

Col. Crosby, this is from his original summary, and about the only real change is the knocking off of the last two paragraphs. I could simply cut them off the copies of the Summary which we had run if this is all right.

E. Payne

A handwritten signature or set of initials in blue ink, appearing to be 'EP' or similar, located below the typed name 'E. Payne'.

*corrected JH
Jan. 21/64*

January 2, 1964

SUMMARY
by
Leo Szilard

Unless a decisive step is taken towards arms control, Russia might deploy before long anti-missile missiles around her rocket-launching sites and around her cities. This could lead to a new arms race in which the Administration might find itself forced to double, or triple, the number of Minutemen scheduled to be built, to deploy anti-missile missiles around our cities, and to embark on a fall-out shelter program for the protection of the inhabitants of our cities, at a cost of about \$50 billion.

X Economic considerations may slow Russia's build up of her anti-missile defenses sufficiently to make it possible for us as yet to avoid such a new arms race / by reaching an agreement with Russia on a cut-off in the production of bombs and rockets.

Russia might perhaps agree to a production cut-off, as a first step, if America and Russia were to reach a meeting of the minds on reducing their strategic striking forces, step by step, to a "minimal" level, just sufficient to inflict "unacceptable damage" in a counterblow, if an atomic attack were extended to their territory.

We have now reached the point when we can no longer use our strategic striking forces any longer as a deterrent, except as a deterrent against "nuclear blackmail." Moreover we would be more secure if both Russia and we reduced these striking forces to a minimal level, provided that the measures of inspection adopted would be sufficient to give us assurance that Russia would not secretly retain a strategic striking force large enough to be capable of destroying a significant portion of the minimal striking forces we retain.

X In the course of the last year the Soviet Union has accepted our notion

that America, as well as Russia, may retain a "minimal" strategic striking force, for a period of years to be agreed upon, and that inspection shall not be limited to equipment which is to be destroyed, but be extended also to equipment which is being retained.

We would have to explore whether the Russians mean the same thing as we do when they appear to accept the principle of the minimal deterrent. But before we can do this we must clarify our own minds on what we ourselves mean when we speak of this principle.

X An agreement based on the concept of the "minimal deterrent" would provide for a step-by-step reduction of Russia's as well as America's strategic striking forces to a "minimal level." At this minimal level the Russians would be left in the legitimate possession of perhaps twelve rockets and bombs, up to three megatons each, which could reach their target. ^{be counted on to} ~~These~~ ^{This} would make it possible for them to demolish, in a counterblow, twelve of our largest cities, totaling 25 million inhabitants. We would need to retain about forty bombs and rockets which could reach their target, in order to be capable of demolishing Russian cities totaling the same number of inhabitants.

The agreement ought to limit the size of the tactical bombs retained by America and Russia, to one kiloton and their number to about three hundred, on each side.

The current superiority of our strategic striking forces is a rapidly vanishing asset. In a year or two Russia could absorb an all-out American attack, directed against her strategic air bases and missile bases of known location, and still retain a "residual striking capacity" sufficient to demolish all of our cities of over 100,000. In other words, within a few years, the strategic striking forces of Russia may reach "saturation parity" with those of America.

Many people within the Administration know that we would be far more secure if both America and Russia agreed to reduce their strategic striking forces to the "minimal level." Russia might agree ^{provided} ~~if~~ she could be assured that Germany ^{would} ~~will~~ not have atomic bombs and that China would not build a substantial strategic striking force. Conceivably, China might be willing to cooperate ^{provided} ~~if~~ we were willing to create a de-nuclearized zone in the Far East and Southeast Asia.

* * *

We cannot have general disarmament without having a far-reaching political settlement, but the conclusion of an agreement based on the concept of the "minimal deterrent" need not await a political settlement in Europe, or elsewhere. Moreover, in view of the current estimates of Russia's conventional armies, such an agreement could be negotiated between America and Russia without including limitations on conventional arms which would involve other nations in a major way.

Russia might agree to a production cut-off in bombs and rockets, in time to avert a nuclear arms race, if we reach a meeting of the minds with them on the concept of the "minimal deterrent" at an early date. If the conversations were carried far enough to convince them that an agreement could be negotiated without running into any major hitches, then the Russians might accept a production cut-off, even before an agreement based on the minimal deterrent is spelled out, with the i's dotted and the t's crossed.

* * *

What the Russians would accept and also what the Congress would accept depends on whether the Administration can make them understand the need to avoid a new arms race, the perils which we face in the current situation and the advantages that an agreement based upon the concept of

X the "minimal deterrent" would hold for all concerned.

X Unless it becomes possible somehow to arrange for greatly improved
 X communications between the Administration and the Soviet Government,
 X on the one hand, ~~and~~ between the Administration and the Congress, on
 X the other hand, ~~no~~ ^{can} decisive progress towards a meaningful agreement on
 X arms control ~~is going to~~ be made. ~~Instead, we may be taking a number~~
 XX ~~of~~ little steps, like the test ban, for instance. These little steps ^{may}
 improve the international climate, but if nothing decisive is done,
 before long, the climate may keep on improving and improving until
 X there ~~is~~ ^{comes} a new crisis and, then we shall be back where we started from.
 X To make progress is not enough; ~~for~~ if the progress is not fast enough,
 something is going to overtake us.

~~There are a number of Senators who are deeply interested in the
 issue of our national security. If they were to acquaint themselves in
 detail with the ~~main~~ problems involved they could make a constructive
 contribution to the formation of our national policy in this area; they
 could assist the Administration by a dispassionate appraisal of the
 policies which are under consideration and they could assist the Admini-
 stration by preparing the public for the acceptance of these policies,
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~~Further, if they were to inform themselves fully on the main issues
 involved in arms control, they could engage in conversations with the
 Soviet Government, at the highest level. Because what they might say
 could not commit the Administration, their conversations would not take
 on the aspect of negotiations. Thus it would be possible for them to
 have the kind of free-wheeling discussions with the Russians which is
 needed to get our own thinking across to them and to explore what they
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unabridged

NOT FOR RELEASE

January 1964

SUMMARY

by
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Economic considerations may slow Russia's build up of her anti-missile defenses sufficiently to make it possible for us as yet to avoid such a new arms race, by reaching an agreement with Russia on a cut-off in the production of bombs and rockets.

Russia might perhaps agree to a production cut-off, as a first step, if America and Russia were to reach a meeting of the minds on reducing their strategic striking forces, step by step, to a "minimal" level, just sufficient to inflict "unacceptable damage" in a counterblow, if an atomic attack were extended to their territory.

We have now reached the point when we can no longer use our strategic striking forces any longer as a deterrent, except as a deterrent against "nuclear blackmail." Moreover we would be more secure if both Russia and we reduced these striking forces to a minimal level, provided that the measures of inspection adopted would be sufficient to give us assurance that Russia would not secretly retain a strategic striking force large enough to be capable of destroying a significant portion of the minimal striking forces we retain.

In the course of the last year the Soviet Union has accepted our notion that America, as well as Russia, may retain a "minimal" strategic striking force, for a period of years to be agreed upon, and that inspection shall not be limited to equipment which is to be destroyed, but be extended also to the equipment which is

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We would have to explore whether the Russians mean the same thing as we do when they appear to accept the principle of the minimal deterrent. But before we can do this we must clarify our own minds on what we ourselves mean when we speak of this principle.

An agreement based on the concept of the "minimal deterrent" would provide for a step-to-step reduction of Russia's as well as America's strategic striking forces to a "minimal level." At this minimal level the Russians would be left in the legitimate possession of perhaps twelve rockets and bombs, up to three megatons each, which could reach their target. This would make it possible for them to demolish, in a counterblow, twelve of our largest cities, totaling 25 million inhabitants. We would need to retain about forty bombs and rockets which could reach their target, in order to be capable of demolishing Russian cities totaling the same number of inhabitants.

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Many people within the Administration know that we would be far more secure if both America and Russia agreed to reduce their strategic striking forces to the minimal level. Russia might agree if she could be assured that Germany will not have atomic bombs and that China would not build a substantial strategic striking force. Conceivably, China might be willing to cooperate if we were willing to

create a de-nuclearized zone in the Far East and Southeast Asia.

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What the Russians would accept and also what the Congress would accept depends on whether the Administration can make them understand the need to avoid a new arms race, the perils which we face in the current situation and the advantages that an agreement based upon the concept of the minimal deterrent would hold for all concerned.

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crisis and, then we shall be back where we started from. To make progress is not enough, for if the progress is not fast enough, something is going to overtake us.

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Further, if they were to inform themselves fully on the main issues involved in arms control, they could engage in conversations with the Soviet Government, at the highest level. Because what they might say could not commit the Administration, their conversations would not take on the aspect of negotiations. Thus it would be possible for them to have the kind of free-wheeling discussions with the Russians which is needed to get our own thinking across to them and to explore what they would be likely to accept.

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