BENA BENA SOCIAL STRUCTURE

by

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PREFACE

The effects of the personal equation are well known in science. Equally well known is the fact that scholars are always limited in their observations, to some degree at least, by the theoretical orientation they carry with them when approaching their respective problems. The problem of observer bias is probably greater in anthropology than in other behavioral sciences because of language and rapport difficulties inherent in working cross-culturally. In addition, anthropologists often take with them to the field work situation their preconceived notions as to how a given social system might, or perhaps even "should" operate.

The brief history of anthropological work in the New Guinea Highlands is an interesting case in point. From 1950 until very recently ethnologists who had worked in the area were in agreement over the character of the societies found in the Highlands. These societies were described and discussed using terms and concepts developed in other parts of the world, primarily Africa. Although minor deviations were consistently reported, no one challenged these concepts until after 1960. This poses an interesting question, in addition to the basic question of how the New Guinea societies differ from other ones; namely, why did it take so long to come to the conclusion that they did? This dissertation attempts to deal with both of these broad questions.

During the course of my work with the Bena Bena peoples I found myself repeatedly attempting to predict on the basis of my knowledge of other societies that certain structural or other features would exist, only to find that they did not. Often, in moments of intense frustration, in doubt that I would ever understand what was going on around me, I would almost

insist that such-and-such a thing had to be the case, only to be told politely but firmly that it was not. Fortunately, the Bena are not easily intimidated by anthropological neophytes. They would reply to what must have seemed to them very bizarre ideas about their culture with a statement to the effect that, "Perhaps that is the way others do it but we Bena Bena do it this way." Or, "Our ways are many. We do not have just one way to do things," and so on. I think it is very much to their credit that they did respond in this way to my fumbling attempts to understand their culture. But needless to say it did not simplify the task I had set before myself.

I cannot pretend to have completely overcome investigator biases. Nor can I assert that what is described herein is correct and that all other accounts are incorrect. Furthermore, I do not know that this way of conceptualizing Highlands social structure is more useful than any other way, although I personally believe that it is, and that it attends closer to the social reality "out there" than do other accounts. I do wish to raise the questions that emerged out of my own difficulties in conceptualizing that complex of human behavior that is Bena Bena in the hope that others may be stimulated to take a second look at Highlands social structures, perhaps from a slightly different perspective.

CHAPTER I.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Highlands New Guinea was opened to anthropological research barely more than a decade ago, at that particular moment in time when the fullest impact of structural anthropology was being felt. Ethnographers working in the Highlands, from the first and continuing down to the most recent, have, generally speaking, been much influenced by the structural tradition. Their work on New Guinea clearly reflects this interest, and, indeed, it has recently been suggested that the concentration upon this type of approach may now be binding us to the distinctive feature of New Guinea societies:

> Ethnographers working in New Guinea were able to present interim accounts of the poly-segmentary stateless systems of the Highlands with less effort and greater speed by making use of the advances in understanding already achieved by their colleagues who had studied similar social systems in Africa. Yet it has become clear that Highland societies fit awkwardly into African moulds. When first tackling the New Guinea societies it was a decided advantage to be able to refer to the analytical work available on Nuer, Tallensi, Tiv and other peoples, but it may be disadvantageous if this African orientation now prevents us from seeing the distinctively non-African characteristics of the Highlands (Barnes, 1962:5).

The attempts to understand and characterize New Guinea societies almost exclusively in terms of the so-called "African model" have, it seems, led us now into a blind alley. How and why this came about is an interesting and informative chapter in the history of ideas. I propose to examine this history in detail and by so doing to (1) clarify what may be understood by the African model, (2) illustrate with my own field work as well as with the available literature why New Guinea societies do not fit the preconceived "model," (3) expose certain biases which have been

instrumental in impeding progress, and (4) attempt an alternate conceptualization of the subject societies using the Bena Bena people as an example.

Most of the confusion surrounding our efforts to understand Highlands social structures stems from a failure to deal adequately with the basic theoretical issues, with the definitions, the terms employed and the concepts utilized.[1] Dr. J. A. Barnes, for example, recognizes in a perceptive summary article that there may be a misunderstanding of the "African model" in the first place:

> It has been easy to make the mistake of comparing the de facto situation in a Highlands community, as shown by an ethnographic census, with a non-existant and idealized set of conditions among the Nuer, wrongly inferred from Evans-Pritchard's discussion of the principles of Nuer social structure (1962:5).

But Barnes himself, just as virtually all ethnographers who have worked in New Guinea,[2] appears unconcerned with the various theoretical problems posed by the uncritical acceptance of such a conceptual device and does not attempt to specify or define what he means by the "African model." Thus it is not clear whether it is, in fact, a "model" or an "ideal type" (Martindale, 1959; Brodbeck, 1959), whether he is speaking of an "ideological" v.s. a "statistical" model (Leach, 1961a, 1961b), or some unspecified combination of both, or, finally, whether he is using the notion of segmentary lineage system as a political or kinship phenomena, or both (Smith, 1956).

When one reads, as in the quotation above, "non-existent and idealized set of conditions among the Nuer" one gets the impression that an "ideal type" is meant. But if this is what is meant then it would be legitimate, even necessary, to compare the de facto situation in New Guinea to the ideal type just as the de facto situation in Africa is compared with

it, although it is stated that this is a mistake.[3] This can be seen if we consider for a moment the nature of ideal types:

> The ideal type is a conceptual tool. Items and relations actually found in historical and social life supply the materials. These are selected, fused, simplified into the ideal type on the basis of some idea of the student as to the nature of social reality (Martindale, 1959:69).

Although it is not always perfectly clear what structural anthropologists are attempting to do I think that most scholars would agree that they have been and are importantly concerned with constructing "ideal types" of the nature indicated above. This seems to be fairly clear, for example, in the following quotations which we will take to be representative:

> My own view is that the concrete reality with which the social anthropologist is concerned in observation, description, comparison and classification, is not any sort of entity but a process, the process of social life. The unit of investigation is the social life of some particular region of the earth during a certain period of time. The process itself consists of an immense multitude of actions and interactions of human beings, acting as individuals or in combinations or groups. Amidt the diversity of the particular events there are discoverable regularities, so that it is possible to give statements or descriptions of certain general features of the social life of a selected region. A statement of such significant general features of the process of social life constitutes a description of what may be called a form of social life. My conception of social anthropology is as the comparative theoretical study of forms of social life amongst primitive peoples (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952:4).
>
> . . . . Similarly, the social anthropologist discovers in a native society what no native can explain to him and what no layman, however conversant with the culture, can perceive -- its basic structure. This structure cannot be seen. It is a set of abstractions, each of which, though derived, it is true, from analysis of observed behavior, is fundamentally an imaginative construct of the anthropologist himself. By relating these abstractions to one another logically so that they present a pattern he can see the society in its essentials and as a single whole (Evans-Pritchard, 1962:23).

The "African model," then, can be seen as an ideal type based upon "items and relations" actually found in African societies. These items and relations have been "selected, fused, simplified into the ideal type"

by the famous Africanists on "the basis of some idea of the student as to the nature of social reality." Such a conceptualization has usefulness in that it offers a shorthand description of a particular class of societies. But its primary importance lies in its predictive power. That is, can one predict de facto behavior from his knowledge of the ideal type. And, with respect to the case at hand, the "African model," as ideal type, would be useful in the New Guinea case if (1) it aids in their description, but, more importantly, (2) if one could predict de facto New Guinea behavior from it. Although it may be somewhat confusing it is not, of course, this comparison to which Barnes is really objecting. Nor is it the fact of the wrong inference although the incorrect inference may be a problem also. What Barnes seems obviously to have in mind, and which is in fact one of the critical problems, has to do with the distinction raised by Leach (1961a, 1961b) between ideal and statistical norms:

> In later writing Fortes has treated the concept of social structure in a different way . . . . Whereas in the Tallensi books structure is a matter of jural rules, the ideal form of which can be represented as a paradigm, Ashanti social structure is shown to emerge as a statistical norm. Fortes himself does not contrast these two arguments and he perhaps intended to imply that the statistical pattern must always converge towards the normative paradigm. But this could only be a presumption. If in reality the ideal order of jural relations and the statistical order of economic relations do not converge, then the significance which we attach to the 'structure of unilineal descent groups' will need careful reconsideration.
>
> It is my thesis that jural rules and statistical norms should be treated as separate frames of reference, but that the former should always be considered secondary to the latter (Leach, 1961a:8).

Thus, researchers have attempted to compare statistical norms of New Guinea behavior with jural rules (ideals) of African societies and, when the de facto behavior deviates from the expectation the conclusion is that New Guinea societies do not fit the "African model." This conclusion is,

of course, premature as most investigators seem to have realized, even though the paucity of theoretical material for New Guinea would lead one to believe they were not concerned about it in the first place. This explains, at least partially, I think, why the discussion has not appeared in print:

> . . . . This procedure gives an exaggerated picture of the differences between the Highlands and Africa, and although most ethnographers have avoided this error in print, it persists in many oral discussions (Barnes, 1962:5).

The failure to separate clearly the two areas involved -- the statistical from the ideal -- is one of the critical problems of analysis and, like other important ones, as we shall see later, can be traced back to Radcliffe-Brown. It can be seen with the utmost clarity, for example, in the following passage:

> Social usages may be defined as norms. The norm, however, is not one imposed by the scientist. It is one which he notes as observed by the society. It may be sufficient in some instances to go and see what all the people are doing to determine a social usage. You see, for instance, that all men in the United States wear trousers: You have established a social usage. In many instances, however, it is not as simple as that, because you find certain variations in behavior. You have then to go to the people themselves and ask, 'What do you think is the proper thing to do?' They may give you a rule. It is the recognition of that rule, together with its observance, which constitutes the usage. Any given rule has two aspects, both of them establishing the norm. First there is the recognition of the rule, and you get at that simply by asking people questions. You may find that in a given instance 80 per cent of the people will tell you that that is the rule; 15 per cent will say, 'I don't know'; and 5 per cent will say, 'No.' Second, there is the degree of conformity, and in an instance in which you get an 80 per cent recognition of the rule, you are likely to get perhaps only 60 per cent conformity. Twenty per cent may say, 'I know that is what I should do, but I get away without doing it.' Your norm, therefore, is always of this double nature. You cannot define a social usage except in terms of what people do and what they think ought to be done. The norm is not established by the anthropologist. It is a rule which has an average distribution and a certain standard deviation in its observance; it is characterized by what people say about rules in a given society and what they do about them (Radcliffe-Brown, 1948:58).

I quote this at such length because of its fundamental importance for the understanding of what is involved in the controversy over New Guinea social structure as well as for its relevance to what is to follow. That the same confusion inherent in the above is present in the New Guinea case can be seen quite clearly in Van der Leeden's reply to Pouwer's analysis of his dissertation:

> A quantitative analysis fails to give a reliable impression of the truly important structural elements. A complementary qualitative study of the behavioral variability is a requisite for positive results. Each observed case, each variation, needs evaluation as to its functional significance and its emotional value for the bearers of the culture (1960:127).

In any case the following three things emerge. First, there are the jural rules (i.e., what people say ought to be the case). Second, there are the statistical norms (i.e., the average of the actual behavior). And, unfortunately, there are the assertions of anthropologists based upon some subjective combination of both, which constitutes much of the available ethnography both for New Guinea and elsewhere. In so far as anthropologists have been notoriously unconcerned with quantification, most accounts of primitive groups are based primarily upon jural rules, that is, somewhat crude, idealized versions of some reality "out there." The question of how well the actual behavior need fit the idealized accounts has always been subject to dispute. This question forms the basis for such things as Fortes suggestion that the category 'descent group' be restricted to groups in which descent is the only criterion for membership, (Barnes, 1962:6), Leach's insistence on separating the ideal from the statistical, and is, also, as I have indicated, behind the 'mistake' to which Barnes alludes.

In order to clarify this let us represent Leach's position with a fourfold diagram:

	Jural Rules	Statistical Norms
Africa	A	B
New Guinea	C	D

The distinction, again, is between the rules (ideals) for behavior and the behavior itself. "A" and "B," Leach asserts, can vary independently of one another. The problem of using the "African model" for New Guinea societies can now be seen, following Barnes, as not only a faulty attempt to compare de facto situations in the Highlands with African abstractions (A with D), but also the comparison of a statistical norm (D) with an ideal one (A), rather than with another statistical one (B), thus omitting a more critical comparison, A with C. In the first place, any positive results from such a comparison could be expected only when the ideals (jural rules) happen to correspond closely with the statistical norms (i.e., when the statistical pattern converges towards the normative paradigm). But in the case at hand one could expect positive results only when the statistical norms of New Guinea behavior happen to correspond with African ideals for behavior.

In any event one unfortunate result of the failure to specify which level is under discussion in any given case is that it is virtually impossible to interpret the various descriptions given in the literature so as to arrive at some valid judgement. For example:

> In the Highlands usually a majority, though rarely all, of the adult males in any local community are agnatically related to one another. Most married men live patri-virilocally. Many a large social group is divided into segments each associated with a son of its founder. It is argued that these groups are patrilineal descent groups (Barnes, 1962:5).

The obvious questions to be posed here are, of course, how large a majority? What is meant by most? By many? And does it make any difference if the evidence is based upon ideological rather than statistical facts? I submit that it does, and our consistent failure to recognize the point so cogently insisted upon by Leach, that the ideological can vary independently of the statistical facts tends to keep us in a quandary.

Both jural rules and statistical norms, in Leach's sense, could be expressed as ideal types. That is, one could have an ideal type of ideology as well as of actual behavior.[4] Thus it would be entirely feasible to compare African ideology (expressed as an ideal type) with New Guinea ideology, or African behavior (as ideal type) with New Guinea behavior. One implication of Barnes' criticism is that these comparisons (A with C and B with D) are not being made but, rather, we have attempted to compare only A with D. It is not this simple, of course, as most ethnographers have not been concerned with the distinction. Their accounts are never clearly expressed solely either in ideals or in behavior or, if they are, it is not clear which. And, therefore, the most fundamental questions, whether A and C or B and D are, in fact, equivalents, have by no means been settled. This is presumably what Barnes has in mind when he says:

> When in several respects these societies were discovered not to operate as an Africanist might have expected, these deviations from the African model were often regarded as anomalies requiring special explanation (Barnes, 1962:5).

This leads us to another problem. It seems the "special explanation" in the New Guinea case usually takes the form of "anthropological butterfly collecting" (Leach, 1961b:3) in which all Highlands groups are classified first as "unilineal," secondly as "patrilineal," and thirdly

depending upon what the "anomalie" happens to be in the particular case. Thus, for example, the Kuma are of this type but:

> The generations between the founders of the smallest groups and the original ancestor of the clan or phratry are obscure: No one can even guess how many generations have elapsed, and none of the intervening names (besides those of the ancestor's sons) is even known (Reay, 1959:34).

The Gahuku-Gama are likewise of this general type but:

> Members of the sub-clan consider themselves to be true blood relatives, all descended from a common named male ancestor. The sub-clan, however, is not a true lineage, for although its members conceive of it as a genealogically structured unit, they are normally unable to trace true genealogical connections with all those who belong to it (Read, 1955:252).

An even more striking example:

> I wish to show how the unilineal descent groups occurring in the New Guinea Highlands conform, in the main, with the characteristics of the African groups, but also show some striking differences. These differences, by showing how it is possible for unilineal descent groups to dispense with long genealogies, throw some light on the problem pointed out by Fortes -- namely, 'the limits of genealogical depth in lineage structure' (Salisbury, 1956:2).

These can all be seen as manifestations of the "unilineal bias" also mentioned by Leach (1961a) as will become clearer as we proceed.

Accompanying the above failure to distinguish between ideological and statistical facts has been an apparent lack of any specific interest in New Guinea political systems and an accompanying tendency to analyze New Guinea societies only in terms of descent and kinship. M. G. Smith, in a brilliantly argued essay, has indicated the necessity to view segmentary lineage systems primarily as political phenomena:

> . . . the distinction between lineage and kinship reflects the political primacy of the first principle. This political character of lineage organization is also linked with the corporate character of lineage groups, a feature normally lacking in kinship associations. It is also found under conditions where centralized administration is absent or weak, and normally in these conditions lineages are local groupings discharging political functions within these areas. This provides a subdivision of the

> population into territorial segments and the correlation of these territorial segments with the genealogical segments of the lineage units directs attention to the segmentary organization of such societies with its dual but closely related aspects and reference to localization and descent. Concepts such as fission, fusion, accretion, assimilation, intercalary lineages. . .and the like, are simply specialized derivatives of this concept of segmentary organization (Smith, 1956:42).

Barnes' comment that there has been comparatively little attention paid to the processes whereby groups such as clan and sub-clan segment and divide (1962:8) is directly related to the lack of interest in politics. It seems clear that if New Guinea scholars had concentrated on relating New Guinea societies to the African model as political systems rather than as purely kinship systems there would be less confusion now. As political systems New Guinea groups diverge much more widely from the African model than as descent systems per se and, had any serious attempt been made to analyze them in this way, it seems likely that the distinctive features of New Guinea societies would have emerged with sufficient clarity to cause us to question more critically our efforts to describe them in terms of the preconceived model. Without going into great detail here let us just consider the following:

> Since political action has a segmentary form and process, unilineal groups which are political units have a segmentary structure down to the lowest level of their politcal organization. Where unilineal groups do not form the units of political competition, they lack such segmentary structure, except in a genealogical diagram. This is one half of the story. The other half reflects the administrative aspect of governmental process. Since administration has a hierarchic form and process, unilineal groups which are administrative units have an hierarchic structure up to their highest level of administrative organization. Where unilineal groups do not form the units of administrative organization, they lack such hierarchic structure, except in a genealogical diagram. Segmentary lineage structures, in the current sense of this term, represent the coincidence and interrelation of these administrative and political principles of action and organization in units recruited on a basis of unilineal descent . . . (but) . . . the structure of segmentary lineage systems therefore represents more correctly and adequately a particular balance in the combination,

> interrelation, and distribution of political and administrative functions and processes, by virtue of which the segments are defined, than it does any of the apparent bases of group organization, whether this be unilineal descent, locality, or their combination (Smith, 1956:54).

What I am suggesting is that we have concentrated to date almost exclusively on the bases for organization rather than on the functions of groups and have thus by-passed many of the questions which would have brought into focus more clearly the differences in question. But because the distinction between ideology and statistical norms has not been made clear we have not as yet established the bases for group formation, and, having an "educated guess" that the basis is unilineal descent we have then also attributed the same political and administrative functions to the New Guinea groups that the African groups manifest. The similarity of function does not necessarily follow, of course, even if the groups are in fact unilineal descent groups. But if they are not unilineal descent groups they obviously cannot be segmentary lineage systems, for:

> Unilineal descent is a necessary foundation for the development of lineage groups, but it is not the efficient cause. Lineage groups are conceived of as segmentary in structure and corporate in function. Where unilineal descent obtains without groups of this character, there are no lineages in the sense of this theory (Smith, 1956:39).

An even more clear-cut indication that New Guinea systems probably diverge markedly from the African model, intimately related to the above, has to do with the nature of leadership in segmentary lineage systems in which, according to M. G. Smith:

> Lineages are recruited on the principle of unilineal descent, lineage leaders normally being chosen on the basis of seniority, whereas offices, or unit corporations, are normally filled by processes involving some degree or type of selection (1956:61).

Although little has been written specifically on New Guinea leadership, it is quite clear that leaders are not "lineage leaders." Likewise,

they are not recruited on the basis of seniority and there quite definitely is a selective process involved in the choice of leaders (Read, 1959; Reay, 1959; Berndt, 1962; and Salisbury, 1962). In short, even though New Guinea societies may be similar to African ones in many respects there are quite obvious and important differences with respect to the nature of politics, leadership and authority generally. But, again, because of the general lack of interest specifically in political phenomena no one has been motivated to look at the respective systems from this point of view. Similarly, the differences might have been made clearer had there been more interest shown in the relations between larger groups, such as between "tribes" or "Phrateries" or "clans." Although certain kinds of relationships have been noted, such as those of traditional enemy or those involving marriage, again, no truly political analyses have been offered. Thus we do not know if the New Guinea inter-group relations are similar to those in Africa or what this might mean for our understanding of them. Do New Guinea groups, for example, have "rudimentary offices" such as the following quotation indicates for Africa:

> It is, furthermore, easy to show on the data from these types of society that beyond the internal administrative systems of the lineage units there are agencies of a predominantly administrative character, which operate to reduce the latent dangers of conflict between maximal lineages for the stability of the society as a whole, and that, from an analytic point of view, these agencies resemble rudimentary offices. Thus, the Tallensi statuses of tendaana and chief; the omuseni, omulasi, ovwali, dream-prophet, rain-maker, and war-leader of the Bantu Kavirondo; and the leopard-skin chief and prophet among the Nuer, are all agencies of this type. . . . By means of these institutionalized positions, administrative action limiting the range and type of political conflict among the major political units of the societies concerned were affected. Notably also, rules and conventions governed the action of these extra-lineage agencies, and limited the expression of opposition between lineages, as well as within them (Smith, 1956:53).

Even a cursory glance at the available literature on New Guinea will indicate that either such 'offices' do not exist or else they have not been

reported or analyzed as to their function. The tendency has been to follow the dichotomy established between 'centralized' and 'non-centralized' (i.e., 'segmentary') political systems (Radcliffe-Brown, 1940; Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940) and to assume that New Guinea groups, being 'uncentralized' must also be 'African.' And this in spite of certain indications to the contrary. For example:

> . . . poverty of habitat and of productive technology tend to inhibit the development of unilineal descent groups by limiting the scale and stability of settlement . . . it does seem that unilineal groups are not of significance among peoples who live in small groups, depend upon rudimentary technology, and have little durable property . . . . Where these groups are most in evidence is in the middle range of relatively homogeneous, pre-capitalistic economies in which there is some degree of technological sophistication and value is attached to rights in durable property (Fortes, 1953:24).

Now there may be some question as to what constitutes 'poverty of habitat,' 'durable property,' or 'pre-capitalistic economy,' but nevertheless features of New Guinea societies are close enough to these notions to at least cause us to think twice before simply lumping them indiscriminately together with African ones under the category 'unilineal descent groups' or 'non-centralized.' Indeed, as Fried (1957) has argued, the category unilineal descent group itself can be broken down into several types each with its own theoretical significance. I am suggesting at this point that had we looked more into the ecological setting, had we been more concerned with Highlands societies as political systems, and had we attempted to move beyond the unsatisfactory typology of political systems offered by the Africanists, the most important differences between New Guinea and African societies would have been easier to comprehend.

If cross-cultural comparison is fundamental to anthropology we must know that we are dealing with comparable units:

> Given as a bona fide anthropological objective the discovery of regularities in the cultural process and the formulation of the laws governing their operation, it is absolutely necessary to make certain that the institutions brought together for comparative study are in fact comparable (Fried, 1957:2).

The failure to distinguish 'models' from 'ideal types,' 'ideological' norms from 'statistical' ones, and 'politics' from 'kinship' has seriously hindered ethnological research in New Guinea (as well as elsewhere). The consistent lack of concern with the theoretical status of the concepts we employ virtually negates our efforts to compare and understand Highlands social structures and makes it exceedingly difficult to even accept the ethnographic reports now available for, as M. G. Smith points out:

> Such comparative materials cannot directly disprove the theory, simply because the latter consists in a specialized use of certain words, and a type of conceptual system not directly open to controversion by comparative materials. It follows that comparative materials will only carry their full weight after a critical analysis has been made of the theory as a system of interrelated definitions, and when the crucial assumptions and relations of its key concepts have been clearly understood (1956:42).

One finds in the available literature, then, one questionable assertion after another, one questionable use of a term after another, and one misleading interpretation after another:

> But, in most, though not in all, Highland societies the dogma of descent is absent or is held only weakly (Barnes, 1962:6).

In so far as descent is one of the crucial variables under consideration if we are to compare New Guinea societies to African ones it would seem important that this be a completely valid statement. But how can we know it is valid when we do not know whether it reflects an ideological fact or a statistical one. That is, does it mean that those people who say they are patrilineal by descent and that they reside patri-virilocally do not really mean it, and thus hold the idea weakly? Or does it mean that although people say they are patrilineal the statistical facts indicate

a wide discrepancy from this ideological commitment? Barnes attempts in this context to make a distinction between 'filiation as a mechanism of recruitment to social groups and to ascribed relationships and descent as a sanctioned and morally evaluated principle of belief' (1962:6). This, it seems to me, is an absolutely crucial distinction but it is unfortunately not made completely clear by Barnes. We must distinguish here between 'ideology' and 'dogma.' By ideology we will mean something similar to, but not exactly the same as, 'filiation as a mechanism of recruitment to social groups.' We must be cautious here not to imply that an ideology of patrilineal descent means that the principle is in fact followed rigidly or 'dogmatically,' as it were. By dogma we mean this latter, that is, it is believed that descent is formal and authoritative. The belief must be such that the people who hold the dogma believe that it must be so, that this is the only right and proper way to behave. Ideology, as I conceive of it here, implies merely that a belief exists. It does not imply its absolute formalization, acceptance, or authoritative character. Thus, although New Guinea peoples may share with Africans an ideology of patrilineal descent, they do not necessarily share a dogma of patrilineal descent. To rephrase Barnes, then, and make the distinction clearer, let us say, filiation as a belief about a mechanism of recruitment to social groups such that recruitment by the principle is sanctioned but not prescribed; as opposed to, prescribed relationships and descent as authoritative, sanctioned, and morally evaluated principles of belief.

Investigators take the ill-defined notion of an "African model," by which they generally seem to mean an equally nebulous "segmentary lineage system" and with their own idiosyncratic notion of what this is, or is supposed to be, and certainly without ever specifying what they mean by it,

attempt to measure New Guinea societies against it. And, if the society in question does not quite fit either the classification is extended (the "anthropological butterfly collecting" mentioned by Leach /1961b:37/) or the anomalie is either explained away or glossed over as unimportant.

For example, even though a dogma of agnatic solidarity and descent is one of the main features of the "African model" and is equal, at least, in importance to the actual facts of descent and solidarity,[5] and even though this is associated invariably with very long genealogies and exceptional knowledge about them, interest in them and so on, Berndt does not even find it necessary to question either the apparent lack of these dogmatic features or the paucity of genealogical knowledge in the Highlands and writes the following description:

> The basic structure of the lineage may be diagrammed . . . . The diagram shows an ideal patrilineage, a paradigm, as Fortes puts it. The shortness of genealogical memory is encouraged by a relatively high death rate, so that a man's paternal grandfather's brothers might have died before he was born and their male descendants be genealogically lost to him. Most middle-aged men remember the names of both grandfathers and at least one great-grandfather, but few can give any information about the brothers of these and their offspring, who automatically formed "new" lineages . . . . The only stable feature is the male descent line from father to son, conceptualized as a continuous process in time and symbolized by a growing creeper, or "rope," linking generation with generation (1962:27).

This is fairly obviously a far cry from the "classic" lineage system described by Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Fortes (1945) in which all genealogical relations between lineages are known and valued, and in which there is a well-defined dogma associated with the lineage principle:

> . . . . We refer to these genealogical segments of a clan as its lineages. The relationship of any member of a lineage to any other member of it can be exactly stated in genealogical terms and, therefore, also his relationship to members of other lineages of the same clan can be traced, since the relationship of one lineage to another is genealogically known (1940:192).

> A maximal lineage is fixed with reference to its founding ancestor, who is the focus of its unity and the symbol of its corporate identity. From time to time its unity and identity become explicit in the common cult of this ancestor and in the regulation of intra-lineage relations which hinges on it. The ancestor cult is the calculus of the lineage system, the mechanism by means of which the progressive internal differentiation of a lineage is ordered and is fitted into its existing structure. It is also the principle ideological bulwark of the lineage organization (Fortes, 1945:33).

It seems clear that there has been a strong and consistent tendency to make the facts of New Guinea social structure fit the preconceived model. This will become more and more in evidence as we go along. Suffice it to say at this point that in addition to the theoretical shortcomings mentioned above there have also been involved at least the following three biases: (1) the unilineal bias, (2) an over-emphasis on the biological foundation of kinship ties, and (3) an emphasis on purely sociological explanations of New Guinea warfare. I will illustrate these biases and their effects in a later section. In order to avoid them, as well as the theoretical pitfalls mentioned let us now turn our attention to the African model itself. It is only by specifying in advance and in some detail the crucial features of the African societies that the abovementioned shortcomings can be avoided and meaningful comparative statements can eventually be made.


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CHAPTER II.

THE AFRICAN MODEL

Although there has been, and to a certain extent continues to be, some controvery over the true nature of the African model, its major features can now be stated fairly precisely. First, and most important, it is characterized by unilineal descent:

> Lineages are groups of persons claiming genealogical relations unilineally; they may or may not be localized, and may or may not be exogamous units. The type of descent used in unilineal systems may be either through females or males; and in certain societies, both types of unilineal descent obtain concurrently to provide two sets of lineages to which all persons belong, their matrilineages, membership of which is traced through the mother, and their patrilineages, membership of which is derived from the father (Smith, 1956:39).

Members are recruited, then, specifically on the basis of descent as opposed to other recruitment principles such as locale or common interest. It is with respect to descent that most of the confusion seems to arise when comparing New Guinea groups with African ones. This is because one finds, in the local group, as a fairly regular thing, the presence of non-descent recruited members:

> The New Guinea hamlet is found to be full of matrilateral kin, affines, refugees, and casual visitors, quite unlike the hypothecated entirely virilocal and agnatic Nuer village (though similar to real Nuer villages) (Barnes, 1962:5).

It seems, however, that in most cases the members by descent constitute a majority, or at least are recognized as such by the anthropologist, and thus the conclusion is drawn that the groups in question are similar to African ones. But because no one has dealt directly with the distinction emphasized by Leach between ideological and statistical norms, preferring instead to follow the inadequate methodology of Radcliffe-Brown in this

respect, the fundamental question of what really constitutes a rule of descent has been avoided. In order to make this clear allow me to repeat a quotation from Radcliffe-Brown:

> You have to go to the people themselves and ask, "What do you think is the proper thing to do?" They may give you a rule. It is the recognition of that rule, together with its observance, which constitutes the usage. Any given rule has two aspects, both of them establishing the norm. First there is the recognition of the rule, and you get at that simply by asking people questions. You may find that in a given instance 80 per cent of the people will tell you that that is the rule; 15 per cent will say, "I don't know," and 5 per cent will say "No." Second, there is the degree of conformity, and in an instance in which you get an 80 per cent recognition of the rule, you are likely to get perhaps only 60 per cent conformity. Twenty per cent may say, "I know that is what I should do, but I get away without doing it." Your norm, therefore, is always of this double nature (1948:58).

The question of what one does if there is 80 per cent recognition of the rule but only 40 per cent conformity has not been answered. Nor is it clear what one does if there is only 50 per cent recognition and 50 per cent conformity, or 10 per cent recognition and 50 per cent conformity, or 10 per cent, and so on. Ethnographers working in the Highlands, recognizing an important deviation (statistically) from the rules of agnatic descent, patri-virilocal residence, and so on[1] have thus began to question the ideal type. This unsatisfactory procedure is what has led Leach to insist on the distinction being made between these two levels and is also, albeit not so obviously and in a somewhat different way, almost surely behind Barnes' assertion that the dogma of descent is "absent or held only weakly" in the Highlands, as well as the necessity he feels for drawing a distinction between "filiation as a mechanism of recruitment to social groups and to ascribed relationships and descent as a sanctioned and morally evaluated principle of belief" (1962:6). It is, first of all, entirely unsatisfactory to follow Radcliffe-Brown's procedure in establishing norms.

There cannot be one norm with a "double nature." There must be two, one ideological and one behavioral and both must be stipulated if our analyses is to proceed with clarity.[2] We must, then, determine if New Guinea natives believe in a principle of agnatic descent and also how closely they follow it. If it could be shown that they either do not recognize agnatic descent or that they do not, in fact, practice it, they cannot, by definition, be similar to the African model for the African societies upon which the model is based do both.

Furthermore, there must be a "dogma" of descent over and above the simple fact of recognition. It is not enough to simply recognize the agnatic principle as, for example, Western Europeans do with respect to surnames. There must be a belief that genealogical connections can actually be traced, and some genuine concern on the part of the people to trace them when necessary. Although genealogies may vary in length, generally speaking they should be fairly long, and remoter ancestors should be remembered. The fact that the relations between the living can only be established by reference to deceased persons should not be minimized or overlooked, and there has been a tendency on the part of New Guinea scholars to do so. That is, a genealogy must reflect the contempory situation even if this necessitates its modification. Modification must involve a concern with deceased ancestors. If there is no concern with modifying the genealogy or with the ancestors there can be no true dogma of descent and you cannot have a true lineage system.[3] Similarly, there must be also a concern for "agnatic solidarity." That is, the members of the lineage must believe themselves to be an agnatic group, they must feel some loyalty to one another as agnates and take some pride in their being. This kind of thing is presumably what Barnes has in mind when he says:

> But in most, though not in all, Highland societies the dogma of descent is absent or is held only weakly; the principle of recruitment to a man's father's group operates, but only concurrently with other principles, and is sanctioned not by an appeal to the notion of descent as such but by reference to the obligations of kinsfolk, differentiated according to relationship and encompassed within a span of only two or three generations. In each generation a substantial majority of men affiliate themselves with their father's group and in this way it acquires some agnatic continuity over the generations. It may be similar in demographic appearance and de facto kinship ties to a patrilineal group in which accessory segments are continually being assimilated to the authentic core, but its structure and ideology are quite different (1962:6).

The agnatic dogma is related also to a third criterion for a lineage, namely, its "corporateness." And, with the exception of Evans-Pritchard, who in his earlier work on the Nuer (1940) did not insist on the corporate character of lineages, most students of the African model would agree to its corporate nature:

> The most important feature of unilineal descent groups in Africa brought into focus by recent field research is their corporate organization (Fortes, 1953:25).

> Unilineal descent is a necessary foundation for the development of lineage groups, but it is not the efficient cause. Lineage groups are conceived of as segmentary in structure and corporate in function. Where unilineal descent obtains without groups of this character, there are no lineages in the sense of this theory. Lineages are thus corporate groups of a segmentary character defined in terms of unilineal descent (Smith, 1956:39).

The idea of "corporate," as used by the structuralists, follows both the concept of "corporation" (Maine, 1866) as well as that of "corporate group" (Weber, 1947). By corporate, anthropologists generally mean at least the following: (1) The lineage has continuity in time:

> Where the lineage concept is highly developed, the lineage is thought to exist as a perpetual corporation as long as any of its members survive. This means, of course, not merely perpetual physical existence ensured by the replacement of departed members. It means perpetual structural existence, in a stable and homogeneous society; that is, the perpetual exercise of defined rights, duties, office and social tasks vested in the lineage as a corporate unit (Fortes, 1953:27).

(2) The lineage, in relation to outsiders, is a "single legal personality":

> A lineage is a corporate group from the outside, that is in relation to other defined groups and associations. It might be described as a single legal personality -- "one person" as the Ashanti put it . . . all the members of a lineage are to outsiders jurally equal and represent the lineage when they exercise legal and political rights and duties in relation to society at large (Fortes, 1953:25).

(3) Probably most important is the fact that a lineage must be corporate in function, it must act as a unit at least for some purpose:

> Segments (lineages) which are simply defined by genealogical reference are purely heuristic, and of a different character from those embodied and defined organizationally. In the latter case, continuity of the units presupposes both contraposition with similar units, and recurrent common activities (Smith, 1956:57).

> A group may be spoken of as "corporate" when it possesses any one of a certain number of characters: If its members, or its adult male members, or a considerable proportion of them, come together occassionally to carry out some collective action -- for example, the performance of rites; if it has a chief or council who are regarded as acting as the representative of the group as a whole; if it possesses or controls property which is collective, as when a clan or lineage is a land-owning group (Radcliffe-Brown, 1950:41).

(4) As can be seen in the above a lineage, to be corporate, must also have leadership and authority. This, of course, to maintain its internal organization and co-ordinate its common action. This leads to a still further consideration. Namely, when you have unilineal descent groups and when the groups so formed are corporate you have lineages, but you still do not have the "African model" for this entails a third criteria, that of "segmentation," and hence political organization of a specific kind. Segmentary lineage systems (the African model), as M. G. Smith has shown us, are defined more importantly by political functions than by any others:

> . . . the fundamental concepts of segmentary theory centre about the definition of a system of political relations, and on the basis of this, differentiate lineages from other kinship groupings in terms of segmentary principles and structures which reflect and discharge political functions (1956:43).

This, of course, hinges upon certain definitions of "government," "political," and so on. For our purposes we will accept Smith's view, the essentials of which can be summed up:

> All societies manage their public affairs by a process known as government; this varies a great deal in form and content, but always involves two modes of action and their interrelation; one mode of action is administrative, has a hierarchic form, and expresses authority; the other mode is political action, which has a segmentary form and embodies relations of power . . . . Thus all societies have political and administrative organization, and hence both hierarchic and segmentary structures . . . . Since all political organization involves segmentation, and since political organization is only one aspect of the process of government, a distinction cannot be drawn between societies which are organized on segmentary principles, that is, lineage societies, and those which are not. What is crucial in any particular case is the nature of the segments. In some societies these may be lineages, in others localities, in others age-sets or regiments, in others cult-groups or associations, in others official orders, and so on. Moreover, political segments may be of different kinds in the same society at different levels, or in different situations; at one level lineages, at another age-sets may provide the units of political organization and action (1956:54).

Unilineal groups, if they do not form units for political competition, lack segmentary structure (except in genealogy), and hence do not conform to the African model. The principle of unilineal descent is the ideological base of lineage organization and defines the lineage as a corporate, perpetual group. Unilineal descent is, however, "simply an abstract category of kinship relations which can be invested with these variable political and administrative significances and used as a guiding principle for the organization of political and administrative relations." And, it thus "permits many deviations from genealogical descent as well as correspondences with it, without thereby being in any way invalidated or its dominance challenged" (Smith, 1956:64). In short:

> The lineage is an ideological conception of government character in some societies, just as the nation, the class, or the party is among ourselves. In lineage systems the principle of unilineal descent is re-defined, reinterpreted, followed, or deviated from as the conditions of governmental organization makes necessary or

> convenient. The lineage principle of itself does not entail organization in terms of lineage corporations, just as the democratic principle of itself does not entail democratic states, while the dictatorial principle is one thing, and dictatorship is another. The problem of lineage development, its form and formation, is therefore a problem of the governmental significance of lineage structures in any society (Smith, 1956:64).

Here again, it must be noted, the fundamental question of how one should determine the rules of unilineal descent becomes important. To what extent can the principle of unilineal descent be "re-defined," "reinterpreted," "followed or deviated from?" Where is the point at which an ideology of unilineal descent ceases to exist? When a majority of the members no longer believe in it? Or when a majority believes in it but do not in fact follow it? Here it becomes clear, it seems to me, that, as Leach argues (1961a, 1961b), the statistical norms can vary independently of the ideological, but only in the sense that the statistical approximate closely or diverge widely from the ideology. They cannot vary independently in the sense that you can find one without the other because, of course, one has meaning only in terms of the other. Once an ideology of patrilineal descent is clearly established as present, for example, one can proceed to the statistical, using the ideology as a reference point. Or, once the statistical facts have been ascertained the ideology can be investigated from that fixed point. What all investigators have had in common is their primary concern with ideology rather than statistical norms. The confusion here is simply that the ideology has been variously defined . . . as what the people say, or do, or, following Radcliffe-Brown, as I indicated, both. The fundamental issue as to how one establishes a rule, whether ideological or statistical, still remains, of course.

No matter how one might decide to establish a rule, however, we can see that the African model must consist of, at least (1) recognition of a principle of unilineal descent (ideological), (2) a dogma of descent,

(3) groups formed on this basis which are corporate (lineages) and, (4) the discharge of political and administrative functions by the groups so formed. It is only when all four of these features are present that you have "segmentary lineage systems" (the "African model").

Whether or not the statistical facts correspond to the ideological commitments is a different and separate consideration. It may be, for example, that you find an ideology of patrilineal descent, patri-virilocal residence, and so on, but more than 50 per cent of males do not follow the ideology in this respect. This is a very significant fact and one that should not be overlooked. But it does not necessarily mean that there is no ideology of patrilineal descent, or even that it is held weakly. It means, rather, that the statistical facts diverge widely from the ideology. If one finds, at a given moment in time, and in a given social system, a situation of such a kind, it is probably the case that either the ideology or the behavior, or both are changing. One would then wish to know why the discrepancy existed, what brought it about, what its effects on the rest of the situation are, and so on. A discrepancy of this type, however, between the actual behavior and the ideology can never by itself prove the absence of the latter.[4] Just because great numbers of people consumed alcohol during prohibition does not mean that the rule did not exist.

In addition to the four criteria noted above as crucial for the existence of a segmentary lineage system there are other less important features usually found associated as well. These features are sometimes afforded a prominence or an importance they do not warrant. The fact of "segmentation" is such a feature itself, and many writers still speak of "segmentary societies" as if this is a special type in spite of Smith's convincing arguments to the contrary:

> Political action is therefore that aspect or form of social action which seeks to influence decisions of policy by competition in power. That is to say, political action is always and inherently segmentary, expressed through the contraposition of competing groups or persons. This inseparability of political action from segmentary organization is the basis for the combination of these two concepts which lies at the foundation of the theory of segmentary lineage systems (1956:48).

It is not, then, the segmentary character per se that separates out one type of society from another, but is the nature of the segments involved in political action which, in some cases are lineages. The term "segmentary" cannot be used to characterize a specific type of society.

Related to this are certain facts about the process of segmentation itself. Barnes, for example, characterizes the "African model" as having what he terms "chronic segmentation" and implies that this is somehow typical:

> In Nuer, Tiv and Tallensi we have a clear picture of how, given adequate fertility, two brothers from their childhood gradually grow apart until, after several generations, their agnatic descendants come to form two distinct co-ordinate segments within a major segment. Even if some analytical queries remain the process over at least the first three generations is well understood. This kind of segmentation we may call chronic, for in a sense the division of the lineage into two branches is already present when the brothers are still lying in the cradle. The details of the process may be unpredictable but the line of cleavage is already determined. Segmentation or fission in New Guinea appears not to take this inexorable form; one cannot predict two generations in advance how a group will split . . . . Segmentation, as it were, is not chronic but catastrophic (1962:9).

While this appears to be true it should be made clear that no specific process of segmentation need be crucial to have a segmentary lineage system. It is only crucial that there be a process and whether this be "chronic" or "catastrophic" does not matter. It seems unlikely to me, however, that segmentation is unpredictable as Barnes asserts for the New Guinea case.

Long genealogical depth, too, although usually associated with segmentary lineage systems, is not itself a necessary feature and, as I indicated, is important only in so far as it betrays a dogma of descent. The concentration on length of genealogy with a corresponding neglect of features of dogma can be seen beautifully in the following summary by Salisbury:

> The hypothesis is that group unity and continuity are conceptualized in concrete terms, such as identification of the group with land, and a complex religious organization, when the group population has been stable and static. Genealogies are used for such conceptualizing when the group has been mobile and expanding, since genealogies give an appearance of stability. The hypothesis is supported when it is considered that even a 'stable' society uses genealogies to give an appearance of stability to its most changing element -- the internal structure of the lineages. Genealogies can and do perform all the functions outlined by Fortes -- conceptualizing group continuity and structure, expressing group segmentation in pseudo-historical form -- but these functions can be performed by other institutions. This paper is an attempt to specify some of the conditions under which genealogies are used by societies, in preference to alternative methods (1956:6).

The contention here that the functions of genealogies respecting group unit and continuity can be replaced by other institutions seems to me nothing short of an admission that the Siane are not a segmentary lineage system. Salisbury's insistence that they are reflects again the ubiquitous unilineal bias. We will return to this later in a different context.

The relative importance of still other features for segmentary lineage systems is not so easy to determine. The type of leadership and methods of arbitrating inter-group disputes are examples. The presence or absence of an agnatic ancestor cult is another, as is the position of women before and after marriage, as well as differences in status between agnatic vs non-agnatic members. One is tempted, for example, to argue that

non-agnates can never hold identical status in a descent group but must be "second-class citizens," but there may be exceptions to this.

Likewise, it is probably the case that women never give up membership in their agnatic group in societies practicing relatively strict unilineal agnatic descent as a recruitment principle. But, again, there may prove to be exceptional cases. And, it might be possible to have a strong dogma of agnatic solidarity, continuity, great genealogical depth and interest, and still not have an agnatic ancestor cult. Although one might reasonably expect to find these things they are probably not crucial features of segmentary lineage systems. Their presence or absence is not sufficient to establish the existence or non-existence of the "African model."

Leadership, however, may prove to be another matter although the paucity of material specifically on this topic makes generalization difficult. There do seem to be some important differences between leadership in segmentary lineage systems and the still questionable New Guinea societies. Barnes gives us a valuable hint of what might be at stake:

> In establishing a position of dominance in these transactions a man is seriously handicapped if he lacks the support of his agnates, but he cannot hope to succeed without utilizing in addition a wide range of other connexions, some matrilateral, others affinal and yet others lacking a genealogical basis. If he is successful it is his local group, usually but not invariably consisting of his close agnates, which more than others enjoy his reflected glory. Among Tiv and Tallensi, and less certainly among Nuer, it seems that a man acquires dominance primarily because he belongs to the dominant local group, whereas in the New Guinea Highlands it might be said that a local group becomes dominant because of the big men who belong to it. The contrast is greatest between the Highlands and those African societies where leadership within lineage segments is determined more by rules of seniority than by individual effort (1962:7).

The New Guinea leader, it is clear, is not always a representative of his descent group, he may be able to command the cooperation of members of

other descent groups than his own simply by virtue of his reputation. Indeed, there are cases in which individual men leave their descent group in order to ally with a successful leader. Leadership is achieved, not as ribed in New Guinea, and a leader is not simply primus inter pares but is constantly striving for dominance. Leadership, beyond the level of the smallest segment is not importantly linked to seniority in New Guinea as it is in Africa in such a way that automatically the eldest member of the lineage or clan is leader.

> . . . the head of the lineage is usually the group's most senior man. But beyond this level of segmentation authority is achieved. The most important men are "big men" or "men with a name," individuals who attract followers and wield influence because, in the first instance, they possess qualities which their fellows admire. There is some expectation that a son will succeed his father. People believe that the character of the parent is transmitted to his offspring, and a man of eminence may be likely to seek and to encourage in his son the qualities which inspire confidence and dependence. Indeed, the son of a "big man" may have a slight advantage over others -- access to greater wealth, for example -- and various pressures may induce him to emulate his father (Read, 1959:427).

A related factor here, also mentioned briefly in the first chapter, has to do with political relations between maximal segments and hence, again, leadership. Smith has argued, and we have for our purposes accepted his argument, that the distinctive features of segmentary lineage systems is the particular combination of political and administrative functions taken over by the descent group. And, in so far as these consist of external as well as internal relations there must be agencies of some kind to deal with them. Smith has shown what kinds of administrative agencies are available in African societies for regulating external affairs:

> It is, furthermore, easy to show on the data from these types of society that beyond the internal administrative systems of the lineage units there are agencies of a predominantly administrative character, which operate to reduce the latent dangers of conflict between maximal lineages for the stability of the society as a

> whole, and that, from an analytic point of view, these agencies resemble rudimentary offices. Thus the Tallensi statuses of tendaana and chief; the omuseni, omulasi, ovwali, dream-prophet, rain-maker, and war-leader of the Bantu Kavirondo; and the leopard-skin chief and prophet among the Nuer, are all agencies of this type . . . . By means of these institutionalized positions, administrative action limiting the range and type of political conflict among the major political units of the societies concerned was effected (1956:53).

The point, of course, is simply that no one, to date at least, has denoted equivalent institutionalized positions fulfilling these functions in the Highlands. This is not to assert dogmatically their absence but, again, only to suggest that if New Guinea groups were approached in this way the features which distinguish them from the African model might emerge more clearly. The question of whether such positions are crucial to segmentary lineage systems has not been answered as yet, even in the African case, but there may well prove to be a distinctive type of leadership and authority structure above and beyond the segments themselves, and this may well prove to be present in the African case but absent in the New Guinea case.

With all of the abovementioned in mind as a guide to what it is we must find in the New Guinea case if we are to have a society resembling the African model let us turn now to a detailed, quantitative description of one New Guinea Eastern Highlands group. It is only in this way that we can attempt to see beyond the confusions apparent in the literature for, even though ethnographer after ethnographer has recognized important deviations from and exceptions to the African model, there has been little attempt to see the New Guinea type in terms of its own inherent qualities and tendencies rather than as an aberrant example of the African type. There has been slight disposition to look beyond the unilineal principles and methodology first stressed by A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, a good example, I think, of the unilineal bias which has, unfortunately, been reinforced by

certain ideological and behavioral similarities between New Guinea and African societies. Furthermore, as I hope to show, even where attempts have been made to progress beyond the ideal type these have too often been handicapped by still other biases, most importantly but not exclusively associated with structural anthropology.

I will attempt to deal with both the ideology and the de facto behavior so as to avoid certain of the problems mentioned above. I will attempt to measure one New Guinea group against the ideal type stipulated above and to show that it does not fit, as well as why it does not. I will offer an alternative conceptualization and review existing hypotheses pertaining to the development of segmentary lineage systems in order to explain the differences between African and New Guinea societies.

Let me make clear at the outset that I do not believe the case I am describing to be wholly typical of the Highlands. Indeed, as I will show later, it is because it is in some ways probably divergent that it is aa illuminating as it is. Even so, there are striking similarities with other groups as near as I can tell from the literature and discussions with others and it must be left, to a certain extent, up to the reader to draw his own conclusions as to how representative a case it may be. It is surely more representative of the Eastern Highlands than the Western Highlands, which is to be expected, and the similarities become fewer as you go from East to West.

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

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

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
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

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
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Nikiwa
Ohawapawa
Gwawaigi
Tikikipawa
Lagi
Khawawa
Kawawila
Lagi
Giaigiawa
Hapalagu
Agawa
Kawilapa
Hawa-gawigila
Akawa
Mikiwapa
Ewika
Likikawawa
Aka
Yagawa
Tikikipawa
Kakikawa
Yapa
Agawa
Lukigawa
Fikikawa
Angawi
Zawa
Akawa
Akawi

CHAPTER III.

KOROFEIGU SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Korofeigu, in the Eastern Highlands of the Territory of New Guinea, is the name of a place, a people, and what we will, for our purposes, designate as a tribe. As a place it is a piece of territory of approximately ten square miles located at the southernmost end of the Bena Bena valley close to its junction with the Asaro river, and roughly twenty miles by road from the town of Goroka. Korofeigu territory is bounded on the north by the Bena Bena river, on the east by a section of the main Highlands road linking Goroka and Kainantu, to the south and west by a crest of ridge and a tributary of the Dunantina river respectively. The ten square miles of land are claimed by the approximately 750 persons who reside on and cultivate them, and, as we shall see, by an indeterminate number of other people, widely scattered. These 750 people constitute an autonomous local group, the largest group within which warfare is prohibited, as well as the largest single unit which acts as one for any purpose and owes no loyalty or allegiance to any larger body. Prior to European control there were probably twenty to thirty such tribal groups inhabiting the area now designated as the Bena Bena census division.[1]

For purposes of warfare, pig exchanges, and male initiations tribal groups like Korofeigu usually, but not always, act as single units. According to their ideology the Korofeigans are one people and they live together on the same ground, "because their ancestors did." There is no belief in a common ancestor, or even a common origin for the tribe as a whole.

Korofeigu, as a tribe, is divided into four exogamous groups which are, according to their expressed ideology, patrilineal descent groups. These groups are also "local" in the sense that the members of each reside together in a common territory in one or more villages. Each of these four groups is a corporate entity in that it has clearly defined land rights within the larger Korofeigu territory. Its members are said to be agnatically related and are all "brothers and sisters." Each group is named and the members of each group believe they have a common ancestor. No one can trace their precise relationship to the ancestor but neither are they concerned to do so (unless asked to do so by an anthropologist). The four Korofeigu groups, from largest to smallest, are called Nagamitobo, Nupasafa, Wai'atagusa and Benimeto. This type of group can legitimately be called a "clan," provided one does not mean that the members are in fact recruited exclusively on the basis of agnatic descent or that there is a full blown dogma of descent which binds them together. That is, the people will state that they are all related to a common ancestor, that they are agnates, that men should reside with their fathers, should be loyal to their agnates, and so on, and this is importantly the way they perceive the world. But this is clearly an ideology of agnatic descent rather than a genuine dogma of descent and in addition there are very significant deviations in de facto behavior from the ideology.

The term "clan" as I am using it here means essentially what Murdock (1949) means by the term. That is, it is first a compromise kin group:

> A compromise kin group is commonly larger than an extended family, but the alignment of kinsmen is identical. The principal distinction is the addition of a unilinear rule of descent as an integral factor in the structure of the group. The core of a unilocal extended family always consists of persons of one sex

> who are in fact unilinearly related, but this relationship is purely incidental, need not be formulated, and is frequently not even recognized. The bond of union is primarily and often exclusively residential. In a compromise kin group, on the other hand, the unilinear relationship of the core of the group is at least as crucial an integrating fact as the residential alignment (Murdock, 1949:66).

Secondly, the clan must meet the following three criteria: (1) it must be based explicitly on a unilinear rule of descent which unites its central core of members, (2) it must have residential unity, and (3) the group must exhibit actual social integration (Murdock, 1949:68). One further feature which should be made clear is that females married to males of the clan are also included in clan membership according to Murdock (1949:69). Although Murdock's definition appears to fit the Bena Bena case much more sensibly than other definitions, there are more fundamental problems involved as we will see, having to do with how one determines whether or not any given criterion is being met in any given case. That is, how does one determine whether women change group membership at marriage? What constitutes a unilinear rule of descent? And so on.

The clan is by far the most significant entity for the Bena Bena. Membership varies in size from few, as in remnant clans, up to as many as 300-350 people. The average size of the four Korofeigu clans, which is probably fairly representative, is 188 persons. Each of these clans is politically autonomous, claims its own territory which is, of course, part of the larger Korofeigu ground, and acts as one for all purposes vis-a-vis other clans. Although the tribe, as mentioned above, can and sometimes does function as one for purposes of warfare, initiation and pig festivals, even these three activities, as we will see, can be more properly interpreted as clan functions.

Clans, in turn, can be subdivided into smaller units which we will refer to as "sub-clans" (see genealogy). These sub-clan groups are not named, they are strictly exogamous, and are said to be patrilineal. Each of the sub-clans has a common ancestor who is considered to be one of five brothers. The five brothers are the sons of the clan founder. The majority of sub-clan members cannot tell you the name of their common ancestor without consulting an older man first. In some cases no one can tell you who their common ancester was. But in either case even the old men, who are regarded by the people as the storehouses of group knowledge, cannot trace precise genealogical connections for anyone directly back to the ancestor in question. Sub-clan groups do not hold land. They might be considered corporate, however, in that they hold common religious paraphernalia but even this, as we will see, is questionable. For certain purposes, however, primarily funerals, the sub-clan acts as a single unit vis-a-vis other like units. Sub-clan groups are referred to by using the name of the oldest living male member. They are local in that the members live on the common territory of the clan, but they are not local in the sense that all the members live together in a single village or neighborhood, as they frequently do not (see map).

Sub-clans further sub-divide into smaller units. These groups, again, are not named, are patrilineal, exogamous, and have shallow but precise genealogies. The members of these groups claim to be agnatically related and they can trace their precise relationships if called upon to do so. These groups might be termed "lineages" but they do not hold land nor can they be said to be in any way, corporate. Lineages of this character are little more than extended family groups, the members tend to help one another and sometimes garden and build houses together but the members do not always

reside in a common village or neighborhood. Lineages, too, are referred to by using the name of the oldest living male member.

It seems fairly clear that Korofeigu groups of all types (except for the tribe) can be characterized as patrilineal descent groups, at least in terms of ideology. As, indeed, can all Highlands New Guinea groups reported to date. The situation for Nupasafa clan, if diagramed structurally, would look like this:



Figure 1

Gooyi is considered the first ancestor of Nupasafa group. It is emphasized that he had five sons, Okanupao, Korabina, etc., who are the sub-clan founders. The five sub-clans that exist contemporaneously thus cite their relationships one to the other albeit somewhat imperfectly. Kikipe, for example, the oldest living male in his sub-clan, cannot remember past his own father and thus the connection to the ancestor. Afooya, on the other hand, although he remembers his father and grandfather,

cannot remember the link between grandfather and sub-clan founder. The other three, Gobei, Eopave and Benaranofi, who are considerably older, claim that their fathers are sons of the sub-clan founders, a very obvious example of genealogical telescoping. The genealogical depth of sub-clans, then, is very shallow, usually being four to five generations only.

With the exception of three adult males and their children, every male member of Nupasafa clan claims to be a member of one of the five sub-clan groups, even though they cannot all state a precise genealogical connection. They consider themselves members and are so considered by those who actually can trace the genealogical connections. The three exceptions will be discussed later, the point to be made here is simply that others who claim to be members of Nupasafa group (as defined above) are not in fact members, just like the three above, but there is a fundamental difference in that some acknowledge that they are not related and some do not. If any of these remain in Nupasafa, that is, either those claiming membership or those not claiming it, their children will almost surely be incorporated eventually as sub-clan members.

But it must be emphasized that this is the verbal picture of the group -- its ethnosociology, given by informants. Thus they describe their relationships if called upon to do so. This is the ideological, not the sociological picture. It is the ". . . charter, in Malinowski's sense, for a given configuration of contempory social relations" (Barnes, 1962:6). Barnes and others have suggested that ". . . in most, though not all, Highland societies the dogma of descent is absent or is held only weakly . . ." (1962:6). In the terms I have chosen to employ we see that an ideology is definitely present, quite definitely, and as such it cannot be weakly held. Whether or not a genuine dogma of descent is present remains to be seen.

But it is clear that ". . . the principle of recruitment to a man's father's group operates, but only concurrently with other principles. . ." (Barnes, 1962:6).

It is necessary now to turn to the de facto recruitment and membership principles if we are to understand fully the structure and functioning of New Guinea groups. Let us first consider a putative "group" which would be involved if all of the persons who, on the basis of recognized descent could call themselves Nupasafans were members. We will refer to this hypothetical entity for convenience sake as "x." Unlike the clan, as discussed above, this putative group, which could be called a sib following Murdock (1949:47), has no expression in common residence, joint action, and is in no way corporate. We have seen that descent, ideologically, is a recruitment principle. Now we must examine the de facto behavior to illustrate the broad discrepancy involved in this case between ideology and action.

Of the 110 male residents of Nupasafa clan 33, or 30 per cent are non-agnates. That is, they can trace no genealogical connections through male links with other members of the group. Of the 122 female residents, 78, or 64 per cent are non-agnates. So of the total number of residents 111 of 232, or 48 per cent, are non-agnates. This portion, of course, naturally includes the women who are married into the clan. These married women, for all practical purposes are just as much members of the group as are the males. Indeed, collectively they are its backbone, although women individually are not as important as men. Half of the clan, then, are non-agnates. To say that Nupasafa is patrilineal in a statistical sense would require qualification, although one might, as if often done, say that the clan is organized around an "agnatic core."

The agnatic core in this case would be 35 male adults, 42 male children, 5 adult females and 39 female children, 121 out of 232 people -- just slightly over half. There are various ways one might wish to consider this; one might, for example, say that out of 232 residents, 40 (35 adult males and 5 adult females) constitute the agnatic core. Or, that the total of 121 agnatically related persons constitute the agnatic core. In the latter sense the agnatic core consists of a relatively large number of children with a smaller number of adults to look after them. Usually, however, when we speak of patrilineal descent groups of this type we are thinking in terms of a core of adult males, so let us consider for a moment, only the adult males of Nupasafa.

Of the 35 married males 2 are teen-agers still observing the avoidance rules respecting their new brides. They have nothing whatsoever to say about group decisions, they still live from their father's gardens, and so on. They are, in effect, still children. Three others who are slightly older do visit their wives but, like the former, have nothing to say in decision making; they do not garden or build houses for their wives as yet, and in fact are seldom present, preferring instead to wander about courting, playing 'lucky' or stealing pigs. Of the remaining 30, one is a deviant individual who has never been married and is considered to be totally irresponsible; 4 are so old or so incapacitated as to be useless and play little or no part in the normal group activities. Five of the 25 still remaining, although of Nupasafa descent were actually raised in other places and returned to Nupasafa as adults. Thus of the 232 total members of Nupasafa clan, 20, or less than one-tenth, are mature active males who have lived their lives in the clan territory and who would constitute, so to speak, the true agnatic core.

Of the 16 non-agnatic adult males resident in Nupasafa, 5 are too young to participate importantly in group activities. They reside in Nupasafa because their fathers, either real or adopting, do. The remaining 11, however, are fully mature males who participate directly and actively in all group tasks. This brings up some additional points which should be stressed for, although in most of these 11 cases an investigator can uncover a kinship bond of some sort between these individuals and the rest of the clan it is misleading to infer from this that it explains their presence in the clan. That is, the motive for their residence is not that they have kinsmen there. This is a very important factor to bear in mind because it is all too easy to explain behavior in terms of kinship obligations whereas, in fact, as I will argue later, the kinship bonds are secondary in importance and are, in fact, in many cases, the result of residence. We find in this particular situation that six men (all of the adult members of Kikipe's sub-clan) reside in Nupa as a result of their fathers having taken refuge there after a raid many years before. As I have indicated above these men claim to be a sub-clan of Nupa, descendants of one of Gooyi's sons. This claim is supported by the other members of Nupasafa and it is only because I happened to uncover a former marriage that would have been incestuous that the full truth came out.[2] Two other men moved to Nupasafa because of the fear of sorcery in their natal groups. One of these men is married to a Nupa woman but this is not significant as a motive for their change of residence, and, as we will see, the availability of land is not a factor either. The second man lives with his wife and children in Nupa because of his fear of sorcery. He does have a sister in Nupa, married to a Nupa man, but he actually resided in Nupa prior to her marriage. He was allowed to do this as a "friend." We will return to

this point later. Two other men reside in Nupa with their Nupa wives, two of the three men mentioned who do not actually claim to be members of Nupa when asked. One of these is a Bena native from a nearby tribe. He has land in his own clan territory but prefers to live in his wife's clan because of her brother who is a powerful and influential man who patronizes him. He himself is somewhat of a milque-toast and, although he sometimes says he will eventually return to his own ground it seems unlikely that he will and his children will almost surely be considered Nupasafans. The other man in this category is a native from the Sepik river who first came to the Highlands as an ambulance driver. While working in Goroka he married a Nupa woman and, after being fired for an infraction of rules, moved with his wife to Nupa. He will probably eventually work in Goroka again or perhaps even go back to the Sepik but in the meanwhile he participates in most Nupa activities including even religious ones to a certain extent. If he leaves his wife and children behind the children will, of course, be considered Nupa. The remaining non-agnatic male resides in Nupa because his father resided there years before for a short time, a reason they believe sufficient for allowing him membership. This man is not even a Bena speaker but is a Bena speaking Kamano.[3] He could return to his own ground except that he murdered a previous wife from that area and is afraid of retaliation from her clan. There is, then, a core of participating members which is primarily responsible for the major decisions respecting all group activities and is the pool from which leadership is drawn. It consists of 20 agnates and 11 non-agnates. To argue that Nupasafa clan is patrilineal, even in terms of its "core," is a rather serious oversimplification.

We have seen up to this point that 48 per cent of the members of Nupasafa clan are non-agnates. Forty-eight per cent, I believe, is a substantial figure that must be given serious consideration in spite of the ideology of descent. I have talked only about adult males in so far as decision making and action goes, but it is clear that the daily action of all group members, not just their more formalized participation, is also relevant to our discussion. This means simply that the local group, the workaday personnel the ethnographer observes, talks with, follows, and so forth; the group which is referred to in the literature as the "localized clan," "clan-oriented parish," or even "descent group," might be profitably considered an agnatic group in terms of its ideology but it is not truly an agnatic group in any statistical or behavioral sense of the term and, likewise, cannot be considered to have a genuine "dogma" of descent.

But what of the presumtive membership of x, were there such a thing? Where do they reside? What happens if one attempts to trace down all of the persons known to be related agnatically? Do the persons who are known to be related agnatically form im any interactional sense a group? Are they corporate? What do they do? This is another side of the coin, one which seems rarely to be considered in discussing New Guinea groups.

In the case of Nupasafa one would find that of 61 known male adult agnates 26, roughly 43 per cent, do not reside within the confines of the territory sharing their name or with the group (clan) that utilizes that territory. Out of 57 male children known to be agnates, 15, or 26 per cent (the children of the 43 per cent), reside in other places. This means that 41 of a total of 118 known male agnates of Nupasafa, or 35 per cent, do not reside in their "hereditary" territory. Suggestive as they stand, these figures do not fully convey the situation. Non-resident adult males under

consideration here includes only those known absolutely to be agnates. Several others are thought to be agnates but the people are not completely certain and I have not included them in this category. The category male children does not include all who are known to be agnates, but only those who are personally known. All informants were certain that each absent agnate had more children than they could cite, but as they had never seen them all they had little idea of the true number. If the full figures were available, I am confident that non-resident male agnates of Nupasafa would easily exceed 50 per cent of the total. And the fact that they are continually being forgotten, is in itself, indicative of the de-emphasis on agnation as a criterion for recruitment.

Let us look at similar statistics for females. As one might expect from the residence pattern, 22 out of 27 native adult females, or 81 per cent of the agnatic group, resides in other places. Nineteen out of 57 native female children, or 33 per cent, reside elsewhere. This is a total of 41 agnatic females out of 84, or 49 per cent who reside elsewhere. Again, the figures are incomplete, for the same thing is true of females as of males: I am sure some adult females have been completely forgotten[4] and I include only females and female children known and known to be agnates.

If one speaks, then, of a putative entity, x, formed strictly by combining all individuals according to their descent, one finds more than 50 per cent of the members, both male and female, are probably resident elsewhere. Is it a group? The answer, of course, is no, not by any standard definition. The members never come together for any purpose. They do not participate as a group in any activity and, indeed, many of them have never seen each other and have no probability of ever seeing each

other. The number of both men and women forgotten is an index of the discontinuity of these persons as a group. Nevertheless, according to the procedure set forth by Radcliffe-Brown (1948), a group with the composition of Nupasafa clan would probably by classed as a unilineal descent group in so far as most of the members profess patrilineal descent, patrivirilocal residence and so on, and roughly half of the members follow the professed ideology. If, however, one insists on a clear distinction between ideology and behavioral facts one can see that to classify Nupasafa clan as a unilineal descent group and attempt to treat it in accordance is a great oversimplification. Clearly there is a great discrepancy between the ideology of patrilineal descent, patri-virilocal residence and associated factors and the statistical norms of behavior, with at least 50 per cent of all known agnates probably residing and participating elsewhere. Does this mean that Nupa is not truly patrilineal? That the dogma of descent is only weakly held? That there is less group solidarity? That Nupa does not fit the African model?

It must, first of all, be made clear that in Korofeigu at least, men living apart from their descent group are not thereby second-class citizens. They may be, and in rare cases they are, but generally speaking no real difference in status can be determined on the ground of nativity. One man may be more successful in the group than another but if so it is because of personal merit, not because one is a member of the majority descent group resident there and the other not. On very rare occasions I have heard a man remark, invariably in the heat of a serious argument, "so-and-so is not a Nupa. Don't listen to his talk." But this is never taken seriously by the others and, furthermore, when it happens the opponent usually replies, "Yes, my place is so-and-so and I can easily take my children

and pigs and go back there." One understands this and its importance, I think, in view of the great value placed upon group strength -- and the need for group strength to be maintained at all costs. The man who replies in this manner is therefore exercising a powerful threat which is always heeded. The maintenance of group strength is as much a part of the ideology as is the notion of patrilineal descent. And, for reasons I will discuss later, the commitment to maintain the group strength can and does override descent as a recruitment principle. The result is that rights conferred by residence at least equal those established by birth. The fact that the majority of men in any given group may be living there because of descent does not in itself disprove this contention. It is false only if an instance can be cited which demonstrates that a member by descent actually has precedence over a member by residence. This situation, however, as we will see, does not arise in Korofeigu.

Potentially, the members of Nupasafa clan retain rights in Nupasafa land. They have the unquestioned right to reside in Nupasafa if they wish; it does not have to be extended to them. But in this system, although the rights held by agnates living elsewhere are real enough, they are seldom exercised; they are for most persons theoretical rights, not practiced. In any case, the land rights of a Nupasafa agnate, even when resident, are not greater than those of a non-agnatic Nupasafa resident.

Ownership of land is based on tillage, in addition to descent and inheritance. Any individual who resides in Nupasafa, expresses his intention of remaining there and cultivates a plot of ground, owns it.[4] It could be argued that he owns it forever, but, in fact, he does not claim it forever, nor does he pass on all land acquired in his lifetime to his heirs. During his lifetime a man will probably cultivate some

seven or eight, or possibly more, plots of ground. Each of his sons will receive one of these plots when he dies. These will be the most recent ones he has cultivated, which, because of the shifting pattern of cultivation, will usually be the closest to where he is living when he dies. Plots of ground cultivated and hence owned earlier, are simply forgotten. The people keep moving on over the land as new gardens are planted and may never return to the original ground. If they do return, such a long time will have elapsed that land claims will have been forgotten. Land is not a problem; from the point of view of the Korofeigans at least, there is an abundance. The Korofeigu situation appears very similar to that described by Reay for the Kuma (1959:9).

The relative abundance of land and the fact that land disputes seldom arise, make it virtually impossible to verify the contention that rights based upon residence are equal to those based upon descent. If a Nupasafa agnate from another place wanted to come back and claim land, for example, he could do so with no difficulty. But the same is true of a non-agnatic person, provided he gets permission to join the group at all, and that is not difficult as new members are always welcome. The question of a land dispute between an agnate and a non-agnate could never arise because of the ready availability of land. The question thus remains hypothetical. The rare disputes encountered are settled by establishing who first planted the plot of ground in question, not by reference to agnation.

Paradoxically, ultimate ownership of Nupasafa land is not truly in the hands of any <u>group</u> because the totality of individuals who collectively hold rights to land do not constitute a group. They do not because, as I have indicated, land is owned by the individuals who have cultivated it and who reside on it <u>plus</u> those who have rights in it but do not reside

on it. That is to say, some of it is owned by residents of Nupasafa clan and some is owned by members of the putative "x," who are not living on the ground in question. But the people who reside on it and use it effectively control the land.

The picture becomes even more complicated, however, because individuals hold theoretical rights in various clans which they might exercise if they wished. These rights, based on a variety of principles usually remain "theoretical," just like the rights of non-resident agnates. Thus, for example, a man might hold rights in the group he was born into, equivalent rights in a group in which he was raised, the same rights in a group his father was raised in, his mother's group (either her natal group or one she happened to be raised in), and so on. These are rights in the sense that the individual involved could probably go to any of these groups and settle down with no trouble whatsoever. In addition to these groups where his presence would be welcome, he could also probably live with his wife's group, or one she was raised in, a group in which his or her brother had been raised, one into which his wife's sister is married or even one where he or his father happened to have friends for one reason or another.

All of these choices are probably not open to any given individual but he will be welcome in more than one group. There are theoretically no limits with respect to which groups these might be, but because of the nature of the terrain, population density, how far a man dare walk, and so on, certain practical limits are imposed. A man must be known personally by other groups before he is admitted, of course, and, although friendship cannot be ruled out as an important factor, it is easier to become personally acquainted through some bond of kinship. People do take up residence with friends as well as with kinsmen, a fact which is

surely not always clear in the literature.[5] Which group a man elects to reside in is a personal matter as are the choices he makes with respect to other kinds of social interaction. Indeed, it is just this consideration that has posed some of the most critical problems for students of New Guinea social structure, this fact of diffuse individualization.

Related to this and, indeed, a very important part of it, is the fact that kinship terms are easily assigned to all persons who reside in Nupasafa irrespective of why they reside there. Generally speaking such persons are indistinguishable from those who are of local descent. This is much more than simply a convenience or a way of classifying people, of course, for it has important behavioral implications as well. Marriage rules, for example, apply to these people as well as to native born. Thus none of the immigrant men or their children could ever marry a Nupa girl. Such a marriage would be incestuous, even though the people, if asked, would admit that no biological connection existed. Likewise, the only three clans with which Nupasafa will not contract marriages at all are groups with which some of their ancestors are said to have resided for a time, people who therefore are like "brothers and sisters" and cannot marry.

What this means, of course, is that the simple fact of residence in a Korofeigu group can and does determine kinship. People do not, necessarily, reside where they do because they are kinsmen, rather, they become kinsmen because they reside there. Although local connections and non-biological ties have been stressed by many authors and their importance re-emphasized by Titiev (1943) and Murdock (1949), and though virtually all investigators have recognized that membership in New Guinea groups is to a large extent open and that it need not be based exclusively

on agnatic ties (or even cognatic or affinal ones), the easy ascription of kinship has received little attention. It is most often simply ignored and exceptions to the agnatic principle are explained solely in terms of cognation or affinity. For example, Brown, in an article written to deal specifically with this problem says:

> By using 'non-agnatic ties,' I intend to refer to a person's ties with a large field of recognized kin and affines outside the patrilineal exogamous clan. A man's non-agnates include: his mother and her agnates, his mother's mother and her agnates, his father's mother and her agnates, his wife and her agnates, his sister's husband and his agnates (1962:58).

Note here the emphasis on the biological foundation of kinship. Except, of course, for affines. This interpretation may be quite correct; I am merely suggesting that if we take the notion that residence can determine kinship, which is an eminently feasible one, and if we insist on distinguishing between rules and their observance, we might arrive at a very different interpretation of the facts of New Guinea social structure. Essentially the same picture is given by Reay of the Kuma. She says, very perceptively:

> It is expedient for the Kuma to be uninterested in genealogies, because the lack of strict reckoning facilitates the assimilation into agnatic descent groups of people who are not in fact agnatic kin. Genealogical shallowness is useful to them. The Kuma's consciousness that the clan is by no means permanent or unchanging is accompanied by an over-emphasis of clanship and an insistence on its continuance; the assimilation of outsiders is glossed over and hidden (1959:35).

This description fits the Korofeigu case beautifully. In Kuma, apparently, the exceptions to the unilineal principle seem, again, always either cognatic or affinal kin. It may be the case that in Chimbu and Kuma no one except cognates and affines are recruited, but this is most certainly not true in Korofeigu. It might be argued, of course, that in any of these areas non-agnates (of whatever kind) constitute only a small

minority and are therefore not important. But, as van der Leeden has reminded us, the statistical facts need not follow the ideological commitments, "a quantitative analysis fails to give a reliable impression of the truly important structural elements" (1960:127). Thus the actual number of non-agnates is not all-important with respect to the principles involved, nor are the principles simply a reflection of the statistical facts. This becomes even more clear, perhaps, if we consider also the "over-emphasis" of clanship mentioned by Reay.

Even though the description given earlier of Korofeigu social organization is objectively valid there are certain additional facts which must not be overlooked. There is, first of all, as Reay suggest, an over-emphasis on clanship. This occurs at the expense of tribe, sub-clan, and lineage, as well as the nuclear family. It takes the form of denying the existence of smaller units within the clan, emphasizing that individuals should help everyone, not just lineage and sub-clan members, and stressing that clan loyalties are paramount. It also is seen in the use of clan rather than tribal names when denoting one's group membership and in the fact that the majority of group rituals are conducted at the clan rather than at lower levels. This has very important bearing on any comparison with the African situation. The tribe exists, of that there can be do doubt, but there is reason to question its importance as well as the functions which it ideally could be said to perform.

Ideally the four Korofeigu clans join each other for purposes of defense and offense, sometimes for initiations and pig festivals. But it must be made clear that this was not always and invariably the case. There were occasions when one or two clans would be fighting against a common enemy and the other Korofeigu clans for one reason or another would not

participate. Indeed, I know of one case at least in which Nupasafa allied with Kapakamaligi clans against Hofaga clans who were being helped by Nagamitobo and Wai'atagusa. This indicates clan autonomy of the most important and fundamental kind. Likewise, it was not always the case that the four clans would hold initiations or pig festivals at the same time, although they certainly preferred to do so if possible. The fact is, not all four clans would have enough eligible youths or sufficient pigs at the same time, the result being that only two or three Korofeigu clans would initiate simultaneously with one or more clans from a friendly tribe nearby. The point is that although Korofeigu is a tribe, and although the four constitutent clans ideally united as one for certain purposes, practical considerations sometimes interfered so that the ideal was not always attained. The tribe exists only by agreement of the clans that unite to form it, the clans do not exist as segments subordinate to some higher body. The tribe, in short, is not truly "sovereign" whereas clans can be so considered.

Sub-clans, too, exist, and the investigator can attribute functions to them. But the ideology stresses the clan and tends to deny the existence of sub-groups within it. Howlett, for example, working for three months in Korofeigu, was unable to define any group smaller than the clan[6] and both she and I were told repeatedly that such sub-groups did not exist. And, even after months of field work, when I discussed sub-clans, for which there is a generic term, informants would say that it was not right for men to help only their sub-clan members but that they should help all clansmen equally. The Korofeigu sub-clan, as I have conceived of it, seems to be somewhat similar to what Salisbury terms a "lineage" in Siane,

in that it is smaller than a clan, has no traceable ancestor, and apparently must be discovered by the investigator. But there the similarity ends:

> A smaller size of grouping than that of the men's house may be recognized, although there is no native term for it, and such groups have no proper names. This group can be isolated by the observer as soon as he starts to collect material on kinship, land tenure, and inheritance, and, although it has no traceable common ancestor, I propose to use the term 'lineage' to describe it (Salisbury, 1962:17).

One must be cautious in attributing functions to such groups. As I will discuss later, Korofeigu sub-clans seem to function almost exclusively with respect to funeral arrangements.

Lineages, too, as they can be said to occur are largely in the mind of the investigator. They do exist, of course, in the sense that individuals will claim to be of one "line" as opposed to another "line" of a sub-clan, but this has little significance for behavior and becomes important mainly because the question is posed. A lineage is simply not a corporate group here, it has no special functions, and receives little if any emphasis on the part of the people. By far the most significant units in Korofeigu social structure are individuals and clans and this fact is most significant when considering the African model for New Guinea. A social organization built upon individuals and clans is not the same as one built up around lineages of various grade.

The importance of individuals in New Guinea has repeatedly been stressed. And the importance of the clan has been stressed in like manner. The significance of both units can be seen in the following quotation:

> The clan is normally the largest effective unit in Siane society, occupying one village and comprising about two hundred individuals. It is an exogamous group within which marriage is forbidden, it is a kinship group, where everyone uses either kinship terms or personal names for everyone else; it has a clan name. There is, however no native term for 'clan' as such . . . . To express the idea of clanship, the phrase we rako or 'one man' can be used in certain contexts; thus 'Famti' and I are 'one man' means we are clan-mates (Salisbury, 1962:14).

An organization emphasizing almost exclusively the clan and individuals is quite different from one emphasizing the clan, maximal, major, minor and minimal lineages (Evans-Pritchard, 1940:192). And, even though as I have indicated one can discuss sub-clans and lineages as smaller units within the clan, their significance is minimal -- certainly when compared to the formalized "lineage systems" of Africa. This is (in part at least) what Barnes has in mind when he refers cryptically to the "absence or weakness of a dogma of agnatic descent" (1962:7), and it is this fact, along with many factors related to it, which constitutes the heart of the problem. But the important facts of social structure take on meaning only when seen against certain major features of culture.

CHAPTER IV.

KOROFEIGU SOCIAL STRUCTURE, CONTINUED

There are, it appears, some similarities between the social organization of New Guinea and that of Africa. These similarities, however, are largely superficial. One can, in the New Guinea case, isolate and discuss clans and certain kinds of clan segments although these latter are largely in the eye of the beholder. There are kinship ties that bind but these are very easily ascribed. There is an ideology of patrilineal descent but no real dogma of descent. There are lineages but no lineage system, and there is a segmentary pattern but the structure of authority and the process of segmentation is quite different. There is a proliferation of ties at the individual level but there is, as we will see, and contrary to Barnes' assertion (1962), strong clan solidarity. The multitude of questions posed can be answered only after a fairly detailed account of certain Korofeigu customs.

It has been stated by Fortes and accepted by Barnes for discussion of the New Guinea materials that matrimonial alliances are of two types, either they are "restricted to a certain group, so that enduring connubial alliances, either symmetrical or one-way, are maintained and renewed down the generations," or they are "deliberately dispersed" (Barnes, 1962:8). In the latter case, deliberately dispersed, marriages are such that "every marriage between two groups is an impediment to further marriages between them" (1962:8) and this "latter alternative is more common in the Highlands and accords well with the emphasis on a multiplicity of freshly established interpersonal connexions rather than on group and intergroup solidarity"

(1962:8). The important implication of this view of marriage is that in either case it has political connotations and is seen as establishing bonds of kinship (and loyalty, etc.) between the marrying groups. It is related also to the notion that bride price is not payment for a bride but is, rather, an equivalent exchange, the manifest function of which is to establish ties of an essentially "political" nature. The critical hypotheses here set forth by Barnes are that (1) New Guinea marriages are "deliberately dispersed" (i.e., the motive for marriage is to establish ties of a political kind between an individual and the bride's clan) and (2) the result of deliberately dispersed marriages is a loss of solidarity on the part of the groom's clan. If one examines closely Korofeigu marriage customs it is difficult to agree with the views stated above.

Korofeigu marriages are instigated, as is fairly common elsewhere in the New Guinea Highlands, by the father of the groom. The decision to seek a bride for his son has not been arrived at independently, however, but only after lengthy consultation with other men of the clan. The clan youths are married according to their age grade, so when the father of one of the youths of the eligible age grade decides to acquire a bride for his son the other fathers of boys in that age grade must agree for they will soon be called upon to do the same. Indeed, the first youths of the age grade married cannot see or have relations of any kind with their wives until all members of the grade have wives. There is an avoidance period for at least one year, usually considerably longer for the first boys of the age grade to marry.

Having made the decision and being supported by the others the father cries out early one morning that he is assembling the bride wealth for his son and that everyone who can should help him. This announcement

is rapidly spread over the clan territory and the people who wish to help, both men and women, will postpone what they are doing and assemble in the man's village, bringing with them whatever contributions they can make to the bride wealth. The contribution will, of course, be returned to them at some later date and the father or the boy being married himself is obliged to make the return.

Bride wealth consists of pigs, long ropes of small shell sewn on bark cloth, larger shells, small decorations highly embrodered with shell, which are used in festivals for dancing, and nowadays, money. A forked pole, roughly eight feet long is cut and driven into the ground somewhere in the village. The ropes of shell and other ornaments are hung from the forked end and arranged in a pleasing manner. Around the base are laid either newspaper or lap lap and on them are placed pounds, shillings, and sometimes other items arranged in a tasteful display. This takes the better part of the day and donations of shell or money are received from a wide array of clansmen, including wives of fellow clansmen who sometimes donate. It takes a large number of pigs, both for the bride price itself and for feasting at the wedding. Arrangements for the pigs are also completed at this time, completed because they have been mostly committed beforehand or the man would not have proceeded to the point of assembling the shell and money.

The most interesting feature of assembling bride price is the fact that although the bulk of the pig, shell and money is put up by the man's sub-clan, he is always helped by a large number of other clansmen who are not of his sub-clan. And this is true even though the sub-clan in most cases could easily afford all of the bride price itself. A deliberate attempt is made to get help from outside the sub-clan and people say this

is the way it ought to be done. The members of any given sub-clan would be most upset if they were not given help by other clansmen and the other clansmen would be very upset if they were not asked to contribute. Indeed, such a situation would be simply unthinkable.

Once the bride price has been collected in this manner and has been evaluated and discussed by those concerned it is placed in a large net bag and tied to the forked pole. The next morning men carry it to a place where they know there is an eligible girl they would like to acquire as a bride. The prospective bride and groom have little or nothing to say about who will become their spouse.[1]

The men, when offering the bride price, leave their own territory so as to arrive at the prospective bride's place of residence before sunrise. Word of their coming precedes them so that the man responsible for accepting her bride wealth will have slept in the house that night or will be apprised that he should appear there that morning.[2] The forked stick is driven into the ground a few yards from the entrance and the men who placed it there withdraw a few feet and squat or sit, waiting to see if it will be accepted. If the man is completely uninterested he will emerge from the house, ignoring them completely and go about his daily business. No one else will dare to speak to them as that would signify their intention or interest and the men offering the bride wealth will leave after a short time. Expressions of interest and their intensity can be indicated by a number of procedures. If, for example, the man offers the visitors fire and gives them firewood he is interested, if he should give them tobacco or food, he is very interested, and so on.

Marriages are difficult to arrange because they entail having large numbers of pigs on the part of the bride's clan as well as for

the groom and the bride price will usually have to be carried for long distances and for several months before it will be accepted. By the time it has been accepted, it will have been offered for several girls in several places. Tentative arrangements will probably have been made at least once before and fallen through, and the men will at this point be eager to get the marriage over and done with. The number of pigs to be killed and exchanged between the two clans are tenatively arranged, this must be an equivalent exchange, and the men leave the bride price and return to their own clan excited and satisfied. Within the next few days the bride's clan will call to collect the live pigs they have been promised as bride wealth and to make the final arrangements for the feasting. They depart after accomplishing this and the wedding ceremony follows fairly quickly, within the week being fairly typical.

On the day of the wedding arrangements are began early. Women pick brightly colored leaves and flowers and a long path of them, some three or four feet wide and up to thirty yards long is laid in the village. Pigs cooked the day before are arranged on platforms to be presented to the bride's clan and suckling pigs are placed at one end of the path to be given to the bride, her mother and female relatives. The women of the groom's clan seat themselves near the gifts of suckling pig, the men of the groom's clan standing nearby in readiness. The groom himself is not in attendance. He is not permitted to see his bride nor will he be able to see or visit her until all of his age mates are married which is a period of one year at the very least.

The bride's clan appears en mass, dressed in their best and hiding completely the bride in their midst. They approach to the opposite end of the path of flowers and stop. A spokesman steps forward and calls out

to the groom's clan, giving a short speech in which he states that they are giving a bride who will bear children for the groom's clan, work for them, and so on. He says they must not fight from that point onwards and now they must be friends.[3] Then a member of the groom's clan responds, echoing the sentiments of friendship, and stressing that they are giving pigs for the girl and will be glad to have her, will take good care of her, etc. Suddenly the bride's clan splits ranks and she emerges to view, dressed in a new bark skirt, wearing an elaborate feather headdress loaned to her by her father or guardian for the occasion, and weighted down with cooked pork which hangs from her shoulders and hips by bark cloth thongs. Her body has been heavily greased with pig grease and she glistens in the afternoon sunlight. A man from the groom's clan starts forward at the same time accompanied by three or four women of his group who are made up in paint and feathers. The women jig along beside him beating hourglass drums or shaking bamboo tubes full of beans and dance excitedly around him. The man, who is usually the groom's father's brother or a close agnate picks up the bride by the legs and carries her erect to the opposite end of the path where the women of the groom's clan are waiting. He sets her down gently and utters a loud shriek of exultation. The women of the groom's clan begin stripping the pork from her and chattering noisily while in the process. Her mother and usually one or two other female relatives are coming forward at this time, covered with clay and mourning for her. She and they are seated and given the choice suckling pigs and all of the women begin to talk together excitedly, the women of the groom's clan attempting to console the bride's mother and relatives.

While the women are so occupied the men of the two clans exchange gifts of cooked pig. The men of the bride's clan come forward and receive

their pig along with cooked sweet potatoes, yams, sugar cane, and other foods and then withdraw to the opposite end of the area again to eat. The two clans do not eat together at this time and after finishing their meal the bride's clan very quickly departs leaving the bride's mother, relatives, and usually one or two men who will stay with the bride for a few days to insure that she will not run away, that she is treated well, and so on.

The following morning the bride is visited by virtually all of the people of the groom's clan who bring her gifts. She will be given at least one sow, usually by her father-in-law and probably two or three others by his agnates. She is given pig grease in bamboo tubes. Women give her pieces of bark cloth, bean seed, paint, wooden dishes, and nowadays knives, spoons, and perhaps metal cooking pots. Everyone comes and tries to get acquainted. For the first month of her stay in the groom's clan the bride lives a life of ease, learning the names of her affines and others, sitting around conversing. She is required to do no work, "until her new skirt gets dirty," they say, but she will, if she has the best of intentions, go to the fields sometimes with the other women and care for the small children, fetch water, and so on. If she is not the first new bride for the age grade she will be accompanied by the other brides who are undergoing exactly the same experience. These brides reside in the houses of the groom's mothers and are well treated. Sometimes the younger siblings of the groom bring them gifts and everyone tries to make the new brides feel at home.

The groom's father, or paternal uncle, or some other man of the clan at this time begins a "marriage garden." This is a larger than average plot with which he is helped from time to time by virtually all of the men and women of the clan. The men work together in large numbers to fence

the plot and later, after all of the women have broken the ground, to dig the drainage ditches in it. By the time the marriage garden is completed almost every adult person will have helped. Then, when the first crop reaches fruition, plots within the garden are allocated to each man who has helped. If he has more than one wife he will receive one plot for each wife. The presentation is done in a formally prescribed manner in which a man walks across the garden calling out in as loud a voice as possible the name of each person who is entitled to a plot. The purpose of this procedure, as near as I can determine, seems to be that it indicates to other Korofeigu clans and close neighbors that such and such a clan has successfully completed a marriage and (therefore) are successful pig raisers and gardeners, etc., which gives them prestige. The people who have been given plots dig their sweet potatoes and whatever else may be planted in them and the plots are replanted and belong solely to the man who was responsible for purchasing the bride. She begins cultivating this garden and caring for it, it enables him to feed her, repay debts of food, and so on until her husband can begin gardening for her which will be considerably later.

If one examines Nupasafa marriages closely it becomes obvious that they are dispersed. There are 60 wives who represent 24 different tribal groups and 35 or more clans. Fourteen out of the 60 are from the other three clans of Korofeigu, four are from Kapakamaligi, by far the nearest tribe to Korofeigu. Generally speaking we can say that all others, the other 42, are from some distance whereas the 18 mentioned can be considered from nearby. This has some significance as we will see. The question is, what of the "deliberately dispersed marriages?"

In Bena Bena brides are scarce and few choices are open. Marriages, as we have seen, are arranged for age grades rather than for individuals.[4] Consequently, brides must be found at about the same time for all boys in the eligible age grade. The relatively high incidence of polygyny,[5] coupled with the previous custom of female infanticide, results in a shortage of eligible females. As a result of this Nupasafa must, as I have indicated, travel long distances over long periods of time and they are not too particular where the brides come from. In some cases they buy girls who have not as yet had their first menstruation. Out of 73 cases known to me 20, or 27 per cent, of the females were married prior to their first menstruation. Also, it is not unknown for females, especially young girls, to be purchased as wives even when they do not speak the Bena language. The chances that a boy will get a wife who is immature or who does not speak the language are probably related to his father's status (how "big" a man he is) and to his position in the age grade (ideally, the oldest boy marries first and so on). If the boy's father is a man of low prestige he will not receive as much help as other men, will have fewer pigs and less wealth to work with and this, in turn, may affect the clan from whom he wishes to purchase the bride.

But in any case, contrary to Fortes, Barnes, and many others, ties of real importance are not necessarily or invariably established by marriage. Marriages are not deliberate in this sense. In some cases a girl will never see her own people again, nor will her husband see them. Indeed, one can say that as a general rule, the farther away a bride originates, the younger she was when purchased, or the further removed her language from Bena, the less likelihood there is that she or her husband will interact with her natal group or maintain ties with them.

This can be seen reflected in a Bena custom whereby a bride, after she has resided in her husband's group for a time, will pick a "brother" from among her husband's group. The Nupas say of this, "She is from a far away place and she needs a brother to look after her. She never sees her own brothers." Thus 39 out of 65 women married into Nupa have such brothers and the remaining 26 either have not picked their "brother" as yet or are from the other three Korofeigu groups or Kapakamaligi -- close enough both geographically and in terms of relationship to see their own brothers. The women might well like to see their kinsmen, and their husband might well like to interact with his wife's kinsmen, but in many cases they simply cannot and do not. Strong ties are not always established through marriage either between individuals or groups and it is difficult in the Bena case to see the establishment of such ties as either the motive for their behavior or as the social function of the marriage customs. In this respect we see a very important difference between New Guinea and African societies.

Here again we are faced with a question of individual rights. The situation with respect to women's rights in their natal homestead has traditionally been difficult to handle. Does a woman give up her rights when she marries? In the Bena she does not, but they are very rarely exercised by a woman after her marriage. A woman upon her marriage in fact becomes a member of her husband's group. For as long as she is married, and usually even if she is divorced or widowed, she continues to reside in her husband's group and takes part in activities there. Indeed, her change in group membership is dramatically and symbolically seen in the marriage ceremony itself and she becomes the property of her husband's group. The bride is paid for and in the Bena this is not simply an equivalent exchange with the bride's group returning all of the bride wealth at the

marriage ceremony itself or at a later date. Pork is exchanged as I indicated, but in addition to that which is exchanged in this way additional pigs and wealth are given as actual payment for the bride. Bena brides are bought and sold. This can be seen clearly in the Bena resistance to changing the bride price (Langness, 1963). The old men say, "It is our business," and they think of it in that way although one could show, it is true, that in the long run no one really comes out ahead.

The carrying of the bride by a man of the groom's clan is, I believe, symbolic of her change of membership. Also symbolic of this is the fact that she must be given a new name, no one in the groom's clan can call her by the name she was given at birth. The operation of the levirate with preference to age mates failing the brother, along with continued residence in the groom's clan, the presence of an adopted "brother" there and so on combine to make it rare indeed that a woman returns to her natal clan. But nevertheless, she retains the right to her natal ground and to claim land there if necessary or if, for some reason, she and her husband desire to do so. Women can and do own land but rarely exercise the right if they have a husband with land rights which he exercises elsewhere. Women, unless very old, do not remain single except for very short periods, there is little reason for a woman to need land. And, even if she wished to claim land in her natal ground it would probably be for her husband rather than for herself and he, representing strength, would be a welcome addition to the group. Indeed, a woman is much more welcome in her natal group with a husband than without and I know of at least one case in which a bride, running away and returning to her natal clan alone was shot and killed.

One further feature of Bena marriage needs to be discussed before conclusions can be drawn. This is an apparently distinctive Bena custom

whereby a father cannot receive bride wealth for his own daughter and as a consequence every Bena girl, at birth, acquires a sort of legal guardian, a man who "marks" her as it is stated in pidgin English. Sometime late in a woman's pregnancy or just after the birth of the child in rare cases, a man will kill and cook a pig which is presented to the pregnant woman and her husband. If they accept it (and it is usually known beforehand that they will) it means that the man who presented it becomes the legal guardian of their female child (in the case of a pregnancy turning out to be a boy the man has given a pig for nothing). This man will then receive the girl's bride price and is primarily responsible for accepting it and making all of the arrangements for her marriage. He usually consults with the real father, especially nowadays, but his word is law with respect to the final decision. While the girl is growing up the legal guardian is responsible for her to a great extent. He must give her shell to wear which is the only form of real wealth she will ever have. He gives her presents from time to time, he insures that she gets choice pieces of pork, and he must furnish pigs to be killed at her various initiation ceremonies. He is helped in this partly by her real father but more importantly by other men of the clan who must be repaid out of her bride wealth. The real father cannot claim any of the bride wealth but his help is repaid by giving part of the bride wealth to her brothers. A man is thus responsible to his sons to help their sister through her initiations. The only explanation given by the Bena for this is that "a man cannot receive pay for his own semen," and it is a rule that is scrupulously followed. A man <u>never</u> receives bride price for his own daughter. <u>All</u> female children have such a legal guardian. A functional analysis of this custom would

bring to light some interesting facts, both psychological and sociological, but I will comment here only on the more obvious sociological factors of Bena marriages as they relate to problems of solidarity.

It seems that Bena marriages, even though widely dispersed as Barnes points out for New Guinea marriages in general, result in more solidarity for the clan than might otherwise be the case. In the first instance, because the ties outside are so diffuse they do not impede the strengthening of ties within the local group and, also, further internal ties are established between women married in and their adopted "brothers." Furthermore, the fact that every girl has an adopting "legal guardian" who in fact acts as a sort of second father (at least until time for her to marry), and who cooperates with her real father and others in seeing her through the first years of her life results in even further clan solidarity. And, by virtue of contributions either to her bride price per se, or to the marriage garden, every clan member has a mutual interest and investment in the bride. This involvement, as I have indicated, transcends sub-clan boundaries and strengthens the clan at the expense of the sub-clan. For example, out of 52 girls known, 21 are "marked" by men of their own sub-clan, 25 are marked by clan members other than sub-clan members, and 6 are marked by people outside the clan.[6] People are suspicious if sub-clans attempt to do things alone or become too powerful. One should also not overlook a powerful "selective factor" here in that those girls who would not fit into the network of clan relations, or do not wish to fit, run away, and thus, if a girl does not run away, it is an indication of her good intent and makes for more internal solidarity than would be the case otherwise.

Essentially the same functions are performed by adoption in general. Girls are sometimes adopted in the more usual sense of the term and are

taken from their biological parents to be raised by others. Boys, too, are adopted in this latter way, but less frequently, and, although there is a kind of "chicken and egg" situation here, the net effect of this is to promote clan solidarity as ties are always maintained between the adopting family and the boy's true parents just as they are between the girl's true parents and her legal guardian. Out of 42 male children in Nupasafa, 5 have been adopted in the sense that they have been taken from their biological parents and are being raised by others. Four of these cases cross sub-clan lines and only one is an adoption by one sub-clan member of the son of another member of that sub-clan.

There is, however, a related phenomenon here. This is not quite adoption in the usual sense of that term but more similar to what happens in the case of female children. A boy will sometimes be "looked after" by a man other than his father. This means that some other clansman will take on the responsibility of buying a bride for the boy, seeing him through the initiations, and so on. This usually happens when a man is active and fairly successful but has no son of his own. He may attempt to adopt a son and, failing this, will "look after" someone else's son, usually a man who has several male children. Sometimes an older man who is still active, but whose own sons have grown and been married, will "look after" someone else's son. He will do this in order to stay actively involved in the complex round of social activities which result from marriage and its preliminaries. Of 19 youths being "looked after" in this way, 12 are being looked after by non sub-clan members and 7 by members of their own sub-clan. These figures, both those for females and males, indicate to me that sub-clans tend to be unimportant and that the ties that bind the members of the clan together consistently cut across the sub-clan lines.

One sees the same phenomenon with respect to land ownership and usufruct. Looking at the land use map it appears that sub-clan members do tend to hold contiguous blocks of land. It must be made clear, however, that although there is a slight tendency for this to happen, and it stands out quite clearly using the different colors, the fences surrounding the blocks do not correspond with the colored blocks. This means that if one separates out plots of ground on the basis of who fenced them the tendency for sub-clan members to be together is much less. What happens, it appears, is that one sub-clan member will state in advance his intention to plant a huge block of unclaimed land. By the time he gets around to doing so, for practical reasons he will have to reduce his ambition and sub-clan members (and sometimes others) will then take what is left over. The actual fencing and planting is separate so that simply locating the land on the map does not represent a true picture of the behavior involved. Consistent with all of the above is the fact that of 40 cases of usufruct known to me exactly 20 involve priviledge extended across sub-clan lines and 20 within sub-clan lines. It seems clear that the tendency to sub-clan cooperation and integrity is slight at best and that the clan as a group does gain solidarity at the expense of the groups within it.

But sub-clans do have important functions which they perform as a group. These are principally of a religious character and are most easily discussed in relation to old age, death, cannibalism, and ancestor worship. The Korofeigans do not grow old gracefully and both men and women attempt to work, even to perform the most difficult tasks until they become simply impossible. These too old to work spend their days sitting around the otherwise deserted villages, chatting with each other or occasionally looking after infants. The old are well taken care of and do not lack for

essentials such as food and firewood. But these essentials, along with other things are provided for them, not by their own offspring, but by some man from another sub-clan who is chosen specifically to perform this function. Usually the person is chosen by the oldster himself but sometimes by the old person's son. It is considered an honor to be so chosen and it would be quite unheard of for anyone so chosen to refuse. Upon the death of the old person and even before his actual demise there are rewards for the person who looks after him. These are in the form of pork, personal satisfaction, prestige, and a part of the inheritance. This custom is intimately associated with the belief in ghosts and a form of ancestor worship.

An old man will usually specify before his death whether or not he wants to be buried or cremated. If he wishes to be buried he will specify the location and the actual type of burial which can be either in the ground or simply exposed on a rocky ridge to the southeast of the villages. This is a place traditionally used for this purpose and people avoid it as much as possible out of fear. There is one further possibility for a corpse, which cannot be chosen, and that is to be consumed by clansmen. The Bena practiced a form of cannibalism in which the eating of a corpse was a token of great respect and esteem for the deceased. It is with respect to this custom that Bena sub-clans have an important function. A body cannot be consumed by anyone of the same sub-clan as the deceased. Thus an old person has someone from another sub-clan who looks after him and when he dies the guardian's sub-clan may elect to eat him. His corpse is butchered in a special manner, cooked in an earth oven, and consumed by the members of the honoring sub-clan. Everything is eaten, certain portions being given children and women, but the bones are always carefully

preserved. Later the bones are presented to the deceased's sub-clan, along with a certain amount of pork which is essentially an exchange for the flesh of the deceased. His sub-clan will, then, after perhaps wearing his skull or finger bones for a time, place them all high up in the rocks of the ridge mentioned above. Not everyone was eaten in this manner by any means, and only people who were popular and influential would be so honored. Women could be eaten as well as men and if a woman committed suicide upon the death of her husband, as some did, and if his body was consumed hers usually was also. There were other instances of cannibalism but they were apparently rare and involved the eating of the corpse of an ally killed in battle. Under no circumstances would the corpse of an enemy be eaten and there are definite beliefs about benefits being derived from eating the flesh of powerful warriors or persons of note. Although cannibalism has been given up in Korofeigu under pressure from the Australian administration it is still not considered by the people to have been an undesirable custom and it probably still occurs further back in the bush, if only occasionally.

The custom of appointing a man from another sub-clan to look after the aged and of restricting cannibalism to non sub-clan members makes sense more easily if seen in the context of the belief in ghosts. The Bena believe in two souls, one of which after the death of the body travels to frenonua, "a place out there" (to the southeast). The other stays around close to the living and becomes a ghost. Ghosts, called fere, are greatly feared although their character is not completely malevolent but depends upon their treatment while still alive. The belief is that a person's ghost may wreak vengeance upon the living for an affront which occurred before the person died. Thus Bunabopiso refused Utresso a drink

when the latter was an old man and Utresso's ghost later caused Bunabo's pigs to sicken and die. Uwareka did not have his mother's body buried in her natal clan ground where she wished and her ghost later caused him much trouble by affecting his pigs and gardens. He then exhumed her bones and buried them where she had requested. Malevolent ghosts function most importantly with respect to gardens and pigs, but in rare cases they can cause children to be ill and they also are believed to cause, by attacking people, a form of temporary insanity.[7] But unlike ghosts from other areas, for example those reported by Spiro from Micronesia (1952), the character of Bena ghosts is not determined by their character while living. A ghost becomes malevolent and causes evil to someone primarily if the person is believed to have offended the person prior to his death. The Korofeigans believe that old persons should be looked after well, but they are also aware of human foibles in this respect and they say that a person's own children may neglect their duties. It is for this reason that another person is appointed. This, of course, tends to reduce ill feeling between the elderly and the members of their own sub-clan and in so far as a ghost can only affect those within his own sub-clan the dangers are thus minimized, friction both between the living and the living and the dead is lessened. It might be pointed out here that further evidence for the change of membership of women at marriage can be found in the fact that women married into a sub-clan are believed able to harm the members in exactly the same way as males. Thus the ghost of Mumugefa's wife caused Abio, a man of Mumugefa's sub-clan, to go temporarily insane because he had slighted her prior to her suicide.[8]

In any case one can perceive in all this that the sub-clan functions vis-a-vis other sub-clans for the purpose of caring for the aged,

ritualistic cannibalism, and as a unit vis-a-vis the ghosts of its deceased members. The net result of this, however, is to bind the clan together and to maintain clan solidarity rather than sub-clan solidarity. To eat a person is a great honor and if a sub-clan eats another's deceased members this is a great mark of respect. Furthermore, the daily furnishing of firewood and food to the elderly by one sub-clan member (who is, of course, helped from time to time by others of his sub-clan) results in mutual satisfactions and strong personal, family, and sub-clan ties between individuals and sub-clans as well.

Interestingly enough the ghosts of the recently dead do not function independently and as individuals with respect to benevolent activities in the same way as they do for malevolent activities. The situation is very similar to that mentioned by K. E. Read for Gahuku:

> I take this opportunity to correct certain statements which I made in an earlier paper. In 'Nama Cult of the Central Highlands. . . I stated that: 'The spirits of the recently dead are felt to concern themselves in certain situations which confront their living descendants. They are thought to punish those who transgress accepted norms of conduct with illnesses and other misfortunes. Their favour must then be sought by means of prayer and sacrifice.' Subsequent field work made it clear that the spirits of the recently dead are not generally concerned with the conduct of the living. They neither bestow favours on nor punish their descendants and they cannot be regarded as arbiters of moral conduct (1955:269).

In Korofeigu, then, specific recently deceased person's ghosts can and do affect the living, but usually only if they have just cause. But the "prayers and sacrifices" to which Read alluded, which are in fact offered, are offered to ancestors generally, to the "generalized belief in an ancestral quality within a more inclusive supernatural power concept rather than the allocation of specific functions to the spirits of the dead" (Read, 1952:9), to a diffuse kind of ancestral power, unlocalized and ill defined. This power, as Read also pointed out, is seen manifested

in the sacred flutes, called nama in Bena as they are in Gahuku, flutes which are the property and responsibility of the sub-clan and which are intimately linked to the ancestors and represent their benevolent power.[9]

> The nama are also regarded as the spiritual manifestation of a benevolent power to which the fortunes of the dzuha are linked. The nature of the power is difficult to discover, but its reality is attested both by the ritual treatment which the people award the flutes and by the general concern for their preservation, a concern which goes far beyond that required to maintain an elaborate deception (Read, 1952:8).

The nama flutes, which are always played in pairs, are of bamboo, approximately 24 to 30 inches long and 2 to 3 inches in diameter. A hole is burned near one end and the flute is played by blowing into the hole while holding the flute with the left hand and regulating the flow of air with the right hand at the far end. Most flutes are decorated with geometrical designs which are etched on during the manufacturing process but some are perfectly plain. Men go to concealed places to make new flutes and will get other men to try them out for them at prearranged times. They go to the village and when they hear their flutes try to ascertain how others react to them. That is, are they considered pleasant? Do people comment favorably about them, and so on. The flutes are played on different religious occasions and are, as had been indicated above, intimately linked with the ancestors. When a clan is preparing for a pig exchange the flutes are played, at various stages in the preparations they are played signalling the completion of that part of the ritual, they are played during male initiations, and so on.

Although nama is the generic term for bird, and the Gahuku-Gama, who have a similar religion, consider nama to be a bird of some kind (Read, 1952), the Bena deny that nama is a bird and claim that it is something like a devil, or like some kind of "monster," but it is difficult to tell

how much this has been influenced by European contact. A part of the nama ceremony involves three men who walk around at night, two of them playing a pair of flutes and the third ranging ahead of them with a sharp splinter of bamboo. Each woman in the clan is supposed to give a gift to nama who at this time is believed to be staying with the men. The women hold gifts of food out through the doorway of their house and the man grabs it roughly while at the same time cutting or sticking their hands with the sharp bamboo. The cult, which we cannot go into detail about here, in most of its details is very similar to those described for Gahuku-Gama (Read, 1952) and Gururumba (Newman, 1961).

When a man invokes the supernatural to protect his garden and to make it bear in abundance he does not call out to a specific ancestor as ghost but to the ancestral power in general. When the flutes are sounded prior to the pig festivals and the ancestral power is called upon to help the people in the years to come it is not specific ancestors which are invoked but the clan ancestors in general. All benevolent intervention appears to be on the part of rather nebulous "ancestors," whereas malevolent acts are usually attributed to the ghosts of specific deceased persons who have some reason for their malevolent acts. It is somewhat misleading to attribute great significance to the corporateness of the sub-clan with respect to the ownership of flutes or even to participation in religious ceremonies in general because sub-clans do not oppose one another at these times. That is, there is no competition between them and sub-clans do not play the flutes unless the other like segments of the clan do likewise. Even though the flutes are sub-clan property they are used only at times and on occasions when the entire clan is engaged in an activity. Sub-clans are not the units which perform independently any of the functions calling

for the use of the sacred flutes. Sub-clans do not, then, hold land, they do not initiate by themselves, they do not hold pig festivals of any kind, fertility rites, or perform any other task independently of the others which involves the use of the flutes. Nor are the flutes kept hidden from other sub-clans by the members of any given sub-clan although they are all concealed together from the women and children in the men's house or houses. One could also question their assertion that the flutes really belong to sub-clans <u>per se</u>, because the actual ownership is somewhat cloudy, they tend to be claimed by individuals, and there is more than one pair for some of the sub-clans. This is an interesting point to pursue. The Nupa flutes, for example, are distributed according to the following:



Figure 2.

An examination of the genealogies of the sub-clans (see Page 33) in this context reveals some interesting facts and speculations and gives certain further clues to the true nature of the social structure. For example, there is a positive correlation between the amount of genealogical knowledge (or the number of specific connections that can be traced) and the number of flutes associated with the sub-clan. Thus in sub-clan number one where all connections are known there is only one pair owned, interestingly enough by the oldest active male (Nomapiro). Benaranofi, it should be pointed out, is both quite old and feeble and is also blind. Similarly, in sub-clan number four, where all connections can be traced with the exception of one (Letonabe) there is also one pair only and again, owned by the eldest active male (Bonanihi) who is the eldest son of the eldest brother (Gobei). Both Gobei and Blefu are too old to take an active part in clan affairs. Letonabe's position is somewhat enigmatic because although he is considered Nupa and has a wife there he prefers to live in another place and seldom visits Nupa. His wife, who is fairly old, is well looked after by others and for all intents and purposes Letonabe might as well not exist.

In sub-clan number two it is exactly where the major connection cannot be cited (between the lineages of Lukabefa and Eopave) that the two pairs of flutes are claimed, one pair by Nehea and one pair by Nagiya. The interesting point here is that Lukabefa, who is the eldest living male in his lineage is a Seventh Day Adventist convert and the flutes are claimed by Nehea, the next eldest. In Eopave's lineage, Eopave himself is very old and no longer resides in Nupa. Nagiya is a "big man" and the eldest of the lineage and thus claims them. In sub-clan number three, even though the division is not perfect it is near enough to be suggestive and we find

three different sets of flutes represented,[10] one owned by Mumugefa who can trace no genealogical connection to the others of the sub-clan but claims membership nevertheless, one pair belonging to Klehopave (the eldest male in the largest lineage of the sub-clan), and one flute belonging to Sepik (the only adult representative of a lineage) who also cannot trace a precise connection to the other sub-clan members.

Although nothing can be proven conclusively by this examination the facts of flute ownership are quite suggestive. It appears that formerly there were more sub-clans represented which have not maintained themselves, the remnant members of which have attached themselves to lineages or sub-clans of larger size and have been accepted by them. This is another clear example of the "openness" of New Guinea society, it seems to me, and again it points up the individualistic nature of life in the Highlands. It appears that in spite of the claim of sub-clan ownership the flutes are controlled by dominant individuals and in some cases there are more flutes than sub-clans. When discussing the flutes and religious activity it seems we are again brought up against the facts of individuality and clanship as the dominant features of social structure, again it seems, manifesting themselves at the expense of the lesser groups within the clan.

The emphasis on individual rather than group ties is one consideration with regards to Highland group solidarity, one that has often been made, and one, while relevant, has sometimes led to conclusions which can be quite misleading. Group ties are often involved, I submit, even though they are best seen in some instances only by reference to individuals. The often cited example of pig exchange networks is a good case in point. These annual or recurring events with their important religious overtones are festive occasions at which large quantities of cooked pork and other

valuables are given by one or more groups to one or more others. The pork and other items must be "backed" at some later time by those who receive it. Exchange in the Bena is somewhat different than that reported for other parts of the Highlands, considerably smaller in scale but more frequently held. Indeed, the Korofeigans make fun of the Chimbus to the West and others by saying, "They must save all their pigs and then kill them all at once while we here kill pigs all the time." There is a certain amount of truth in this statement for at least the Bena in the grasslands do have more pigs than natives who live in the "bush." Korofeigu is known as the "ples blong pig" and natives travel down from the surrounding mountains to purchase them, exchanging valuable plumes and shells which were traded up originally from the coastal areas.

Each clan participates in at least one exchange per year. These take place usually between October and February, during the wet season when food is abundant. Plans are made well in advance as preparations are extensive and time consuming. First it is agreed that clan A will give pigs to clan B. This is for help rendered in the past in one capacity or another, either clan B helped clan A in fighting, or they gave them food when they were experiencing a drought or for similar reasons. All clans, at any given time, are probably indebted to several others in this way and it is never difficult to find a rationale for an exchange.

The members of clan B travel to clan A and agree to accept so many pigs. The actual number is kept track of by a series of finger length sticks and individual men will accept a stick or sticks. The members of clan B will accept only as many sticks as they know they will be prepared to return pigs for at a later date, two or more years hence. Once the arrangements have been agreed upon, which takes a few days as men will

change their minds, other men will tardily volunteer pigs and so on, the other preparations begin. People in clan B, the clan which will be traveling to clan A to receive the gifts of pork, begin to assemble feathers, long plumes preferably, and to make new bark cloth skirts and decorations of various kinds. Men will not refrain from borrowing plumes even if it involves considerable traveling and risk. And men will begin to design their kafi, large dancing frames they will wear on their backs to the festival. At first the designing is all imaginary and there is much consultation with peers about ideas. Occasionally a man will dream of a design and will give it to a friend, who will either accept it or reject it. Not every man in the clan will be giving pigs and some will also not participate in the dancing although the former is by no means prerequisite for the latter.

Once a man has a firm idea for his kafi he will begin gathering the materials he needs to construct it, supple lengths of thin bamboo and cane, bark cloth, native paints, vine for fastening, and so on. He selects a hidden location which the women and children are not likely to find and begins to construct his dancing frame, helped by other men experienced in such matters and watched by initiated youths who are participating for the first time. The actual construction of the kafi, including the time spent discussing it, thinking about it, gathering the materials and putting it together and painting the designs is considerable, lasting for probably a month or six weeks. At certain stages the flutes are taken out and played, "Nama is defecating now," they say explaining to the uninitiated and the women that his feces is the paint used for the crude but colorful geometric designs. The paint is of a variety said not to be known to the women. When the men of the clan have all completed their kafi, usually a day or

two before the festival is scheduled, they put them on and dance into the villages with them jigging and whooping, where the women and children see them for the first time, gasp in astonishment, and exclaim loudly and obsequiously their great delight.

Three or four days before the festival is to take place the members of clan A visit clan B. They come in singing and dancing although not highly decorated. They receive relatively small quantities of pork cooked for them by clan B. First arrangements are made, mutually flattering speeches are exchanged by representatives of each of the groups, and then clan A departs, singing and dancing as they came. The excitment and tension mount from this time on until the festivities are over and people talk of nothing else, making last minute preparations and hurrying to finish everything that will be needed.

Two days prior to the festival day several of the men and women of clan B travel to clan A for the purpose of butchering the pigs they will receive. The men who are receiving pig go themselves or send someone who knows how to butcher to represent them if they either cannot go or do not know how to butcher. The women accompanying the men clean and prepare the intestines for cooking, gather grass and greens of different kinds for the butchering and cooking and so on. Before each pig is killed its measurements are taken around the chest with a piece of thin vine. The man who is to receive it measures it in this way, supervised by the man who is giving it. The receiver will keep the vine and use it to measure the growth of the pig he picks to return and when the pig reaches the proper size he will know it is time to complete the exchange.[11] This task finished to the satisfaction of everyone the people return home once again.

If the festival is being held in a fairly distant place the people sleep very little the night before and arise at 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. to depart. There is a great deal of confusion, milling around, commands shouted back and forth, but soon the party gets underway. Men either carry their kafi or are helped by others to carry them. Women carry the men's headdresses, paint, plumes, plus cooked sweet potatoes to tide everyone over until the feast. Everyone attends, everyone wears their everyday clothing and carries their best to wear at the festival whether they be participants or spectators. A brisk pace is followed over rough, steep paths until the group arrives at a strategic location usually on a ridge top overlooking the site of the day's event. The goal is to arrive at this spot by sunrise in order to have sufficient time to assemble and dress. The people rest momentarily in the wet morning grass, everyone is quiet now and intent on organizing their finery. Women build small fires to warm sweet potatoes, the children romp in the tall grass, men begin helping their wives, sons, or daughters into their costume if they are fortunate enough to be participating. The father dresses himself last if he has agreed to furnish decorations for a wife, son or daughter. Ornaments damaged in transit are quickly repaired, men help each other with their hair . . . sometimes it is tied tightly in small tufts to aid in the placing of feathers or bright bits of grass. Many people have new woven arms bands, bark cloth skirts and everyone has on their shell ornaments. Smaller boys stand impatiently, supporting the men's kafi which tower over them and sway in the morning winds so that they are difficult to balance. Men curse missing items and delays, the older men implore everyone to hurry. "You don't dress quickly," they say, "the sun is hot. When are you going to sing?"

After two or three hours they are almost ready. The men are being helped into the vine shoulder straps of their kafi which are tied in such a way as to leave the arms free for drumming on the hourglass shaped wooden drums. The as yet unprepared begin to tremble -- hurrying to get ready on time. A spokesman yells out to other Korofeigu clans on adjacent ridge tops, "Nupa is ready, you go first." And the reply drifts back, "no, we are one, you go first." Nupa assembles and begins to sing, feebly at first, almost timidly, trying to find the proper pitch. The singing becomes stronger and stronger as they parade back and forth on the ridge top. The other clans move in and take up positions in line. Spectators watch closely and any flaws in the decorations, such as a loose plume or an unpleasant angle are quickly corrected under their critical supervision. The entire mass moves forward a few feet, chanting and singing, then backward, the intensity mounts, the spectators move back, and finally the move down the hill towards the host group begins.

As they reach the crest of a ridge lower down the mountain they pause and a man dramatically calls out to the ancestors, "You hear us now! Hear us singing for you! We are singing for you now!" Then again the colorful, noisy undulating mass moves slowly down the mountainside, trampling the tall sharp kunai grass underfoot as they proceed.

In a short time, a half an hour perhaps, they have reached the bottom of the hill where they are met by a group of people from clan B and led into the village where they dance back and forth ringed by spectators. Dust from the bare earth of the village floor rises in a thin powder covering the legs of the dancers, filters upward, making it difficult to breath. There are shrieks and cries and the singing is intensified. A "big man" of clan B says to the hosts, "You have not killed pigs for us!

We were asleep and you woke us! Why did you wake us! You have killed and eaten the pigs yourselves! Why did you wake us up!" The dancing continues. Individuals who tire drop out for a rest but are soon activated again by the excitment. Members of the host clan, armed with bows and arrows, run around and around the massed dancers in ever widening circles chanting rythmically, "Whoa-yo, whoa-yo," and moving the spectators further and further back. After roughly two hours of dancing the members of the host clan lead the body of dancers toward a garden fence near the village. The garden is still productive and a member of clan A calls out, "Look, we give you a garden to dance in so your feet will not pain! It is a good garden! The sweet potato vines are not yet dead, it is still bearing!" The fence is broken down and trampled underfoot in a symbolic show of strength and the dancing continues in the garden, up and down, back and forth, until the sweet potato vines are a mass of twisted, crumpled refuse, and the garden ditches have been filled by soft earth by the myriad pounding feet.

The dancing stops abruptly in the early afternoon. Many of the participants simply drop where they were standing to rest after the hours of exertion in the hot sun. The hosts arrange a feast of pork, sweet potatoes and other vegetables in huge piles, one for each of the recipient clans. Later, when the people are sitting around after eating, the large pigs which are being formally presented are brought out. As each pig is carried forward and put on a pile the name of the donor is called out for all to hear, and the name of the recipient as well, for the pigs are given, it is true, by individuals to other individuals. In addition to these pigs there are still others, usually slightly smaller which have been killed and are presented even though no one formally agreed to accept

them. These pigs, however, as they are small and presented almost as an afterthought, are invariably accepted by someone, usually men who were unable to take part in the formal arrangements because they lacked a pig of suitable size. The men who accept these smaller pigs must repay them but this is not considered to be of major significance because smaller pigs have no real prestige value. The idea behind this procedure seems to be to kill and present as many pigs as possible. The giving group strives to present "so many pigs that the receivers will not be able to carry them home." It is a great achievement to give so much pork that it cannot be carried. There is, at the end, speech making, which emphasizes the friendliness of the exchanging groups; their co-operation in the past, as well as their great success in warfare, and pledges of lasting unity. The receiving clan, as they must carry the pork long distances, leave while it is still afternoon, men carrying the larger pigs on platforms of bamboo, women often carrying smaller ones on their heads. People are tired and eager now to get home before dark if possible.

The point that must be emphasized here is that in spite of the fact that the majority of the pork is exchanged by individuals the festival is by no means an individual pursuit. Of course pigs are actually exchanged by individuals but this is primarily an artifact of the situation and the event is most importantly a group activity. The festivals will not, of course, be held at all unless enough individuals (members of the group) agree to exchange at the same time, to members of the same group, and all in the same direction, thus making it, it seems to me, quite clearly a group function. And again, the group involved is almost exclusively the clan. Sub-clans and lineages have no particular significance during these occasions, the emphasis is purely on individuals and clans. Individuals

distinguish themselves by giving pigs, by having superior personal adornments, by dancing in an exciting and dramtic manner and so on. This does, indirectly, reflect on lineage, sub-clan, and clan to be sure, but except for individuals and clans there is no competition, no exchange. It is not unusual for a spectator to be so overwhelmed at the spectacle of a pleasingly decorated and particularly active dancer that he will approach the person with highly flattering praise at the conclusion of the dancing. This must be recognized by a gift on the part of the individual so flattered and this, in turn, will be "backed" at a later date. It is likewise true that by being an outstanding personality and in this way distinguishing oneself, one brings fame to those associated with him. Individual glory seems to bring fame to the clan, however, more than to any other group.

Another example of the individualistic emphasis of New Guinea interactions often cited is the fact that at times, when two groups are fighting, certain individuals may elect not to participate, ostensibly because they have relatives or friends in the enemy group. It could well be argued, in the first instance, that groups which can tolerate members who refuse to cooperate at such times are, in fact, displaying very strong group solidarity although it is exactly the opposite conclusion which is usually drawn. But in any case, it is not at all clear as to how important or widespread such exceptions might have been. Reay, for example, states of the Kuma:

> In warfare with a traditional enemy, every man in the parish could be conscripted to fight, whereas a group that was only temporarily hostile invariably included some men who were related to parish members through inter-marriage, and then kinship links with obligations neither to kill nor to injure certain persons made the parish fighting force in some measure less effective (1959:54).

Furthermore, as has been noted by more than one author, individuals do not hesitate to commit other very aggressive acts against the same categories of persons they presumably will not fight physically with:

> It is entirely legitimate to perform sorcery against members of another district, and this range obviously includes a man's own wife and the wives of his lineage kin, unless they belong to the same district (Berndt, 1962:211).

> . . . for women are believed to be the principal agent through which sorcerers work. The most virulent form of sorcery requires some of a man's semen, which is mixed with various leaves and grasses and burned over a fire, and it is believed that a man's wife would not scruple to obtain his semen if someone of her own group requested her to do so (Read, 1954, 870).

If individuals are believed to be so prone to aggressive acts through sorcery (and, one might add, in their daily lives as we are led to believe from descriptions of Highlands personality), it does not seem clear that they would hesitate to act aggressively in other ways as well. And, although the people of Korofeigu state that in a battle they would not kill their brothers-in-law or their fathers-in-law, etc., this seems to have depended to a great extent upon how intimate a relationship was in fact maintained between them, whether or not they were recognized in the heat of battle, the relative strength of the two warring groups, and like considerations. This general view is supported by the only anthropologist who was in this particular area early enough to witness the indigenous pattern of warfare:

> A man was certainly expected to serve his village in action against his siter's husband or against his wife's brother. I observed one case of a newly wed lad of our acquaintance taking the field against his bride's folk a few days after his wedding. I also overheard two or three instances of men shouting that they had just made their sisters war-widows, or their wives brotherless. I never met a man abstaining from action with his village because his village was opposed to the village of his brothers-in-law. On the other hand I frequently met a man abstaining from action with his co-villagers in battle because they were fighting against the clan of which his mother was born, or against the clan into which his paternal aunt was married. In respect to brothers-in-law, we may say that they are not permitted neutral rights when their respective villages are in conflict (Fortune, 1947:109).

My own informants indicated to me that men did not always refrain from helping the local group even when their kinsmen, including those of the mother's clan and the clan of the paternal aunt were involved as its antagonists. This fact is also consistent with the aims and means of Bena warfare as we will see later. But it should be made clear at this point that the implicit assumption underlying assertions that individuals refrain from taking part in battles involving their kinsmen reflects a bias towards the overriding importance of consanguineal and affinal kinship bonds. A man's first loyalty may very well be to his kin, but in Korofeigu his kin may be determined by his residence. Thus one can see that although there are individual choices involved and a person may refrain from killing a kinsman in battle this individual act does not necessarily affect clan solidarity and a man's first loyalty remains to his clan. There are only secondary ties outside, ties which he can either elect to maintain or not, his choice being determined by a host of factors most fundamentally described as economic and self-protective.

The same important element of individual choice is characteristic of Bena kinship relations generally, and, although I do not wish to deal in detail with kinship here, it is worthwhile to consider the mother's brother, sister's son relationship that has figured so prominently in anthropology in the past, and especially in the African case. The comparison points up very well the individual emphasis of New Guinea society as well as another of the mechanisms which I believe creates and perpetuates clan solidarity. There is in the Bena case, and at the ideological level of analysis, an almost "classic" relationship which is supposed to exist between a sister's son and his mother's brother. There are important mutual obligations that individuals in this relationship should ideally observe, the most important

being a ceremony called yapifana. When a male child reaches the age of six or seven his father will kill pigs and present them, usually along with some shell or bark cloth or other wealth, to the boy's mother's brother.[12] Later, when the boy is larger, his mother's brother returns the pork with equivalent gifts and at this time decorates the boy in feathers, paint and pig grease. The two have throughout their lifetime a relationship of mutual respect and must help one another. The mother's brother will often help buy a bride for the boy and the boy will help the mother's brother at various tasks if called upon to do so. When the mother's brother dies the boy has the right to go to his clan and demand a payment due him in the form of pork and material goods, provided the yapifana was performed in the first place. When a man for some reason, usually in mourning, finds it necessary to cut his hair he presents it, along with gifts of pork and other things, to his mother's brother. This is an act of great trust and intimacy because hair is a powerful ingredient for sorcery and to give your hair to someone is symbolic of an almost sacred trust. The mother's brother carefully buries the hair in a secret place and later he "backs" the pork and valuables given to him at this time. All of this behavior, as I suggested above, is the ideal for the relationship. The people of the mother's clan are angry if it is not performed and if the relationship is not joined. Nevertheless it quite often is not fulfilled because of the lack of pigs at the proper time, or other reasons, and a careful examination of the facts involved in quite rewarding.

Just as a Bena father cannot receive bride wealth for his own daughter, so a mother's brother cannot receive pork or goods for his real sister's son. The relationship between the boy and his mother's brother, if joined at all, is actually and invariably joined between the boy and a

classificatory mother's brother. And this is a rule which, like the one respecting father-daughter, allows of no exception as near as I could determine. The mother's classificatory brother who becomes the mother's brother for the boy is picked by the boy's father and the reasons for the choice vary widely. They usually have to do with proximity, accessibility, and ability to fulfill the exchange obligations. The generalization made earlier which states that the distance involved can be a measure of the intensity of affinal relationships maintained holds true here also although it manifests itself in a somewhat different way. Because kinship is so easily ascribed, and also because it can be ascribed simply on the basis of common residence, it becomes possible in many cases for a man to pick a mother's brother for his son in a group actually nearer than the mother's natal clan. If, for example, a clansman of the mother's happens to be living in his wife's territory nearby, or with friends nearby, and so on. This can also be extended to a man who is considered a classificatory brother of the mother's because he was raised in her clan although he himself is not of her clan by descent and is not living there any longer. Conversely, if the mother lived in a clan other than her own for a time prior to her marriage, a man from there might be chosen. And, it is not completely unknown for a man to just arbitrarily choose someone for the relationship because there is no one near enough who really qualifies in any other way. Furthermore, because of the practice Bena brides have, mentioned earlier, of picking a "brother" in their husband's clan, it is possible under certain circumstances for the mother's brother to reside in the same clan as the boy. There can be other factors involved also.

For example, Tupa (See Table II) is mother's brother to Bunabo's son, Pimaso. This is so, they reason, because Bunabo's wife, Ietopesso, came

from Mohebeto. One of Tupa's sisters is married to a man from Mohebeto. Therefore, Ietopesso can expect to get food and help from Tupa just as if he were her brother and, as he is the same as her brother, but not a blood relative, he can be mother's brother to her son, Fimaso. In this case Namaryahopa, Bunabo's first born child, a daughter, has as mother's brother a classificatory mother's brother who actually resides in Mohebeto. His second born, also a son, has a mother's brother also in Mohebeto, also a classificatory personage but not the same as Namaryahopa's. The reason Fimaso will have Tupa is simply that his father decided to choose him for the relationship. Bunabo's only explanation for this is simply that "It is a long way to Mohebeto and Tupa 'looks after' Ietopesso." This is slightly more complicated than it sounds as in this particular case Ietopesso also picked Tupa as a "brother" when she was married to Bunabo in the first place. This appears to have been before Tupa's sister was married to the man from Mohebeto but of this I am not absolutely certain.

A similar case can be seen in that Lefeya is mother's brother to Abio. This is so because Abio's mother was a bride by capture and most of her clansmen were either killed or widely scattered. So, when Abio's father, Afooya, killed pigs for yapifana he gave them to Lefeya who had "looked after" (been a brother to) Abio's mother. Lefeya, of course, agreed to the relationship by accepting the pig and valuables which obligated him to reciprocate. Abio is entitled to payment upon the death of Lefeya.

Another case, with a somewhat different rationale is that Kikipe is mother's brother to Konilopa. Kikipe and his sub-clan are not true Nupa, but even so they could not now marry a Nupa female as that would be considered incestuous. But it was not always so and many years before

Konarbo's elder sister, who was Konilopa's mother, was married to a man of Ecpave's sub-clan. She died, Konilopa was adopted by Kanarobo who then lived in Nupa, and Koni's real father moved to Ketarabo, some distance away. As Kikipe is of the same clan originally as Kanarobo, and Kanarobo's elder sister of course, but is not her real brother, he is eligible to be mother's brother to Konilopa. In this case it is interesting to note that the relationship was not actually joined while I was in the field and Kikipe was having some difficulty in making up his mind whether or not to accept the responsibility. It was further complicated by the fact that Sefagupa, Kikipe's son, had recently stolen one of Konilopa's wives. Even so, Konilopa was attempting to capitalize on the relationship, which had been discussed for years and I think actually validated at one point with a gift of pork. This latter, however, was a bone of contention and I am not sure of the true situation.

One final example will suffice to make the point. Wareka is mother's brother to Sefagupa's child, Aimos. He is also mother's brother to Feka's child, Korabina. Wareka is said to be "like a brother" to both of the mothers and he does, in fact, look after them as a brother would. Wareka, who is considerably older than either of the mothers, was picked by Fopolekaso and Legegume because they are both from Soiyagu. Segiya, who was Wareka's grandfather (and quite a famous man) once took refuge at Soiyagu after a battle and resided there for a time. He planted trees there, had gardens, and his name was known there. He left and returned once. Wareka's father lived in Soiyagu also for a short time. When Legegume arrived in Nupa as a bride she chose Wareka as "brother." When later Fopolekaso arrived and was effusively greeted by her clan sister, she also picked Wareka as "brother." Wareka, who agreed to all of this,

and who is regarded as a fairly "big man," thus has ties with Eopave's sub-clan, Kikipe's sub-clan, as well as with the people of Soiyagu, although he seldom sees any of the latter. He would, however, be very welcome in Soiyagu and could easily take up residence there if necessary, that is, in the event of Nupasafa being defeated in warfare or if he were having trouble in Nupa for one reason or another.

One sees here again an important discrepancy between ideology and practice. It is desirable, on the one hand, to have and maintain relationships with affines, particularly with the mother's brother, but facts of time and distance, economics and danger can and often interfere. The result of this is an extremely wide latitude of individual choice. And, again, a latent function of the tendency to choose individuals who are near, often in the same clan as I have indicated, adds still further bonds which contribute importantly to clan solidarity. It is true that an individual has many and widespread social ties, but from the point of view of any given individual the great majority of them, and by far the most significant ones, are those he has with fellow clansmen, whether they be ties based on agnation, affinity, or ascribed simply on the basis of proximity and residence. Some idea of the importance of the mother's brother, sister's son bond in the welding together of the clan as a single unit can be seen in that in Nupasafa clan, out of 87 cases known to me 23, or 26 per cent of the mother's brothers are within the clan, 53, or 61 per cent are outside, 11, or 13 per cent have not established any such relationship. These ties, along with those resulting from the adoption of both male and female children, the practice of "looking after" children with respect to their marriage, those resulting from contributions to bride wealth, and others not yet

mentioned, constitute an important part of the totality of ties binding the clan into a permanently enduring, autonomous unit.

Two other aspects of Bena kinship need mentioning here, a relationship formed by two people having the same name, and relationships resulting from the system of age grading mentioned earlier in a different context. When a child is born a man (or woman) may decide to give the child a name. Infants are given names usually a few days after their birth, most often by some adult other than a parent (parents can and sometimes do name their own children, however). If a person gives a child a name that he (or she) has, a special kind of relationship is formed, one that endures for life. For example, if a man who has the name 'Yafa' names the child of a clansman 'Yafa,' the two enter into this relationship. There is a special reciprocal kinship term, 'apatnigasi,' and there are certain kinds of behavioral expectations between them. The elder is supposed to be highly nurturant towards the younger, he should be benevolent and give the child choice portions of food, presents of other kinds from time to time. He will take every opportunity to talk and visit with the child, holding and fondling it whenever possible, and always encouraging the child to use the appropriate kinship term. In short, the elder person in the apatnigasi relationship is like a second parent. The child will call his apatnigasi's wife by the same term his apatnigasi does, a term which is not used by others and she will treat the child in roughly the same manner as her husband. Needless to say this also establishes relationships between the child's true parents and the child's apatnigasi and his family. Indeed, my subjective interpretation is that the relationship is actually established for the purpose of cementing an alliance or friendship with the parents rather than with the child, but evidence for such an interpretation is not readily available.

In any event it is the case that the adults do share a relationship as well as the two individuals, and the net effect of a clan wide network of such special kinship ties, again, is to bind the people together by still an additional means and, again, crossing over and weakening sub-clan and lineage ties.

The relationship can be entered into by persons in different clans also if circumstances permit. For example, a man temporarily living in one clan may so name a child and then move, etc. I do not have extensive figures available but in the dozen or slightly more cases I know of it is interesting that not a single one involves two members of the same sub-clan with one exception. The exception is between Mumugefa and Abio (See Table II) where we might well question one or both claims to actual sub-clan membership.

The most important kinship ties established, and those which most effectively cross-out ties of all other kinds and bind people together, are those of age grades. In this respect the Bena situation is, again, very similar to Gahuku:

> Few social relationships outside the family are as important as the bonds established by age. A boy and his age mates share a wider range of common interests and activities than close kinsmen. They have mutual interests, share the same experiences, submit to the same moral teachings and are therefore supposed to be friends for life. The typical features of the relationship can be seen in children of five years of age, in the groups of small boys who walk about with their arms round each other's shoulders, talking and whispering confidentially, and in the little girls who run screaming through the kunai, their long hair tresses clutched in the hand of some boy while his friends menace them with toy bows and arrows. Later, this same group of boys pass through the rites of initiation together, and through all stages of their novitiate in the zagusave their common interests and dependence on those who are senior to them are emphasized (Read, 1952:12).

The true importance of the relationship is difficult to assess in that it so permeates the daily life of the people that its isolation for analytical purposes does great violence to the truth. Men and boys are constantly in the company of their age mates, decisions are reached, plans are made, even daily tasks performed only with the help of one's age mate. There usually is one age mate above all others who is the closest and the most trusted. A man has loyalties to all of those individuals who were initiated with him but naturally enough he forms greater attachments for some than for all and for one or two than for others. If, for example, two clans initiate simultaneously a man will use the same term for all of his age mates in both clans, but he will have much stronger loyalties to those of his own clan who he grew up with and ran with as a small child. And from among those he invariably will have picked one or two who are closer than the rest. The enduring relationships of the most overt kind that emerge for the observer are always those of age mates and even after a few short weeks it becomes apparent that certain men are virtually always together, whether they be travelling to a distant place for some reason, repairing a fence, cutting timber, making an earth oven, or performing a host of other tasks. This is truly a relationship of peers, unlike the relationship between close agnates in which the principle of seniority is involved. A man should defer to his elder brother, his father, grandfather and all men his senior within the clan, but vis-a-vis his age mates the principle of seniority for all practical purposes is inoperative. Thus a man can confide in and discuss personal matters more easily with an age mate. He can state opinions and exchange ideas without having to defer to age. What is more important perhaps, is that only in conjunction with his age mates would he really dare to challenge an older man's decision.

For example, when Kaiesso's wife, Hohoe, was divorced by Kaiesso he wanted her to leave. She, too, wished to leave and none of Kaiesso's brothers wished to exercise their leviritic priviledge. But Blefu, Kaiesso's father still would not permit her to depart. Blefu insisted she should stay and help him in his garden as he was getting old and needed her. This was an unpopular decision even with Blefu's own sons, but it was even more unpopular with Kaiesso's age mates who were next in line to take her as a second or third wife. They resented it both because they felt the old man was not taking cognizance of Kaiesso's wishes (their age mate) and they felt that if Blefu was not going to send Hohoe away he should allow one of them to marry her. But the important consideration is that in spite of the fact that the decision was generally unpopular, that it was without precedent, that it ran counter to the wishes of all involved except those of Blefu himself, no one individual would challenge the decision. It was only much later, and only after much consultation with all of his age mates, that Feka, who wanted Hohoe very much as a second wife, backed by his age mates including Kaiesso, criticized Blefu publically and demanded that he change his decision and either permit Hohoe to leave or to become his wife. Blefu, a man of great prestige did not back down even under pressure, but this does not detract from the point that seniority tends to be challenged by age grades and not by individuals.

One of the outstanding features of Bena ethos, or one of the Bena 'themes,' or ideas about personality development if you will, can be summed up by saying that 'children are not adults.' Bena children are virtually never punished and, generally speaking, they are nurtured and always well cared for. There are, however, occasions when they are always punished, and quite severly at times. These have to do with any interference by the

young in adult activities. Thus, for example, if a group of boys are too near the butchering they must be switched painfully away. If a little girl stumbles onto some men counting a bride price she may be frightened out of her wits by being chased away by a threatening axe-wielding adult. If a young man speaks out at a public meeting he is apt to be told to be quiet, and it is usually added that as he does not work and does not help the adult males and so on he therefore has no right to speak in the decision making. A person is not truly an adult even after having completed the initiation, after marriage, or even after initial success in battle for that matter. Full adulthood can be attained only by age, experience, knowledge, and by spending roughly the first thirty years of life under the dominance of adults. I do not say guidance for little real guidance is involved, youths are pretty much left alone to do as they please, provided they do not interfere with adult activities and cooperate on those occasions when it is deemed necessary. Young people, up until roughly age thirty, have little to say even if they are asked, and they are not asked.

The Bena recognize eight stages in the life cycle of males and it is only when a man reaches the sixth of these, approximately between the ages of thirty and forty-five, that he is an adult. By the age of about thirty he has been married for a considerable time, may have two or more wives and two or more children, and he is just becoming an adult. For the first time the elder males will ask his opinion, he will be sought to attend the meetings held irregularly by the clan males, and his aid will actively be solicited in exchanges, marriage preparations, and so on. The previous years, especially those between about twenty to thirty, have been years during which the young man has been under almost constant pressure to conform. Even as late as the twenty-fifth year most Bena males, even

though married and with children, do not have their own gardens. Their wife or wives do not live in their own houses and still reside with their husband's mother or mothers. The husband's father begins to force the young man out. He tells him often that he must now begin gardens for his wives and make houses for them, he must now, in effect, become a man. Pressures are put on the young man by other clansmen as well and people begin to demand that he pay them back for the contributions they made to his bride wealth. This is paid back in the form of contributions by him to the bride price of youths in the age grades below, and the young man can do this only if he has pigs and gardens of his own. If he does not have these things he is considered to be simply 'rubbish,' a man without a name, and, of course, to be a 'man with a name' is the highest position to which a man can aspire. It is only after the young man has felt and submitted to these pressures, only after he has begun active gardening and pig raising, only after he has proven himself capable of contributing a share towards the purchase of wives or participating in the pig exchanges that he is truly an adult.

The same pressures are being applied to all of the members of the age grade. Not only do the fathers of the young men individually nag them and remind them to grow up and produce, but the elders collectively nag them as a group. It is not uncommon for the elders to publically reprimand the age grade for their refusal to cooperate, to begin working with the older men in the gardens and so on. Looking at my daily record for the period of one year indicates that on eight occasions, fairly evenly spaced, the men of the subject age grade were publically chastised in this way. The youths suffer this in silence and may go away for a time as a group to hunt pigs or court and steal women from another clan. The age grade

wanders essentially as a group at this time and, as the adults are aligned against them, so they are aligned against the world, and the unity of the age grade expresses itself in this collective action whether it be by distinguishing themselves in battle, successfully stealing women or pigs from another place, passive resistance to the adult males by their failure to cooperate, or whatever. But because the age mates in any age grade are drawn from all sub-clans the ties between them reinforce clan solidarity and when they finally do mature and take their place as adults the ties between them are so firmly established and so strong that no outside ties can replace them. It is in the clan that security lies and the clan is only as strong as the ties that bind its adult members together. In Korofeigu the ties that bind age mates are easily as strong as those of agnation and, in fact, can and do override them in importance at times.

One of the chief functions of age grades was in warfare and the deployment of troops was on the basis of age grades so that, for example, when raiding an enemy village one age grade would be on the left flank, one on the right flank, still another attempting to set fire to the stockade, and so on. Likewise, prior to administrative control, when fighting was rampant and there was the constant threat of annihilation, men would be sent out of the heavily stockaded villages by age grades in order to protect women working in the gardens. Each age grade, as it passed through the initiation rites, was instructed in the skills of warfare, in its techniques and aims. The youths were told who the enemies were, how strong they were, who the leaders were, as well as how to go about destroying them. Prowess in battle was a value virtually above all others and the greatest achievement for a young man was to distinguish himself in battle. But individuals do not fight wars alone and a man would have an opportunity

to distinguish himself only if his age grade was brave and active, if the age grade was weak everyone suffered and thus age grade after age grade extended themselves to the utmost to prove their worth through brave deeds and success in battle.

The pattern of warfare practiced by the Bena and their immediate neighbors must be numbered, I think, among the most continuous and violent ever recorded. Warfare and raiding were endemic. The threat of destruction was constantly present and even the most successful groups were often forced to disperse and flee:

> . . . in the continually fluctuating fortunes of war each group has suffered an astonishing number of vicissitudes. The vanquished and the dispossessed were compelled to seek refuge with their friends and allies, and from time to time during its more recent history each tribe has been scattered and dispersed over a wide area. But conquered groups never ceased hoping for revenge, and they aimed to achieve it by forming alliances with their stronger neighbors. Not infrequently, these alliances resulted in one group suddenly attacking the people who had given it refuge, for, except in the relationships between linked tribes, political expediency outweighed all other considerations (Read, 1955:254).

In view of the importance that such a pattern of warfare must have in its relation to social structure it seems incredible that no one has seen fit to examine Highlands warfare in detail. The descriptions that are given suffer seriously from a peculiar sociological bias which I will return to later. But it should be noted that warfare, in the Bena area at least, was quite definitely not a kind of sociological game in which virtually no one was ever killed, or a relatively unimportant pursuit involving some kind of fictional 'equilibrium' as has sometimes been implied for other Highlands groups:

> If space permitted, it could also be shown that the necessity to display 'strength' and to achieve 'equivalence' was one of the principle considerations in warfare; ultimately no one won. Further, the alignment of tribes and tribal segments tends to ensure that

> structural groups 'face' each other with an equal 'strength-potential': Ideally, it is virtually impossible for any group or combination of groups to maintain superiority over any other, or to maintain it only at the expense of jeopardizing some more inclusive range of common interests (Read, 1959:429).

Again:

> However, wholesale destruction is the exception rather than the rule, and there are relatively few deaths in any one skirmish. Every now and then, members of a district may be forced to leave their home territory and seek refuge elsewhere; but most inter-district fighting is on the level of 'hit and run' raiding. There is a repetitive quality about this, interspersed with peace ceremonies and other inter-district gatherings, so that there is a constant fluctuation of friendly and hostile relations (Berndt, 1962:233).

In Bena the stated aims of warfare were the complete and total annihilation of the enemy if possible. This included every man, woman and child, whether they be old, crippled, pregnant or feeble minded and, except in very rare cases, no one would have been spared for any reason.[14] Although it is true that most raids probably resulted in only one (or few) deaths, cases are known in which entire groups were destroyed. Many groups are represented today, in fact, by very few (and in some cases only one) living members, as the outcome of a series of grievous defeats. Furthermore, in view of the relatively small populations involved one might argue that even the loss of one or few members at a time, when raids are frequent, as they were, would be a serious depletion of manpower resources whether the deaths be male or female.

Warfare, called luva, is distinguished from feuding which is called nonogatna. Luva is fighting against true enemies rather than against fellow tribesmen or other allies. Real enemies, however, seem to have been for Korofeigu, everyone, with the exception of Kapakamaligi, their nearest neighboring tribe. I believe even the Korofeigu alliance with Kapakamaligi may be only a temporary one for Korofeigu claims to have been

similarly aligned with other groups in the past for a time and in every case the alliance was eventually broken by luva. Thus Korofeigu and Gitenu seem to have lived together for several years and considered themselves virtually one, or so they say. But then there was a fight in which Gitenu was virtually destroyed. A similar situation occurred between Korofeigu and Katagu, with the result that Katagu remains even to this day a very small group. The Korofeigans are very proud of their warlike reputation and of their great success in battle. And, objectively viewed, they were successful. Korofeigu, at the time of the first European contact was a large group, larger than any of its neighbors, and completely dominated the Bena Bena valley all the way to Asaloka (Holmes, 1957). There was no idea of an 'underdog' and even though groups which had once been defeated were sometimes invited back they were apparently tolerated only until they began to get too large, at which time the dominant group would again attempt to attack and defeat them. Just as it is important to maintain the strength of your own group so it is important to decrease the strength of your enemies. This is the rationale for the killing of women, children, and old people, for the Korofeigans say, 'If you do not kill everyone they will have children and will be strong.'

There seem to have been no consistently observed rules for warfare as there were for feuding in the Bena. No means was considered unfair and there were constant betrayals, secret agreements and alliances. Ambush and sneak attacks were common procedure. Deceit was a common practice and one learned to trust no one except fellow clansmen and to a lesser degree, fellow tribesmen. The 'double cross' was typical and groups bribed to attack one group would just as often turn on those who had given them the bribe. There was constant suspicion of sorcery and that, coupled

with death from previous wars and revenge killings kept the cycle of violence and killing going. In order to gain revenge it was not uncommon to bribe a group supposedly friendly with the suspected sorcerer's group to treacherously kill the suspected person. Payment for this was in the form of pork and other valuables. Likewise, if there was a successful leader and warrior who was continually successful against one, a group friendly to him could sometimes be bribed to kill him. People, it is said, ate with one hand holding their bow and arrows. A man would not consider traveling even a short distance without his weapons, a habit which continues over even to the present in some areas of the Bena: "Most men will not leave their clan grounds without carrying their bows and arrows although such a sight is rare west of Goroka" (Howlett, 1963:10). There were times when pigs had to be kept tethered during the day and allowed to graze only at night and still other occasions when the people would be forced to flee quickly, carrying children and pigs in whatever numbers they could manage.

Much of the raiding was carried out on a 'hit and run' basis, in which case a group of raiders would sneak up quietly on an unsuspecting victim, quite often an unarmed woman or child in a garden, fill the unsuspecting victim full of arrows, and depart as quickly as possible. But there were recurrent full scale raids in which large numbers of warriors would attack stockaded settlements, burning and pillaging. Sometimes one man would sneak over the palisade early in the morning to let the others in, sometimes the barrier would be directly attacked, set fire to, and breached. The men's houses were the first target almost invariably and it would be surrounded, the door fastened tightly, and fire then put to it. Anyone attempting to escape was shot as they came out. Similar procedures were used on women's houses as well. These raids left many dead, either

burned, shot and sometimes hacked to pieces as well. Once a person was down he or she would be surrounded and arrow after arrow fired, well beyond those necessary to bring about death. Sometimes, when the men were storming a village their wives (some of them, at least) would go along to watch. They would prepare food and water and stay some distance away on a ridge from which they could see the proceedings. The men would come to eat and drink, replenish their supply of arrows and then return to the battle. Young boys, too young to participate, were encouraged to accompany the war party to watch and to learn what they could. Later they would be given bows and arrows, spears and war shields by their fathers and others and would take their place alongside the older men. At other times the old people, women and children would be hidden during the fighting and, if they happened to be discovered, the men would fight desperately to save them. Caves were often used for this purpose and sometimes the entrances were artifically concealed by planting bamboo or casuarinas for concealment. Killing and the violence associated with war were common experience for all. There were no rituals or special observances for a youth when he killed his first man in battle, nor were killing or the killer regarded as unclean.

There were, however, rituals associated with going into battle. These were directed exclusively towards success in battle and involved the killing of pigs and feasting. At these times the spirits of ancestors would be invoked to aid them, sometimes the ghost of a particularly good fighter would be asked to come and enter their bows and arrows so that they could shoot straight and kill their enemies quickly. They would call out his name and instruct him to come and help them take revenge on those who had

killed him. 'I shoot you now,' they uttered, 'with the bow of So-and-so,' and hoped for a clean hit.

After battles won there would be singing on the way home. The older men would explain that the ancestors sang after winning battles. The principal weapons in the Eastern Highlands were the bow and arrow, thin hardwood spears about as long as a man is tall which were thrown by hand, and sometimes hardwood clubs. The bows, as well as the spears and most arrowheads were of black palm which could only be acquired by the Korofeigans by trading salt of their own manufacture for it in the surrounding mountains. Arrows were unnotched, unfeathered, with long, heavy, hand carved, wickedly barbed heads which could be removed only by extremely painful surgery performed with sharp bamboo splinters. Large war shields, almost as high as a man, and topped with cassowary plumes were also acquired by barter. Each man had such a shield and there were well developed techniques for using them which were taught to all the young men along with other knowledge of war. The shields were used for protection from arrows and men became adept at shooting from behind them. They were also effective for storming a stockade and were sometimes held above a man who was attempting to set fire to the barrier or cut through the vine fastenings.

Camouflage was known and used. Men would cover themselves skillfully with grass or leaves in order to sneak up on someone unobserved. They could move silently through the waist-high kunai grass which afforded exceptionally good cover. Techniques for defending the men's house were developed. One method was to dig a tunnel which started in the center of the men's house and led outside to open some yards away. One man would sleep over the entrance to the tunnel by covering it with his war shield and thus they could get out quickly if need be. Sometimes the men's house was constructed

with false posts at one point which could be easily kicked out and they could then burst through the grass walls. Or a smaller house, similar in appearance to a menstrual hut would be constructed near the men's house. Three or four men would be appointed to sleep in it each night, the theory being that in the event of a raid these men could cause enough annoyance to the attackers so that their imprisoned comrades would have a better chance to get out. On occasions when attacks were actually being expected sentinels were posted at strategic locations to watch and give warning. In the event of attack women and children would run to prearranged hiding places, taking advantage of the confusion to escape. They would be joined there later by the others.

Before concluding this section it is necessary to discuss one more element of Bena culture which is inextricably linked with warfare, leadership. Although as Read (1959) has pointed out there were other criteria for leaders, by far the most important was success in battle. This seems to be an even more important consideration among the Bena than among Gahuku. No man could hope to become a leader if he were not a successful and knowledgeable warrior. This was not, however, simply a matter of numbers of enemy killed, although that was important, but also involved such things as knowledge of strategy, of the weapons of war, and the ability to impart this knowledge to others. The closest thing to a formal education a Bena youth received was that he received in warfare from the gipina, or other leader he followed. To become a gipina was a goal to strive for but in order to qualify a man had to pursue and master knowledge of the skills of war. Gipinas were also sometimes curers or rain-makers as well, and many of them had magical knowledge of other kinds, but not always, and these accomplishments were not essential for becoming a gipina. Most of

the gipinas had several wives but this, too, was not a prerequisite for office. Gipinas, generally speaking, however, were men of wealth and would have many wives, pigs and gardens (these things, of course, do tend to go together). This was related to their success in battle as well as to their prominence in all civic matters including the planning and executing of the larger pig festivals and initiations.

The most important feature of leadership is the fact that the influence of the gipina was not limited to their own lineage or sub-clan or even their own clan, but extended outward to anyone who wished to follow a particular leader or could be recruited by the leader. There were invariably more than one gipina per clan and they would vie for the allegiance of clan members and others outside the clan as well. A leader could lead and influence all of those who would follow him and there are stories told of how such-and-such a gipina wanted to battle so-and-so only to be deserted by the people who chose instead to follow a different leader against a different enemy. The citizens were fickle and would tend to follow the leaders who were the most successful, or at least the most convincing. And, when they became unsuccessful they would be replaced by others who could capture and hold the attention and loyalty of the people.

There seems to be a clearly established pattern of deference in which the average man defers to his lineage and sub-clan elders, they defer to the gipinas, and a gipina, in turn, defers to a more famous or important gipina, if placed in a situation where deference becomes necessary. The principle of seniority, it should be pointed out, works in only a limited way, so that a man must be of sufficient age so as to be a fully adult member of the community before he can function as a lineage or sub-clan

leader. But age above adulthood is redundant for this purpose and is replaced by the ability to perform and to dominate others by force of personality. Strict adherence to the principle of seniority is, of course, inconsistent with the strong emphasis on individualism. Thus in Nupasafa clan Bonanihi, who is the oldest active male in Gobei's lineage, dominates it. But it is Tubutaboe, the next eldest, rather than Puponesso the eldest who dominates the inactive Blefu's lineage even though Puponesso is still in the prime of life, and the two together, Bonanihi and Tubutaboe, lead the sub-clan with little deference on the part of either for the other even though Tubutaboe is considerably younger. In Benaranofi's sub-clan it is Wareka and Bunabopiso who dominate although Nomapiro is older and, in fact, more successful in terms of wives, children, and pigs. In this case it appears to be clearly a matter of personality as Nomapiro, even though very competent in most aspects of his culture, is not a striking personality. He has a rather coarse, feminine voice, is exceptionally dark skinned and unattractive by native standards, he does not know how to butcher which, although not too important, is definitely a strike against him. He does not like to speak up at meetings and tends to remain quiet and withdrawn although he will readily give advice and opinions in private conversations with others. In Kikipe's sub-clan, Kikipe and Kanarobo vie for leadership with little deference one to the other for any reason. They are approximately the same age. Yafa and Ginigiavo always defer to either Kanarobo or Kikipe. In Eopave's sub-clan Nehea dominates his lineage but defers to Nagiya in sub-clan matters as do the others. And, finally, in the sub-clan of Afooya it is Klehopave who has replaced Afooya as the dominant person due to the increasing age of the latter. Yatama, who is older, is unable to lead.

Due to the intervention of the administration in the past few years, the replacement of traditional leaders by administratively sponsored luluai's and tultuls, and, more recently, by native counselors, the gipinas have mostly died or are too old and feeble to function contemporaneously. For that reason one cannot say with certainty what the situation was prior to contact. But it seems clear enough that although each sub-clan ideally had or wanted a gipina, it did not work out that way in practice. Ninisahafo, Bubisso, and Gebei were gipinas at the same time, for example, and there were at that time five sub-clans as there are now. And, in fact, although the men claim that in the past each sub-clan had a gipina, they cannot cite a single time, even in the memory of the oldest males, when there were more than three gipinas at any given time.

That a gipina could exercise authority and influence in a clan other than his own is born out primarily by the case of Korotoya, the youngest of the surviving gipinas. Korotoya, although a member of Nagamitobo clan, effectively led Wai'atagusa clan as well as his own, and, for a time, at least, just after the deaths of both Ninisahafo and Bubisso, and at the time when Gobei was decreasing in influence because of advancing age, led Nupasafa clan into battle as well. This was also just at the time of the first European intervention so that the pattern was broken up. Korotoya is now the counselor for Nagamitobo clan, the only counselor in Korofeigu who was also a traditional leader and his authority is greatly enhanced because of this, making him much more successful as a leader than the other counselors who were not traditional leaders.[15] The immediate response it appears, when a group was leaderless, was to seek a new leader known to be strong and successful, not to automatically promote some individual who was somehow 'next in line.' This is not to say that people could not suddenly

become gipinas upon the demise of one, but they could only if they were truly prepared and qualified and could convince the people to trust and follow them rather than some other gipina in another clan or sub-clan. There were times it seems when effective leadership was simply not available in the clan and they would then ally with others under the direction of a famous and powerful man.

The competition for followers can be seen in the process of settling new villages. An eminent man who decides for some reason to move will start building a new house and marking out ground for a garden. He will actively recruit people to move with him and if he is successful eventually a new village will result. If he cannot convince anyone to follow him, or if only a very few follow, he will eventually give up the attempt and move back to the parent village. I believe it is quite likely that this is, in fact, one pattern of segmentation, although I have no data that fully corroborates this. In any case, the people follow leaders who are successful, who know what to do, how and when to do it, and can convince people that they ought to do it. A short time before my arrival in Nupasafa, Afooya had attempted to convince some of the people to move and had, himself, built a new house some distance away from the others when promised by some to join him. But they changed their minds and decided to remain where they were at which point Afooya had to return. If he had attempted to remain by himself he would not have been able to protect his pigs or his family from marauders.

Gipinas had great if not absolute authority in battle and this diffused to other situations as well. For most of the everyday tasks of living, however, little direction is needed. Everyone knows how to build a house, gather firewood, repair a garden fence and plant crops and they do not require supervision. But in battle, when direction is critical and

obedience is important, the gipina had virtually unlimited authority. It is said that they could, if necessary, order a parent to put to death a child that was noisy and giving away their hiding place. Old persons, too, if feeble and unable to keep up could be and apparently were ordered killed if the circumstances were such that it was deemed necessary by the gipina. These leaders had no special authority with respect to the pig festivals as near as I could determine, but their authority as war leaders diffused out to pig festivals and other activities as well so that their opinions carried greater weight than might otherwise have been the case. People would ask the gipina when to build a garden or a house and defer to his advice mainly because it was convenient and it allowed for less competition for help from others on any given day. The gipina would recruit others to help himself and others and in general took over the coordination of group tasks. But he did not really command these things except as they might relate to warfare. People asked him for help outside of warfare because he was wise and influential, not because he was all-powerful. It seems equally clear that not all gipinas were as skillful at arranging or directing the complex arrangements for the pig festivals as they were at the skills of war and the one was not dependent upon the other. But, as indicated above, generally they went together. Likewise, a gipina was not always acknowledgeable with respect to clan lore. Gipinas did not always know more myths or stories than other men, nor do they appear to have been more informed with respect to genealogical knowledge. Ability in warfare and knowledge attendant upon it was the truly necessary prerequisite for leadership. A gipina, for example, unlike the average man, can cite the names of all types of arrows, where they came from and why one is more effective than another for killing. He handles them with almost loving

care and is sensitive to the slightest imperfection in their construction. He is a master in the use of the heavy war shield, the hand spear, as well as in all the tricks and strategies of battle. He knows all of the convenient hiding places, terrain, distances between places and so on. This knowledge was transmitted from father to son and there was a strong tendency for gipinas to be the sons of gipinas but, again, this was by no means a prerequisite for the position and lacking a son, or a satisfactory son, a gipina would sometimes train someone else in this lore.

When the tribe acted as a whole it was after public consultation by the gipinas of the various clans. These leaders would discuss the situation at hand, outlining their views and opinions and eventually a plan would emerge. The plan, whatever it might be, even though arrived at by consensus, was associated with the name of one or more gipinas and if it proved later to be successful they would gain in prestige. If it failed they would tend to lose prestige, although it appears to have been much more difficult to lose prestige, once had it than to gain more. Lineage and sub-clan-leaders would speak also at the meetings, usually in support of a particular gipina and in this way they would establish a reputation for either good or bad judgement. The men, gipinas included, would listen respectfully to the old men but would follow their advice only if they felt it was sound or if it coincided with their own. Once a plan emerged it was up to the gipina responsible for it to see that it was carried out and he had complete authority to see to its implementation.

Aside from the gipinas and the lineage and sub-clan leaders there were no leadership positions. There were medical specialists but they did not hold any kind of political or administrative authority. There were also men who reputedly could control the weather, either causing it to

rain or to stop raining but, again, they did not have political functions. Some men were noted for their knowledge of garden magic or for knowing magic that would make pigs grow but this knowledge did not necessarily give them power or authority over others in any political or administrative sense. A gipina might also be a rain-maker, or have garden magic, or even be able to heal, but these talents were largely independent of his leadership position. Possession of such knowledge and skill might, however, influence people's opinion and thereby add to one's chances of becoming a gipina.

One final topic must be mentioned before going on, that dealing with disputes and the arbitration of disputes. What happens, for example, when two sub-clans or two clans have a serious disagreement? Luva, of course, does not occur between sub-clans of the same clan or between clans of the same tribe. Fighting between these groups is always nonogatna. It is believed that nonogatna should be settled by arbitration if it threatens to get out of hand or continues for an overly long period of time. Or, if it threatens to result in excessive intra-group strife whether it be sub-clan or clan. It is important to emphasize the notion of 'excessive' for, even though it cannot be precisely defined, argumentation or fighting must reach a certain stage of seriousness before public opinion becomes aroused enough to intervene. Thus, for example, if Gobei's sub-clan should have a dispute with that of Benaranofi's over something of mutual concern, with the result that an altercation ensues, it is quite likely that a death would result before the remainder of the clan took it upon themselves to intervene. The intervention, when it did come, would be more in the nature of a peace-making ceremony than arbitration or settlement and would be brought about by a third, ostensibly 'objective,' sub-clan. This latter group would kill pigs, invite the disputants together and present each unit

with gifts or pork, urging them to eat together. After considerable speech making, prodding, and assorted expressions of self-righteousness and moral indignation on the part of both parties to the dispute they invariably do sit down together in this way. The speeches and discussions at these times seem invariably to stress the fact that the two disputing groups were 'like children,' and, having misbehaved their 'fathers' or 'brothers' are now helping them back to the proper way of behaving. At one such speech, for example, involving a clan rather than a sub-clan spokesman it was said, 'We were like children. We did not know what we were doing and now you, our father (referring to the third clan), have come and shown us the right way.'

The most interesting feature of this intervention by a third party is that it can and does take place at all levels of organization. If two brothers fight a third person intervenes and brings them together. If two sub-clans, a third intervens, if two clans, still another becomes involved and this procedure can even involve two tribes because a clan or clans from one tribe will, under certain circumstances, intervene in the internal affairs of another. Thus on one occasion when two Kapakamaligi clans were feuding the Korofeigu clans of Nupasafa and Nagamitobo killed pigs for them and brought about a peaceful settlement. This particular problem involved the death of one man, caused it was believed by his clansmen by sorcery from the other clan, who then murdered the suspected sorcerer. His clan, claiming a false accusation and wrongful murder wanted revenge and for days talked of fighting. At this point the Korofeigu clans stepped in and settled the issue by giving pork and getting the two Kapakamaligi clans to demonstrate their good faith and intentions by eating together. The act of eating together is probably the most important and powerful way of acknowledging

friendship because of the ubiquitous fear of both sorcery and betrayal known to occur on these occasions. This particular event, of course, was post-contact, but I am certain that essentially the same procedure were followed formerly.

The spokesman on these occasions are, as one might expect, the gipinas, if there happens to be gipinas available who are involved. Otherwise the clan, sub-clan, or lineage leaders involved in the altercation do the speaking. They are aided by the leaders of the intervening groups. There are no special 'extra-lineage agencies' (Smith, 1956:53) other than these but here one finds some similarity with the African groups as these intervening agencies can be seen as similar in function to those described by Smith for Africa:

> It is, furthermore, easy to show on the data from these types of society that beyond the internal administrative systems of the lineage units there are agencies of a predominantly administrative character, which operate to reduce the latent dangers of conflict between maximal lineages for the stability of the society as a whole, and that, from an analytic point of view, these agencies resemble rudimentary offices. Thus the Tallensi statuses of tendana and chief; the omuseni, omulasi, ovwali, dream-prophet, rain-maker, and war-leader of the Bantu Kavirondo; and the leopard-skin chief and prophet among the Nuer, are all agencies of this type . . . . By means of these institutionalized positions, administrative action limiting the range and type of political conflict among the major political units of the societies concerned was effected. Notably also, rules and conventions governed the action of these extra-lineage agencies, and limited the expression of opposition between lineages, as well as within them (1956:53).

The functional equivalence of the subject agencies, if they be truly equivalent, do not make up for the many dissimilarities already mentioned between African and New Guinea groups. But before attempting to classify Korofeigu as a type different from the classical African type, and attempting also to explain why a different type is found in New Guinea, it

will be very helpful to compare the Bena case with other Highlands groups as they have been recorded in the literature.

Problems of interpretation and explanation, it must be born in mind, are inextricably linked to description and, in the case at hand, it is not at all easy to separate problems inherent in the de facto situation (empirical problems) from those which result simply from description and interpretation (problems of the literature). A careful examination of the literature should clarify the two different aspects of the situation, as well as shed some light on the several 'biases' mentioned in the introductory section. There is also involved in this particular case the fact mentioned earlier, if only in passing, that the Korofeigu example is probably not representative of all Highlands New Guinea groups. Exactly how representative it is I am unable to say and the reader must to a certain extent judge for himself as we compare statements and descriptions from the literature with those contained above and in the next section. I will say, however, that at least some of the generalizations that will emerge from this discussion can be extended to at least some of the other Highlanders. Although Korofeigu may be quantitatively atypical (that is, even though I doubt, for example, that non-resident agnates reach the 50 per cent level in most cases) the underlying principle, in this case, open recruitment and the maintenance of group strength, probably remains the same. Korofeigu will be found to be much more typical of Eastern Highlands groups than those of the Western Highlands. It will also, I think, be more typical of groups peripheral to it than those further away. Korofeigu appears to be near one end of a continuum, with groups such as Enga (Meggitt, 1958), and Mbwomb (Vicedom and Tischner, 1943) at the

opposite end. The Enga and Mbwomb seem to typify the African model very closely, both with respect to ideology dogma, and behavior, whereas, as we have seen, the Bena do not. I believe many others also do not.

CHAPTER V.

OTHER NEW GUINEA SOCIETIES AND THE AFRICAN MODEL

It is virtually impossible to adequately compare Bena Bena with the other Highlands groups reported to date in the literature. This unfortunate situation is due primarily to the failure of ethnologists to distinguish between the ideals and the facts of behavior as mentioned in an earlier section, but also because of the operation of certain biases associated with structural anthropology. Although many ethnologists have commented upon what would seem to be outstanding differences between New Guinea and African groups almost no one until recently has seen fit to seriously challenge the use of the so-called 'African model.'

> The people of the New Guinea Highlands, first become accessible for study at a time when anthropological discussion was dominated by the analyses of political and kinship systems that had recently been made in Africa. Ethnographers working in New Guinea were able to present interim accounts of the poly-segmentary stateless systems of the Highlands with less effort and greater speed by making use of the advances in understanding already achieved by their colleagues who had studied similar social systems in Africa. Yet it has become clear that Highland societies fit awkwardly into African moulds. When first tackling the New Guinea societies it was a decided advantage to be able to refer to the analytical work available on Nuer, Tallensi, Tiv and other peoples, but it may be disadvantageous if this African orientation now prevents us from seeing the distinctively non-African characteristics of the Highlands (Barnes, 1962:5).

While it seems obvious now that the "African orientation" is indeed blinding us to distinctive features of New Guinea society there are, I submit, still deeper reasons for our limited success. These are clearly related to the "African orientation" and have to do with the fact that the Highlands has been the almost exclusive domain of structurally inclined

anthropologists. Thus, beginning with K. E. Read, the first ethnologist to work in the Highlands,[1] important differences have clearly been perceived between African societies and New Guinea ones, such as the Gahuku-Gama amongst whom Read worked, but he and those following him did not find it necessary to use a new "model" and they seem to have engaged in the "anthropological butterfly collecting" mentioned by Leach (1961b:3). Read, however, at the same time, indicated that a second look would certainly be in order.

> Gahuku-Gama culture is characteristically Melanesian in respect of certain salient features. I mention here only the absence of chieftainship and of any sui generis political machinery or offices. The political system is essentially similar to that which I have described for the Ngarawapum of the Markham valley, but with a marked difference in scale. The group, indeed, is numerically much larger than we are accustomed to find in New Guinea, though by no means as large as other Central Highlands groups. With the exception of the Kuman and the Mbowmb, segmentation and the interrelationships between segments are also more complicated than anything to be found in the published literature. I give, therefore, only the barest outline of the social structure (1952:3).

Even so, further perusal discloses that Read tends to minimize the differences he himself pointed out and considers the Gahuku to be essentially a "patrilineal," "segmentary," "descent-based" society, more or less similar to the African ones. Thus he describes, for example, the dzuha, which is:

> Each clan is further divided into a number of unnamed subclans or dzuha. Members regard themselves as directly descended through males from a common male ancestor and thus as related. This man's name is seldom remembered, but the group believes implicitly in his existence in the past . . . .
>
> The dzuha is a strictly exogamous, land-holding, and predominantly local group. The members characteristically reside together, either in a specific portion of the village or in a separate settlement. In a number of cases, however, the vicissitudes of warfare or exile consequent on repeated enemy attacks have resulted in a dispersal of segments amongst different tribal and sub-tribal groups. This naturally affects internal solidarity, but the scattered segments retain their common identity for a considerable time.

> The dzuha, finally, is made up of a number of related patrilineages, genealogical units whose members trace a known descent through males from a known male ancestor. Genealogical knowledge is not extensive and the people cannot as a rule remember farther back than the generation of their great grandparents. The patrilineage thus normally has a depth of between four to five generations. The genealogical inter-connections of patrilineages within the dzuha cannot be stated exactly; but the common descent of members of the inclusive unit is maintained by the assertion that the founding ancestors of each component lineage were brothers, themselves descended patrilineally from an unnamed male ancestor common to the dzuha as a whole (1952:4).

Before commenting further let me quote one more passage from Read's work which, in addition to its relevance here, will become more important as we look at the work of others:

> The smallest permanent group is the four generation patrilineage. This is not named, but its members tend to form the nucleus of a residential group and possess certain critical rights to land which seems to distinguish them from other similarly constituted groups. For most purposes, however, the identity of the patrilineage merges into that of a larger patrilineal group which I shall call the sub-clan. This group also is not named, but it is readily distinguished by a descriptive phrase (ha'makoko dzuha none) which may be translated as "the people of one root." Members of the sub-clan consider themselves to be true blood relatives, all descended from a common named male ancestor. The sub-clan, however, is not a true lineage for although its members conceive of it as a genealogically structured unit they are normally unable to trace true genealogical connections with all those who belong to it. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, while it is necessary -- because of land rights and property inheritance -- for members of the true patrilineage to remember exact genealogies, exact relationship is less important for members of the sub-clan than the tradition of common descent and the remembering of the common ancestor. At the fourth generation or higher, therefore, there is a tendency to recall the names of only sufficient individuals to explain a connection between the component true patrilineages. In other words, there is a continual telescoping of the genealogical framework so that at any point in time the sub-clan appears to have a depth of, at the most, five generations (1955:252).

No real comparison of Gahuku and Bena can be made because Read does not distinguish clearly between the facts of behavior and the stated ideals of behavior. There are many indications in the above passages that Bena and Gahuku may be similar with respect to residence, recruitment and so on.

This is particularly true of the sub-clan which is, as we can see, "not a true lineage." Read even offers an explanation for this and implicit here, it seems to me, is the fact that recruitment to the sub-clan is open rather than restricted to true agnates. When you couple this with Read's statement that internal solidarity is "naturally affected" by the repeated dispersal of segments due to warfare it is even more difficult to understand it as a true lineage system, based as it must be on fairly precise genealogical knowledge, common and recurring activities, a "dogma" of descent, perpetuity, and so on.

A glance at Read's published work, however, indicates that he was not interested in social structure per se and, following his own interests, he naturally enough did not deal with social structure except in "barest outline." It is to his credit, then, that he both perceived and stated important differences even though he did not follow them up in their specifics. It is not so easy, however, ten years later, to read and understand the following in a chapter on "environment and social organization":

> This (the use of the term "lineage") is contrary to the usage prescribed by Notes and Queries (RAI, 1951) which restricts the term 'lineage' to groups possessing a traceable common ancestor. However, since the Siane 'lineage' bears as many resemblances to African lineages described in the literature, and is cognate with the Gahuku dzuha, which is a true lineage, I prefer to retain the term (Salisbury, 1962:17 [footnote]).

Here, I think, one sees the blinding influence of the "African orientation" (i.e., unilineal bias) in its most blatant form. In addition to the conscious deviation from the more traditional definition of lineage, as well as the erroneous assertion that the dzuha is a true lineage, we find Salisbury asserting that the grouping he has described, which is the smallest of economically significant Siane units, is similar to African lineages. This, it seems to me, is an absolutely incredible assertion when one considers

that the Siane groups at issue are parts of wards rather than segments in a lineage system, that is, parts of minor, major, or maximal lineages, and that the ward, in spite of Salisbury's attempt to see it as primarily a kinship (descent) group (p. 15) is importantly a residential (and "domestic" group). "The fact that it is primarily a residence group, however, is brought out by the native usage of calling the members of the group by the name of the plot of ground on which the house is built" (Salisbury, 1962:15).[2] Contrast this with the following:

> Apart from Nuer usage, we consider it important to define lineages as groups with a depth of at least three generations, since they are then distinct structural segments in a system of such segments and not easily confused with domestic groups (Evans-Pritchard, 1940:197).

Again, in Salisbury, one finds the failure to distinguish between the ideals of behavior and the facts of behavior, and one cannot truly compare the Siane situation with Bena Bena. Salisbury does state, however, that "exceptions to the rule of descent and locality are few, and for one clan comprised only 2 per cent of all residents." But, "There is a tendency for such people to be absorbed into membership of the clan with which they live, but this does not vitiate the general statement that clan membership is defined by birth" (1962:14). One cannot help but wonder if (1) the clan containing only 2 per cent non-agnates is representative of all Siane clans, (2) whether or not the non-agnates are actively recruited (which would, I think, vitiate the general statement that they are descent groups), and (3) on what basis the 2 per cent was uncovered (that is, do 2 per cent of the people admit to being non-agnates as some Bena admit to it, or does the 2 per cent represent a genuine behavioral exception to an ideological principle).

The unilineal bias can be seen also in a recent publication by Ronald Berndt. Follow carefully his discussion of the "patrilineage":

> The basic structure of the lineage may be diagrammed as on p. 26. The diagram shows an ideal patrilineage, a paradigm, as Fortes puts it. The shortness of genealogical memory is encouraged by a relatively high death rate, so that a man's paternal grandfather's brothers might have died before he was born and their male descendants be genealogically lost to him. Most middle-aged men remember the names of both grandfathers and at least one great grandfather, but few can give any information about the brothers of these and their offspring, who automatically formed "new" lineages (1962:27).

The segments here (automatically formed "new" lineages), of shallow genealogical depth, lacking a true "dogma" of agnatic descent, and which are segments of villages and districts rather than, again, minor, major or maximal lineages, cannot very well be equated with African lineages. Especially when we are also told:

> Social relations within the patrilineage are based upon common agnatic descent. Cognatic ties, however, spread beyond the patrilineage, embracing not only the district but also members of adjacent districts in the same or other linguistic units. All the members of a patrilineage have more or less identical lineage ties, defining their common status as against the members of other such units; but only siblings of the same parents have exactly the same cognatic kin. The kinship terminology reflects these two spheres, which are seen as being to some extent in contrast, if not in opposition. The first is basically the co-operative sphere, at a more than individual level. It is extended by the adoption of males who may help to perpetuate the units of which they become members, and by the perception of certain common interests and aims within the linked lineages, the clan. The second sphere involves mutual ties of sentiment, reciprocal duties, and help in particular circumstances, but not on a group basis (Berndt, 1962:35).

The questions that need to be posed here are: If social relations are based upon common agnatic descent, what about the adoption of males (which, reading between the lines seems to be fairly common procedure)? What about the shallow genealogical depth? Again we would like to know how many are truly agnates and how many are "adopted." But again no distinction is offered between the ideals for behavior and the de facto

behavior and no numbers are given. The question of recruitment is ignored and the groups in question are considered "patrilineal descent groups" without further question. Again, it seems to me, we are blinded by the "unilineal bias," the "African orientation" or whatever you wish to call it. Indeed, the lengths to which we have gone to see New Guinea groups as essentially "African" are almost unbelievable. For example:

> To cite all the ways in which these descent groups conform with the characteristics of unilineal descent groups, as outlined by Fortes, would be a mere repetition of points brought out in the classic African studies. Suffice it to say that they are groups in which membership is by virtue of descent, and all members stand in real or fictitious kin relationships with all other members. They are corporate groups, as has been shown already in their corporate obligations in the blood feud. They are groups which, as far as an outsider is concerned are internally undifferentiated (Salisbury, 1956:3).

Having asserted their essential "oneness" with African lineage groups Salisbury then goes on very convincingly, it seems to me, to demonstrate that they are not at all like African descent groups. They are, as I mentioned before, segments in a "ward" rather than trule lineage segments, the ward leaders are not lineage or clan elders and, in Salisbury's own words: "Despite my detailed questioning, no informant could trace a genealogy going further back than to his grandfather, or in a few cases, to his great-grandfather" (1956:4). To continue, "there were no genealogies showing how the various clans, men's houses, and lineages were related to each other, and so providing a 'conceptualization of the existing structure viewed as continuing through time and therefore projected back on pseudo-history " (1956:4), and, "Despite all my inquiries to find cases, I could find almost no evidence that the groups were 'in the process of continuous further segmentation at any given time as is characteristic of African groups" (1956:5). But what is even more important, perhaps, " . . . the

seceding member of another village does not become the founder of a new descent group; instead he and his children become incorporated in existing lineages" (1956:5). Salisbury then gives the final blow, it seems to me, to any notion of true similarity with African groups:

> All descent groups are also residence groups, which means that lineages live next to one another in a common men's house area; men's houses cluster in a village; the constituent clans of an exogamous group are neighbors, and in this way set themselves off from the other clans of the same tribe with whom they intermarry; yet the tribe as a whole is also a residence group. The few cases of migrant clans stress the general rule of relationships being in accord with residence -- they are fitted into the kinship structure of the tribe on whose land they have been given permission to settle, and call all tribal members 'brother' (1956:5).

Now it would seem that a group which is of only three or four generations depth, which is one segment of several between which no true genealogical connections can be traced, in which the connections are, by implication, considered unimportant, that are not segmentary according to the "African" principles, which recruit members on the basis of residence, and which are, in fact, residential groupings, are not truly "African" in type. And, indeed, the similarities that are mentioned are either questionable or do not distinguish an "African type" from any other type. For example, it is said that membership is by virtue of descent. I have just indicated, using Salisbury's own words that this is not completely so and even if the majority are members by descent it still does not make them "descent groups" because the underlying principles need not be based exclusively on the de facto behavior any more than exclusively on the stated ideology. That is, even if 80 per cent are truly agnates it would not change the underlying principle of open recruitment for the sake of clan strength which apparently is not typical of African groups. The other characteristics mentioned by Salisbury in this context do not distinguish between an

"African type" and any other. For example, corporateness with respect to feud, internally undifferentiated vis-a-vis outsiders, and with members standing in real or fictitious kin relationships (1956:3).

Others besides Salisbury have drawn attention to the shallowness of genealogical depth found among the so-called "Highlands descent groups." And they have even offered explanations for the shallowness which are fairly adequate so far as they go. For example:

> The sub-clan, however, is not a true lineage, for although its members conceive of it as a genealogically structured unit they are normally unable to trace true genealogical connections with all those who belong to it. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, while it is necessary -- because of land rights and property inheritance -- for members of the true patrilineage to remember exact genealogies, exact relationship is less important for members of the sub-clan than the tradition of common descent and the remembering of the common ancestor (Read, 1955:252).

Read, before Salisbury, links the shallowness and relative unimportance of genealogical depth to land and inheritance. Salisbury's linking of genealogical depth to land, however, although of a somewhat similar character emphasizes static groups rather than land availability and inheritance per se:

> The continuity of the larger groups is also conceptualized in ties with the land. Religiously this is expressed in the relationship between the ancestral spirits and the land -- a theme which is stressed in the first-fruits ceremonies for each garden (1956:5).

Reay disagrees with Salisbury's hypothesis but remains concerned with genealogical shallowness. She makes what I consider to be a critical point but unfortunately does not follow out all of the ramifications:

> The Kuma system is a continuous shedding and re-forming of groups that are continually changing their structure. In view of this structural instability and the observable changes in the composition of the smaller groups Salisbury's hypothesis associating genealogical shallowness with structural stability and static groups is untenable. It is expedient for the Kuma to be uninterested in genealogies, because the lack of strict reckoning facilitates

> the assimilation into agnatic descent groups of people who are not in fact agnatic kin. Genealogical shallowness is useful to them. The Kuma's consciousness that the clan is by no means permanent and unchanging is accomplished by an overemphasis of clanship and an insistence on its continuance; the assimilation of outsiders is glossed over and hidden (1959:36).

The critical point is the direct statement that non-agnates can be and are assimilated and that this is related to genealogical shallowness. This is true, I am certain, of many Highlands groups other than the Kuma and Bena. The number of outsiders so assimilated may vary, as from the 2 per cent mentioned by Salisbury (1962:14) to the 20 per cent mentioned by Brown (1962:61), to the 50 or more per cent for the Bena Bena, but the principle involved seems clear and it means, as Brown (1962) and Barnes (1962) have now both recently stated, that recruitment is open in New Guinea in a way that it is not open in Africa. It may be true that in an African group one finds non-agnates but when this occurs they are either clearly defined as non-agnates and remain non-agnates, or else they are very special cases, usually affines. In any case, unlike the New Guinea examples, African groups do not actively recruit non-agnates nor do they easily allow them full membership. It is in this respect, I believe, that the New Guinea ideology and dogma, as well as the de facto behavior is, in fact, quite different from the African. Non-agnates are actively recruited and eagerly accepted. The important question to be answered is why should this be, and it is precisely here that we come up against the operation of still further biases, the net effect of which is to prevent us from seeing the facts which would lead us away from the "African model."

In the first instance, as I have already indicated above, we have been so blinded by the "African orientation" that we have not really questioned the patrilineality of New Guinea groups. This has been made easier than it might otherwise have been because of our failure to distinguish

between ideals and de facto behavior. Thus, in any case where a discrepancy has been noted between what the people say they do and what they do do, it has been an easy matter to say to ourselves, that is the way it must be in African also, for, after all, we are interested in the "model" and not in the reality.[3] There has been very little disposition to look beyond the unilineal principles first stressed by Radcliffe-Brown, a wonderful example, as I have indicated, of the "unilineal bias" mentioned by Leach (1961a:6), reinforced by certain ideological similarities between New Guinea and African societies.

We have seen that, in the Korofeigu case at least, men become citizens and claim land for reasons other than those of patrilineal descent and are accepted as equals. The maintenance of the group strength is one of the ideals that must be met. An abundance of land is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the "open recruitment" policy. This condition is widely met in the Eastern Highlands as most ethnographers working in the area have mentioned. For example:

> The population of each district varies considerably (ranging from about 50 to 480) and so does the area each district covers. At least half is usually unoccupied or uncultivated, with shifting cultivation the rule. Land is fairly plentiful in this part of the Highlands, although not all is equally fertile (Berndt, 1962:20).

> Although the parish is a local group, it can hardly be said to be politically responsible for its territory. As there was no land shortage, wars were never fought to annex ground (Reay, 1959:53).

> As long as land is plentiful this could well lead to increasing cultivation of individual gardens, a decreasing dependence on the village as a source of labour 'help,' and a relegation of the village to the status of a ceremonial centre (Salisbury, 1962:137).

It is important to note, however, for reasons that will emerge later, that in other areas, particularly as one moves towards the West in the Highlands, land becomes scarce:

> The population is not evenly distributed. The over-all density, for example, is less in the easternmost valleys (Kainantu and Goroka sub-districts) and greatest in the central subdivision (Chimbu sub-district), where there are approximately 250,000 inhabitants. A recent report claims that there is only a little over five acres of land per head in the Chimbu region, and, if this proves to be true, problems of considerable magnitude could arise there in the foreseeable future. Some pressure does apparently exist and has resulted in a considerable migration of Chimbu people over the ranges eastwards into the less heavily populated Miruma and Kofena groups. Similar conditions may also be found in Wabaga (further West) where there are 70,000 people living in a relatively small valley (Read, 1954b:3).

There is a corresponding emphasis upon specific genealogical knowledge and greater genealogical depth in the Western Highlands and, in general, the people there seem to approximate much more closely the African type. Indeed, Meggitt has claimed that the scarcity of land is related to genealogical depth and the stress placed upon agnation in that where land is scarce it becomes important to be able to state a precise claim through genealogy.[4] Although the Chimbu material presented by Brown and Brookfield (1959) seems to constitute a serious exception I believe the evidence supports Meggitt's thesis. But even if we admit that an abundance of land is a necessary condition for open recruitment and the functioning of a system similar to the Bena one this is not a sufficient condition; we are still faced with the problem of why it is necessary for a system to "facilitate the assimilation into agnatic descent groups of people who are not in fact agnatic kin" (Reay, 1959:36). And here, I believe, we run into another bias which has prevented us from seeing the situation as it is. This is the tendency, well attested in the literature as I will illustrate, to interpret warfare as a strictly sociological phenomenon.

The most highly plausible explanation for the "looseness" or "flexibility" of Highlands societies, it seems to me, is the pattern of warfare

and raiding which existed prior to administrative control. D'Arcy Ryan seems to be the only anthropologist to have stated a similar view:

> While this is not the place for a detailed discussion of warfare, some mention of it is relevant in the present context. Until the establishment of control by the Australian Government in 1950, inter-clan fighting would seem to have been almost chronic; and clans that were not actually engaged in fights of their own helped other clans in theirs. Apart from formal open battles, which were probably not very frequent, there was a constant series of sporadic guerrilla raids. The result of all this activity was that many clans were almost exterminated and the survivors driven off their land. It was the habit of the victors to lay waste the territory of the defeated, uprooting gardens, burning houses, felling trees, so that even had the survivors been able to remain, their devastated land would no longer have supported them. It is apparent, then, that the maintenance of places of potential refuge was a matter of vital importance, for even the strongest and most secure clan could be defeated by a sudden rearrangement of alliances against it. It is perhaps too much to say that the flexibility of residence-patterns was a direct consequence of Mendi's style of warfare; but certainly, it did offer a solution to problems of refuge raised by warfare. It was warfare that made it necessary; and it was warfare, too, that, as a major factor in limiting the population, made such flexibility possible (Ryan, 1959:268).

Here one sees, as I have attempted to indicate for the Bena, that warfare was endemic, with constant raiding, a recurrent threat of annihilation, repeated betrayals, and so on. Perhaps one of the reasons Ryan did not place even more emphasis than he did on the relationship between residence pattern (and social structure) and warfare is the fact that very little has been written about New Guinea warfare per se. This is a fact which I think is most unfortunate as it is probably the single most crucial variable if we are to ultimately understand Highlands social structures. What has been written about warfare gives a very ambivalent and incomplete picture. Ideally, we would wish to know just how serious warfare was prior to contact, how many people were actually killed, how often there was fighting, what the attitudes of the people were towards it, how it was viewed by the warriors themselves, what happened to the defeated, and so on.

But such information is no longer available, at least in those areas which have been under administrative control for some time. In searching through the literature we find, on the one hand, the notion that warfare was simply some kind of game, one which no one took seriously and in which almost no one was hurt or killed. At the opposite extreme it appears that warfare was an extremely violent and destructive activity, frequently engaged in, more or less disliked by the people, unending in its duration, and indiscriminate with respect to its victims. The different impressions arise, I believe, for several reasons.

One reason which seems to be associated with the de-emphasizing of the importance of warfare is the fact that battles were, in some areas at least, not fought over land. As near as I can determine warring over land is associated with its scarcity just as is genealogical depth. Thus, in the Eastern Highlands, as in the Bena Bena, warfare was not conducted for the purpose of land annexation:

> As there was no land shortage, wars were never fought to annex ground (Reay, 1959:53).

> It is rare for a war to kill more than one or two men and after a champion has been killed the defeated clan may flee, leaving its village to be razed by the victor while it seeks protection in temporary exile. Wars are not usually fought for territorial gain, however (Salisbury, 1962:26).

> Land is fairly plentiful in this part of the Highlands, although not all is equally fertile (Berndt, 1962:20).

The pattern seems to be somewhat different to the West where wars are fought over land which is scarce:

> Since many of the ridge tops and upper slopes are horticulturally useless, cultivation of the valley floors and lower slopes is intensive. In the central valleys clans have occupied all the usable land, and land disputes are common. In the past these were a direct cause of much of the constant interclan warfare, nowadays they are the subject of bitter litigation (Meggitt, 1962:158).

> Actually, the Wabaga have very little land which they can afford to sell or lose, and therefore, on economic grounds, can hardly be expected to welcome white intrustion, let alone white interference with their customs and beliefs (Elkin, 1953:163).

Associated with this is the fact that defeated groups were often invited back after they had been successfully dispersed. This can be interpreted to mean that groups actually need someone to fight with or the overall system will somehow fail:

> . . . . All districts other than one's own are potential enemies as well as friends; it is only strangers with whom one does not fight. The active desire for this kind of relationship, in which hostility is a necessary component, is illustrated in the plea sometimes sent by victorious districts to the neighbors they had driven away: 'Come back to your own ground: We have no one here to fight!" (Berndt, 1955:106).

It should be made clear for the Bena at least that defeated groups were not invited back so long as they constituted a serious threat, nor was the same rationale given.

The fact that few people were killed is even more often cited in order to minimize the importance of warfare:

> It is rare for a war to kill more than one or two men, and after a champion has been killed the defeated clan may flee, leaving its village to be razed by the victors while it seeks protection in temporary exile (Salisbury, 1962:26).

> But because fighting usually takes place among districts within a certain range and involving persons more or less closely connected through affinal and other kinship ties, it is often suggested that there are, ideally, limits beyond which destruction should not go. Women and children, like the aged or the unarmed, are not ordinarily exempted, but if more than three or four people are killed in a single fight there may be an outcry that the enemy 'is shooting us like wild pigs' (Berndt, 1962:240).

It is exceedingly difficult if not impossible, however, to decide just what constitutes "few" in this context, in some cases even when reading the same author:

> Such a case shows what can result from the killing of a pig belonging to someone in another district. In this particular series of raids, there were about eighteen deaths. Examples of this kind are not unusual. They tell us something about the general state of affairs before external influences were felt to any great extent (Berndt, 1962:265).

> Occasionally there are cases of 'mass killing' involving perhaps a dozen persons, rarely more. When this takes place the district affected is likely to split up and scatter (Berndt, 1962: 253).

Still another reason that appears to be involved in minimizing the importance of warfare is the fact that warfare was a highly valued pursuit and a part of everyday life. This is taken by some to mean, again, that warfare was a social necessity. "A sign that two groups intermarry," Elkin writes, "is that they fight" (1953:170). This reflects a rather narrow sociological approach to the phenomenon of warfare, developed to an extreme by structural anthropologists and given its clearest articulation by Gluckman (1959). It can be seen very clearly in the following:

> If space permitted, it could also be shown that the necessity to display "strength" and to achieve "equivalence" was one of the principle considerations in warfare; ultimately no one won. Further, the alignment of tribes and tribal segments tends to ensure that structural groups "face" each other with an equal "strength-potential": Ideally, it is virtually impossible for any group or combination of groups to maintain superiority over any other, or to maintain it only at the expense of jeopardizing some more inclusive range of common interests (Read, 1959:429).

The same "sociological equilibrium model" with its attendant minimization of psychological and other considerations is similarly expressed as follows:

> However, wholesale destruction is the exception rather than the rule, and there are relatively few deaths in any one skirmish. Every now and then, members of a district may be forced to leave their home territory and seek refuge elsewhere, but most inter-district fighting is on the level of 'hit and run' raiding. There is a repetitive quality about this, interspersed with peace ceremonies and other inter-district gatherings, so that there is a constant fluctuation of friendly and hostile relations (Berndt, 1962:233).

This type of argument is detailed and carried to its best, I think, in a very perceptive article by Robert Glasse. He sums up his argument thus:

> My central thesis is a simple one. It is that in order to exact vengeance the small local groups of the Huli form temporary alliances: but these alliances are unstable because once the act of vengeance is completed, hostility develops between the allied groups due to the working of the system of redress. Revenge defines enemies and allies, but when the fight is over, the principles of redress divide the allies who fought as one. The result is that powerful factions are never able to fully develop. Revenge and redress ally and oppose different combinations of groups over a period of time and thereby promote an uneasy integration and a kind of balance within the wider social order (1959:274).

Glasse, however, unlike others writing in this vein, does not state or imply that because warfare, over time, results in balance or equilibrium, it is unimportant or inconsequential. But, again, it is somewhat difficult to determine precisely how important it was. The following would indicate to me that it must have been of rather grave importance:

> Warfare mobilizes the men of many parishes, usually culminates in a sustained engagement which may stretch over several weeks or even months, and is finally terminated, when the losses on either side have balanced out for a formal, negotiated peace. Feud, on the other hand, is interminable and progressive; it may lapse for periods of several weeks, months, or even years, only to recrudesce when opportunity presents itself. The tactics of warfare are frontal and flank attacks by parties of wildly screaming bowmen; the tactics of feud are raid and ambush: the swift, stealthy foray followed by hasty retreat after the damage has been done. The aim of warfare is general destruction: houses are burnt, gardens are destroyed and men, women and children are slaughtered without mercy. The aim of feud is limited destruction: retribution for a specific injury. The original cause -- indeed, even the precipitating cause -- of warfare is often unknown or obscure to many allies who come to join the issue; a dispute flares into a fight between two men; their friends and kinsmen come to their assistance; then allies from outside the two local descent groups originally involved are drawn in and the conflict spreads and gains impulse.
>
> Feuds may sputter and occasionally flare for over a period of many years; alternatively they may grow into more general actions and become war: there is no guarantee that feud will remain feud.. The losses in feud are usually small: one or two deaths, a few pigs, a ravaged woman, a burned out house. The losses of war vary with the scale of the engagement which is in turn subject to its own internal and external dynamics. The largest war that I have

accounts of probably involved 700-800 warriors on each side at its peak; it lasted for a period of nearly six months and resulted in 16 deaths on either side as well as many arrow wounds. It was terminated at the request of the initiators and, more generally, because food was getting scarce on both sides (Glasse, 1959:285).

And even those writers who do portray warfare as a kind of sociological "taking-a-stance," in other statements tend to contradict themselves:

> In warfare the aim is the complete destruction of an enemy and his means of livelihood, and each single tribe is opposed to other tribes which are regarded as traditional enemies and, consequently, as being permanently 'at war' with one another (Read, 1955:253).

> If this death is attributed to sorcery, the explicit aim may be merely to kill the person, or some member of the unit, held to be responsible, so that a croton may be planted over the grave of the first victim. The actual result could be several deaths or the wounding of participants on either side, the devastation of gardening lands, the destruction and burning of a village and its stockade, the abduction of women, and the looting of pigs, corpses, garden produce, and other commodities (Berndt, 1962:233).

Other writers, who do not share the same sociological orientation, although saying all too little about warfare, seem to take a more serious view of what occurred and emphasize more consistently how many deaths resulted:

> Warfare is valued for its own sake, and it expresses the aggressive attitude men admire but cannot indulge to any extent without the community. They value it, too, as a means of intimidating and exterminating enemies who threaten to diminish and destroy the clan. The recognition that warfare has depleted many clans does not prevent them from viewing it as a most powerful means of achieving strength in numbers (Reay, 1959:159).

> A serious offence may become the occasion of a fight lasting for weeks and months, involving many deaths and ending only when exhaustion and starvation force them to stop (Nilles, 1950:40).

> In fact, there are separate terms for the inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. The former is called roBo hiJune, 'fight shoving' and the latter is called nande hiJune, 'stick shoving.' Intertribal fighting was characterized by its violence, its basic insolubility, and its long duration. These were wars between traditional enemies. Fights between clans of a single tribe, described above, were shorter in duration, less violent, and were

> capable of a solution short of annihilation of one of the parties. The term that refers to them is 'stick fight.' These stick fights are another substitute for war, but they are not symbolic. The only weapons used are sticks. Deaths may occur, but it is less likely to occur than in a fight involving bows, arrows, and spears. Fights with bow and arrow did occur within the tribe, but is is significant that they too are called by the same term. In nande hiJune it was considered sufficient to avenge a death with a death, to in some way even the score between the two conflicting groups. In roBo hiJune the attempt was to destroy the other group (Newman, 1961:24).

Thus, although it is true that most raids resulted in only one (or few) deaths, it is obvious, in the first place, that raiding is not easily distinguished from warfare, and in the second place, that there were cases in which entire groups were destroyed.[5] If you ask the Bena why they attempted to kill all enemies without exception you are told simply, "If we do not kill them all they will have children and be strong and kill us."

If it is impossible to establish in any conclusive way how important warfare was in the pre-contact Highlands, it is not impossible to show that warfare is not the same in all parts of New Guinea and that in the Highlands it may turn out to differ from warfare in other parts of New Guinea in what appear to be significant and suggestive features. It is quite likely that within the Highlands itself there are significant differences from area to area although this latter is not so easy to establish. Broadly speaking, warfare can be divided into two general types, what we will refer to, solely for convenience sake, as "restricted" or "unrestricted" warfare. By restricted warfare I mean warfare that occurs only for very specific cause. This type of warfare may be found most frequently in the non-Highlands areas of New Guinea and can be fairly easily associated with the "sociological equilibrium model." Restricted warfare can be seasonal. That is, it can be limited either to certain natural seasons of the year, such as the wet or dry season, or to culturally defined "seasons" or

"periods" such as "headhunting season," initiation time, harvesting season, and so on. Restricted warfare can be seasonal and for specific cause both at the same time. Warfare can also be restricted in the sense that its goals are limited. That is, if the goal is specifically one life for one life rather than unlimited killing. Likewise, warfare can be restricted in the sense that only very specific groups constitute the enemy. By unrestricted warfare I mean warfare that can occur for a broad number of reasons and is not restricted to a special season, natural or cultural. Unrestricted warfare, generally speaking, may prove to be typical of the Highlands but there are exceptions.

Probably the best example of restricted warfare is that of the Arapesh:

> The especial type of provocation for Arapesh warfare made such warfare subject to women's consent, and to their sexual consent. Insofar it is unique in the New Guinea area that is known. The warfare was confined to a narrow issue. The men of different localities were frequently on an explicit offensive and defensive in regard to their exclusive rights in women. If a broader issue of exclusive rights in land exploitation was perhaps implicit beneath the overt struggle, it remained implicit, and did not become a prime objective in the warfare. Land was little disputed, but, instead, a more readily transferable goods. This broad characteristic of Arapesh warfare is not uncommon in the area. Neighboring tribes of headhunters do not directly dispute the exclusive exploitation rights to land which they maintain. Their offensive takes heads, which are also more readily transferable than land. They remain content with their accessions of enemy heads, and, for lack of an expansionist land policy, even become disgruntled if neighboring areas become depopulated of heads (Fortune, 1939:24).

> Without hypothesis, it is clear that Arapesh culture did not promote warfare to any very vicious extreme. Warfare was made dependent upon women's sexual consent in extramarital liasons outside locality borders, and it was regarded with considerable distaste. The chances for domestic peace, and for consequent peace abroad, were very high, and compare more than favorably with the chances for peace in other societies (Fortune, 1939:37).

The Arapesh case is probably an extreme example of restricted warfare. The only cause, overtly at least, is adultery, and adultery of a special and complex kind involving individual initiative, social approval,

clan support, a go-between, elopement, extensive planning and traditional battlefields. Significantly, there was often peace and little emphasis on violence and killing. What I take to be a similar kind of restricted warfare is reported for the Marindese of Southern New Guinea although the information is not complete. Here it seems that warfare is undertaken only during the dry monsoon (and, as I interpret it, not always every year), involves very extensive preparations before each expedition and extremely lengthy rituals subsequent to each expedition. The specific reason given for the head-hunting that is involved is the necessity to acquire names which have a magico-religious significance. For example:

> The basic cause of head-hunting is the need for names in a community, something that holds true uniformly for many of the New Guinea tribes that engage in it (van der Kroef, 1952:222).
>
> When an expedition goes into the interior to hunt heads, spies are usually sent in advance. These hide themselves in the bush close to the village to observe its life, and also to learn the names which the villagers call each other. Elaborate preparations are made, sometimes weeks in advance. On occasion, when it has not been possible to learn the names of the victims, survivors of the village, especially young children, are forced to tell the names of those who have fallen (van der Kroef, 1952: 225).
>
> The dry monsoon is generally regarded as the most suitable time, but the hunt must not take place before the gardens have been properly cared for (van der Kroef, 1952:226).
>
> Traditionally the hunt culminates in an elaborate feast, celebrating the capture of the heads, which among the majority of the head-hunting communities of Southern New Guinea is also a focal point of religious observance and mythological commemoration. It is during this feast that rituals and traditions acquire meaning, and the social motives underlying the head-hunt are fitted into an over-all pattern of approved behavior. Preparations for the feast are elaborate, and may sometimes take as much as a year (van der Kroef, 1952:231).

Although it is more difficult to judge from the literature, Kwoma warfare appears to be of the restricted type also:

> Open warfare between New Guinea tribes is infrequent, and the Kwoma are no exception. A war was waged in the time of the grandfathers of living informants. It began with a territorial dispute with the people who inhabited part of the area that the Kwoma now occupy (Whiting, 1941:163).

> The head-hunting raid provides the most frequently employed means of expressing aggression toward a foreigner. Such a raid is planned in advance, and allies are often recruited from friendly neighborning tribes. A careful itinerary is drawn up, and an unsuspecting and weak hamlet is chosen for attack (Whiting, 1941: 164).

There is, unfortunately, no way of telling how frequently such raids were carried out.

The Abelam case (Kabeary, 1941a, 1941b) seems to be somewhat similar to Kwoma but there is only very limited reference to warfare per se. I am completely unable to decide what the situation might have been for the Kutubu peoples (Williams, 1940, 1941) except that they seem to have had peaceful relations with their neighbors (1940:131). The Kiwai Papuans would seem to constitute an important exception to the general rule of comparative non-violence in non-Highlands cultures:

> The purpose of the real wars, on the other hand, is to kill as many of the enemy as possible, destroy their property, and capture the heads of the slain. A minor fight between two villages, originally of little consequence, may develop into a deadly enmity if somebody happens to be killed. In this way a long war began between the Mawata and Turituri tribes, who shortly before had formed one and the same community of Old Mawata. Once a blood-feud has begun, it seems hardly ever to end definitely. The traditions of the people enable us to trace their history some generations back, and reveal to us how, in spite of peace being concluded and maintained for quite a long time, an old craving for revenge would be taken up over and over again by some group or other, who thought that the slaying of some near relative of theirs in previous fights had not been sufficiently expiated. Several tribes have been completely exterminated in these wars, and it was only the arrival of the white people which put a stop to the endless conflicts (Landtman, 1927:148).

It is not possible to do a thorough comparative study of New Guinea warfare here. I have no doubt that there are other exceptions to the

general category but, still speaking in general terms, the differences between the over-all Highlands pattern of warfare and the ones cited above are very striking indeed. The Bena Bena pattern, as I have indicated, was almost totally unrestricted. That is, it was not seasonal, either culturally or otherwise, it was not restricted in its goals in that one life was not considered the normal revenge for the loss of one life, and everyone constitutes the enemy except for the changing and impermanent alliances. The causes for war were many: to revenge a death, theft of a woman or a pig (and other things for that matter), failure to fulfill an exchange obligation, rape, and, much more important perhaps, almost any death other than those from old age or accident. In the case of deaths, other than from the latter causes, the deaths are attributed to sorcery which the Bena believe, always comes from outside the clan. Such deaths almost invariably resulted in fighting. The following excerpts from the article by Fortune quoted earlier indicates a very similar situation for the Kamano:

> . . . . When a man died naturally, however, an entirely different sequence took place. The women of the village where the death took place remained mute, while the men of the same place carried the corpse and hid it in the long grass outside the village . . . . At the same time they sent out reconnaissance parties with the mission of detecting a payment due at this time from those who desired this natural death to those who had been ready to procure it by evil magic, or soul-stealing, undertaken for a promise to pay; and sometimes the parties out on reconnaissance were successful in detecting such payments . . . .
>
> After the ambushes which opened a war had taken place the aggressors notified their own women that they might now keen over their own man who had died a natural death a few days earlier; in this manner mobilization occurred somewhat dramatically, with women in one village wailing over a man dead in the course of nature, and in another village (or more often two others) in the neighbourhood over men killed with arrows . . . .
>
> War parties of men from surrounding villages within a radius of a few square miles soon began to come into the villages of both principals in the issue that had been raised . . . .

If the weather was fine and the grass dry, the attack opened with one party firing the grass downwind upon its opponents, following through the smoke and deploying opposite the enemy fire at thirty to fifty yards range. The village huts of both principals were usually reached and burned on the first or second day. If it was wet it was naturally more difficult to mount an offensive than in the dry season when the grass might be burned. The war continued until one party decisively was routed. The victors returned from the pursuit calling the number of their kills and the number of pigs and bags of shell-money secured in plunder. Their women and children received them back with a lyrical song, and soon afterwards men, women and children of the victors systematically plundered the gardens of their routed and conquered enemies (Fortune, 1947:108-109).

That Huli warfare occurred for a wide variety of causes is indicated in the following:

I am not going to say very much about the specific kinds of breaches which give rise to vengeance; but among them the following are most common: insult, adultery, seduction of young girls, theft, damage to gardens or other property, failure to meet obligations, such as the payment of compensation and finally attempted or actual homicide (Glasse, 1959:283).

That it was not restricted with respect to its aims:

. . . . The Huli concept of revenge, however, is not one of only equivalent return: they seek to inflict a more grievous injury than they have received, even though this usually results in a counter-action in return. If a pig is stolen, a dozen of the thief's pigs will be taken in return if his identity is discovered; if a kinsman is killed, the dead man's relatives will seek to kill four or five enemies in return (Glasse, 1959:283).

Although Berndt's various accounts are unclear and contradictory regarding warfare the following might indicate that warfare where he worked was not restricted with respect to its enemies:

Any one district may be on either friendly or inimical terms with any number of others: but the position is likely to change almost overnight. There is no permanency in such matters, except only in the expectation of interaction itself. All districts other than one's own are potential enemies as well as friends; it is only strangers with whom one does not fight (Berndt, 1955:106).

Essentially the same relatively unrestricted pattern seems to be true for Mendi (Ryan, 1959) and Gahuku-Gama (Read, 1952). It is probably the same for Chimbu (Brown and Brookfield, 1959) but it is not completely clear. The Siane case (Salisbury, 1962) is unclear as is the case with the Kuman (Nilles, 1943). Warfare among the Orokaiva (Williams, 1930) and the MaFulu (Williamson, 1912) is clearly unrestricted in type and, although these latter peoples are not true Highlanders, they are very similar. The Kapauku Papuans (Pospisil, 1958, 1963) seem a clear exception, as do the Sibil Valley people (Brongersma and Venema, 1963) and some of the Baliem Valley people (Matthiessen, 1962). All of these statements, however, should be regarded as very tentative as the paucity of good material makes any generalizations at this time rather questionable.

There is more or less general agreement, however, that the pattern of warfare in at least major portions of the Highlands was one of the most continuous and violent on record. In view of this one is somewhat surprised when, even though recognizing the importance of violence and killing for its own sake, what seems an obvious further conclusion is never drawn. Namely, that the psychological concomitants of such a pattern of warfare must in some way importantly influence or be related to the character of the extant social groups. Warfare as an important variable with respect to the formation of social groups has continually been dismissed by writers on the Highlands as of little consequence. Notice in Barnes' speculations on violence that there is no direct indication that the pattern of warfare might be importantly linked to the kind of social groups that are found in the area:

> A characteristic of Highland cultures, and perhaps of Melanesia as a whole, is the high value on violence. The primitive states of Africa, and even the African stateless societies

> which we have been considering, are readily likened to the kingdoms and princedoms of mediaeval Europe, valuing peace but ready to go to war to defend their interests or to achieve likely economic rewards. Prowess in battle is highly rewarded but warfare is usually not undertaken lightly and most of the people most of the time want peace. In New Guinea a greater emphasis appears to be placed on killing for its own sake rather than as a continuation of group policy aimed at material ends. In these circumstances we might expect to find a less developed system of alliances and countervailing forces, and less developed arrangements for maintaining peace, than we would have in a polity directed to peace and prosperity. Secondly, we would expect that leaders, whatever their other qualities, were moved to violence at least as much as their fellows and possibly more. The Highlands of New Guinea cannot have been the scene of a war of all against all, for the pre-contact population was large and often densely settled; indigenous social institutions preventing excess violence and destruction must necessarily have been effective, for otherwise the population would not have survived. Likewise, other qualities than prowess in violence were required for leadership, in particular the ability to engage and co-ordinate the efforts of others in ceremonial exchange. Yet despite these qualifications I think it may still be hypothetized that the disorder and irregularity of social life in the Highlands, as compared with, say, Tiv, is due in part to the high value placed on killing (1962:9).

Instead, then, of being like African societies (or like earlier European ones) we find, by implication at least, that the New Guinea peoples take war lightly, value violence and killing for its own sake, and do not want peace. Indeed, the reason the New Guinea peoples have survived at all, we see, is that unspecified indigenous social institutions "must have been effective" and the leaders were not "all bad," so to speak. And, again, in spite of the institutions and "good" qualities of leaders, life in the Highlands is "disorder and irregularity." This implies a very peculiar view of both social structure and personality it seems to me. And one conclusion which could easily have been drawn from all of this is that in order for a group to survive this pattern of warfare and violence it must maintain a strong, large membership. And, because of the vicissitudes of war, and repeated scattering of people, groups based exclusively or even importantly on strict unilineal principles would be exceedingly

difficult to maintain. Thus for expediency one need not be too particular respecting someone's genealogy, so long as he can fight. Groups which constantly find it necessary to scatter and re-group, which are decimated by casualties, which must take refuge from time to time with others, including friends (who are willing to accept them for the same reason they want to be accepted) cannot, I submit, maintain lineage purity and cannot insist on descent as the sole (or perhaps even most important) criterion for membership. As implicit suggestion of this appears very early in the writings on the Highlands but seems to have never been followed out:

> In a number of cases, however, the vicissitudes of warfare or exile consequent upon repeated enemy attacks have resulted in a dispersal of segments amongst different tribal and sub-tribal groups. This naturally affects internal solidarity, but the scattered segments retain their common identity for a considerable time (Read, 1952:4).

The "internal solidarity" here is that of a so-called patrilineal descent group, it should be made clear. And the difference between this pattern of fighting and the African one, which is mainly defensive, formalized, and rare, is also worth emphasizing.

In any event the relevance of warfare in the formation of social groups seems to me to be one of the "crude nursery facts" that Leach (1961a:9) mentions. Even if it should be found that the pattern of warfare has nothing at all to do with the structure of New Guinea societies (which is hard, indeed, to believe), it is remarkable that no one to date has seen fit to seriously consider the possibility. The reasons for this, as I have indicated, have to do with the purely sociological analysis of war, making this kind of warfare relatively unimportant and socially necessary.

But even more interesting, perhaps, is the implicit view of New Guinea personality contained in some accounts which must be seen as one which presumably has no fear of death, indeed, would presumably welcome death of even the most ignoble kind, does not wish to survive either as an individual or part of a group, does not wish to propagate or be able to raise his or her children, and so on. This implicit view of personality emerges fairly clearly, in fact, in the following passages:

> Fighting was, and remains, the 'breath of life' to these people, one of their main preoccupations . . . . Respect for strength involves a readiness to give way to it as well as to practice it. Coupled with this is the emphasis on self-assertion, with individual leaders basing their authority largely on force and likely to be supplanted at any time by rivals -- leaders usually unable, or unwilling, to co-operate in any sustained defense in a time of crisis (Berndt, 1962:266).

> There is no need for him to be specially prepared because being prepared is part of ordinary living. It is partly for this reason that men sleep together in their communal houses away from women, so that they can be ready in case of attack. Nevertheless, they seem often to have been caught unawares. Perhaps living under constant threat of raids blunts both expectation and excitement and leads to carelessness; but this is not the case when it comes to planning a raid or a fight (Berndt, 1962:235).

> But this underlies what has been said before: fighting, revenge and counter-revenge are so commonplace that people become accustomed to this state of affairs and are often careless about their own safety (Berndt, 1962:129).

Not all scholars are as prepared as Berndt, it seems, to explicitly state that the people are so indifferent to life, even their own life, as this. Even so, the Korofeigans, at least, do not view warfare as 'the breath of life,' nor do they wish to die either in battle or otherwise. Likewise, they do not wish to return to the raiding and warfare that existed prior to European contact. In 16 months I was unable to find a single person who expressed any genuine desire to go back to the traditional pattern. Furthermore, the quickness and ease with which the traditional pattern was

given up indicates very clearly that fighting was not regarded as lightly as Berndt and others would lead us to believe. Consider the following remarks, for example:

> Since the evacuation of the Bena Bena area by European miners and their parties, tribal fighting has once more broken out and further patrols will have to be made to the area to prevent the trouble spreading. As long as one European was in the area no serious inter-village hostilities occurred (i.e., in the vicinity of the Bena Bena drome and the old Government Post). The evacuation of this area is to be regretted, as these natives had made considerable progress whilst the station was in the area. It is felt, however, that a period of extensive patrolling here would rectify matters in a comparatively short space of time . . . . The outbreak of tribal fighting in the Bena Bena area has only occurred since E. M. Peacock, a miner, left the area. If a base camp had been established at Bena Bena at the time of his departure, it can confidently be asserted that the outbreak of hostilities would not have occurred even if such a base camp had only been visited once a fortnight or at even longer intervals (Black, 1934, 9-10).

It seems to me that if the indigenous pattern of warfare was so absolutely essential to equilibrium, and taken so lightly, as Berndt and others would have us believe, the presence of one miner in such a large area would not have prevented it. This, of course, is speculation and I do not mean to suggest that there are no natives who would like to see the administration and the white people leave as there are many who would.

The Korofeigans themselves explain much of their social organization and some of their customs to a great extent in terms of fighting. If you ask, for example, why they practiced female infanticide, they will reply, "Sons will stay with us and look after us, they will fight to protect us. But daughters just marry and go away. It is hard when you have too many children to look after; sometimes you must take your children and run away and you can't carry them all." If you ask why one of a pair of twins was always killed you get the same answer. If you ask why the men

sleep together in the men's house, you are told it was for defensive purposes. Villages were formerly stockaded for defensive purposes, located on high, sharp, inacessible ridge tops for the same purpose, and one old man, when I asked why he was building a house with an unusually high doorway replied, "I am building this house for my mother (a classificatory mother) who is old and cannot crawl in the door of her house anymore. Always before we were fighting and running away to hide in the kunai. We slept in the kunai. My mother never had a nice house like this to sleep in because we were always fighting and running away. Now I want her to have this nice house." On another occasion I asked a different old man why he was always making earth ovens to cook in (he had made one daily for about two weeks which was unusual as cooking is usually done simply over an open fire except on special occasions) and he gave me a similar answer: Before they had run away and fought a great deal and he didn't eat well so now he wanted to eat well before he died. The explanation given for why a chronic and very troublesome thief is tolerated in the community is in part and importantly because he is a good warrior. More examples could be given. The point is, that, in Korofeigu, at least, the people are open in their recruitment policies and tolerant of individual idiosyncracies largely as a result of a felt necessity . . . they want to survive and multiply. Strict genealogical reckoning militates against their survival and thus is not as important a principle as it might be in other environmental or ecological circumstances. Although the materials are not extensive, the accounts mentioned by the earliest Europeans, including the all too brief description by Fortune (1947), tend to give a picture of warfare in the Eastern Highlands consistent with those given by the Bena rather than with the more sociological version:

. . . . The people live in villages which were in most cases surrounded by a barricade of split slabs up to 12 feet high if timber were available; and in the country away from the timber-clad ranges, wild cane stalks woven together formed a very effective wall; at intervals along the barricades the wall extended outwards to allow the besieged villagers to protect the barricades against invaders. Getting in close to it and protected by their wooden shields the invaders would cut the vine binding it together and let in their comrades to burn the rounded grass-thatched houses and kill all to whom they could get near enough (Leahy, 1936:229).

. . . . She wailed to some purpose but death, or at least murder is an everyday occurrence with these people and they forget it quick. Still Isagori is definitely not going home again preferring the quiet civilized life to the incessant struggle for life which is the lot of all the people in here. Neshaw's mary will bring a young Neshaw into the world soon and they calmly told me they would cut its throat soon as it came along as the father was not here to look after it (Leahy, 1934, entry of 21 February).

In the event of a plain murder the whole village belonging to the murderer is then placed on the black list and parties of natives are always on the lookout to avenge the killing, hiding alongside the pathways in the long grass and springing out on any party much smaller than themselves -- a couple of defenseless old women or young children so much the better and filling them with arrows. One of our Purari boys gave us a demonstration without the killing of an unfortunate native, surprised and killed in this manner, even to the screaming and writhing of the victim as after the first attacker put an arrow into him the rest of the hidden natives rushed up and shot arrow after arrow into him until he died (Leahy, 1934, entry of 19 March).

. . . . after about one hour came to recently burnt villages of Gafia situated on the sides of Hayuka creek. About 150 natives, men, women and children were hurriedly taking foods from the Gafia gardens. Sigoiabu natives had attacked Gafia and were now, raiding their gardens. Then went in northerly direction came to a large village of 44 houses with double stockade. Were led there by the remnants of Gafia men (about 30, armed) (Bates, 1932).

. . . . Leaving Karanuntoka came out in grasslands of Sofa Sofa valley. Traveled 3/4 hour south of east came to deserted village of Ufeto, on the banks of the Ufeto creek. Met 400 natives in 'war dress' and armed, some women carrying extra arrows and supplies. They were expecting a fight from Mahomito West (Bates, 1932).

The Geiminarbi community on the Bena Bena slopes near the (?) Mission Station, although friendly, have been responsible, with others, for repeated attacks on Mohoweto villages. They have reached warnings on several occasions to desist. These they have repeatedly ignored. On November 20 the patrol came on an attack

> on Mohoweto village, unobserved, due to smoke screen lit by the combatants. The following villages had combined in this attack: Safanuka, Sigeiya, Kwahoisipa, Geiminarbi, Garfogohi, Oryafayufa, Nayufa. When the attackers were approached they made no attempt to run away. They were told that they had been warned before about fighting and that they were to disperse at once and return to their villages. This they promised to do and commenced to go in small, reluctant parties. The patrol then continued on to Mohoweto, where the villagers were found to be hard-pressed. No sooner had the party got out of sight than the attackers were back at it again (Black, 1934).

If my interpretation of warfare in the Eastern Highlands is correct, and if it is intimately related to social structure, one would expect to find corresponding differences in social structure in areas where warfare is of a different type. And, although the evidence is by no means conclusive, it seems to bear this out. For example, warfare in the Western Highlands, around the Mt. Hagen area, seems to have been in general less serious and less violent than in the Eastern Highlands. One of the first impressions recorded is consistent with this thesis:

> . . . . Their (the Wahgi valley peoples) weapon is the spear and though war takes a prominent part in their lives it would appear not to be so general as with Bena Bena. This is only a surmise and is of course open to correction (Taylor, 1933). (Note: At this point Taylor was saying that there were two 'tribes' in the Highlands, the Wahgi and the Bena Bena).

John Nilles (1943, 1950) reports a pattern of warfare for Kuman which appears to contrast with the Eastern Highlands type, one in which there was a season for warring, and in which war appears as a kind of "leisure activity":

> Before the Administration gained control over the Kuman people, the men were engaged in tribal fights almost without interruption. The fights began after big dances had been held, when there was much leisure and no special task to be done. After eating pig the men felt strong and vigorous; their potency had to be proven in a fight. The season was as a rule in November, December or January, when the spring planting had been finished and the first greens harvested and eaten. The causes of fights were innumerable, but the chief were wives, pigs, ownership of land, thefts, or old tribal disputes (1943:117).

Here one sees an indication of a more restricted type of warfare, a more ritualized, institutionalized, formalized variety of warfare, perhaps similar to the "sociological game" type discussed previously. The same type occurs further to the West as the following accounts, somewhat popularized, indicate:

> During our stay in the Sibil Valley a war was waged between the villages of Sagasaga and Lewengbon (to the west of Betabib). When compared with the great wars which we know, a Sibil war is more like a sporting event, although people do die in the process. The cause of this particular fight was the death of a man in the village of Sagsaga. Nobody believed very firmly that he had died of natural causes, but much rather than his death was due to witchcraft. There must therefore have been black magic in the affair, and Lewengbon must be sheltering the culprit. Something naturally had to be done, and Sagsago called upon men from a friendly village to help them destroy the keladi gardens belonging to Lewengbon. The keladi gardens were chosen precisely because keladi is eaten at all kinds of religious ceremonies. The people of Lewengbon considered themselves to be innocent and were deeply offended, so that the only solution was to fight. There is no question of falling upon the villagers by surprise, and the women and children are in no danger at all. In accordance with Sibil custom both sides agree when the war is to begin. The two parties together clear the battleground and the fight can then begin. Participation is not limited to the two warring kampongs, but men from villages friendly to one or the other of the combatants may take part (Brongersma and Venema, 1963:97).

A similar kind of warfare is reported by Matthiesen for the Baliem valley, perhaps a more extreme variant:

> The sun had climbed over the valley, and its light flashed on breastplates of white shells, on white headdresses, on ivory boars' tusks inserted through nostrils, on wands of white egret feathers twirled like batons. The alarums and excursions fluttered and died while warriors came in across the fields. The shouted war was increasing in ferocity, and several men from each side would dance out and feign attacks, whirling and prancing to display their splendor. They were jeered and admired by both sides and were not shot at, for display and panoply were part of war, which was less war than ceremonial sport, a wild, fierce festival. Territorial conquest was unknown to the akuni; there was land enough for all, and at the end of the day the warriors would go home across the fields to supper. Should rain come to chill them, spoil their feathers, both sides would retire. A day of war was dangerous and splendid, regardless of its outcome;

> it was a war of individuals and gallantry, quite innocent of tactics and cold slaughter. A single death on either side would mean victory or defeat. And yet that death -- or two or three -- was the end purpose of the war, and the Kurelu, in April, were enraged (1962:11).

Unfortunately, it is impossible to say, on the basis of the available information, just what kind of structural features are involved in these particular Western groups. The Kuman, however, are probably fairly similar to the Enga and the latter represent a very interesting situation. From the various accounts rendered by Meggitt (1957, 1958, 1962) it would seem that Enga could have had both restricted and unrestricted types of warfare:

> In the past, once or twice each generation, large-scale sporting fights occurred in which two or three phratries would fight more or less as units. The usual pattern was that one clan, irked by the behavior of another, insulted and challenged its members to demonstrate their skill and courage in battle. Each clan called on its phratry for aid; and the teams assembled on conveniently situated grassy downs to fight. In the last of these fights which occurred in the Sari area some years ago, three phratries fought a triangular battle for about a week. About 2,500 men were involved; but actions were mainly among individual clans. Combatants broke off each evening for food and rest; and night attacks were deplored. The group skirmishes were punctuated by formalized and generally bloodless duels between important men of opposing teams. These were concluded by the duelists' exchanging their shell and feather decorations. The main battle was concluded by agreement among the big men of each clan when casualties on each team had reached ten or so; and a large scale exchange of pork and valuables followed. Then all went home. It was bad form to use such fights as a pretext for burning houses, seizing pigs or land, or killing women or children (Meggitt, 1957;135).

This appears to be a clear example of restricted warfare. The paradoxical situations of having unrestricted warfare at the same time is more understandable when we realize that the Enga area is one of the few in which battles were fought over land:

> The more common sort of fight was that wherein one clan, using the theft of a pig or of pandanus nuts as an excuse, attacked without warning a neighbouring clan in an attempt to seize land. Then, any technique which ensured victory was adopted. Night attacks and ambushes were most favored. Enemy houses were fired

with their occupants inside; women and children were cut down; pigs were seized; pandanus palms were felled; and gardens were torn up. In short, everything possible was done to disorganize the enemy clan so that it was forced to flee piecemeal to kinsmen for shelter (Meggitt, 1957:135).

. . . . . Clans of one phratry should not fight each other, but in fact they sometimes did. The victors seized the losers' land and dispersed their parish. This was considered reprehensible behavior, and other clans of the phratry felt obliged to offer hospitality to the vanquished. The main causes of interclan fighting, whether within or without the phratry were: seizure of a neighbouring clan's land or regaining of one's own land; avenging the deaths of clansmen, their wives and children; recovering abducted women or stolen pigs or pandanus nuts; avenging the rape of clan wives or daughters.

One would expect such causes of interclan friction to arise most often between contiguous clans, and my inquiries confirm this. Kara clan was involved in disputes with at least 41 different clans (some of them several times) between about 1925 and 1945, and at least 36 deaths occurred (Meggitt, 1958:270).

In the violent interclan struggles for land that have occurred through the years, many Mae Enga have been destroyed by invaders and their fleeing members killed or attached to related groups. Unless the investigator actually encounters the survivors themselves, however, he is not likely to learn the details of such events (Meggitt, 1962:160).

It is obvious from Meggitt's work that the major cause of serious war for Enga was shortage of land. I do not know whether one could consider this a form of restricted warfare or not. It is clear, however, that the pattern was different in this way from the Bena Bena pattern. And, it is also clear that in Enga we find great emphasis on genealogical knowledge, descent, and so on.

The Chimbu, also one of the relatively clear cases found in which warfare was fought over land, do not emphasize genealogical depth (Brown and Brookfield, 1959; Brown, 1961, 1962). But Chimbu and Enga share a further common feature that they do not share with the peoples of the Eastern Highlands, scattered homesteads and the lack of villages. This

could explain the fact that kinship per se is stressed by the Chimbu whereas it is not stressed so much by the Bena. For example:

> War and fights were part of the usual relationships between groups in all Highlands societies. But only in a few areas, notably Enga and Chimbu, is population density high enough for land shortage to be counted as an underlying cause, and for the occupation of conquered territory to be a common outcome.
>
> War and alliance were linked to other features of Chimbu society. Matrilateral kinsmen and affines were often the originators of alliances and peace settlements, and hosts to temporary exiles. After an intertribal killing, compensation was paid to the relatives of those killed by the enemy, but compensation was not normally made outside the tribe (Brown and Brookfield, 1959:42).

One might conclude that in areas where there are land shortages and a scattered homestead pattern of settlement it is necessary to facilitate ownership and inheritance, and perhaps even defense, by the careful reckoning of unilinear descent. Or, as in the Chimbu case, by replacing strict unilineal descent with a more bilateral emphasis. Conversely, in an area like Bena Bena, where there is an abundance of land, village organization, and a much more serious threat of annihilation, neither strict unilineal reckoning or an insistence on pure kinship bonds can be maintained. We will return to this later but it seems clear that descriptions and interpretations of New Guinea warfare have consistently viewed warfare as a constant, and have further been subject to the "sociological bias" mentioned previously. This has seen, as an associated factor, a failure to challenge the so-called "African model" thus perpetuating the "unilineal bias."

An associated notion mentioned earlier in relation to marriage is the 'lack of solidarity' attributed to New Guinea groups. This has been mentioned by many, given its most recent articulation by Barnes, and is seen expressed as follows:

> This lack of predictability or regularity in change in the segmentary pattern is, of course, another aspect of the basic contrast between group solidarity and individual enterprise. The sanctions that maintain the segmentary status quo, whether derived from economic or physical pressures, or from cult or dogma, are weaker in the Highlands than in Africa and the incentives for change are stronger (Barnes, 1962:9).

The concept of solidarity, perhaps given its greatest popularity in anthropology by Radcliffe-Brown, remains an extremely nebulous and ill-defined one. Nonetheless I think this theme of 'lack of solidarity' in the Highlands which is so predominant in the literature deserves some further discussion.

The solidarity of a group can mean either its endurance over time and resistance to change, or it can mean essentially its esprit de corps at any given moment and for any given task. Statements about lack of solidarity in the Highlands refer to both kinds of solidarity as near as I can determine. But it is important to note that they uniformly, it seems to me, are based upon the assumption that the groups in question are patrilineal descent groups to begin with, and this can be very misleading. In so far as the basic question at issue is whether or not New Guinea groups are truly patrilineal descent groups, little credence can be placed in statements about solidarity based upon their assumed patrilineality. Such generalizations would have to be skewed to the extent that they prove not to be patrilineal descent groups.

It is obvious that if a patrilineal descent group is being continually scattered over time, its solidarity over time, must be affected. Thus, if New Guinea groups are patrilineal descent groups which are scattered frequently, they also lack solidarity over time. But the same thing applies, of course, to any kind of group that is constantly scattered; so the solidarity we must be concerned with is the esprit de corps, or "task

oriented solidarity." This latter is presumably the solidarity that writers have in mind when they stress the emphasis on individual rather than group ties in the Highlands. While there are a preponderance of individual ties, conclusions based upon this fact can be misleading in several respects as I have attempted to indicate earlier. A Bena Bena group is held together by a complex web of individual ties rather than by a dogma of descent and agnatic solidarity. The various ties of adoption I mentioned, age grading, communal gardening and house building, the necessity for defense, as well as customs relating to old age, death, cannibalism, initiation, and kinship all tend to cement the members of the clan together and can be seen in sum, I think, as functional equivalents of the dogma of descent and agnatic solidarity believed to bind descent groups together. This is so much so that one is tempted to think the system was deliberately conceived to overcome the failure of agnatic principles. But here, it seems, we may be overly influenced by a still further bias which needs to be examined, that having to do with our attitudes towards kinship and the part it plays in the formation of social groups.

The important point to be emphasized is that the sheer fact of residence in a Bena Bena group can and does determine kinship. People do not necessarily reside where they do because they are kinsmen, rather, they become kinsmen because they reside there. Although virtually all investigators have recognized that membership in New Guinea groups is to some extent open and that it need not be based exclusively on agnatic ties, or even on cognatic or affinal ones, the easy ascription of kinship and associated behavior has received little attention. It is most often simply ignored and exceptions to the agnatic principle are explained solely in

terms of cognation or affinity. This may be hindering our comprehension of New Guinea social structure in the same way as the unilineal bias has. Almost exactly twenty years ago Titiev pointed out clearly the dangers of concentrating too exclusively on consanguinity or physiology as factors in the reckoning of kin. His observations seem to me very pertinent for the New Guinea case today. For example:

> Although a great many writers have commented on the significance of locale in conjunction with unilateral classifications of relatives, there is still so strong a bias in favor of the physiological connotation of kinship that anthropologists have often made unsatisfactory analyses of their material by slighting or disregarding residential factors (Titiev, 1943:519).

Thus, it seems to me, that when ethnographers have observed important deviations from the unilineal type, their bias in favor of physiology or consanguinity has sometimes prevented them from seeing the full importance of residence and locale. Hence one finds Pouwer and Van der Leeden, for example, agreeing to critical deviations from unilineal systems but arguing over whether or not they are 'bilateral' or 'ambilineal' systems. The fact that Pouwer, at least, recognizes implicitly that they are groups based primarily upon territory is significant, but he apparently is not satisfied with such a simple and straightforward explanation:

> However, bilaterality can very well be interpreted as an integrative idea. A consistently bilateral kinship reckoning may well be combined with a restrictive territorial criterion: only those descendants are considered as members of the corporate kin group who, via father, mother, or both, are domiciled in the group's territory. Descendants who settle elsewhere, men as well as women, are still individually connected with their original group, but their descendants belong to the group where they live (unless they return to the original territory). This system has the same effect as unilineality, viz. to limit the number of members of the kin group; but the descent lines do not comprise men only or women only, but both. Like unilineal groups, such groups can have corporate functions. For example, they have their own territorial rights, and they are units which participate in marriage relationships. In contrast with the unilineal groups, however, they are -- by definition -- localized. A kin group of this type coincides with

> a local group, if we leave out of consideration the individuals who married into it. The sibling relationship is the structural nucleus of such a group, which Goodenough calls a 'restricted non-unilineal descent group,' and Firth an ambilineal or ambilateral ramage. Not infrequently one can trace the members of the group back to a number of brothers and sisters. The bilateral ties between individual members of a kin group and members of other kin groups may acquire corporate significance by fusion of the groups (Pouwer, 1960:115).

While I find myself in agreement with much of Pouwer's thinking I also think it is unfortunate that he, like virtually all other ethnographers who have worked in the area, finds it necessary to emphasize consanguinity as the important organizing feature and to neglect the more obvious features of residence and territory.[7] The emphasis on biological kinship as in the case of Brown (1962) may turn out to be perfectly justified but there is a great danger that these claims may be assertions rather than facts in which case further pertinent questions are stifled at the outset.

As I have indicated, the Korofeigans deviate markedly from the patrilineal systems described for Africa. I do not think much is to be gained by attempting to classify them as bilateral, ambilineal, or 'quasi-unilineal' descent groups. All of these classifications imply physiological or biological bases for group formation and overlook the other factors which may well be more important. But even more critical here, irrespective of what factors eventually are found necessary to explain New Guinea social systems, is the fact that descriptions given of New Guinea groups in terms of kinship organizations tend to stop further inquiry. We run into a peculiar fallacy of explaining human behavior purely in terms of kinship. That is, to say or imply, for example, that a person resides where he does because of kinship bond is no more an explanation for his residence behavior than saying birds build nests because of 'instinct.' And the tendency to be

satisfied with descriptions of residence rules and kinship, what I have termed the "bias in favor of biological kinship," without looking further and dealing with ecological, environmental, and psychological factors has prevented us from seeing the distinctive features of Highlands culture and enabled us, again, to perpetuate the unilineal bias.

There is one further problem involved, intimately related to "explanation by kinship" that needs to be discussed. Namely, the confusion of motive with function which is a common fault of structural anthropology. This is related to explanation by kinship in the sense that structuralists do not, as a matter of course at least, concern themselves with motives for behavior in the first place. Thus when kinship has been described, as I have already indicated, explanation stops and the student is left to believe either that people automatically align with consanguineal or affinal kinsmen or, if not satisfied with that, to infer that being with consanguineal or affinal kinsmen is a sufficient motive for their residence and other behavior. Thus the function of kinship may be seen to bind people together, to maintain continuity over time, or what have you, but whatever motives might be involved, whether they be economic, psychological, or even social, are omitted from consideration. The particular confusion of motive with function I have in mind for the New Guinea case is only indirectly related to this, however, and can be seen in regards to marriage as was briefly touched upon earlier.

In the African case, ". . . matrimonial alliances are established not at random but in accordance to social interest" (Barnes, 1962:8). This means, as I read it at least, that Tallensi marriages are motivated by social interest. And, whereas Tallensi marriages may have this motive, their function is to cement political alliances, extend kinship ties,

(i.e., maintain connubial alliances or disperse ties), and so on (Barnes, 1962:8). Were it not for the well known sociological bias of structural anthropologists, one might assume that the motive and function of Tallensi marriages are one and the same which they could, of course, be. It is far more likely that the motive here (social interest) has been confused with the function (political alliances, etc.). But in any case the adjective "deliberately" surely implies this confusion. Because New Guinea marriages are dispersed (empirically) does not mean they must be deliberately dispersed (i.e., consciously motivated by social interest) as I have tried to show in my previous discussion of Bena Bena marriage. The failure to distinguish between motive and function with respect to marriage enables us, again, to assert that Highlands New Guinea groups are similar to African ones. In the Bena Bena the motive for marriage is not really social interest nor, as I have indicated, is this the function of marriage. This becomes an important point because it indicates that marriage, although a "corporate" activity is not a "political" activity and hence one of the political functions usually attributed to segments in African systems is missing in the Korofeigu case. Let us now summarize what has been said and attempt some conclusions.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSION

Let us now return to the original criteria specified as necessary for the "African model." First, there must be unilineal descent. I have attempted to show that it is not completely clear whether the Korofeigans have unilineal descent or not. That is, although they profess an ideology of unilineal descent exclusively through males there is no 'dogma' of descent and there are, furthermore, very important behavioral deviations from the stated ideals. It is exceedingly difficult to know just how great a difference this implies between New Guinea and African groups because, as has been often pointed out, there are exceptions to the ideological beliefs in Africa also and there are behavioral deviations from the rules as well. Nevertheless, I think it is clear that in the case of the Bena Bena we can safely conclude that, as there is no real dogma of descent, they are not the same as the African type. That is, although the Bena say they are patrilineal they do not cling to this belief dogmatically and they do not insist on agnatic purity as African groups do. This seems to be true of some other Highlanders as well. It can be seen in the fact that the Bena Bena will say, when asked about the presence of large numbers of non-agnates, "We are a small group. All of our adult males have been killed by enemy sorcery or in warfare. We need men to fight our enemies." This is, it seems to me, explicit recognition of a second ideological comittment, namely, to maintain the group strength. The same kind of overt, conscious attempt to maintain group strength and deviation from the dogma of agnation can be seen in an

attempt on the part of Wai'atagusa clan to purchase a Nupasafa girl known to be pregnant by a Kapakamaligi man. They argued, "We are a small clan. Let us have so-and-so as a bride for our son. The child will be ours, too, and will help us to be strong. We will look after it well." Clearly agnatic purity, although stressed in some contexts, is not a dogmatically held principle of recruitment and members are recruited for other reasons. The fact of genealogical shallowness, so often discussed in the New Guinea case is another good indication that there is no true 'dogma' of descent. How else does one explain the lack of interest in genealogy? The importance of the facts of residence? When you have groups with an ideology of patrilineal descent but no dogma of descent, and in which there is 50 per cent behavioral deviation from the ideology, it seems to me you have groups of a very different kind than those classic types reported from Africa.

Furthermore, as we have seen, the groups in a "segmentary lineage system," at all levels of segmentation (i.e., major, minor, maximal, etc.), must be corporate in function. That is, the segments at each level must have certain duties they perform as a corporation. Here, again, the situation is by no means simple to illustrate, but I cannot see where Bena Bena lineages, as I have defined them, and as they are conceived by the Bena themselves, are corporate in any way. They do not own land, they do not oppose like groups for marriage, they do not feud, they are never the units involved in legal disputes of any kind, and so on. The members of the lineage, although admittedly close kinsmen, do not garden together to the exclusion of others. They do tend to build houses together but there are many exceptions and it hardly seems worthwhile or meaningful to say they are corporate with respect to house-building. The people, as they do also with sub-clans, deny that lineages exist as sub-groups within the clan in

spite of the fact that there is a generic term for them. That is, the ideology and/or dogma is quite different from the lineage systems of Africa where all the different levels of segmentation and corporate functions are consciously stressed.

Sub-clans, although they do not own land and are not the warring units, can be seen as corporate for certain purposes, mainly funerals, perhaps with respect to ownership of the sacred flutes, and they are the "core" in arranging marriages, although as I have indicated they prefer marriage to be a clan wide activity. But there is little insistence on agnatic purity as can be seen from the genealogy and no one is concerned to trace his connection to other members of the sub-clan. They are members of the same sub-clan mainly because they want it that way. Also, as is the case with lineages, the people deny the existence of sub-clans as sub-groups of the clan. They insist that the clan is one and that there are no smaller units within it.[1] This indicates clearly, again, that they have no ideology of "segmentary lineage systems" as there is in Africa.

A further consideration arises at this point which is of importance. As M. G. Smith (1956) has indicated, the truly distinctive feature of lineage systems lies in the fact that the segments perform political functions. By political is meant essentially competition for power. In the Korofeigu case neither lineages nor sub-clans can be seen as units competing for power and hence they are not political. The lineage never acts as a corporate group at all and the tasks carried on by the sub-clan, even if we grant that they are marriage and ownership of the sacred flutes as well as funeral, do not involve competition. Quite the contrary, they involve cooperation and the net effect of the regular performance of these tasks is

to bind the clan more solidly together at the expense of all lesser units within it.

In Bena Bena it is the clan exclusively that performs the political functions attributed to various segments in African lineage systems. The clan is the important corporate group, it owns land, it goes to war, defends itself, it is the important unit for marriage, for initiation, for pig exchanges and its members are jurally equal vis-a-vis the outside. In short, it has virtually all functions in and of itself and it is a group of sufficiently small size and flexibility to be able to successfully manage the various tasks without allocating them to various sub-groups. The significant units of analysis in the Bena Bena, both with respect to politics and social structure in general, are individuals and clans. Both the emphasis on individuals and on clanship have been repeatedly stressed and there is no need to dwell on it further. Sub-groups within the clan, although they can be defined and isolated analytically if necessary, exist to an important part in the minds of the investigator and care should be taken in assigning to them functions which they may not have.

It is clear, it seems to me, that Bena Bena societies do not meet the four criteria necessary for the African model. They are not truly unilineal descent groups, they have no genuine dogma of descent, the groups formed are not corporate in function at all levels, and the groups at some levels at least do not discharge political and/or administrative functions. It is not surprising then, that other features usually associated with the African model are also not found. The "chronic" segmentation mentioned by Barnes (1962:9), long genealogies, and ascribed leadership might be mentioned

as cases in point. We have already mentioned the shallowness of genealogies, let us look briefly at "chronic" segmentation and leadership.

As Barnes has indicated, "comparatively little attention has been paid in New Guinea studies to the process whereby groups such as clan and sub-clan segment and divide" (1962:8). But it is perfectly clear that the process of segmentation in New Guinea is not identical to that in Africa, leading Barnes to conclude somewhat rhetorically that in New Guinea we have segmentation which is not "chronic" but is "catastrophic":

> . . . . This kind of segmentation we may call chronic, for in a sense the division of the lineage into two branches is already present when the brothers are still lying in the cradle. The details of the process may be unpredictable but the line of cleavage is already determined. Segmentation or fission in New Guinea appears not to take this inexorable form; one cannot predict two generations in advance how a group will split. Instead it seems that within the group of agnates and others there is a multiplicity of cleavages or potential cleavages. In a crisis these are polarized, two men emerge as obvious rivals and each with his followers forms either a new unit or a distinct segment of the existing unit. Segmentation, as it were, is not chronic but catastrophic (1962:9).

Competition for power in African societies, however, is between segments in a system of:

> . . . poly-segmentation (is) seen as an enduring condition whereby there are in existence, and perhaps have been for a long time, a fixed hierarchy of segments, each segment of higher order containing several segments of lower order. Evans-Pritchard and Fortes's earlier work discusses how in different contexts segments variously oppose and support one another without changing their status in the segmentary hierarchy. The terms 'fission' and 'fusion' were applied to these shifts of opposition and alliance in different contexts (1962:8).

The segments in question are lineages of various grades led by leaders who are agnates, their positions being ascribed on the basis of agnation and seniority. Thus it is plain that when a struggle for power ensues and there is rivaltry for leadership positions it occurs between brothers or close agnates. This can result in the splitting of a segment and the formation of a new one. This is the on-going process reported for Africa. But the

recurring process of fission and fusion takes place in an environment very different from that found in New Guinea. The segments in question have a chance to grow and divide more or less without interruption of serious kind from the outside. Warfare is mainly for defensive purposes and is not nearly as common as it is in New Guinea. Thus in the New Guinea case fission does not follow this inexorable process because groups are constantly scattering, disappearing, or re-forming and recruiting. They probably seldom reach sufficient size so that fission as a natural process of growth becomes necessary in the first place. In this sense segmentation is unpredictable. But it is predictable in the sense that one can be certain that when segmentation does occur as a result of competition for power it occurs between those who stand to gain power. In Africa, between brothers, in New Guinea, between those men in the clan aspiring to be "big men." As big men do not acquire power by virtue of their position in a lineage segment, segments of this kind are not created. The segments that are created are simply new groups which, if they manage to survive, in time may become new clans.

In still another sense, however, "fission" and "fusion" in New Guinea is "chronic" just as in Africa. This is simply because warfare is chronic and groups constantly scatter and regroup. Thus groups constantly fuse by accepting new members and eventually split when members are attracted away either to regroup or to follow a new leader. Fission and fusion as on-going processes are as much, or perhaps even more a part of life in New Guinea as in Africa. Fission is equally as predictable in New Guinea as in Africa because in both instances it occurs between those struggling for power. It is less predictable only if you wish to specify who the particular individuals will be who are involved in the struggle for power. The idea that if those struggling in this way are not agnates the situation is unpredictable seems

to me still just one more instance of the unilineal bias. Segmentation per se, as Smith (1956) pointed out, is not unique to African societies. But segmentation following the lines dictated by agnation and ascribed leadership is distinctive of Africa and, again, the New Guinea case does not fit. It should be pointed out once more, perhaps, that failing to look for the motives behind segmentation helps to perpetuate the fallacy that New Guinea societies fit the African model, being only a somewhat aberrant type. The motives and/or antecedent conditions behind segmentation in Bena Bena, when it does not occur outside of warfare, probably have to do with the optimum size of groups exploiting relatively unproductive land with crude horticultural techniques, the number of people who can effectively work communally at certain tasks, or the optimum number of individuals who can organize their activities following relatively informal patterns of leadership, to say nothing of more personal motives such as the desire of an influential person to gain prestige or to further his own ends in some other way. When a Bena group becomes so large that it cannot organize itself effectively for the tasks necessary for life as it is lived in New Guinea, it must split, with some members following one "big man" and some another. I cannot help but believe that prior to European contact and largely because of the pattern of warfare, this seldom occurred.

A still further important difference between New Guinea groups and African ones is the relative impermanence of membership in the former as contrasted with the latter. That is, groups are constantly scattering and re-grouping and individuals sometimes switch their allegiance to other groups or other leaders. It is this fact which seems to have led to assertions about lack of solidarity. But as I have indicated I do not believe the groups in question lack solidarity, unless simply solidarity

over time is meant, and I have tried to show the kinds of ties that make for group solidarity of a task-oriented kind in the absence of a strong dogma of agnatic solidarity and de facto agnatic ties. Indeed, it is as if Bena institutions have evolved to compensate for the lack of agnatic solidarity and to overcome the relative impermanence of membership. This can be seen in the marriage customs which, as I have indicated, do not cement political alliances outside the clan. It can be seen in the fact that women upon marriage become, for all intents and purposes, members of their husbands' group. Adoption, the funeral customs, certain features of kinship, age grading, and communal activities all contribute to the solidarity of the clan. The fact that there is an individual emphasis in New Guinea and that individuals have individual ties outside their own group does not necessarily imply a lack of group solidarity unless one believes also that there is a corresponding lack of strong individual ties within the group. The assumption that this is the case in New Guinea seems to me to be based upon the implicit belief that if the group does not have agnatic ties it has no important or binding ties at all, again, the ubiquitous unilineal bias.

If, then, the groups I have described for the Bena Bena as "clans" are not in fact descent groups similar in type to the African model, the question is: How are we best to consider them? I think little is to be gained by attempting to describe them as "bilateral," "ambilineal," "quasi-unilineal," or what have you, although any one of these labels might well describe them more accurately, or at least not less accurately, than patrilineal descent groups. But all of these labels again, it seems to me, tend to imply physiological or biological bases for group formation and to stultify rather than encourage any deeper understanding. This tendency seems clearly present in the work reported to date for what was Netherlands New Guinea:

> One of the dangers which are continually present among small units in this area so arduous for its inhabitants, is extinction. We have . . . seen how often it happens that a lineage dies out or becomes too small to maintain its position. It is evident that they have armed themselves against this by deviating from the unilineal principle. It is surely not accidental that of all lineages the smallest ones are more bilateral, whereas the larger lineages . . . have kept to their patrilineal structure (Bureau for Native Affairs, 1958:149).[2]

I think much might be gained, at least temporarily, by viewing these groups as fundamentally "unilocal patrilocal groups" (Titiev, 1943:523) or clans, following Murdock (1949), which have not become "unilocal patrilineal lineages," or sibs, due to ecological factors primarily associated with land and warfare. Viewing the groups in question in this way, rather than as descent groups, has the advantage of recognizing them as segmentary, land-owning, exogamous, corporate groups with political functions, but also recognizing that they are groups in which membership is not determined most importantly by biological descent from a common ancestor. That they are groups composed of only two important levels, the clan and the individual, and that although sub-groups within the clan can be distinguished they may be largely imaginary in function and in important. This allows us further to look beyond the "fallacy of explanation by kinship" to an examination of the societies in their proper ecological setting. As Leach points out:

> But the Pul Eliya community does not only operate within an established framework of legal rules, it also exists within a particular man-made ecological environment. It is the inflexibility of topography -- of water and land and climate -- which most of all determines what people shall do. The interpretation of ideal legal rules is at all times limited by such crude nursery facts as that water evaporates and flows downhill. It is in this sense that I want to insist that the student of social structure must never forget that the constraints of economics are prior to the constraints of morality and law (1961a:9).

At the same time, when thinking of the groups as unilocal and patrilocal we must be sensitive to the fact that paternity does not mean exclusively

biological paternity. That is, men tend to live with the man who is responsible for buying their bride whether this be true father, adopting father, some other man who is "looking after" them or even a friend. And even then men change their residence and loyalties for still other reasons, economic, personal, or what have you. We must also recognize that kinship is not necessarily the determing factor with respect to human behavior but that kinship can be and is adjusted to fit behavior. And we must be more than careful in imposing a preconceived structure on each new society that becomes grist for the ethnographer's mill:

> Yet if our approach is to be genuinely unbiased we must be prepared to consider the possibility that these type categories have no sociological significance whatsoever. It may be that to create a class labelled matrilineal societies is as irrelevant for our understanding of social structure as the creation of a class blue butterflies is irrelevant for the understanding of the anatomical structure of lepidoptera. I don't say it is so, but it may be; it is time that we considered the possibility (Leach, 1961b:4).

It is virtually impossible at this time to attempt a meaningful comparison of all New Guinea groups reported either with each other or with African societies. The Bena Bena seem clearly to deviate markedly from the African type. But even though one cannot argue with anything approaching certainty about other Highlands groups there are reasons for believing that the biases listed have interfered in the descriptions and interpretations available. There are hints in the literature indicating that the social structure in question are not always what one would be inclined to think at first glance. And, indeed, why else have investigators found it necessary to speak of "carpels, parishes, parish-settlements," etc. (Hogbin and Wedgwood, 1953); "linguistic units, districts, villages, and patrilineages" (Berndt, 1962); or "tribe, close people, clan, subclan, patrilineage" (Salisbury, 1962); or "phyle, sub phyle, phratry, clan, main segment,

sub-clan, sub-subclan, and sub-lineage" (Reay, 1959), rather than simply of clan, maximal, major, minor and minimal lineages? But, while changing the terminology, we have done little to change the underlying interpretations, continuing instead to see Africa in New Guinea.

More specifically, one cannot help but wonder when he reads passages such as the following:

> District membership itself carries with it this assumption of common kinship, as against the assumption of non-kinship outside it except in interpersonal terms. Only agnatic kin within a certain range consistently and ideally live together, so that local and kinship bonds mutually reinforce and define each other. But other categories of kin ordinarily occupy different villages if not different districts, and, therefore, except among the Fore, are not necessarily bound by common interests in war. Kin living outside the district are in potentially hostile territory and conventionally should be viewed with caution, although certain relationships, especially those between nenafu cross-cousins, or between close brother and sister, remain, ideally, free from antagonism or suspicion (Berndt, 1962:35).

The Siane, as well as Kamano, seem to fit the pattern I have described for Bena also:

> In a sense the tribe is a kinship unit, since kinship terms can be used to describe all the members of one's own tribe. But such terms are rarely so used, unless an individual wishes to emphasize his nearness to a tribal 'brother' as contrasted to his distance from a member of another tribe. This extended form of kinship is often validated by claiming common descent from the mythical tribal ancestor, who emerged from a hole in the tribal land and created the original clans of the tribe, but genealogies are not kept in support of this claim. On the other hand, many clans who call themselves by the tribal name and who call their fellow tribesman 'brothers' have traditions of migration to the territory on which they now live. They may be recognized as 'kin' by members of a distant tribe, from which they migrated. Nevertheless, since they were once granted permission to settle on tribal land and now live on it, they call themselves by the tribal name. In short, tribal membership is indicated by the use of a tribal name, members of the tribe think about its internal organization in terms of a kinship idiom, but the effective determinant of who shall call himself by the tribal name is residence on the tribal land and the possession of certain rights over that land (Salisbury, 1962:13).

Perhaps the clearest recognition of all of the underlying importance of the kinds of deviations I have mentioned is found in Marie Reay's account of Kuma:

> The generations between the founders of the smallest groups and the original ancestor of the clan or phratry are obscure; no one can even guess how many generations have elapsed, and none of the intervening names (besides those of the ancestor's sons) is ever known. Exact genealogical links can be traced between all established members of only one-third of the sub-subclan, and nearly all groups of this kind include other members who have been incorporated either from other clans or at least from other sub-subclans of the same clan. To an outside observer, the extent to which the Kuma clan and its segments depart from the Kuma ideal of unbroken agnatic descent from a common ancestor is obscured by the people's insistence that the groups are formed by agnatic kin (Reay, 1959:34).

Many more quotations could be cited all indicating that locality bears an important role in the ascription of kinship ties, genealogical record, intensity and frequency of interaction, land ownership and so on. There are, it seems to me, enough doubts raised by any of the published accounts on the Eastern Highlands to warrant a very careful second look. But in taking a second look it is of the utmost importance that we do not handicap our effort by clinging blindly to preconceived notions which tend to bias both our descriptions and our interpretations. It is only in this way that we can be free to take full cognizance of all the many and complex variables encountered . . . economic, personality, and cultural . . . which act so as to produce and maintain the subject social structures as they are. Factors such as inaccessible terrain, poor soil and erosion, a high death rate among children, endemic diseases, the importance of women in the economy, head-hunting and war have been suggested as important in this context (Bureau of Native Affairs, 1958:148-149). Goodenough has pointed out additional factors which might be involved such as environmental instability, recurring disaster, and, at the cultural level itself, the problems

of achieving wealth and leadership without a system of inheritance (1962:11). Certainly all of these ideas deserve much more attention than they have received in the past.

I have attempted to show that the current controversy over New Guinea social structures can be traced in large part to the history of ideas brought to bear on the problem. Highlands New Guinea has been the almost exclusive domain of structurally inclined anthropologists, and at just that time during which the structural tradition was enjoying its greatest florescence. Biases within the theoretical framework itself, along with serious problems of definition, have combined to prevent us from seeing the New Guinea societies in terms of their own distinctive features. These biases have influenced the descriptions given in the literature making it difficult even now to compare and understand the social structure in question. In those instances in which scholars have had reason to question the use of their preconceived model they have tended to overlook certain important ecological considerations because of additional or related biases. Not the least of these ecological factors seem to be warfare and land availability which, although necessary conditions, are not sufficient to fully explain the facts of social structure.

Finally, I have attempted to demonstrate, using the Bena Bena peoples as an example, that New Guinea societies, at this point in time at least, are more properly conceived of as local rather than as descent groups of the African type. There are indications that other Highlands peoples share some of the Bena characteristics. It has also been suggested that there are differences in Highlands societies with respect to the type of warfare they engaged in; and these differences may be associated with how widely the subject societies diverge from the African model. The extreme deviants

can be located in the Eastern Highlands in terms not only of severity and frequency of warfare, but also in terms of adherence to principles of descent and residence, land availability, and probably many other important factors of personality and culture as well.

The most important single reason for our failure to make greater progress in analyses of New Guinea societies has to do with the failure to distinguish clearly between ideology and statistics of behavior. Until we rid ourselves of the tendency to describe societies or cultures in terms of subjectively arrived at combinations of what they say they do, what we perceive them to do, and what they do do, we can hardly expect to draw significant conclusions.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. This, of course, is not unique to the ethnology of New Guinea but is, rather, a criticism easily leveled at ethnological work almost anywhere.

2. It should be made clear that Dr. Barnes is not more at fault here than others. The notion of the African model is implicit if not explicit in the work of many others who have worked in the Highlands. It is to Barnes credit that he has attempted to make explicit that which is most often implicit.

3. It is not the terms per se that matter here but the nature of the concepts so delineated. That is, one might use the term 'model' in such a way as to mean what I mean here by 'ideal type.' But in order to avoid the arbitrary and sloppy use of terms I will use these terms as defined by Martindale (1959), and Brodbeck (1959) and attempt to show that what is usually meant by the "African model" is an 'ideal type,' by these definitions at least, and only has significance as such.

4. This gets further complicated by the fact that it is possible to consider a 'statistical norm' an ideal type. Thus Leach's distinction here has a rather spurious character in that at first glance one might think that he is contrasting an ideal type with a different order of conceptualization which he is not.

5. I have in mind here the distinction alluded to by Barnes between filiation simply as a mechanism of descent and the dogma of descent which may or may not be associated. The Tallensi, he points out, have both of these whereas in the Highlands, he states, the dogma of descent is absent (1962:6). This, of course, implies only that it is possible to recognize unilineal descent but consider it unimportant. Needless to say the notion of unilineal descent is not considered to be unimportant in the 'African model.' From the point of view of the anthropologist it would be possible to recognize unilineal descent groups, even functional ones, but if the people denied their existence or their descent features the dogma would have to be considered absent.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. The "rules" here being either "ideology" or established by the anthropologist as some combination of ideology and actual behavior as seen by himself.

2. This still avoids, of course, the fundamental philosophical problem of how many people must agree before a rule is truly a rule, but it at least clarifies the practical problem of the ethnographer in this respect.

3. Genealogical depth per se, in any given case is relatively unimportant. It is important primarily it seems to me, as an indication of how important the dogma of descent is held by the people being investigated.

4. To argue otherwise would involve accepting a purely pragmatic criterion for the establishment of rules in which the rules would be defined simply by what people did rather than by what they said they did. In this case one could ignore ideology completely, whether it be what people said they did or what they said they ought to do as well.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. It is virtually impossible now to determine how many "tribes" there were at the time of European contact. This is complicated by the fact that administrative control and the new forms of government imposed have in some cases merged former independent groups into smaller units. See Langness, 1963, for an example of this.

2. It is interesting that very few adult men in Nupasafa were aware of this although the old men were very matter-of-fact and open about it once it was brought out into the open. None of the women or children knew that these men were not true Nupasafans and, in fact, no one cared very much one way or the other except, perhaps, the investigator himself.

3. The significance of this is subject to a wide range of interpretation. The man comes from an area roughly twenty miles away where Bena is understood and is quite similar to his own language. And, of course, Bena speakers were not traditionally any kind of group nor did Bena speakers have any particular loyalties to one another. I emphasize his acceptance in Nupa to illustrate a point which will come later. Namely, that membership in Bena Bena groups is very open indeed.

4. The expression of intent to remain is important here as it forms the basis for an important distinction between non-agnates who consider themselves Nupa and non-agnates who reside in Nupa but do not consider themselves members. A man residing in Nupa who does not consider himself Nupa and who has no intention of remaining permanently may cultivate a plot of ground but if so, it will be ground given to him in usufruct or else new ground which will eventually revert to some member of Nupa who does reside there permanently.

5. The fact that friendship can be very important and that people reside not only with kinsmen can be seen in the ease with which post-contact natives establish new social ties (Langness, 1963).

6. Diana Howelett, a geographer from the Australian National University, worked in Korofeigu for three months prior to my field work there. Although a geographer she was importantly interested in social organization as well, and did considerably investigating along these lines only to be met with repeated denials that clans were composed of smaller units within them (Howlett, 1960).

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. A boy will sometimes request his father to attempt to purchase a specific girl -- someone he has met courting or in some other way -- and the father may try at first to buy her. But this seldom works out and usually the boy must take whoever his father is able to get.

2. Normally, of course, men sleep in the men's house and would not think of spending the night anywhere else.

3. Objectively viewed this has little real meaning because certainly clans fight with at least some of those from which they receive brides. But nevertheless they believe for the moment that they will be and should be friendly.

4. It must be pointed out that marrying by age grades is not the practice of all Highlanders. It does occur among Gahuku, Kamano and Yagaria groups peripheral to Bena Bena.

5. In Nupasafa clan 11 of 44, or 25 per cent of married males had more than one spouse simultaneously. This was the lowest figure during my fieldwork period and it went up at one point to 13 out of 44, or 30 per cent. I do not think this is typical for all the Bena but it is probably consistently higher for all Bena groups who inhabit the grasslands rather than the 'bush' as they have more pigs and hence can acquire more wives.

6. The six outside are "marked" either by mother's brothers or by men who were residing in Nupa at one time or another or with whom the girl's parents were residing at her birth.

7. This is somewhat similar to that discussed by Newman (1963), and somewhat less similar to that discussed by Reay (1960) and Rodrique (1963). It is also discussed by Sinclair (1957).

8. It was not proven that she committed suicide by drowning but the consensus of opinion was that it was suicide.

9. A very similar religious system described in great deal and at some length can be seen in Newman (1961).

10. Flutes do not always occur in pairs for various reasons. Sometimes one of a pair is buried with a male child and later replaced, the flutes being somewhat fragile sometimes break, or become too old, and so on. Also a man can only play one at a time and thus two men may own flutes independently but play them jointly.

11. This particular procedure whereby men butcher the pigs they will receive and measurements are kept is said by the Korofeigans to be borrowed from Gahuku. They claim to have not followed this procedure formerly and simply took what they were given and vice versa.

12. This ceremony can also be performed for a female child although it seldom is. It stands a greater chance of being performed for a female child if she happens to be a first born for reasons we need not discuss here.

13. It is only fair to the argument to point out that these figures are seriously skewed in favor of their not being within the clan. The 23 cases I can cite with certainty as being within the clan. The number 53 includes some cases in which I did not specify clearly what I wanted to know and as a consequence the individual cited as mother's brother may be who it is believed the mother's brother should be rather than an actual statement either of who it is or that the individual did not have such a relationship. Likewise, within the 53 cases are those in which the relationship has been established but the mother's brother died before the boy was decorated and the return made. I do not know what might happen in these cases but it would be reasonable to think that a substitute may eventually have been found within the clan, particularly in any case involving the destruction of a group through warfare. This is only to say that there is good reason for supposing that the figure for mother's brothers within the clan might easily exceed the 26 per cent given.

14. Men do state that when fighting, if they saw their brother-in-law or father-in-law, or some relative or friend they would not kill them but would take them captive and later release them. But no one, with the exception of men who kept captive women as wives, could cite an example of this actually happening and it must have been fairly rare. Also, even though it may have been possible at times to spare a given individual, it would not have been very possible in situations where houses were surrounded and burned or when volleys of arrows were loosed, and these were standard techniques of warfare.

15. Korotoya (the Nagamitobo councilor) abuses his position as counselor and tends to use it for his ends rather than for those of the administration as I have indicated elsewhere (Langness, 1963). But this does not mean that he is not an effective leader.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. Prior to 1950 there had been some research in the area. Reo Fortune worked in the Kamano area in the 1930's but has published only one very brief article (1947). Vicedom and Tischner worked in the Highlands prior to this time also but were ethnologists only secondarily. There is also mention of a Dr. Bernatzik, an Austrian ethnologist (Bates, 1932) but, again, apparently nothing was published.

2. I do not wish to take up space with whether or not the ward is primarily a domestic group or an agnatic group. It seems clear, however, from the discussion on page 16 that the ward is best described as a domestic group. In any case a ward, as it is described by Salisbury, most certainly cannot be a genuine segment in a lineage system.

3. This has not been done without some anxiety, however, and it is this fact I think which leads Barnes to remark, 'This procedure gives an exaggerated picture of the differences between the Highlands and Africa, and although most ethnographers have avoided this error in print, it persists in many oral discussions (1962:5).

4. Personal communication. I fully concur with Meggitt on this point in spite of the Chimbu material (Brown and Brookfield, 1959; Brown, 1961, 1962) which seems to contradict it. I believe there are other factors operating in the Chimbu case and that it will need special explanation.

5. It is exceedingly difficult, of course, to define what constitutes a "war" and how many individuals must be killed before a "war" occurs or is "serious." Certainly in view of the small populations involved a dozen deaths would be a serious loss. Even the loss of one or few members at a time when raids are frequent (as they were), could be a serious depletion of manpower resources.

6. Imagine, for example, one of the modern nations allowing certain citizens not to participate in a battle or war while at the same time not punishing them in some way. This notion, again, however, seems to me to be linked to the notion discussed earlier that war is really some form of sport in New Guinea.

7. It also appears in the "arguments not in print" mentioned by Barnes (1962) in the form of claims of bilaterality. Indeed, it would seem at times as though without biological kin ties there could be no organization at all.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. I am aware that this may be a result of not framing the proper questions. It seems clear that if there is a generic term for lineages and sub-clans, and if sub-clans, at least, do perform certain function, the people must be aware of their existence. And of course they are. This, however, makes their denial of the sub-clan really a denial of its importance and thus, it seems to me, is of equal significance for the point.

2. This passage is a translation from A. C. Van der Leeden, Hoofdtrekken der Sociale Struktur in het Westelijke Binnenland van Sarmi (Main Feature of the Social Structure in the Western Hinterland of Sarm'), Thesis, 1956, p. 158.

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