

July, 1949

Nicolai Machiavell ~~sk~~ sky

by Leo Szilard

Telnowsky: May I come in?

BARDIN Kalgan (Director of the 2nd Transural Atomic Project): Certainly, I'm just loafing, trying to get a call through to Moscow. Don't know why it takes them so long today, they seem to get worse and worse.

Telnikow Telnowsky: I just had a call from Moscow. That's what I want to talk to you about. Machiavellnikow called me, the connection was not too good, I may not have gotten right all that he said.

Kalgan: Too many rival NKVD groups listening in these days--I suppose--clicking in and clicking out. What did Nicolai want?

Telnowsky: Wants Kurtshatow to send him 100 grams of Uranium 235, Brand 15A, for shipment to America. Wants me to cut red tape. You know anything about this? What is the idea of shipping brand 15A to America?

Kalgan: Yes, I know what he has in mind. He wants to force the resignation of Lillienthal.

Telnowsky: I don't get it.

Kalgan: Don't you read Machiavellnikow's bulletins?

Telnowsky: I know I should, but I am too busy.

Kalgan: Hah! Then you don't know that Machiavellnikow almost succeeded in getting Lillienthal ousted. Last year in October, he ordered our agent in the Argonne Laboratory to take a hundred grams of enriched Uranium from stock and to hide it or to destroy it. No use taking unnecessary risks and try to smuggle it past the guards. Machiavellnikow figured the loss would become known by the time the newly elected American Congress convenes. That Congress, he thought, would be Republican and Lillienthal would be ousted in disgrace.

Telnowsky: I did not know we had an agent in the Argonne Laboratory. Is he a scientist?

Kalga: We have three men there. Scientists would be no good for this. They use their own heads instead of carrying out instructions, just like you guys here. In the Argonne Laboratory, we have got one guard and two FBI men. They are reliable, and the FBI men can get access to everything without arousing suspicion.

Telnowsky: What does a policeman know about Uranium? How does he know what to look for and where to look for it?

Kalga: That was easy. Don't imagine that we are the only ones plagued with security regulations. They have the same rules there we have over here. Bottles with Uranium 235 in them are labelled in code. All other bottles are labelled what they are, copper oxide, or manganese sulfate, or what not. Our man just took the stuff out of a coded bottle, put it into an envelope, stamped it "Secret," and threw it in the wastepaper basket--a "burn" basket, you know. We have them painted blue; over there they are painted red, and the contents are burned every night just as they are supposed to be burned here. That was all there was to it.

Telnowsky: And then what happened?

Kalga: Then nothing happened. At first they didn't discover the loss, and then, when they did, they kept it secret. In the end, we had to leak the "news" to the American press. This was the most difficult part of the whole job, but finally it was accomplished, and then came Gickenlooper's attack on Lilienthal, and the Atomic Energy Commission, and it almost succeeded, but not quite.

Telnowsky: Who is Gickenlooper?

Kalgan: He is a Senator from the Middle-West. He is honest enough, they tell me, but he is coming up for re-election. In America, Senators are re-elected from time to time, and sometimes it makes them nervous.

Telnowsky: And now what?

Kalgan: Now the Americans have tightened regulations. Now they have a foolproof system for accounting for the stuff. Now if a chemist does any work with plutonium in the Argonne, an armed guard must sit at his side. The chemist won't like that, and he may not make any progress. Maybe no work will be done, but nothing can get lost.

Telnowsky: Machiavellnikow should be satisfied. What more can he want?

Kalgan: He still wants to oust Lilienthal. Lilienthal pushes for full cooperation with the British and in the end, he might succeed.

Telnowsky: Why is that so important?

Kalgan: The British are probably ahead of the Americans on ideas on reactors, but they lack the resources. Full cooperation might speed up the development in America.

Telnowsky: So what next?

Kalgan: So Machiavellnikow wants to send 100 grams of Uranium 235 to America and have our man smuggle it into the Argonne Laboratory. Some of the stuff missing they can always explain away. A surplus, Machiavellnikow says, they can't explain away. There will be another uproar, some more confusion, again Lilienthal will be attacked, and maybe this time he will be ousted.

Telnowsky: I have mixed feelings about this. After all, the Americans haven't been doing so well under Lilienthal, that is, if we can trust the reports we get. Take the reactor development. They seem to have made a complete mess of it. They have done nothing to enlist scientific talent, they did not even get back any of their good men who had worked

on it during the war. If Lillenthal goes, and someone else takes over, maybe they'll pull themselves together and tackle the problem of getting their good men back and perhaps even some fresh talent.

Kalman: Machiavellnikow has considered this, and he thinks that he can play it safe. He has made his arrangements. If Lillenthal goes, Rosner escapes from the United States and turns up in Moscow.

Telnowsky: I don't get it? Who is Rosner?

Kalman: He is a scientist. Not a very good one, probably; I do not suppose you have ever heard his name. But he is in a high position in the Argonne Laboratory and besides, he was born in Europe.

Telnowsky: I still don't get it. Do you think Rosner can tell us anything we do not already know?

Kalman: He might, at that, but that's beside the point. This is what Machiavellnikow says: A large proportion of the men who during the war spark-plugged and guided the atomic energy work in America had come from Europe. None of these men were ever fully trusted, except perhaps Rosner, and none of these men, except Rosner, is at present working for the Commission. If Rosner escapes, we can be sure that all of these men will be kept out of Atomic Energy whoever may be running the show in America. Rosner was the only one who was fully trusted by the FBI. If he was a traitor, none of these men can be trusted, so people will argue. Machiavellnikow thinks there might even be legislation excluding foreign-born scientists.

Telnowsky: There are, of course, a number of very good native born American scientists who could get into atomic energy work.

Kalman: They could, but they won't. Most of them were associating in one way or another with these men who came from Europe. All of them will be questioned about their associations; they will be questioned about all their past. By the time they will be invited in, they will be so disgusted they will say "No, thank you." Excuse me, please (lifting up

the ringing telephone) this might be my call. (Speaking into the telephone.) Yes...Yes...That is very unfortunate...No, he is irreplaceable...Well, thank you for letting me know. (Turning to Telnowsky.) You need not bother about that Uranium shipment, the stuff stays here. Machiavellnikow has just been arrested. The samples 15A contain Extremium, as you know. Sessonoff charges that Machiavellnikow's project was merely a ruse to let the American's have a sample of Extremium so they can determine its properties.

Telnowsky: Surely, you do not believe that?

Kalgan: No, I don't.

Telnowsky: Anyway, the Americans must know about Extremium.

Kalgan: Why must they? I admit they may have discovered it during the war, but if they haven't, they probably do not know about it. They do not have enough good men left in this work. Who is there left? Who today over there would be likely to hit upon Extremium? Machiavellnikow is no traitor. But it was foolhardy of Kutschatow to agree to send brand 15A which contains Extremium. If the Americans had gotten it, and had discovered the surplus sample, they might have fooled around with it and might have hit on Extremium.

Telnowsky: Didn't you just say they have no one left in this work who could make such a discovery?

Kalgan: Don't be so God damned logical; what I am trying to tell you is that Kutschatow is going to be arrested tomorrow.

Telnowsky (shouting): What for?

Kalgan: Accused of conspiracy with Machiavellnikow.

Telnowsky: But surly you are not going to stand for this! This will wreck the reactor program.

Kalga: I could resign of course, but what good would that do? Alexandrowitsch will be put in my place. You know what that means. He will get rid of Landau and Leipunski and Russinow. They have too many ideas. They argue too much. They are not safe. He will replace them with harmless ones who will play ball.

This whole thing may blow over in a few months, and if it does it will have cost us six months or a year. But if Alexandrowitsch takes over, he will wreck the reactor program for good, or for the next five years anyway.

Telnowsky: What is all this about? Do you know? Can you tell me?

Kalga: Machiavellnikow is Korsakow's man. Sossonow is trying to hit Korsakow; Machiavellnikow's arrest is the opening shot of the battle. For two years now, Korsakow has been in charge on the American desk. He was exceedingly successful--that is in my opinion. But his policy is far too subtle for the grasp of Sossonow and his gang. Sossonow is violently opposed to it. The Politbureau, they say, is split on the issue. Where Stalin stands, I was not able to find out.

Telnowsky: Tell me more about it, if you can. Perhaps I could be of some help in this fight. I know America well, as a student, I spent three years in Ithaca.

Kalga: I know you did, and the NKVD is plenty worried about it; they came to see me about you not once, but ten times. I myself would very much like to know what you think about Korsakow's policy, but in Moscow they would not trust your advice because you studied in America.

I myself have never been in America, although I wrote my thesis on the "Psycho-pathology of American Capitalism." Korsakow and I studied psychology together at Leningrad. He was a brilliant student.

Telnowsky: What is his policy?

Kalman: He is using the Party in America to demolish the fetishes of the Americans, fetishes like justice, freedom and democracy.

Telnowsky: What can the American Communists accomplish? There are very few party members in America.

Kalman: Korskow has instructed the party in America to be provocative for the sole purpose of drawing fire. Under the pressure of an aroused public opinion Congress, and above all, the Courts, will be goaded--so Korskow predicted--into acts of political discrimination, flagrant injustice, and perhaps even outright violations of the American Constitution--another one of those American fetishes. The Americans are a peculiar people. Korskow says,--and I think he is right about this--that they will fight well only as long as they can fight with a good conscience and fight for something irrational. In the past, they have fought quite hard for abstractions, such as democracy, freedom, justice, and the right of self-determination of minorities. Americans are under the illusion that these abstractions are realities. They think there really is democracy in America and justice and freedom and protection for minorities. These abstractions are for them symbols, like the flag. Destroying their illusions is like soiling the flag. Under a soiled flag, Americans can't fight well. Sure, they will go through all the motions of fighting, in any case, but the zest for the fight will be gone.

Telnowsky: And you say, Korskow has been successful with this?

Kalman: He was successful beyond all expectations. I am not too surprised about this, for I know something about the American political system. Minorities who command plenty of votes and who may throw those votes from the "democrats" to the "republicans", or vice-versa, are pretty

well protected over there. Both parties are bound to vie for their favor. But the Communist vote is not large enough to count, and Communists will not vote for either party anyway. So the two parties outdo each other in heaping abuse on them. They could outlaw them, of course, but then all the fun would stop. Besides, that would be an open breach of the Constitution, and they don't want an open breach of the Constitution; they have that much sense, at any rate. So they try to bend and twist the Constitution without actually breaking it. They make rules and pass laws which discriminate against those who are members of the Communist party. And they dismiss from government jobs those, who are members of organizations of which Communists are also members. Students, who refuse to swear that they are not Communists are deprived from fellowships.

In one sense, all this doesn't amount to anything, of course, just a handful of people are affected. But every single case makes a headline. The newspapers spit fire and smoke, and the millions of Americans who read the daily papers and watch this spectacle are affected by it.

There are not many Communists in America, but under Korsakow's direction, they accomplish much. For the subconscious of the mind is more logical than the conscious. And many Americans who say that they see nothing wrong in discrimination against subversives and who are sincere in saying it, will nevertheless be deeply affected. They are not conscious of any violation of freedom, justice, or the rights of minorities, but their subconscious is not so easily deceived. Tomorrow, these very same Americans will be less proud of being Americans, and they will not even know why.

Telnowsky: Isn't this a little bit too subtle?



Kalgin: I told you it is a subtle policy, and Sossonoff is just as incapable of grasping it as of grasping your equations of the Atomic Reactor. He has to fight Korsakow's policies, and if he wins out...well, it will be just too bad. We shall know soon enough. Machiavellnikow's arrest is bringing matters to a head. In the meantime you had better watch your step.

Telnowsky: I still don't get it. What has Machiavellnikow to do with Korsakow?

Kalgin: I told you, he is Korsakow's man, and at the moment he is the most vulnerable one. Korsakow is not particularly interested in atomic energy, and so he left Machiavellnikow a completely free hand. Still Korsakow visited our place here three months ago. He wanted to know what we thought of the progress the Americans make with the bomb.

Telnowsky: What did you tell him?

Kalgin: I told him we did not believe they have anything much better than the Nagasaki bomb. A little better maybe, but not very much. They could not have made much progress without some of the first class men working at it full time--which they are not--not without frequent bomb tests--which clearly they are not making.

I told Korsakow that the chances are that the present American bombs are quite similar to the Nagasaki bomb, that ~~we~~ had to be carried in a B-29. No B-29 or any similar bomber will get through to the Urals. I doubt that they will get through to Moscow. If there is war, we shall occupy France, Belgium, and Holland, and B-29's can get through to Bordeaux and Le Havre, to Rotterdam, to Amsterdam, to Brussels, and to Paris. The Americans can drop atomic bombs on these cities and that's just about all they can do if they have to carry their bombs in B29's. This is all they are going to do with their bombs, if you ask me.

Telnowsky: Who is in charge of Los Alamos now.

Kalgan: Bradbury.

Telnowsky: Never heard of him.

Kalgan: He is not a bad director, though, he stands up for his men, and the spirit of the laboratory is not bad. He does what he can. Fortunately for us, that's not enough. He would have to get in really good men first. Incidentally, one of these men has now gone to Los Alamos for a year and he is supposed to be very good. I wanted to ask you about him. Darn it now, his name has slipped my mind for the moment.

Telnowsky: Could you find out his name and let me know, please? This is something we should not take lightly. What else did Korsakow want to know?

Kalgan: He was worried about rumors about American bombs one thousand times more powerful than the Nagasaki bomb. McCloy, the American boss of Germany, made a speech three years ago. He said that scientists had told him that, given the same intensive effort, that went into the development of the bomb during the war, it should take no more than two years to make bombs one thousand times as powerful as the Nagasaki bomb. One of the Commissioners, Pike I believe was his name, recently made a speech in which he referred to McCloy's statement, and said that the two years are up now, and bombs one thousand times as powerful as the Nagasaki bomb are nowhere in sight. Korsakow wanted to know whether McCloy was bluffing or Pike was concealing something. "Which of the two is lying," he asked me.

Telnowsky: No one needs to be lying it seems to me. McCloy said, given the same effort that went into the production of the bomb during the war, did he not?

Kalgan: That's what I told Korsakow. I don't know whether I succeeded in reassuring him. "Let's not underestimate the enemy," was all he said.

Telnowsky: I think I had better go now. Is it allright to warn Kutschatow?

We have to do that, it seems to me.

Kalgan: Of course. But don't tell him you have it from me. He should take plenty of warm clothing. Explain the situation to him as well as you can. You will know how far you can go. His position here will be kept open until he returns. If things go wrong, there is no telling what may happen, of course. But if Korsakow wins out, all will be well.

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by Leo Szilard

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Kalgan: (Director of the 2nd Transural Atomic Project): "Certainly, I'm just loafing, trying to get a call through to Moscow. Don't know why it takes them so long today, they seem to get worse and worse."

Telnowsky: "I just had a call from Moscow. That's what I want to talk to you about. Machiavellnikow called me, the connection was not too good, I may not have gotten right all that he said."

Kalgan: "Too many rival NKVD groups listening in these days--I suppose--clicking in and clicking out. What did Nicolai want?"

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Kalgan: Yes, I know what he has in mind. He wants to force the resignation of Lilienthal.

Telnowsky: I don't ~~understand~~ <sup>get it</sup>.

Kalgan: <sup>Why</sup> don't you read Machiavellnikow's bulletins?

Telnowsky: I know I should, but I am too busy.

Kalgan: Hah! then you don't know that Machiavellnikow almost succeeded in getting Lilienthal ousted. Last year in October he ordered our agent in the Argonne Laboratory to take a hundred grams of enriched Uranium from stock and to hide it or to destroy it. No use taking unnecessary risks <sup>and</sup> ~~by~~ trying ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> smuggle <sup>it</sup> ~~the stuff~~ past the guards. Machiavellnikow figured the loss will become known by the time the newly elected American Congress convenes. That Congress, he thought, would be Republican and Lilienthal would be ousted in disgrace.

Telnowsky: I did not know we had an agent in the Argonne Laboratory. Is he a scientist?

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In the Argonne Laboratory

We have got one guard and two FBI men. They are reliable, and the FBI men can get access to everything without arousing suspicion. They tell me it was not at all easy to get our men into the FBI, and even more difficult to get them assigned to the Argonne, but somehow, Machiavellnikow wangled it.

Telnowsky: What does a policeman know about Uranium? How does he know what to look for and where to look for it?

Kalman: That was easy. Don't imagine that we are the only ones plagued with security regulations. They have the same rules there we have over here. Bottles with Uranium 235 in them are labelled in code. All other bottles are labelled what they are, copper oxide or manganese sulfate or what not. Our man just took ~~that~~ stuff out of a ~~bottle~~ <sup>lead</sup>, put it into an envelope, stamped it "Secret", and threw it in the wastepaper basket. <sup>Here we have them</sup> ~~They are painted~~ over there they are painted red, and the contents are burned every night just as they are supposed to be burned here. That was all there was to it.

Telnowsky: And then what happened?

Kalman: Then ~~nothing~~ nothing happened. At first they didn't discover the loss, and then, when they did they kept it secret. <sup>In the end, we</sup> ~~Finally~~ had to leak the "news" to the <sup>American</sup> press, and this was the most difficult part of the whole job, but finally it was accomplished, and then came <sup>en</sup> ~~Glickeloooper's~~ attack on Lilienthal, and the Atomic Energy Commission, and it almost succeeded, but not quite.

Telnowsky: Who is ~~Glickeloooper~~ Glickeloooper?

Kalman: He is a Senator from the Middle-West. He is honest enough, they tell me, but he is coming up for re-election. In America, Senators are re-elected from time to time and sometimes it makes them nervous.

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Telnowsky: Machiavellnikow should be satisfied. What more can he want?

Kalgan: He still wants to <sup>oust</sup> ~~ask~~ Lilienthal. Lilienthal pushed for full cooperation with the British and in the end, he might succeed.

Telnowsky: Why is that so important?

Kalgan: The British are probably ahead of the Americans on ideas, <sup>on reactors</sup> but they lack the resources. ~~If they ~~work~~ everything~~ Full cooperation might speed up the development in America.

Telnowsky: So what ~~next~~ next?

Kalgan: So Machiavellnikow wants to send now <sup>200</sup> grams of Uranium 235 to America and have our man smuggle it into the Argonne Laboratory. ~~It~~ Some of the stuff ~~is~~ missing they can always explain away. A surplus, Machiavellnikow says, they can't explain away. There will be another uproar, some more confusion, again Lilienthal will be attacked, and maybe this time he will be ousted.

Telnowsky: I have mixed feelings about this. After <sup>all</sup> the Americans haven't been doing so well under Lilienthal, that is, if we can trust the reports we get. Take the reactor development. They seem to have made a complete mess of it. They have done nothing to enlist scientific talent, they did not even get back any of their good men who had worked on it during the war. If Lilienthal goes, and someone else takes over, maybe they'll pull themselves together and tackle the problem of getting their good men back and perhaps even some fresh talent.

Kalgan: Machiavellnikow has considered this, and he thinks that he can play it safe. He has made his arrangements. If Lilienthal goes, Rosner escapes from the United States and turns up in Moscow.

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Telnowsky: I still don't get it. Do you think Rosner can tell us anything ~~we~~ we do not know already?

Kalga: He might, at that, but that's beside the point, <sup>T</sup> this is what Machiavellnikov says: <sup>A</sup> large proportion of the men who during the war spark-plugged, ~~pushed~~ and guided the atomic energy work in America, had come from Europe. None of these men were ever fully trusted, except perhaps Rosner, and none of these men, except Rosner, is at present working for the Commission. If Rosner escapes, we can be sure <sup>I</sup> that all of these men will be kept out of <sup>A</sup> atomic <sup>E</sup> energy whoever may be running the show in America. Rosner was the only one who was fully trusted <sup>by</sup> the FBI. If he was a traitor, none of these men can be trusted, <sup>so the Americans will argue.</sup> Machiavellnikow thinks there might even be legislation excluding foreign-born scientists.

Telnowsky: There are of course a number of very good native born American scientists <sup>who</sup> who could get into atomic energy work.

Kalga: They could, but they won't. Most of them were associated <sup>ing</sup> in one way or another with these men who came from Europe. All of them will be questioned about <sup>their</sup> ~~these~~ associations, they will be questioned about <sup>all</sup> their past. By the time they will be invited in, they will be so disgusted they will say "No, thank you." Excuse, me please (lifting up the ringing telephone) this might be my call. (Speaking into the telephone) Yes,..Yes...That is very unfortunate....  
...No, he is irreplaceable. ..Well, thank you for letting me know. (Turning to Telnowsky.) You need not bother about that Uranium shipment, the stuff stays here. Machiavellnikow has just been arrested. The samples A-15 contain Extremium, as you know. Sossonoff charges that Machiavellnikow's project was merely a ruse to let the American's have a sample of Extremium so they can determine its properties.

Telnowsky: Surely, you do not believe that?

Kalga: No, I don't.

Telnowsky: Anyway, the Americans must know about Extremium.

Kalga: Why must they? I admit they may have discovered it during the war, but if they haven't, they probably do not know about it. They <sup>do</sup> ~~did~~ not have enough good men left <sup>in this work.</sup> after the war. Who is there left? Who today over there

would be likely to hit upon Extremium?



W.P. and Russian dictatorship -

Play politics

*What we believe to be true !!!  
No question of expediency :-*

Quoted out of context!

The question which I believe this conference ought to clarify is whether or not there is a majority in the atomic scientists' movement which can agree on a common platform. I do not mean a platform intended for publication but a platform formulated for the guidance of our own actions. The Lake Geneva conference showed that it is not possible to formulate a meaningful platform if we try to abide by a self-imposed unanimity rule. But I believe that there is in fact a vast majority in the atomic scientists' movement which can agree on a number of significant points. As I go along I shall try to formulate these points.

Kayser



First of all, let me say that the most important task of our movement ought to consist in clarifying our own thoughts on the vital issues which confront us at present. Our next important task is to help to bring about a dispassionate public discussion of these issues.

We can do these things only if we take as a starting point the actual situation which faces us at present and first of all try to evaluate what goes on at present in the name of foreign policy. Fortunately there is a factual report available to all of us in Byrnes' book "Speaking Frankly". [There are thirty copies of this book available here for you and if we are going to discuss tomorrow the meaning and value of our foreign policy then you ought to read tonight the chapter which deals with the Yalta conference, the chapter which deals with the Potsdam conference in 1945 and if you have time left, also the chapter which deals with the London Conference which was held in September 1945, one month after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.]

If you read Byrnes' book *Frankly Speaking*

On the basis of these chapters you may come to the ~~same~~ conclusion ~~as I did~~ that our foreign policy <sup>was</sup> with Russia was from its very inception based on a false <sup>assumption</sup> ~~assumption~~ towards the problem of a postwar settlement and that the peace is being lost by default.

Russia had been considered prior to the last war as a minor <sup>power</sup> party and had been treated as such, <sup>when she</sup> and became a major military power during the war. It was a foregone conclusion that she would behave after the war as other victorious nations had behaved in the past in similar circumstances. It was a foregone conclusion that she would ~~draw~~ throw her weight about and that some of Russia's aspirations would have to be resisted. Now in what manner could we have successfully resisted these Russian aspirations which came to the foreground at Yalta and Potsdam--or let me put the same question in a ~~more~~ more general form: Through what means could we have hoped to exert influence on the course of action of the sovereign Russian Government?

It will strike you if you will read Byrnes' account of the Potsdam conference that <sup>at Potsdam, with the</sup> ~~there~~ we did not show the slightest concern for Russia's welfare. One of Russia's greatest needs at that time <sup>and</sup> ~~I believe it still is~~ was assistance for her economic reconstruction. At Yalta and at Potsdam Russia wanted 10 billion dollars of reparations in ten years out of current German production. At Potsdam, <sup>the U.S.</sup> ~~we~~ refused to agree to this and instead <sup>we</sup> told Russia that she might go ahead and remove factories and equipment from her own zone. This I believe was a very grave mistake. My point however is not that mistakes have been made because mistakes are unavoidable. My point is rather that our whole approach to the problem of settlement with Russia was basically mistaken and that <sup>the</sup> ~~our~~ specific mistakes <sup>of the U.S.</sup> were the logical consequences of <sup>her</sup> ~~our~~ basic approach to the problem.

Let us suppose for a moment for the sake of argument that we would have adopted a totally different approach. Let us suppose that when Russia asked for 10 billion dollars in ten years ~~that~~ out of current German production we would have replied as follows: *the fact of the U.S.* ~~we~~ believe that in order to raise the standard of living in Russia at a fast enough rate Russia ought to have about 2 billion dollars a year for the next year amounting to 20 billion dollars rather than the 10 billion dollars for which she asked. *The U.S. Govt is* We are not at all sure that this amount could in fact be taken out of current German production without depriving the Germans of the incentives which the development of a peaceful Germany requires. From a purely economic point of view, the United States would have no difficulty in supplying to Russia the probable deficit but from a political point of view the Government of the United States is not in a position to make a pledge in this

respect at the present time. The Government of the United States *is therefore willing to* ~~is~~ recognize *of reparations* ~~therefore~~ that Russia has a claim to 20 billion dollars to be taken out of current German production spread over a period of 10 years, with the *following* understanding *2 Billion dollars per year* that if in the opinion of the United States Government ~~this~~ *is not too* would be too great a burden on Germany, the Government would do its best to obtain the approval of the American people and Congress for covering on her part one-half of the deficit.

The point which I wish to make is, some such proposal put forth at Potsdam *would have* ~~which~~ been the first step towards a situation in which Russia would have had a strong positive incentive for continued cooperation with the United States and an important stake in *the* ~~the political, moral, and~~ economic reconstruction of Europe. The course which *the U.S.* ~~was~~ took *at Potsdam* was the exactly opposite course and as a result

*The U.S. manouvered herself*  
~~we~~ very quickly moved ourselves into a position vis-a-vis of Russia from which we can exert influence on her only by holding the fear of ~~sambours and~~ ~~permenant~~ ~~over her head.~~ ~~This method~~ ~~isxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ~~did not prove to be very effective and above all it involves incalculable risks.~~ It is quite possible that in a fashion the method which we adopted will work. I mean that it will work in the sense that Russia ~~will~~ <sup>may</sup> yield to pressure and I shouldn't be too surprised if Russia did yield on a number of points even at the present London conference; but I would be surprised if by applying this method we would be able to make genuine progress towards the permanent establishment of peace, *and it does involve incalculable risks.* — *permanant* *the U.S.*

I do not believe that ~~we~~ <sup>the U.S.</sup> should appease Russia and by appeasement I mean ~~displaying~~ generosity at the expense of some other nation. When ~~we~~ <sup>the U.S.</sup> agreed, for instance, that Poland should be compensated at the expense of Germany for the territories which she was about to lose to Russia, ~~we~~ <sup>the U.S.</sup> committed such an act of appeasement and ~~I~~ believe *we made a* a grave mistake.

In discussing the question of postwar settlement with Russia ~~it is very important for us to recognize~~ ~~we must also keep in mind the fact~~ that there are a number of issues which have a direct bearing on the relative military position of the United States and Russia and that these issues cannot be resolved on the basis of rational ~~agreements.~~ They cannot be resolved by an appeal to reason because ~~our aim~~ <sup>the U.S.</sup> and Russia's aim are not the same but rather the opposite. Clearly ~~we~~ <sup>the U.S.</sup> would want to win the war if there should be war between ~~us~~ <sup>the U.S.</sup> and Russia and Russia ~~will~~ <sup>would</sup> also want to win this war. Issues of immediate strategic and military importance

cannot therefore be reasoned away and any agreement which may be reached on such issues will be determined by the relative willingness of the United States and Russia to permit a serious quarrel to arise <sup>over</sup> about the <sup>controversial</sup> issue <sup>their</sup> and also by the relative military power and their <sup>relative</sup> willingness ultimately to go to war over the issue. In these circumstances it would be <sup>comparatively</sup> relatively easy to reach an agreement on issues of this type if the probability that there will be in fact a war between the United States and Russia is felt to be small and ~~there~~ it will be exceedingly difficult to reach an agreement <sup>on such issues</sup> if it is felt that the probability for such a war is great; <sup>strategic</sup> but clearly ~~this is an area~~ <sup>are in an area</sup> of conflict <sup>in which</sup> where a vicious circle can easily develop.

<sup>on the basis of this approach</sup> I have formulated very roughly and in some haste last night

a number of points which might be included in the platform that may be drafted <sup>for my own guidance</sup> at the end of this conference. These points are as follows:

- (1) ~~That~~ <sup>we</sup> accept the factual account of Mr. Byrnes' book ~~and that~~ <sup>we hold</sup> on the basis of <sup>Byrnes's</sup> ~~his~~ account that the peace is being lost by default ~~and that~~ <sup>and</sup> in this sense we ~~have to~~ dissent from our foreign policy as defined in Mr. Byrnes' book.
- (2) That we believe that settlement with Russia leading to <sup>a</sup> permanent establishment of peace must be sought within the framework of a set-up which will offer Russia strong positive incentives ~~and~~ for continued cooperation with the United States and a stake in the ~~moral~~ <sup>political</sup> and economic reconstruction of Europe.
- (3) That we hold that in the absence of a satisfactory postwar settlement with Russia there is an ever-present danger of war and that under the threat of such a war there is no possibility for a moral, political and economic reconstruction of Europe.

(4) ~~That~~ <sup>P</sup> pending such a settlement we / consider it, nevertheless, necessary to help Europe as best we can and that we are therefore in favor of granting the economic assistance of ~~10~~ billion dollars for which the Paris Conference had asked.

(5) ~~that~~ <sup>I</sup> In view of the absence of a satisfactory postwar settlement we are in favor of maintaining and of increasing, if necessary, the armed strength of the United States but ~~that~~ we do not believe that it is in the public interest to push further the development of atomic bombs towards bombs which are more powerful or <sup>produce</sup> ~~developing~~ a greater amount of radioactivity than the atomic bombs which are already available.

1 (6) ~~that~~ <sup>W</sup> We are agreed that the ultimate solution <sup>of the problem of</sup> ~~of permanent peace~~ <sup>war.</sup> is world government and ~~that~~ we believe it is urgent that the people all over the world ~~make~~ <sup>make</sup> up their minds on how fast and how far it is necessary to move towards a genuine world government.

(7) ~~that~~ <sup>W</sup> We believe that it is urgent to have a strong world government movement in existence all over the world ~~in general~~ and ~~within~~ <sup>in</sup> the United States in particular.

X (8) ~~that~~ <sup>W</sup> ~~we~~ ~~do~~ ~~not~~ believe however that the existence of such a movement will ~~eliminate~~ the acute danger of war which arises out of the absence of a satisfactory postwar settlement between the United States and Russia.

(9) ~~that~~ <sup>W</sup> we believe that for the present we need in the United States a world government movement which will ~~inure~~ result in clarifying the thoughts and the desires of the people concerning the establishment of world government rather than a political movement ~~in~~ <sup>the</sup> establishment of world government. For this reason, we are more in favor of a

movement aimed at the calling of a world constitutional convention at some future date than in favor of a movement that would aim at bringing pressure on the United States Government to take the initiative for modifying the charter of the United Nations with a view of transforming the United Nations into a genuine world government.

10. Diagnosis of post war world  
[no matter how of rights]  
w.f. very serious matter

~~11. Camp of ...~~

12.) Need for atomic energy control, not possible to value it without ~~power~~ except in context

13. Camp of ... will get lower we are likely to react.

14x750  
2520  
1252

1

~~Handwritten scribble~~

~~Handwritten scribble~~



~~Handwritten scribble~~ dinner

primary  
Security for  
Europe  
Inspection  
project to absorb  
the chance

Neosolutron

Shumsky's agreement

It was at the prelates campus  
this side of the Procyne Mountains  
~~the~~ that great beyond to assemble  
on the terrace of the Adminis building  
Building. The same was about to  
set behind the hills. The  
dinner was the last of the  
days events which was devoted  
to the ~~opening ceremonies~~ of  
dedication of the Big Cyclotron  
The Big Cyclotron was ~~blasted~~ in  
it to the ~~Monday~~ which ~~started~~  
handed it had been just completed  
it was a huge structure ~~of~~  
~~requiring large~~ ~~outside~~ ~~distance~~ ~~from~~  
~~available~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~terrace~~  
terrace. In the dusk it  
looked like an enormous  
hamstone.

For months the Big Cyclotron



had been advertised as the longest  
in the country & operating expenses  
alone (not counting the scientist's  
salary incomes) just including  
gas water maintenance power  
and water were estimated at  
a million dollars a year  
That was 400 dollars more  
than the Chicago explosion.

July 49

2<sup>nd</sup>

~~Machiavelli~~  
Nicolai Machiavellnikow

(T) "May I come in?" said Telnowsky

(K) ~~"Come in"~~, I'm just loafing" said Kalgan, Director of the

T Transural Atomic Project. ~~"~~ Trying to get a call through to Moscow, don't know why it take sthem so long ~~to~~ <sup>today</sup> ~~out~~ it through. They seem to get worse ~~every day~~ and worse."

(T) "I just had a call from Moscow, that's what I want to talk to you about. M. called me, <sup>might that</sup> the connection was not too good. ~~I was not sure whether I got him right.~~ <sup>I was not sure whether I got him right.</sup>

(K) Too many different NKVD groups listen ing in these days, <sup>usual</sup> clicking in and clicking out, I suppose. What did M. want ?

T He said he had asked K. to ~~maxx~~ <sup>send</sup> him <sup>50</sup> fifty grams of Uranium 235, Brand ~~X55~~ 15 <sup>A</sup> for shipment to the U"ited States!

~~XXXXXXXXX~~ Wants the package to go out to day by special courier Wants me to cut red tape. You know anything about this ?

What is the idea of shipping the stuff to the <sup>America</sup> U.S.?

K "Yes," said K. "I know what he has in mind. He wants to force the resignati n of Lilienthal .

T "I don't understand," said T.

(K) "Why," said K. DonSt you read M.'s bulletins ? ~~on~~ <sup>on</sup> America?

(T) I know, I should but these ~~last m nths~~ <sup>am</sup> I was too busy.

(K) "Hah," said K. , "then you do n t know that M. almost succeeded in getting Lilienthal ousted. Just before the American elections ~~of~~ <sup>last year</sup> ~~of~~ he ordered one of our agents in the Argonne Laboratory to remove hundred grams of <sup>was checked</sup> Uranium, rich in Uranium 235 <sup>was checked</sup> from stock

and to hide it or to destroy it. He ~~xxxxx~~ the loss will be

become public by the time the ~~1st~~ Congress convenes, which we all

thought ~~would~~ be Republican, and Lilienthal ~~will~~ be ousted in a

disgrace.

*Henry King the jet  
figured and taking it  
of what  
the  
Gabe*

I did not know we had an agent in the Argonne Laboratory. Is he a scientist?

We have three men there, said K. They are not scientists. Scientists are ~~difficult~~ not so easy to get and if you got them you still could not use them. They want to use their own head instead of carrying out instructions. Just like you guys here. "Scientists would be no good for this," K. repeated. But we got one guard and two FBI men. They are reliable and the FBI men can get access to everything without arousing suspicion. "They tell me it was not at all easy to get our men in the FBI in the first place, and ~~then~~ more difficult to get them assigned to the Argonne. But M. managed somehow.

"What does a policeman know about Uranium, how does he know what to look for and where to look for it?" asked F.

That was easy, said K. Do not imagine ~~xxxxx~~ we are the only ones ~~playing~~ <sup>plugged</sup> with security regulations. They have the same rules there we have over here. Bottles with Uranium 235 in it are labelled in code. All other bottles are labelled what they are, copper oxide or manganese sulfate or what not. Our men just took that stuff out of ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> bottle. put it into an envelope ~~xxx~~ stamped it secret and ~~through~~ <sup>over</sup> it in a waste paper basket, ~~ainted~~ <sup>a "burn" basket</sup> red, ~~which means that the contents of the basket are burned every night,~~ <sup>know the are printed blue, they are printed red over there.</sup> just as they are here. That was all there was to it.

T

And then, T. asked, what happened ?

K

Then, said K., nothing happened. For a number of months they did not discover the loss ~~and we had to go to a lot of trouble to make them notice it~~ And when they did, they kept it secret.

We succeeded finally to leak the "news" to the press, and this was just about the most difficult part of the whole job. But it was accomplished and then came Hickenlooper's attack on Lilienthal and the Atomic Commission and it almost succeeded but not quite.

*What is Hickenlooper etc*

And now, what ? asked T.

K

Now the Americans have tightened security regulations where it is ~~impossible~~ *impossible practically* them to do any chemical work with Uranium 235 or Plutonium in the Argonne, and the ~~commission~~ *committee* thinks they have now a foolproof system of accounting for these substances. [They won't make any progress in the chemistry of the stuff, but nothing can get lost.]

T

Well, said T. " M. should be satisfied. What more does he want ?

He still wants to oust Lilienthal. Lilienthal is a strong man, he says and he pushes for full cooperation of the United States with the British. *[What known well that the early to that on beyond that]*

T

So what now ?

K

So M. wants to send now fifty grams of ~~the~~ Uranium 235 to the United States and have one of our man smuggle it into the Argonne Laboratory. Some of the stuff missing they could explain away. A surplus, M. says, they can't explain away. There will be another uproar, some more confusion, again Lilienthal will be attacked and maybe this time he will be ousted.

(T)

I have mixed feelings about this, said T. After all the Commission has not been doing so well under Lilenthal, judging from the reports we get. Take the reactor development. They seem to have made a complete mess of it. They have done nothing to enlist scientific talent, they did not even get back any of those who had worked in this field during the war. If Lilenthal goes and the Commission <sup>may be</sup> reorganized, maybe they pull themselves together and tackle the problem of getting the old men back and perhaps even some fresh talent.

(K)

M. has considered this, and he thinks he ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ can play safe. He has made his arrangements. If Lilenthal goes, Rosner escapes from the United States and turns up in Moscow.

(T)

I don't get it. <sup>Who</sup> is Rosner?

K

He is a scientist. Not a very good one probably, I do not suppose you have ever heard his name. But he is in a high position in the Argonne Laboratory and besides he was born in Europe.

(T)

I still don't get it, said T. Do you think Rosner can tell us <sup>anything</sup> we do not know already?

(K)

He might, but that's beside the point. This is what M. says: A large proportion of the men who during the war sparkplugged, pushed and guided the atomic energy work in ~~xxx~~ America had come from Europe. None of these men were ever fully trusted, except ~~Rxxx~~ perhaps Rosner, and none of these men, except Rosner, is at present working for the Commission. If Rosner escapes, we can

all be sure that ~~none~~ of these men will ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ be kept out

even if the Commission should pull itself together ~~xxxx~~ [after Lilienthal leaves] Rosner was the only one who was fully trusted by the FBI. If he was a traitor, no one can be trusted, so they will argue . M. thinks there might be even legislation excluding foreign born scientists.

(7)

There are of course a number of very good native born American scientists, who could get into the Atomic work , said T. ~~but~~

(8)

*they could get into this work, but these men who came from Europe*  
I must admit that if M pulls all this off, they will be probably be disgusted that they cant be gotten. E

They will be surprised about how ~~well~~ they did. They will be surprised about how they did. They will be surprised about how they did.

Excuse me please, said K. , lifting up the ringing telephone, *(speaking into the telephone)* this might be my call *at least* . " Yes, he said, ~~speaking.~~ " And *yes "he said, "that's me" and* after a while, "That is very unfortunate. " "No, he said, he is irreplaceable. " And finally "Well, thank you for letting me know." With that he turned to T. "You need not bother about that

Uranium shipment, the stuff stays here. M. Has just been arrested. The samples A-15 contain ~~some~~ *some* of Extremium. *as you know.* Sossonoff charges that M.'s projet was merely a ruse to let the Americans have a sample of Extremium. *so they determined it*

Surely, you do not believe that charge, said T.

No, I do'nt, said K.

Anyway, T. said, the Americans must know ~~xxx~~ about Extremium.

(9)

Why must they, said K. I admit they may have discovered it during the war, but if they haven't, they probably do not know about it. They did not have enough good men left after the war who is there left ? *who is there left? who in your opinion would be likely to hit upon it?*

M. is no traitor. But it was foolhardy of Kutschatow to agree to send brand 15-a, which contains Extremium. If the Americans had gotten it, and <sup>had</sup> ~~discovered~~ <sup>the surplus sample they</sup> ~~that there is a surplus there~~ they might have fooled around with <sup>it</sup> ~~the surplus samples~~ and might have hit on Extremium.

T: Didn't you just say they have no one left <sup>in this work?</sup> who could make such a discovery?

K: Don't be so God damned logic, <sup>at</sup> what I am trying to tell you is that Kutschatow is going to be arrested to-morrow.

T: <sup>(shouting)</sup> What for? ~~He~~ ~~shouted.~~

K: Accused of conspiracy with M.

T: But surely you are not going to stand for this. <sup>Explained</sup> ~~the~~ This will wreck ~~the~~ reactor program.

K. I could resign of course, but <sup>what would</sup> ~~good will~~ that do? <sup>?</sup> They will replace ~~me with Alexandrowitsch.~~ <sup>will be put in my place</sup> You know what that means. He will get rid of Landau and Leibunski and Russinow & they have too many ideas. They argue too much. They are not safe. He will replace them with harmless ones who <sup>will</sup> play ~~safe~~ <sup>safe</sup>. This whole thing may blow over in a few months, and if it does it will have cost us six months or a year. But if Alexandrowitsch takes over he will wreck the reactor program for good, or for the next five years anyway.

T: What is all this about? <sup>?</sup> Do you know, <sup>?</sup> Can you tell me?

K. M. is Korsakow's man. Sossonow is trying to hit Korsakow, M.'s arrest is the opening shot of the battle. For two years now Korsakow has been in charge on the American desk. ~~To my mind~~ He was exceedingly successful that is in my opinion. But his policy

is far too subtle for the grasp of Sossonow and his <sup>gang</sup> ~~group~~. Sossonow is violently opposed to it. The Politbureau they say is split on the issue. Where Stalin stands, I was not able to find out.

T: Tell me more about it, if you can. I know America well, I spent three years in Ithaca, as a student. Perhaps I could be of some help in this fight.

K: I know you did <sup>study</sup> the NKVD <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ plenty worried about it, they came to see me about you not once, but ten times. I myself would very much like to know what you think about Korsakow's policy, <sup>because you studied in America. Personally you had</sup> but in Moscow they would not trust your advice. I myself have never <sup>"the work on"</sup> been in America, although I wrote my thesis on the "Psycho-pathology of American Capitalism". <sup>Both</sup> Korsakow and I studied psychology together at Leningrad. He was a brilliant student.

T: What is his policy?

K: He is using the Communist party in America to demolish the fetishes of the Americans. fetishes like justice, freedom and democracy.

T: What can the American Communists accomplish? There are very few party members in America.

K. Korsakow has instructed the party in America to <sup>lie</sup> ~~exhibit~~ provocative ~~behavior~~ for the sole purpose <sup>of</sup> ~~to~~ draw fire. Under the pressure of <sup>above all</sup> an aroused public opinion Congress, and <sup>more important,</sup> the Courts, will be goaded - so Korsakow predicted, - into acts of political discrimination, flagrant injustice and perhaps even outright violations of the American Constitution - another one of those American fetishes. <sup>The Americans are a peculiar people.</sup> Korsakow says, and I think he is right, <sup>about this -</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~on Americans~~ are a peculiar people, they will fight well only as long as they can



*added for readability  
irrelevant  
quote*

*4/22*

fight with a ~~clear~~ <sup>good</sup> conscience. In the past, they have fought hard for abstractions, such as democracy, freedom, justice and the right of self determination of minorities. ~~They~~ <sup>Americans</sup> are under the illusion

that these abstractions are realities. They think there really is democracy in America and justice and freedom and protection for minorities. These abstractions are for them symbols, like the flag.

Destroying ~~these~~ <sup>their</sup> illusions is ~~like~~ <sup>like</sup> soiling the flag. Under a flag soiled Americans ~~can't~~ <sup>can</sup> fight well. Sure, they will go through all the motions of fighting, in any case but the zest ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> it will be gone.

T: And you say, Korsakow has been successful with this ?

K: <sup>Mr. He</sup> So far he was successful beyond all expectations. I am not too surprised about this, for I know something about the American political system. Minorities who command plenty of votes and who may throw those votes from the "democrats" to the "republicans", or vice versa, are pretty well protected over there. Both parties are bound to vie for their favor. But the Communist vote is not large enough to count, and Communists will not vote for either ~~of them~~

*party*

anyway. So the two parties outdo each other in heaping abuse on them. They could outlaw them, of course, but then all the fun would stop.

Besides, that would be an open breach of the constitution, and they don't want ~~to~~ <sup>have</sup> an open breach of the constitution; They have that much sense, at any rate. So they try to bend and twist the constitution without actually breaking it. They make rules and pass laws, ~~which~~

~~and~~ discriminate against those who are members of the Communist party. And ~~dismiss~~ <sup>dismiss</sup> from government jobs those, who are members of organizations of which Communists are also members. Students,

who refuse to swear that they are not Communists are deprived from

fellowships. <sup>In one sense</sup> All this doesn't amount to anything, <sup>of course</sup> just a handful  
 of people are affected. But every single case makes a headline, The  
 newspapers spit fire and smoke, and the millions of Americans who read  
 the daily papers and watch this spectacle are affected by it. ~~There~~  
 are not many Communists in America, but under Korsakow's direction  
 they accomplish much. For the subconscious of the mind is more  
 logical than the conscious. And many Americans <sup>(will be deeply affected)</sup>  
 who say that they see nothing wrong in ~~xxxxx~~ discrimination against  
 subversives and who are sincere in ~~it~~ saying, <sup>(it will nevertheless see)</sup> They are not conscious  
 of any violation of freedom, justice or the rights of minorities  
 but their subconscious is not so easily deceived. To-morrow, these  
 very same Americans will be less proud of being Americans, and they  
 will not know why.

T: Is <sup>with</sup> this ~~not~~ a little bit too subtle?

K: I told you it is a subtle policy, and Sossonoff is just as inca-  
 pable of grasping it as he ~~would be to grasp~~ <sup>of grasping</sup> your equations of the  
 Atomic ~~Reactors~~. He has to fight Korsakow's policies, and if he wins  
 out... well it will be just too bad. We shall know soon enough. M's  
 arrest is bringing matters to a head. In the meantime you had better  
 watch your steps.

T: I still don't get it, what has M. to do with Korsakow?

K: I told you, he is Korsakow's man, and at the moment he is the most  
 vulnerable one. Korsakow is not particularly interested in atomic  
 energy, and he left ~~them~~ <sup>(so) M. a)</sup> completely free hand. ~~xxxxx~~ Still Korsa-  
 kow visited ~~this~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~place~~ <sup>here</sup> three months ago. He wanted to know what we  
 thought of the progress the Americans made with the bomb.

T: What did you tell him ?

K: I told him we did not believe they have anything much better than the Nagasaki bomb. A little better may be, but not very much. They could not have made much progress without some of the first class men working at it full time [ which they are not ] - not without

frequent bomb tests, [ which clearly they are not making. ] ~~xxxxxx~~

~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ If ~~the~~ first class men had joined the Los Alamos

staff we would know about it. If they made frequent bomb tests we

would know about it. I told Korsakow that the chances are that

the present American bombs are quite similar to the Nagasaki bomb,

that ~~it~~ had to be carried in a B 29. No B 29 or any similar bomber

will get through to the Urals. I doubt that they will get through to

Moscow. If there is war we shall occupy France Belgium and Holland

And B 29s can get through to Bordeaux and Le Havre , to Rotterdam

to Amsterdam , to Brussels and to Paris. The Americans can drop

Atomic bombs on these cities and that's just about all they can do

if they ~~have~~ <sup>know</sup> to carry their bombs in B 29s. This is all they are

going to do with their bombs, if you ask me.

T: Who is in charge of Los Alamos now.

K: Bradbury.

T: ~~BA~~ never heard of him..

K: He is not a bad director, though, he stands up for his men, and

the spirit of the laboratory is not bad. He does what he can. Fortunately

for us, that's not enough. ~~He would have to get in ~~the~~ first~~ <sup>really</sup>

B 38

*grad*

men first, full time. Incidentally, one of these men has now gone to Los Alamos for a year and <sup>he</sup> is supposed to be very good. I wanted to ask you about him. Darn it now, his name has slipped my mind for the moment.

T: Could you find out his name and let me know, please. This is something we should not take lightly. What else did Korsakow want to know?

K: He was worried about rumors about American bombs one thousand times more powerful than the Nagasaki bomb. McCoy, the American boss of Germany made a speech <sup>(3 years ago)</sup> once in which he said that scientists had told him that, given the same intensive effort, that went into the development of the bomb during the war, it should take no more than two years to make bombs one thousand times as powerful as the Nagasaki bomb. One of the Commissioners, Pike I believe was his name, recently made a speech in which he ~~xxxxx~~ referred to McCoy's statement, <sup>and said</sup> saying that the two years are up <sup>nowhere</sup> and bombs <sup>one</sup> thousand times as powerful as the Nagasaki bomb <sup>re nowhere</sup> in sight. Korsakow wanted to know whether Mc Cloy was bluffing or Pike was concealing something

Which of the two is lying, he asked me?

T: No one needs to be lying, it seems to me. ~~it may be that they just~~ Mr Cloy ~~did not put in the kind of effort that went into the making of the~~ <sup>did not put in the kind of effort that went into the making of the</sup> ~~went into the production of the bomb during the war.~~ <sup>As a matter of fact, we know they didnt.</sup>

K. That's what I told Korsakow, but I dont know whether I succeeded in reassuring him. Lets not underestimate the enemy, was all he said.

T: I think you had better go now, <sup>is it alright to</sup> and tell Kutschatow what is going to <sup>now</sup> I think we have to do that if necessary.

~~to him~~ Of course

~~hasn't~~ But don't tell him you have it from me .. He should take plenty  
of warm clothing . Explain the situation <sup>he lives</sup> as well as you can . You will

know how far you can go. His position <sup>here</sup> will be kept open <sup>until he returns.</sup> ~~of course.~~

If things go wrong there is no telling what may happen, of course,

But if ~~Korsakov~~ wins out, all will be well.

Insert for Malheur  
K. my wife Wagon and Keller  
and the other and the  
T. and the  
K. yes and Wagon  
T. Wagon is with a native American  
K. He is the I had not ~~any~~ ~~trust~~,  
in any way he is being kept  
in the middle, may be they ~~do not~~  
dislike him because he stands  
up for his competitors. —  
will fight)

---

Who is the chairman

One of those ~~best~~ Midwestern  
Senators. He is ~~a~~ honest <sup>enough</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>they</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>use</sup>  
just too much patriotism and not  
enough sense. Besides he is <sup>awfully</sup>  
up for reelection. In <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>new</sup> ~~the~~  
senators are selected from there to  
there and it makes them nervous. —

---

Insert / Old Plan of giving  
subsidies for the. etc. —  
The Colossus

---