does not talk sense, will not accomplish anything of lasting value, even if he temporarily sweeps some members of Congress off their feet, by making huge political contributions to them.

There are many intelligent men in Congress who have insight into what needs to be done. The Lobby could help these men to have the courage of their convictions. There are others in Congress who are not capable of such insight. The only thing to do with them is not to return them to Congress, and to replace them with better men. This may make it necessary to persuade better men to run in the primaries and to stand for election. To find such better men must be one of the tasks of the Movement, and the Lobby must be prepared to help the members of the Movement to perform this task.

I did not come here to enlist any of you in such a movement or to launch such a Movement. I came here to invite you to participate in an experiment that ought to show whether such a movement could be successfully launched at the present time.

First of all, I ask each of you to look into your own heart and to try to discover whether you yourself would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives--as formulated from time to time--appealed to you and you thought that the Movement could be effective.

Next, you may want to ask others--within this University community--whether they might not wish to participate in the experiment also.

Those of you who wish to participate in the experiment are asked to show a copy of my speech to several people in your home community who might be interested, and to determine which of these would be likely to form part of a dedicated minority.

I would appreciate your writing me in about four to six weeks how many people you have contacted and how many of these (and who of these--(name and address) you think, could be counted upon.

Those to whom you talk in your home community should not go around and recruit still others. They may, however, introduce you to others who might be interested, and you will be then in the position to evaluate their interest and to report back.

It seems to me that there is no need to enlist those who are interested as members of an organization. What one needs to create is not a membership organization, but a Movement.

The Board of the Lobby would hold hearings, once every four months, and would subsequently proclaim in detail the immediate political objectives it proposes to support. I would communicate these objectives, perhaps in the form of a series of pamphlets, to all those who are believed to be seriously interested. Those who regularly receive the communications of the Board would be regarded as members of the Movement, if they are willing actively to support at least one of the several specific objectives proclaimed by the Board.

The articulate members of the Movement would be expected to discuss the relevant issues with editors of their newspaper and various columnists and other opinion makers in their own community. They would be expected to write to, and in other ways keep in touch with, their Congressman and the two Senators of their own State. Also each articulate member would be expected to keep in touch with at least one ~~key~~ KEY member of the House or the Senate.

One of the main functions of the Lobby would be to help the members of the Movement clarify their own minds on the political objectives they wish actively to support and to help arrange appointments for those members who come to Washington to see Congressmen, Senators and certain key members of the Administration.

The members of the Movement would be regarded as pledged to vote in the primaries as well as in the elections. As far as federal elections are concerned, they would be pledged to cast their vote, disregarding domestic issues, solely on the issue of war and peace. Further, the members of the Movement would be regarded as pledged annually to spend 2 per cent of their income on political contributions.

So that each member of the Movement may know where his contribution should go, in order to be most effective in furthering the political objectives which he has chosen to pursue, the Lobby will keep in touch with each member. The Lobby would keep the members informed not only in general about the particular contests for seats in Congress which are of interest to the Movement, but it may advise one member to take an interest in one of these contests and another member to take an interest in another of these contests.

This does not mean the Lobby would explicitely endorse anyone running for office. It may be assumed that if the importance of a given contest is brought to the attention of a member, the member will have no difficulty figuring out for himself which of the two candidates for office he would want to support.

For covering the operating expenses of the Lobby and the Research Organization (which would be maintained independently and operated parallel to the Lobby), one would look to the members of the Movement.

Each year a certain group of the members would be asked by the Board of the Lobby or the Trustees of the Research Organization to contribute 2 per cent of their income to them, rather that to spend it for political contributions. One year this group might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "C". Another year it might be composed of those whose names start with the letter "R", etc.

The influence of the Movement would be greatly enhanced if the Lobby were able to say not only how many votes it represents, in toto, but also how many votes it represents in each state and in each congressional district. So that the Lobby may not make false representations, concerning the votes it may be able to deliver, the Board shall from time to time ask all those who regularly receive its communications, to say which of the political objectives proclaimed by the Board they propose to support and if they intend to perform with respect to those objectives as members of the Movement are expected to perform.

The Movement must not wield the power that it may possess crudely. People in Washington want to be convinced, they do not want to be bribed or blackmailed. He, who gives consistently financial support to certain key members of Congress, may evoke their lasting friendship and may count on their willingness to listen to them as long as they talk sense. He, who talks to members of Congress, but does not talk sense, will not accopplish anything of lasting value, even if he temporarily sweeps some members of Congress off their feet

by making huge political contributions to them.

There are many intelligent men in Congress who have insight into what goes on; the Movement could help these men to have the courage of their convictions. There are others in Congress who are not capable of such insight; the only thing to do with them is not to return them to Congress, and to replace them with better men. This may make it necessary to persuade better men to run in the primaries and to stand for election. To find such better men, must be one of the tasks of the Movement, and the Lobby must be prepared to help the members of the Movement to perform this task.

I did not come here to enlist any of you in such a Movement or to launch such a Movement. I came here to invite you to participate in an experiment that ought to show whether such a movement could be successfully launched.

First of all, I ask each of you to look into your own heart and try to discover whether you yourself would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives - as formulated from time to time appealled to you and you thought that the Movement could be effective.

Next, you may want to ask others - within your University community - whether they might not wish to participate in the experiment also.

Those of you who wish to participate in the experiment are asked

to show a copy of this speech to people in your home community who might be interested and to determine which of these would be likely to be part of a dedicated minority that would give all-out support to a movement of the kind I have described.

I would appreciate your writing me, in about four to six weeks, how many people you have talked to and how many of these and who of these (name and address), you think, could be counted upon.

Those to whom you talk in your home community should not go and recruit still others. They may, however, put you into contact with others who might be interested, and you will be then in the position to evaluate their interest and to report back.

This experiment is meant to be based on the communities of Harvard University, Swarthmore College, Western Reserve University, and The University of Chicago.

If enough of you collaborate in this experiment, with luck we might be in a position to know within two months whether a movement of the kind I have described could get off the ground.

Those of you who participate in this experiment may need to have a copy of this speech, and we can discuss later just how I can get a copy to you.

If the result of this experiment indicates that such a movement could get off the ground, then perhaps one would want to start the Movement with talks, in front of large student audiences across the country, from coast to coast. If within the next 12 months one could find 20 thousand students who would go all-out in support of the

Movement, and if each student would, directly or indirectly, bring ten other people into the Movement, then the Movement could rapidly attain 200,000 members. This would represent about 20 million dollars per year in political contributions, or 80 million dollars over a four-year period, and this is probably as much as one would want to have.

Whether such a movement could grow further and could come to represent one or two million votes would then probably depend on the future course of world events.

THE END

Leo Szilard
Dupont Plaza Hotel
Washington 6, D. C.

February 24, 1962

RESPONSES TO DATE

Between November 17 of last year and February 12 of this year, the speech "Are We On The Road To War?" was delivered at the following universities or colleges: Harvard, Western Reserve, Swarthmore College, The University of Chicago, The University of California in Berkeley, Stanford, Reed College, The University of Oregon in Eugene, and Sarah Lawrence College.

In most cases I stayed over another day to be available to interested students for further discussion. The audience turnout and response were very good with the possible exception of Western Reserve. I spoke there before a mixed audience of students and adults of about 1,800, and the student response was rather mediocre.

I expected a good response at Reed College but not at the University of Oregon; yet 1,200 people turned out there to hear the talk at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and 200 students returned the next day to continue the discussion.

The speech was first given under the auspices of the Harvard Law School Forum. After the lecture, a copy of the speech was sent to those who asked for it and gave their name and address. We ran out of copies, and a graduate student, Mr. Michael Brower (at 3 Dana Street, Cambridge 38, Mass.) volunteered that he would mimeograph additional copies and mail them out on request (at 15¢ to 25¢ each, depending on size of order).

By January 1 he had distributed 2,300 copies, by January 15 another 3,500, by February 1 another 2,000, and by February 15 another 3,500.

Each campus mimeographed its own copies of the speech for distribution. Chicago distributed 2,500 copies to date.

The press comments were uniformly favorable. A set of press clippings is available in the office of Professor Bernard Feld in the Physics Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in the office of Professor David Hogness in the Department of Biochemistry at Stanford University, and at the office of Professor Owen Chamberlain in the Physics Department at the University of California in Berkeley. It can be also obtained from me.

A few days after I delivered the speech in Chicago, ABC's 6 o'clock Television News -- a coast-to-coast broadcast originating from New York -- devoted a few minutes to describe what I am trying to do, and ended up by saying, "We wish him good luck."

I am overwhelmed by the mail that pours in. Mrs. Ruth Adams, who recently looked through my accumulated mail, estimates that we have about 400 hard-and-fast pledges of 2 percent so far, and indications of many more.

A sample of the more interesting letters is available at the offices of Feld, Hogness and Owen Chamberlain. It can also be obtained from me.

The present disorderly procedures might yield us 1,000 or perhaps 2,000 pledges, and the interest manifested so far is sufficient to set up the Council. I presume, however, that the Council would want to identify perhaps 25,000 people by name who would pledge 2 percent of their income, before setting up the political organization that would give advice and guidance to those who pledge 2 percent of their income. For this purpose the Council might need $25,000 to $50,000 "seed money."

Groups have sprung up spontaneously in support of the "Movement" around the Austen-Riggs Center in Stockbridge, Mass., as well as around the University of Connecticut at Storrs, Conn., and I have met with some members of these groups in New York at the apartment of Arthur Penn, a Broadway director. We discussed the possibility of obtaining "seed money" for the Council by holding in New York and perhaps in Hollywood $300-a-plate dinners for 12 to 15 guests each. Mr. Arthur Penn, who would be in charge of this operation in New York, has the names of 8 persons who have volunteered to act as hosts for one dinner each.

I am being approached by representatives of the Methodist Church and the Society of Friends, and I shall discuss with them how to reach those of their members who are interested and who might want to pledge 2 percent of their income.

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