

CHESTER BOWLES
ESSEX, CONNECTICUT

May 11, 1955

Dear Mr. Szilard:

Sometime in the coming weeks I am most anxious to talk to you about your most challenging letter in the New York Times on the need for liquidating the cold war before we destroy ourselves in a hot war. I am in New York only rarely at present because I am in the process of finishing a book. However, things will be easier for me soon.

In the meantime I would deeply appreciate your comment on the enclosed speech by C. Rajagopalachari, who as you may know is one of India's most respected citizens, a close associate of Gandhi, a former Governor General and former Chief Minister of Madras state, philosopher and author.

He says some extraordinary, confused, unfair and ignorant things which should be corrected. (He is, by the way, quite anti-Communist, but very mixed up on America.) I have written him a letter suggesting that what we need to abolish is war, but what I am sure would be far more effective is a letter from you commenting from your unique vantage point.

Would it be at all possible for you to write a letter which I would send him? Would it also be possible to get a copy of Einstein's (whom he deeply admired) letter to Roosevelt in 1939?

With my warmest regards.

Sincerely,


Chester Bowles

Mr. Leo Szilard
University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

New York, May 20/55

Dear Mr. Bowles,

It will be a great pleasure to see you sometime in New York when you ^{time} permits. When that time comes, please telephone Longacre 3-5000 and ask for Mr. Spanel's secretary. She ought to be able to tell you where you can reach me or she can find me for you, and I can then call you back.

I read with much interest the speech of C. Rajagopalachari. I am greatly impressed by his general approach to the problem though I think that he is wrong in believing that we can make progress by abolishing, i.e. physically giving up atomic bombs as the first step toward peace and disarmament.

I have dictated a memorandum (not yet transcribed), commenting on his speech, which you may wish to send on to him or not according to how you feel about it. Unfortunately I am not able to deal with the issue right now on its merits in detail. And without the details what I say will remain unconvincing.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

He
Honorable Chester Bowles
Essex, Connecticut

Memo

From: Leo Szilard

May 24, 1955

To : Chester Bowles

I read with very much interest the speech of Mr. C. Rajagopalachari. I fully agree with him on what he says about the use of the bomb against Japan. The fact is that I spent much of my time from March until August 1945 trying to prevent just this. When everything else failed, sixty-three of us working on the uranium project in Chicago sent a petition to the President, which was based on moral considerations only, all previous appeals to reason and wisdom having failed. I cannot go into a full analysis here of why the bomb was actually used, but none of the reasons given (even by the best men in the government, for instance, Secretary Stimson) were valid and they were manifestly invalid at the time they were put forward.

There are, I believe, some reasons to think that taking into account the habitual behaviour of government -- any government -- it will not be possible to make progress towards disarmament by first physically getting rid of the bomb. The only likely road toward disarmament and peace leads, I believe, through the steps of -- political settlement -- abolishing of all conventional weapons (except machine guns) -- abolishing of the strategic air force and their bombs. I cannot spell out here why I believe that this order will be easier to accomplish than the reverse but I am preparing now a manuscript where this question is investigated.

I should, however, add this: In the absence of any agreements, the time might not be very far off when we ought to demand that the United States, Russia and England pledge themselves by unilateral declarations not to resort to the use of atomic weapons unless they are first attacked by atomic weapons. I do not believe that the United States would be ready to make such a declaration today, but this can change in the near future for the following reasons:

We are now moving toward an Atomic Stalemate. According to a speech given by Chet Hollifield of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress, such an Atomic Stalemate will be an accomplished fact perhaps as soon as two years from now and probably no later than in four years.

Once we have an Atomic Stalemate, a full scale atomic war, no matter who gets in the first blow, would end with the devastation of both Russia and the United States to the point where the continued existence of either of them as a nation would be in serious jeopardy. Such a situation is without precedent in history, and it is therefore not easy to predict how the governments will respond to it.

It is not likely that even a half way responsible person within the government of either Russia or the United States would want to risk provoking a full scale atomic war once we have reached an Atomic Stalemate. But the great danger is that, if there is no political settlement, fighting may break out in some remote area with Russia and the United States supporting the opposite sides. Then, if either Russia or the United States should resort to the use of atomic weapons (even though at first their use would be limited to military targets in the tactical area) things would probably go very fast from bad to worse and before long there would be a full scale atomic war.

Because this danger is beginning to be recognized, I believe it is quite possible that when we reach the Atomic Stalemate, the United States might be willing to renounce by unilateral declaration the first use of atomic weapons.

Today the United States is reluctant to do this because if she is limited to conventional weapons, she would not be able to hold for very long, in case of an attack, some of the more remote areas. However, what is really important from the point of view of discouraging attack is to be able to resist and thereby to make it expensive for a would be conqueror to conquer. This can be done with conventional weapons also. It is not necessary to win every conflict and as the Atomic Stalemate draws nearer it becomes much more important to avoid a full scale atomic war.

The real issue is, of course, how to get a political settlement that will eliminate the danger of war, make disarmament possible and permit us to eliminate the strategic air forces and their bombs (even though the latter might have to be the last step rather than the first one).

Let me now say one word about the bomb test. The tests hitherto made are not much to worry about, though the vigilance of the public in this respect is all to the good. Obviously the number of bombs tested

is quite small compared to the number of bombs that would be used in case of war.

We have every reason to worry about what radioactive contamination will do in the case of war not only to the belligerents but also to other nations. This danger is so much greater than the one due to the tests that I find it difficult to get excited about the tests.

Manifestly war has become impossible but by no means improbable. As of today the danger of a preventive war is still with us. And I think it will remain with us until we can clearly say what specific approach can lead us to an adequate peace settlement that we can trust.

I am writing something on the subject of such a settlement - not for publication, only to be used as a basis of discussion and deliberation - and I shall send you (if I may) a copy when I have a rough draft completed.

CHESTER BOWLES
ESSEX, CONNECTICUT

June 14, 1955

Dear Mr. Szilard:

I very deeply appreciate your going to such trouble to write the memo. It is very good and I am taking the liberty of sending it on to Mr. Rajagopalachari.

Right now I am terribly busy on a manuscript of a book on foreign policy which should be published in early November. However by the first of October the pressure should be off, and I would like very much to have a chance to see you.

With many thanks and best wishes.

Sincerely,



Chester Bowles

*I'd wish we would
@ little more enthusiastic
about peace!*

Mr. Leo Szilard
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

CB:ib

CHESTER BOWLES
ESSEX, CONNECTICUT

December 1, 1955

Dear Dr. Szilard:

Thank you so much for sending me the Bulletin with your article on disarmament. I shall look forward to reading it. Ordinarily I read the Bulletin every month but I missed this issue.

I still hope that we will have a chance sometime for a talk.

With my warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles
Chester Bowles

Dr. Leo Szilard
5734 University Avenue
Chicago 37, Illinois
(transcribed in Mr. Bowles absence).
CB:ib

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

April 14, 1960

Dear Leo Szilard:

I have just read, with great interest, your article in the February Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists entitled, "How to Live with the Bomb and Survive". I am profoundly impressed with your carefully reasoned argument. The contrast is so favorable with the usual passionate and simply exhortatory statements on this explosive issue. I agree completely that we can best advance the cause of peace, or at least eliminate a lot of the confusion, by paying more attention to the realities of the situation.

Your ideas are startling, but even those who might be tempted to dismiss them out of hand will be compelled by your incisive reasoning to give careful thought to your conclusions.

It has long seemed necessary to me to recognize realistically that neither the current negotiations, nor any immediately foreseeable future negotiations, are apt to produce any definitive settlement. I am convinced that our energies should be directed towards keeping the stalemate stable, or as you more accurately put it, "metastable". The important thing, as you recognize, is to prevent wholesale destruction of human life. If it is impossible or unlikely that a major power struggle is avoidable, perhaps the alternative you propose is the answer, or an answer. It demands a great deal of restraint, but simply because of the sheer horror lack of restraint would bring, it might work.


Certainly we need more of this kind of careful, realistic thought if we are to avoid catastrophe. I hope that many people, both within and without the scientific community, will read this article, so that it will have a lasting effect on our quest for survival.

It occurs to me that you might be interested in the enclosed speech on "Defense, Disarmament and Peace" which I gave last month in Los Angeles.

With warmest regards, and deep personal gratitude for all you have done and are continuing to do,

Dr. Leo Szilard
C/O Memorial Hospital
68th Street and York Avenue
New York City, New York

Sincerely,


Chester Bowles

April 18, 1960

The Hon. Chester Bowles
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Bowles:

I am writing to thank you for your very kind letter of April 14.

Enclosed you will find a draft of a letter which I am trying to formulate and which is addressed to the President Elect of the United States. I thought that perhaps you might be interested in this letter in general, but I should be grateful if you were to look in particular at the passage on page 2 which I have marked in the margin. If Senator Kennedy should wish to set up such a study in case he is elected President, it would be necessary for him to decide soon who the men would be to carry out the study and to advise these men privately of it, if and when he is nominated. Unless they were forewarned, such men would find it difficult to take three months off in the period immediately following the elections.

I wonder what you think of this particular proposal.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

enc.

March 3, 1961

Dear Mr. Bowles:

I left a message with your office saying that I had returned to this country, after a month's stay in Moscow, and that I might stay in Washington for perhaps a month, at the Hotel Dupont Plaza. I would very much like to see you, at your convenience, sometime in the near future.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

The Honorable
Chester Bowles
Undersecretary of State
U. S. Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

March 17, 1961

Dear Mr. Bowles:


Enclosed is a condensation from the story, "The Voice of the Dolphins". I have edited out that part of the fiction which is not germane to the problem of disarmament, including the dolphins themselves. I have written this story to show what it would take to accomplish disarmament -- twenty-five years hence. My own view is that disarmament could be accomplished very much faster, within the next eight years, perhaps, if we are able to communicate with the Russians. It seems to me that we are not doing this at present.

I expect to remain in Washington for the next six weeks, and to stay at the Hotel Dupont Plaza. If you see anything further that I could do, I trust you will let me know.

If my own plans crystallize further, I may take the liberty of contacting you again.

With best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,



Leo Szilard

The Honorable
Chester Bowles
2823 Que Street, N. W.
Washington 7, D. C.



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1961

Dear Leo:

Many thanks for the copy of your note to Kennie O'Donnell and the President. I hope it will be possible for you to see the President before he leaves for Europe, although I know he is swamped with preparatory work, the usual amount of emergency situations, and a certain amount of speech-making commitments.

I am having lunch today with Mac Bundy, and I will suggest that he do his best to work it out.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. Leo Szilard,
Hotel Dupont Plaza,
Room 842,
Washington 6, D. C.

June 4, 1961

Honorable Chester Bowles
Under Secretary of State
United States Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Bowles:

I am writing to thank you for your kind letter of May 26 and to say that I am grateful for your mentioning the matter to Mac George Bundy.

To my regret, there was no date set prior to the departure of the President for Europe.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Leo Sgillard

LS:ek

17 October 1960

To: Mr. Chester Bowles

Dear Mr. Bowles,

On October 5th I had an extended, and rather satisfactory, private conversation with N.S. Khrushchev. Because I believe that the first approach to him after the elections might well set the tone for all subsequent conversations throughout the next four years, I am anxious to give you orally a report on both the mood and substance of my conversation. Thus I would hope to convey to you a type of approach that might evoke a constructive response.

I should be very grateful for your setting aside a few hours for an interview after the elections, and letting me know the date as soon as you are able to do so.

Should the elections be won by Vice-President Nixon, I should still want to have this interview with you - believing, as I do, that the role played by the leaders of the Opposition party might be almost as important in this matter as the role played by the Secretary of State.

I am asking Mr. Harris Wofford to transmit this letter to you, with such comments as he might care to make.

Over the telephone, I can be reached at the Memorial Hospital in New York at Extension 133 - TRafalgar 9-3000. If my extension does not answer, a message may be taken by the hospital but such messages are not always delivered.

Yours very sincerely,

LEO SZILARD

Memorial Hospital, Room 812
444 East 68th Street
New York 21, New York.

August 25, 1961

The Secretary of State
Attention: The Honorable Chester Bowles
U. S. Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I take the liberty of sending you attached a copy of
a memorandum dated August 24, 1961, which speaks for itself.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

Enclosure

August 25, 1961

Secretary of Defense
Attention: Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky
U. S. Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I take the liberty of sending you attached a copy of
a memorandum dated August 24, 1961, which speaks for itself.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

Enclosure

August 25, 1961

The President
Attention: Mr. Mark Raskin
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I take the liberty of sending you attached a copy of
a memorandum, dated August 24, 1961 which speaks for itself.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

Enclosure



SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1961


Dear Mr. Szilard:

Mr. Bowles is away from his office for a few days on vacation and I am, therefore, taking the liberty of replying to your recent letter to him.

I know that Mr. Bowles will be very pleased to have a copy of the memorandum which you have so thoughtfully sent to him.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,


Brandon Grove, Jr.

Mr. Leo Szilard
The University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois

(Not printed at Government expense)

For

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 86th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Defense, Disarmament and Peace Address by Congressman Chester Bowles

REMARKS
OF

HON. CHET HOLIFIELD

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1960

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I consider it a personal honor to have the privilege of inserting in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an address my distinguished colleague from Connecticut, the Honorable CHESTER BOWLES, made on March 11, before the Modern Forum in Los Angeles, California.

Mr. BOWLES' background as a successful businessman, a brilliant author, a highly competent Governor, a distinguished Ambassador to India, and at present a very valuable member of the U.S. House of Representatives has earned him a high degree of respect among serious minded Americans. His views on the urgent problems of our time are, in my opinion, a most valuable contribution to our thinking. They possess a clarity and pertinency that deserve our attention. Mr. BOWLES' reputation as a clear thinking statesman has grown steadily over the post World War II period. In the eyes of many members of the Democratic Party, Mr. BOWLES is rapidly achieving a national respect and standing commensurate with that of the top half dozen Democrats who are being spoken of as candidates for the Presidency.

DEFENSE, DISARMAMENT, AND PEACE
(By CHESTER BOWLES)

On April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower appeared before the United Nations General Assembly in New York City to make what history will perhaps consider the greatest speech of his 8 years in the White House. Appealing for an end to the arms race, he said:

"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children."

On September 18, 1959, at the same rostrum, before the same audience, Premier Khrushchev echoed the President's sentiments of 6 years before:

"A priceless fund of human energy, knowledge, ingenuity and skill is thrown into a bottomless pit, squandered on growing armaments. * * * We need peace. * * * We would like to devote all our economy and resources to peaceful purposes in order to provide our people with an abundance of food, clothing, and homes."

And in their joint communique from Camp David, September 27, 1959, the American President and the Soviet leader agreed that "the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today."

The armaments spiral

Yet the world today continues to spend over \$100 billion a year on arms. What is more, we do so with frighteningly inconclusive results. The leading strategists of the

very nations most involved in the arms race are precisely those who are most preoccupied with spending more.

As the arms race deepens, the intellectual and moral appreciation of the urgency of disarmament deepens, too. But it has an inconclusive air about it, and for practical purposes it is readily displaced by the equally demonstrable necessity to regain a more stable and acceptable defense posture.

For a host of understandable reasons, most men of affairs in Washington and Moscow remain preoccupied with the challenge of armament, not disarmament. On occasion they console themselves and the rest of us with the sophisticated half-truth that more armaments will help promote disarmament because, as Churchill said, "We arm to parley."

But the side-effects of the arms race are by no means all so positive. It might seem absurd to keep telling ourselves that the best way to promote peace is to speed up the arms race if the alternative—refusing to maintain effective deterrent strength against growing Soviet military capability—were not even more absurd.

Clearly peace is no longer—if it ever was—a simple, one-directional, pastoral proposition. It is an incredible maze of moral, military, economic, and technological problems.

The continuing debate

It is not surprising then that few public policies have been subjected to more pulling and hauling, more scrutiny and study, more pressures and conflicts of interest, more hard work and dedication in some quarters, or more politics and propaganda in others, than have the twin issues of arms and arms control in the last few years. The attention given the former has far exceeded that given the latter, but our policies on both have been equally confused.

Moreover, controversies surrounding these issues have refused to fall into any particular pattern. They have sprung up inside the Administration, inside the State Department, inside the Pentagon, and inside the Atomic Energy Commission.

We have seen them inside Congress and inside the Republican and Democratic parties.

In all likelihood controversies of the same sort have arisen inside the Kremlin too.

Today many of our most intelligent observers—some of them participants in the very policy disputes which I have mentioned—are shrugging their shoulders and concluding that it is impossible to bring any kind of ordered policy out of this chaos.

These pessimists may be wrong today. But if the increasing complexity of all these factors continues unabated, they will be right tomorrow.

Year by year the problems of peace become inherently more difficult. This is especially true of the interlocking problems of defense and disarmament. The longer we let the problems grow, the less controllable they become. How, we may ask, can we get our bearings? Where can we take hold of the problem?

If we are honest and serious in our attempt to estimate the requirements of peace, we will begin where we must begin—with a look at where we are with arms, and not with arms control.

I. THE DEFENSE DEBACLE

Secretary Herter has recently stressed the urgent need for creating a "more stable military environment." Presumably he had in mind what most of our most competent strategic thinkers, military and nonmilitary alike, have been worrying about in public lately.

In January Gen. Thomas S. Power, the able head of our Strategic Air Command, advised us that without an ample missile warning system, a surprise attack from 300 Soviet missiles could in 30 minutes virtually wipe out America's bomber and missile retaliatory force. The accelerating accuracy of missiles has, according to some commentators, already reduced the number of Soviet missiles needed.

Our strategic dilemma

"At bottom, the defense debate concerns only one question," a well-known columnist writes. "The question is whether the Soviets now have or will soon have the small number of ICBM's needed to wipe out the American deterrent, which is now totally vulnerable. The number needed at this time is only 150 Soviet ICBM's."

"By decisive military superiority is meant the power to attack without suffering serious

retaliation," another of our most distinguished observers adds. "In theory, the Soviet Union will have this decisive superiority within the next 2 years, if we do nothing more to offset it than we are now planning to do."

In his testimony before the Senate Space Committee CIA Director Allen Dulles reportedly compared the Soviet and American ICBM positions as follows: At present, Russia has 10 ICBM's and the United States 3. By June the Russians will have 35, the United States 18. A year later the Soviet total will be between 140 and 200, and the United States will have 54. By 1963 the position may be 500 to 200.

But it would be highly misleading to imply that our strategic dilemma is reducible to the celebrated missile gap alone.

Involved in that dilemma are all the other disturbing ramifications of our reliance on a fallacious, single strategy giving us strength largely in what the experts call "nuclear first-strike power." This is the kind of strength which is increasingly valuable only for the kind of war we say we would never fight: a sudden preventive war initiated by us.

As a second-strike, or strike-back force, the Strategic Air Command can now be largely crushed by a missile attack and deprived of most of its retaliatory capacity.

Obstacles: the budget and technology

It would seem an elementary precaution to protect that capacity, but we are refusing for budgetary reasons to do what needs to be done in terms of spreading the targets (dispersal), or placing our air bases underground (hardening), or keeping a sizable portion of our bombers in the air and therefore safe from sudden attack on the ground (airborne alert).

We have refused to expand our highly successful Polaris submarine program, at the same time as we have neglected antisubmarine warfare.

We have cut back our conventional forces—the Army and the Marines—thus reducing our capability to fight limited wars, and helping to assure that another war, if it comes, will be total and global. We have far to go on air defense and antimissile developments, and have yet to begin a serious civil defense program. Yet all these are highly important to our deterrent strategy.

The administration's failures in the defense field have not been entirely due to the budget, but that has been one of the two basic factors responsible for our current defense debacle. The other has been technology.

Often budgetary and technological influences have joined together in an unholy alliance to promote something that passes for policy like a "bigger bang for a buck."

Of course a multiple strategy will cost more than a single strategy. Of course the development of realistic strategic alternatives to minimize risks will cost more than a one-shot policy like massive retaliation, which has only succeeded in underscoring the extreme risks of thermonuclear war, bluff, and surrender.

At one and the same time, the budget has been both the only brake on galloping technology and the greatest assurance that the strategic consequences will be as ferocious as possible. As the former AEC Commissioner, Thomas E. Murray, says:

"Nuclear energy has to a certain extent developed according to a dialectic of its own. * * * Initially we were afraid to think of the ultimate consequences of integrating this boundless energy into a military strategy which already viewed the destruction of civilian populations as a normal objective of modern warfare. But we went ahead and integrated it anyway. In a fit of absent-mindedness we have allowed military technology to shape our strategic policy instead of shaping the technology to fit a rationally conceived strategic policy. * * * We have become caught in the grip of a technological runaway."

Khrushchev's speech before the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960, shows that the Pied Piper of technology is sweeping everything before it in Russia too.

He stressed that Soviet armed forces had been modernized with rockets and nuclear weapons which could be accurately aimed and landed on any target in the United States. He added that Soviet scientists and designers now have a fantastic weapon in development, hardly a reassuring sentiment for policymakers in other nuclear capitals.

Mounting fears over this kind of technological merry-go-round contribute more and more fuel to the mounting instability of the world's strategic picture.

The character and speed of delivery of nuclear weapons now make it inevitable that technology on one side of the cold war will be challenged to work overtime and at forced draft to outwit technology on the other side. The premium is growing steadily on seizing a temporary advantage to forestall a new technological breakthrough from a probable opponent. The outlook is for an endless series of attempts to unbalance new temporary balances, with overall costs in money and danger projecting upward geometrically.

Another ominous gap

Accompanying this trend is the growing gap between the rewards of offense and the penalties of defense. The disparity between the two has already become so great that perfectly sane and sober American strategists are seriously concerned over the possibility that sane and sober Soviet strategists may soon feel that a surprise nuclear attack on the United States would be a rational Soviet policy.

To begin with, Soviet strategists must be puzzled by the alarming lack of balance of our own defense posture. Because our retaliatory forces—bombers and missiles—are now so highly vulnerable, our capacity for massive retaliation must seem to Soviet planners to be even more phoney than it was when the administration first announced it early in 1954. At that time I vigorously and publicly attacked the massive retaliation concept in an article in the *New York Times* for February 28, 1954, a few days after the announcement.

I pointed out that the doctrine was dangerously defective whether judged from a strategic, political, moral, or legal point of view. I said it would fail to meet the most likely danger, it would frighten our allies as much if not more than the Communists, it would be militarily unsuitable to many continents of the world, it would invite localized aggression, and it would promote miscalculations, abet Communist propaganda, freeze our chances for more diplomatic flexibility, and erode our moral standing.

In the intervening years the value of the massive retaliation doctrine has continued to deteriorate. Today the only way we could effectively employ our massive retaliation forces would be to use them not in their

relatively ineffective retaliatory capacity after an attack has nearly destroyed them, but rather for a massive first-strike attack on the Soviet Union.

In the midst of a spiraling political crisis in Berlin, the Middle East, the Formosa Straits, or somewhere else, the Kremlin could easily assume that we might be tempted to break out of the impasse of our impending diplomatic and political defeat by using the only means at our disposal. Under such circumstances, neither side need feel deliberately infatuated with aggression. Both may legitimately feel threatened and tempted.

The disappearing stalemate

As the Soviets study the state of our defenses, and as the accuracy of their missiles increases, they will be bound to recognize that their chances in a missile war are mathematically computable as such chances have never been before. In the prevailing state of our defenses, it has been estimated that the Soviet Union has the capability of initiating and winning a nuclear war with the confident expectation of suffering no more damage than the U.S.S.R. suffered in World War II—terrible as that was. The nuclear stalemate has disappeared, or is fast disappearing.

The perilous elements of surprise, speed, miscalculation, and accident are inherent in the weapons technology of the decade we are entering. As if these factors were not enough, we can now add the deadly new picture of our cold war strategists psychoanalyzing one another's intentions across the Iron Curtain. It is hard to imagine a greater new element of instability.

Day after day the resources, energies, manpower and brainpower of this generation of Americans are increasingly concentrating on the prospects of bare survival against a cataclysmic, half-hour, nuclear holocaust. The displacement effect of our preoccupation with survival is awesome. Diplomacy, foreign aid, and education alike become tails on the kite of this basic strategic effort.

Threatening and counterthreatening the extermination of tens of millions of people is the central feature of deterrence and counterdeterrence in the nuclear age, and we are advised that we must find new ways to make our threats "credible."

Yet because technology continues to triumph uncontrolled, the threats are losing credibility out of sheer frightfulness. The atomic bomb at Hiroshima was thousands of times more powerful than the biggest high-explosive bomb used in World War II. But some of the hydrogen bombs which we have since produced are 1,000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb. A single 15-megaton weapon is 10 times greater than the total explosive power dropped in World War II.

We can only guess what new "mystery weapon" Khrushchev has in mind, and what even more mysterious ones we can find to combat it. But there is no mystery about what lies at the end of this road in the contest of nuclear technologies. If the contest continues unabated, the end of the road will be the end of the world.

Someone has said that the planets around us may be unpopulated for a very good reason: their scientists were more advanced than our own.

II. THE DISARMAMENT DEBACLE

Part of the disarmament debacle involves the reverse of the defense debacle and consequently the use of outworn symbols. Many of us, on whatever side of a given disarmament issue, continue to talk in the language of earlier years. Yet in the disarmament field, perhaps more than in any other, the speed of technological change has rendered yesterday's semantics more and more obsolete.

For instance, anyone skimming through the disarmament literature today can find current material which might just as easily have been written in various previous periods. The controversies and the comments may differ markedly—and they may be equally out of date.

The persistence of old habits

Thus the language of some of our disarmament advocates sounds like 1936—as though we still had the Neutrality Act on the books, and as though the Nye committee investigations and the "merchants of death" were just behind us.

The language of some of our generals makes them sound as though they were still living in 1948 when America had a monopoly of atomic bombs. "The old psychology of

nuclear monopoly obstinately survives in the Pentagon, in flat defiance of the grim facts of recent history," one of our defense experts wrote 2 weeks ago.

Still other language sounds as though we were living in the prethermonuclear age of 1951, before H-bombs multiplied the dangers of A-bombs a thousandfold. Even those who have accommodated themselves to thermonuclear terminology have not yet absorbed into their consciousness the radical newness of the missile age.

So when we talk about disarmament today, we must not lapse into the old habits of reference pertinent to the years before World War II, or to a prenuclear or even premissile age. The world of 1960 is a different world from all of these, and we must look at it for what it is, discarding old dogmas when they are outgrown.

Ironically, Mr. Khrushchev seems at times to be freer in shedding his dogmas than his nondogmatic, democratic opponents have been. For instance in the Kremlin in February 1957, I had occasion to ask Khrushchev if he were not in fact a deviationist from his own Marxist faith. We were discussing disarmament, and I had challenged his willingness to negotiate an effective disarmament agreement.

I mentioned that Marxist dogma stressed that the capitalist West was largely dependent on its armament industries for continued prosperity. That doctrine seemed to imply that disarmament would hasten the triumph of communism. As American armament industries closed down, unemployment presumably would rise, purchasing power would dry up, and spreading depression would lead to political upheaval and the collapse of capitalism.

Why, then, did Mr. Khrushchev not act on this Marxist premise and strive with everything he had to achieve a workable disarmament agreement, the prelude to capitalist collapse?

His failure to act was tantamount to establishing him as a deviationist. Was he not concerned over the reactions of his more doctrinaire associates? His own smiling reaction indicated that he got the point and was unperturbed.

Here is an instance where we might well prefer that modern Marxists keep their

dogma and act upon it, rather than put it on the shelf.

Meanwhile, we Americans have our own dogmas to be overcome in the arms-control field. How often have we heard that the most intractable problems are, of course, the political ones—Berlin, Germany, the Middle East, Korea, Vietnam, the Formosa Straits—and how often has it been explained that these problems must be solved before arms control is possible?

We are told that arms are essentially an effect, not a primary cause, of world tension, and that nations will not and cannot disarm while they are in conflict on other vital issues.

The paramount need for arms control

But increasingly there is a hollow ring to this repetition that arms are a symptom and not a cause. Arms control is taking on a significance all its own. Particularly in the light of the current nonnegotiability, or doubtful negotiability, of many of the world's major substantive problems, arms control indeed begins to take top priority.

As former Secretary of State Acheson has said:

"Chancellor Adenauer has repeatedly urged that a key subject for summit discussion lies in the control and limitation of armaments. I venture to express the same view. There's not only room for negotiation, but there is a great need for negotiation, and this lies in the field of control of armaments. It is here that the hope of negotiation rests."

In this instance I think that the German Chancellor and our former Secretary of State are abundantly right. They understand that armaments today are both a symptom and a cause of current world tensions. The power and speed of modern armaments are themselves steadily helping to make all the world's leading political issues nonnegotiable.

Indeed the greatest danger of all we face at the moment is that most important issues, by the mere fact of their current importance, tend to become nonnegotiable. The result is that negotiations, which almost everyone accepts as necessary, are more and more conducted for the sake of appearances. International conferences are reduced to methodology and propaganda.

Moreover, I am very much afraid that this is the impression which we ourselves, with the assistance of Soviet propaganda, have created about our own attitudes on disarmament.

Over the past few years a tremendous amount of cross-conflict has occurred concerning the major issues in the field of arms control.

The issues under discussion, singly or in combination, have included * * * the cessation or limitation of nuclear testing * * * cutoffs in the production of fissionable material * * * the freezing or reduction of nuclear stockpiles * * * the transfer of non-nuclear components or of nuclear weapons themselves to nonnuclear powers * * * protection against surprise attack * * * the balanced reduction of conventional forces * * * zones of aerial and ground inspection * * * the development of reliable international instruments for inspection and enforcement activities * * * tentative proposals on the use of outer space.

U.S. confusion on disarmament

In the last few years the record of our preparations for and participation in negotiations on these subjects has been a confused one. And the confusion is by no means entirely of Soviet making. Indeed on most of these issues we have appeared to be engaged in a game of musical chairs—with ourselves, with our allies, and with the Russians.

The initial challenge to the formulation of an American policy on arms control has been the irrepressible conflict among the agencies chiefly interested—the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Their interagency conflicts have been further complicated by their intra-agency conflicts.

These various sources of contention have always lurked just below the surface, and not infrequently the disputes have broken out in public. It is easy to see why policies once pasted together have rapidly come unstuck—why new "package" proposals are likely to come untied—why disarmament negotiators have undercut, and been undercut, in turn. Above its embattled disarmament advisers stands the White House, serene and apparently untroubled over the con-

licts of position papers and the damage to our national reputation.

In such a situation, the end runs to Congress have been notorious—from the different services, from the AEC, from disappointed disarmament advisers, and from an incredulous and worried public.

During the breathing spaces in between international conferences, the administration has understandably found it to be the better part of valor to appoint yet another high-level study committee to take a fresh look at the problem—whether it be defense or disarmament.

This fresh look often consists of a wearied review of the accumulated points at issue, presented by professional staff members who are drawn from the State and Defense departments and who are mired in previous controversies.

They perform for the benefit of a new set of temporary and more or less honorary Presidential appointees who as often as not are selected for their lack of previous experience in the field.

The latest such study was made by the Coolidge committee, appointed last summer for the express purpose of formulating our Government's position in advance of the new 10-power disarmament talks which open in Geneva next Monday, March 15.

Apparently all the old intra-administration struggles were reenacted for the Coolidge group, and its top-secret report, submitted on December 31, has been accepted on all sides as a dud.

"Altogether too fruitless"—"narrow focus"—"failed to produce a program"—"promptly christened the 'mouse'"—"included virtually no disarmament proposals at all"—such were the inside descriptions of the committee's work which have reached the public through the press.

The effects of confusion

The result was that last month when our partners for the Geneva talks—the British, French, Canadians, and Italians—arrived in Washington to formulate a joint position, they had to cool their heels for 2 weeks because the United States itself had no position.

One columnist has reported that the State Department even inquired at the United Na-

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tions about postponing the March 15 talks on the hope that there were already so many other conferences going on in Geneva that there might not be enough hotel rooms. But it didn't work. When next Monday rolls around, our disarmament position will once more have had to take shape under pressure of a deadline.

With 7 days to go, the New York Times reported from Paris on March 8:

"France's Western guests are being determinedly hopeful * * * Everyone recognizes the importance of publicly patching things up by the time of the Geneva meeting and worrying later about the remaining differences. An unhealed division in the West would clearly help the Russians in their efforts to discredit the West's plans."

No one underestimates the problems of coalition diplomacy. With luck, in spite of all the odds, we and our allies will be able to present something resembling a united front when we join the other five powers at Geneva—the Soviets, Czechs, Poles, Rumanians, and Bulgarians—to whom united fronts come more easily.

But at best, I fear, our proposals will be a re juggling of past proposals, a loosely collected series of possible first-, second-, third-stage steps, a cumbersome package to put up against Mr. Khrushchev's new campaign for "total disarmament in 4 years."

I am deeply convinced that we should take a long and steady look at what all this confusion is costing us. It is essential that we assess the reasons for the fundamental inadequacies of our disarmament effort. I have no doubt that what we need most are greater consistency of purpose, preparations in depth, decisiveness in leadership at the highest level, and new funds, new personnel, and new institutions where the need is clearly indicated.

III. TWO POLICIES AT ONCE?

It is clear that our defense debacle and our disarmament debacle are interrelated. To a degree each has an inner logic of its own. And each in its way deserves our undivided attention.

At the heart of these debacles lie two fundamental truths. The first is the fact that arms races throughout history have usually ended in war. The second is the fact

that unpreparedness and unilateral or unsafeguarded disarmament have always ended in national catastrophe.

These two truths are equally basic and must be treated side by side. Some of our major difficulties stem from attempts to separate them in our thinking. Those whose principal emphasis is the perfection of our military defenses are often deeply suspicious of the advocates of arms controls. Those whose emphasis is the achievement of safeguarded disarmament are equally suspicious of the military men.

What is essential to a fresh approach to our dilemma is the recognition of both basic propositions as parallel routes to disaster. Some who recognize this fact recoil from what they see and tell us that our only alternative is to leave the outcome to fate. But such defeatism, however understandable, is potentially catastrophic.

Viewed from the defense perspective on survival, our problem is how to keep up with the arms race. Viewed from the human perspective on survival, our problem is how to curtail it.

Two inseparable perspectives

These two perspectives seem destined to live or die together, an inseparable if unstable combination.

The central question facing us all at the moment is how to operate from both perspectives at once and pursue simultaneously the policies of rearmament and disarmament, of arms and arms control.

Some critics are certain that the task is impossible. They regard the policies as inherently conflicting—economically at odds, politically unmanageable, and psychologically frustrating. On specific issues these policies would seem to pull naturally in opposite directions.

Even the moods of the two policies seem competitive, not complementary. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* for January 1959, Mr. Albert Wohlstetter commented: "Relaxation of tension, which everyone thinks is good, is not easily distinguished from relaxing one's guard, which almost everyone thinks is bad."

The two nuclear questions of greatest current controversy are excellent up-to-date examples. They are the issues of nuclear tests and of the transfer of nuclear weapons.

A brief résumé of each of the controversies might shed light on the problems we can continue to expect in the future, as we pursue rearmament and disarmament together.

The issue of nuclear testing

Nuclear testing has never been a simple issue. It was not nearly as simple as Vice President Nixon thought in October 1956, when he denounced Adlai Stevenson's test suspension proposal as "catastrophic nonsense." Nor was it as simple as Mr. Nixon indicated in November 1959, when he took the other side of the question and announced that anyone urging a resumption of nuclear tests was "ignorant of the facts" (a statement, incidentally, which throws a curious shadow over President Eisenhower's subsequent decision that we are now considering ourselves "free to resume testing").

Surely our patient negotiators, now in the 17th month of the three-power nuclear test talks in Geneva, do not regard the issue as a simple one. Since October 31, 1958, when these talks began, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union have been painfully attempting to find an acceptable formula for inspection and control to allow the discontinuance of tests.

Seventeen articles out of a proposed twenty-two article treaty have been agreed upon. What the U.S.S.R. is apparently willing to accept today in the form of inspection and control constitutes a degree of progress which has surprised and encouraged many observers. In articles already agreed upon, the U.S.S.R. has committed herself to accept a complex global monitoring and control system that will include foreign observers and inspectors operating inside Russia.

Some experts are convinced that the Soviet interest in test cessation is sufficiently great that the prospects for eventual agreement are genuine. Others are dismayed by apparent shifts and inconsistencies in the Soviet position.

Meanwhile the length of the test negotiations has generated new pressures to find some way to break off the talks. Forces in the Pentagon and the AEC are vitally interested in resuming tests. Viewing matters from a defense perspective, they are eager to make cleaner bombs, test the proposed nuclear charges for the warheads of the Polaris and Minuteman missiles, improve the small

warheads for the Nike-Zeus antimissile, and develop small, tactical, battlefield weapons. Press reports indicate that preparations are underway for the resumption of certain nuclear tests within a matter of months if the three-power Geneva talks fail. The tests will be held underground, and the tunnels in which the weapons will be tested are reportedly already being dug.

Coincidentally it is controversy over the detection of precisely these small nuclear underground explosions that has obstructed progress at Geneva. Scientists from both Russia and the West agree that a worldwide network of 180 monitoring stations with present equipment can detect nuclear blasts on the earth's surface, on water, or up to 30 miles in the air. But so far they have been unable to work out a reliable detection system for underground tests.

Mr. Khrushchev himself has recently conceded that not all nuclear weapons tests can be detected, but repeats the standard Soviet charge that we in the West are interested only in inspection for inspection's sake, not for disarmament.

In the midst of these conflicting forces, Mr. Phillip Farley, the State Department expert on disarmament and atomic energy, told the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee last month that the nation which would still benefit most from a test ban would be the United States.

In this cross-current of pressures, President Eisenhower has responded to the deadlock at Geneva with his new proposal for a treaty to end all presently detectable tests except underground shots below a certain seismographic rating. At the moment our official position is tantamount to saying that we will not agree to stop underground tests as long as our scientists say they are too small to be detected. The Russians continue to say that all tests, detectable or not, must be stopped.

Our dilemma over test resumption

With the expiration of the moratorium on testing, President Eisenhower has also announced that we now consider ourselves "free to resume testing." But are we really free to do so? In a column on February 16, 1960, Walter Lippmann suggested that if we did, "there would be an uproar around the world. Quite competent and cool observers

believe that the uproar would bring about a special meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations to protest against our action, and that if the question were put to a vote, we should be lucky to get 10 votes out of 80."

Mr. Lippmann may overstate the uproar, but I doubt if he exaggerates by a wide margin. Unquestionably the damage to our moral position would be enormous if we resumed tests.

Thus we are facing another real dilemma. If we break off negotiations and resume testing, we bear the full brunt of world opinion. If we allow the test ban negotiations to drag on, month after month, the Russians will get what they have wanted all along, an informal, de facto suspension of tests without any means available for the rest of the world to determine whether the U.S.S.R. is behaving.

No one who really hopes for the successful conclusion of the test negotiations will readily agree that nuclear tests, however small, should be resumed as long as there remains a chance, however small, that agreement will be reached. At the same time we know that an indefinite suspension of tests without controls could damage our military capability. This is especially true when we have no way of assuring that the U.S.S.R. has refrained from secret tests.

The divergent perspectives of defense and disarmament converge on the inspection question. More reliable scientific preparation, in depth, might already have saved us much time, uncertainty, and embarrassment. To the degree that forces within the governments involved desire to test regardless of whether tests can be detected, a solution for the detection problem would not end this controversy. But it would end a source of tremendous confusion and obstruction at Geneva.

In a field in which progress on all sides is difficult, it would be prudent not to neglect those areas where more accurate scientific information might tip the scales of policy. One obvious area for effort is to improve the scientific underpinning of the controversy over the detection of underground tests. Since we have not moved ahead with vigor to close this major technical gap in the past, it is essential that we do so now.

The issue of transferring nuclear weapons

The controversy over the sharing of nuclear weapons is another major current example of how the different perspectives of defense and disarmament converge in the scientific and technical context of controls.

Our strategic planners are legitimately worried as the amount of available reaction time in case of attack comes closer and closer to zero. They are understandably concerned over how to speed the transfer of nuclear weapons for use if and when an attack occurs.

Our nuclear weapons now in Britain, for instance, are physically separated from the missiles which can carry them and which are under British control. The administration reportedly now wants to make atomic weapons available to Britain as warheads for IRBM's manned by British crews and for air-to-air missiles carried by British interceptors. Such a move could be a precedent for similar action in the case of other allies.

Reportedly too, the administration wished and still wishes to do this under the President's "inherent powers" as Commander-in-Chief. Leading members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have publicly challenged the legal propriety of such a move. At a press conference on February 3 the President himself, to the consternation of his advisers, undermined carefully presented Defense and State Department views by adopting the contrary approach that a change would be needed in the present atomic energy law which prohibits "transfers" of weapons from our "custody" and "control."

From the defense perspective, General Lauris Norstad has been warning that the need for instantaneous defensive action in case of attack now requires that nuclear warheads be made available to some of our allies on some new basis inside NATO. In case of war, he stresses, there won't be time to negotiate a formal transfer. He has tentatively suggested that one solution might be an atomic-armed international "fire brigade" to operate under NATO colors, but the proposal is still an embryonic one and "custody" of nuclear warheads is technically still in American hands.

The constitutional, legal, and policy arguments which these developments have

opened up are still gathering clouds on Capitol Hill.

First of all, there was the astonishing attempt to bottle up a constitutional debate by a classified presentation to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Second, the President's remarks suggested that signals had once more been seriously crossed between the White House and the departments concerned.

Third, there is a growing feeling that what were intended to be specific congressional restrictions on the custody and control of nuclear weapons have been greatly eased by administrative interpretation.

Fourth, the administration's eagerness to avoid a congressional debate on this subject has been especially disquieting because only last summer, in July 1959, many Senators and Congressmen had expressed their misgivings over the substance and manner of the administration's handling of certain new agreements with seven NATO countries permitting the exchange of nuclear information.

The expanding nuclear club

Naturally, from the disarmament perspective, there has long been active concern over the spread of nuclear weapons. It has always been highly improbable that the world's other 90 nations would be content to allow the United States, Britain, and the U.S.S.R. to preserve their nuclear monopoly in the absence of international controls.

In its helpful new pamphlet, "The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control," the National Planning Association suggests that some 11 more countries have the scientific and industrial capacity to follow France into the nuclear club with actual weapons over the next 5 years. The countries include Belgium, Canada, West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Communist China. Just behind them are eight more countries with a similar prospect, if exploited, over a slightly longer period of time.

All of this means that the nuclear club is the least exclusive club in the world, and new members can in no sense be vetoed at the whim of the self-conscious elite who now belong.

Recognizing the awesome danger implicit in the "nth country problem" the 1959 Gen-

eral Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution proposed by Ireland and directed specifically against the further spread of nuclear weapons. The resolution urged that the 10-power disarmament conference, now about to open at Geneva, "should consider appropriate means whereby this danger may be averted, including the feasibility of an international agreement, subject to inspection and control, whereby the powers producing nuclear weapons would refrain from handing over the control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them, and whereby the powers not possessing such weapons would refrain from manufacturing them."

Once more there would seem to be surface evidence that the defense and disarmament perspectives are competitive, not complementary. One view stresses the need for a wider sharing of nuclear weapons, arguing that denying our allies a capacity which our probable enemy already has is suicidal in an era of split-second strategy. The other view stresses the equally realistic danger that a further proliferation of weapons increases the likelihood that they will never be brought under control, and that the dangers of the accidental or deliberate triggering of a nuclear war will be correspondingly enhanced.

Possible solutions through controls

But these divergent perspectives, under closer examination, may not be unalterably opposed. Once more what chance there may be for reconciliation lies in the field of control systems. It is probably predicated on new procedural answers to this order of questions: What specific steps, if any, are consistent with both defense and disarmament requirements? What new arrangements inside NATO can be made to present at one and the same time the steadiest deterrent and the least provocation to outside aggression? What system can maximize the dedication of nuclear technology to common purposes and minimize the sense of deprivation which now serves as an incentive for nonnuclear powers to become nuclear?

The answers are not likely to be found in the indiscriminate granting of nuclear weapons to just any ally, as the President's press conference remarks of February 3d might be read to favor. By the same token the an-

swer is not likely to be found in the simple satisfaction of hoarding our own nuclear weapons while refusing to consider the very real prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons over our objection and without our help.

Now that the French example is before them, the 5th to nth powers can confidently be expected to exert increasing pressure on us, the British, and the Russians, to placate in one manner or another their desire for nuclear prestige.

Within NATO it may be timely and possible, under the urgency of these new pressures, to negotiate new arrangements for a recognized and equitable division of labor. Such arrangements might be based on accepting the proposition that there is no NATO equality of weapons, manpower, finances, or industrial production. It might involve general acceptance throughout the alliance of assignments of roles and missions to avoid useless rivalries and duplication.

Internal NATO involvement of nonnuclear members in control, supervision, observation, and planning activities might help to divert the ambitions of some members to emulate France's independent course. Development of a credible, overall NATO nuclear deterrent strategy itself could reduce the provocations of separate nuclear deterrents and even reassure the Russians. Joint scientific research, inside NATO, could be of great potential value in the fields of both arms and arms control.

Outside NATO the threatened spread of nuclear weapons is bound to have effects equally profound. There can be little private gratification in the Kremlin, for instance, over the prospect of an independent nuclear capability in Communist China or in restless East Germany. Out of mutual danger may come new opportunities for agreements based on mutual interest. In its significant study on "The U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe," recently prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Columbia-Harvard Research Group may have had this in mind when they said: "In the long run, we may come to regard the Russians as our most conservative and responsible adversary, as we explore the possibilities of common interest in limiting certain aspects of the arms race." This may appear extraordinary, but it is in no sense impossible.

IV. NEEDED: MULTIPLE STRATEGIES FOR PEACE

I began by stressing the deficiencies in our military and strategic positions that have accrued from our lingering preoccupation with the reckless single strategy of massive retaliation. That strategy itself was the normal outgrowth of our fixation on big bombs and balanced budgets.

The continuing effectiveness of our deterrent strategy now depends on our ability to muster the skill, nerve, and wherewithal to equip ourselves with multiple strategies for defense. By the same token our chances for a world of greater safety and freedom depend on our ability to develop multiple strategies for peace.

The Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, under Senator JACKSON, is performing a tremendous public service by investigating the adequacy of our policy-making institutions in coping with this double challenge.

Vital unanswered questions

Our inadequacy in the field of arms control research is obviously one of the most glaring deficiencies we have. I have already discussed instances where advance technical preparation in depth might have spelled progress where we have had frustration and defeat. Additional examples keep occurring:

Item. Why has so little been done to implement the Berkner report of March 16, 1959? This panel of seismologists outlined a 3-year program of research and development which it thought would restore to full efficiency the inspection system for bomb tests agreed upon in 1958 at Geneva.

Item. Many distinguished atomic scientists now feel that the addition to the detection network of a series of unmanned seismic stations to pick up small earth shocks might get the Geneva test conference over its last hurdles. Why is the push not being made?

Item. Time and again Senator HUMPHREY, the chairman of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee which has done such outstanding and effective work in this field, has sought an appropriation of \$400,000 which the State Department wants for its own use in procuring special foreign policy studies relating to disarmament, weapons control, and possible technical means for

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enforcement. Time and again the funds have been refused.

Yet the costs and the risks of not moving ahead in these areas are mounting daily; \$400,000 is one-thousandth of 1 percent of our annual defense budget. Where is our awareness of relative risks?

And where is our system of values? If one asks his 10-year-old son today whether in his lifetime he thinks it might be possible to take a fishing trip to the moon, the boy is likely unhesitatingly to answer "Yes." If he is asked whether he thinks it will ever be possible to get missiles under international control, he is likely unhesitatingly to answer "No."

We are, I am afraid, living in a fool's paradise of complacency. What will end it short of catastrophe, I do not pretend to know. But I do know that we have a right to worry, and we have an obligation to propose those things which seem sensible.

Proposal for an Arms Control Research Institute

One of the latter is Senator KENNEDY's new proposal for an Arms Control Research Institute embodied in S. 3173 which he has introduced in the Senate and the companion bill, H.R. 10977, which I have introduced in the House. Our purpose can briefly be described.

We propose to give this new agency the responsibility for a vast new research effort to fill those gaps which science and technology can fill in our preparation for peace and disarmament. The Arms Control Research Institute would conduct studies in the physical, natural, and social sciences relevant to specific disarmament issues. It would be an excellent beginning for the joint research activities which should eventually follow—with our allies, in the United Nations, and even with the Soviet Union.

Guided and directed from the White House, the Institute could be a clearinghouse for arms control proposals—deliberately organized to bring ideas and people together on a practical basis for peace. If the Institute operates as we intend it to operate, we will be able to say with more assurance than we can today that our efforts for arms control are a vital and realistic part of American policy.

The urgent need for action

The incredible fact is that we have delayed so long, and are still delaying, in giving the arms control problem the priority it deserves. It is not that we have never been urged. Rather it is that urgings have fallen on deaf ears.

Thus, it was 10 years ago last week, on March 1, 1950, when a distinguished Connecticut Senator, the late Brien McMahon, took the floor of the Senate to call for the kind of action which we have never had. He spoke with urgency then, and his message has great urgency now. Let me conclude as he concluded with these words—10 years old, and still so new:

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"With each swing of the pendulum the time to save civilization grows shorter. When shall we get about this business? Destiny will not grant us the gift of indifference. If we do not act, the atom will. If we do not act, we may be profaned forever by the inheritors of a ravished planet. We will be reviled, not as fools—even a fool can sense the massive danger. We will be reviled as cowards—and rightly—for only a coward can flee the awesome facts that command us to act with fortitude. This time of supreme crisis is a time of supreme opportunity. The prize of atomic peace lies waiting to be won—and with it a wondrous new world."

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

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IN THIS COLLECTION

April 14, 1960

Dear Leo Szilard:

I have just read, with great interest, your article in the February Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists entitled, "How to Live with the Bomb and Survive". I am profoundly impressed with your carefully reasoned argument. The contrast is so favorable with the usual passionate and simply exhortatory statements on this explosive issue. I agree completely that we can best advance the cause of peace, or at least eliminate a lot of the confusion, by paying more attention to the realities of the situation.

Your ideas are startling, but even those who might be tempted to dismiss them out of hand will be compelled by your incisive reasoning to give careful thought to your conclusions.

It has long seemed necessary to me to recognize realistically that neither the current negotiations, nor any immediately foreseeable future negotiations, are apt to produce any definitive settlement. I am convinced that our energies should be directed towards keeping the stalemate stable, or as you more accurately put it, "metastable". The important thing, as you recognize, is to prevent wholesale destruction of human life. If it is impossible or unlikely that a major power struggle is avoidable, perhaps the alternative you propose is the answer, or an answer. It demands a great deal of restraint, but simply because of the sheer horror lack of restraint would bring, it might work.

Certainly we need more of this kind of careful, realistic thought if we are to avoid catastrophes. I hope that many people, both within and without the scientific community, will read this article, so that it will have a lasting effect on our quest for survival.

It occurs to me that you might be interested in the enclosed speech on "Defense, Disarmament and Peace" which I gave last month in Los Angeles.

With warmest regards, and deep personal gratitude for all you have done and are continuing to do,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles
Chester Bowles

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