

CAN A PAX RUSSO-AMERICANA BE BUILT ON CO-EXISTENCE, OR
MUST IT BE BUILT ON FRIENDSHIP?

I believe that a Pax Russo-Americana ^{in order to} cannot endure if it is ~~based on co-existence, and that it must be based on friendship.~~
~~ought to be~~ friendship rather than

Friendship denotes ^fhuman relationships, and governments are not human beings, ^{and since} much pernicious confusion is caused today through the public discussion of ^{international} ~~political~~ issues in which people talk about governments as though they were human beings, I ~~shall~~ hasten to clarify what I mean by the term of "friendship": At the Yalta Conference, when America still thought that she needed the help of Russia in order to bring the war against Japan to a rapid conclusion, both Churchill and Roosevelt indicated that Russia might expect to receive ~~some~~ aid after the war for the reconstruction of her devastated economy. There was some talk about letting Russia have a billion dollars a year for ten years in the form of reparations out of German current production, ^{and} President Roosevelt showed human understanding for Russia's needs for security, ~~and~~ agreed ~~agreed~~ ^a America/at Yalta/to territorial redistribution which was rather generous to Russia, ^{thought} I should add, that ~~of course~~ American and English generosity at Yalta was generosity at the expense of other nations. Nevertheless it may be said that President Roosevelt was not devoid of a feeling of friendship for Russia. After Roosevelt's death, at the Potsdam Conference, when America no longer needed Russia's help to bring the war against Japan to an end,

President Truman showed complete indifference to Russia's economic needs.

^{His} ~~President Truman's~~ relationship with Russia ^{to} was ~~not motivated by~~ ^{had no element}

^{contained no element}

of friendship, and the relationship between America and Russia in
the year that followed Potsdam might, at best, be called ^{arranged as} co-existence.

~~This is not quite correct.~~
~~This kind of relationship~~
~~is not~~ ^{is} ~~not the~~
one which a Free Press America
could be safely built.

4/21/50
C. V. I.

POINT IV PROGRAMS 6

Even though both in Russia and America very large economic resources may become free/^{due}to saving on arms expenditure, they may achieve in the second stage of the stalemate, it does not appear likely that ~~more~~ more than a small fraction of these economic resources may be made available for the development of the less industrialized nations. Human beings are by and large selfish, but they are not without generosity. Governments, however, are not human beings, and the people delegate to the government the selfishness, and they don't delegate to the government their generosity.

In the post-war years, the United States made available rather large sums for aid under the Marshall Plan, and considerable, even though smaller sums, for aid to some of the lesser industrialized nations. But aid under the Marshall Plan was appropriated by Congress in the setting of the Cold War, ~~and was regarded as one of the battles in that war.~~ ^{aid} aid to under-developed countries was not given to those countries which needed it most, ~~and~~ ^{or} which could have benefited most by that aid, ~~but it~~ ^{and aid} was used ^{rather} as an instrument of foreign policy and a weapon in the cold war.

Less important than making capital available to under-developed countries is to make available to them ~~the~~ know-how and technical personnel; and in recognition of this, President Truman proclaimed the so-called Point IV Program. Unfortunately, the claim that the United States can help such countries, ^{underdeveloped} ~~as India for instance,~~ ^{as was for instance in the} rapidly to achieve a higher standard of living, comes very close to being a fraudulent claim.

In countries of the type of India, whose birth rate and infant mortality are high, initially any progress will primarily reduce infant mortality and thereby increase the rate at which the population grows. *P* Most of the governments of over-populated countries have, therefore, now recognized the need of putting at the disposal of families, means which would enable them to plan the size of the families. Some such governments may be expected to be successful by using the means already available at the present stage of scientific progress. But the means available at present are quite unsuitable to the needs of many of the areas which are involved. This leads me to believe that the most important, single step that Russia, as well as America, may take towards helping to lay the foundations for the improvement of the standard of living in under-developed areas, would be to enable their scientists to set up joint research projects which would be concerned with unsolved problems that are relevant to the problems of under-developed nations.

In contrast to governments, scientists are human beings. They are keenly aware of the need of building a world community in which it may be possible to maintain peace without having to resort to the use of force or to a threat of the use of force. *Many of them* Among research *would like nothing better than to participate in res,* projects in which Russian and American scientists could cooperate, *and work in many of the problems work which is* none could be expected to be as important as ~~such~~ such biological *relevant to the problems* advancement of the research projects as may make available some physiological means *underdeveloped areas of the world & out of the reach* of controlling conception, which would be suitable to the needs of *cooperative efforts*

families in the under-developed regions of the world. As an important/^{back}product of Russian and American cooperation of this sort, there might be established a mutual trust among American and Russian scientists, and this mutual trust might play a very important role in the foreseeable future. For if America and Russia agree on the important arms limitations, and above all, if they agree to refrain from entering the third stage of the arms race, they will need to convince each other that there are no major secret violations of the agreement occurring in either country. Mutual trust is the relationship which can be developed ~~by~~ between human beings. It is not a relationship that can be easily developed among governments, which are not human beings. The American people do not trust their own government. One can hardly expect them to trust someone else's government.

The American Government has three branches; one of them is the Administrative; another is Congress. Congress represents the people, and Congress will trust no foreign government. The truth of the matter is that the American people do not trust their own government, and, therefore, ~~xxxxx~~ it would be foolish to expect them to trust anyone else's government.

Had I posed this question to myself several years ago, at the time when the cold war was at its climax, and Senator McCarthy at the height of his influence, I should have probably hesitated to say with a reasonable degree of assurance that such means can be found. But ~~for~~ since that time, ~~freedom~~ remarkable progress has been made in the direction of freedom, both in Russia and America. It is now possible for American and Russian scientists ^{and engineers} to meet in circumstances where mutual trust may develop between individuals.

Trust denotes a human relationship. Governments are not human beings, ~~they~~ they cannot be expected to trust each other, and they rarely do. But scientists are human beings and, moreover, they are drawn to each other by their passionate interest in the work of scientists. If the liberalization of the past few years continues unchecked, ~~it would be possible to develop between Russian scientists and American scientists a feeling of mutual trust, and the Russian Government, as well as the American Government, should be able to draw on this asset when the time comes when they need to convince each other that the limitations, aimed at halting the arms race, are not secretly evaded.~~ ^{and that it is inevitable} ^{agreed} ^{and the Russian Government} ^{may} ^{should be able to} ^{draw on this asset} ^{when the time comes} ^{when they need to convince} ^{each other that the} ^{limitations, aimed at halting the arms race,} ^{are not secretly evaded.}

violation of the ~~limitations~~ provided by ~~the~~ agreement. These

rewards, because they are paid by an inter-governmental agency,

~~would~~ will be free from United States income tax. ^{XTP} I have added the last

provisions for ~~tax~~ ~~benefit~~ ^{the sake the benefit of} those ~~skeptics~~ ^{in the} who believe ~~in~~ ^{the power of} monetary

inducements; ^{I myself believe that} and ~~in any case~~, monetary inducements, ~~can~~ ^{could} do no harm.

^{P-4} But if the American and Russian Government ~~will~~ make it clear, ~~soon~~

~~enough~~ to the scientists and engineers, ^{what the role} the ~~important function~~ that

they ~~can~~ ^{must} play, ^{in order to} by ~~enabling~~ the two governments to convince each

other there is no reason to fear secret violations, ~~the scientists~~ ^{then these men}

~~would~~ ^{would} ~~cooperate~~ ^{with or without} with enthusiasm, ~~in the absence of any~~ monetary

^{shown in} inducements. ^P Once ~~we~~ ^{the world} move into the second stage of the stalemate,

and the possibility of a ~~Pax~~ Pax Russo-Americana becomes clear

to all, ~~and~~ once scientists, engineers, as well as the public in

general, realize that maintaining the stalemate stable is ~~in the~~

^{imperative for} ~~interest of~~ Russia, as well as America, ~~just as it is in the~~

~~interest of the whole world~~, who ~~can~~ ^{would} seriously believe that American

and Russian scientists ~~will~~ ^{would} ~~break~~ break faith with each other, ~~with~~

^{but be updated} and the true ^{mission} ~~interests~~ of their nations, ^{and with whole risk} as well as ~~the~~ world?

^{peace of the} ^{the safety of the} ~~whole world?~~

The End.

Clearly, ^{research and} development ~~of~~ work on a major scale, aimed at
an effective defense against long-range-rockets, can ^{not} go on either
in the United States or Russia without many thousands of scientists
and engineers ~~being~~ ^{knowing about it} involved. Let us now visualize the President
of the United States ^{was going before the country and} ~~announcing~~ that America has concluded an agree-
ment with Russia for the purpose of stabilizing ~~the second stage~~
~~of~~ the atomic stalemate. The President may explain that for this
purpose it is necessary to halt the arms race and ~~to~~ refrain from
developing means, on which an effective defense against incoming
long-range-rockets ~~can~~ ^{could} be based. The President may point out

that America and Russia ~~can~~ ^{could} both legally abrogate this agreement,
and ~~each will~~ ^{that Russia may} be forced to abrogate ~~this~~ ^{the} agreement unless ~~the other~~ ^{America}
~~is~~ ^{is} able to convince here ~~there~~ ^{that} there are no major secret evasions of
the agreement occurring. ~~For this reason, so the President would~~

~~explain, he is appealing to all American scientists and engineers~~
~~to enlist their help in convincing the Russian Government that the~~
~~agreement is not secretly evaded in America, with the consent and~~
~~approval of the President.~~ ^{that the that} It would be the patriotic duty of every
American scientist and engineer ~~to~~ ^{to} who would discover such a violation

~~committed by any of the agencies of the United States Government, to~~
~~report it either to the President of the United States, or an inter-~~
~~governmental control commission set up for the purpose, or preferably~~
~~directly to the Russian Government.~~ ^{or directly to an}
America and Russia have jointly ^{might further state}
set up a fund, so the President would ~~explain,~~ ^{high} out of which rewards
would be paid for information leading to the discovery of a ~~major~~

It would be in the interests of America and Russia, as well as the rest of the world, to stop the arms race when the second stage of the atomic stalemate has been reached. ^{and prevent the advent of the third phase of the} Unless this ~~is~~ ^{is in fact done,} the ~~arms race~~ atomic stalemate might become inherently unstable in the following sense: If the arms race is permitted to continue, both America and Russia will strive to develop means ^{for} ~~to~~ ^{ing} destroy incoming long range rockets in flight. An elaborate system of defensive rockets carrying atomic or hydrogen warheads might ^{perhaps} ~~provide the means through which an~~ ^{a fully a new} effective defense against solid-fuel-long-range rockets ~~might be~~ based.

If nothing is done to keep America and Russia from entering the ^{is} third phase of the arms race, they will not be able to limit the number of hydrogen or atomic bombs that they may stockpile to any reasonable level which could still be regarded as safe from the point of view of the world as a whole. Moreover, if either Russia or America should achieve a technical break-through and be the first to develop an effective defense against incoming long-range rockets, ^{with the help of them} the ~~nation~~ ^{first} first accomplishing this goal would be in a position to exact any price from the other nation, by demolishing as many cities as it wishes, without having to pay a similar price ^{herself} ~~to that which it~~ has exacted. Clearly, ^{it} when this happens, the atomic stalemate will be inherently unstable, and just about anything might happen.

~~Assuming now that America and Russia recognize that it would be in~~

~~their interests to prevent the arms race from entering the third phase and are willing to conclude an agreement, to this effect with~~ ^{may} ~~race at the second stage~~ ^{with each other} ~~shape of the stalemate~~ ^{draft the arms} ~~at the second stage~~ ^{at some point}

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page 2

~~How~~

[Handwritten signature]

HOW TO ENSURE THE STABILITY OF THE SECOND STAGE OF
THE ATOMIC STALEMATE

X The second stage of the atomic stalemate, which is characterized by solid-fuel-long-range rockets which could be launched from bases inside of America and inside of Russia from bases which can be made invulnerable to an aerial attack, neither nation needs to fear that a sudden attack on her bases might appreciably diminish her ability to strike a counter-blow. Therefore, this stage of the stalemate will not be inherently unstable,, and should there occur through accident or some mistake in judgment an unfortunate incident, there would be no need to respond with instant action. X In saying ^{all} this ^{provisionally} I have tacitly assumed, ~~that~~ and I had better make ^{my} assumption explicit, that neither America or Russia are in possession of ^{an effective defense against that would permit them} effective means to destroy incoming long-range rockets in flight. ^{There would be a third below} and I shall be discussing later why it is important to avoid a ^{arm starting} third stage of the arms race aimed at the development of such ^{a defense} means.

It is my contention that in the second stage of the stalemate, it would be possible for either America or Russia to adopt and unilaterally to proclaim a satisfactory philosophy concerning the hypothetical use of "clean" hydrogen bombs of great power in certain eventualities; and that if either party proclaims such a philosophy, it would be in the interest of the other party to adopt the same philosophy. I contend that in adopting such a philosophy either America or Russia could retain a stockpile of "clean" hydrogen bombs as a major factor in the power balance and that while she might retain hydrogen bombs as an instrument of potential power that may be used to protect those areas

rely on low-flying pilotless bombers which would be launched from scattered bases and which could be regarded as effective, ^{at least} for a period of years-until Russia develops appropriate counter measures.

Because I propose to discuss here ^{mainly} policies which would appear to be desirable from the long-term point of view, I shall ^{essentially} completely disregard in my discussion all these transition ^{at} phases of the rapidly changing stalemate and ~~try to~~ focus ^{my} attention on what might be called the second stage of the stalemate, towards which both Russia and America are moving at present.

In this second stage of the stalemate, solid-fuel-long-range-rockets will be available in large numbers to both Russia and America. Both Russia and America will have available ~~powerful~~ "clean" hydrogen bombs ^{of high power,} ~~of a type~~ that can be produced in adequate quantities, ^{that is} ~~and are~~ compact, as well as ^{light} large enough, to be carried by long-range rockets. ^{in these}

At this second stage of the stalemate there will be no need for America to have bases on foreign soil, ~~nor will either~~ America or Russia need to adopt a policy of "instant ^{counter-retaliation} retaliation", since the bases from which the long-range-rockets can be launched may be scattered within the territory of Russia and America proper, and they will be so-called "hard bases", i.e., they will be "invulnerable", ~~in the sense that they could not be destroyed by an aerial attack.~~ The elements of technological instability which are contained in the present - the first stage - of the stalemate ^{may} ~~will~~ thus be absent in the second ~~stage~~ of the stalemate.

When the second stage of the stalemate is ^{approaching} ~~reached~~ and if ~~the arms race~~ ^{could be stopped at that stage,} then America and Russia could agree to limit the number of powerful hydrogen bombs in their stockpile, and they could agree to eliminate from their stockpiles all the "dirty" hydrogen bombs, the fission-fusion-fission bombs. The number of "clean" hydrogen bombs they may both wish to retain might be fairly large - just how large may depend on factors other than purely military. *

But if the arms race were permitted to go further and if America and Russia were to develop defensive counter measures,

Prior to the onset of the atomic stalemate, both Russia and America had a vital ^{and opposite} interest in the distribution of military power ^{on} ~~within~~ the continent of Europe. This made it impossible to bring about in the post-war period, any ~~of the desirable~~ changes in Europe with the consent and approval of both America and Russia. At the same time, the nations in Europe did not lack security, for the map of Europe was frozen ^{fast} because Russia and America had vital and opposite interests ~~in Europe.~~ *

In the atomic stalemate, and particularly as the second stage of the stalemate approaches, America and Russia are going to be increasingly indifferent to any of the changes that might take place on the Continent of Europe. In the ~~second~~ ^{present} stage of the stalemate, there is no ^{reason} why the United States should wish to maintain ^{any} military bases on foreign soil, and a military alliance with the nations of Western Europe would no longer add ^{much} ~~anything~~ to the security of the United States. The United States may continue to maintain an alliance with the nations of Western Europe, but she would increasingly regard these allies as expendable. Similarly, Russia may become increasingly indifferent to what happens in Europe.

P At this point, it may become possible to bring about changes in Europe with the consent and approval of both Russia and America, as well as the nations directly involved. What might these changes be?

to the unification of Germany, only when she is ready to abandon her political friends in Eastern Germany, ^{where} ~~who~~ could not be expected to retain political office if Germany were reunited. True enough, the political party at present in power in Western Germany would presumably not remain in office either, if Germany were united. But whether Russia would, or should, regard the replacement of Adenauer's party by the German Social Democratic Party as a change for the better, is by no means clear.

Should a political settlement be obtainable on the Continent of Europe, ^{that is} ~~to~~ ^{changes fully satisfactory} to all nations in that area, then the security of the nations which make up the Continent of Europe ^{may} ~~will~~ perhaps not present a major problem. But if no ^{fully satisfactory} ~~such~~ settlement can be achieved, then ~~an~~ inter-European security might well represent ^{serious} ~~such~~ a problem.

There are two different approaches to the solution of the problem of inter-European security. Both of these approaches ^{one} ~~must~~ ^{not be based} ~~start from~~ the premise that in the second stage of the atomic stalemate, neither Russia nor America ^{can be expected to} ~~may~~ take action at any appreciable cost to themselves, ^{in order} to prevent changes in Europe ~~from occurring that~~ ^{even if such changes were to} ~~may~~ come about, through one nation in Europe taking armed action against another nation in Europe.

One of ~~the~~ two possible approaches to ^{the problem of} ~~freezing~~ ^{the map} ~~the map~~ ^{an agreed upon} ~~preferably~~ ^{the map} ~~a revised map~~ would consist in providing the nations in Europe, or at least some of the nations in Europe, with a limited number of clean hydrogen bombs of high power. The ~~map~~ ^{map} of Europe could then be stabilized through ~~exactly~~ the same kind of mechanism through

which Russia and America may protect -- in the second stage of
the ~~atomic~~ stalemate -- those areas of the world in which they have
a vital interest. ~~If this approach were chosen, then one must not
be under any illusion with regard to any commitment that America or
Russia might be willing to make to protect any nation of Europe
against any of the other nations of Europe. If such a commitment were
made at all one would have no right to be expected that the commit-
ment would be honored.~~

Russia would ~~greatly~~ profit through a flourishing East-West trade from such an improvement in the economy of Europe, and it is conceivable that Russia and American~~s~~, acting in concert with each other, would want to facilitate such a development in the foreseeable future.

one must not disregard
But ~~it is just as well to beware of~~ the political problems with which Europe may be faced in the not too distant future. Right now the nations of Europe are all tired of war, and at this time, people in Western Germany are more interested in increasing their prosperity than in the problem of unifying Germany. But human memory is short, and the time might come when unifying Germany may become the ~~one~~ overriding political issue on which all Germans ~~can~~ *may* unite. Furthermore, once Germany is unified, the problem of recovery of territories lost to Poland ~~might~~ *might* become a similar over-riding issue. Therefore, if it becomes possible to change the map of Europe with the consent and approval of Russia, as well as America, it would be very desirable to create, right from the start, a situation which is politically stable. Only in that case ~~will~~ it be possible to freeze the status quo without having to lean on a threat of force.

Perhaps it might be possible to provide Poland with an adequate compensation to induce her to agree to the return of former German territories -- possibly according to some gradual but fixed schedule. If this could be done, then one of the valid reasons for maintaining Germany divided would disappear.

PA There would still remain a major difficulty. Russia can agree

Remarks by Leo Szilard
April 8, 1958

I believe we ought to have a summit meeting soon where Russia and America should agree on a number of steps to be taken that could be taken almost at once. These measures would represent first steps to the establishment of a world at peace.

What could be these first steps?

Colonel Leghorn and I came independently to the conclusion that there is one very important first step that America and Russia could take, and moreover either of them could take this step unilaterally.

After I shall give you a short description of the present situation -- as I see it -- Colonel Leghorn will speak on the subject of this first step.

There might be a set of first steps, and it is conceivable that the group here assembled might be able to agree amongst themselves what these steps might be. But subsequently, of necessity, we shall come at some point to the parting of the ways. Some of us are inclined to think that before long America and Russia may reach an agreement that will provide not only for the cessation of bomb tests and the cessation of the manufacture of bombs, but also -- and this is the crucial point -- to the elimination of the stockpiles of bombs, jet bombers, and long-range rockets. Others, like Colonel Leghorn and I, believe that this will not happen, and that we shall have to live with the bomb for a long time to come.

After Colonel Leghorn finishes his first address at today's meeting, I shall try to give you my reasons why I believe that we shall not be able to get

rid of the bomb.

Colonel Leghorn will then, in his second address at today's session, give you his picture of the world of arms towards which we are moving at present. When he is through with this, then I shall try to say why I think that we might be able to stay alive in such world, and what we must do in order to stay alive in it. I shall try to convince you that if we did what we could and must do, then this world would be more peaceful and secure than the world has ever been in the past. Right now, war has become impossible, but it is by no means improbable. In the ^{world} ~~way~~ that Colonel Leghorn and I envisage, war in the ordinary wholly sense of the term would be unnecessary, and therefore ~~improbable~~ ^{absolutely}.

In the past 12 years most of us were aware of the fact that we have gotten the world into a mess by producing the bomb. Most of us thought that the way out of this situation must lie in turning the clock back by getting rid of the bomb. Perhaps the time has now come to ask whether we were right, and whether it might not be easier to get out of the present situation not by attempting to turn the clock back -- which might be impossible -- but by turning the clock as fast as we can - foreward.

As I shall try to show towards the end of the meeting, this could be accomplished if Russia and America cooperated in this matter in an intelligent as well as rational fashion, and it cannot be accomplished in any other way.

CAN A PAX RUSSO-AMERICANA BE BUILT ON CO-EXISTENCE,
OR MUST IT BE BUILT ON FRIENDSHIP?

I believe that a Pax Russo-Americana, in order to endure, ought to be based on friendship rather than co-existence. Friendship denotes human relationships, and governments are not human beings; and since much pernicious confusion is caused today through the public discussion of international issues in which people talk about governments as though they were human beings, I shall hasten to clarify what I mean by the term of "friendship".

At the Yalta Conference, when America still thought that she needed the help of Russia in order to bring the war against Japan to a rapid conclusion, both Churchill and Roosevelt indicated that Russia might expect to receive aid after the war for the reconstruction of her devastated economy. There was some talk about letting Russia have a billion dollars a year for ten years in the form of reparations out of German current production, and President Roosevelt showed human understanding for Russia's needs for security. America agreed at Yalta to a territorial redistribution which was rather generous to Russia, though I should add, that American and English generosity at Yalta was generosity at the expense of other nations. Nevertheless it may be said that President Roosevelt was not devoid of a feeling of friendship for Russia. After Roosevelt's death, at the Potsdam Conference, when America no longer needed Russia's help to bring the war against Japan to an end, President Truman showed complete indifference to Russia's economic needs. This relationship to Russia was devoid of any feeling of friendship, and the relationship between America and Russia in the year that followed Potsdam might, at best, be characterized as co-existence. This is not the kind of relationship on which a Pax Russo-Americana could be safely built.

Because in the second stage of the stalemate, both America and Russia may be able to reduce their arms expenditure to a small fraction of their national income, they will have available vast

resources which they may divert in part into the production of consumer's goods, and therefore raise the standard of living of the people -- and in part into the building of new production facilities at home or abroad. The times are past when Russia needs economic assistance from America, but it is conceivable that both America and Russia might be willing to use what they save on arms expenditure for the development of the less industrialized nations. There might even be a cooperative effort aimed at this objective, which might combine America's willingness to make available capital and Russia's willingness to make available professionally trained men, particularly engineers and doctors. The rapid development of the less industrialized areas may be regarded as an essential step in the building of a world community in which peace may be maintained without resorting to force or the threat of force and in which, therefore, ultimately far-reaching disarmament may be accomplished. I do not know enough about Russia to be able to make any forecast in this respect, and wish therefore to limit what I am going to say now to the United States. I believe it is unlikely that what the United States may save in arms expenditure may be made available for the development of under-developed areas. Human beings are, by and large, selfish, but they are not without generosity. Governments, however, are not human beings, and the people delegate to the government their selfishness rather than their generosity. True enough, in the post-war years, the United States made available rather large sums for aid under the Marshall Plan and considerable, even though smaller sums, for aid to some of the less industrialized nations. But aid under the Marshall Plan was appropriated by Congress in the setting of the Cold War, and aid to under-developed countries was not given to those countries which needed it most, or which could have benefited most by that aid; such aid was used rather as an instrument of foreign policy and a weapon in the cold war. With the cold war fading out of the picture in the setting of the atomic stalemate, I cannot see

Congress appropriating amounts for foreign aid that could substantially speed up the industrialization of the under-developed countries. Under the circumstances I am rather skeptical about the possibility of establishing mutual trust between Russia and America on the governmental level through some joint effort which these two governments might make in the direction of building a world community through a rapid development of the less industrialized areas.

And yet it is necessary to accelerate the development of the less industrialized areas. Important though it would be to make capital available for this purpose, it is perhaps equally important to make available to them in abundance technical personnel together, perhaps, with a modest amount of capital. This in a sense was recognized by President Truman when he proclaimed the Point IV Program.

Unfortunately, the claim that America can help/countries ^{decisively} such as say, for instance, India, to achieve a higher standard of living comes very close to being a fraudulent claim. In countries of the type of India, where both the birth rate and infant mortality are high, initially any progress will reduce infant mortality and thereby increase the rate at which the population grows. No attainable amount of capital export from the United States to India could conceivably keep pace with the rate of population growth in India until the birth rate is lowered.

~~Steps that May be Taken Prior to the Advent of the Second Stage
of the Stalemate~~

X There may be some risk that during the present stage -- the first stage of the stalemate -- an all-out atomic war might break out as a result of an accident or a serious error of judgment. ~~It is very unlikely, however,~~ ^{appears} that such a war would break out as a result of a wanton attack by the American Strategic Air Force against Russian cities, or by the Russian Strategic Air Force against American cities, ~~is hardly likely~~. Therefore, the greatest danger for the outbreak of an all-out atomic war ^(in the immediate future) lies in the possibility of a local conflict which leads to armed action, American and Russian military intervention on opposite sides, the use of atomic weapons in such a war, and the ensuing possibility that emotions may be aroused which may make it impossible to localize the conflict. X There are two ways in which the danger of an all-out war, arising in this manner, may be diminished.

1. Russia and America may impose upon themselves certain restrictions concerning the use of atomic weapons, if such weapons should be used by them ^{at all} in a war.

2. Russia and America may ~~try to~~ reach a political settlement that will make reasonably sure that there will not occur -- in any of the foreseeable contingencies -- an armed conflict in which America and Russia may intervene on opposite sides. X

Self-Imposed Restrictions on the Use of Atomic Weapons - a temporary expedient.

To the first of these two points I may say the following:

~~Several years~~ ^{Several years} ~~Sometime ago~~ ^{Sometime ago} Russia proposed that the use of atomic weapons in warfare be ~~entirely~~ prohibited. Since prohibition of the use of atomic weapons is not enforceable, what then would be the meaning of such a prohibition? Clearly, America as well as

X Russia, could each unilaterally proclaim that she would not resort to the use of atomic bombs in case of war, ^{and} if this restriction were observed by both sides, the outbreak of an atomic war would be avoided and thus the world would be spared the all-out atomic catastrophe to which a war might otherwise lead.

write

The American Government has rejected this Russian proposal. Her spokesmen ^{have} stated that America would have to consider the possibility that such a pledge, given in peace time, might not be honored in war time, ^{therefore American} ~~and that she~~ would have to maintain two military establishments, one based on divisions armed with conventional weapons, and one based on divisions armed with atomic bombs -- in order to be in a position to shift rapidly to the use of atomic weapons, if atomic weapons were to be used against her in violation of the pledge given. ^P In addition, the American Government ^{apparently} ~~is~~ ^{apparently has} ~~not~~ ^{believe} that ~~she~~ ^{has}, at least a temporary, advantage if she is free to use atomic weapons in case of war, in those areas where Russia can more easily introduce a large army equipped with conventional weapons.

Be this as it may, the American Government ^{since that time} ~~has repeatedly~~ ^{frequently} stated ~~her intention to~~ ^{that it would resort to the} use atomic bombs if war should come as a result of aggression, even though the aggressor were willing to forego the use of atomic bombs. Since just what constitutes aggression would be presumably unilaterally determined by America, the American position means that America reserves the right to use atomic weapons in any ^{war}.

^{In my personal opinion -} as long as, in the absence of a satisfactory political settlement, there remains a danger that a war might break out in which America and Russia may intervene militarily on opposite sides, ^{In my personal opinion -} America and Russia should be willing to impose upon themselves certain specific restrictions that will reduce the danger that a local war may lead to an all-out atomic war which neither of them wants. Are there any such restrictions which would accomplish this end, which either America or Russia could unilaterally proclaim and which, ^{were} once they ~~are~~ thus proclaimed, would be likely to be observed by both of these nations because it would be in their interests to do so?

In discussing this issue, we must ^{keep in mind} ~~start out with the~~ ~~assumption~~ that in the present strategic stalemate, neither America nor Russia have any longer a strong incentive for wanting to change the existing boundaries of sovereign nations by armed action.

Government,

by armed action. In these circumstances, ~~one may propose~~ that either America or Russia should declare, that in case of ~~such a~~ ^{local} war, she will not use atomic bombs nor permit her allies to use atomic bombs except on their own side of the pre-war boundary -- as long as ~~the~~ ^{the} enemy abides by the same restriction. This would mean, that in order to defend the territory with atomic bombs, the troops would have to be withdrawn perhaps ten or twenty miles from the pre-war boundary. Any massing of enemy troops in that zone would then be foolhardy because atomic bombs could be used against them. Since the attacker would not use atomic bombs within the pre-war territory of the defenders, and atomic bombs would be used by the defenders only sparingly, there would be much less destruction of the defended territory, than if both sides were to use atomic bombs freely on both sides of the pre-war boundary of the territory.

America and Russia could, of course, impose the restrictions, here advocated, upon themselves in case of war without giving any pledge in this respect in peace time. But for the government to be able to impose such restrictions on the military commanders, it is necessary for the government to be clear in their own minds of the advantages of such restrictions. Frequently, statesmen do not know what they think, until they hear themselves say it and for this reason a proclamation by the American Government or the Russian Government, made in peace time, would improve the chances that such restrictions would be actually observed in case of a war.

During an extended visit to Germany last year, I had occasion to discuss the advisability of advocating the restrictions, here described, on various occasions. I learned in April of this year at the Quebec meeting that Colonel Richard Leghorn has reached rather similar conclusions. Since he is much more of an expert in military matters than I am, this gave me the reassurance that I needed in order to go on record in favor of the adoption of such restrictions, as a temporary expedient for lessening the danger of a war ^{that might break out} in the immediate future.

5th Section

Apr 20 1958

FINAL SECTION

~~the case~~ *The case against atomic dis at an early date*

I have assumed that America and Russia will not be able to ^{halt} prevent the arms race ^{and that this race will} to continue until the stalemate has entered into its second stage, and we shall ^{thus have to} live in a world of solid fuel, long range rockets and powerful, clean hydrogen bombs. This, I ^{submit} postulate, will come about not through virtue but through necessity.

^{Let us} But I wonder whether we couldn't go further and say that assuming the proper philosophy ^{were} is adopted concerning the hypothetical use of the bombs, the strategic stalemate in its second stage may be regarded as the answer to ^{and} a prayer ^{inasmuch as} and that it might represent a situation in which ^{for} the world will be safer, ^{would than} at least for another generation to come, ^{would} than it ^{had} would be if we succeeded in ridding the world of the bomb. ^{in the case of an} What would be the situation of the world if Russia and America were to reach an agreement to rid the world of the bomb at an early date? ^{It is not known to the destroying of the} Unless ^{bombs somehow also} they also agreed to shoot all physicists and engineers who know how to make the bomb--so that the knowledge of how to make the bombs ^{were lost also} is forgotten--in case of another war of any kind, atomic war would come to the world after a relatively short period of conventional warfare.

~~X~~ In the absence of general principles universally ^{accepted} adopted by all nations, it is not possible to adjudicate ^{to} conflicts between nations and ^{as a matter of fact} it is not even possible to put forth reasonable arguments that may have a uniform appeal ^{uniformly} to the sense of justice ^{the people of} of all nations. If we get rid of the bomb, what would ^{then} prevent nations from ~~adapting~~ attempting once more to settle conflicts by resorting to arms, except perhaps the memory of the bomb? Would the memory of the bomb be strong enough and just how long could this memory be kept alive? ~~X~~ In this century the United States entered the war twice against Germany, not in order to make the world safe for

$28 \times 4 = 1120 + 1200 = 2,320$

democracy nor in order to establish the Four Freedoms in the world, as she ~~has alleged~~ ^{might be supposed}, but for the sole purpose of preventing a German victory. The United States was forced to enter the war for this reason, ^{since} for a German victory would have produced a major shift in the ~~balance~~ ^{balance} of power and that shift would have threatened America's security. Indeed, had Germany won either the ^{first or the second} 1st or 2nd World Wars then--~~in the absence of atomic bombs and the stalemate--~~ ^{a world free of atomic bombs would have} the United States could not have stopped Germany from becoming militarily so strong as to be able to vanquish the United States, in the event of a third World War. ^{in the absence of atomic bombs}

Sharp
9
 X It is true that the great powers, if they act in concert with each other, might use something like the machinery of the United Nations Organization for preventing the smaller ^{powers} ones from disturbing the peace. But the United Nations organization cannot keep the peace among the great powers. For the time being, among the great powers, Russia and America could perhaps protect their possessions from being lost to them without having to resort to arms. But England and France just recently ^{resorted to the use of} were impelled to employ force in order to protect what they regarded as their vital interests. Is it not likely that if the bomb is abolished, armed conflicts ^{may} will continue to occur between nations, that such armed conflicts ^{may} will threaten to change the power of balances adversely, either from the point of view of Russia or from the point of view of America, and that these two nations might them be drawn into the conflict? If this should happen, before long atomic bombs would reappear on the scene and at that point on, ^{all} hell might break loose. X

In contract to this, let us now consider the situation of Russia and America in the second stage of the atomic stalemate. X There might be major changes in the so-called power balance gradually

taking place. ~~For instance~~, China might become a great industrial power, Germany might become economically ~~far more powerful~~ ^{far stronger} than England or any other nation on the continent of Europe, with the exception of Russia, Japan might become ~~once more~~ ^{once more} a great industrial nation with an orientation of her trade towards China. But the times when America or Russia had to be concerned about the war potential of any nation or combination of nations because of industrialization of certain nations, accompanied by conspicuous rise of the production of steel, coal or oil, may be regarded in the setting of the atomic stalemate as gone forever. In that stalemate Russia and America are unconquerable and as long as the stalemate exists they shall remain unconquerable. ~~The case of England and the nitrogen problem~~ Other nations might acquire, of course, a similar status of invulnerability, but no nation will represent a danger to any other nation unless somehow it produces a government which is insane and adopts a policy of threatening murder and suicide. This brings me to the so-called "nth power" problem, a term originating in Washington, D.C. and coined for the purpose of being able to discuss in a polite fashion the possibility that in the near future France might be testing her first atomic bomb. ~~In a recent white paper~~ the British government has indicated that in case of a major war in which Russia is involved, England would use ~~her~~ hydrogen bombs against Russia--presumably dropping them on Russian cities and killing millions of civilians, men, women and children, even if Russia were willing to fight the war with conventional weapons. Since there is no reason why England should not expect Russia to retaliate in kind, the statement of the British white paper is tantamount to threatening murder and suicide. Without entering into the question of whether the British government may be regarded as sufficiently crazy to make such a threat believable and therefore effective, I venture to

predict that with the advent of the second stage of the strategic stalemate and in case of the kind of Pax Russia-Americana I have been discussing, any nation threatening murder and suicide would automatically place itself in the position of a common enemy of Russia and America. *It* This does not mean however that England would have to be deprived of ~~a~~ ^{herself of the} protection which the possession of ~~powerful~~ ^{of high power} clean hydrogen bombs and a ~~suitable~~ ^{of high power} delivery system, based on ~~solid-fuel,~~ ^{of high power} long-range rockets might afford her. England might well retain such ~~an~~ ^{the bomb as} instrument of power in her possession if she adopts the same ~~philosophy~~ ^{mode of behaviour} concerning the hypothetical use of her bombs that I have described above as ~~suitable~~ ^{suitable} to the needs of both Russia and America. England might well proclaim a price list and set a reasonable price on each of her ~~territories,~~ ^{the} which she is committed to defend. It is true that the loss of a city of a half-million inhabitants would be a far greater loss for Britain than, say, for Russia, but on the other hand, it is also true that losing the possession of some of her colonies would be a far greater loss to Britain than ~~the~~ ^{would be gain that the} acquisition of ~~the~~ ^{such a} colony would represent for Russia, and I am making here the wholly unjustified assumption that Russia would like, if she could, ~~to~~ ^{adopting} acquire any of the British possessions--and I am ~~attempting~~ ^{some up} here for the sake of argument, the manifestly absurd premise that the acquisition of some British colony is among the political aims of Russia. ~~are covered by Russia.~~

Even though I am inclined to think that the importance of the so-called "nth power problem" is being somewhat overrated in Washington, D.C., I am saying this rather reluctantly because in my experience, some of the conclusions reached by the American government in the past ten years, and some have been wrong, but they have all one

Bad example.

small army countries

FIFTH SECTION

X Perhaps Britain, by threatening murder and suicide in a recent paper, has rendered a public service to the world. By doing so she drew attention to a danger that still lies in the future, but nevertheless may require early action on the part of the great powers. Britain did not threaten to use the threat of murder and suicide for acquiring new possessions. She has proposed to make use of this threat only in order to preserve what she now possesses.

But why shouldn't in the future some small nation, under a government more irresponsible than that of Britain and perhaps ruled by a dictator whose mental sanity the world may have legitimate doubts, view the threat of murder and suicide for purposes of blackmail in order to acquire what some other nation possesses and what is being coveted. America and Russia, acting in concert

with each other, as well as with the other major nations of the world, might do well to take precautions against this possibility, by exerting the considerable influence that they possess to keep certain regions of the world free of atomic bombs. These might be the very same regions where the status quo can be

preserved through maintaining an inter-governmental armed force equipped with conventional weapons -- an eventuality that has been discussed above. But there are other regions of the world where a status which is not politically fully acceptable to the nations of the area cannot be frozen by maintaining such an inter-governmental armed force, and one of these areas is the continent of Europe.

Continuation of Fifth Section -

There are a number of small countries, however, which possess just one or two cities. The possession of hydrogen bombs by such small countries would appear to be very undesirable, however, from the point of view of peace. If a country of this kind would possess a few hydrogen bombs, enough to destroy one of her neighbors and a few more with which to threaten to demolish a city in America or Russia, if one of her own cities were demolished, it would be virtually impossible for America or Russia to protect the neighbors of that country, for we must not forget that guarantees are worthless - that in the second stage of the stalemate neither Russia or America will have sufficiently strong interest to prevent a change in the status quo in most areas of the world to be willing to sacrifice a city of their own for the purpose of doing so. Russia and America might well guarantee the status quo in an area if none of the nations within the area possess atomic or hydrogen bombs, because then Russia and America, acting in concert with each other, could threaten to demolish a city of suitable size in any nation of that area should such a nation resort to arms against its neighbor. Such a threat, however, will not be believed if the offending nation can in turn demolish a city in Russia or America, if it is known that neither Russia or America have any vital interest in preserving the status quo in that area. For that reason it would seem essential that in such areas where America and Russia want to protect the status quo, even though it is not in their vital interests to do so, no nation within the area shall be permitted to have atomic or hydrogen bombs at its disposal. The inter-dependence of the world is such today that Russia and America are in a position to bring

pressure other than military on the smaller powers in order to persuade them to renounce atomic weapons.

And this brings me to the problem of the continent of Europe. Prior to the on-set of the strategic stalemate, both Russia and America had a vital interest in the distribution of military power within the continent of Europe, and this was the major reason why it ~~was~~ ^{would have been} not possible to bring about ^{any of the desirable} changes in Europe ^{in the postwar period} with the consent ^{and} or approval of both America and Russia.

After the advent of the second stage of the strategic stalemate, what goes on in Europe need no longer concern Russia or America from a point of view of their security. Thus on the one hand it may become possible to bring about ^{certain} ^{desirable} changes in Europe with the consent and approval of both Russia and America, but on the other hand the nations in Europe ^{might no longer} will not be able to look for security to either Russia or America ^{or both} because neither America or Russia ^{might be} ^{expected} ^(that they may be expected to keep) willing to enter into a commitment to preserve an agreed-upon status in Europe ^{if the nations of Europe are armed} ^{for the "atom" age} ^{with atomic bombs} if they would have to pay an appreciable price in case they are called upon to ^{live up to their commitment} ^{more they have to live up to a} ^{commitment to protect these nations against} ^{each other} live up to their commitment. ^{From points of view other than military, both Russia and America might of course} ^{in Europe and they would have reason} ^{to work for} have an appreciable interest to want to see a peaceful and prosperous Europe.

One of the hopeful signs in Europe at the present is the move of Western Europe towards a customs union. This ^{present} movement toward a ^{an economically} ^{integrated} united Europe would be probably severely disturbed if a united, disarmed, neutral Germany were created where France remains ^{still} armed and an ally of the United States.

The French military needs are closely tied to her African possessions, and it is conceivable that if the war is ^{Algerian} ~~now~~ brought to an end, most of the continent

of Europe ~~could be transformed in~~ ^{might become} an area in which arms are maintained at a

low level ~~and in which no nation has available either atomic or hydrogen bombs.~~

If it were possible to accomplish this, Europe would reach an ~~unheard of~~ ^{unprecedented} level

of prosperity, ^{very} rather fast. ^P If a nation can divert ~~ten~~ ^{10%} percent of its national

income ~~for~~ ^{from} military expenditure to the increase of her production capacity,

this shift alone will lead to a ~~three percent~~ ^{3%} increase in the annual national

product (and therefore) if the population is kept stationary to a three percent

increase in the standard of living - ~~Russia~~ ^{Wanted Russia and America to improve production} could greatly profit through East-

West trade from such an improvement in the economy of Europe. In the atomic

stalemate, particularly if the second stage of the stalemate is reached, there

is no reason why the United States should wish to maintain military bases on

foreign soil and a military alliance with the nations of Western Europe would

add nothing to the security of the United States. ^{Russia might be indifferent at that point to the voice of foreign bases maintained by the nations of Europe} The nations of Europe are

^{There are however serious difficulties arising from within Europe itself} tired of war. At this time people in Western Germany are far more interested

in their increasing prosperity than ~~they are interested~~ in the problem of

unifying Germany. But human memory is short, and the time might come when

unifying Germany might ~~be the~~ ^{become the} one political issue on which all men in Western

Germany can unite; and once Germany is unified, the problem of the recovery of

territories lost to Poland might become ~~the one issue on which the German people~~ ^{such an overriding issue} can concentrate.

If the present status of Europe ~~is~~ ^{should be} changed with the consent and approval of

Russia as well as America, it would be desirable to create right from the start

a situation which is politically stable, so that it may not be necessary to

~~safeguard~~ ^{protect} the new status by the threat of the use of force. Perhaps it might be

of such a state of affairs in Europe I believe that might be the result of the present stage of the war in the foreseeable future.

possible to offer Poland adequate compensation to induce her to agree to a return of ^{the former} some German territories, according to some fixed, but gradual, schedule.

If this could be done, one of the valid reasons for maintaining the present division of Germany would disappear. There would still remain one difficulty -- Russia can agree to the unification of Germany only when she is ready to abandon her political friends who could not be expected to retain ~~the~~ political office in case Germany is unified. True enough, the political party in power in Western Germany would ^{presumably} most likely not remain in office either; but whether Russia would ^{or should} regard it as a major asset to replace the rule of Adenauer's party by the rule of the ^{German} Social Democratic Party is ~~not clear~~. ^{by no means certain.}

~~In the second state of the stalemate the nations which make up the continent of Europe will have no common enemy, and they will not be able to achieve unity by virtue of having a common enemy. For this reason the problem of European insecurity might be a real problem. It does not seem practicable to protect the status quo in Europe by means of an inter-government armed force, which might represent an adequate measure for preserving the peace in other areas of the world. But no nation in Europe could afford to have an appreciable number of their cities demolished for the sake of a political adventure, and therefore if the nations of Europe will agree to forego the possession of atomic and hydrogen bombs, either America or Russia, both acting in concert, would be in a position to enter into a commitment to protect every nation in Europe against every other nation of Europe without having to fear that they may have to pay a price in excess of what they are willing to pay in case they are called upon to live up to their commitment.~~

* If a satisfactory political settlement can be reached in Europe the security of the nations of Europe will not present a major problem. But in the absence of such a settlement

European security will present a problem and any project considers how to solve it

SECTION FIVE (Continued)

If a political settlement could be established on the Continent of Europe which is fully satisfactory to all nations in that area, then the security of these nations will not present a major problem.

But if no such settlement can be achieved, then the security of the nations of the Continent of Europe might become a major problem.

There are two different possible approaches to this problem. Both of these are predicated on the premise that in the second stage of the atomic stalemate between Russia and America, neither Russia nor America have a major interest from the point of view of their own security to prevent at an appreciable cost to themselves changes in Europe that might be brought about by one of the nations of Europe through armed action against another of the nations of Europe. One approach to the problem of European security might consist of providing every nation on the Continent of Europe with a limited number of atomic or clean hydrogen bombs. This might then lead to the stabilization of the map of Europe through exactly the same mechanism through which the strategic stalemate between Russia and America might lead to a stabilization of those areas of the world in which Russia and America have a vital interest to preserve the status quo. It is clear, however, that if the nations of Europe are armed with such weapons, neither America nor Russia could be expected to make a commitment to protect any of the nations of Europe against any of the other nations of Europe, or if they do give such a commitment, they could not be expected to honor the commitment in some of the foreseeable contingencies. For should any of the nations of Europe have a strong incentive to change the status quo and be willing for

the sake of bringing about such a change, to pay the price of having a few of her cities demolished, she may also be able to exact a similar price from Russia or America; and there is no reason to believe that under the conditions described either Russia or America would be willing to pay such a price.

On the other hand, if the nations of Europe were to agree to renounce the possession of atomic and hydrogen bombs, then either Russia or America, or both, could guarantee a status quo agreed upon and make a commitment which they would be in a position to honor; for none of the nations of Europe could conceivably have a sufficient incentive for bringing about any changes in the ~~situations~~ status quo to be willing to pay the price of having demolished a considerable fraction of her cities, and this is precisely what America or Russia might threaten to do if the offending nation is not able to exact a similar price from them. Or to be more precise, if the offending nation does not have even one atomic bomb with which she could demolish one city in either Russia or America. We are dealing here with what you hear referred to politically in Washington, D.C. as a "nth's country problem". But what they mean the problem that France may soon test her first atomic bomb. The remarks here presented are meant to be a contribution to the discussion of this problem.

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SECTION SIX -- INSPECTION

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SECTION SEVEN -- COEXISTENCE OR FRIENDSHIP

I personally believe that the kind of pax Russ-American which is needed in order to secure peace not only for a limited period of time but long enough to be able to build a world community in which peace will be maintained without having to resort to a threat of force so that ultimately we may have a world without arms, cannot be built on coexistence between Russia and America, but must be built on friendship. Because friendship is a term that denotes a human relationship, it is not easy to say what the term "friendship" between nations denotes. Yet even without a precise definition, it should be possible to make clear the difference between friendship and coexistence.

Towards the end of the war, Russia was economically seriously weakened, and she was therefore greatly interested in obtaining upon the termination of war, reparations from Germany out of current production, -- the amount of a billion dollars a year for a period of ten years. Both Roosevelt and Churchill were opposed to reparations out of current production because -- so they said -- they had tried this after the first war and it did not work. In retrospect one might remark that both America and England were rather determined not to make the same mistakes after the second World War which the two nations made after the first World War, with a result that they made entirely different and conceivably bigger mistakes. It is obvious that if any reparations are extracted from a nation these reparations have to come out of current production. It is also likely that immediately after the war, Germany would not be able to pay reparations out of current production and that had the Russian demand for

50 x 12 = 600

reparations been accepted, America might have had to foot the bill to the tune of one billion dollars a year -- a rather puny amount in the light of the fact that America is spending about 40 billion dollars a year for defense at the present time.

In any case at the Yalta Conference, when America wanted Russia to enter into a commitment to cooperate in the war in the Far East, agreed to Russia's demand of ten billion dollars reparation as a basis of discussion. James Byrnes, in his book "Speaking Friendly", states this fact and he relates that when Russia raised the issue at the Potsdam Conference, she was told that she could not have any reparations from ~~out of~~ Germany out of current production but that she may take whatever she wants out of the zone in Germany which she has occupied. When Russian negotiators reminded American negotiators of the promise given at Yalta, they were told, "yes, yes, we agreed to this as a basis of discussion, but in the meantime we have discussed it and have decided against it". The relationship that America established at Potsdam concerning Russia was coexistence, but it was not friendship.

The time is probably past when America could utilize her economic resources for the purpose of being of assistance to Russia to any appreciable degree, but America could offer her cooperation to Russia for the purpose of developing the less industrialized nations of the world to the point where it would be possible to build a world community of nations. This is the only foundation upon which ultimately peace could be based-in which the threat of using force will no longer be necessary for the preservation of peace. America or Russia

could, each acting on its own, be perhaps of some help to the less industrialized nations. But Russia does not have much capital to spare, and America has few engineers and doctors who would be willing to live and work in under-developed areas. Only a combination of American capital and Russian professional skill can lead to rapid industrialization of the majority of the under-developed areas which lie outside of the ^{sphere} sphere of influence of either Russia or America.

Leedsport

memorably Minus

Out-line of Paper and Summary

One of the features which characterizes the present world situation is a sort of a stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of Russia and America. Both America and Russia ~~are~~ ^{may ~~not~~ be} stock piling powerful "dirty" hydrogen bombs ^{of high power} which could be carried by jet bombers to almost any point on the Earth. ~~The Cold War has somewhat abated but it has not completely stopped.~~ ^{and they would destroy each other to any desired degree}

Possibly, America and Russia could soon reach an agreement that would provide for the cessation of bomb tests and the freezing of the number of atomic and hydrogen bombs, which they may retain in their stockpiles. But if prompt, far-reaching, disarmament is the answer to the problem that the bomb poses to the world, then no agreement which steps short of eliminating the bombs, and the means suitable for their delivery, may be regarded as an adequate measure.

Is it likely that this crucial step will be taken by America and Russia in the near future? In the present paper I am examining this question and end up by predicting that such a step is not likely to be taken for ten years and that it might not be taken for twenty-five years.

If this forecast is correct, then the most important question before us is the following: What must America and Russia do--~~while~~ the stalemate lasts--in order to avoid the outbreak of an all-out atomic war which neither Russia nor America wants.

In the past twelve years most of us scientists were aware of the fact that we have gotten the world into a mess by producing the bomb and we thought that the way to get out of this situation may lie in turning the clock back, by getting rid of the bomb. Perhaps the time has now come to ask whether we were right and whether it might not be easier to get the world out of its present predicament--not by attempting to turn the clock back, but by doing just the opposite i. e., advance ^{ing} the clock ^{fast} as fast as we can.

Most of the present paper is concerned with drawing the conclusions from this latter thesis. I am led to conclude that it should be possible to stabilize the stalemate between the strategic striking forces of Russia and America, particularly the kind of stalemate towards which we are moving at present. I shall try to show that if this were done in the proper way, then war (at least in the

ordinary sense of the term, which means the slaughter of soldiers or civilians) would no longer be needed as an instrument of policy by either Russia or America. Thus war would become exceedingly improbable in the world in which America and Russia will of necessity occupy a dominating position. This result could be accomplished in the foreseeable future should Russia and America begin to cooperate to this end, in an intelligent as well as rational fashion, and that it cannot be accomplished any other way.

The Pax Russo-Americana which I envisage might be built on the following foundations:

(1) An agreement providing for arms limitation which permits America as well as Russia to retain a fairly large but limited number of ~~powerful~~ clean hydrogen bombs ^{of high power} in their stockpiles which could be carried by solid-fuel-long-range rockets that could be launched from ~~scattered~~ and invulnerable bases. ^{inside of Russia and America}

(2) An agreement between Russia and America ^{to} refrain from entering into the final stage of the arms race by refraining from developing defensive means suitable for the destruction of long-range rockets in flight.

(3) Means by which Russia and America can convince each other that there are no major secret violations of the arms limitations ^{that have} agreed upon.

(4) Such desirable changes of the present world map which can be brought about with the consent and approval of both Russia and America as well as the other major nations involved.

(5) ^{Means for the} ~~The~~ freezing and ~~protecting~~ ^{maintaining} of the map against forcible changes brought about by military intervention that would violate the territorial integrity of any nation.

(6) Friendship between Russia and America rather than co-existence and a joint effort to build up a world community of nations which may remain at peace even in the absence of any "deterrents" based on force.

At present the stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of Russia and America is essentially based on their strategic Air Force which operates from vulnerable bases in Russia and in America, as well as from ^{vulnerable or clean} bases on foreign soil maintained by America. ^{which may carry atomic hydrogen bombs of high power.} The stalemate in its present phase is not stable and it might therefore lead to an all-out atomic war that neither America nor Russia wants.

The character of the stalemate is rapidly changing however and we could before long have a stalemate based on solid-fuel-long-range rockets capable of being launched from invulnerable bases inside America and inside Russia. The "warheads" carried by these rockets could consist, within the foreseeable future, in ~~powerful~~ "clean" hydrogen bombs. *of high power.*

When this second stage of the stalemate is reached it may then become possible to eliminate the technological instability inherent in the present, the first stage, of the stalemate (~~which is~~ characterized by a strategic air force that operates from vulnerable air bases and may carry dirty hydrogen bombs.)

Moreover, ~~thethis~~, the second stage of the stalemate the basic causes of the power conflict, in which Russia and America found themselves caught in the post-war years, may wholly disappear and, accordingly, ~~most~~, if not all, the controversial issues of the post-war years may become negotiable. While America and Russia may each desire to bring about certain changes in the present status quo neither of them may be willing to make substantial economic sacrifices in order to bring about, forcibly, any of these changes. Therefore, they may both be content with modifying the status quo, where this is desirable, ~~from the point of view of stabilizing peace~~, only with the approval and consent of both nations as well as with the consent of the other major powers involved. My main point is, that at this stage of the stalemate America's and Russia's real interests will closely co-incide; these will consist in preserving the status quo, eliminate all risks of an atomic war and maintain or achieve economic prosperity.

But if it be true that Russia and America will have nothing to fear from each other at this stage, there will still remain fear to be feared. Such fear must necessarily be engendered by the existence of large stockpiles of ~~powerful~~ "clean" hydrogen bombs, ~~particularly~~ *of high power* in the absence of a ~~clear~~ *substantive* philosophy ~~(understood by all)~~ as to how such bombs might be employed in any hypothetical--and be it ever so unlikely--contingency. *markedly.*

Since, as I assume, ~~that~~ these bombs will remain stockpiled in Russia as well as in America for a long time to come, how then can the world rid itself of fear? Is there any satisfactory set of rules of conduct concerning the potential use of such bombs in any hypo-

thetical--and be it ever to unlikely--eventuality, which either Russia or America or both may adopt, if necessary by unilateral declarations? Rules of this sort, if they are to render the stalemate stable, must be of such a nature that--once they are formulated and proclaimed by either party--it should be, from then on, in the interests of ~~both America and Russia~~ ^{both parties} to abide by the proclaimed set of rules.

We may a priori leave out of consideration, on moral grounds as well as grounds of expediency, any rules that would be based on "deterrents" that will imply a threat to the lives of civilians, ~~or involve the mass slaughter of soldiers~~. But we must not, and cannot, rule out the threat that bombs might be used for the destruction of property--in certain hypothetical eventualities.

One particular set of rules, that appears to be satisfactory in all these respects, is set forth in the present paper. It is my contention that if the American and the Russian Governments abide by such a set of rules, then no "disturbance" that might occur (as the result of an accident resulting from a technological error or from some mistake in judgment) would be capable of starting a chain of events leading to ever increasing destruction and that it would therefore be in the interests of both nations to abide by the self-imposed restraints which are circumscribed by this particular set of rules.

Because the strategic stalemate toward which we are moving is wholly without precedent, any satisfactory set of rules of conduct must of necessity be unprecedented also. This, of course, presents a major difficulty because any set of rules--in order to serve a useful purpose--must be politically acceptable and nothing that is unprecedented is easy to accept. The rules that I propose suffer from this defect also, but if I were asked to propose a set of rules which does not suffer from this defect and yet would fill the bill in the atomic stalemate, I should have to reply: "I regret, I am unable to oblige."

Fortunately, measures that may not be ~~politically~~ ^{morally} acceptable to the people today may become acceptable tomorrow when the people have had enough time to see the necessity of these measures. And

politicians even though they may appear to be fools some of the time, won't all be fools all of the time.

With such a vista of a stable stalemate before us, ~~one~~ *it is necessary to go further to inquire* of our main concerns must now be to maintain that stalemate *remain stable in the could make any run.* stable. If America and Russia were to enter into the third phase of the arms race, i.e., the phase in which scientists and engineers ~~would~~ *more to* develop means capable of destroying long range rockets in flight, then each one of these two nations would have to fear that the other might achieve a technological breakthrough and thus become immune to any attack by long range rockets. Clearly, if one of the two nations was thus in a position to destroy the other in one single sudden blow, while it is in the position to put up an effective defense against any possible counter-blow, then the stalemate would have to be regarded as inherently unstable. Moreover, during this third phase of the arms race, America and Russia would want to increase the number of atomic or hydrogen bombs because they may need an indeterminate number of such bombs for the destruction of long-range rockets in flight. Thus, it would be impossible for them to freeze the bomb stockpiles ~~at~~ *at* the comparatively low level which - in the absence of this kind of an arms race - would be acceptable to them. ~~As a matter of fact, if American and Russian strategic defense policy becomes focused on the destruction of long range rockets in flight, it will be impossible to freeze the bomb stockpiles at any level that might still be regarded as reasonably safe from the point of view of the world.~~

Assuming that America and Russia were to enter into an agreement providing for a freeze in the number of bombs which they may stockpile and prohibit research and development work aimed at the destruction of rockets in flight, how could they convince each other that there is in fact no illicit work secretly in progress? I am examining this question in the present paper, and I am led to the conclusion that in the setting of a ~~P~~ *P* Russo-Americana, there is a satisfactory answer to it.

April 18, 1958

A PAX-RUSSO-AMERICANA IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE

vs versus

~~THE~~ REACHING ATOMIC DISARMAMENT AT AN EARLY DATE

by

LEO SZILARD

SUMMARY

One of the features which characterizes the present world situation is a sort of a stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of Russia and America. Both America and Russia are stock piling powerful dirty hydrogen bombs which could be carried by jet bombers to almost any point on the Earth. The Cold War has somewhat abated but it has not stopped. Perhaps it is true that ~~war is now~~ impossible but it is my no means improbable. ^{perhaps true} It is ~~conceivable~~ that before long America and Russia ~~could~~ ^{might} reach an agreement that will provide for the cessation of bomb tests and the freezing of the number and perhaps also the total power of the atomic and hydrogen bombs which they may retain in their stockpiles. But if far-reaching atomic disarmament in the near future is the answer/^{to the problem} that the bomb poses to the world--and I am not sure that it is--then no agreement which stops short of eliminating the bombs and the means suitable for the delivery of the bombs, (such as jet bombers and long range rockets) may be regarded as an adequate measure. Is it likely that this crucial step will be taken by America and Russia in the near future? ^{am} In the present paper I ~~shall~~ ^{am} examining this question and I am led to ~~conclude~~ ^{the conclusion} that ~~such a step~~ ^{is not likely to be} taken for the next ten years and that it may not be taken for twenty-five years. If this conclusion is correct, then the most important problem before us is/^{this: must} What/America and Russia ~~must~~ do in order to avoid the outbreak of an all-out atomic war which ~~manifestly~~ neither Russia nor America wants.

/In the past twelve years most of us were aware of the fact that we have gotten the world into a mess by producing the bomb. Most of us thought that the way/^{to get} out of this situation must lie in turning the clock back, by getting rid of the bomb. Perhaps the time has now come to ask whether we were right and whether it might not be easier to get the world out of its present predicament not by attempting to turn the clock back--which might be impossible--but by turning the clock as fast as we can forward. / In the last two sections of the present paper I ~~shall~~ ^{am} present the case for ~~this thesis~~ ^{latter} and I contend ~~that we could~~ ^{thus obtain} ~~such a world~~ ^{a world in} which war--at least in the ordinary sense of the term--would be wholly unnecessary and, therefore, exceedingly improbable. I ~~shall~~ ^{am} attempting to show ~~that this result could~~ ^{that this result could} be accomplished ^{in the foreseeable future} were Russia and America to cooperate to this end in an intelligent, as well as rational, fashion and that it cannot be accomplished any other way.

In the present paper I shall try to appraise, as carefully as I can, the chances of achieving peace through the early accomplishment of far-reaching atomic disarmament and I shall compare its chances with the chance of achieving, in the foreseeable future, a Pax-Russo-Americana.

I am led to conclude that the chances are overwhelmingly in favor of a Pax-Russo-Americana provided that a real attempt is made to base it on the following:

(1) An agreement providing for arms limitation which permits America as well as Russia to retain a fairly large but limited number of powerful clean hydrogen bombs in their stockpiles, as well as solid-fuel-long-range rockets which could be launched from scattered invulnerable basis.

The maintenance by America and by Russia of a strategic atomic striking force of this nature would cost only a small fraction of the expense which they currently incur for the maintenance of the strategic air force.

(2) An agreement between Russia and America to refrain from entering into the final stage of the arms race by refraining from developing means suitable for the destruction of long-range rockets in flight.

(3) Means by which Russia and America can convince each other that there are no major secret violations of the arms limitations agreed upon.

(4) Such changes of the present world map which can be brought about with the consent and approval of both Russia and America as well as the other major nations involved.

(5) The freezing and protecting of the map against forcible changes brought about by military intervention that would violate the territorial integrity of any nation.

(6) Friendship between Russia and America rather than co-existence and a joint effort to build up a world community of nations which may remain at peace even in the absence of any "deterrents" based on force.

At present we have a stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of Russia and America based essentially on their Strategic Air Force which operates from bases in Russia and in America, as well as from bases on ~~foreign~~ foreign soil maintained by America. The stalemate in its present phase is inherently unstable and might lead to an all-out atomic war that neither America nor Russia wants.

The character of the stalemate is rapidly changing however and we could before long have a stalemate based on a solid-fuel-long-range rockets capable of being launched from invulnerable bases inside America and inside Russia. The "warheads" carried by these rockets could consist, within the foreseeable future, in powerful "clean" hydrogen bombs.

When this phase of the stalemate is reached it may then become possible to eliminate the technological instability inherent in the present state of the stalemate (which is characterized by a strategic air force that operates from vulnerable air bases and may carry dirty hydrogen bombs.) Moreover, in this phase of the stalemate both Russia and America may be free to reduce their arms expenditure to a small fraction, perhaps less than 1% of their national income.

In this phase of the stalemate the basic causes of the power conflict, in which Russia and America found themselves caught in the post-war years, may disappear and, accordingly, most, if not all, the controversial issues of those post-war years may become negotiable. Where America and Russia may each still desire to bring about certain changes in the present status quo neither of them may be willing to make substantial economic sacrifices in order to bring about, forcibly, any of these changes. Therefore, they may both be content with modifying the status quo where this is desirable from the point of view of stabilizing peace only with the approval and consent of both nations as well as with the consent of the other major powers involved. At this state America's and Russia's real interests will closely co-incide, they will consist in preserving the status quo, eliminate all risks of an atomic war and achieve economic prosperity.

But if it be true that Russia and America will have nothing to fear from each other at this stage, there will still remain fear to be feared. Such fear must necessarily be engendered by the existence of large stockpiles of powerful clean hydrogen bombs, in the absence of a clear philosophy (understood by all) as to how such bombs might be employed in any conceivable--and be it ever so unlikely--contingency. The question which thus arises is, therefore, as follows:

satisfactory

Is there any/set of rules of conduct concerning the potential use of such bombs in any conceivable--and be it ever so unlikely-- contingency which both Russia and America may adopt--if necessary by unilateral declarations? Such rules if they are to render the stalemate stable must be of such a nature that once they are formulated (and understood by the Governments as well as the people involved) from then on it would be in the interests of the nations to abide by this particular set of rules.

A set of rules fulfilling these requirements is set forth in the present paper. It is my contention that if the American and the Russian Governments abide by this set of rules--and I shall try to show that it will be in their interests to do so--then no "disturbance" that might occur (as the result of an accident resulting from a technological error or from some mistake in judgment) would be capable of starting a chain of events leading to ever increasing destruction.

In any civilized society there is a minority of human beings who are inclined to give due weight to moral considerations. A set of rules, even if they were fully accepted by all Governments, ~~would~~ might not hold up were it actually invoked in a contingency should the rules offend the sensibilities of this minority. On this ground alone I ~~have eliminated from consideration~~ left out of consideration sets of rules based on sanctions which will threaten the lives of civilians; men, women and children.

Because the strategic stalemate toward which we are moving is wholly without precedent any satisfactory set of rules of conduct must of necessity be unprecedented^{ed}~~xxxxxx~~ also. This, of course, presents a major difficulty because any set of rules--in order to serve a useful purpose--must be politically acceptable and nothing ~~unprecedented~~ ^{that is} unprecedented is easy to accept. The rules that I propose suffer from this defect also, but if you were to ask me to propose a set of rules which does not suffer from this defect and yet would fill the bill in the atomic stalemate, I should have to reply, "Gentlemen, I regret that I am unable to oblige."

Fortunately, measures that may not be politically acceptable today may become acceptable tomorrow when people have had enough time to see the necessity of these measures. All politicians may be fooled some of the time but they won't be all fools all of the time.

America and Russia might at first wish to retain stockpiles of small bombs also with the thought in mind that such bombs could be used in combat, particularly if they were to intervene on opposite sides of a local conflict. But in this state of the atomic stalemate which I envisage, America's and Russia's position would be strengthened rather than weakened if there were a universal agreement to prohibit the use of atomic bombs in warfare with the possible exception of such unlikely contingencies as an invasion of American territory proper

by Russian troops or Russian territory proper by American troops. Disregarding such contingencies, which almost certainly would not occur, America and Russia would be better off if they agreed to rid the world altogether of small atomic bombs.

The chances are that even though America and Russia might wish to remain free to maintain an air force, an Army and Navy, these would wither away fast because they are expensive to maintain as well as wholly unnecessary as long as the stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of America and Russia remains in existence.

If I am right in my contention that it is possible for America to retain powerful clean hydrogen bombs in her stockpile and live at peace without ever having to threaten to use these bombs for the killing of civilians, nor even to threaten to use atomic weapons in local wars, then one is led to arrive at the following conclusions.

The need of the hour is not an agreement between Russia and America that provides for a prohibition of further bomb tests but rather an agreement which provides for America and Russia to continue bomb tests until they both know how to make powerful clean hydrogen bombs which are light enough and compact enough to be carried by solid-fuel-long-range rocket. This is necessary in order to enable Russia and America to replace the powerful "dirty" hydrogen bombs in their stockpiles with similar "clean" bombs.

The present Russian and American stockpiling of dirty bombs represents a threat to the population of the whole world. Clearly, the arms race must be stopped at some point but if it were stopped right now we would freeze the most undesirable, of all conceivable, stages in the atomic arms race.

What we need is an agreement between Russia and America that will provide for the cooperation of their scientists aimed at preventing the arms race from entering into its next state. I. e., the stage at which scientists would develop means that would make it possible to destroy long range rockets in flight. If America and Russia were to enter into this "final" stage of the arms race, they would thereby preclude themselves from freezing their bomb stockpiles at any level that may be regarded as reasonably safe. Moreover, Russia as well as

America would live under the constant threat that there might occur a technological break-through achieved by either America or Russia which would render the stalemate once more unstable.

Assuming that America and Russia were to enter into an agreement prohibiting research and development work that would get them into this final stage of the arms race, how could they convince each other that there is no secret work in progress aimed at the development of means for the destruction of long-range rockets in flight? I am examining this question in the last section of the present paper and I am led to conclude that there is a satisfactory answer to it.

April 18, 1958

Towards

~~A PAX-RUSSO-AMERICANA IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE~~

~~rather than the~~
~~EARLY ATOMIC DISARMAMENT AT AN EARLY DATE~~

by

LEO SZILARD

*On the possibility of
a Pax Russo-American
in the second stage
of the atomic state-
mate.*

Most of the present paper is concerned with examining this

letter thesis, and I am lead to ~~the~~ conclude that it should be ~~possible~~

~~possible~~ to stabilize ~~in~~ a more advanced form of the stalemate between

the strategic striking forces of Russia and America under certain

specific conditions, and that this may lead to a situation in the

world in which war, (at least in the ordinary sense of the terms in

which it means the slaughter of soldiers and civilians, would become

almost unnecessary as an instrument of policy for Russia, as well

as for America, and that it would therefore become exceedingly

improbable in the world in which America and Russia will of necessity

occupy a dominating position. I am attempting to show that this

result could be accomplished in the foreseeable future, should Russia

and American begin to cooperate to this end in the near future in

an intelligent as well as national fashion and that it cannot be

accomplished any other way.

Handwritten notes:
The stalemate...
which is now in place...
particularly the kind of stalemate towards...
I shall try to show that if this were done then...
would no longer be needed...
or
thus war...
or
I am attempting to show that this...
1919/11/11

X

Which is the same as to be ready to proceed for reaching atomic disarmament at an early date or a Par Russo Americania in the foreseeable future.

SUMMARY

X One of the features which characterizes the present world situation is a sort of a ~~stalemate~~ ^{post} stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of Russia and America. Both America and Russia are stock piling powerful "dirty" hydrogen bombs which could be carried by jet bombers to almost any point on the Earth. The Cold War has somewhat abated but it has not ~~stopped~~ ^{completely}. ~~Perhaps it is true that war is now becoming impossible but it is no means improbable.~~ ^{war is now becoming impossible} ~~It is conceivable that before long America and Russia ~~could~~ reach an agreement that will provide for the cessation of bomb tests and the freezing of the number and perhaps also the total power of the atomic and hydrogen bombs which they may retain in their stockpiles.~~ ^{perhaps some parallels,} ~~But if far-reaching atomic disarmament in the near future is the answer that the bomb poses to the world--and I am not sure that it is--then no agreement which stops short of eliminating the bombs and the means suitable for the delivery of the bombs (such as jet bombers and long range rockets) may be regarded as an adequate measure.~~ ^{prompt} ~~Is it likely that this crucial step will be taken by America and Russia in the near future?~~ ^{to the problems} ~~In the present paper I ~~shall~~ ^{am examining} examining this question and I am led to conclude that more likely than not, such a step will not be taken for the next ten years and that it may not be taken for twenty-five years.~~ ^{is not likely to} ~~If this conclusion is correct, then the most important problem before us is what America and Russia must do in order to avoid the outbreak of an all-out atomic war which ~~manifestly~~ ^{is} neither Russia nor America wants.~~ ^{is not likely to}

X In the past twelve years most of us were aware of the fact that we have gotten the world into a mess by producing the bomb. Most of us thought that the way ^{to get} out of this situation ~~must~~ ^{may} lie in turning the clock back, by getting rid of the bomb. Perhaps the time has now come to ask whether we were right and whether it might not be easier to get the world out of its present predicament--not by attempting to turn the clock back ^{and we} which might be impossible--but by turning the clock as fast as we can forward. ^{to the immediate future}

In the last two sections of the present paper I shall present the case for the ^{rather} thesis that we could, if we only understood the real ^{and we could} problems which face us, have then in the foreseeable future a world in which war--at least in the ordinary sense of the term--would be wholly ^{by stabilizing} unnecessary and, therefore, exceedingly improbable. I shall attempt ^{to show} to show ^{it could in fact be accomplished} it could in fact be accomplished were Russia and America to cooperate to this end in an intelligent, as well as rational, fashion and that it cannot be accomplished any other way.

What is the point of this? This is a world in which this result could be accomplished...

in which they will be...

The Pax Russo Americana which I envisage, might be based on the following:

In the present paper I shall try to appraise, as carefully as I can, the chances of achieving peace through the early accomplishment of far-reaching atomic disarmament and I shall compare its chances with the chance of achieving, in the foreseeable future, a Pax-Russo-Americana.

Thus I am led to conclude that the chances are overwhelmingly in favor of a Pax-Russo-Americana provided that a real attempt is made to base it on the following:

(1) An agreement providing for arms limitation which permits America as well as Russia to retain a fairly large but limited number of powerful clean hydrogen bombs in their stockpiles, as well as solid-fuel-long-range rockets which could be launched from scattered invulnerable bases.

The maintenance by America and by Russia of a strategic atomic striking force of this nature would cost only a small fraction of the expense which they currently incur for the maintenance of the strategic air force.

(2) An agreement between Russia and America to refrain from entering into the final stage of the arms race by refraining from developing means suitable for the destruction of long-range rockets in flight.

(3) Means by which Russia and America can convince each other that there are no major secret violations of the arms limitations agreed upon.

(4) Such changes of the present world map which can be brought about with the consent and approval of both Russia and America as well as the other major nations involved.

(5) The freezing and protecting of the map against forcible changes brought about by military intervention that would violate the territorial integrity of any nation.

(6) Friendship between Russia and America rather than co-existence and a joint effort to build up a world community of nations which may remain at peace even in the absence of any "deterrents" based on force.

At present we have a stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of Russia and America based essentially on their Strategic Air Force which operates from bases in Russia and in America, as well as from bases on foreign soil maintained by America. The stalemate in its present phase is inherently unstable and might lead to an all-out atomic war that neither America nor Russia wants.

as the ~~saying~~, as I assume, that these bombs will remain stockpiled
in Russia ~~as well~~ ^{since} as well as in America for a long time to come, how then
can the world rid itself of fear? Is there any satisfactory set
of rules of conduct concerning the potential use of such bombs in
any hypothetical--and be it ever so slight--^{unlooked}eventuality, which either
Russia or America or both may adopt, if necessary by unilateral
declarations? Rules of this sort, if they are to render the stalemate
stable, must be of such a nature that--once they are formulated ^{by either party} and
proclaimed--^{by either party} it should be, from then on, in the interests of both
America and Russia to abide by the proclaimed set of rules. ~~¶~~ We may
a priori leave out of consideration on moral grounds as well as
grounds of expediency any rules that would be based on deterrents
that will imply a threat to the lives of civilians or which ~~would~~
~~even~~ involve the mass slaughter of soldiers. ^{and can not,} But we must not ^{rule}
out the ^{threat}possibility that bombs ^{might} may be used for the destruction ~~of~~
~~a~~ ^{need} strictly limited ^{may} destruction ~~of~~ of property, in certain
^{hypothetical eventualities.}

Today's success of preserving a balance of important relationships!!

The character of the stalemate is rapidly changing however and we could before long have a stalemate based on a solid-fuel-long-range rockets capable of being launched from invulnerable bases inside America and inside Russia. The "warheads" carried by these rockets could consist, within the foreseeable future, in powerful "clean" hydrogen bombs.

The first stage!

When this ^{second stage} phase of the stalemate is reached it may then become possible to eliminate the technological instability inherent in the present state of the stalemate (which is characterized by a strategic air force that operates from vulnerable air bases and may carry dirty hydrogen bombs.) Moreover, in this phase of the stalemate both Russia and America may be free to reduce their arms expenditure to a small fraction, perhaps less than 1% of their national income.

Moreover, the second stage

In this phase of the stalemate the basic causes of the power conflict, in which Russia and America found themselves caught in the post-war years, may disappear and, accordingly, most, if not all, the controversial issues of those post-war years may become negotiable. Where America and Russia may each still desire to bring about certain changes in the present status quo neither of them may be willing to make substantial economic sacrifices in order to bring about, forcibly, any of these changes. Therefore, they may both be content with modifying the status quo where this is desirable from the point of view of stabilizing peace, only with the approval and consent of both nations as well as with the consent of the other major powers involved.

My main point is that

At this state America's and Russia's real interests will closely co-incide; they will consist in preserving the status quo, eliminate all risks of an atomic war and achieve economic prosperity.

maintain or

But if it be true that Russia and America will have nothing to fear from each other at this stage, there will still remain fear to be feared. Such fear must necessarily be engendered by the existence of large stockpiles of powerful clean hydrogen bombs in the absence of a clear philosophy (understood by all) as to how such bombs might be employed in any conceivable--and be it ever so unlikely--contingency. The question which thus arises is, therefore, as follows:

prohibitive

Is there any/set of rules of conduct concerning the potential use of such bombs in any conceivable--and be it ever so unlikely--contingency which both Russia and America may adopt--if necessary by unilateral declarations? Such rules if they are to render the stalemate stable must be of such a nature that once they are formulated (and understood by the Governments as well as the people involved) from then on it would be in the interests of the nations to abide by this particular set of rules.

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universal grounds as well as on grounds of exp.

Some out of consideration rules of conduct are suggested that would "deterrents" that or for that matter the bones of soldiers (but I do) not rule that these are to use the hydrogen since we must assume that these limited use of the bomb for limited deterrence. For a long time to come, how then can the world rid itself of fear? I propose to... I don't know how can such a state-mate be rendered stable? This question is the... maybe reduced to the... American to answer

~~One particular~~

~~A set of rules fulfilling these requirements is set forth in~~

the present paper. ~~It is my contention that if the American and the Russian Governments abide by this set of rules, and I shall try to show that it will be in their interests to do so~~ then no "disturbance" that might occur (as the result of an accident resulting from a technological error or from some mistake in judgment) would be capable of

starting a chain of events leading to ever increasing destruction ~~and that it would therefore be in the interest of both nations~~

~~In any civilized society there is a minority of human beings~~

who are inclined to give due weight to moral considerations. A set of rules, even if they were fully accepted by all Governments, ~~may~~ might not hold up were it actually invoked in a contingency should the rules

offend the sensibilities of this minority. On this ground alone I

~~have~~ left out of consideration ~~sets of~~

~~rules based on sanctions which will threaten the lives of civilians; men, women and children.~~

~~Because the strategic stalemate toward which we are moving is wholly without precedent any satisfactory set of rules of conduct must of necessity be unprecedented~~ also. This, of course, presents a

major difficulty because any set of rules--in order to serve a useful purpose--must be politically acceptable and nothing ~~unprecedented~~ is easy to accept. The rules that I propose suffer from this defect

also, but if you were to ask me to propose a set of rules which does not suffer from this defect and yet would fill the bill in the atomic stalemate, I should have to reply: "Gentlemen," I regret, that I am unable to oblige."

Fortunately, measures that may not be politically acceptable today may become acceptable tomorrow when people have had enough time to see the necessity of these measures. ~~Politicians~~ politicians may be fooled some of the time, but they won't be all fools all of the time.

America and Russia might at first wish to retain stockpiles of small bombs, also, with the thought in mind that such bombs could be used in combat, particularly if they were to intervene on opposite sides of a local conflict. But in this stage of the atomic stalemate which I envisage, America's and Russia's position would be strengthened, rather than weakened, if there were a universal agreement to prohibit the use of atomic bombs in warfare, with the possible exception of such unlikely contingencies as an invasion of American territory proper

appears to be

such a

which would be able to but would not hold up were it actually invoked in a contingency should the rules offend the sensibilities of this minority.

to the self-interest of the nations which are involved in this part of the set of rules

is supposed to be in order

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it is our hope that

incontingencies

the people

In the second stage of the stalemate

by Russian troops or Russian territory proper by American troops. Disregarding such contingencies, which almost certainly would not occur, America and Russia would be better off if they agreed to rid the world altogether of small atomic bombs. The chances are that even though America and Russia might

wish to remain free to maintain an air force, an Army and Navy, these would wither away fast because they are expensive to maintain as well as wholly unnecessary as long as the stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of America and Russia remains in existence.

If I am right in my contention, that it is possible for America to retain powerful clean hydrogen bombs in her stockpile and live at peace without ever having to threaten to use these bombs for the killing of civilians, nor even to threaten to use atomic weapons in local wars, then one is led to arrive at the following conclusions: The need of the hour is not an agreement between Russia and America that provides for a prohibition of further bomb tests but rather an agreement which provides for America and Russia to continue bomb tests until they both know how to make powerful clean hydrogen bombs which are light enough and compact enough to be carried by solid-fuel-long-range rocket. This is necessary in order to enable Russia and America to replace the powerful "dirty" hydrogen bombs in their stockpiles with similar "clean" bombs.)

The present Russian and American stockpiling of dirty bombs represents a threat to the population of the whole world. Clearly, the arms race must be stopped at some point but if it were stopped right now we would freeze the most undesirable, of all conceivable, stages in the atomic arms race.

What we need is an agreement between Russia and America that will provide for the cooperation of their scientists aimed at preventing the arms race from entering into its next state. I. e., the stage at which scientists would develop means that would make it possible to destroy long range rockets in flight. If America and Russia were to enter into this "final" stage of the arms race, they would thereby preclude themselves from freezing their bomb stockpiles at any level that may be regarded as reasonably safe. Moreover, Russia as well as

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^{then}
 America would live under the constant threat that there might occur
 a technological break-through achieved by either America or Russia
 which would render the stalemate ~~once more unstable.~~ ^{inherently}
^{instable.}

Assuming that America and Russia were to enter into an agree-
 ment prohibiting research and development work ^{that would get them}
~~into this final stage of the arms race, how could they convince each~~
~~other that there is no~~ ^{secret} ~~work in progress, aimed at the develop-~~
~~ment of means for the destruction of long-range rockets in flight?~~

I am examining this question ~~in the last section of the present paper~~
 and I am led to conclude that there is a satisfactory answer to it. —

Oct 20/58

First section

Introduction

Propaganda has been defined as ^{the} gentle art of confusing your friends without deceiving your enemies. For the past 12 years ^{while the cold war} the statesmen of the so-called free

^{was raging} world, as well as the statesmen of Russia, have been practicing this art ^{was practiced} on a

grand scale and with conspicuous success. As ^{the} result of this operation, political

thought is ^{at present} in a state of unprecedented confusion -- in view of the threat that

the bomb presents to the world, imperils ^{where this is what they conceal is} the life of all of us. ^{There was} a time when ^{statesmen} statesmen ^{concealed their} concealed their ^{strengths} strengths; nowadays they speak ^{of} the absence of it. ^{Clearly} Clearly the bomb poses a new problem to the world, and the statesmen of the

world do not know the answer to this problem.)

^{At present} Because of this, America as well as Russia and the rest of the world, is ~~at~~ present in real trouble, and when in trouble, the best recipe is "to state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth".)

I believe ^{that if they followed this recipe} scientists could at this ~~con~~ juncture render a ^{and make} service ^{public} by making a ^{real} significant contribution to the clarification of the ^{relevant} issues in the public mind.

In order to do my share to help to dispel the fog that in the past 12 years, the ^{scattered public} discussion ^{by statesmen} by statesmen has spread over the issues connected with the bomb

^{and} I propose to disregard ^{the} amenities ^{on this occasion} and for the sake of clarity, call a spade a spade.

The Strategic Stalemate -- Where it Stands at Present, and What Form it

May Take in the Foreseeable Future.

We have at present ^a some sort of stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of Russia and America, essentially based on America's and Russia's ability to destroy each other to any desired degree. Both Russia and America have found out ^{apparently learned} how to make powerful so-called "dirty" hydrogen bombs ^{of the} of the

fission-fusion ~~fission~~ type. Such bombs could be transported today by jet bombers ^{from inside the area of Russia or from inside of America} from ~~inside the area of Russia or from inside of America~~ to almost any point of the earth. ^{and the air bases} ~~maintained at an~~ ~~frequency not~~

X
The American Strategic Air Force operates from bases inside America and also from bases maintained by America on foreign soil. These bases are vulnerable and could be knocked out by a single sudden attack. For this reason America has been forced to adopt, as her defense ^{policy} strategy, the principle of instant retaliation.

If warning is received that foreign planes have crossed what America regards as

her air defense perimeter, American jet bombers carrying powerful hydrogen bombs, ^{at the}

^{“dirty” or “clean” variants} are supposed to take off. They are not supposed to continue their flight into

Russian territory unless subsequent information appears to confirm that an attack

against American bases or American cities is ^{“imminent”} in progress.

Such a stalemate would have to be regarded as inherently unstable if it were

possible for ^{either} both of these two nations to destroy in one single, sudden attack

the ability of the other nation to retaliate. This is not the case at present,

but there are elements of this ^{kind of} instability contained in the present situation.

Moreover, maintaining the present form of stalemate is an exceedingly costly

operation and a drain on the economic resources of both Russia and America. We

might be ^{going} going through a transition period in which America might be forced to

keep ^{about} but one-third of its bombers loaded with powerful hydrogen bombs in the air,

which would further greatly increase the cost involved. There might further be

a ^{further} transition period in which America ^{will} partially rely on submarines capable of

firing intermediate range rockets ^{equipped} armed with hydrogen bombs; ^{also} or else America

might partially rely on low-flying pilotless bombers which ^{would} may be launched from

scattered bases and which ^{could} might be regarded as effective for a period of years

until Russia develops appropriate counter measures.

For the purpose of our ^{discussion, aimed at discovering} considerations, which are the discussing of the policies which ^{would} appear desirable from the long-term point of view, we shall disregard these

all those at ~~dealing with~~
(transition phases of the stalemate and focus our attention on what we might call

the second stage of the stalemate, towards which both Russia and America are ~~moving~~
moving at present.)

~~PP~~ In this, second stage of the stalemate, solid-fuel long-range rockets will be available in ^{large} record numbers to both Russia and America. Both Russia and America will have developed powerful clean hydrogen bombs, of a type that can be produced in adequate quantities ^{and is} that is, compact, ^{as well as light} enough and large enough to be carried by long-range rockets. ~~There is no reason to assume that either America or Russia have developed clean hydrogen bombs to the point where they meet these specifications, and I am assuming they would both have to continue bomb tests in order to accomplish this objective.~~ At this stage of the stalemate there will be no need for America to have bases on foreign soil, nor will either America or Russia need to adopt a ^{policy} strategy of instant retaliation, since the bases from which the long-range rockets ^{can} may be launched ^{may} will be scattered within the territory of Russia and America and there will be so-called "hard bases" ^{proper} that will be invulnerable ^{i.e. they} and could not be destroyed by an aerial attack. The elements of technological instability which are contained in the present - the first stage of the stalemate - will thus be absent in this second stage of the stalemate.

When the second stage of the stalemate is reached and if the arms race can be stopped at ^{that} this stage, then America and Russia ^{could should be able} would be in a position to agree to limit the number of powerful hydrogen bombs in their stockpile, and they ~~could~~ ^{could} agree to eliminate from their stockpiles all the "dirty" hydrogen bombs, the fission-fusion-fission bombs. The number of clean hydrogen bombs they may both wish to retain might be fairly large, ^{- just} (how large ^{may} would depend on factors which ~~are~~ ^{are} other than purely military.

~~Then~~ ^{But} if the ~~arms race~~ ^{is} ~~is~~ ^{were} permitted to go further and if America and Russia ~~begin~~ ^{would} to develop defensive counter measures, which ~~will~~ ^{would} put them in a position to destroy long-range rockets in flight, ~~the arms race would enter its third and most dangerous stage.~~ ^{then} ~~The stalemate might once more become inherently unstable if either Russia or America~~ ^{should} ~~succeeds~~ in achieving a technological break-through leading to an effective defense against rockets in flight. Such a defense would presumably be based on the use of atomic or hydrogen bombs that ~~would be exploded in the vicinity of the incoming rocket, while it is in flight.~~ ^{then} This means that in the third ~~stage~~ ^{phase} of the arms race it ~~will~~ ^{would} be impossible for Russia and America to agree to limit the stockpiles of bombs to any level that might still be considered reasonably safe from ~~a world point of view.~~ ^{the} ~~of the world.~~ ^{of the world}

The Present American Military Policy

~~I shall~~ ^{examine} ~~propose to scrutinize now~~ ~~the present American military policy must be viewed, I believe, from the perspective of the~~ ^{clearly} ~~changing stalemate, because it takes a long time from the formulation of a policy until that policy can~~ ^{always} ~~be implemented.~~ ^{actually} ~~I propose to scrutinize~~ ^{and therefore} ~~the present American military policy~~ ^{on} ~~on the assumption that it would have to be operative in a setting that is characterized by the existence of an atomic stalemate of the kind that will exist in the second stage -- that is, a stalemate based on powerful clean hydrogen bombs and solid-fuel-long-range rockets. Viewed in this way I shall try to show that the basic premise of American military policy is invalid.~~

~~What is the present American military policy?~~ ~~XXXX~~ If there is an armed conflict

in any area of the world and if America and Russia intervene militarily on opposite sides, America ^{prepares to} ~~may~~ use atomic bombs in combat. America may use atomic bombs also ^{to a} ~~in the depth~~ of several hundred miles behind the pre-war boundary for the purpose

X of disrupting communications and destroying supplies ^{and} as well as air bases. Most

of those who advocate this military policy believe that even though there ~~may~~ ^{will}

be a strategic stalemate -- and I shall assume in my discussion throughout this

paper the second stage of such a stalemate -- and even though ^{in actuality likely} America and Russia

^{will} may have large stockpiles of clean hydrogen bombs, these stockpiles ^{will} somehow neutralize

each other ~~because~~ ^{could possibly} neither side ~~can~~ ^{be used} use in any manner powerful hydrogen bombs ^{of high}

^{power} against the territory of the other without provoking an all-out atomic war that

~~neither side can possibly want.~~ ^{neither of them} Therefore, so they argue, the course of the war

and its outcome will remain ~~ineffective~~ ^{totally unaffected} by the existence of these powerful clean

~~hydrogen bombs.~~ ^{at least} I shall try to show ^{you} later why I regard this assumption ^{as} wholly

X ~~invalid.~~ ^{it} But I propose to accept for the moment, for the sake of argument, ~~this~~ ^{invalid}

~~premise.~~ ^{I am, however, willing to assume again} Let us then assume that ~~we shall~~ ^{there may be} have a localized atomic war

^{more} and that ~~war~~ ^{for the sake of argument} remains localized. How will such a war ever end, if Russia and

America fight on opposing sides? ^P In the unlikely case, if atomic bombs are used,

^P We saw in the case of the Korean war in which no atomic bombs were used, how

difficult it was to end the war, long after it became clear that the war will end

with the restoration of the status quo except, of course, for the extensive

destruction which has been wrought in both north and south Korea. If atomic bombs

are used on both sides, the war might still end with the restoration of the status

quo, but only in the unlikely case that both Russia and America are equally well

supplied with atomic bombs. ^X Otherwise the war would be likely to go on until the

area is almost completely destroyed, with few buildings standing and few people

surviving, at which point either America or Russia could withdraw from the fight

without conceding victory to the other, or at least without conceding ^a victory ^{that is}

worth having, ^{Neither America or Russia would then have} and leaving the other ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ the possession of the area, which by then

^{"unpleasant"} is completely devastated. area

The following pertinent question:

mind, we may now ask ~~what may happen in the second stage of the stalemate if~~

there is a resort to arms in an area in which both America and Russia have a

vital interest. According to present American policy, America would be prepared

to fight a local war with atomic weapons used within the area and perhaps within

a zone of several hundred miles beyond the pre-war boundary. It is not clear

why Russia should accept to battle on these terms. Why should Russia not instead

proceed as follows: - at least in name if the

honestible countries follow an entirely different
track?

independent countries
necessarily
in each and every country
must
therefore

war
~~Let us assume a concrete case -- one which has the advantage of not being~~

~~very likely to occur.~~ Suppose that Turkey feels menaced by the growing power

of the Arab states and ~~the~~ ^{that} Turkish troops invade Syria. Under Paragraph 51

of the UN Charter, which provides for collective defense in case of an armed

attack against a member of the UN, Russia would be within her ^{legal} rights to take

armed action against Turkey. But in accordance with the pattern established

in the post-war years, she might prefer to permit an army of volunteers to

invade Turkey. If this volunteer army invades Turkey and if the Turkish armies

are in danger of being defeated, ~~the United States~~ ^{America} might -- disregarding the

letter of the law -- intervene in order to save ~~an area~~ ^{her ally} from being ^{unilaterally} literally

defeated. ~~X~~

There was an incident in the recent past which justifies this forecast, when France and England violated the UN Charter by invading Egypt. Russia threatened to intervene by permitting an army of volunteers to intervene in Egypt. Under Paragraph 51 of the Charter of the UN, Russia would have been within her legal rights openly to intervene. The United States responded by threatening to intervene on the opposite side. This she could not have done without violating the UN Charter, and it is anyone's guess whether she would have in fact done so had the contingency arisen. But the fact remains that in making such a threat, the United States has disregarded the letter of the law.

^{then} Let me ~~then~~ ^{suppose} assume that America would either equip the Turkish army with

atomic weapons or that American troops would actually land in Turkey and ~~that a~~

~~local war fought~~ ^{fight the war} with atomic weapons would be ~~fought in that area.~~ ^{with in or outside Turkey and} Assuming

U.S. superiority in small atomic bombs, which ~~would~~ ^{may} be used not only on the

Turkish side of the pre-war boundary, but would also be used beyond the pre-war boundary in a zone of a few hundred miles depth, for the disruption of communica-

tions and for the destruction of supplies and air bases. With such a development

in prospect, would it not be logical for Russia to advise the United States

that if she were to continue the fight with atomic weapons, or if she were to

continue to supply the Turkish army with such weapons, Russia would demolish one

of ten cities which will be listed in her note and which might have size ranging

from 500,000 inhabitants to 1 million inhabitants. Russia would assure the United

States that upon deciding which of the ten cities she wishes to demolish, she

would give the city selected four weeks notice in order to permit an orderly

evacuation of the city and in order to permit the American Government to provide

for the housing and feeding of the refugees. Russia could further make it clear

in her note that she would tolerate the destruction of one of her cities an equal

in size to the American city that she is going to select, provided the United

States would give the Russian city selected by her four weeks notice to permit an

orderly evacuation.

To such a note the American Secretary of State might reply with a threat that

America would demolish two cities in Russia for each city which Russia may demolish

in America.

Russia might have a reply to such an American note by saying the following:

The Russian Government has adopted the principle of tolerating the destruction of

one of her cities for one American city which she may have to demolish. She is

determined to adhere to this principle of one for one. If America should demolish

two cities for the first American city which Russia destroys, Russia will have

to demolish one additional city in America in adherence to this principle of one

~~for one.~~ If ~~then~~ America should ~~persist in destroying~~ ^{then retaliate to ~~destroy~~ by demolishing} two additional cities in
Russia, Russia will ~~have to~~ ^{again have} demolish one American city for each of the two Russian
cities. ~~It is~~ ^{quite} obvious, so Russia could point out, that if Russia ~~adheres~~ ^{more to the adhere} to the
principle of one for one, while America ~~adopts~~ a principle of two for one, in
time all American cities and all Russian cities will be demolished. Because the
Russian Government has no reason to assume that the American Government ~~is~~ ^{has gone} insane,
or that, if it were insane, ~~America~~ ^{the people} would tolerate such a government to remain
in office, she ~~will~~ ^{must} disregard the threat and proceed with the policy which she ~~has~~ ^{of two for one} proclaimed
~~to demolish one American city~~ ^{and} unless there is an immediate cessation of the use of atomic
weapons in the Turkish war, ~~and American as well as the~~ ^{America restrains from}
~~Turkish troops remain on their side of the~~ ^{and American as well as the}
~~border immediately.~~ ^{border immediately.}
What I am trying to do here is to show that in the second stage of the stale-
mate ~~Russia could invoke~~ ^{Russia could invoke} the ~~she~~ ^{she}
~~powerful clean hydrogen bombs which Russia may have in her stockpile~~
~~and threaten to use them and conceivably~~ ^{and threaten to use them and conceivably}
~~could be invoked by Russia without Russia risking an all-out atomic war.~~ ^{actually use them without} ~~It~~ ^{therefore}
follows that it ~~lies~~ ^{lies} not within the choice of America alone to decide whether a
local war may or may not be fought by means of ~~atomic weapons~~ ^{small bombs} according to
whether or not it suits America's purposes to do so. The ~~assumption~~ ^{assumption} to the contrary
is ~~a~~ ^{the} basic premise of ~~the~~ ^{the} present American military policy, and I have tried to
show - on hand of a ~~not too realistic~~ ^{perhaps} example - that this premise is invalid.

John E

Secured Section

Apr 20/58

to America as follows: We regard the use of atomic weapons in warfare as an intolerable atrocity and we are determined to bring such a war to a halt. We are submitting to you, therefore, a list of ten American cities ranging in size between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants. ~~which~~ We propose to designate one of these cities and allow four weeks for the orderly evacuation. After four weeks time we shall demolish that city by means of a clean hydrogen bomb carried by solid fuel long range rocket. If on receiving this message, America may indicate that she will retaliate and Russia might reply that America wishes to designate Russian cities having 500,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants and give the city four weeks notice in order to permit orderly evacuation, Russia will tolerate the destruction of such a city without any further reprisals. This is a price that Russia may be willing to pay in order to honor her commitment to defend Syria and by proceeding in ~~the~~ manner indicated ~~in~~ she can exact the same price from America and she can do so without, in my opinion, risking an all-out atomic war. The earlier Russia clearly defines the price that she would exact, the more effective would be the deterrent effect of her warning for America may be willing to pay an inordinately high price for the sake of honoring a commitment, real or imaginary, that she has made. But they are not likely to be willing to pay a high price if they know exactly what the price will be prior to making the commitment which may exact that price.

Steps that May Be Taken in order to lessen the danger of Atomic War. ~~Apart from the danger that an all-out atomic war may break out as a result of an accident,~~ ^{but} we may disregard the possibility that such a war will break as a result of a wanton ^{act} by the American Strategic Air Force against ~~the~~ Russian ~~Strategic Air Force~~ ^{cities} or by the Russian S.A.F. against ~~the~~ American ~~Strategic~~ ^{cities}.

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The outbreak of an all out

Therefore, the greatest danger for ~~such an~~ atomic war lies in the possibility of a local conflict, which leads to ~~a resort to arms,~~ ^{armed action} America and Russia ~~militarily intervention,~~ ^{on opposite sides} the use of atomic weapons in such a war and the ~~possibility that emotions are~~ ^{may be} aroused which ~~make it impossible to localize the conflict.~~ ^{ensuring} There are two ways

in which the danger of an all-out war originating in this manner may be diminished: 1) for Russia and America to impose upon them ^{themselves} ~~certain~~ ^{restrictions specified with atomic weapons} ~~limitations~~ when fighting a local war; and 2) a political settlement ^{between Russia and America which will make it possible to reduce the} ~~chances of a resort to arms~~ and the American and Russian ~~intervention~~ ^{may} on opposite sides to the point where such a contingency may be regarded as exceedingly unlikely.

1) To the first point I may say the following: Some time ago Russia had proposed that the use of atomic weapons in warfare be outlawed, or prohibited. ^{Since} ~~Clearly~~ prohibition of the use of atomic weapons is not enforceable, ^{would be} ~~What then is the meaning of such a pro-~~ ^{hibition?} ~~America as well as Russia could each unilaterally declare~~ ^{that in case of a war,} she would not resort to the use of atomic weapons. The advantage of this Russian proposal lies in the fact that it could be put into effect without any further delay. If ^{observed by both sides,} it would prevent the outbreak of an atomic war and thus safeguard the world against an atomic catastrophe to which such a war might otherwise lead. ^{The disadvantage of the proposal} ~~lies in the fact that nations don't trust such pledges and therefore~~ they consider the possibility that such a pledge given in peace time might not be honored in war time. ^{In particular} ~~the American government~~ ^{is unwilling to trust the pledge of the Russian government and felt} that she would have to maintain two military establishments, one based on divisions armed with conventional weapons and one based on divisions armed with atomic bombs, in order to be in the position to shift

rapidly to the use of atomic weapons if atomic weapons were to be used against her in violation of the pledge given. Moreover, ^{the} America might have believed that she has at least a temporary advantage if she ^{is free to use} uses atomic weapons ^{in case of war} in certain areas where Russia can ^{more} easily introduce a fairly large army equipped with conventional weapons.

~~In any case,~~ ^{Be this as it may} The American Government has specifically rejected the Russian proposal and has stated her intention to use atomic bombs if war should come ~~as a result of aggression,~~ ^{as a result of aggression} even though the aggressor were willing to forgo the use of atomic weapons. Since ^{principally} just what constitutes aggression would be principally unilaterally determined by America, the American position means that America reserves the right to use atomic weapons in any war.

~~I believe that~~ ^{as long as} as long as in the absence of a satisfactory political settlement there ^{remains} is a danger that a war might break out in which America and Russia intervene militarily on opposite sides, ~~it would be in~~ ^{both} Amer's interest and in Russia's interest to impose ~~certain restrictions upon themselves~~ ^{and Russians} certain restrictions on the use of atomic weapons, in order to eliminate the danger that ~~the~~ ^{my} local war will lead to an all-out atomic war, which neither nation wants. Once it is clear what these limitations are to be, it may be just as well to ~~formulate and publicize~~ ^{to formulate and announce} them, which either America or Russia could do by unilaterally declaring what the ~~limi-~~ ^{by} tations will be ~~but~~ ^{that} which she would abide as long as the opposing nation abides by the same limitations. ^{by these restrictions}

~~Now, are there such limitations which both America and Russia could proclaim in force and which both of them would be likely to observe in war, because it is in our interest to do so?~~ ^{by both nations} In discussing this issue, we may start out with the assumption that ^{would be in their} neither America nor Russia has ^{have any danger} strong incentives for wanting to change the existing

America and Russia will ^{could} of course impose the restrictions here
^{advocated} described upon themselves ^{in case of war giving} without necessarily making any pledge in
 this ~~xxx~~ respect in peace time. But for the ~~civilian~~ government to
 be able to impose such restrictions on the military commanders, it
 is necessary for the government to be clear in their own minds ^s of
 the advantages of ~~these~~ ^{such} restrictions. Frequently statemen do not
 know what they think until they ^{hear} themselves saying it and for this
 reason a proclamation by the American government and ^{or by} the Russian
 government, made in peace time, ~~even though it represents a pledge,~~
 would not be enforceable ~~would have no influence~~

~~would greatly improve the~~
~~chances of the states that such~~
~~restrictions would be observed~~
~~in most case of a local war,~~
~~enforceable war.~~

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boundaries of sovereign nations by armed action. ~~Therefore, should~~
 there be a conflict anywhere in the world in which nations resort
 to arms and should America and Russia be forced to intervene on
 opposite sides, both America and Russia ~~ought to~~ ^{should} be willing to ob-
 serve such ~~limitations~~ ^{restrictions on} in the use of atomic bombs which will favor
 the defenders and thereby making ~~conquests~~ ^{make the} of territory more difficult.

~~What should be such a limitation?~~ Suppose both America and
 Russia were to declare that in case of such a war, ~~they will not use~~ ^{she}
 atomic bombs nor permit their allies to use atomic bombs ~~except on~~ ^{as long as her government}
 their own sides of the pre-war boundary. ~~This would mean that in~~ ^{by the same restriction}
 order to defend the territory with atomic bombs, the troops would
 have to be withdrawn perhaps ten or twenty miles from the ~~boundary.~~ ^{pre-war}
 Any massing of enemy troops in that zone would then be ~~vulnerable~~ ^{hundreds}
 because atomic bombs could be used against them. Since the ~~enemy~~ ^{attacker}
 would not use atomic bombs within the pre-war territory of the
 defenders and atomic bombs would be used by the defenders only sparingly,
 there would be much less destruction of the defended territory than
 if both sides ~~used~~ ^{were to} freely atomic bombs ~~beyond~~ ^{on both sides of} the pre-war boundary of
 that territory. ~~X~~ ^{his page attached}

~~I have thought of such a limitation of the use of atomic bombs~~
~~in local wars that could be formulated and proclaimed in peace time~~ ^{discussed this possibility}
~~when I spent an extended period of time in Europe and discusses this~~ ^{notable I was last year while visiting}
~~possibility quite extensively there.~~ ^{last year and I} I learned on the occasion of
 the Quebec meeting that Col. Richard Leghorn had developed quite
 similar ideas, and ~~since he is more more of an expert in military~~ ^{much}
 matters than I am, this gave me reassurance to the point where I am
 now willing to go ~~on record in print.~~ ^{here} ~~in favour of the~~

2) Political Settlements. ~~The closer we come to the second stage~~ ^{immediate adaptation of the}
 of the strategic stalemate, the less important become the controversial ~~xxx~~

issue

~~she recognizes as lying in the Russian sphere of influence, and Russia would not militarily intervene in those areas which she recognizes as lying in America's sphere of influence.~~ *P* ^{is not a private} This does not mean that

copy of copying about map

Russia and America ~~shall~~ divide the world up among themselves. ^{clearly} Quite

~~on the contrary,~~ ^{must of necessity} most of the areas of the world ~~will~~ remain out of the

sphere of influence ^{proper} of either America or Russia. *P* There are many areas

~~in which it would be in the interests of both Russia and America, as~~ ^{not falling into the above mentioned category}

well as the nations lying within the area ^{somehow} to freeze the status quo and

thereby to give the nations in the area the kind of security which

they need, so that they need not ~~divert~~ ^{would be a subtle function} divert any of their economic

resources into military expenditures. In these particular areas it

might be possible ~~to~~ set up a regional intergovernmental armed force

with the consent and approval of Russia and America as well as the

^{major} other nations who are involved. Whether these intergovernmental

armed forces ^{could} can operate under the auspices of the United Nations ^{is} ~~will be~~

~~is~~ ^{presently might} discussed ~~further~~ below. *P* In any case, the sole function of such

regional armed forces would be to prevent any nation ^{of} in the area from

violating the territorial integrity of ^{an} other nation and it ~~would~~ not be

the function of regional forces to prevent government changes by in-

ternal revolution, as ~~was~~ long as no military forces cross the

country's frontier, ^{has} within which ~~the~~ ^{it} revolution occurs. *P* The regional

intergovernmental armed forces ~~would~~ not be equipped with atomic weapons

but they could be highly mobile and could be equipped with high fire-

power so that they might be militarily stronger than any one nation

within the area, ~~but~~ particularly if the arms level of the nations

within the area is kept at a low level, by mutual agreement. ~~X~~

~~X~~ Concerning the role which the United Nations might or might not

play as a sponsor of these regional intergovernmental armed forces,

General

one might

~~I wish to~~ make the following remarks:

At the end of the last war it was generally believed that--as long as the great powers act in concert with each other--the United Nations organization may be able to guarantee the security of the smaller nations and may make it unnecessary, as well as impossible, for them to go to war with each other. Attempts made in the past ten years to use the United Nations for purposes other than those for which it was designed have weakened this organization. *It remains* to be seen whether they have damaged it beyond repair. Only if it were possible to restore the United Nations to its original function ^{to serve} would it be able/as an agency to which the organization of the regional intergovernmental armed forces might be entrusted. *P* There are other

areas of the world, and in particular the continent of Europe, where it would appear very undesirable to freeze the status quo ~~and it~~ *and impracticable to restore peace by maintaining an intergovernmental armed force* would be very important to explore whether the desirable changes in *It is my contention that* status quo might be brought about there with the consent and approval

of both Russia and America as well as the nations of Europe. *in the case of Europe* The *should be pushed* ~~reaction~~ Division of Germany might be a source of major trouble at some time in the *after the advent of the second stage of the state* ~~future~~ *note. For this reason I should like to discuss the* future even though at the present time German nationalism is at a ~~low~~ *of this note towards the end return of this map* ~~ebb~~ *rather than attempt to deal with it although they* and West Germans are more concerned with prosperity than with the need of German unity to which they pay lip service. It is not easy

to see how German unification can be brought about in the near future unless Russia were willing to abandon her political ~~to rule~~ Eastern Germany. But perhaps more important than this, sooner or later a united Germany might claim, and almost certainly would claim, return of the territories which were ceded to Poland. One may doubt the wisdom of creating a united Germany in the near future unless it is possible to return to Germany these territories but somehow

short

compensating Poland for the territories lost to Germany. The economic unification of Western Europe which is now in progress is one of the few optimistic signs from the point of view of the economic future of Europe and also from the point of view of Russia, who would economically greatly benefit, when East-West trade is fully restored, from ~~for~~ the prosperity of Western Europe. It is difficult to see how this economic unity of Western Europe if one were to create a united and disarmed Germany rather than make ~~submerge whole into~~ out of the whole continent of Europe an area throughout which arms were maintained at a low level. Perhaps this might be impossible even after the Algerian problem is solved one way or another and France is in essentially the same position as Western Germany and the other nations on the continent of Europe.

Dr. J. H. ...

In many respects the problems here touched upon will be easier to solve when the stalemate between America and Russia has reached the second stage. At that point the continent of Europe would have ceased to be of interest to America from a strategic point of view. Having inclination to make arrangements for further developments, I have always felt that NATO could serve no ~~advantage~~ military objectives, in that it would not seem to serve some useful function for a while and there was a time when Britain and France ~~we~~ restrained America from taking ill-considered action, and there was a time when America restrained France and England from pursuing in person ill-considered action. It might also be that the imagined military use of Europe for which NATO was a symbol serves a useful purpose in facilitating the bringing about of European economic unity. But from a purely American point of view, it is difficult to see what useful function NATO might serve in the strategic stalemate. Thus with the advent of the second stage of the stalemate, if not any earlier, it might be possible to bring about significant changes in Europe with the full approval and consent

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of Russia. ~~and~~ But the freezing of the map of Europe can hardly be accomplished by setting up intergovernmental forces on the continent of Europe which are stronger than the nations of Europe themselves. The security of the nations in Europe will presumably have to rest on the fact that none of the nations of Europe may have any strong incentive to bring about changes in the map of Europe once a settlement has been reached.

When Americans discuss among themselves the need to stabilize the status quo, we are not only thinking of changes which might be brought about by military intervention but also changes brought about by subversion, and ^{the} I have in mind particularly the possibility of subversion by Russia. This is almost an obsession with some Americans even though there is no actual historical example in the post-war period for the kind of subversion of which they are most afraid. ^{the} It ~~is~~ ^a the Russian-supported Communist revolutions in ^{June} any of the so-called "free" countries ~~in~~ Europe. I do not fully understand the causes of this obsession and cannot therefore say much on this subject except to remark that in the post-war period up to these last few years, Americans have generally been inclined to underestimate the military power of the Russian government and to overestimate her spiritual power over the minds of the people of Europe. This may perhaps account for the fact that some Americans believe that Russia is bent on conquering the world by subversion. Americans are supposed to believe in capitalism and Russians are supposed to believe in communism. On the basis of my own experience, I should be inclined to say that Americans do not believe in capitalism and sometimes I am inclined to suspect that Russians might not believe in communism. Some Americans are so obsessed with the fear of Russian subversion that they tend to overlook the fact that subversion is ~~not~~ a method of conquest which has been used in modern times by nations other than Russia. If I asked my Russian friends to give a classical example for subversion in recent times, they might well mention the ^{important} recent ^{subversive act} intervention in Iran by the U.S. They might point out that Iran was under the government of Mossadegh--a legally elected government, not subservient to Russia--which represented the people as well as

governments are wont to represent the people in democracies other than the old established democracies, first in England and North America. Iran ^{nationalized} legalized its oil resources which up to that time were under British control. Subsequently, the Iranian army, equipped with American Sherman tanks, overthrew, conceivably without American consent but ^{hardly not} certainly with American approval, Mossadegh's government and established a government under the regime of the Shah, which denationalized oil. After the dust settled, ^{has} it could be seen that American oil company ^{more in possession of} obtained about half of the oil ^{resources} while the other half was restored to the British.

A somewhat similar event took place in Guatemala where the ^{legally elected} government of Arbenz was overthrown by force and after the dust had settled, it was possible to appraise the benefit which the United Fruit Company has derived from the change in government.

While Russians will in general be inclined to see a causal connection between the ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ gain of the American oil companies and the ^{subversion} United Fruit Company and the ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ that occurred, Americans in general are inclined to regard these gains as incidental consequences rather than causative factors of the subversion.

As far as the national interests of the United States are concerned, in ^{contrast} contradistinction to some private special interests which might be involved, the motivation for subversion does not lie in the desire desire of the U. S. government to transform the subverted country into a truly capitalistic state, an aim which would be difficult of accomplishment, and ^{if this} still less ^{be the} to introduce ^{the} the American political system, a parliamentary form of democracy, which functions as well as it does because it is based on the dominance of two political parties which do not differ from each other in their major political objectives. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ If the U. S. pursues ^{any} an allegedly national

objective through the method of subversion, the objective is the establishment of a government which may be expected to yield to American influence rather than to Russian influence. Because it is almost impossible to make sure that this objective can be accomplished on anything but a short term basis. America has no strong incentive to engage in subversion. While one may state the fact that from the point of view of stabilizing the status quo in the atomic stalemate, it might be highly desirable that neither America nor Russia should indulge in the diplomatic game of subversion, it ^{can have} ~~is~~ ^{serious} ~~might~~ be a ~~serious~~ mistake to outlaw or prohibit subversion within the framework of any Russian-American agreement that might provide for the needed political settlement. If this were done, there could result recriminations which would undermine the confidence in America's and Russia's good faith and genuine desire to keep the agreement in force that they have concluded. Many of the governments which are friendly to America are unpopular governments and if these are overthrown, many Americans may accuse Russia of being guilty of subversion. Similarly, if there is revolution attempted in any of the countries which are in the Russian field of influence, the Russian government may accuse America of attempting subversion. That no agreement outlawing subversion could be enforced is obvious. But to make matters worse, subversion cannot be proven even after the accomplished fact, and still less can it be discovered in advance. All this makes me believe that a pledge not to subvert should not be demanded from or given by either America or Russia in order to avoid the possibility of unenforceable accusations that a pledge given has been broken.

It is very unlikely that subversion will continue to occur after the adjustment of the second stage of the atomic stalemate. The cold war is an evil, but it will not be the same if the

P → F

1/5

... by ...

... can be fought with ...

Third section
~~second section~~

The Case for and Against Disarmament *atomic* ~~at an early date.~~

X Russia has unilaterally stopped ^{her} bomb tests ^{for the time being}, and it is conceivable that America ^{may} will follow suit once she has tested ^{most of} the bombs that she ~~feels~~ ^{between} she needs to test. It is also conceivable that America and Russia, when they have enough bombs stockpiled to destroy each other ^{it would be as well as} and perhaps the rest of the ^{analyzed} world (to any desired) degree -- might agree to freeze the size of their stockpiles. But clearly, from the point of view of the danger of ^{an atomic} war, not much ^{would} will be accomplished by stopping the bomb tests ^{or} and by freezing the stockpiles in this manner. If far-reaching atomic disarmament at an early date is a solution to the problem posed by the bombs -- ^{and as} ~~and this~~ we shall see in a moment it is possible to doubt ^{this} -- then nothing short of destroying the stockpiles of bombs ~~both in Russia and America~~, as well as eliminating the strategic striking force of both Russia and America ^{may} can be regarded as a measure adequate for eliminating the danger of an atomic war.

This is precisely what the Russian Government is proposing. The position of the Russian Government ^{in this respect} has, ^{on account} because of its great simplicity ~~the~~ ^{and because of this, it} by virtue of being easily understandable, ^{deserves} and will undoubtedly get strong popular support.

The existence of the bomb is inherently a menace to mankind, and the elimination of all bomb stockpiles, as well as all effective means ~~suitable~~ for the delivery of bombs, is therefore a goal which all sane men must regard as desirable. X

The present official Russian position comes very close to -- and is in fact almost identical -- ^{with} the position which ^{is held by the great majority of} practically all American scientists except those who ^{are undoubtedly} are prejudiced against Russia, have proclaimed and have fought for in the months that followed the Second World War.

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an agreement with Russia that will eliminate "bows and arrows" from the arsenals of both countries. ~~In discussing the issue of disarmament with men who are close to the Administration, one finds rarely that they are~~ ^{those men} ~~are~~ ^{not} opposed to disarmament. ~~but~~

What they really say is "yes, my darling daughter, hang your clothes on the hickory ^{tree} limb, but don't go near the water".

I believe that at present the Administration is divided on the issue of far-reaching disarmament ~~that~~ ^{which} ~~would have to~~ include the elimination of the bomb. I have the impression that there are powerful forces within the Administration in favor of ^{such} far-reaching disarmament, and these forces might well include the

President himself. But even if the Administration were veering towards ~~far~~ ^{fall} reaching atomic disarmament, ^{we must remember that} the Administration is only one branch of the Government; Congress is another branch. I might, of course, be wrong, but if I correctly assess the balance of forces, then the outcome of the struggle inside the American Government will be won by those who would wish ^{us} to stop short of the elimination of the bomb ^{within the foreseeable future.}

I am basing this forecast on the record of the past 12 years. It is quite understandable that as long as Russia did not have the bomb, Governments being what they are, considerations of expediency were given more weight than moral considerations and ~~that~~ ^{expedient} the American Government found it ~~convenient~~ ^{to} rely on the threat of mass retaliation in order to counter a ~~real~~ ^{real} or imaginary desire for expansion ^{it was clear} which they imputed to Russia. But since 1949, ~~we have known~~ ^{it was clear} that Russia knows how to make atomic bombs; and since 1954, ~~we have known~~ ^{it was clear} that she knows how to make powerful hydrogen bombs. ^{Certainly since 1954} The American Government did not lack incentives ^{dismissing with Russia in earnest} for ~~considering~~ ways and means to accomplish far-reaching atomic disarmament, and

my discussion more suggestively really whole
yet planning along these lines remains sluggish and such progress in the realm
of pure thought as was achieved on the topic of disarmament kept behind the
pace at which the arms race was moving ahead. *P* On the basis of this *perhaps* record,

I have now reluctantly concluded that for the next ten and probably for the
many years next 25 years, we shall have to live with the bombs. *on this occasion* I therefore wish to appeal
to those of my fellow scientists who *agree with* share this *view* that *we* begin *in earnest* to think how
we can live with the bomb since it would appear that we must live with the bomb
for a long time to come, *B* because *as* ~~this~~ we know from experience - it takes a long

time from the formulation of a policy to the implementation of that policy by
the Government, I propose that we base our thinking on the *advent of* ~~assumption that the~~
second stage of the stalemate between the strategic atomic striking forces of
America and Russia will ~~become an actuality and that it will be~~ *submit that* in the setting

will be given by solid fuel long-range rockets and clean powerful hydrogen bombs, that
that our task is to ~~the war will have to find a way to survive, at least in our generation.~~ *in this setting during an extended period*
world ~~at least in our generation.~~ *at times.*

On stabilizing the stalemate

In the absence of a clear philosophy in what hypothetical contingencies

bombs may be used, for what purpose and in what manner, *✓* the second stage of the
~~stalemate~~
stalemate will be of indeterminate stability, and the stockpiles of bombs will
represent a danger to both America and Russia. Since neither Russia *nor* America
wants an all-out atomic war, or for that matter any war, it *might* ~~should~~ be possible
to formulate a rule of conduct that will render the second stage of the stalemate
stable. Those versed in physics know that the stability of *a* ~~the~~ system depends
on the system -- assuming that the system is stable -- is determined by the changes
that the system might conceivably undergo, and that these may very well be changes
which the system *need not* just because it is stable, ~~does not~~ actually undergo. There is

a conceptual difficulty here which I fear statesmen might be unable to overcome.

unless they are more or less willing to learn ~~at~~ now
and perhaps we physicists will have to -- if we are able to agree on the con-

some of the things we physicists have learned
ditions necessary for stability -- jam the solution down their throat by using

in retreat: - the problem is this: our problem must be phrased in
such legitimate means as might be available to us. If there is a rule of con-

as long as
duct which, if Russia abides by it and America abides by it, will make sure

and America
that any disturbance (that might more or less accidentally or due to an error of

vacuum
judgment) ~~occur~~, will be self-limiting and will not lead to a chain of ever-

if there is such a rule
increasing destruction. It will be manifestly in the interest of Russia and

and it is not
America to abide by the rules, because in most cases statesmen do not know what

they think until they hear themselves saying it. It would be essential that

frankly
these rules should be proclaimed, and they could be unilaterally proclaimed by

America in preference so that both profits and
either Russia or America, or by both. *the people are put*

in the position to understand what
rules which would meet all requirements and which would render the system stable?

Let us imagine a setting in which America and Russia have agreed to freeze

most
their stockpiles of powerful hydrogen bombs and in which a good fraction, if not

all, of the powerful hydrogen bombs in their stockpiles are clean rather than

imagine
dirty bombs. Let us further assume a setting in which both Russia and America

recognized that they have
have a common of over-riding interest to preserve the status quo and to avoid

both of these objectives?
the risk of an atomic war. How could they go about accomplishing this? Both

must be limited! certain
Russia and America may have certain commitments to defend areas in which they

protect
have a vital interest, against invasion by foreign troops. These commitments must

of necessity be limited commitments, for no matter how strong these vital interests

may be
are, the preservation of Russia and America proper remains the over-riding

must
interest. If America wants to defend those areas which she is committed to

conclude - a
defend, against perhaps imaginary danger of a military invasion that might be supported by Russia, she could *do so by issuing it unilaterally* issue a proclamation, in which she would make *such a proclamation* clear that she has certain limited commitments concerning the defense of these areas; that she is determined to *protect* defend these areas without resorting to war in the conventional sense of the word; and that she is renouncing the use of atomic weapons either against soldiers in combat or else *asa -* morally most reprehensible — means of carrying the war to the civilian population by dropping ~~such~~ bombs on cities *which must* and killing hundreds of thousands or millions of people, men, women, and children. *through* She is determined, however, to retain the bombs as an instrument *of a proclamation however could make* of power to be used solely for the preservation of the status quo, not as an *it clear that* instrument of *potential slaughter* killing, but as an instrument of *potential destruction of property* demolishing. Accordingly, America could issue unilaterally a price list in which would be listed every area which America is committed to defend and the price which America would be willing to pay for discouraging an invasion of the area, *as we shall presently see* which of necessity *the price that Am. is willing to pay* would have to be identical with *the* a price that she may extract from Russia in case *at necessity* Russia were to support an invasion of that area. *with the* In the case of each *specific* area, America would *have to* specify that she may demolish a certain number of Russian cities of a certain size *should she* in case of Russian supported invasion of the area. *or protect external front. to the business nations* The price need not be accurately fixed in advance. Let us assume the Russian cities have been divided into ten size categories. Then, for example, America might specify that if a given area is invaded, she would demolish between two and four Russian cities of a given *posed for* size category, *The price of each area* which would depend on the importance that America attaches to preserving the territorial integrity of *that* the specific area. The actual decision, whether America will destroy two, three, or four cities,

need not be taken until the territory is actually invaded, if indeed it is ever invaded. America would have to make it clear that she would at the time the contingency actually arises, specifically name the cities which she would demolish and give these cities four weeks' notice in order to permit an orderly evacuation. She also would have to make it clear that she would tolerate the demolishing of an equal number of her cities by Russia, that she would expect Russia to name the cities and to give them four weeks' warning in order to permit the orderly evacuation and in order to permit the American Government to make provision for the housing and feeding of refugees. There would be no reprisals, as Russia did not demolish more cities in America than America would demolish in Russia. However, if Russia would demolish more cities-for each such additional city America would demolish one, and just one, Russian city in exchange. In no case would America exact a greater price from Russia for any territory that might have been invaded than the maximum price that had been listed. In determining the prices America has attempted to set the price just high enough to discourage an invasion of the area. However, should an invasion actually occur, this would have to be taken as an indication that America has underestimated the price that Russia is willing to pay for conquering an area and therefore, while America cannot raise the price that she may exact for an area once the area has been invaded, she must reserve the right to issue a new price list.

The prices listed for all the other areas may have to be set higher in the light of experience that has been gathered.

Naturally, Russia might make^a unilateral proclamation quite similar to that of America, and there is no real need for Russia and America to reach any agree-

Insert

*should section
on page P of bunch called
the core for and against disarm*

I believe it is easy to show that only if both America and Russia recognize that the principle of tolerating the destruction of one city for each city which they may demolish can the stalemate be rendered stable.

The net result of any invasion supported by Russia or by America would, if the system here proposed were adopted without any qualifications -- and some qualifications might well be acceptable -- the conquest of a territory by one of Russia's allies with the support of Russia, or else the conquest of a territory with the support of America at the cost of a loss of an equal number of cities both in Russia and America. At a time when the spirit of the cold war will be regarded as a ghost from the past it will be clear to Russian statesmen that the loss of American cities is a loss to America but not a gain to them. From that point of view what I have to balance against each other is their desire to bring about a territorial change that cannot be brought about in any way except by force, and I have to balance it against the loss of a corresponding number of Russian cities. I can imagine almost no example where the balance would be in their favor even if they were to lose only one city of 500,000 inhabitants. I therefore believe that under this system no city would ever be destroyed and all that the system would accomplish is to stabilize the stalemate and to eliminate the necessity for war in order to bring about changes that either Russia or America might wish to see take place.

ment on the prices that they may list.

There is only one issue on which Russia and America are to reach an understanding. They ought to reach an understanding which American cities correspond in size to which Russian cities lest there might arise a dispute over this issue in case the price lists are invoked.

*Insert here
my proposal of*

I can easily imagine the reaction which this scheme will evoke among my Russian friends. They are likely to point out that while under the American political system America may have to pay a price for protecting a territory against invasion and while this price might be quite high, as was the case for instance when America tried to protect South Korea, the American people would never be willing to pay such a price if the price were known in advance. Many Russians believe that the American Government is controlled by bankers and that bankers are mostly older men who are willing to sacrifice if need be the life of American soldiers, but they are not willing to sacrifice property. If cities are demolished, mortgages held by bankers may lose their value, and the scheme would therefore be regarded by bankers as highly immoral. I might reply to my Russian friends that if bankers are really as influential in America as they believe them to be, bankers ought to be able to get Congress to pass legislation that will compensate them for the loss of property and perhaps even provide them with a nice profit. I might further argue that our Russian friends underestimate the influence ~~of~~ the powerful lobby maintained in Washington by the Construction Industry and that it is certainly in the interests of the construction industry if there is any conflict attended by destruction of property, it should be in the location where the American construction industry can take charge of the necessary

reconstruction rather than in the remote area of the world where any reconstruction that might take place will have to be entrusted to local companies. I can imagine no one who would be so eloquent in pointing out the immorality of the present American military policy that favors the fighting of a local war with atomic weapons that must of necessity lead to the destruction of the area that America is committed to defend than the spokesmen of the American construction industry.

But if my Russian friends were really right, it would follow that America would ~~have~~ be faced with an alternative of adopting the scheme here proposed or of accepting the Russian official position which demands that the world be rid of bombs. On the other hand this is not for America alone to decide. Russia at some future date might see the virtues of the scheme here described and might prefer it to what Russia officially proposes at present, that is, the total elimination of bombs from both America's and Russia's stockpile. Of this, of course, I could not be certain for I am not able to appraise to what extent Russia too takes an emotional attitude towards property and whether Russia itself might not find it more tolerable to have a war in which millions of soldiers are killed than to tolerate the demolishing of some of her cities that have been built up with the sweat of her labor.

*If in Russia
might point in her present demand
that the world be rid of the
bombs.*

*The case against atomic
is unanswerable at an early date*

SECTION FOUR

I shall, however, continue my discussion on the assumption that the second stage of the stalemate will remain in existence for an extended period of time. *This stalemate might be rendered inherently*
~~This will be the case only if America and Russia succeed in refraining from~~ *keeping*
~~entering into the third stage of the arms race in which scientists and engineers~~ *insoluble of Am. and R. more to move into*
the third phase of the arms race
~~will~~ *may* strive to develop means that would make it possible to destroy long-range

rockets in flight. If American and Russia were to enter into this third phase of the arms race, *they would then no longer able to*
~~thereby precluding themselves from freezing their bomb stock-~~

piles at any level, that may be regarded as reasonably safe. *P* Moreover, America

and Russia would then live under the constant threat that there might occur a

technological break-through, achieved by *either* America or Russia, which would render

the stalemate inherently unstable. For one of these nations would then be in

a position to destroy the other, and the other would be unable to retaliate in

kind. It is manifestly in the interest of America and Russia to freeze the

Therefore I shall examine below
~~second stage of the stalemate and thus we must ask whether,~~ if they agreed to

do so, they would be able to convince each other that there is no illicit work

secretly in progress that will render the stalemate inherently unstable. *I shall*
discuss this issue further below.

If Russia and America are able to maintain the second stage of the stale-

mate over an extended period of time they *may* ~~would~~, after the first few years,

realize that while they would want to maintain a limited number of hydrogen

bombs in their stockpiles; there would be little point in retaining the small

bombs in addition to the powerful hydrogen bombs, with *the* a thought in mind that

~~if~~ such small bombs could be used in combat, *more* if they ~~are~~ to intervene on

opposite sides of a local conflict. Even though the use of small bombs in

46 x 12 = 552

warfare might be envisaged in the exceedingly unlikely hypothetical eventuality
of ^{the} invasion of American territory proper by Russian troops, or ^{of} Russian territory
proper by American troops, ^{yet} America ^{and the world} and Russia ^{Am and R} would be better off if they first
renounced the use of atomic bombs in combat and subsequently ^{proceeded} agreed to rid the
world altogether of small atomic bombs ^{as they offer} as soon as the second stage of the stale-
mate is reached. In the second stage of the stalemate, even though America and
Russia might remain free to maintain an air force, an army, and a navy, it ^{should} would
not take them long to perceive that these do not add appreciably to their
security while they add appreciably to ^{their} the military expenditure. For this
reason America and Russia may be expected to reduce these forces, and as the
second stage of the stalemate continues in being, the arms expenditure of these
two nations might fall to a small fraction of its present level. || The economic
resources which would thus become free in America, as well as Russia, might ^{then} , ^{at} }
^{least} in part, be used by these two nations in cooperation with each other for the
building of a world community in which peace may be preserved without the
necessity of maintaining a threat of force.

April 22, 1958

On the Possibility of ^a ~~the~~ Pax Russo-Americana
in the Second Stage of the Atomic Stalemate

By

~~Dr.~~ Leo Szilard

~~Introduction~~
Introduction

~~On the role of~~ Propaganda
~~the art of~~
Propaganda has been defined as ~~the gentle~~ art of confusing your friends without deceiving your enemies. For the past ~~12~~ ^{twelve} years, while the cold war was raging, this art was practiced on a grand scale and with conspicuous success. As the result of this operation, political thought is at present in a state of unprecedented confusion, which -- in view of the threat that the bomb presents to the world -- may imperil the life of all of us.

There was a time when diplomats used speech to ~~conceive~~ ^{con} their thoughts; nowadays when they speak, what they ~~conceal~~ is mostly the absence of thought. ~~Clearly~~ ^{clearly} the bomb poses a new problem to the world, and ~~the~~ ^{clearly} statesmen of the world do not know the answer to this problem. ~~At present~~ ^{clearly} America as well as Russia and the rest of the world, ~~is~~ ^{are now} in real trouble, and when in trouble, the best ~~is~~ ^{maybe} recipe is to state "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth".

INTRODUCTION - (CONTINUED)

I believe that scientists in America, if they are able to carry over their predilection for the truth into the public discussion of the ~~political issue~~ ^{issues raised} ~~involved~~, ^{by the bomb} might render a great public service at this juncture. Some of the political truth that has to be stated is unpleasant truth ~~that has to be stated~~ ^{and unpleasant} ~~and in a sense~~ bitter medicine. But Americans are proud ~~that they are~~ ^{of being} free to say what they think, and this is ~~a~~ ^{the} time to exercise this freedom. ~~If~~ scientists participate in the public discussion of the issues raised by the bomb, their function ought to be to clarify and not to persuade. If a politician says something in a public discussion, the first question that comes to mind is ~~not whether it is true what he says, but rather~~ "why does he say it?" In our political system, this is probably as it should be. In our political system it is not necessary nor possible for the voter to make up his mind on every issue on which the government has to reach a decision. It is the role of the politicians to make up their own minds on such issues, as well as they can, and then ~~to~~ persuade the people to go along with the decisions they have reached.

^B But the issues raised by the bomb are too important for the people to delegate ~~all~~ ^{things} decisions to the government. There ~~must~~ ^{ought to} be at least an informed minority among the people, who are capable of understanding ~~this~~ ^{these} unfortunately somewhat complex ~~issue~~ ^{issues} and who may, therefore, ~~be in a position to influence~~ ^{communicate their views to} the government. The rapid progress ~~in~~ science is largely due to the fact that scientists are able to clarify scientific problems in their own minds by discussing these ~~issues~~ ^{problems} with each other. These ~~discussions~~ ^{such} are ~~productive~~ ^{as} because if a scientist says something, his colleagues do not have to ask, "why does he say it?" ~~All~~ they have to ask is whether what he says is true, or whether he is in error.

~~To be in error is a privilege that scientists share with all other people.~~

~~But~~ ^{But} scientists, if they speak in public on the issues raised by the bomb, ought

to resist the temptation to turn into politicians, ~~and to neglect their duty~~

to clarify for the sake of being more persuasive, ~~in favored~~ ^{in favored} ~~advice~~ ^{advice}

Scientists who participated in the public discussion of whether or not the

United States ought to stop bomb tests were not always able to resist this

temptation. Some of those who advocated stopping the bomb tests in order to

prevent a further contamination of the atmosphere by radioactive products

were not ^{mainly} really concerned about this aspect of the bomb tests. ^{Rather} They were keenly

aware of the need of stopping the arms race somewhere and ~~to begin at least to~~

reach an agreement with Russia on something. ^{at least one issue} I am as much aware of this need

~~as they are, but it seems to me that freezing the status quo at a point where~~

both Russia and America ^{may} are manufacturing and ^{may} might have stockpiled large

quantities of ^{powerful} dirty hydrogen bombs ^{is} just about the worst point at

which to ^{"stop"} freeze the arms race. Clearly, we must begin to reach an agreement

with Russia on ^{some thing} something, but would it not be more logical to reach an agreement

with Russia on continuing the bomb test for the purpose of enabling both

America and Russia to replace the dirty hydrogen bombs in their stockpiles

which ^{may} present a threat to the population of the whole world ^{with} clean hydrogen

bombs; ~~and then as soon as possible freeze the total number of bombs which~~

~~Russia and America may keep in their stockpiles.~~ ^{may} If we ~~have~~ to advocate a

step which America and Russia might ^{promptly} take ~~without any further delay~~ in order

to diminish the danger of an atomic war which neither of them want, perhaps

we ought to urge the governments of both of these nations to stop shouting at

each other. ^{not} Statesmen who do know the intricate construction of bombs may not be aware of the fact that some of these bombs may be sensitive to noise and that too much shouting might one of these days set off one of these bombs!

No official of the American or Russian government can publicly question that a proposal put forward by his own government was put forward in good faith. Would it not therefore be logical, as well as desirable, ^{and a good "first step"} for America and Russia to enter an agreement that no official of either government may publicly question the sincerity of any proposal put forward by the other government?

This does not mean, of course, that scientists in America shall refrain from questioning the sincerity of the proposals put forward both by the Russian and American governments. I believe that scientists in America, if they want to contribute to the clarification of the issues, ought to view current events much the same way as ^{the} a historian might look upon these events to whom might fall the melancholy task -- if the world should go through an atomic war -- to write the history of the ^{the} downfall of the Industrial Civilization. ^P Clearly, no

historian who looks back upon the Peloponnesian War that destroyed Greece, will ^{would interpret} view the events that lead up to that war, by attributing the responsibility for ^{the} that war to either Sparta or Athens. ^P In the ^{post war} years, there was a ^{has}

power conflict between America and Russia which was strongly reminiscent of the power conflict between ~~Ath~~ Athens and Sparta. ^{With the advent} During this period the stale-
^{of the present stalemate} mate between the strategic striking forces of Russia and America, which has

^{now undergoing a} arisen and which is still in the process of rapid change, ^{has begun} appears to resolve ^{much evaluation} this power conflict, and ^{this} make it easier for all of us to discuss dispassionately the events of the past 12 years. ^{future}

3 ^{a process of} ^{to undergo} ^{this solution}

or unwilling

maximum price listed. She has carefully appraised what incentives ^{prices} America may ~~have to support~~ ^{be willing to pay for being the first to} armed attack of the territory of any of the nations located in all the areas which are listed, and she believes that she has set the price high enough so that the ~~commitment~~ ^{for the} into which she entered affords these areas adequate protection. Should subsequent events, however, prove that her appraisal of America's unwillingness to pay the price ^{specified} listed was wrong, Russia, ^{at all these times} while she ~~will not exact a higher price than listed,~~ ^{may then} will subsequently issue a new price list, in which she may revise upward the prices specified in the old list. X

Russia realizes fully that it is necessary to render the stalemate stable, and she knows that this requires her to impose certain restraints on herself. Therefore, Russia has adopted the principle of "one for one," and accordingly, if she is forced to demolish a number of American cities lying within ^{of certain} ~~certain~~ size categories, she will tolerate America's demolishing an equal number of Russian cities of the same size categories. For any additional city which America might demolish in Russia, Russia would demolish, according to the principle of one for one, one American city of the same size category.

Russia has no intention to take armed action or support anyone else's armed action directed against a territory which America is committed to protect, but there might be unforeseen contingencies where Russia might have to take such action. For this reason Russia would welcome, if America were to issue a price list similar to one issued by herself, ^{and covering all} a list of the areas which America is committed to protect, ^{and} specifying the price for each area in terms of the number and categories, ^{of size} ~~of size~~ of Russian cities that America ^{would want to} ~~may wish to~~ demolish. X

" Russia would expect America to give four weeks' notice to the Russian cities which ^{she may} have been singled out for destruction and, naturally, Russia would demolish -- according to the principle of "one for one" -- one American city of the same size category ^{for each} as a Russian city which may have been destroyed by America. "

" Russia believes that this ^{matter} might be perfectly well handled by means of unilateral declarations, and sees no reason to propose that America and Russia enter into an agreement in regard to this ^{it} matter. However, for the sake of the stability of the stalemate -- which to maintain is as much to the interest of America as ^{it is} to the interest of Russia -- Russia proposes to reach an ^{amicable} ~~inimical~~ understanding with America on the division of the Russian, ^{and} as well as American, cities into equivalent size categories, lest a dispute ^{arise} over the size category to which a ^{denuclearized} particular city ^{belonged} that may have been demolished, ^{and destroyed} belongs, ^{and destroyed} and endanger the stability of the atomic stalemate. " " Since Russia knows that the American people would not cherish losing any of their cities, she proposes in case of a ^{conflict} which may endanger an area ^{should threaten to engulf} protected by Russia, to name ^{several} the American cities from among which the cities singled out for destruction will be selected, which she would actually demolish in case she were forced to invoke the published price list. In this manner the inhabitants of the ^{several} cities named by Russia will ^{have} ~~be~~ given an opportunity to make their ~~representations and~~ views known to the American Government on the ^{merits} issue of the particular conflict ^{American involvement} which has arisen, ^{which threatens to engulf} ~~the one that surrounds~~ the one protected by Russia. "

X

All I can say with reasonable assurance is that the choice lies between ridding the world of the bomb and rendering the atomic stalemate stable. And if there is a better way of ~~ridding~~ rendering than ^{rule of conduct} the stalemate stable/by adopting the philosophy here described, I ~~should~~ would like to ~~know~~ be told about it.

The ^{rule of conduct} philosophy concerning the potential use of the bomb, here ^{proposed} described, suffers from the ^{definite} defect that it is unprecedented, ~~Because~~ ^{but} the atomic stalemate represents a situation which is wholly without precedent in history, any philosophy of conduct which would render ^{it} it stable, must of necessity be unprecedented also. The philosophy here described suffers from this defect also. ^{And} But if I were asked to propose a ^{rule of conduct} philosophy which would not suffer from this defect and yet would be able to cope with the problem posed by the atomic stalemate, I ~~should~~ ^{must} have to reply, "I regret I am unable to oblige".

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This, of course, is ~~greatly to be regretted~~ ^{very regrettable because}. Unfortunately, a ^{rule} proposal that is unprecedented is not easy to accept, and the ^{rule of conduct} philosophy must be politically acceptable if it is to be adopted by the Government.

But

Fortunately, measures that may not be acceptable to the people today may become acceptable tomorrow, when the people have had enough time to see the necessity of these measures.

The thought that cities might be demolished is, of course, hard to take. And it will not be easy to explain to the public and possibly even harder to explain to ~~the~~ ^{the} statesmen, that no cities need to be demolished if the ^{rule of conduct} philosophy here proposed were adopted.

The stability of a mechanical system which is subjected to

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certain constraints, is determined by the conceivable motions which are permitted by ^{those} ~~this~~ constraints, but if the system is stable, ^{it remains} ~~the system is~~ at rest and these ^{do not} ~~conceivable motions~~ actually do not take place. This is, of course, something that the physicists learn in the ~~the~~ ^{freshman} course; ^{but will the physicists they} ~~but~~ shall we be able to explain to statesmen, that in a ^{stable stalemate} ~~system in which~~ cities might ~~not~~ be conceivably demolished, if the system is indeed stable, no city ^{will} ~~be~~ actually demolished? ^{but} ~~be~~ that as it may, let ~~us~~ for the sake of argument at least, assume that the atomic stalemate has been rendered stable by the adoption of ^{the} ~~the~~ appropriate ^{rules of conduct} ~~philosophy~~ concerning the potential use of "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power and ^{then} ~~try to visualize what~~ kind of a world we should ^{then} ~~have~~. Clearly, it ~~wouldn't~~ take long until Russia and America would discover, that while they might remain free to maintain an air force, an army, and a navy, these would not add appreciably to their security, ^{but} ~~while~~ they would add appreciably to their military expenditure. Before long, America and Russia ~~not~~ could be expected to reduce these forces and, if the second stage of the stalemate continues in existence for an appreciable period of time, the arms expenditure of these two nations, ~~would~~ fall to a small fraction of its present level. ^{could then} ~~The~~ economic resources which would thus become free in America, as well as Russia, might at least in part, ^{then} ~~be~~ used by these two nations, in cooperation with each other, for the building of a world community, ^{peace} ~~and~~ in which ~~it~~ may be preserved without the necessity of maintaining it by a threat of force.

Let us now compare for a moment ^{such a stable form of the stalemate} ~~the~~ atomic stalemate ^{for} ~~or~~

~~somewhat optimistic version -- of the possible benefits of an atomic stalemate with the situation which ~~will~~ prevail in the world if America and Russia ^{had} agreed to rid the world of the bomb at an early date.~~ P

is my contention that unless ~~in~~ ^{the world somehow} in addition to doing away with the bombs ~~we~~ also did away somehow with the knowledge of how to make

~~them~~ ^{should there be another war, then} bombs ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ case of another war ~~after~~ after a comparatively short

period of conventional warfare -- ~~the~~ ^{that} war would be fought with

atomic bombs.

11 Russia ~~does~~ ^{is proposed} not wish to divert an appreciable fraction of her national income into arms expenditure. ^{she} It is, therefore, greatly reducing her army, navy, and Air Force. Russia may, therefore, not be in a position to defend an area she is committed to protect, by fighting a war in the conventional sense of the word. Accordingly, all Russia ~~feels~~ ^{may count herself} committed to do is to exact from America ^{a reasonable} the specified price for which ^{Russia} she ~~knows~~ ^{in turn be willing to} she must pay an equal price. ~~Having~~ ~~exacte~~ ~~d~~ ~~such~~ ~~a~~ ~~price~~ ~~As~~ Accordingly, America could -- if indeed she were willing to pay the ^{specified} price ~~to~~ ~~conquer~~, (or have an ally of hers ~~conquer~~) ^{specific} the ~~area~~ ~~that~~ ~~was~~ under Russian protection, ~~but~~ ~~while~~ America and Russia would both lose an equal number of cities, ~~but~~ America would derive no benefit from having demolished cities in Russia -- which Russia would, of course, soon rebuild; ^{the gain of R} therefore, America would have to balance - ~~to~~ ~~conquer~~ ~~or~~ ~~have~~ ~~an~~ ~~ally~~ ~~of~~ ~~hers~~ ~~conquer~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~ ~~in~~ ~~question~~, against the loss which she would incur, by having a certain number of her cities demolished. Russia does not believe that ~~xxx~~ America has ^{an} a ^{vital} ⁱⁿ ^{interest} in any of the areas listed by Russia ^{which is sufficiently} sufficiently great, ~~to~~ ~~induce~~ ~~her~~ ~~to~~ ~~lose~~ ~~to~~ ~~accept~~ the loss of even one city, of half a million inhabitants, for ^{justly taking} the sake of ~~taking~~ ~~possession~~, (or having an ally of hers ~~take~~ ~~possession~~) of any of the areas ^{gaining} ~~which~~ ~~are~~ ~~under~~ Russian protection. For this reason, Russia believes that her proclamation extends adequate protection to all the areas listed. ^{of this sort} It is my contention that if Russia were to issue ~~such~~ a proclamation, it would be ~~greatly~~ to America's interest to adopt the same philosophy concerning ^{of the} potential

potential

use of her "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power, for ^Eevidently,

if both America and Russia adopt this philosophy, the stalemate

will be stable in the sense that no initial disturbance ⁴could

lead to a chain of ever-increasing destruction. Moreover, it would

be exceedingly unlikely that any city would ever be actually

demolished, if this philosophy were adopted. *R* Quite similarly, if

America were to issue a proclamation of this sort, it would be

in the interest of Russia to embrace the same philosophy. *R* It is

my contention that in the second stage of the atomic stalemate,

even in the absence of any limitation on the number of bombs that

America and Russia may stockpile, ^{with reasonable assurance} that could be verified, and even

the stalemate would be stable.
~~if both Russia and America retained "dirty" hydrogen bombs of high~~

~~power in addition to the "clean" hydrogen bombs of high power which~~

~~they would stockpile, there would be no appreciable danger that the~~

~~"dirty" hydrogen bombs would be dropped or that hydrogen bombs either~~

~~"clean" or "dirty" would be dropped on cities that have not been~~

~~evacuated.~~

Americans might want to know what assurance they would have

that Russia would not ^{be tempted to} ~~resort to the use of hydrogen bombs or to the~~

~~dropping of hydrogen bombs on cities that have not been evacuated,~~

~~in deviation from her proclaimed intentions. At this point we must~~

⁴~~ask~~ just what interest would Russia have to do such a thing. ² Leaving

aside the ~~moral~~ ^{whole} condemnation of the world which she would incur, and

leaving out of consideration the possibility of American retaliation

in kind, Russia ^{may be} ~~cannot be~~ assumed to be ~~un~~ aware of the following fact:

If Russia were to drop hydrogen bombs on ~~an appreciable number of~~ ^{few} American cities, ~~demolishing the city as well as killing the~~ ^{without warning} inhabitants, she would thereby not create as much trouble for the American Government as if she were to demolish the same cities without killing the inhabitants. Just imagine the position facing the American Government if a few large cities were demolished, and the Government would have to house and feed millions of refugees. Why should the Russian Government oblige the American Government by sparing her the facing of such a calamity? It is conceivable that were the Russian Government to issue the kind of proclamation I described, the American Government, because of the prevailing ~~emotional~~ emotional attitude towards property, would revise her position on atomic disarmament and prefer to reach an agreement with Russia ~~to~~ ^{to} rid the world of the bombs. Russia may or may not have a similar emotional attitude towards property, and ~~may or may not~~ ^{might} also prefer to rid the world of the bomb, rather than render the state ~~mate~~ stable by adopting the philosophy here described.

~~out there~~ To be sure, I would not know - all I can say with reasonable assurance that the choice is between ridding the world of bombs and ~~stalemate~~ ^{making} rendering the atomic state stable. And if there is a better way of ~~making~~ rendering the stalemate stable than the ~~philosophy~~ ^{philosophy} by adoption of the ~~philosophy~~ ^{philosophy} here described

I should like to be known as a realist. I should like to be known as a realist. I should like to be known as a realist.

Am 504 C
Soviet Power

Disarmament First Period Continued

With the military establishment shrunk, tariffs abolished and credits made available, that will enable all countries to make out of the technological development that is now taking place in the United States, the standard of living should show a rapid rise during the first period throughout which the Atomic Stalemate continues in existence. The absence of any political crises anywhere that lead to fighting in remote areas will create a feeling of external security whereas the rapid rise of the standard of living will create a feeling of internal security. This first period comes to an end when the bombs and means for their delivery are abolished. The time schedule for this step could be either fixed or it could be left to the Soviet Union and the United States to decide this point which will mean this step would be taken when both are ready and willing to take it.

Once the strategic air forces, their bombs and above all their means to carry bombs are abolished, and the danger of an areal attack disappears, then the Soviet Union might choose to propose that the United States conduct an areal survey of air territory as the best means to convince the United States that no secret evasions occur in air territory. It is impossible to say at this time whether such an areal survey would be sufficient for the purpose. We must keep in mind that technological advances are made all the time and that any number of new devices might arise that could become dangerous if manufactured in sufficient quantities once Russia and the United States having given up the strategic air forces ~~have~~ and it is invincible. Thus suspicion might arise either in America that some untoward manufacture might take place in Russia not directed at the production of long range bombers or other means suitable for the delivery of bombs but rather things which are much less conspicuous and which cannot be detected by taking photographs.

During this second period there are essential no military

secrets left and, therefore, there is no rational reason why the Soviet Union might not find it the easiest way to convince America of the absence of any secret evasions by inviting America to maintain agencies in Russian territory - Russians who may move around unobtrusively anywhere, who would act as plain clothes inspectors, whose identity is not known to the Russian Government.