

Revolutions - Most
There are changes which
will be acceptable only
if possibility of war is regarded as
very remote

7-1

In these past nine years we have become so accustomed to look upon every change from the point of view of whether ~~the~~ it brings the country into our camp or the Russian camp that it is quite difficult for us to imagine a state of affairs of the world in which war is a remote possibility and in which the Russian-American power conflict has faded out of the picture. As long as this power conflict ~~dominates~~ *governs* our thinking and Russia's thinking revolutions which lead to change in government are regarded as ~~xxxx~~ very important events by America and Russia, at least in certain critical regions of the world. In general we should like to see countries to be governed as parliamentary democracies. But this consideration is ~~underwritten by~~ *subordinated to our* a desire to see a government in power which is securely in our camp. Similarly, Russia likes to see countries go Communist, but this is not ~~important~~ much more than a means *in the end of* ~~to keep a country~~ *to have* securely in her camp and if a choice is between a Communist government that is allied to the United States such as ~~the case of~~ Yugoslavia or a non-Communist government which is allied to Russia, the form of government becomes a secondary consideration for Russia also. If it were possible to arrive at a settlement which would in fact eliminate the power conflict our concern and Russia's concern about revolutions or military coup d'etats such as we had recently in Iran will become very much less than it is today. It is therefore conceivable that within the framework of an over-all settlement one may want to suppress the direct conquest of one nation by another but would want to tolerate civil war, even though weapons may be ~~smuggled~~ *suggested* to both parties ~~to the~~ *by other means - provided* conflict from both sides as long as this weapon transport remains *conform to* within the framework of the disarmament provisions.

Negot. from strength.
~~Most controversial points may~~
~~be irrelevant in new setting~~

Most controversial points upon which Russia and America are deadlocked at present are important mainly in the present setting. If a settlement is adopted which creates a new setting the important issues will probably be entirely different from those which appear to be important today. In view of this and if the general approach to the problem which confronts us is accepted, it would appear completely out of place to engage in negotiations for an over-all settlement with a view of settling as many of the controversial points as possible in our favor. One of the tragic consequences of the concept that we ought to do justice ^{plus} and that we could do it successfully by negotiating from strength is the fact that in these last nine years our government has never indicated what she would regard as a satisfactory settlement of the post-war problems. The reason given for this reticence ~~is based on arguments that~~ are quite valid for business negotiations in private life. If the government discloses, so people say, what we want to negotiate for and if ~~the government's position~~ ^{the government's position} will serve as a starting point of the negotiations and the government would then be forced to yield ground from there ^{on} in the customary give and take of negotiations and end up with fewer of the ~~the~~ controversial points settled in our favor ^{it} than/would otherwise might have. Because of these false concepts of the nature of the over-all settlement and in the absence of any lead given by the government ~~and~~ there was virtually no public discussion of what the substance of an over-all settlement might be ^{those products and} in nine years ^{was thus lost} of valuable time available for thought and deliberation. ^{who wants to think} Anybody ~~so thinking~~ about this problem if he should start now, would have to start virtually from scratch.

*Agreement should not
be unilaterally underrivable
status*

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Meuf

Even if the agreement will not completely freeze the status quo it will certainly make it difficult to bring about changes. For this reason it is important to see to it that the agreement satisfies as far as possible such legitimate national aspirations. In the absence of generally accepted basic principles in international relations many of such national aspirations will be contraversial and it will not be possible to settle them for the time being. It should however be possible for the United States, Russia, and the other major nations to draft some general principles acceptable to them and to settle some of the contraversial national aspirations in this manner. It should be pretty obvious for instance, that it would be desirable to establish a united Germany, to return to Germany most of the territories it owned before the war and thereby eliminate the danger of establishing an easy goal for reawakened German nationalist movements--a goal which all Germans would clearly want. This raises a question as to whether it would not be desirable to compensate Poland for territories which she would have to yield either at the outset or maybe in ~~xxxx~~ stages over a 25 year period by returning to her territories which she succeeded to Russia. These are not issues on which Russia and America ~~xxxx~~ have opposing interests as long as they are both guided by the real national interest. Stability in Europe ought to be as much Russia's concern as it ought to be America's concern.

*How are we left
in case of abrogation*

10-1

Even though the agreement may offer great incentives for Russia and America to want to keep in force as long as the governments of these countries are guided by enlightened national interest the possibility of abrogation by one of them cannot be disregarded by the other.

Both governments would want to know what their position will be if there is an abrogation, if the arms race starts from scratch, and if it is likely to lead to war. Would they then have ^{as good a} ~~a fair~~ chance to win the war? *as they have today?*

This is a point of course where America's and Russia's interest are not parallel, and the negotiations for an over-all agreement might break down over this point unless both governments are satisfied that the over-all agreement proposed would make the occurrence of abrogation exceedingly unlikely. If that is the case then it may be that either America or Russia will be faced with a decision of accepting a smaller chance of winning a war that might follow an abrogation for the sake of a greatly increasing chance of avoiding the war in accepting an otherwise satisfactory over-all settlement.

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The probability of abrogation if the agreement provides for the elimination of ~~AMERICAN~~ of A and H bombs and perhaps a major part of the heavy equipment of the armed forces, both America and Russia make a major investment when they accept the agreement. While the possibility of abrogation cannot be excluded, it is nevertheless likely, and the likelier the greater the investment is, that neither Russia nor America will want to enter into the agreement with the intention of abrogating it later. It seems to me this will stand to reason, provided that both of them enter into the agreement freely and not under the threat of some imminent attack on their ~~cities~~ cities. In this respect and only in this respect, we have a more favorable situation now that Russia is heavily armed and has a considerable stock-pile of arms. A few years ago the main argument against an over-all settlement, heard in private discussion, was a statement that Russia will enter into the agreement in order to get us to destroy our bombs and heavy equipment, but that she can do so without losing anything, with the intention of abrogating the agreement later.

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Secret violation

Both Russia and America will be mostly concerned that the disarmament proposals of the agreement shall not be secretly violated so long as the agreement is not openly abrogated. It is doubtful that they could be sure of this if all they had to rely on was inspectors operating under some international organization. I am not convinced that it is possible to spell out in the agreement all In view of the fact that conditions change I am not certain that it would be possible to spell out in the agreement for once and for all just precisely what measures shall be adopted to give Russia and America satisfaction in this respect. In this respect it may be very helpful for Russia and America to retain the legal right to abrogate the agreement. Rather than spelling out in advance what will satisfy us we can then give to Russia at any time and suggest that she propose ways and means to give us greater assurance that no secret violation of the agreement is going on in her territory. Clearly, unless we can be assured of this we will have no choice but to abrogate the agreement and to start the arms race from scratch. But there is no doubt that it is within Russia's power to give us satisfaction on this score if she desires to do so. Just as it is in our power to let Russia know that no secret violations are occurring in the US. One way of giving the other nation greater assurance is simply by making ~~spies~~ spying easier. This can be done in many ways, all the way to granting full immunity to legitimate spies. Writing at a time when secrecy is greatly over-rated and we believe it is within our national interest to keep secrets, it is difficult to visualize that in a new setting it may be in the national interest for Russia and America to convince each other that there is nothing that

must

is being kept secret.

Much depends of course on the kind of disarmament that is adopted. If we eliminate merely A-bombs from national armament then the problem is more difficult than if we eliminate all rockets bombers and aircraft carriers that could be used for the delivery of the bombs. One might go further and have commercial aircraft ^{carrying} so designed as to be wholly unsuitable for the ~~kind~~ of bombs as has been suggested by V. Weisskopf. If disarmament is extended to all heavy mobile equipment and heavy guns, tanks, flame throwers, etc. are completely eliminated, finding a few such illegitimate objects would establish violations and would make discovery of a violation much easier/^{than} if there is a mere reduction in the number of such equipment.

*Enforcement against
minor nations*

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Enforcement does not arise with respect to Russia, America and such other nations as may have the right to abrogate the agreement. The case of most other nations, some ways of enforcing the observance of the agreement and particularly of the disarmament clause of the agreement must be found. To me it would seem that economic sanctions are wholly unsuitable for this purpose and particularly since one would not want to apply them in the case of minor violations and it would be difficult to know where to draw the line. I believe that the best way of dealing with this problem is to set up an international police, preferably a provisional force which recruits its members from the smaller nations. In all those countries where violations could have serious consequences there would be set up an organization of this international police force and in case of violations the individuals responsible for those violations would be arrested. Since the violators might be members of the government the international police force would have to have weapons, such as light tanks, etc. that would give it a superiority over the local police in case the local police would try to interfere. The way the international police is organized is of course of great importance since it is necessary to give the nation considerable assurance that the international police would not interfere with internal matters and will remain aloof in the case of civil war. It will be necessary to create some political structure to create a framework for the international police and they ought to be able to bring those arrested before some court. In practice there are only a few countries who could be dangerous to the peace of the world and major contingents of the international police would have to be stationed only in those regions where those countries are located.

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A question which requires serious consideration is to what extent the international police should be able to protect nationals who discover and report violations of the disarmament agreement. After the first war in Germany there was an inter-allied control commission established which supervised the observance of the disarmament clause of the Versailles Treaty. Men who reported violations of these clauses to the commission were arrested and tried for espionage in Germany. It is doubtful that it would be wise to permit such inconsistencies.



Disarmament

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I am attempting here to raise questions rather than to answer questions, but with respect to disarmament it seems advisable to discuss the problem involved on the basis of specific set of suggestions. I should choose a type of disarmament which I believe might be the most suitable one from the long range point of view. Even though it could probably not be acceptable without modification in the near future.. I should think that the over-all settlement we want to eliminate completely A & H bombs and the means suitable for the delivery, that is bomber planes, and other planes which could be successfully substituted for the bombers. I would further eliminate with a few exceptions that shall be stated below all mobile heavy equipment from national armaments such as guns, tanks, flame throwers, but I would not put any limitations on machine guns. I would permit heavy fortifications, such as the Maginot Line that would serve purely defensive purposes. This type of disarmament would give security to Russia and would also give security to Western Europe. If Western Europe decides to protect itself with a Maginot Line across Europe. It would permit almost complete elimination of military expenditures, both in Russia and in Europe. It would make secret violations exceedingly difficult but it has also certain drawbacks. It would become impossible to defend a country like Indo-China against a rebellion like that of Viet Mienh, since wherever there is a vigorous armed groups fighting against a government which is only lukewarmly supported by the population, the government is bound to be defeated unless it has a superiority due to a supply of heavy equipment. Similarly, in a country like Iran where a military coup replaced a popular government, the new government supported by the army could not maintain itself for long

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without superior equipment. From a long range point of view it might be argued that there is no justification for maintaining such governments in existence and that over a transitional period of maybe 25 years the problem could be solved by allowing certain groups to remain in possession of a minimum amount of heavy equipment but not permitting the importation of such equipment in the future after a certain date.



Stages

14-1

The final stages of disarmament can probably be reached only in stages. But the stages ought to follow each other as fast as possible as long as we can be sure that no secret violations of disarmament provisions would be detected. As far as Russia or America is concerned the secrecy would not be threatened by even the fastest rate of radical disarmament for they are permitted to retain the bombs and the means of their delivery until such time as disarmament is virtually completed. I doubt whether this would be the wisest course we might follow.

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